Mostrar mensagens com a etiqueta demografia. Mostrar todas as mensagens
Mostrar mensagens com a etiqueta demografia. Mostrar todas as mensagens

segunda-feira, março 11, 2024

Essa gente não existe!!!

 Por um lado, "Montenegro acredita que país é capaz de voltar a crescer a "3, 4 ou 5%"":

""Nós conseguimos crescer a 3, 4, 5 por cento, conseguimos. Já conseguimos noutros períodos da nossa história, porque é que a minha geração, a vossa geração hão de estar renitentes quanto à sua capacidade?", questionou, dizendo que o país até tem mais instrumentos tecnológicos, mais financiamento externo e mais qualificações. Por essas razões, Montenegro disse acreditar muito na capacidade dos empresários e de Portugal."

por outro lado, "Peter Zeihan, March 5, 2024" diz-nos:

  • vamos ter um choque demográfico mais forte do que o que aconteceu com a Peste Negra.
Quem vai comprar a produção que suporta um crescimento de 3, 4 ou 5%? Essa gente não existe!!!

Aos 7' 21'':
"in the next few years, the Koreans will lead us into whatever's next as that bulge that's currently capital and skills rich and paying taxes ages into Mass retirement, and it all goes away, and so a few years from now, the Koreans will have to figure out a new economic and political and social model that is not based on consumption or on production or on investment what will that look at what will that look like I have no idea because no country in human history has ever crossed that Rubicon and the Koreans definitely will not be alone all right let's start bottom left with the Germans are in the same situation as Korea for very similar reasons this is their last decade as an industrial power if you want a beamer get it now you should probably get 10 years apart because you're going to need those I'd love for that to be a joke."

BTW aos 10' 59'':

"and then there's the Chinese who is already one of the five fastest collapsing workforces in human history and this data from June of last year is wrong they updated the data in July check out the bottom of it they are now reporting officially a larger drop in the birth rate in the last five years in China than what happened to the Jews of Europe during the Holocaust that's an official data unofficially the Chinese Academy of Sciences which is kind of their wise men group that interprets government statistics says that this is wrong that they've overcounted their population by more than a 100 million people"

segunda-feira, dezembro 04, 2023

"todos tratados como Figos"

Ao longo dos anos tenho referido esta previsão no blogue. Demografia, e o reshoring estão dar um poder negocial cada vez mais forte aos trabalhadores. Por exemplo:

"Escrevi aqui algures que um dia seríamos (os nossos descendentes) todos tratados como Figos."

"ALMOST EVERYONE agreed that the mid-2010s were a terrible time to be a worker. David Graeber, an anthropologist at the London School of Economics, coined the term "bullshit jobs" to describe purposeless work, which he argued was widespread. With the recovery from the global financial crisis of 2007-09 taking time, some 7% of the labour force in the OECD club of mostly rich countries lacked work. Wage growth was weak and income inequality seemed to be rising inexorably.

How things change. In the rich world, workers now face a golden age. As societies age, labour is becoming scarcer and better rewarded, especially manual work that is hard to replace with technology. Governments are spending big and running economies hot, supporting demands for higher wages, and are likely to continue to do so. Artificial intelligence (Al) is giving workers, particularly less skilled ones, a productivity boost, which could lead to higher wages, too. Some of these trends will reinforce the others: where labour is scarce, for instance, the use of tech is more likely to increase pay. The result will be a transformation in how labour markets work.

...

To understand why, return to the gloom. When it was at its peak in 2015, so was China's working-age population, then at 998m people. Western firms could use the threat of relocation, or pressure from Chinese competitors, to force down wages. David Autor of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and colleagues estimate that this depressed American pay between 2000 and 2007, with a larger hit for those on lower wages. Populist politicians, not least Donald Trump, took advantage, vowing to end China's job "theft"

...

The approach is already bearing fruit for workers. In a recent paper, Mr Autor and colleagues demonstrate that tight American labour markets are leading to fast wage growth, [Moi ici: Por isso, é que o patronato é tão amigo da imigração, mão de obra barata] as workers switch jobs for better pay, and that poorer employees are benefiting most of all (see chart 3). The researchers reckon that, since 2020, some two-fifths of the rise in wage inequality over the past four decades has been undone.

