"the importance of saying “no”"

Dizer não, é difícil e, muitas vezes, nunca chega a ser enunciado. Afirmamos as escolhas do que decidimos fazer e não clarificamos as escolhas do que não queremos, ou não devemos fazer. Por vezes isso dá asneira grossa. Sobretudo quando se compete em mercados muito competitivos, mercados polarizados (um link de Maio de 2006) e cheios de salami-slicers, não de Bruce Jenners. Segue-se aquela sensação de não ser nem carne, nem peixe, um stuck-in-the-middle, um médio que não se diferencia, que não emociona ninguém, que não tem inimigos.

"Remember the days when Tim Cook would brag about how Apple’s product line could fit on a single table? It would be much harder to make that claim today.
...
When Jobs returned to Apple in 1997, he slashed the company’s product line to a few core products and preached the importance of saying “no” — not just to ideas you don’t like, but also to those you love if they don’t work within the larger vision. [Moi ici: Recordar "the next big thing"] He revitalized the company with a focused product line, which helped grow its cult following. [Moi ici: Recordar o recente "The paradox of focusing on a niche"] As Apple’s values change, this kind of focus is under threat.
...
Apple under Jobs wasn’t perfect. Jobs certainly wasn’t either. But it’s undeniable that Apple stood for something that redefined our expectations of personal computing and mobile devices. The company’s products looked great, and the options were streamlined, not confusing. Their prices were aspirational but, usually, attainable.
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Cook’s Apple has shifted from focusing on the products to focusing on the share price."

Trechos retirados de "Apple’s Product Line Is a Mess"

Mais qualidade para lucrar mais

Os meus amigos da Cascata de Números desafiaram-me para a falar sobre Qualidade.

O meu ângulo de abordagem será o da: mais qualidade para lucrar mais.

Como aumentar a facturação quando não se pode aumentar a produção por falta de pessoas? (parte V)

Parte I, parte II, parte III e parte IV.

Comecemos pelo último texto citado:

"Por outro lado, grande parte dos profissionais que dominam este ofício trabalha por conta própria, mostrando pouca disponibilidade para aceitar desafios por conta de outrem que embora estejam hoje mais valorizados monetariamente, continuam a não ser suficientemente aliciantes."

E acrescentemos uma citação do último postal:

"Business model innovation is a powerful force of abrupt market-level change, in some cases more powerful than technology.
...
Likewise, don’t let an excessive focus on your products prevent you from paying attention to your business. Many executives at incumbent businesses, wedded to their business models, react to disruption by blaming their products. As they see it, all the newfangled lemonade stands out there are stealing customers because they have created better-tasting lemonade. Stop blaming your lemonade! The truth is that the upstart’s lemonade tastes the same as yours, or maybe even worse. It’s the new business model that is stealing your customers, not the product. ”

Quem lê este blogue sabe o que é Mongo, a metáfora do Estranhistão. O mundo cauda longa a espalhar-se por todo o lado, em vez das grandes séries do século XX, customização, individualização, interacção, co-criação, proximidade, pequenas quantidades.

Há dias em "Calçado português? Bom no fabrico, desconhecido na marca" voltei a ler a actualização dos números:

"A conclusão nessa altura foi que tanto o calçado masculino como o feminino made in Portugal tinha melhor avaliação (média de 34 e 31,50 euros, respectivamente) do que o italiano (31,50 euros e 29,60 euros) quando a origem do produto não era revelada. Só que, depois de dar a conhecer a origem, o sapato português desvalorizava (-18,2%, para 27,80 euros, no masculino; e -18,4%, para 25,70 euros, no feminino), ao passo que o calçado italiano valorizava ligeiramente (+1,6% no masculino) ou mantinha o preço inalterado (no calçado feminino), ainda assim 13,6% acima do preço do calçado português."

Recordo outra comparação entre o calçado italiano e o português, a dimensão, aqui: "Calçado italiano e português" (empresas bem mais pequenas - também por causa disto).

Stop! reparem no título "Calçado português? Bom no fabrico, desconhecido na marca".

