Acho estranho ...

No FT de hoje "Novartis plans to spin off generics unit Sandoz in October".

Em empresas pequenas este tipo de decisão devia ser tomada mais vezes. Empresas pequenas têm poucos recursos e devem concentrar-se onde podem fazer a diferença. Em empresas pequenas, normalmente, um dos negócios vive à custa do outro. E recuo a Jonathan Byrnes, a Kotler e à curva de Stobachoff. Em empresas pequenas, sem "plant-within-the-plant", a gestão comporta-se como um esquizofrénico que às segundas, terças e quartas olha para as bolas vermelhas como artesanato, e às quintas, sextas e Sábados olha para as bolas vermelhas como produção em série. Resultado: desempenho zombie.

Em empresas grandes, com acesso a recursos humanos que se podem focar em coisas diferentes... acho estranho. Quer isto dizer que quem pensa a corporação não vê capacidade de criar valor na pertença da Novartis e da Sandoz a um mesmo todo. 

Inveja da Novo Nordisk?

Seguir a onda?

Num cenário polarizado ...

Há muitos anos que aqui no blogue, praticamente desde a primeira hora, escrevo sobre a importância de seleccionar os clientes-alvo e trabalhar para eles. Por exemplo, em 2006 escrevia sobre o perigo de ser uma Arca de Noé:

• Deixar de ser uma Arca de Noé
• Porque não podemos ser uma Arca de Noé!

A reforçar esta mensagem de focalização nos clientes-alvo, tenho desenvolvido aqui também a metáfora de Mongo, um mundo pleno de variedade e de tribos numa paisagem enrugada:

• 1 Origem de uma metáfora
• Criatividade e Mongo
• Covid, empresas, estratégias e paisagens enrugadas

Às vezes criticam-me porque supostamente no mundo actual as empresas tanto podem servir em simultâneo gregos como troianos. No entanto, continuo na minha, ainda na semana passada li, "Why Mushroom Leather (and Other New Materials) Are Struggling to Scale":

"Compare the number of venture capital firms funding software to the number of venture firms specialising in material innovation or fashion. There are far fewer.

The reasons for the chasm are structural. Once a software solution is invented, the marginal cost to distribute the second, third and one millionth sale are close to zero. By contrast, once a new material is invented, the marginal costs for subsequent units are nearly the same. It is only with learning and scale that costs begin to decrease.

At the same time, building the capacity to produce new materials often requires considerable capital expenditure to build out infrastructure."

Entretanto, ontem li "The Myth of the Mainstream":

"Chasing the mass market is a losing proposition for marketers in a polarized culture. Allying with the subculture that loves you is the best way to drive brand success.

...

For years, McDonald's seemed to embody everything that was wrong with the American diet. The brand had become a symbol of food choices that were driving escalating rates of obesity and hypertension.

The company spent more than a decade trying to fight this perception among American consumers by targeting them with messaging about its updated menu, which offered healthier alternatives more in line with contemporary diet trends - but to no avail. Year over year, McDonald's sales declined, and its brand perception continued to spiral downward.

...

Finally, the company decided to go on the offensive. Instead of combating the opposition's hate and attempting to win over those in the middle, McDonald's decided to focus on its fans - the people who self-identify as McDonald's devotees despite the vitriol directed at the brand. 

...

In doing so, it tapped into what these devotees love about McDonald's and not only activated their collective consumption but also inspired them to spread the word on behalf of the brand. The result of this strategy was a 10.4% increase in global revenue for McDonald's from 2018 to 2021 and the return of dormant customers: more than a quarter of those who came in to buy the Travis Scott meal, for example, hadn't visited the chain in over a year. Seemingly overnight, McDonald's went from being a cautionary tale to the darling of brand marketing and a case study for advertising effectiveness.

If you want to get people to move, you must choose a side. The notion that you can win by playing to the middle is a misleading myth.

What's going on here? Conventional wisdom would tell us that in a world of increasingly polarized opinions, our best bet is to appease the middle, if only because that's where the majority of the market is. That also seems like a safe bet to many companies, as a middle-of-the-road position is less likely to alienate potential customers.

...

The middle doesn't adopt new products with any urgency. They are not the first to respond to marketing communications, nor are they likely to weigh in on a debate between advocates and detractors. They mitigate their own risk of moving out of step with what might be considered generally acceptable by stepping back and observing other people's responses first.

