Fugir da comparação pelo preço

Elementos relevantes para apoiar uma reflexão por parte de quem trabalham com OEMs, mesmo que não do sector automóvel. Fugir da comparação pelo preço:

"many automotive suppliers are under the impression that OEMs only choose to buy from them if they offer the best price. Our experience tells us this is only half true, at best. While price is a key criterion for OEMs when selecting suppliers, they also take into account many other criteria, such as plant location and delivery track record. Neglecting these is a surefire way to harm your chances of establishing a business relationship with automotive manufacturers. Suppliers need to understand the entire selection process in order to be truly successful with a targeted OEM. Answering these three key questions will ensure you take the right approach:

• How are OEMs making purchasing decisions?

• Who makes the decisions?

• Which criteria do OEMs consider?

...
Provide your direct contacts with convincing argumentation about your product’s superior quality so they speak up for you in internal meetings. Remember: If the buying team doesn’t have proof that your products are a) more reliable, b) more effective, or c) more efficient than your competitors’, they have no option but to choose solely based on your price."

Trechos retirados de "Avoiding Price Pressure: 3 Tips to Negotiate Successfully With OEM Buying Centers"

Fugir da race-to-the-bottom

O amigo @walternatez chamou-me a atenção para este artigo muito interessante:

How millions of French shoppers are rejecting cut-price capitalism https://t.co/wl767AfCZQ cc @ccz1

— walter, lider impopular (@walternatez) January 28, 2020

Há uma frase acerca do leite que já citei aqui muitas vezes:

"Milk is the ultimate low-involvement category, and it shows. Only 10% of the international sample (in Denmark, Germany and Spain the number is less than 5%) would expect the private label version to be of a lesser quality."

Cito-a, embora não a pratique. Há muitos anos que prefiro leite dos Açores.

Outra citação deste blogue é:

"When something is commoditized, an adjacent market becomes valuable"

Como fugir à comoditização? Apostando na diferenciação. Recordo este exemplo francês do leite integral que descrevi no ano passado em "Cambão versus estratégias baseadas nos clientes-alvo".

O artigo conta uma estória sobre como fugir da race-to-the-bottom:

"“Someone said, would I please have a look at milk,” Chabanne said. “So I did. It was an
absolute disaster. Dairy farmers were desperate, losing money on every litre; prices werebeing driven down mercilessly by the big retail groups.”
Chabanne did the arithmetic: a mere eight cents (6.8p) a litre was the difference between
a milk producer going bust (or worse: the suicide rate among French dairy farmers is30% higher than in the general population) and making a decent living. [Moi ici: A distribuição grande consegue este poder negocial porque há produtores muito grandes que conseguem ganhar dinheiro mesmo com preços muito baixos. Recordo o tamanho médio das produções leiteiras em Portugal e na Europa. No texto sobre Portugal escrevi "Explorações com menos de 10 cabeças podem ser rentáveis, não podem é seguir o mesmo modelo de negócio das que praticam a produção à escala industrial."]
...
“The average French consumer buys 50 litres of milk a year,” he said. “That meant that if consumers spent just €4 more on their milk per year, the producer might actually survive. I was convinced people would be prepared to do that.”
.
His hunch has proved right. French consumers have bought 123m litres of milk labelled C’est qui le patron?! (Who’s the boss?) since its launch in November 2016, making it the fourth-biggest milk brand in France, outsold only by the most cut-price supermarket-own brands. [Moi ici: Como não recordar o tema da polarização dos mercados]
...
As with all of the cooperative’s products, neither was advertised on TV, promoted instore or pushed by a sales team. [Moi ici: Notável]
...
The basic assumption by supermarkets is that all consumers want competitively priced produce. The cheaper, the better. CQLP might have just rewritten that rule. [Moi ici: Como não recordar a ideia de que quem trabalha prefere trabalhar para uma empresa que dê sentido ao seu esforço. Como não recordar que na língua inglesa "patron", patrono, é também sinónimo de cliente regular. Aquele que patroniza]
...
In just three years, CQLP has won over nearly 11.5 million French consumers – about one in five adults. It has also boosted the incomes of more than 3,000 farmers and manufacturers, all of whom benefit from the pledge emblazoned in big, bold capitals on the brand’s packaging: “This product pays its producer a fair price.”
...
C’est qui le patron?! is “basically about consumers both taking control of what’s on our plates, and supporting producers”, he said. “There will always be people, for all kinds of reasons, for whom price matters most. But there are also more and more who feel maybe slightly guilty when they shop for food – and would like to do better.”"

Lembrei-me da estória dos pêssegos:

"A informação que o gerente me deu não devia estar escondida. A caixa de pêssegos devia ter uma foto do agricultor, um mapa da região onde foram produzidos e uma mensagem pessoal dele para os consumidores.
.
Voltando ao segundo tweet, citado lá em cima, o século XX enterrou-nos no Normalistão, encarcerou-nos num modelo mental em que só o preço conta, e só nos ensinou uma forma de fazer preços: custo mais uma margem.
.
No Estranhistão, os actores económicos vão aprender que o preço não tem nada a ver com o custo e tudo a ver com o valor percepcionado pelos clientes-alvo."