Agora, leiam o artigo "Meet the Italian Makers of Luxury":

"We are long used to applauding designers at the end of a season. But behind them is a plethora of generally unheralded artisans who also power the “Made in Italy” brand, creating everything from knits to sneakers. Now, one nascent company is aiming to place that talent firmly in the spotlight.
...
“We decided we wanted to celebrate the unknown,” Mr. Johnston said, “those who are rarely identified but are also behind some of the most beautiful creations made for the luxury market.” He noted that many artisans sign strict confidentiality agreements that keep them out of the public eye. [Moi ici: Conseguem fazer o paralelismo com aquela parte do título "Bom no fabrico, desconhecido na marca"]
...
 "Create ways in which consumers could truly appreciate things made by hand and preserve a crafted  society in the digital age.”
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All of the sales tags carry the label’s logo and the names of the Italian businesses that made the products, highlighting the craftspeople involved [Moi ici: Recordar "Fugir do anonimato"]. Available online are supplier details like contact and address information alongside photographs and biographies of the artisans who worked on the piece.
...
As a direct-to-consumer brand, Crafted Society’s retail prices do not include the traditional distributor or wholesale markups, nor the usual markup associated with a premium brand name, which usually is 7 to 10 times the manufacturer’s cost price. (Crafted Society said its markup is three times the cost price.
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The partnerships that Crafted Society has been building, he said, could also tackle a broader crisis weighing on the future of Italian luxury manufacturing: the struggle to find the next generation of artisans.[Moi ici: O mesmo tema do artigo do Caderno de Economia na parte IV desta série]
“Most artisans in factories and workshops now are in their 60s and 70s, and younger people are not so interested in this line of work,” Mr. Mattioli said. “We cannot recruit them by saying the big luxury names we work for because of our contracts. But if we can take pride in what we do and in our community, and can present our craft independently, perhaps we can convince them of the importance of what we do.”

E volto aquela citação com que terminei o postal anterior e iniciei este. Há anos coloquei esta pergunta numa empresa de calçado: 

- Não têm receio que os vossos trabalhadores comecem a trabalhar para marcas a partir de casa?

E pensar no 2º golo? E pensar num modelo de negócio alternativo? Como metaforicamente escreveram num comentário na parte IV: "obrigar as empresas "a saírem da vala""

Quem está focado no 1º golo pensa à la Bruce Jenner, quem pensa no 2º golo pensa em salami slicers. Quem pensa no 2º golo sabe que tem de dizer não a muita coisa.

É tão difícil fazer esta transição... Maliranta e Taleb explicam 

"shifts toward particular logics can be reversed" (parte V)

Parte I, parte II, parte III e parte IV.

Como não fazer logo o paralelismo com os dinossauros azuis, pretos e vermelhos.
Como não pensar nas frases "stuck-in-the-middle", "salami slicers".

Mesmo sector de actividade, mas vantagens competitivas e pressupostos completamente diferentes.

Imagens retiradas de "What Is Dead May Never Die: Institutional Regeneration through Logic Reemergence in Dutch Beer Brewing", Administrative Science Quarterly 1–44 (2018) de Jochem J. Kroezen e Pursey P. M. A. R. Heugens.

Acerca do papel da estratégia (parte IV)

Parte I, parte II e parte III.

Voltemos à Parte I, e ao exemplo da empresa 4:

"empresa a querer mudar de concorrentes, sinónimo de querer subir na escala de valor - ainda precisa de perceber que existem diferentes tipos de clientes e que recusar encomendas não é pecado."

Escrever "empresa a querer mudar de concorrentes" significa que a empresa não gosta do campeonato onde se descobriu. Por exemplo, pode ser um cenário deste tipo:

Ou seja, quer subir na escala de valor. Será que desempenho é o vector a ter em conta?

Assim de repente vêm-me à cabeça:

• Os macacos não voam - não se pode pensar que "out of thin air" se vai competir com o cadastro alemão em termos de marca associada a desempenho e fiabilidade;
• Proposta de valor baseada na inovação > 5 anos "Kaplan e Norton afirmam que a aposta na eficiência dá resultados num espaço de 6 a 24 meses, a aposta no serviço começa a dar resultados ao fim de 24 a 48 meses e que a aposta na inovação pode só vir a dar resultados ao fim de 8/10 anos, há uma marca por criar, uma tradição por inculcar";
• Ganham os alemães. "there is an asymmetry in competition across tiers. Price cuts by higher quality tiers are more powerful in pulling customers up from lower tiers, than lower tier price cuts are in pulling customers down from upper tiers; i.e., customers "trade up" more readily than they "trade down.""
• Teoria dos jogos e não jogar em tabuleiros em que os outros mandam: "Lesson #1: Do not play a strictly dominated strategy"

Talvez a aposta em vectores alternativos: Flexibilidade? Rapidez? Nichos? 