The red herring is that we perceive this indifference as an opportunity to persuade them to one side or the other. But the truth is, they are not typically convinced by any marketing communications. Instead, they, too, take cues from other people - sometimes those who are for you, and at other times those who are against you.

Our chances of successfully influencing behavior increases when we choose to address the people who are most likely to take action.

With this in mind, it becomes abundantly clear that in a polarized scenario, the chances of marketers getting people to move are far greater when we activate the collective of the willing as opposed to trying to convince detractors or even persuade the indifferent."

Sobre a polarização do mercado, recordo Polarização do mercado ou como David e Golias podem co-existir. 

Música para os meus ouvidos

"When the Covid-19 pandemic subsides, the world is going to look markedly different. The supply shock that started in China in February and the demand shock that followed as the global economy shut down exposed vulnerabilities in the production strategies and supply chains of firms just about everywhere.
...
Yet many things are not going to change. Consumers will continue to want low prices (especially in a recession), and firms won’t be able to charge more just because they manufacture in higher-cost home markets. Competition will ensure that. In addition, the pressure to operate efficiently and use capital and manufacturing capacity frugally will remain unrelenting.
.
The challenge for companies will be to make their supply chains more resilient without weakening their competitiveness."

É sempre assim: num mundo com cada vez mais incerteza uma das respostas é mais governo, mais centralização, mais regras. Os trechos que se seguem são música para os meus ouvidos:

"During the pandemic, when demand surged in many product categories, manufacturers struggled to shift from supplying one market segment to supplying another, or from making one kind of product to making another. A case in point is the U.S. groceries market, where companies had difficulty adjusting to the plunge in demand from restaurants and cafeterias and the rise in consumer demand. SKU proliferation—the addition of different forms of the same product to serve different market segments—was partly responsible.
...
[Moi ici: O trecho que se segue revela um pensamento tão "básico" que me interrogo como pode aparecer na mesma revista que publicou os artigos de Drucker e Christensen. Acham mesmo que o leito ou a manteiga para o canal HORECA é compatível com o leite e a manteiga para o consumidor final? Quantidades e embalagem? Se o produto fosse exactamente o mesmo seria entregue pelos mesmos canais? Come on!!!] Separating demand into many different SKUs makes forecasting more difficult, and trying to fill needs by substituting products during periods of shortage causes a real scramble. The lesson: Companies should reconsider the pros and cons of producing numerous product variations."[Moi ici: Música para os meus ouvidos]

A HBR escreve para um público-alvo que é composto sobretudo por empresas grandes. Empresas grandes são as empresas que estão contra Mongo, que querem servir todo o tipo de clientes. é claro que essas empresas gostariam muito de acabar com a maldita variedade que Mongo traz.

As PMEs que têm pensamento estratégico estão no lado oposto, apostam no aumento da variedade, escolhem um tipo de cliente-alvo e procuram servi-lo obsessivamente.

Trechos retirados de "Global Supply Chains in a Post-Pandemic World"

Colapso do meio-termo e a polarização do mercado

O capítulo 4 - "The Collapse of the Middle" do livro “Remarkable Retail” de Steve Dennis foi uma revisão de temas que são tratados neste blogue quase desde o seu início.

"As we take a closer look, however, we start to see what I first explored in a 2011 blog post as the “death of the middle.” Then, a couple of years later, I began referring to this phenomenon as “retail’s great bifurcation” — a title later borrowed for an excellent Deloitte study, which I will discuss below."

Aqui no blogue a primeira vez que se escreveu sobre a morte do meio-termo - o stuck in the middle - e a polarização dos mercados foi em Abril e Maio de 2006 - Porque não podemos ser uma Arca de Noé! (II).

