Fixado na guerra anterior

No WSJ de ontem li "U.S. Companies Shift From China to Avoid Tariffs":

"Until a few years ago, Chinese factories supplied the world with Sharpie retractable pens and Oster blenders.

No more.

Consumer giant Newell Brands now makes those products, and more, at its own plants in the U.S. and Mexico. Many of its other products are made in factories in Vietnam, Indonesia and Thailand.

Chris Peterson, Newell's chief executive, said the company's shift reduces its dependence on China at a time when both the Democratic and Republican parties "are getting more protectionist in terms of trade policy."

Tariffs are becoming an entrenched tool tying together geopolitics and trade, and they are playing a bigger role in long-term manufacturing and sourcing decisions. Nowhere are they hitting harder than in China, where importers and exporters are navigating an increasingly complicated regime of levies on goods ranging from semiconductors to mattresses.

...

Retail-industry trade groups and some executives warn some items can't be produced anywhere else in the world and that escalating tariffs will simply raise consumer prices and fuel inflation. Analysts at Goldman Sachs estimate that every percentage-point increase in the overall U.S. tariff rate would increase core consumer prices by just over 0.1%.

"The problem is the best place to make shoes is China," said Ronnie Robinson, chief supply chain officer at Designer Brands, parent company of footwear retailer DSW.

Robinson said for every dollar the government adds in tariffs, consumers pay an extra $2 to $4 at the checkout. "The reality is that you and 1 are paying for the tariffs as part of the ticket price when you go into the store and buy," he said.

Robinson said Designer Brands sources about 70% of its footwear from China, down from 90% several years ago. He said the company aims to reduce its reliance further to about 50%, but China will remain the company's largest single source of shoes.

Peterson said just 15% of Newell's goods rely on products made in China today, down from more than 30% several years ago. He expects that by the end of next year the share will fall below 10%."

 E fiquei a pensar em certas desculpas que se dão.

Por exemplo, no JN do passado dia 19 de Agosto, "Concorrência chinesa ameaça indústria nacional". Senti-me a recuar 20 anos atrás:

"As indústrias do têxtil e do calçado atravessam um mau momento. Nos primeiros seis meses do ano houve um aumento das insolvências, com estes dois setores a destacarem-se pela negativa. Taxas de juro em alta, inflação, dificuldade de adquirir matérias-primas e a concorrência que classificam como "desleal" das empresas chinesas estão entre as causas apontadas pelos empresários para o mau momento. Mas, pela primeira vez, algumas das empresas que trabalham mais para o mercado nacional do que para exportação estão a resistir melhor à crise."

So weird!

Números sobre o calçado e o ITV:

• A percentagem de insolvências decretadas aumentou 9,3%, para 1054, relativamente ao período homólogo;
• O têxtil e moda com mais 110 falências decretadas (mais 178%), 
• A confecção de vestuário exterior com mais 31 (um aumento de 78%); e
•  O fabrico de calçado com mais 587 (um crescimento de 414%).

"“O têxtil até cresceu em número de clientes, o problema é que eles fazem encomendas mais pequenas”, refere Jorge Machado, presidente da Associação Têxtil e Vestuário de Portugal e da Euratex - Confederação Têxtil Europeia." 

Reparem na caldeirada de desculpas:

• Encomendas mais pequenas (lembram-se deste discurso aqui classificado como estranho, acerca do calçado?).
• Estamos a viver um período com duas guerras, uma na Europa e outra às portas.
• Taxas de juro em alta e a inflação.
• “A União Europeia (UE) baixou as suas importações em 17% e Portugal teve uma diminuição de vendas de 5%. Ou seja, nós até aumentamos a nossa quota de mercado” - Atentem neste ponto, aumentamos a quota de mercado.
• 4 anos depois, ainda a tentar a carta da pandemia "as empresas de vestuário e moda “durante a pandemia tiveram de se endividar para evitar despedimentos e manter a paz social”."
• "a “concorrência desleal” das empresas chinesas é outro problema que a UE tem de atacar, “sob pena de acabar com todo o setor industrial europeu”" - mas então não estão a ganhar quota de mercado?

Como mostrar que isto não passa de desculpas? Tratando-se do sector económico nacional com produtividade mediana mais baixa, não consegue ter produtividade para o nível de custos que agora tem. Como é que a França e a Alemanha perderam as suas empresas têxteis? O fenómeno dos Flying Geese

Aproveitar o reshoring

Na passada segunda-feira o WSJ incluia o artigo "Supply-Chain Overhaul Boosts GE Appliances' Sales":

"GE Appliances, one of the largest home-appliances manufacturers in the U.s., says a

$2 billion effort to remake its supply chain has helped it double revenue since 2017.

...

It is an example of how companies are resetting their supply chains to be more flexible, moves that come after retailers and household goods companies navigated disruptions, shipping delays and dramatic shifts in consumer demand during a chaotic period marked by waves of stockouts and overstocking.

"A lot of companies are really striving to create increased visibility in their supply chains and also to build greater resilience in their supply chains," 

...

One of the biggest changes has been to bring more manufacturing into the U.S. from Asia. GE Appliances has added 4,000 manufacturing jobs across its nine U.S. plants over the past seven years. Shifting production from overseas has cut shipping costs by reducing the number of bulky appliances that are sent across the Pacific Ocean and has given GE Appliances more control over production.