A similar trend is probably playing out across the rich world. Germany's employment agency keeps a tally of jobs that are facing severe worker shortages. So far this year it has added 48 professions to the 152-strong list. Most require technical, rather than academic, education, with shortages most pressing in construction and health care. Japan offers time-limited visas for workers in a dozen fields, including the making of machine parts and shipbuilding, and the country's wages are rising faster than at any point in the past three decades. The wage premium that accrues to those with a university education is already shrinking; it may now fall faster."

Recordar:

Trechos retirados da revista The Economist de hoje, "Welcome to a golden age for workers"

terça-feira, outubro 17, 2023

Demografia, direitos adquiridos, ou a análise do contexto (parte VI)


No FT de ontem um tema que em Portugal levará muita gente a uma síncope, "It's time we stopped talking about retirement"

"A second reason I resisted the R word is that I had no plans to stop working. I had begun preparing for my post-FT life several years earlier, spending evenings and weekends training to become a counsellor, with the hope of helping others deal with their career dilemmas. When the time came to leave full-time journalism, I discovered my bosses were happy for me to continue contributing articles and teaching in the executive education business I had helped set up. So I have settled contentedly into a three-part career of writing, lecturing and counselling.

I am not alone. The number of UK over-65s still working rose to 1.47mn in the quarter to June 2022, an all-time record, according to the Office for National Statistics. This compares with 1.1mn in 2014. Much of the increase was driven by part-time work and self-employment.  

Part of the reason people carry on working is financial. Rising prices and the ending of gold-plated company pensions mean many cannot afford to stop working entirely. Even the best of the old-fashioned private sector final-salary pension schemes provide annual increases that fall far short of current inflation.

But there is also the desire to continue to matter. Moving on from a full-on job brings with it more identity issues than simply accepting one’s age. There is a loss of status. The question “what do you do?” requires a new answer. The “well, I used to . . . ” response palls after a while.

Many 60- and 70-somethings I come across want to continue being players rather than spectators. Having more time to watch sport, travel or go to the theatre has its attractions. But for many, there is still a drive to participate, to be in the fray.  

One of the problems with giving up work entirely is that you could be a long time retired. The average 65-year-old can expect to live into their mid-80s in developed countries, according to OECD figures. And many are living longer than that. Worldwide, there were nearly 500,000 people aged 100 or more in 2015, four times as many as in 1990, according to a 2016 Pew Research Center report, which said the number of centenarians was likely to reach 3.7mn by 2050.

Health problems start to intrude at some point. But healthier eating and exercise (one of the pleasures of self-employment means you decide when to go to the gym) help stave them off.

It is not just that many older people want to work; ageing societies will need them. Bain, the strategy consultancy, predicts that a quarter of the US workforce will be aged 55 or more by 2031. In Germany the figure will be 27 per cent, in Italy 32 per cent and in Japan 38 per cent."

domingo, setembro 10, 2023

Futurizemos

O Portugal que conhecemos com as suas tradições e cultura vai mudar muito, mesmo muito:



Estão a imaginar os activos, portugueses ou imigrantes, a suportar os inactivos nesta quantidade?


Gráficos retirados de Boletim Económico do Banco de Portugal (Junho de 2023)

domingo, julho 23, 2023

Tic-Tac-Tic-Tac

Recentemente ouvi este podcast, "The Depopulation Bomb: Stephen J. Shaw". Um dos indicadores interessante que o autor refere passa por comparar o número de pessoas na "gaveta" dos 50-54 anos com o número de pessoas na "gaveta" dos 0-4 anos. 

Olhando para a pirâmide demográfica de Portugal em 2023 as contas levam a concluir que daqui a 50 anos existirão menos 45% de pessoas na "gaveta" dos 50-54. Qual o impacte da redução em 45% da quantidade  de gente em idade produtiva? 

Quais as consequências desta evolução:
  • a nível dos impostos?
  • a nível do ensino?
  • a nível da saúde?
  • a nível do trabalho?
  • a nível das dinâmicas sociais?
  • a nível de segurança social?
Depois, encontrei este tweet e os comentários que se seguiram:

E lembrei-me de ter lido algo na semana passada sobre:

Como diz o autor no podcast e eu traduzi na minha mente de ex-modelador de reactores químicos, a população é como um químico num reactor pistão, num dado momento parece que a quantidade total está a aumentar, e está, mas a não entrada de mais químico vai ditar que no futuro ela vai cair inexoravelmente. Cidades vazias, velhos sozinhos, impostos altíssimos (ainda ontem o embaixador do betão regozijava-se com a redução da dívida em % do PIB, mas a dívida bruta continua a crescer e vai ter de ser paga pelos 8,7 milhões em 2060, mas a maioria serão reformados). Ver abaixo ("By 2050, people age 65 and older will make up nearly 40 percent of the population in some parts of East Asia and Europe")

O que me aborrece é que ninguém no poder quer enfrentar de frente o futuro. Não faz sentido estarmos a caminho de 6,8 milhões de habitantes lá para 2100 e continuar a achar que nada precisa de mudar. 