...
What we see, on the one hand, is that many retailers that are strongly focused on the value end of the spectrum—i.e., great prices, extensive merchandise assortments, and a highly convenient and efficient buying experience—are growing both sales and number of stores. At the other end of the spectrum, many brands that focus on offering unique products, more personalized service, and a more upscale and distinctive shopping experience are also gaining share and continuing to open more locations.
As the chart above illustrates, the problems in physical retail (and in troubled brands more broadly) are highly concentrated among those retailers trapped in what I call the boring, undifferentiated middle, or what Deloitte labels, somewhat charitably, “Balanced.”[Moi ici: O mesmo padrão por todo o lado, não é só no retalho físico, é em todos os sectores económicos ]
...
What Deloitte found was that high-income households have captured a disproportionate share of income growth in recent years. Indeed, the rich are getting richer, as the top 20 percent captured over 100 percent of income growth between 2007 and 2015.
...
For most Americans, however, the outcomes are quite different. They are downright depressing. For 80 percent of households, income growth has either declined or remained stagnant, while costs of non-discretionary expenses like healthcare, education, and other household essentials continue to increase, often markedly.
...
The implications for retail are significant. As both discretionary income and overall wealth have risen sharply for the affluent class, many are spending their gains on both products and services, often trading up to ever more expensive items. At the other end, for the other 80 percent who are getting squeezed harshly, total spending power has declined. As a result, their sensitivity to prices and stretching their dollars even further has greatly increased.
...
Department stores in particular have been swimming in a sea of sameness for decades. Now they are drowning.
The retailers that are struggling typically have both strategic and executional issues. From a business design standpoint they often sit in the middle of the price spectrum, offering neither great product value and convenience nor anything unique from a product, experience, or service standpoint. They sell fairly average “safe” products to the great masses of the population. A little bit of everything for everybody, nothing that special—or remarkable—for anybody. [Moi ici: A agonia de quem vende para o Normalistão quando o mundo está a ficar cheio de tribos. O nosso velho Estranhistão, ou Mongo]
...
These brands act like they are still in business. They think that some customers still really care whether they stay or they go.
I see dead brands. And they don’t even know they’re dead."[Moi ici: Recordo a metáfora do Rádio Clube Português ]

"the importance of saying “no”"

Dizer não, é difícil e, muitas vezes, nunca chega a ser enunciado. Afirmamos as escolhas do que decidimos fazer e não clarificamos as escolhas do que não queremos, ou não devemos fazer. Por vezes isso dá asneira grossa. Sobretudo quando se compete em mercados muito competitivos, mercados polarizados (um link de Maio de 2006) e cheios de salami-slicers, não de Bruce Jenners. Segue-se aquela sensação de não ser nem carne, nem peixe, um stuck-in-the-middle, um médio que não se diferencia, que não emociona ninguém, que não tem inimigos.

"Remember the days when Tim Cook would brag about how Apple’s product line could fit on a single table? It would be much harder to make that claim today.
...
When Jobs returned to Apple in 1997, he slashed the company’s product line to a few core products and preached the importance of saying “no” — not just to ideas you don’t like, but also to those you love if they don’t work within the larger vision. [Moi ici: Recordar "the next big thing"] He revitalized the company with a focused product line, which helped grow its cult following. [Moi ici: Recordar o recente "The paradox of focusing on a niche"] As Apple’s values change, this kind of focus is under threat.
...
Apple under Jobs wasn’t perfect. Jobs certainly wasn’t either. But it’s undeniable that Apple stood for something that redefined our expectations of personal computing and mobile devices. The company’s products looked great, and the options were streamlined, not confusing. Their prices were aspirational but, usually, attainable.
.
Cook’s Apple has shifted from focusing on the products to focusing on the share price."

Trechos retirados de "Apple’s Product Line Is a Mess"

Não é nem roubo nem desigualdade

Recomendo uma reflexão baseada em dois textos de Niraj Dawar.

O primeiro texto é "The Critical Role Of Context In Building Brands" e parte do vídeo com alguns anos, que muitos terão visto, de um reputado violinista a tocar anonimamente no metro de Washington, quando dias antes tinha enchido o Symphony Hall de Boston com os bilhetes a $100. A mensagem de Dawar é: o contexto é tudo.

"But ultimately, where does context reside? In the mind of the customer. By creating context, marketers play with the customers’ mind. They shape it to create the most receptive setting for the brand and the product."

O meu ponto de vista é: não podemos servir todo o tipo de clientes e para alguns, ainda que o nosso produto ou serviço seja de topo, não seremos a melhor solução pois o resultado que procuram obter nas suas vidas pode ser conseguido com uma oferta alternativa, ou mais barata, ou mais fácil, ou mais luxuosa, ou mais amizade genuína, ou mais ...

O segundo texto é "Brands And The Consumer Hourglass Theory" e vai de encontro a muitos desabafos que faço quando vejo empresas a deixarem dinheiro em cima da mesa - Damn! It's not about the price!!!