Puzzles e mistérios

“Over the years, as I’ve exhorted companies and their leaders to embrace a richly defined values proposition rather than a dollars-and-cents value proposition, I’ve heard all kinds of warnings about the downside to thinking bigger and aiming higher. One common worry is the inevitable competitive backlash: If a braver, more clever, more forward-looking company succeeds at doing something new, the reasoning goes, then surely larger, richer, more established companies will decode that success, “mimic its logic, and upend the innovator who moved first. What’s the point of launching a whole new way to be in a business if you are inevitably going to be shot down by rivals with all the strategic firepower they need?...
No good deed goes unpunished.” In competitive strategy, the worry goes, “No good idea goes uncopied.
...
I’m constantly amazed at how unwilling or unable most big, incumbent, long-established organizations are to learn from (let alone copy) the market makers in their field. Imitation may be the sincerest form of flattery, but it’s among the rarest forms of competitive response. And it’s certainly no excuse for limiting, in advance, the scope of your strategic ambitions. What your competitors won’t do, despite how much they know about what you’re doing, may surprise you.
...
the questions intelligence agencies faced were puzzles:
...
Today, the most important questions are mysteries:
...
What’s the difference between a puzzle and a mystery? Puzzles, Treverton explains, can be solved with better information and sharper calculations. Mysteries, however, can only be framed, not solved. “A mystery is an attempt to define ambiguities,” he writes. “Puzzles may be more satisfying, but the world increasingly offers us mysteries.” And treating mysteries like puzzles, he warns, can be dangerous and delusional—creating a false sense of confidence that crunching more information will clarify situations that can be understood only with more imagination.
Well, what’s true for intelligence gathering is also true for thinking intelligently about strategy and competition. As puzzles, the companies we’ve met don’t have many missing pieces.
...
So the reason these companies are so distinctive is not because other companies lack the information to mount a challenge. It’s because they lack the imagination to match and respond to these “lighthouse” competitors, to summon their passion and patience for doing business their way."

Acham que o problema do SNS, por exemplo, é um puzzle? Acham que mais dinheiro é a solução?
Acham que ter sucesso no mercado é à custa da racionalidade e da ciência?


Trechos retirados de “Simply Brilliant: How Great Organizations Do Ordinary Things in Extraordinary Ways” de William C. Taylor.

Apostar na diferenciação

Recordar daqui "innovation and differentiation positions lead to superior pricing power"

"An inability to connect with customers is a big part of the problem for companies that find themselves lost in the undifferentiated middle. In a PwC consumer survey, 73 percent of respondents said customer experience was an important determinant in their purchasing decisions. In fact, the survey revealed that consumers are willing to pay as much as a 16 percent premium for a superior experience, and they are more likely to stay loyal to the brand that offers it.
...
Becoming a differentiator

The path to differentiation (and to thriving as a differentiator) depends on whether your company is currently a hopeful, a doer, a visionary, or a differentiator.

• Hopefuls: The most important step is to build a strong brand strategy. This starts with defining the right brand identity.
• Doers: Rather than starting from square one, you’d benefit from a capabilities-driven strategy. Identify your competitive advantage and build your strategy around that.
• Visionaries: Your focus should be on building operational capabilities so you can take action on your strategy. Be mindful to allocate resources in a way that aligns well with your brand strategy. For example, if your brand focuses on innovation, then product development and R&D would take precedence over other investments. 
• Differentiators: The key is to grow strategically — through innovation, strategic alliances, and more — to stay on top.

...
Build strategy, then operationsFor hopefuls and doers to become visionaries and eventually differentiators, they
have to put customers at the center of their approach to the four important brand strategy components — identity, value, perception, and awareness — and then build operational capabilities on top of that strategy. Here’s how. Focus on what you do best for your customers.
...

...
Realize that value involves more than just price.
...
Make sure you know who your customers are.
...
Get the word out.
...
Winning the brand challenge
The challenge of being caught in the middle is not likely to fade away. If anything, it will become more pronounced. But with a plan centered on first defining a customer-centric strategy, then bolstering operations, and then continually checking and protecting your reinvigorated brand identity, you’ll be on the path to lasting differentiation."

Trechos retirados de "How to stand out in a crowded marketplace"

Para reflexão sobre preços

Um excelente texto sobre algo que demorei muito tempo a aprender, "The Competitive Advantage of Revealing Your Higher Price".

"Salespeople who sell a product or service with a higher price complain that it is more difficult to sell, believing their competitors with a lower price have it better. Many withhold their pricing as long as possible because they are worried the high price will cost them their deal when that strategy is the very thing that makes it more difficult for them to win. If you want a competitive advantage, you will reveal your higher price early in the process."

Como não recordar a empresa que vendia "Rolls-Royce" e pôs na sua análise SWOT que o preço era um ponto fraco. Come on!

A sério, vale a pena ler e meditar sobre o pragmatismo de revelar um preço alto bem cedo, quer como critério de limpeza, não perder tempo com quem nunca irá pagar esse preço, quer como mecanismo de posicionamento e diferenciação.

O estilhaçar do século XX (parte II)

Parte I.