Não é o que nos acontece que interessa, mas o que fazemos com o que nos acontece.

Já depois de escrever o texto até aqui li o NYT de ontem e encontrei o artigo, "Vast Demographic Shifts Are Reshaping the Globe":
"Japan had the first major shift: By 2013, a quarter of the population was 65 and older, making Japan the oldest large country ever. Much of Western Europe will follow, with record old-age populations, and South Korea, Britain and Eastern Europe will be next, along with China.
At the same time, many low-income countries today will have huge prime-age labor forces for the first time. Can they take advantage of the opportunity?
...
The projections are reliable and stark: By 2050, people age 65 and older will make up nearly 40 percent of the population in some parts of East Asia and Europe. That's almost twice the share of older adults in Florida, America's retirement capital. Extraordinary numbers of retirees will be dependent on a shrinking number of working-age people to support them.
As a result, experts predict, things many wealthier countries take for granted - like pensions, retirement ages and strict immigration policies - will need overhauls to be sustainable. And today's wealthier countries will almost inevitably make up a smaller share of global G.D.P., economists say."

domingo, janeiro 29, 2023

Aprender com os outros o que vamos viver

Aprender com os outros o que vamos viver:

Imaginem as implicações de:

"No Japão, as casas são como carros.

Assim que você se muda, a sua nova casa começa a valer menos do que você pagou. E, quando você termina de pagar seu financiamento, depois de 40 anos, ela não vale quase nada."

quinta-feira, janeiro 19, 2023

O futuro da globalização

Há dias ao ouvir Joe Rogan e Peter Zeihan fixei este trecho:

"The Chinese are going to lose a greater percentage of their population in the next 20 years from aging than Europe did in the Black Plague, according to Peter Zeihan"

É deixar isto afundar lentamente nas profundezas da consciência. Isto é impressionante!

Esta semana começaram a aparecer notícias sobre o suposto primeiro ano em que a população chinesa começou a diminuir, segundo Zeihan isso já acontece há algum tempo, segundo ele os números chineses são adulterados há muito tempo.

No WSJ de ontem pode ler-se:

"As life in China has been restored to normal following the government's lifting of pandemic restrictions, Mr. Liu said Beijing will focus on boosting domestic demand this year, which he said will lead to more imports from the country's trading partners."

Lembro-me de escrever sobre esta possibilidade em Agosto de 2008 em Especulação. O que Zeihan diz é que isto não funcionará, porque a China já não tem a estrutura demográfica capaz de suportar a economia com a sua actual dimensão.

"“In the long run, we are going to see a China the world has never seen,” said Wang Feng, a professor of sociology at the University of California at Irvine who specializes in China’s demographics. “It will no longer be the young, vibrant, growing population. We will start to appreciate China, in terms of its population, as an old and shrinking population.”" (fonte)

Voltando à afirmação inicial, "The Chinese are going to lose a greater percentage of their population in the next 20 years from aging than Europe did in the Black Plague, according to Peter Zeihan", é pensar no impacte, nas consequências disto para o fim da "fábrica do mundo", tendo em conta o efeito do banhista gordo, As banheiras pequenas enchem depressa. Veremos o acelerar do fim da globalização como a conhecemos, veremos a reindustrialização na Europa. STOP! Veremos? Mas a Europa não tem demografia! Veremos a industrialização de África?

terça-feira, janeiro 10, 2023

A grande mudança


Ando a ouvir o podcast #1921-Peter Zeihan - The Joe Rogan Experience. É impressionante a opinião de Zeihan acerca da China e da sua situação demográfica. Por exemplo, segundo ele a China nas próximas décadas vai perder mais população (em%) do que a Europa durante a Peste Negra.