"Citigroup calls it the Hourglass Theory. As income inequality increases, consumers are polarizing into two groups – the few looking for high-end, highly differentiated and high value-added products, and the many looking for value, and sometimes extreme value.
.
The middle, which was the staple target market of consumer goods companies since at least the mid-twentieth century, has shrunk, and continues to shrink." [Moi ici: Isto faz-nos recuar a 2005 e à polarização dos mercados]

O ponto de Dawar, com o qual estou totalmente de acordo, é que isto, o desaparecimento do mercado do meio termo, não acontece por causa do aumento das desigualdades económicas. Quantas pessoas conhecem com um bruto carrão, e que não têm onde cair mortas com dívidas? Quantos estudantes não querem gastar um cêntimo em livros e propinas, mas não hesitam em ir à discoteca da moda derreter dinheiro? [Apesar desta linguagem não faço julgamentos de valor, cada um é livre de decidir onde e como gastar o seu dinheiro, a menos que depois eu tenha de contribuir para fazer o bail-out de uns quaisquer lesados-[colocar nome dos maus de turno]]

"But while the data on income inequality are incontrovertible, there is another explanation for the hourglass that marketers should not rule out: attention scarcity.
.
What if the scarce commodity at the source of the hour glass is not so much consumer income or spending, but consumer interest and attention?
.
Consider for a moment that consumers now make thousands of purchase decisions in hundreds of product categories every year. They can’t possibly be experts in all of these product categories, nor do they have an interest in optimizing their choice in each product category. They just want something that will do the job."

Acredito profundamente nisto que se segue:

"for most of the thousands of choices consumers make, they merely want a reasonable product – give me something that works at a price that makes sense. This is the very definition of value.
Some consumers are willing to spend the time to learn about product categories about which they are passionate, and are usually also willing to spend more money on the better products in those categories. For all other product categories, they couldn’t care less.
...
So the bifurcation of the market into what looks like an hourglass occurs, but due to attention disparity, not income disparity.
.
If it is interest and consumer attention that are creating the hourglass"

Por isso, tento convencer os empresários que quando um concorrente conquista um cliente que entra num mercado pela primeira vez, o mais certo é que esse cliente ainda não esteja no patamar [de atenção] que os torna como a oferta mais adequada. O seu interesse e conhecimento vai ter de aumentar porque, por exemplo, querem subir na escala de valor, só nessa altura estarão maduros para uma outra oferta.

E no seu caso, como é?

Um mundo polarizado (parte VI)

Parte I, parte II, parte III, parte IV e parte V. 

"It’s six years later and a similar malaise poisons the broader retail industry. Everyone is talking about the need for disruption, innovation and change, yet most stop well short of actually doing anything about it. Many retail brands talk about game-changing innovation but what we see are lukewarm iterations of existing concepts and old ideas. Retailers, it seems, lack the will or sense of urgency to effect significant and radical change.
.
Adding to the numbness is a continuous chorus of bloggers and retail pundits saying the “retail apocalypse” is overblown. They acknowledge that 8,642 retail stores will close in 2017 in North America alone, but somehow always work their way back to telling us the sky isn’t falling and we need not be overly concerned. Well, I’m here to tell you that the time for concern has passed. We’re well into “shit-yourself” territory.
...
E-commerce will soon drive the majority of sales.
You don’t need to multiply a small number by a big number too many times before the result is a huge number. Online retail is currently compounding globally at a rate somewhere between 12 and 35 percent, depending on where you do business. In the US, for example, even if nothing else changes, e-commerce will comprise 25 percent of total retail within 6 short years. In the UK that figure may exceed 30 percent. Perhaps most staggering of all is that within 3 years, three companies — Amazon, Alibaba and eBay — will control 40 percent of planet earth’s e-commerce. And this is just a warm-up. Within 15 years, e-commerce will overtake conventional retail sales in developed nations, as a new wave of pervasive technologies take hold."

Posso estar enganado, mas acredito fortemente no texto que se segue:

"Physical retail will no longer be a channel for buying
With the vast majority of our daily and weekly needs simply coming to us as necessary, the role and purpose of retail space will no longer be principally to sell products. Rather, these spaces will act as living, breathing physical portals into brand and product experiences. They will become places we go to learn, be inspired, see and try new things, experiment and co-create. Beyond mere consumption, we’ll go to these spaces for entertainment, education, connection and community. This is not to suggest that there will be no products for sale in these physical spaces, only that the emphasis will not be sales but rather on catalysing a relationship with the consumer that transcends the store. The way these spaces are planned, built, staffed, managed and measured will look and act nothing like the retail operations of today. My advice to retailers is to stop thinking “stores” and start thinking stories. Stop thinking “product” and start thinking productions."[Moi ici: Como não recordar as imagens do artigo] 

Trechos retirados de "To Save Retail, Let It Die"

Um mundo polarizado (parte V)

Parte I, parte II e parte III e parte IV.