Recordo que estratégia a sério terá de passar por um trade-off forte, por causa das fiambreiras.

Um princípio a respeitar: começar a partir daquilo que já se tem. Por isso, convido a começar pelo concreto, em vez de elucubrações abstractas bem intencionadas: "Do concreto para o abstracto e não o contrário". E uma boa forma de partir do concreto passa por perceber quem são os clientes actuais que já dão a rentabilidade desejada. Recordar a curva de Stobachoff.

Estratégia e capacidades

"While strategic plans identify what your organization should do differently, [Moi ici: É isto que fazem as iniciativas estratégias que ajudo a construir, como transformar uma empresa no terreno, alinhada com a estratégia] very few provide a roadmap for how to build the skills, knowledge, and processes needed to carry out and sustain the critical changes. But without building these capabilities, it’s very difficult to achieve the results you want.
...
Capabilities lie at the heart an organization’s ability to achieve results, [Moi ici: Estão na base do mapa da estratégia, as capacidade em que investimos] so it’s hardly a surprise that different results require different capabilities. [Moi ici: Recordar Bruce Jenner e os salami slicers] But strategic plans often get this simple equation wrong, for one of two reasons.

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First, many strategic planners and senior executives assume that if the strategy is logical, then people will figure out what to do, and don’t build capabilities development into their plans at all.
...
At the other extreme, some planners like to be prescriptive and can spend significant resources mapping out in great detail what everyone should do differently. But a “paint by the numbers” approach to strengthening organizational capabilities rarely works. Developing capabilities requires experimentation, trial and error, and iterative learning to figure out what will work in each organization’s unique culture, functional structure, and environment.
...
To get started with this approach, think about your company’s own strategy, and what capabilities are critical to achieving results. Then identify opportunities for teams to create or strengthen those capabilities while actually executing some aspect of the strategy. Doing this will ensure that capability development is a real and tangible part of your organization’s growth, instead of a hope or an afterthought."

Trechos retirados de "Your Strategy Won’t Work if You Don’t Identify the New Capabilities You Need"

Foco e mosaico de actividades (parte II)

Parte I.

"Two archetypes describe companies that aspire to a coherent strategy but struggle to develop one:
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4. Portfolio-constrained companies offer a diverse group of products and services, which makes it very difficult to agree on company-wide priorities (although they’d like to do so).
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5. Unfocused companies are pretty good at a lot of things, but not great at anything [Moi ici: Como não recordar Bruce Jenner] — and thus, although they value coherence, they struggle to choose which capabilities to prioritize."

O medo de deixar alguns clientes para a concorrência... ai a curva de Stobachoff


Trechos retirados de "11 Types of Strategic Maturity: Which One Describes Your Company?"

Quantos decisores corariam?

1º Considerar a transição para aquilo a que chamamos de Mongo, a evolução para o Estranhistão = um mundo com cada vez mais tribos apaixonadas e menos gente dentro da caixa da normalidade. Cada vez mais gente que não quer ser tratada como mais um, como plankton.

2º Há anos que escrevo aqui e prego, muitas vezes no deserto, acerca das consequências desta evolução para as empresas, um perigo para as empresas grandes, uma exigência crescente para mais empresas mais pequenas para serem focadas num grupo específico de clientes. Pois, salami slicers em vez de Bruce Jenner! E recordar este insight poderoso:

"Customers often think we are different not because we are different, but because we recognize what makes them different"

O trecho que se segue encaixa-se perfeitamente nesta linha de raciocínio:

"Customers are often more heterogeneous than the companies that serve them. Trying to be a one-stop shop and attempting to appeal to a wide spectrum of customers, isn’t necessarily a smart strategy."[Moi ici: Quantos decisores corariam se lessem este trecho e intuissem o que é que ele significa?]

Poucos acreditam num engenheiro da província que faz previsões sobre um futuro a que apelida de Mongo. No entanto, ... muito à frente.