Na sequência da publicação da parte I recebi este tweet:

Como é que explicas os iPhones desta vida? Não estamos sujeitos aos mesmo mecanismos de "modas"? Não creio que os nichos se vão generalizar.

— Rato SemTino (@RatoSemTino) December 2, 2019

Ora aí está uma boa pergunta.

Não digo que as empresas grandes acabem, digo é que o número de empresas grandes será cada vez menor e terão cada vez menos quota de mercado, porque empresas grandes significam produção em massa e se o futuro é a variedade...

Uma possibilidade de explicação do sucesso da Apple pode residir na juventude da categoria, ainda há desenvolvimento por fazer no eixo do conteúdo físico:

Aliado a barreiras de entrada ainda demasiado altas e aliado a uma marca que se posicionou não pelo preço, mas pela marca e sua diferenciação.

O estilhaçar do século XX

Continua a minha leitura de "Prime movers" de Rafel Martinez e Johan Wallin.

Segundo os autores, quando pensamos na abordagem da criação de valor devemos olhar para a oferta como o resultado de de três conteúdos:

O potencial de criação de valor ao longo de cada uma das dimensões da oferta dependerá do sistema de criação de calor de cada cliente.

Assumir isto e querer fazer parte do processo de criação de valor do cliente, apostando na co-criação de valor, requer o aumento da granularidade ou resolução, para permitir a diferenciação requerida por cada cliente.

Reparem só nesta linguagem usada:

"Enhanced 'granularity' or 'resolution' was not present in the traditional, 'industrial' logic. There, supply and demand factors were considered at a fairly aggregated level, (generic) products and (mass) markets. For example, car manufacturers didn't think of their customers as individuals, but viewed them as a mass of buyers (markets or market segments) who bought the same product.
.
As the potential for interactivity between the firm and its environment increases, being able to specify the contribution of each individual party participating in value co-production is of great help. Instead of throwing products at undifferentiated market 'sinks', in co-productive situations, companies must decide which of their firm-specific capabilities to deploy for each specific customer."

Leio isto e recordo a suckiness dos gigantes.
Leio e isto e recordo o plankton tão querido às Heinz e às Procter & Gamble deste mundo.
Leio isto e recordo Seth Godin:

"The defining idea of the twentieth century, more than any other, was mass.
.
Mass gave us efficiency and productivity, making us (some people) rich. Mass gave us huge nations, giving us (some people) power. Mass allowed powerful people to influence millions, giving us (some people) control.
.
And now mass is dying."

Voltando a Ramirez e Wallin:

"Customers have different priorities in their value creation, and offerings targeted at them reflect these. The characteristics of the offerings can include low-risk solutions; low-cost solutions; broad relationship-based offerings, co-produced with a distributor or not; co-learning initiatives; facility of integration into customer systems; and so on. As customers' value creation conditions evolve, the offerings — and thus the capabilities brought in to make them possible, must be altered.
...
The more the types of 'fit', the more granularity or resolution is required, also with respect to capabilities. From a customer's point of view, a value constellation has an architecture designed around each individual customer, with manysuppliers targeting this customer with different offerings. The logic is the same: offering architecture will be judged in terms of 'fit' with customer value creation."

Aquele, "The more the types of 'fit', the more granularity or resolution is required, also with respect to capabilities", é poderoso. A explosão de tribos e a progressiva incapacidade dos gigantes para se adaptarem ao estilhaçar do mundo da massa. Mongo! Terra de artesãos.

Já cheguei a pensar que Mongo seria de artesãos e suas cooperativas. Talvez um dia, para já ainda é cedo. Antes dessa fase teremos empresas mais pequenas, pelos padrões do século XX,  focalizadas em nichos. Só que com o fim mitigado da geografia, esses nichos têm alguma dimensão.

Está aqui a ilustração do que Mongo traz aos gigantes

Pesquisando Kraft aqui no blogue encontro, como os postais mais recentes:

• Mongo é inevitável (Agosto de 2019)
• exploitation através de local searches quando a paisagem competitiva está em mudança (Agosto de 2019)

Agora no Wall Street Journal de ontem leio "Kraft Heinz Is Cooking Up a Fresh Strategy". Apetece dizer: Duh!

"Investors are celebrating signs of stabilization at Kraft Heinz, [Moi ici: A empresa no primeiro semestre do ano caiu 1,5% nas vendas e agora, no terceiro trimestre só caiu 1,1%] as well as fresh thinking from its new leadership.
...
The new leadership team, though handpicked by the company’s Brazilian private equity owners 3G Capital, shows refreshing signs of understanding what went wrong.
.
They plan to unveil a detailed new strategy early next year but gave preliminary thoughts on a  conference call with analysts Thursday.
.
Mr. Patricio spoke of the need for a “mental change” at the company. He seeks to shift its focus from short-term cost cutting and growth through acquisitions toward investing for long-term organic growth.
.
Still, the company isn’t abandoning frugality.
.
Mr. Patricio stressed the need to cull unprofitable or low-volume products from Kraft Heinz’s portfolio. “Innovation is an area that we have to increase, we have to improve dramatically,” he said when pressed by analysts to elaborate on his views on research and development, which prior  management shortchanged.
.
However, he said R&D spending would be focused on a few big bets rather than spread far and wide— a similar stance to his predecessor, Bernardo Hees."