"When you have something that's in a container on a boat for six weeks, it's difficult to change your orders and be able to adjust to shifts in demand," said North Carolina State's Handfield.

...

The company previously tracked "weeks on hand," which measures finished products relative to how many units typically sell in a given week. It now tracks customer orders delivered on time and in full, a measure that prioritizes existing orders so the company doesn't spend time manufacturing items that aren't in demand, Brey said.

...

"I want to make product as close to when the customer is going to want it as possible," Brey said."

A típica PME portuguesa não tem marca própria, mas pode procurar aproveitar esta tendência junto de marcas que operam no mercado europeu. Essas marcas procuram:

• Mais flexibilidade da cadeia de abastecimento: Vão ter de investir em tornar as cadeias de abastecimento mais adaptáveis ​​para lidar com perturbações e alterações nas condições do mercado.
• Repensar a localização da produção: Vão procurar aproximar a produção dos principais mercados para reduzir os custos de envio e melhorar os tempos de resposta à procura. Lidar com a incerteza e aumentar a rotação do inventário.
• Produzir no regime "make to order": Querem alinhar a produção mais estreitamente com os pedidos reais dos clientes para reduzir o excesso de inventário e melhorar a eficiência.

Talvez a típica PME portuguesa tenha de rever:

• As ferramentas digitais que usa para melhorar a visibilidade em toda a cadeia de abastecimento, desde a produção até aos pedidos dos clientes.
• Os métodos de rastreio do inventário para os tornar mais precisos, com o foco em ter os produtos certos, nos locais certos, no momento certo.

"todos tratados como Figos"

Ao longo dos anos tenho referido esta previsão no blogue. Demografia, e o reshoring estão dar um poder negocial cada vez mais forte aos trabalhadores. Por exemplo:

"Escrevi aqui algures que um dia seríamos (os nossos descendentes) todos tratados como Figos."

"ALMOST EVERYONE agreed that the mid-2010s were a terrible time to be a worker. David Graeber, an anthropologist at the London School of Economics, coined the term "bullshit jobs" to describe purposeless work, which he argued was widespread. With the recovery from the global financial crisis of 2007-09 taking time, some 7% of the labour force in the OECD club of mostly rich countries lacked work. Wage growth was weak and income inequality seemed to be rising inexorably.

How things change. In the rich world, workers now face a golden age. As societies age, labour is becoming scarcer and better rewarded, especially manual work that is hard to replace with technology. Governments are spending big and running economies hot, supporting demands for higher wages, and are likely to continue to do so. Artificial intelligence (Al) is giving workers, particularly less skilled ones, a productivity boost, which could lead to higher wages, too. Some of these trends will reinforce the others: where labour is scarce, for instance, the use of tech is more likely to increase pay. The result will be a transformation in how labour markets work.

...

To understand why, return to the gloom. When it was at its peak in 2015, so was China's working-age population, then at 998m people. Western firms could use the threat of relocation, or pressure from Chinese competitors, to force down wages. David Autor of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and colleagues estimate that this depressed American pay between 2000 and 2007, with a larger hit for those on lower wages. Populist politicians, not least Donald Trump, took advantage, vowing to end China's job "theft"

...

The approach is already bearing fruit for workers. In a recent paper, Mr Autor and colleagues demonstrate that tight American labour markets are leading to fast wage growth, [Moi ici: Por isso, é que o patronato é tão amigo da imigração, mão de obra barata] as workers switch jobs for better pay, and that poorer employees are benefiting most of all (see chart 3). The researchers reckon that, since 2020, some two-fifths of the rise in wage inequality over the past four decades has been undone.

A similar trend is probably playing out across the rich world. Germany's employment agency keeps a tally of jobs that are facing severe worker shortages. So far this year it has added 48 professions to the 152-strong list. Most require technical, rather than academic, education, with shortages most pressing in construction and health care. Japan offers time-limited visas for workers in a dozen fields, including the making of machine parts and shipbuilding, and the country's wages are rising faster than at any point in the past three decades. The wage premium that accrues to those with a university education is already shrinking; it may now fall faster."

Recordar:

• Falta de mão de obra (30.11.2022)

Trechos retirados da revista The Economist de hoje, "Welcome to a golden age for workers"

Dois economistas, três opiniões

"Economists at the Bank of International Settlements looked at data from more than 25,000 companies and found supply chains lengthening as other countries, especially in Asia, became additional stops in trade between China and the US. Companies shifting supply chains away from China are often moving production to countries whose economies are already highly integrated with China, such as Vietnam. Mexico, where investment by Chinese manufacturers has ticked up noticeably in recent years, is also becoming an important link in US-China trade. So it's not so much that the US and Chinese economies are decoupling-they're just coupling in different places.

...

Still, the connectors are proof that talk of the end of globalization is overwrought. Goods and capital still move across borders - even more of them, in fact."

Estes trechos foram retirados de "These Five Countries Are Key Economic; 'Connectors' in a Fragmenting World" publicado pela revista Bloomberg Business Week.

Interessante o que encontramos no WSJ de ontem:

"China passed a significant milestone last fall: For the first time since its economic opening more than four decades ago, it traded more with developing countries than the U.S., Europe and Japan combined. It was one of the clearest signs yet that China and the West are going in different directions as tensions increase over trade, technology, security and other thorny issues.

...

Benefits for the U.S. and Europe include less reliance on Chinese supply chains and more jobs for Americans and Europeans that otherwise might go to China. But there are major risks, such as slower global growth - and many economists worry the costs will outweigh the advantages."