"If you are in an industry where most firms are alike, and the norm is to offer value to a wide spectrum of customers, I predict that at some point – maybe not too far into your future – someone will disrupt your industry by developing a superior value proposition for a very particular customer segment. It’s in those industries where innovation is most feasible and plausible.
...
Focusing your value proposition – whether it is the one for customers or the one for employees – on a specific group of people can empower you to make innovative trade-offs. It can enable you to eliminate traditional trappings that are no longer to everyone’s liking and do a better job across different dimensions.
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In this way, homogeneity in your industry allows you to stop doing certain things that have become outdated. It frees you up to stop offering services and products that target everyone. This opportunity for innovation is not about emulating the awe-inspiring, hi-tech Silicon Valley firms, instead, it’s about making smarter use of the heterogeneity in your business."

Isto é tão claro, tão inevitável para mim...

Imaginem o impacte que isto terá para as empresas grandes...

Pensem nos hummer da Volvo.

Trechos retirados de "Strategy - stop doing what everyone does"

A importância dos indicadores não-financeiros

Para um fã do BSC isto é óbvio:

"Principle 4. Include Nonfinancial Targets
.
Our final recommendation is to incorporate targets that are not directly related to sales and profits in any CEO performance contract. Although the research we base this article on didn’t explicitly measure the effects of nonfinancial targets, it’s clear that many of them are hard to game. To begin with, it often takes a significant amount of time for the results of decisions related to them to become apparent. Investments in employee training, for example, may not translate into employee productivity for a while. Additionally, many nonfinancial metrics, such as brand, reputation, and sustainability rankings, are set by outside agencies and so are hard for managers to manipulate.
...
Creating a compensation package that adheres to the four guiding principles is not easy for a board. Directors need to debate multiple metrics (financial and nonfinancial alike), align them with the company’s strategy and values, [Moi ici: E relacionar com Bruce Jenner e os salami slicers] calibrate them with the risk appetite of the firm, and select an appropriate peer group to use as benchmarks. But this is ultimately what a board is there to do. If it uses executive compensation packages as a way to reinforce the company’s competitive strategy and manage its risks, so much the better. Not only will it be more effective at communicating the strategy and rationale for top management pay with shareholders but it will also ensure that senior managers execute against the right objectives. Remember: Executives will do their best to hit whatever goals are set. So set targets that work for the corporation."

Trechos retirados de "Comp Targets That Work"

A essência da estratégia

Estratégia é ter coragem de assumir que há coisas em que se será mau deliberadamente, e que há coisas em que se procurará ser muito bom.

Num mundo que requer cada vez mais concentração e foco, há cada vez menos espaço para bruce jenners medianos.

Quantas empresas são capazes de assumir este risco de se focarem em algo à custa de menosprezarem outras opções?

"“Ikea is so good at so many things. Why is it so bad at delivery?”
...
ultimately, it comes down to focus:
.
Ikea refuses to expose itself to the idiosyncracies of its customers,” [Frances] Frei says. “There is no way they could do their own delivery with that signature Ikea crisp efficiency—there are too many variables. So they make you conform to them.” Ikea makes great stuff cheap—and that is the draw.
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As the authors put it, this is a case study in how a large retailer can succeed by failing. This is the essence of focus. Ikea focuses on cost and the a big part of it is also educating your customers that delivery is not the preferred option to purchase its products and that customer service is not something you should expect. Since this allows the firm to reduce its cost even further (potentially), it is the “definition” of focus: doing something poorly and using it to do something even better."

Como não recordar o clássico "What is strategy?" de Porter:

“The essence of strategy is choosing what not to do,” 

Trechos retirados de "Ikea: Why is it so bad at delivery?"

Acerca da banca do futuro (parte III)

Parte II.

Há dias no Twitter comentei:

típica argumentação de socialista. picking winners https://t.co/nkxEWwbyTj

— Carlos P da Cruz (@ccz1) August 16, 2017

Assim, na mesma linha, prevejo que muitos florêncios virão a terreiro para defender a antral dos bancos, "Vem aí o fim da Banca".

Como é costume dizer-se no âmbito da metodologia "job to be done":

"Jobs Remain while Solutions Come and Go"

Único senão: "An expert called Lindy"

Granel, fiambreiras e rouxinóis

Habituem-se!

Isto, "Hoteleiros sobem salários para atrair trabalhadores mais qualificados", é um prenúncio!

As duas tendências, Mongo e o reshoring, associadas à evolução demográfica vão obrigar as empresas a ter de pagar mais e mais no futuro.

Por isso, soa-me cada vez mais estranho que um suposto Forum para a Competitividade continue encalhado no "problema dos salários". O que é preciso é concentrar mais esforços para uma de duas coisas: aumentar a eficiência ou subir na escala de valor.