Transcrevi os trechos acima, sublinhei-os ... e agora estou encostado à cadeira a admirar o espectáculo.

Tanta coisa para escrever, tanta turbulência na minha cabeça. Está aqui tudo. Está aqui a ilustração do que Mongo traz aos gigantes.

Mongo ou Estranhistão, o mundo económico para onde caminhamos não é o mundo do mass market do século XX que criou os gigantes do século XX. Os gigantes procuram as grandes quantidades, apostam nas big bets. Cometem o erro da VW:

"turned down requests to build the electric vans in what are limited numbers by their standards."

 Em Mongo é inevitável descrevo a explosão de marcas e sabores, a explosão de apreciadores-contrarians. Em Não acredito nestas relações simplistas escrevi:

O que digo aqui sobre Mongo? Mais variedade, mais tribos, mais flexibilidade, mais rapidez, ... menos friendly para gigantes e mais pró marcas independentes.

É claro que a inovação é a porta para o futuro, duvido é que consigam encontrar uma ou mais "big bets". O mundo está diferente, o mundo já não é o do século XX.

Solução que me vem à cabeça, crescer por aquisição de marcas independentes e mantendo-as como independentes, na gestão e na produção.

"a myopic strategy that leads to consistent mediocrity"

"customer loyalty is driven more by emotional factors than by rational ones.
...
Ask yourself this: Is your company trying to minimize complaints or maximize customer delight? Given the research I’ve cited, you might think that every company would be trying to create dynamic, delightful customer journeys infused with emotion. You’d be wrong. Many focus almost solely on complaints. Their goal: Eliminate the customer’s pain at every point where the consumer and the company intersect. It’s a myopic strategy that leads to consistent mediocrity, because companies miss much of what the customer experiences on his or her journey.[Moi ici: Recordar "There’s nine times more to gain by elevating positive customers than by eliminating negative ones"]
...
The journey between visiting a company’s website, say, and making an actual purchase is an emotional, cognitive, and motivational process. It’s the mix of those forces that creates feelings, memories, and stories about an organization, whether positive, negative, or ambivalent. It’s this variability that creates opportunities for companies to deliver memorable experiences. Rules and standardization can get in the way.
...
When companies focus on reducing variance in customer experience, eliminating outliers, they make sure that, statistically speaking, as many customers as possible occupy the middle of a normal distribution curve. Terrible customer experiences get a lot of attention, which reinforces the strategy of standardizing operating procedures and laying down more rules. Imposing controls helps bring experiences closer to expectations. While eliminating bad experiences may reduce complaints, result in fewer angry customers, and trim costs, the unanticipated consequence of moving most customers to the middle of distributions is that it will also result in consistent mediocrity. They will have undifferentiated, average experiences, which will leave them with few, if any, memories.
...
For that reason, positively varied emotional journeys can have the richest payoff. They leave indelible memories, increase customer loyalty, and have multiplier effects in a world where customers are closely connected. For companies that embrace variability, even terrible experiences that spawn negative emotions — such as that lost purse at Disney World — are an opportunity. If the company surprises and delights the customer by efficiently and innovatively resolving his or her problem, the dominant emotion, the one that lasts in memory, will be positive."

Trechos retirados de "The Magic That Makes Customer Experiences Stick"

Mais qualidade para lucrar mais

Os meus amigos da Cascata de Números desafiaram-me para a falar sobre Qualidade.

O meu ângulo de abordagem será o da: mais qualidade para lucrar mais.

Novos velhos, uma recordação

Há várias perspectivas pelas quais se pode analisar este artigo "This Founder Almost Shut Down Her Design Business After Year 1. Now It Has 400 Employees and a 9-Figure Revenue". Uma delas permite meter-me com os novos que são velhos e os velhos que são velhos.

Recordo Tão novos e já tão velhos ... (Outubro de 2011) e comparo com estes trechos do artigo:

"My investors didn't initially believe in the crowdsourcing aspect of the business, so I hedged my bets by also selling stationery from a collection of well-known stationery brands. I hired an intern and spent my evenings working on my passion: the crowdsourcing experiment. When we started posting the winners of our first crowdsourced-design challenge, sales started to slowly trickle in. And among the few orders we had, it wasn't the established brands that were selling, but rather the crowdsourced designs.
...
It became clear soon that this was a valuable, talented community. I realized that we had tapped into something a lot bigger. They could produce art and design work for many, many industries and businesses.
...
I really love the artists and the designers and I really wanted to bring their work to the world. Proving the point of American meritocracy to the establishment was a really interesting hypothesis that I wanted to see play out. Many of these artists and designers are transitioning from other careers like, for example, an Alaskan oil rig worker and a master plumber in New York. I would say probably 20 percent of the designers probably are fully making a living from Minted."