Entretanto, ontem de manhã iniciei o dia com este tweet:
Depois, apanhei este artigo no Jdn, "O lamento de um otimista sobre a China" que termina deste modo:
"Com uma população em idade trabalhadora cada vez menor, a China, até há pouco tempo a maior história mundial de crescimento, precisa de acelerar o crescimento da produção para recuperar essa posição. No entanto, o maior ênfase de Xi na segurança, poder e controlo vem minar a produtividade, na altura em que a China mais precisa dela. O milagre do crescimento apenas pode sofrer como consequência.
A China chegou muito perto da terra prometida. A sua economia moderna estava numa trajetória extraordinária. A agenda de reequilibrio prometeu mais. Mas Xi quebrou essa promessa. A economia política da autocracia atirou água fria à cara daqueles, como nós, que costumavam ser convictos otimistas em relação à China."

Que associei a este artigo recebido recentemente, "Be Ready for the Manufacturing Renaissance" e a vários trechos encontrados aqui e acolá. Por exemplo, no artigo "Brasileiros à conquista de fábricas portuguesas de calçado" no Dinheiro Vivo com:

""a surpresa do ano" está no comportamento dos Estados Unidos, país que ultrapassou a Colômbia e ocupa agora a quarta posição nos maiores destinos das exportações do setor [Moi ici: Calçado e componentes de calçado produzidos no Brasil], com quase nove milhões de dólares (8,5 milhões de euros), um acréscimo de 56% face a 2021."








sábado, novembro 26, 2022

Demografia é destino

"Em 2021, residiam em Portugal 10 343 066 pessoas, menos 219 mil do que em 2011. A perda de 2,1% de população foi a segunda quebra desde o século XIX - a outra redução foi registada na década de 1960 devido à elevada taxa de emigração. E não fosse o aumento dos imigrantes, a quebra populacional seria ainda maior. Em 2021, os estrangeiros residentes em Portugal eram 542 314, mais 37,5% do que os registados em 2011. A maior comunidade era a brasileira (quase 200 mil), mas os dados revelaram "o forte crescimento" de outras comunidades, como a nepalesa e do Bangladesh. [Moi ici: Nas minhas viagens de camioneta pelo interior norte do país durante esta semana, despertei para este movimento até agora desconhecido para mim, a quantidade de asiáticos que já circulam pelo país]
...
O envelhecimento agravou-se: por cada 100 jovens há 182 idosos, em 2011 eram 128.
...
Em média, no país, por cada 100 que se reformam apenas 76 entram no mercado de trabalho. Em 2011, este valor de novos trabalhadores era de 94. A pirâmide etária evidencia, aliás, que a maior quebra populacional é nos grupos em idade ativa dos 25 aos 39 anos."

Por um lado a demografia a actuar. Do outro, a atracção pela perspectiva de uma melhor recompensa (ver Nem imaginamos o que pode vir por aí). Vai ficar pior. Pensem nos direitos adquiridos.

Trechos retirados de "Um quinto da população vive em 1% do território" no JN da passada quarta-feira. 

sábado, setembro 10, 2022

O grande apagador

Há dias encontrei isto no FB:

Acham que o nível de inflação actual é por causa da guerra?

Acham que o despejar de dinheiro na economia não tem nada a ver?
Acham que o o fim da globalização como a conhecemos não tem nada a ver?
Acham que o envelhecimento demográfico não tem nada a ver?
Acham que a adopção de políticas ambientais sem a infraestrutura para as suportar não tem nada a ver?

Os mata-borrões deste mundo gostam de usar a invasão da Ucrânia pela Rússia como um grande apagador dos errros que eles próprios cometeram, e do que já estava nas cartas e era possível prever. 



terça-feira, julho 26, 2022

Fausto, a "dívida" e o payback time

Ando a ler o livro "The End of the World is Just the Beginning" de Peter Zeihan. 

O autor cenariza o mundo futuro com base em duas variáveis: O fim da Ordem Americana que permite o comércio international, e o colapso demográfico em muitas partes do mundo.

No final do ano passado podia-se ler:

Entretanto, ontem encontrei isto, "Where have all the workers gone? Don't blame COVID, economists say", e o seu conteúdo alinha-se muito com o livro de Zeihan.

"Boomers are exiting the workforce in droves, leaving more job vacancies than there are people to fill them.
...

Canada is in the throes of a serious labour shortage, but economists say it's not all the pandemic's fault — it's the inevitable culmination of a seismic demographic shift decades in the making.