Trechos retirados de "Global Economy Splits Into U.S. vs. China"

"This is a column about two numbers that seem to tell contradictory stories about globalization.

Over the past 15 years, a consensus has developed that globalization has run its course and gone into decline. One popular number supporting this argument: Trade as a share of global output peaked in 2008 at the cusp of the global financial crisis and has never recovered.

But a new metric from a pair of economists, Sharat Ganapati of Georgetown University and Woan Foong Wong at the University of Oregon, tells the opposite story: More goods are traveling greater distances than ever before.

That seems impossible if globalization has truly swung into reverse. So which is right?"

Trechos retirados de "Is Globalization Over? A New Metrie Says No"

Prepare-se, não seja apanhado desprevenido

Na capa do WSJ de ontem, "The World's Factory Floor Struggles to Attract Workers":

"The workplace features floor-to-ceiling windows and a cafe serving matcha tea, as well as free voga and dance classes. Everv month, workers gather at team-building sessions to drink beer, drive go-karts and go bowling.

This isn't Google. It's a garment factory in Vietnam.

Asia, the world's factory floor and the source of much of the stuff Americans buy, is running into a big problem: Its young people, by and large, don't want to work in factories.[Moi ici: A minha primeira reacção é pensar que isto é um sinal positivo, um sinal do mecanismo dos Flying Geese a funcionar]

That's why the garment factory is trying to make its manufacturing floor more enticing, and why alarm bells are ringing at Western companies that rely on the region's inexpensive labor to churn out affordable consumer goods.

The twilight of ultra cheap Asian factory labor is emerging as the latest test of the globalized manufacturing model, which over the past three decades has delivered a vast array of inexpensively produced goods to consumers around the world.

...

"There's nowhere left on the planet that's going to be able to give you what you want," said Paul Norriss, the

British co-founder of the Vietnam garment factory, UnAvailable, based in Ho Chi Minh City. "People are going to have to change their consumer habits, and so are brands.""

Um extenso artigo e com vários pontos de vista:

• banhista gordo,
• flying geese,
• demografia,
• implicações no futuro do mercado e das marcas,
• tentativa das empresas melhorarem a experiência no local de trabalho,
• para quem não tem filhos, ou vive em casa dos pais, o dinheiro não é tudo.

BTW, "Mexico Steps Up As Largest US Trading Partner"   e  "Chipmakers have plans for new US factories. But not enough workers to run them.":

"Chipmakers are rebuilding the US semicondutor industry with $231 billion in new investments spurred by the enactment of the landmark CHIPS and Science Act a year ago.

But even as Biden officials celebrate the anniversary of that legislation this week, there are mounting concerns about whether enough skilled workers will be there to run these factories once they are online.

Labor shortages have already affected the construction of one major project in Phoenix. Meanwhile, a possible national shortfall could also complicate efforts in the year ahead by

Intel (INTC) in central Ohio, Micron (MU) in upstate New York, as well as other new projects from Texas to Utah.

The issue could prove a headwind for America's efforts to reverse a decades-long decline in semicondutor manufacturing and also complicate a key tenet of Biden's case for reelection."

Tudo vai depender do tal jogo de forças (parte VI)

Há um ano escrevi aqui "Qual o resultado final?"

Qual o resultado final do balanço de forças entre a procura tradicional das empresas portuguesas (sector transaccionável) e a procura na Ásia para satisfazer os mercados que as empresas portuguesas já servem ou podem vir a servir.

Depois, em Setembro de 2022 escrevi "Como eu gostava de saber" (parte I e parte II)

Na sequência desse tema desenvolvi uma série de postais sobre o tema "Tudo vai depender do tal jogo de forças" (parte I, parte II, parte III, parte IV e parte V).

Já em Julho passado fui obrigado a escrever "Inversão de ciclo", perante a evolução dos números das exportações.

Entretanto, ontem no FT encontro "China's factories bear brunt of the economic slowdown":

"From slowing global demand to rising geopolitical tensions and a tentative post-Covid recovery, China's manufacturers are tackling some of the strongest headwinds in years.

...

Factory activity, one of the main pillars of growth during the pandemic, has slowed for four consecutive months to July 31, according to official statistics.

...

Feng Tai Footwear exemplifies the difficulties faced by the low-technology manufacturers on which China's economic success has been built. Before the pandemic it sold some 5mn pairs of shoes a year to clients such as Walmart and Target. This year it will do well to sell 3mn. Orders for the second half of this year are down at least a third compared with last year.

"Our sector is in misery," said chief executive Eddie Lam, who runs more than 10 manufacturing plants in China and employs more than 3,000 workers. "Orders often get cancelled halfway. We are basically at a standstill," he added. The country's monthly export delivery value of goods made with leather, fur or feathers as well as footwear has fallen more than a third from 2019, hitting nearly Rmb17bn ($2.4bn) in May this year.

...

Some clients have asked if the company can set up factories outside China, but Feng Tai has no plans yet.

"The US knows very well it cannot risk decoupling from China," Lam said. "I just don't see the advantage of moving production to south-east Asia with higher supply chain costs and additional investments required.

...