Outra das perspectivas de análise parte deste trecho:

"My investors didn't initially believe in the crowdsourcing aspect of the business, so I hedged my bets by also selling stationery from a collection of well-known stationery brands. I hired an intern and spent my evenings working on my passion: the crowdsourcing experiment. When we started posting the winners of our first crowdsourced-design challenge, sales started to slowly trickle in. And among the few orders we had, it wasn't the established brands that were selling, but rather the crowdsourced designs." 

Por que é que alguém há-de fazer a compra de uma marca conhecida numa loja online desconhecida? No entanto, as probabilidades melhoram quando uma loja desconhecida oferece algo diferente.

Sinais de Mongo por todo o lado

Sinais de Mongo por todo o lado.

Desta feita a explosão de marcas, a ascensão das marcas das empresas pequenas, o triunfo do numerador sobre o denominador.

"The fast-moving-consumer-goods industry has a long history of generating reliable growth through mass brands. But the model that fueled industry success now faces great pressure as consumer behaviors shift and the channel landscape changes. To win in the coming decades, FMCGs need to reduce their reliance on mass brands and offline mass channels and embrace an agile operating model focused on brand relevance rather than synergies.
...
Consumers under 35 differ fundamentally from older generations in ways that make mass brands and channels ill suited to them. They tend to prefer new brands, especially in food products. According to recent McKinsey research, millennials are almost four times more likely than baby boomers to avoid buying products from “the big food companies.”
.
And while millennials are obsessed with research, they resist brand-owned marketing and look instead to learn about brands from each other. They also tend to believe that newer brands are better or more innovative, and they prefer not to shop in mass channels.
...
Explosion of small brandsMany small consumer-goods companies are capitalizing on millennial preferences and digital marketing to grow very fast. These brands can be hard to spot because they are often sold online or in channels not covered by the syndicated data that the industry has historically relied on heavily.
...
Retailers have also taken notice of these small brands. According to The Nielsen Company, US retailers are giving small brands double their fair share of new listings. The reason is twofold: retailers want small brands to differentiate their proposition and to drive their margins, as these small brands tend to be premium and rarely promote. As a consequence, small brands are capturing two to three times their fair share of growth while the largest brands remain flat or in slight decline"

Trechos retirados de "The new model for consumer goods"

"shifts toward particular logics can be reversed" (parte IV)

Parte I, parte II e parte III.

"The beer item collectors association BAV also published a bimonthly magazine that frequently reported on historic Dutch breweries. A number of writers also began addressing the history of Dutch beer brewing. As a result, there was growing awareness of the history of Dutch brewing, and a growing amount was recollected and curated, increasing the availability and accessibility of the remnants of the craft logic.
Thus during the first stage of logic reemergence, institutional change took off once ties between the previously dormant and dispersed custodians of the decomposed logic were regenerated. This involved restorative activities as dormant actors were reawakened, ties between them were reestablished, and the remnants of the decomposed logic were again made available and accessible. It also involved transformative activities as the dormant custodians of craft became organized in new ways, new recruits became absorbed in these networks, and foreign entities also came to be regarded as representations of a craft-brewing logic that had decomposed in the Netherlands.
...
PINT’s membership grew from 30 in 1981 to over 1,000 by 1994, and its bimonthly magazine attracted an increasingly wide readership in the Dutch beer-brewing field. But since PINT became organized around multiple local chapters that kept close ties with local pubs, hobby brewing associations, and eventually nascent craft breweries, which were not necessarily members of the association, the texts it produced were indicative of a developing national discourse and captured the regenerated vocabulary of practice surrounding craft brewing that began to emerge from reestablished networks. PINT not only provided a platform for alternative voices in the beer industry but also deliberately disseminated texts about what was ‘‘wrong’’ with the beer industry and what remedies were needed according to emerging ideas that were constitutive of this discourse.
A recurring component of these texts was the use of frames in which prototypical examples of modern brewing, industrial brewing corporations such as Heineken, were depicted as a foil to provide a favorable contrast for craft brewers."

Impressionante como uma revolução pode ser gerada por um movimento de base, que vai agrupando de forma ad-hoc indivíduos e grupos gerando um todo coerente.

Continua.

Trechos retirados de "What Is Dead May Never Die: Institutional Regeneration through Logic Reemergence in Dutch Beer Brewing", Administrative Science Quarterly 1–44 (2018) de Jochem J. Kroezen e Pursey P. M. A. R. Heugens.

"shifts toward particular logics can be reversed" (parte III)

Parte I e parte II.

O interessante é como este renascimento

começou a partir de um movimento de base, sem grandes recursos, sem patrocínios, sem intervenções governamentais.