Recordar Bruce Jenner e as fiambreiras. É preciso pensar estratégia!

"the annihilation of the mid-market"

O Armando recomendou-me a leitura de "Interview: Jim Graham, former COO of The Gym Group, gives his thoughts on the industry" e não pude deixar de recordar os salami slicers e Bruce Jenner ao ler:

"The establishment of a scaled-up low-cost segment, as well as the after-shock of the 2008 recession, has forced people to think differently. Burning platforms and in-flows of new money always brings about change. Adapt or die, I guess.
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The major change has been the annihilation of the mid-market. It’s all but complete now, and that has to be a good thing since many of the assets were poor, the product tired and lacking relevance to the mass market it once owned.
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We’re also seeing material new investment in technology to deliver a digital component to the physical experience. In the long-run this is a good thing for the consumer, but the digital ecosystem is ostensibly chaotic and in the short-term there’s questionable value to the customer from a lot of the early offerings. There are some interesting new niche products in play, but I’m not sure many will scale effectively."

Como não recuar a 2006 e a "Porque não podemos ser uma Arca de Noé! (II)" ou a "Quando se acorda atolado num pântano de indefinição..." e a "The vanishing middle market".

Foram estes textos, conjugados com o livro de Berger e com os primeiros casos de sucesso que acompanhava, de quem procurava alternativas ao modelo que tinha tido tanto sucesso antes da chegada da China à OMC, que me orientaram para a visão optimista que alimento desde então.

Continua.

A propósito dos Bruce Jenner

Ainda ontem referi como as PME se sentem atraídas pelo modelo Bruce Jenner.
.
Assim, foi interessante apanhar estes trechos em "Competing Against Luck":

"When a company makes big investments in developing relationships with customers, natural incentives arise to find ways to sell more products to existing customers. The marginal cost of selling more products to existing customers is very small—and the profit is oh so alluring. We call this “surface growth.” Companies see products all around them made by other companies and decide to copy or acquire them. But in doing so, companies often end up trying to create many products for many customers—and lose focus on the job that brought them success in the first place. Worse, trying to do many jobs for many customers can confuse customers so they hire the wrong products for the wrong jobs and end up firing them in frustration instead. This makes companies vulnerable to disrupters who focus on a single job—and do it well.[Moi ici: Os salami slicers]"

Acerca dos processos

"Processes are often hard to see—they’re a combination of both formal, defined, and documented steps and expectations and informal, habitual routines or ways of working that have evolved over time. But they matter profoundly.
...
processes are a critical part of the unspoken culture of an organization. They enforce “this is what matters most to us.” Processes are intangible; they belong to the company. They emerge from hundreds and hundreds of small decisions about how to solve a problem. They’re critical to strategy, but they also can’t easily be copied.
...
Unlike resources, which are easily measured, processes can’t be seen on a balance sheet. If a company has strong processes in place, managers have flexibility about which employees they put on which assignments— because the process will work regardless of who performs it.
...
Putting Jobs to Be Done at the center of your process changes everything about what an organization optimizes for.
...
the right job spec leads to the right processes that will generate the right data to know “How are we doing?” Jobs Theory focuses you on helping your customers do their jobs, rather than narrow internally measured efficiencies."

Leio isto e recordo:

• processos críticos vs processos contexto;
• fiambreiras e Bruce Jenner;
• mapa de actividades;
• finalidade dos processos;
• abordagem por processos

Trechos retirados de "Competing Against Luck: The Story of Innovation and Customer Choice"

Tantos "Mea Culpa" por fazer...

E esta frontalidade? "Amazon didn’t kill Macy’s. Macy’s did.":