"We have to consider [China] 'plus one' or even more," said Ho, managing director of Tien Sung Group, of global tensions and supply chain disruptions. "We can't put all our eggs in one basket."[Moi ici: Aqui recordo o banhista gordo]"

BTW, este gráfico faz-me lembrar o esquema dos Flying Geese:

Vamos ver se o governo chinês resiste à tentação de, também ele, usar a receita portuguesa: proteger o passado e hipotecar o futuro. Porque como se lê no artigo, é desejo do Presidente Xi Jinping optar por um crescimento "de alta qualidade" que favorece as indústrias de tecnologia em detrimento dos vastos centros de fabrico que produzem bens de consumo básicos.

... devia haver proactividade

Jorge Marrão no Think Tank desta semana recordava que quando mataram o rei D. Carlos, o rei Eduardo VII mandou chamar o embaixador português em Londres e perguntou: mas que raio de país é este em que matam o rei e a primeira decisão é demitir um ministério. Jorge Marrão remata usando este episódio como um exemplo da actuação prtuguesa tipo: evitar ir ao fundo da questão.

Lembrei-me disto ontem durante a caminhada matinal ao ler uma série de artigos sobre a evolução do contexto: Estados Unidos e China/Alemanha.

O FT de quinta e sexta trazia uma página inteira dedicada ao que está a acontecer nos Estados Unidos na sequência da I.R.S..

O FT de ontem trazia na capa e em mais duas páginas o grito de alerta do governo alemão acerca da necessidade da economia fazer o de-risking da China. Mesmo tema no NYT.

O mundo a mudar, o contexto a mudar e ... por cá, comportamos-nos como um protectorado, como dependentes a viver na casa de adultos. Os adultos lidam com o mundo, os dependentes lidam com a sua vida sob os ditames ditados por outros.

Com estas mudanças profundas em curso devia haver foco nas oportunidades e ameaças, devia haver proactividade. 

Outros sintomas de que o mundo está a mudar

Na última página do WSJ de ontem encontrei "U.S. Sees Boom in Factory Building":

"Congress passed two measures last year that aimed, in part, to build America's manufacturing capacity back up.

...

On Monday, the Commerce Department reported May construction spending figures, with overall spending rising a seasonally adjusted 0.9% from a month earlier. Once again, an important piece of that was spending on construction of manufacturing facilities."

 Entretanto, ontem durante a minha caminhada matinal, li dois artigos sobre um mesmo tema, que poderá vir a ter repercussões na forma como os governos como o português estão habituados a receber dinheiro da UE:

• "Alemania se desindustrializa y sufre un desplome de la inversión extranjera"(1)
• "Germany Needs a New Growth Model" (2)

Da fonte 1:

"una tendencia de cierres que afecta especialmente a las plantas de producción que requieren un alto gasto energético.

...

Los sectores que más economía consumen, como el químico o el metalúrgico, optan por llevarse al extranjero plantas de producción, ante el encarecimiento de la cesta energética y la incertidumbre sobre los suministros.

...

«A la industria alemana le esperan tiempos difíciles», dice el economista de Commerzbank Ralph Solveen, que añade que «en la segunda mitad del año existe la amenaza de una disminución significativa de los pedidos que probablemente contribuya a que la economía se siga contrayendo»."

Da fonte 2:

"the German economic engine is facing structural headwinds, weakening the country in the long term as geopolitical tensions mount.

The exports that powered growth in the 2010s—propelled by Asian demand for German cars, machinery, and chemicals—ran out of steam in 2018

...

Now, while globalization has not gone into reverse, it is changing form, and not in Germany’s favor. China’s car exports are exploding, supplanting Germany as the second biggest exporter  and threatening Japan’s spot at the top of the global auto market. Beijing is also upgrading its machinery sector. Ironically, Berlin has exacerbated the competitive threat that is now emerging with little regard for a level playing field with China. 

...

Germany also made little progress in cutting red tape or reducing unwarranted protections for professional service like tax or legal services, which both stifle competition and keep prices unnecessarily high. This makes it harder to start or scale-up a business."

Mais sintomas de como o mundo está a mudar

Mais sintomas de como o mundo está a mudar. 

"When Bayard Winthrop, the chief executive of the retailer American Giant, ordered the batch of shirts that his company would advertise for the Fourth of July, he didn't think much of it. The retailer, which has been producing its apparel solely in factories around the United States for more than a decade, perennially leans into its "Made in America" pitch for Independence Day.

This year's crew-neck T-shirts are fittingly available in red, white or blue with very little embellishment other than getting straight to the point: Letters that read "American Made." They cost $60 each. And they sold out in the first day. Then he ordered another set, which also sold out quickly as well. The company is scrambling to secure its fourth order.

For American Giant, this is shaping up to be its most lucrative Fourth of July yet. The company has been using its "Made in America" status to advertise to consumers since its founding in 2012. But, Mr. Winthrop said, it is now reaching customers at a time when chatter about the global supply chain, re-shoring, trade deal loopholes and sustainability in fashion has moved beyond boardrooms and policy circles. 

Sixty-five percent of U.S. adults said they intentionally bought "Made in America" products over the past year, according to a Morning Consult survey released last month. That's about the same rate of U.S. adults who said they had those same intentions last year.

...

The reality is much of that apparel is made overseas and imported. 

... 

Since the 1990s, production of apparel sold by major American retailers has largely moved overseas, especially to China, which brings heightened tensions between the United States and China into the equation for those companies.

The pandemic also strained the global supply chain, disrupting the reliability of imports. In some cases, retailers are moving production closer to the United States or sourcing a wider share of the goods they sell domestically.