"A key development was the emergence of five independent beer pubs that were not contractually tied to any industrial brewer and that began to import modest amounts of traditional foreign craft beer, predominantly Belgian ale, as an alternative to Dutch industrial lager. These locales, where individuals with ‘‘strange tastes’’ could meet (to quote a representative of one of these pubs), were Cafe ́ De Beyerd in Breda, Gollem in Amsterdam, Jan Primus in Utrecht, ‘t Pumpke in Nijmegen, and Locus Publicus in Rotterdam and Delft. The idea to import foreign beers emerged when the founders of these pubs came in contact with traditional beer styles that were still being brewed in Belgium, Germany, and the United Kingdom.
...The owners of pioneering beer pubs started with very modest means and ambitions and were surprised by the impact of their actions. Their initial success was followed by an emerging network of importers that began to specialize in foreign traditional craft beer.
...
The attention given to traditional alternatives reawakened actors with marginalized or dissolved roles, who were dissatisfied with the state of the Dutch beer-brewing industry. The exposure to foreign traditional craft beer led to these actors’ growing perception that something had been lost in the Netherlands with the shift toward industrial brewing. The pioneering beer pubs gave these actors a chance to meet and (re)connect. One of these, Gollem in Amsterdam, began to organize an annual beer festival in 1978 for alternative Dutch beer. Initially, this was a very small-scale affair, but the festival grew from 65 to over 300 visitors within two years and would eventually attract more than 10,000 visitors...The pubs and their festivals thus provided an important space for marginalized actors, like enthusiast consumers, brewmasters, and pub owners, to connect and discuss the state of Dutch beer brewing. Importantly, these groups contained both individuals with access to institutional remnants and individuals who were entirely new to beer brewing.
...
A group of Dutch beer enthusiasts who frequented the pioneering pubs also regularly traveled to London to visit pubs there. They noticed that the diversity of beers and brewing practices was higher in the UK and that there was a consumer association—the Campaign for Real Ale or CAMRA—promoting the revitalization of traditional craft brewing. This group would go on to establish the Dutch beer consumer association PINT.
...
The establishment of PINT initiated the emergence of an ecosystem of new collective organizations that all contributed to a nostalgia-infused movement for change in the industry.
...
In 1983, Nico van Dijk co-established a foundation for beer item collectors (BAV), which fueled greater awareness of traditional Dutch craft brewing. In 1984, the first modern brewers’ guilds—De Roerstok and Twents Bierbrouwersgilde—were established to encourage hobby brewing, inspiring a new generation of brewery entrepreneurs. The Bier Keurmeesters Gilde (BKG) that trains judges for the independent examination of the quality of amateur beers during competitions and tastings was established in 1986. And in 1987, an association for specialty beer pubs (ABT) was established, which acted as a catalyst for the distribution of craft beer. Collectively, these initiatives amplified the initial effect of the pioneering pubs. They revitalized marginalized actor groups by reawakening traditional members, providing them with spaces to reconnect and reflect, and attracting new recruits."

Continua.

Trechos retirados de "What Is Dead May Never Die: Institutional Regeneration through Logic Reemergence in Dutch Beer Brewing", Administrative Science Quarterly 1–44 (2018) de Jochem J. Kroezen e Pursey P. M. A. R. Heugens.

"shifts toward particular logics can be reversed" (parte II)

Parte I.

Voltemos à tabela 1:

O que vemos ali dentro da área sublinhada é um retrato fiel do paradigma económico do século XX.

Não admira a evolução do número de sobreviventes:

No modelo económico do século XX, o modelo gerado pela Revolução Industrial e que atingiu o seu apogeu no século XX, só existe um pico na paisagem competitiva. No final só pode existir um vencedor.

Mas em Mongo, o modelo económico deixa de ser único e abrem-se muitos outros picos:

Cada pico representa uma hipótese de procurar o sucesso. E ter sucesso num pico pouco tem a ver com ter sucesso num outro pico. Daí a minha exortação, concentrem-se nos clientes-alvo e não na concorrência.

Recomendo uma comparação das duas colunas, na figura acima, entre "Traditional Craft Brewing" e "Modern Industrial Brewing" - dois modelos tão diferentes!!!

O que é que aconteceu para que o renascimento típico de Mongo ocorresse a partir dos anos 70 do século passado?

"The dominance of the large industrial brewers led to substantial diminishment and, ultimately, dissolution of the roles of field actors who used to carry traditional craft brewing. But this decomposed logic left behind institutional remnants that continued to be at least partially conserved [Moi ici: Isto faz-me lembrar uma empresa de calçado que conheço que tem uma fatia muito grande de trabalhadores reformados. Gente com mais de 65 anos e que continua a trabalhar. A quantidade de gente que domina a arte de cortar pele à mão é impressionante. Sobretudo nestes tempos de balancés e máquinas de corte.]
...
While these remnants appear to be important resources for institutional change, regenerating them was rife with challenges due to their significant degree of decomposition. First, although there were individuals who could act as custodians of these institutional remnants, they were dispersed and had either become disembedded from the field or had completely switched to modern industrial brewing. Until 1980, there had been no collective efforts in the field to maintain or conserve elements of the craft-brewing logic. Craft-brewing remnants were therefore scattered around the field. Second, the remaining remnants provided only an incomplete set of representations of the traditional logic, which was insufficiently actionable.
...
Traditional craft brewing had come to be associated with inferior quality as compared with modern industrial brewing, in part because of the political efforts of the modern industrial brewers. Compliance with increased ‘‘quality’’ regulations imposed in 1926, which had resulted in part from industrial brewers’ lobbying efforts, required substantial investments in ingredients and equipment, which many traditional breweries were unable to make [Moi ici: Tão típico! ASAEs et al são criações dos gigantes para afastar concorrência. Recuo a 2010 onde escrevi "Quanto mais maduro estiver um sector para consolidação, maior a torrente de legislação e regulamentação sobre ele. Antes de começar a comprar concorrentes, há que expulsar os mais fracos do mercado, ou criar-lhes dificuldades extra para que sintam uma oferta de aquisição como um alívio bem-vindo."]. These policies, which had institutionalized crisp industrial lager as the dominant and qualitatively superior product, combined with the natural stigma associated with failure initially disqualified remnants left behind by the traditional carriers of craft brewing as legitimate building blocks for later change efforts.
In spite of these challenges, however, the craft-brewing logic reemerged in the Netherlands through the establishment of 489 new breweries between 1980 and 2016. These new organizations collectively regenerated the institutional remnants of craft. This led to fundamental institutional change, as these organizations contributed to the restoration of the institutional orders of the community, family, professions, and religion in the field.
...
The process of regenerative institutional change in Dutch beer brewing began during the early 1970s, when networks of actors with marginalized roles—such as brewmasters and members of traditional brewing families, who were the dormant custodians of craft brewing—were restored and transformed. These groups were reawakened when they were exposed to the surviving elements of traditional craft brewing in surrounding countries and began to mix with other marginal actors who were attracted to a budding hobby-brewing scene. Out of these interactions developed a growing sense that something of value had been left behind with the shift to modern industrial brewing. This fueled an interest in Dutch beer-brewing history and the mobilization of resources to promote nostalgia-infused change, ultimately leading to the rediscovery of what was left of the decomposed craft-brewing logic."