"Macy’s has said that it has too many stores, in too many underperforming locations. It’s closing 100, and no one should be surprised if that number grows in future years.
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Macy’s has also blamed what it calls “changing customer behavior.” That’s code for the rise of Amazon.com and the adoption of e-commerce shopping in general. It’s also the idea that a new generation is spending more money on experiences over physical goods.
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But while Amazon has certainly had a hand in Macy’s struggles — and we’ll get back to this in a bit — Macy’s should look within, first, for the cause of its current predicament.
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Prior to the rise of e-commerce, Macy’s could get away with some of this. But you can now buy the same stuff in lots of places — whether from Amazon or a brand’s own website. Comparing prices has gotten infinitely easier, too.
...
[Moi ici: Recordar as fiambreiras e Bruce Jenner] In stores, it’s trying to go upmarket and downmarket at the same time. [Moi ici: Pois ... stuck-in-the-middle]
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It announced a new store concept in 2015 called Macy’s Backstage, an off-price outlet meant to compete with popular discount retailers like T.J. Maxx, Nordstrom Rack and Marshalls.
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At the same time, Macy’s said in 2015 that it was going to add upscale merchandise to its top 150 stores. Being in the middle is tough.
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The middle is definitely tougher with Amazon aiming directly for your business — what with a huge, and growing, selection of clothes and accessories and plans to build a bunch of its own brands in-house. By some estimates, Amazon will pass Macy’s in clothing sales this year.
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The bottom line, however, is that Macy’s stores, by and large, have looked and felt the same forever. And in digital, Macy’s has long been on the defensive."

É como o erro humano, a culpa é dos clientes,  algo que nos absolve de nos responsabilizarmos nós mesmos pelo que nos acontece.

A arte da renúncia

Ainda acerca da estratégia e da renúncia, (renunciar é tão difícil) na introdução do livro "The Laws of Subtraction" encontro:

"At the heart of every difficult decision lie three tough choices: What to pursue versus what to ignore. What to leave in versus what to leave out. What to do versus what to don't. I have discovered that if you focus on the second half of each choice—what to ignore, what to leave out, what to don't—the decision becomes exponentially easier and simpler. The key is to remove the stupid stuff: ... Better yet, refrain from add-ing them in the first place.
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This is the art of subtraction: when you remove just the right thing in just the right way, something good usually happens.
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I believe subtraction is the path through the haze and maze, one that can allow us to create clarity from complexity and to wage and win the war against the common enemy of excess.
...
That's not easy, because subtraction doesn't come naturally or intuitively—not to me, not to anyone. From the days of our ancestors on the savanna, we are hardwired to add and accumulate, hoard and store."

Quando não se renuncia:

The iPhone 7 if Apple was a democracy 📱😱 (via @JoyofTech) pic.twitter.com/QV9y5h5ar7

— The Next Web 📱💻🌍 (@TheNextWeb) January 11, 2016

Segmentar porque os clientes não são todos iguais

"A paper company took this approach in developing a new offering (product plus services) for its North American customers. The company makes packaging material and is one of several such firms in the market, some of which are tiny shops while others are enormous global companies.
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Historically, the paper company segmented based on customer size— small, medium, and large. But several functions, including sales and customer service, had routinely pointed out this segmentation was not actionable. For example, some of the largest customers only needed the most basic features and were willing to pay less as a consequence, while others needed fully featured offerings. To make matters worse, many small and medium-sized customers valued features such as support services that had only been offered to large customers. What's more, many customers of all sizes complained delivery was too slow and needed to be “just in time.” Other customers, those with large warehouses that could stock plenty of paper, didn't care about just-in-time delivery. They could just pull it from their warehouses."
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So in thinking about how to design its new product and service offering, the paper company realized it would have a failure on its hands if it continued with the status quo segmentation."

E a sua empresa segmenta o mercado que serve? Qual é o critério que segue? E esse critério é útil? Qual é o segmento-alvo da sua empresa?
.
Conheço muitas empresas que teimam em não segmentar o mercado onde actuam. Querem ir a tudo o que mexe, querem servir toda a gente... cuidado com a curva de Stobachoff. E... cuidado com as fiambreiras.

Trecho retirado de "Monetizing Innovation" de Ramanujam e Tacke.

Mongo e o século XXI precisam de outra abordagem

Em "Estratégia na agricultura" referi "The Dizzying Grandeur of 21st-Century Agriculture" e comentei que é antes o modelo nascido no século XX e que começa agora a apresentar sinais de esgotamento traduzido em:

• "America’s Dairy Farmers Dump 43 Million Gallons of Excess Milk"
• "USDA to Buy Additional $20 Million of Cheese"

A mentalidade gringa é esta de competir pela escala, pelo preço e crescer eliminando os concorrentes.

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Mongo e o século XXI precisam de outra abordagem, "Learn to compete peacefully".

.

Precisam de fugir do granel, precisam de fiambreiras e precisam de segmentos onde possam coexistir, precisam de deixar de apostar na redução do custo unitário para se concentrarem no aumento do preço unitário.