Há dias foi a Toys 'R Us agora é a vez da Claire's, "Claire's is closing 92 stores as it files for bankruptcy — see if yours is on the list".

""This decline may be attributable to several factors, including competition from big-box retailers, large tenant closures (leaving malls without an 'anchor' tenant to drive foot traffic), and the increased popularity of online shopping," the company said."

Interessante esta justificação retirada de "We visited a Claire's store the day the teen retailer filed for bankruptcy" Recomendo a consulta do artigo e a observação das imagens... fizeram-me recordar o dia de Carnaval de 2005, 8 de Fevereiro. Nesse dia, ou no dia anterior, no telejornal "País, País" ao final da tarde passou uma reportagem sobre o encerramento das lojas tradicionais em Vila Real com a abertura de um centro comercial. Recordo um lojista a ser entrevistado na sua loja com as camisas de modelos arcaicos amontoadas no chão.

O que seria uma loja com o mesmo tipo de produtos, mas com menos tralha e com espaços de experimentação e teste?

Um mundo polarizado (parte IV)

Parte I, parte II e parte III.

"Deloitte undertook an extensive research process, devoting the better part of a year to examining the retail environment: studying official data; conducting a survey of over 2,000 participants; and drawing on the knowledge of our clients, industry contacts, and our own industry specialists. Our key finding: “Balanced” retailers (which deliver value through a combination of price and promotion) are generally doing worse than either price-based retailers (which deliver value by selling at the lowest possible prices) or premier retailers (which deliver value via premier or highly differentiated product and/or experience offerings). Specifically, premium retailers have seen their revenues soar 81 percent over the last five years, while price-based retailers have seen their revenues steadily increase 37 percent over the same period. This contrasts with balanced retailers, whose revenue has increased only 2 percent.1 What’s more, consumers are more likely to recommend premier or price-based retailers than balanced, suggesting that retailers at either end of the spectrum are more in tune with the changing needs and are better at meeting the expectations of consumers than those in the middle."

Trecho retirado de "The great retail bifurcation"

Um mundo polarizado (parte II)

Parte I.

Bem em linha com a minha versão acerca do futuro do retalho e em desalinhamento com as visões superficiais, "This is the real story of American retail":

"Forget all the “retail apocalypse” headlines. The phrase suggests the whole industry is collapsing, consulting firm Deloitte says. In reality, it’s not.
.
But it is changing in significant and fundamental ways.
...
There’s no apocalypse, Deloitte found, but there is a “renaissance” of sorts going on.

At the high and low ends, retail is thriving. It’s in the middle that it’s faltering.
...
According to Deloitte, more stores are actually opening than closing. But they’re all on the low and high ends. If you look at the middle only, the situation does look dire.

Os que vêem a ascensão da Amazon acham que o caminho que ela está a seguir é a única via, mas reparem na polarização.

Mundo polarizado - cuidado com o meio-termo

Foi numa revista da McKinsey de 2005 que primeiro li sobre o fenómeno da polarização dos mercados, "Porque não podemos ser uma Arca de Noé! (II)".

Todos conhecem o sucesso da Amazon como livraria digital. Menos, conhecem o sucesso das pequenas livrarias independentes:

• Sonho de um optimista ingénuo (parte III) (Setembro 2010)
• Mongo também passa por isto, pela batota (Agosto 2013)
• independentes e Mongo (Dezembro 2013)
• Estes são os meus heróis! (Maio 2014)
• Interessante, nestes tempos de Amazon, Mongo cresce (Janeiro 2015)
• Isto é bonito... (Otubro 2015)
• Quando o mundo muda há quem dê a volta (Novembro 2017)
• Empreendedores literários (Dezembro 2017)

Se os extremos estão bem o que acontecem aos do mercado do meio-termo? Um exemplo, "Bookstore Chains, Long in Decline, Are Undergoing a Final Shakeout":

"“Sales in our mall stores are down this year from 30 to 60 percent,” said Bill Streur, Book World’s owner. “The internet is killing retail. Bookstores are just the first to go.”
...
“There’s no way to compete against Amazon, which doesn’t care if it makes a profit,” said Erik Sanstad, the manager of the Mequon store. Still, he added: “I’m a little reluctant to say the internet killed Book World. We never advertised, never got our name out there.”"