"It's the slowest-moving train on the planet. It was predictable 60 to 65 years ago, and we have done nothing about it," said Armine Yalnizyan, an economist and Atkinson Fellow on the Future of Workers. "We knew this transition was going to happen."
...
In particular, the construction and manufacturing sectors are having a difficult time recruiting skilled workers, followed closely by accommodation and food services, which includes hotels, restaurants and bars. 

"People are finding other places to work. There just aren't enough people willing to do poorly paid jobs that are marginal at best," Yalnizyan noted. 

"Workers have a lot more choices now," Lee agreed. "If you have more choices and you don't have to work in that industry, you'll go and work in an industry where there's a better career stream and where the wages are higher and the hours are more predictable.""

Alinho isto com este trecho retirado do livro de Zeihan:

“Nobody would expect the worker who plugs in the relatively low-tech wiring to be compensated at the same rate as the worker who fine-tunes the sensors. Imagine if all the pieces were made in Japan, a country with a per capita income of some $41,000. That System on a Chip would be pretty fly—and it should be, the Japanese excel at complex microelectronic work—but it stretches the mind to think there might be some Japanese dude who loves to run an injection mold system to make phone cases for a dollar an hour. It would be like Lady Gaga teaching piano lessons to four-year-olds. Could she do it? Certainly. I bet she’d do great. But no one is going to pay her fifty grand for an hour of her trouble

Fica tão claro o modelo Flying Geese. E fica clara a aprendizagem dos dinamarqueses acerca da contribuição líquida dos imigrantes para a sua segurança social:



domingo, julho 24, 2022

Artesãos do futuro

É recorrente a queixa nas televisões e jornais de que há falta de trabalhadores. Alguns empresários e líderes associativos pedem soluções ao governo (BTW, ontem num Continente estranhei tantos repositores com aspecto de indianos/paquistaneses/bangladeshis, nunca tinha reparado)

Em tempos escrevi sobre as escolas profissionais do futuro, um retorno ao século XIX: "é para aí que vamos novamente".

"El lujo es uno de los sectores de la industria de la moda que más depende de fuerza de trabajo especializado y que más está sufriendo las consecuencias del escaso relevo generacional que hay en la artesanía.
...
Este año, LVMH tiene 2.000 vacantes disponibles de artesanos especialistas en divisiones como marroquinería, joyería, relojería y venta. “De cara a 2024, necesitaríamos unos 30.000 puestos de trabajo para asegurar la continuidad de la empresa”, sentenció la directiva.

Según cifras recogidas por WWD, el 65% de los puestos de trabajo en la industria del lujo a escala global se encontraban vacantes en 2021. En los últimos años, el remedio que han encontrado grandes empresas de lujo como Louis Vuitton, Chanel o Hermès, entre otras, ha sido la creación de programas educativos para formar a las nuevas generaciones en la artesanía.

En 2014, LVMH puso en marcha Institut des Métiers d’Excellence, una especie de escuela para formar a las generaciones más jóvenes en la artesanía. 
...
En los últimos años, el remedio que han encontrado grandes empresas de lujo a la falta de artesanos es la creación de programas formativos
...
Gucci, la joya de la corona del conglomerado de lujo Kering, también lanzó en 2018 Gucci École de l’Amour, una escuela que se centra en formar a las nuevas generaciones en procesos de fabricación y artesanía en las categorías de calzado y artículos de piel. La empresa también cuenta con Accademia ArtLab e Fabbriche, un programa interno que se centra en dar formación específica a empleados de Gucci que trabajan en las fábricas."

BTW, tenho na calha para leitura futura, "Return of the Artisan: How America Went from Industrial to Handmade




segunda-feira, julho 11, 2022

O fim da globalização (parte IV)

Parte I, parte II  e parte III.

"The average grocery store today has about forty thousand individual items, up from about two hundred at the dawn of the twentieth century.

...

Take this concept of utter availability, apply it to absolutely everything, and you now have a glimmer of the absolute connectivity that underpins the modern, globalized economy. The ingredients of today’s industrial and consumer goods are only available because they can be moved from—literally—halfway around the world at low costs and high speeds and in perfect security. Phones, fertilizers, oil, cherries, propylene, single-malt whiskey . . . you name it, it is in motion. All. The. Time. Transportation is the ultimate enabler.

...