In the past month, lawmakers in Washington have introduced a series of bills seeking to close off a shipping channel that allows companies like the fast-fashion retailers Shein and Temu - both founded in China - from benefiting from a trade rule, which allows them to forgo paying fees at U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Lawmakers argue this would level the playing field for American-based retailers."

Recordar o recente Sonho ... deliro. O paralelismo para Portugal tem de ser ao nível do Made in Europe.

Entretanto, ontem encontrei esta frase:

"The more immersed we become in a changing culture, the more we need to be reminded of what is timeless and fundamental." 

Trechos retirados de "Shirt Maker Has Patriotism Down to a U.S.A. -Made ' Tee" publicado no NYT de 2 de Julho último.

Sonho ... deliro.

Está quase a fazer dois anos que o primeiro ministro foi descrito assim:

"Ao dr. Costa interessa tanto o que se vai passar daqui a três anos, como a mim o que se vai passar daqui a 300. O dr. Costa quer saber da semana que vem. O que é desesperante é que a direita nem a semana que vem percebe."

 Dali só podemos esperar competência(?) no jogo do imediato. Por isso, seria interessante que um bloco central qualquer, para remover reacções epidérmicas, se reunisse para pensar o futuro, e preparar um conjunto de propostas sobre como criar condições para tirar partido da re-industriialização da Europa. Não seria para escolher campeões, não seria para distribuir dinheiro pelos amigos, mas para, na linguagem de Bloomberg como mayor de New York, pôr a mesa.

A revolução está aí:

"A global arms race to reindustrialise is under way, reversing long-established trends in many advanced economies. The forces driving this race - decarbonisation, deglobalisation, remilitarisation - are likely to have lasting implications for the global macroeconomy and may even help it break free from secular stagnation.

...

Underpinning this shift has been a relocation of manufacturing production from west to east and an accompanying reconfiguration of global supply chains. [Moi ici: Recordar "já não precisamos da vossa ajuda" ] This was made possible by successive waves of trade liberalisation, culminating in China's accession into the World Trade Organization in 2001. These trends were then amplified by the activist industrial policies pursued by countries such as China and Singapore, policies typically not matched in the west.

...

The past few years, however, have seen a new industrial age beginning to take shape, with global manufacturing undergoing a revival, in particular in the west. This has been underpinned by three distinct global arms races.

...

This new industrial age is also beginning to reverse some of the secular macro trends of the past. Fractured supply chains are raising global prices, causing inflation targets to overshoot and interest rates to rise. Public and private money is flooding into manufacturing projects, irrigating firms dehydrated by the investment drought. Higher investment plans are also helping absorb the global savings glut, with global real interest rates rising by over 1 percentage point so far.

Most arms races leave no one better off. Today's race to reindustrialise is different. It mav be just the impetus the world needs to break free of its economic and environmental torpor."

Sonho... deliro.

Trechos retirados de "The industrial arms race is just what we need" publicado no FT de ontem.

Confundir efeito com causa (parte II)

Confundir efeito com causa (parte I) 

Por causa do fácil versus o difícil temos:

• as frases de Maliranta e de Nassim Taleb que ao longo dos anos vamos citando aqui no blogue;
• a pirâmide do flying geese

Há dias escrevemos este postal, Emprego, marketing e subida na escala de valor, onde abordamos o tema da destruição de emprego qualificado e o crescimento do emprego não qualificado. Nestes postais, Tudo vai depender do tal jogo de forças (parte V), e Turn, turn, turn - versão de 2023, abordo o impacte da saída da produção industrial na China.

Ontem, no WJS encontrei "The Disappearing White-Collar Job" onde li:

"For generations of Americans, a corporate job was a path to stable prosperity. No more.

The jobs lost in a monthslong cascade of white-collar layoffs triggered by overhiring and rising interest rates might never return, corporate executives and economists say.

...

"We may be at the peak of the need for knowledge workers," [Moi ici: Típico pensamento anglo-saxónico] said Atif Rafig, a former chief digital officer at McDonald's and Volvo. "We just need fewer people to do the same thing."

Long after robots began taking manufacturing jobs, artificial intelligence is now coming for the higher-ups-accountants, software programmers, human-resources, specialists and lawyers-and converging with unyielding pressure on companies to operate more efficiently.

...

During past periods when higher interest rates pitched the U.S. economy into recession, job losses were often led by industries most sensitive to rate changes, such as manufacturing and construction.

...

Layoffs in the information sector were up 88% in March from a vear earlier and up 55% in finance and insurance, the data show. For manufacturing, they were up 25% ever the same period.

Companies are for the moment focused on keeping bluecollar employees-restaurant servers, warehouse workers, drivers and the like-who remain in short supply, according to economists and humanresources specialists.

...

Whole Foods and Disney announced layoffs in recent weeks that largely hit corporate staff while sparing such customer-service jobs as grocery clerk and hourly theme park attendant. 

...

Payroll data from more than 300,000 small- and medium-size businesses showed that wages for new hires had generally declined in April from a year ago but fell most rapidly in white-collar professions, such as finance and insurance"

O desconhecido difícil para os agentes portugueses é conhecido fácil para agentes estrangeiros - daí  Tamanho, produtividade e a receita irlandesa.

Já há uns tempos que sinto que estamos a ficar maduros para uma revolução semelhante à que Cavaco encabeçou quando libertou a economia à iniciativa privada (bancos, televisões, jornais, empresas nacionalizadas com o 11 de Março...) pena que alguns se distraiam com a engenharia social.