Este discurso faz-me recordar "Talvez focar primeiro o valor e só depois o preço"

Tendências para a evolução dos media

"an increased demand for snack-sized formats and content available in a variety of sizes or lengths. Equally, the old model of edit first and publish second will be reversed, with content being published first and edited second (filtered by the audience). Long copy and rigorous analysis will become a specialist demand available on a pay-per-view basis, with journalists being compensated the same way. [Moi ici: Em linha com o que sempre escrevemos aqui, em vez de competir pelo pelo preço e tentar chegar a milhões, optar por trabalhar para nichos ou tribos underserved] Conversely, people will seek out quality content (judged, increasingly, by external links) regardless of format, length or even language. All of this will also create a high demand for quality search, editing and “sifting” of information and entertainment.
...
Users will shift media to suit their particular requirements. For example, video on demand (or mobile video) will alter the way people watch television, much in the same way that podcasting has already changed the way people listen to radio. Both put the audience squarely in charge of programming. In the future, people will watch, read and listen to what they want, when they want, on any device they want, and content will be designed, edited and personalized for specific physical locations and situations.
...
What are people paying for? The answer is scarcity. If the cost of creating and distributing digital content becomes practically zero, content will be ubiquitous and largely valueless as a result. Personalization and particularly physicalization (e.g. live events and experiences) will, on the other hand, be highly sought after. We will watch movies at home but we will pay more to experience them with other people in a cinema. Add to this a general flight to quality and media such as the best newspapers, magazines, television and radio could do very well in the future.
...
In the future, it will be easier than ever to turn on, tune in and drop out, because while mainstream media channels and events will continue to exist, so too will a plethora of micromedia appealing to every conceivable interest, belief, prejudice and opinion. The top-down model, whereby media owners hold the attention of millions and then sell that attention to other people such as advertisers, is being replaced by companies and individuals who attract the fleeting attention of large, promiscuous audiences and by niche operators who capture the hearts and minds of very tiny audiences.
.
In other words, the media universe is becoming polarized between very large and very small players. Moreover, the content produced by these totally different types of media organization will also be at two extremes, with the larger companies clustering around proven formulae and the smaller operators pushing the boundaries with original ideas. Both will obviously aim to appeal to as large an audience as possible, but only one will be able to survive when the audience is tiny. Equally, anyone stupid or unlucky enough to get caught in the middle will be history."

Trechos retirados de "Future files : 5 trends that will shape the next 50 years" de Richard Watson.

O século XX continua por cá (parte III)

Parte I e parte II.

Há anos que refiro aqui o beco sem saída a que as corporações gigantes estão a chegar ao depararem com Mongo e a explosão de tribos que traz. Por exemplo:

• E porque não somos plankton (parte VII)
• E porque não somos plankton (parte VI)

A P&G a encolher, a Mondelez a encolher, ...

Via Twitter o @hnascim chamou-me a atenção para "So Long, Hamburger Helper: America's Venerable Food Brands Are Struggling", mais um exemplo de Mongo não é um mundo gigantes-friendly (parte III):

"For over a century, brands such as Kellogg’s cereal, Campbell’s soup and Aunt Jemima pancake mix filled pantries of American households that wanted safe, affordable and convenient food. They provided companies with reliable revenue growth from grocery shelves, and there was little reason to mess with that formula.
.
Today, these giants are struggling with competition that is corroding business from both ends. High-end consumers are shifting toward fresher items with fewer processed ingredients while cost-conscious shoppers are buying inexpensive store brands. [Moi ici: Polarização dos mercados] The makers of staples including Chef Boyardee canned pasta and Hamburger Helper meal kits failed to spot the threat and didn’t innovate in time.
.
Anyone searching for macaroni and cheese, a childhood staple, can opt for fancy pasta with organic ingredients or inexpensive store brands such as Kroger Co.’s. Squeezed in the middle are Kraft Heinz Co.’s venerable blue-and-yellow boxes.
...
“A lot of what’s crept into big companies is internal focus, bureaucracy, PowerPoint presentations—the antithesis of agility,”
...
Many big brands didn’t move fast enough to remove artificial ingredients and haven’t been able to shed the negative perception of processed food, said several food executives and others close to the industry.
.
At the same time, they faced low-cost store brands—or “private label” products—from retailers such as Costco Wholesale Corp., Wal-Mart Stores Inc. and regional grocers that sell copycat products. National brands, which have huge marketing costs, generally can’t afford to compete on price with the in-house brands of stores, which need little marketing beyond displaying products prominently on their own shelves.
...
Big food sellers still dominate in America. The 25 largest food and beverage companies commanded a 63% share of $495 billion in U.S. food and beverage sales in 2016, according to consultancy A.T. Kearney.
.
That is down from 66% in 2012, and even seemingly small market-share losses hurt sales and profits. The top 25 companies averaged 2% annual sales growth from 2012 through 2016, compared with 6% for their smaller rivals, according to A.T. Kearney."