Continua.

Trechos retirados de "What Is Dead May Never Die: Institutional Regeneration through Logic Reemergence in Dutch Beer Brewing", Administrative Science Quarterly 1–44 (2018) de Jochem J. Kroezen e Pursey P. M. A. R. Heugens.

"shifts toward particular logics can be reversed" (parte I)

"Many organizational fields in which modernity has seemingly taken hold may experience a revival of traditional arrangements. Revival dynamics are visible in organizational fields as diverse as cattle farming, retail banking, radio broadcasting, and whisky distilling. Such cases pose a puzzle for institutional change theoreticians, who, ... have long depicted change as a process of modern institutional arrangements destroying and replacing traditional ones. Institutional change can thus paradoxically also occur through the reemergence of traditional arrangements that challenge modern ones.
...
Regenerative institutional change thus refers to shifts that occur due to the reemergence of logics that had previously experienced decline and decomposition due to modernization. The development of the grass-fed livestock market in the U.S. as a result of the revival of traditional farming practices suggests a reemergence of particular logics that had previously dwindled in importance due to a shift toward industrial agriculture. The microradio movement in the U.S. spurred the reemergence of communal, religious, and educational radio stations by way of restoring low-power radio technology that had previously been abandoned as a result of increasing corporate concentration and federal regulation. And the reemergence of community banks in areas in the U.S. that were previously subject to acquisition activity by large national banks also suggests that shifts toward particular logics can be reversed.
...
craft revival followed an extensive period of total domination by industrial brewing. 

...
Modern industrial brewing. The Industrial Revolution, the invention of the corporation, and substantial improvements in the transportability of perishable goods ultimately enabled both the proliferation of modern industrial breweries and the emergence of a very different institutional logic around the turn of the twentieth century. [Moi ici: O Normalistão] Although there were many other examples, Heineken is the epitome of industrial brewing. It was established in 1864, when the son of a trader in cheese and butter acquired a struggling traditional brewery that had recently become a limited liability company. Heineken quickly developed into one of the largest breweries globally by focusing on mass production of industrial lager. The economic rationalization of beer brewing by Heineken and others led to a dramatic homogenization of products, such that by 1980 all of the beer produced in the Netherlands could be classified as industrial lager and traditional breweries had failed en masse. As an ideal type, modern industrial brewing involved a concern with profit, market power, and economies of scale; an automated and standardized brewing process; and a highly rational approach to the organization of production and sales, in which brewmasters became operations managers who were hierarchically subjected to financial and sales managers. Table 1 contrasts the ideal-typical logics of traditional craft and modern industrial brewing."

Trechos retirados de "What Is Dead May Never Die: Institutional Regeneration through Logic Reemergence in Dutch Beer Brewing", Administrative Science Quarterly 1–44 (2018) de Jochem J. Kroezen e Pursey P. M. A. R. Heugens.

"manage value in order to make a profit " parte III

Parte I e parte II.

"Increase your firm’s bargaining ability In addition to securing a higher added value, firms may also improve the share of created value that they appropriate by improving their bargaining ability towards buyers and suppliers. In essence, this includes different strategies for increasing price without raising the firm’s added value. This may be accomplished by investing in pricing capability, and commercial decision resources, such as IT-based systems, commercial organization, control systems, and commercial experience that improve the quality of commercial decisions made under uncertainty. It may also be accomplished by the development of particular persuasion resources that allows the firm to negotiate more successfully, and ultimately strike a better deal with buyers and suppliers."

Trecho retirado de "What Is Value and How Is It Managed?" de Niklas L. Hallberg, publicado em Journal of Creating Value 3(2) 173–183, 2017.