Slowbalization (parte II)

E se for mais do que isso? 

"A.P. Moller-Maersk on Thursday posted a sharp drop in first-quarter net profit as inventory corrections in Western economies sent shipping demand falling, pushing freight rates and volumes lower.

The Danish shipping giant expects the destocking effort, the result of an enormous inventory buildup last vear that left retailers swamped with goods, to wind down by the end of the second quarter but that trade volumes are still contracting.

"So far we don't see a strong move towards normalization. Some customers are getting to the end of destocking, but it's not consistent," Chief Executive Vincent Clerc said."

Recordo os recentes:

• Turn, turn, turn - versão de 2023
• Slowbalization
• O choque chinês, não o euro

Trecho retirado de "Maersk Hit by Drop In Freight Demand" publicado no WSJ de ontem.

Turn, turn, turn - versão de 2023

Recentemente escrevi, O choque chinês, não o euro. Agora, imaginem o impacte da reversão deste choque... por isso, tenho escrito esta série de postais - Tudo vai depender do tal jogo de forças (parte V).

Para reflexão:

"China’s days of being the Western world’s go-to manufacturing hub may be coming to an end. This has serious ramifications for China, and the world. Depending on where you focus, this is a good thing, or a bad thing. In fact, it’s probably both.

...

For those with contacts in China, stories of laid off young people struggling to afford their apartments, taking on two jobs in gig economies, or becoming escorts in karaoke bars is becoming commonplace. This is not the country that the CCP once held together with promise of opportunity and quick climbs up the Chinese social ladder. This is starting to turn into America of the late 1990s-2000s, reeling for China’s take over of American tooling and steel, textiles and furniture manufacturing. Many people here know what that feels like.

...

The problem is geopolitics. [Moi ici: Recordar Taiwan como espelho da Ucrânia - Cash, then value, then growth] That should scare China’s investors more. They know the drill already. Companies are slow walking out of China because of those tensions. This includes Chinese companies investing in Southeast Asia to avoid trade tariffs, sanctions, and growing political risk. [Moi ici: Recordar Lembram-se do "banhista gordo"?]

To keep its business with the Americans (and to a lesser extent, the Europeans) Chinese companies are moving off the mainland.

...

In a country with roughly 900 million workers, many of whom are blue collar and not about to “learn to code”, these job losses tear at the social contract between the CCP and its people. Roughly 17% of Chinese people have a college degree compared to around 36% in the U.S., according to Chinese and U.S. government stats.

...

Either China figures out a way to consume what it produces at home rather than relying on the U.S. consumer, [Moi ici: Eu pensei nisto em 2008. Recordo Especulação. No entanto, Peter Zaihan alerta-nos para o colapso demográfico chinês, O futuro da globalização. Só para ter uma ideia do impacte da coisa repito aqui o número tremendo "The Chinese are going to lose a greater percentage of their population in the next 20 years from aging than Europe did in the Black Plague, according to Peter Zeihan"] or Beijing makes it less attractive for companies to set up shop in Vietnam. If they cannot do those things, the bloodletting will continue. If this trend goes on, it should be seen as a harbinger of worse things to come.

...

China used to make almost all of our clothes. Not anymore. That’s job losses for China.

...

U.S. imports of China made apparel decreased from about $25 billion in 2018 to about $17 billion in 2021, according to a March 2023 report by the International Trade Commission (ITC).

Imports of these goods from China declined but imports from the rest of the world grew by 25.2%. The ITC estimated a sizable decline in apparel manufacturing imports from China of 40% between 2020 and 2021, while U.S. production increased by up to 6.3% in 2021 in response.

The ITC study looked at 10 different sectors. In all 10, China exports to the U.S. fell. Computer equipment from China fell around 7%; furniture imports fell 25%; electronics equipment imports fell by 40%. Automotive parts imports fell a whopping 50%, according to the ITC.

...

China and Hong Kong’s investment into Mexico rose six-fold from $117.1 million in 2015 to nearly $700 million in 2022, according to the Mexican government.

Chinese manufacturing growth might have peaked.

China’s future growth industries could pick up some of this labor, but very little. Robotics will be good for China blue collar labor, but biotech, pharma, and AI will not as making the shift from seamstress to scientist is quite the stretch. So is going from Chinese solar panel maker to AI coder. It is also unlikely that lower skilled office jobs can pick up the blue collar workforce losing out to outsourcing.

...

China is surely not a dying manufacturing power. Europe would be in worse shape, for sure. China can turn the ship around, but if it comes at America’s expense, that will be totally unsustainable.

But China’s days as manufacturer of nearly everything in your house and garden shed look to be pretty much over. That’s a lot of workers whose future is in question for the first time in a generation.

...

the bad news is that the erosion of China’s role as go-to manufacturer will likely become a matter of life and death — for industries, for businesses, for some people."

Trechos retirados de "China's Big Troubles: Its Days As Global Go-To Manufacturer May Be Coming To An End"

Slowbalization

 Imagem retirada daqui.

Slowbalization, uma palavra a entrar no nosso vocabulário.

Inflação e desemprego industrial (parte II)

Ainda a propósito de Inflação e desemprego industrial estes trechos do JdN de 28.02 passado no artigo "Empresas portuguesas mais optimistas, na UE não":

Sinais mistos sobre andamento da economia 

O resultado dos inquéritos de conjuntura da Comissão Europeia não era o antecipado pelos analistas.