Alterar a oferta (parte VI)

Parte V, parte IV, parte III e parte II.

"Yet while the internet forever changed shopping, the physical retail environment lagged behind.
...
And over the next few years, the brick-and-mortar buying experience will change even more dramatically.
...
"We had been operating for this idea that bigger is better, the superstore or supercenter. Now we’re seeing a shift away from that, brands closing their stores, reconsidering their footprint,"
...
"At the highest level, you have more physical retail going into service,"
...
places like sporting goods stores, once offering the value proposition of a large inventory of tennis rackets, are now getting into ancillary services, like the restringing of said rackets. Retailers are using services to make their brick-and-mortar locations more valuable in the face of online shopping.
...
that cup of sugar you need from the store? That’s delivered. We go places for people, not things.[Moi ici: Uma ideia interessante]
...
[Moi ici: Segue-se outra mensagem típica deste blogue] In a world based upon extremes, failure can often be found in the middle.[Moi ici: A polarização dos mercados e o pântano do meio-termo] Nobody likes lukewarm coffee. They want it steaming hot or poured over ice. Experts agree that retail is evolving the same way.
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"On the one hand, we will increasingly use digital services (ideally mobile apps) to purchase down-to-earth products—such as toilet paper, laundry soap, milk. I could imagine a kind of Amazon unlimited scheme that will constantly replenish our supply of toilet paper," says designer and MIT professor Carlo Ratti. "On the other hand, I see a blossoming of experiential shopping. Think about choosing fresh food produce: We will always enjoy going to a physical store where we can touch, smell, etc. The store, in turn, can become increasingly focused on providing us with unique experiences.""

Trechos retirados de "The Way You Shop Will Change Forever This Year. Here's How"

Um exemplo de polarização de mercados

Um exemplo daquilo a que se chama a polarização do mercado. Clientes underserved e overserved em desenvolvimento simultâneo num mesmo mercado:

"A growing segment of the U.S. population is making a significant sacrifice for physical fitness, and not just in sore muscles and pre-dawn wake-ups. More and more people are paying hundreds of dollars a month, or thousands a year, for personal workouts, special classes, and ever more luxurious gyms.
...
By contrast, the average American spends a minuscule amount on getting in shape. Almost one-fifth of Americans are health club members, and the average U.S. club dues are $54 a month, or 1.2 percent of median household income, according to the latest data from the International Health, Racquet & Sportsclub Association, or Ihrsa, the fitness industry trade group.
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While midmarket clubs barely gained members, the number of budget club members grew 69 percent in 2015 alone, Ihrsa estimated last year. Much of this growth is driven by franchising, a trend that has brought outside money to the fitness industry."

Empresas com futuro escolhem o seu segmento e não tentam ser tudo para todos.

Trechos retirados de "Why You’re Paying So Much to Exercise"

The Mid-market (parte III)

Parte I e parte II.

"Does all this activity mean the mid-market is finally disappearing, or can operators in this segment of the market evolve to survive? We ask the experts... [Moi ici: Seguem-se trechos da resposta de Richard Millman]
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They need a clear strategy and proposition for the consumer, differentiating on quality of product and service. They need to find their point of difference, both as a chain and as individual clubs. Going upmarket — as some mid-market operators are trying or have tried to do — presents a marketing challenge. It's easier to do if you have just one club than a chain, because to successfully make this move, operators must really understand their local marketplace — what their USP is locally — and how to capture new groups of customers. There are still lots of new audiences out there, provided clubs can define their proposition and find something unique to offer their particular geographic and consumer market."

Acerca da importância do alinhamento.


Trechos retirados do número de Outubro da revista "Health Club Management"

E assim se faz Mongo

"In addition to meeting the perennial need for growth, marketers have been launching more brands in response to the fragmentation of traditional segments. Consider, for example, how customers are migrating out of the middle to the low and high ends of the market in cars, clothes, computers, retailing, and other industries. At the same time, while globalizing consumer tastes are creating segments in some markets that cut across geographies, growing ethnic diversity in other markets is exacerbating fragmentation as customers seek products with local flavor. Furthermore, it's increasingly feasible for marketers to develop and launch brands cost-effectively for fragmenting customer segments. Distribution costs and communication costs are falling, and manufacturing flexibility is on the rise."