"manage value in order to make a profit " parte II

Parte I.

Esta parte II serve só para reforçar uma mensagem clássica deste blogue, mas que muita gente ainda não descobriu.

Há dias fiz este comentário no Twitter:

Não quero entrar em polémica, até porque IMPOSTO É ROUBO, mas o exemplo foi mal escolhido. O sector da metalomecânica, excluindo produção automóvel, teve mais de 10 anos de crescimento pornográfico. Só este ano está a decair um bocado face a 2017, o que até é saudável.

— Carlos P da Cruz (@ccz1) September 17, 2018

A parte I refere quatro alternativas para a reforçar a procura pela oferta de uma organização:

1. Diferenciação;
2. Reduzir o valor da oferta dos concorrentes;
3. Ter o custo mais baixo; e
4. Aumentar o custo dos concorrentes.

Competir pela redução do custo da nossa oferta é só uma das possibilidades. E como escrevi aqui há muitos anos, competir pelo preço mais baixo não é para quem quer, é para quem pode.

Em vez de apelar à culpa dos consumidores

"Bem sei que é uma utopia, que o mercado é global, que a concorrência é selvagem e não contempla lirismos e que as grandes superfícies não se distinguem propriamente pelos seus valores humanistas. Mas fechar os olhos e pensar que o vinho, ou as batatas, ou as couves, ou a carne, ou o leite são produzidas sempre da mesma maneira e com custos mais ou menos certos, como numa fábrica, também não nos ajuda. Quanto menos quisermos pagar, pior beberemos e comeremos. Não há milagres."

Há algo neste texto que me faz torcer o nariz.

Quem conhece este blogue sabe que ele tem como uma das suas imagens de marca o defender o trabalhar para aumentar os preços, para fugir à race-to-the-bottom. Por isso, pregamos o Evangelho do Valor! Por isso defendemos a subida na escala de valor.

Nunca, mas nunca defendi que o caminho para esse aumento de preços passe por apelar à bondade dos clientes, ou por lhes lançar culpas para que pelo remorso aceitem preços mais altos. Pelo contrário, nas empresas nunca me farto de usar esta linguagem que se segue:

"E os clientes são como nós consumidores, a menos que sejam obrigados a recorrer a um monopolista, são egoístas, pensam no seu interesse próprio."

Assim, só há uma forma de fugir do rolo compressor dos preços cada vez mais baixos e aspirar à race-to-the-top, mudar de uma estratégia baseada na quantidade produzida e na eficiência e, apostar na diferenciação.

Uma fábrica pode não ser um negócio a céu aberto, mas também tem os seus infortúnios do clima. Ontem, durante uma caminhada passei pelo espaço onde em tempos foi uma empresa que visitei como técnico, quando era responsável pela qualidade e apoio a clientes de uma empresa onde trabalhava. Muitos anos depois soube que essa empresa tinha fechado porque, depois de um avultado investimento para entrarem num novo mercado, uma alteração tecnológica tornou esse investimento obsoleto.

Um stand de automóveis pode ou não ser um negócio a céu aberto, mas também tem os seus infortúnios do clima.
Muitas vezes dou o exemplo de uma responsável da qualidade com quem trabalhei e que hoje vive no Canadá. O marido tinha um stand e a vida corria bem. No interior havia muita procura por jipes e essa era a sua praia. Houve um ano em que um governo Guterres olhou com um misto de inveja e de gula para a venda de jipes e criou uma lei orçamental que matou o negócio.

Em vez de apelar à culpa dos consumidores, os produtores devem abandonar uma visão de produção como vómito, industrial ou agro-industrial, e apostar na arte, na diferenciação, na autenticidade.

Em vez de apelar à culpa dos consumidores, os produtores devem trabalhar para educar o gosto dos futuros clientes. Beber vinho é como ouvir música clássica, tem de se começar por temas mais populares e subir na complexidade.

E como aprendi com um texto de 1906 de um tal Schumpeter, cuidado com aquilo a que chamam lucro. Uma parte desse suposto lucro é o custo do futuro.

Trecho inicial retirado de "O negócio do vinho é feito a céu aberto, mas os preços são de fábrica"

O futuro passará por voltar ao passado

“In the 1950’s footwear brands offered many different widths and in-store customer service for bespoke fitting. However, with mass scale global production in the 1970’s and fast fashion of today, this went away. Now 90% of the population buy the wrong shoe sizes or don’t even know their correct shoe size. This has created an average of 20% return rate from brick and mortar and e-commerce sales. This mounts to annual 80 billion of lost revenue for the footwear industry! Thus, the pain point is in correct sizing, fitting and reducing returns and not necessarily figuring out the new trendy color for the spring collection. By offering consumers 127 sizes you can capture 90% more of the population simply by offering a vast size range that serves the consumer directly for accurate fit with 3mm increments. The 90% of the population needs to be provided for different widths and global sizing fitting to encompass all markets. 127 sizes will also increase revenue for brands to better serve the consumer for a better fit.”

O futuro passará por voltar ao passado. Uma ideia que não é nova neste blogue.

Trecho retirado de "Janne Kyttanen: Finding the magic number for customization utilizing 3D printing in your industry"