"A estabilização do indicador de sentimento económico em fevereiro contrasta com as subidas expressivas do PMI e confirma que a economia europeia vai ter sérias dificuldades este ano", comenta Andrew Kenningham, da Capital Economics. Recorde-se que a atividade empresarial da Zona Euro, medida pelo índice PMI (divulgado na semana passada) acelerou em fevereiro para um pico de nove meses, sugerindo um crescimento económico do início do ano."

E de ontem, "Eurozone economy expands at strongest pace since June 2022". 

Inflação e desemprego industrial

Inflação e desemprego industrial.

Primeiro, a inflação. Nos últimos meses tenho pensado num título que recordava ter ouvido citar há vários anos. Ontem pesquisei-o e cheguei a "Give Sam Walton the Nobel Prize" e encontrei o que procurava:

"The world's largest retailer, Walmart shrugs off the controversy for a simple reason: The stuff it sells is cheap. Beyond its immense buying power (which sucks profit margins from suppliers), its incredibly efficient logistics systems and sourcing from low-wage foreign labor allow Walmart to drive down the cost of making and shipping many of its products. And Walmart is only the most visible example of a far bigger phenomenon: Globally, even in places thousands of miles from the nearest blue-shirted greeter, more efficient production and transportation are reducing the prices of many of the basic goods purchased by the world's poorest people. If that's rapacious, Walmart-style capitalism, let's have more!

...

Walmart’s low prices come in part from relying on efficient production in developing countries. Of course it isn’t just Walmart’s procurement agents who are buying cheap stuff from Asia; pretty much the whole world is, including retailers from Bangalore to Bangui. That’s because manufacturers in China, India, and elsewhere have become particularly adept at producing low-cost versions of goods demanded by "bottom of the pyramid" consumers — otherwise known as the world’s poorest people."

Agora pensem no que acontecerá se a globalização der lugar à desglobalização, der lugar ao nearshoring e ao reshoring como temos referido ao longo dos anos aqui no blogue. O regresso da inflação provocado pelo aumento dos custos de produção (mão de obra mais cara e sistemas de produção menos eficientes).

Agora pensem no que acontecerá se a globalização der lugar à desglobalização, der lugar ao nearshoring e ao reshoring como temos referido ao longo dos anos aqui no blogue. Uma certa reindustrialização do Ocidente:

• O fim da globalização (parte II) (Julho de 2022)
• Quem é este morcão? (Junho de 2022)
• Os suspeitos do costume (Janeiro de 2013)
• A reindustrialização em curso (Dezembro de 2012)

Uma das Consequências da reindustrialização em curso (Fevereiro de 2023) será o aumento da procura por operários, por colarinhos azuis. Por isto, e por causa da política de imigração de Trump/Biden os salários dos colarinhos azuis nos Estados Unidos têm aumentado muito acima do resto do mercado de trabalho.

Ontem encontrei este artigo, "There's A White-Collar 'Richcession,' While Blue-Collar And Frontline Workers See Wage Growth And More Job Opportunities" e bate tudo certo:

"Typically, the working class and blue-collar workers are the most impacted in challenging economic climates. However, this time, it's different. The wealthy and high-paid, whitecollar professionals are facing what is being called a "richcession," according to the Wall Street Journal."

Mex-ina

"It was January 2022, and Mr. Chan's company, Man Wah Furniture Manufacturing, was confronting grave challenges in moving sofas from its factories in China to customers in the United States. Shipping prices were skyrocketing. Washington and Beijing were locked in a fierce trade war.

Man Wah, one of China's largest furniture companies, was eager to make its products on the North American side of the Pacific.

"Our main market is the United States," said Mr. Chan, chief executive of Man Wah's Mexico subsidiary. "We don't want to lose that market."

That same objective explains why scores of major Chinese companies are investing aggressively in Mexico, taking advantage of an expansive North American trade deal. [Moi ici: Os pró-Biden demonizam a trumpeconomics, os pró-Trump demonizam tudo o que Biden faz, mas na economia Biden segue e amplia o que Trump fez. Como diz Zeihan México, Estados Unidos e Canadá formam um bloco doméstico] Tracing a path forged by Japanese and South Korean companies, Chinese firms are establishing factories that allow them to label their goods "Made in Mexico," then trucking their products into the United States duty-free.

The interest of Chinese manufacturers in Mexico is part of a broader trend known as nearshoring. International companies are moving production closer to customers to limit their vulnerability to shipping problems and geopolitical tensions." [Moi ici: O movimento é muito mais motivado pela economia do que pela política, em minha opinião. Num mundo mais incerto é cada vez mais racional ter a produção perto do consumo. Claro que a erosão da diferença de custos também ajuda.]

Trecho retirado de "Why Chinese Companies Are Investing Billions in Mexico" 

A grande mudança

Ando a ouvir o podcast #1921-Peter Zeihan - The Joe Rogan Experience. É impressionante a opinião de Zeihan acerca da China e da sua situação demográfica. Por exemplo, segundo ele a China nas próximas décadas vai perder mais população (em%) do que a Europa durante a Peste Negra.