Recordar "Polarização do mercado ou como David e Golias podem co-existir"

Trecho retirado de "Profiting from Polarization"

The Mid-market (parte II)

Parte I.

"Does all this activity mean the mid-market is finally disappearing, or can operators in this segment of the market evolve to survive? We ask the experts... [Moi ici: Segue-se a resposta de Michael Clark]
...
Unless it’s a premium or destination club, most consumers will categorise the remainder of gyms as much the same and, as consumer research continues to tell us, they will choose to the join the most convenient one for them. If they have a choice when it comes to convenience, with two or more clubs in similar striking distance, then price becomes more of a factor. This tilts the tables in favour of the budget operators.
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That said, big box mid-market clubs do have numerous offensive strategies available to them to counter the cost differential. One is to address the ongoing consumer frustration of having to pay for all the club’s services and facilities when they only use one or two areas. This can be achieved by breaking out popular formats – for example, some group exercise genres – into a boutique-style ‘club within a club’, with a separate pay as you go fee structure.
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Going forward, I feel it will be all about how mid-market operators can articulate their differentiation and how they can attract new markets using technology and other services. A good location alone won’t be enough to stop consumers comparing on price and choosing what they see as a cheaper like-for-like option."

Trechos retirados do número de Outubro da revista "Health Club Management"

The Mid-market (parte I)

"Does all this activity mean the mid-market is finally disappearing, or can operators in this segment of the market evolve to survive? We ask the experts... [Moi ici: Segue-se a resposta de Ray Algar]
...
Mid-market clubs were very slow to respond when low-cost gyms entered the market and disrupted the status quo. Now, unless they can offer something more compelling, it will only be a matter of time before more of these generic health clubs start to close.
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In the last couple of years, we've seen a disproportionate number of mid-market independents close as membership stagnated, membership prices remained flat and insufficient funds were generated to reinvest into refreshing the experience.
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The low-cost and premium markets are both well defined, but historically the mid-market brands have deliberately been more generic. Neither one thing or the other.
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The remaining legacy brands need to take stock and now jettison things which no longer serve them, or their members, and rediscover their core excellence. Similar offerings may be good enough when there's significant geographic distance between clubs, but can be disastrous as the distance between health clubs shortens.
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Mid-market clubs need to become experts, and build a reputation, in an area they really care about."

Como não recuar a 2005 e ao primeiro artigo que li sobre o fim do middle-market com a polarização do mercado: The vanishing middle market,” The McKinsey Quarterly, 2005 Number 4.
 
Trechos retirados do número de Outubro da revista "Health Club Management"

Balanced Scorecard (parte III)

Parte I e parte II.
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Escrevia no final da última parte: Quando os negócios correm mal a tentação é fazer uns descontos e tentar seduzir clientes por essa via. Normalmente essa é uma via que acelera o caminho para a desgraça.

1.Então, começo a minha intervenção demonstrando o perigo dos descontos introduzindo o Evangelho do Valor. Fazem-se os descontos e os clientes ganhos nunca compensam a perda de receita e a situação ainda se agrava mais.

2.Depois, dedico-me a destruir a Torre de Babel em que as cabeças da gestão estão encerradas: a crença de que só existe um tipo de cliente, o que valoriza o preço acima de tudo. Começo pelos 3 extremos, pelas 3 propostas de valor de Treacy e Wiersema, ou de Porter e mostro a impossibilidade de tentar ser bom para todos ao mesmo tempo, chegando a esta figura do livro:

E referindo o precioso esquema de Terry Hill que usei aqui:

3.Chega o momento de introduzir o tema da polarização dos mercados, para tirar ilusões quanto ao mercado do meio-termo. Ou se é bom num extremo ou no outro, tentar ser carne e peixe ao mesmo tempo não resulta. Aquilo a que chamo tecto de vidro do desempenho das PME.

4.Para finalizar apresento a curva de Stobachoff, a metáfora de Bruce Jenner e os salami slicers. Tudo no sentido de despertar a necessidade de fazer escolhas: quem são os clientes-alvo?

5.Agora depois da destruição dos mitos estão criadas as condições para começar a construir algo. Se a empresa existiu até agora é porque fez alguma coisa bem. Precisamos de encontrar essa coisa boa e verificar se pode ser o alicerce para uma nova vida.

Continua.