Entretanto, ontem de manhã iniciei o dia com este tweet:

um tipo ouve @PeterZeihan, com Joe Rogan, a fazer previsões negativas sobre o futuro da China. Depois, lê: "As imobiliárias chinesas tiveram acesso a um financiamento equivalente a cerca de 15 mil milhões de euros em dezembro, uma subida de 33,4% face ao período homólogo."
...

— Carlos P da Cruz 🇺🇦🚜🇳🇱🇬🇪 (@ccz1) January 9, 2023

Depois, apanhei este artigo no Jdn, "O lamento de um otimista sobre a China" que termina deste modo:

"Com uma população em idade trabalhadora cada vez menor, a China, até há pouco tempo a maior história mundial de crescimento, precisa de acelerar o crescimento da produção para recuperar essa posição. No entanto, o maior ênfase de Xi na segurança, poder e controlo vem minar a produtividade, na altura em que a China mais precisa dela. O milagre do crescimento apenas pode sofrer como consequência.

A China chegou muito perto da terra prometida. A sua economia moderna estava numa trajetória extraordinária. A agenda de reequilibrio prometeu mais. Mas Xi quebrou essa promessa. A economia política da autocracia atirou água fria à cara daqueles, como nós, que costumavam ser convictos otimistas em relação à China."

Que associei a este artigo recebido recentemente, "Be Ready for the Manufacturing Renaissance" e a vários trechos encontrados aqui e acolá. Por exemplo, no artigo "Brasileiros à conquista de fábricas portuguesas de calçado" no Dinheiro Vivo com:

""a surpresa do ano" está no comportamento dos Estados Unidos, país que ultrapassou a Colômbia e ocupa agora a quarta posição nos maiores destinos das exportações do setor [Moi ici: Calçado e componentes de calçado produzidos no Brasil], com quase nove milhões de dólares (8,5 milhões de euros), um acréscimo de 56% face a 2021."

Tudo vai depender do tal jogo de forças (parte VI)

Continuação desta serie - Tudo vai depender do tal jogo de forças (parte V)

• Manufacturing orders from China down 40% in unrelenting demand collapse

"U.S. manufacturing orders in China are down 40 percent, 

...

Unlike the decrease in orders out of China, trade data analyzed by Project44 indicates that the Europe-to-U.S. route is "one of the possibly most surprising and certainly most significant developments since early 2020," Brazil said.

"This sharp rise cannot be explained by the pandemic alone. But a strategic shift from over-dependency on trade with China and geopolitical tensions over Russia are the main drivers of the EU-U.S. trade boom," he said.

...

This year, the U.S. has imported more goods from Europe than China – a big shift from the 2010s, according to Project 44.

"For their part, Europe's manufacturers battling sky-high energy prices and inflation are increasingly exporting to and investing in the U.S.," Brazil said.

Germany's exports to the U.S. were almost 50% higher in September year over year. Germany's mechanical engineering sector has boosted its exports to the U.S. by almost 20% in a year over year comparison of the first nine months of 2022, according to Project 44."

Isto representa um alento para as PMEs tugas, mas não haja ilusões isto são exportações a base de preço espremido.

• Apple Accelerating Supply Chain Retreat From China After iPhone Factory Chaos

"WSJ said Apple is "telling suppliers to plan more actively for assembling Apple products elsewhere in Asia, particularly India and Vietnam, they say, and looking to reduce dependence on Taiwanese assemblers led by Foxconn.""

Recordar o efeito do banhista gordo - As banheiras pequenas enchem depressa 

É transitória ...

Lembro-me de há muitos anos ter lido algures que a Wal-Mart e a China deveriam receber um prémio qualquer do governo americano pelo quanto ajudavam a controlar a inflação.

Em Maio de 2020 citava aqui:

"The deflationary environment created by rising Chinese exports and globalisation is over."

Algo que em Dezembro de 2021 traduzi aqui:

"Com a crise de 2008 começou a desglobalização, o aumento da importância do factor proximidade produção-consumo. Agora, com os confinamentos, com as quarentenas, com as cadeias de fornecimento pouco ágeis num mundo de incerteza...

...

Os impactes da desglobalização serão:

• mais emprego; (falta de mão de obra) e
• preços mais altos (inflação)"

Ontem em "Who will pay for the shift from efficiency to resilience?" encontrei:

"Are we entering a new era of wealth redistribution? Or will the imbalances between capital and labour that have characterised the past half century of economic history linger on?

...

In many OECD countries, there has been a decoupling of productivity and wages over the past 40 years, during which time business has claimed a larger share of national income gains. 

...

Deglobalization, which will favor local labor markets in some industries, is beginning to shift that dynamic. So will the aging population, which will create a structurally tighter labor market as well as millions of new onshore healthcare jobs. [Moi ici: Escrevi aqui sobre como a demografia criará uma ou mais gerações de "Figos" - "Escrevi aqui algures que um dia seríamos (os nossos descendentes) todos tratados como Figos."]

But the third part of the capital and labor story is the increasing pressure on companies to empower consumers and the state at a time of rising costs. Inflation happens for all sorts of reasons, but one of a them is a shift in economic focus from efficiency to resilience. [Moi ici: O que escrevo aqui desde 2008 sobre nearshoring and reshoring e ultimamente sobre o risco político] Both the public and private sectors want to buffer themselves against climate change, geopolitics and market shifts. Changes in supply chains, reserve currency allocations and tax policies are all part of this. But resilience costs money. The question is: who is going to pay?"

Portanto, cuidado com o apagador usado pelos mata-borrões que não passam de fragilistas encartados.