The East India Company traded about 50 tons of tea a year at the start of the nineteenth century and 15,000 toward the end of it. Today that same 15,000 tons is loaded or unloaded somewhere in the world every forty-five seconds or so.

...

In the age of globalization, everyone could get in on global access, manufacturing, and mass consumption. No longer was value-added work sequestered to the Imperial Centers. Manufacturing elsewhere required fuel and raw materials. Expanding industrial bases and infrastructure elsewhere required the same. Expanding middle classes elsewhere demanded even more.

...

In a world "safe" for all, the world's "successful" geographies could no longer lord over and/or exploit the rest. A somewhat unintended side effect of this was to demote geography from its fairly deterministic role in gauging the success or failure of a country, to something that became little more than background noise. Those geographies once left behind could now bloom in safety.

...

The ability to diversify supply systems over any distance means it is economically advantageous to break up manufacturing into dozens, even thousands of individual steps. Workers building this or that tiny piece of widget become very good at it, but they are clueless as to the rest of the process. The workforce that purifies silicon dioxide does not and cannot create silicon wafers, does not and cannot build motherboards, and does not and cannot code.

This combination of reach and specialization takes us to a very clear, and foreboding, conclusion: no longer do the goods consumed in a place by a people reflect the goods produced in a place by a people. The geographies of consumption and production are unmoored."

Segundo o autor de "The End of the World is Just the Beginning", Peter Zeihan, a globalização está a descarrilar pelo descalabro demográfico nos países produtores e consumidores, e pelo fim da Ordem Americana. Há muito que escrevo sobre a desglobalização, mas por causa de Mongo. A demografia é uma variável que raramente é considerada como refiro na parte III. 

quinta-feira, julho 07, 2022

O fim da globalização (parte III)

Parte I e parte II

Na parte II ilustro como o autor aborda o tema do colapso demográfico. Nesta parte III sublinho os trechos que se seguem:

"More products. More players. Bigger markets. More markets. Easier transport. More interconnectivity. More trade. More capital. More technology. More integration. More financial penetration. More and bigger and bigger and more. A world of more.

Ever since Columbus sailed the ocean blue, human economics have been defined by this concept of more. The world's evolution within the idea of more, this reasonable expectation of more, is ultimately what destroyed the old economies of the pre-deepwater imperial and feudal systems. 

...

Geopolitics tells us the post–World War II and especially the post–Cold War economic booms were artificial and transitory. Going back to something more “normal” by definition requires . . . shrinkage. Demographics tells us that the number and collective volume of mass-consumption-driven economies has already peaked. In 2019 the Earth for the first time in history had more people aged sixty-five and over than five and under. By 2030 there will be twice as many retirees, in relative terms.

...

Combine geopolitics and demographics and we know there will be no new mass consumption systems. Even worse, the pie that is the global economy isn't going to simply shrink; it is being fractured into some very nonintegrated pieces, courtesy of American inaction.

...

We aren't simply looking at a demographically induced economic breakdown; we are looking at the end of a half millennium of economic history.

...

First, everything is going to change. Whatever new economic system or systems the world develops will be something we're unlikely to recognize as being viable today. We will probably need far higher volumes of capital (retirees absorb it like sponges), but we'll have far less of it (fewer workers means fewer taxpayers). That suggests economic growth and technological progress (both of which require capital as an input) will stall out.

...

Second, the process will be the very definition of traumatic. The concept of more has been our guiding light as a species for centuries. From a certain point of view, the past seventy years of globalization have simply been "more" on steroids, a sharp uptake on our long-cherished economic understandings. Between the demographic inversion and the end of globalization, we are not simply ending our long experience with more, or even beginning a terrifying new world of less; we face economic free fall as everything that has underpinned humanity's economic existence since the Renaissance unwinds all at once."

Já repararam que no discurso ambiental este tema não é referido? No cenário central, até 2080 Portugal perde 2 milhões de habitantes. Ao mesmo tempo que o número de idosos crescerá mais um milhão de pessoas e a população em idade ativa (15 a 64 anos) diminuirá de 6,6 para 4,2 milhões de pessoas. O tipo e quantidade de consumo vai cair.

O autor, americano, julgo que vítima da doença anglo-saxónica foca-se muito na produção em massa. Teremos menos produção em massa e mais Mongo. Por isso, este capítulo designado "The end of more". Teremos menos globalização e mais blocos económicos.

Trechos retirados de "The End of the World is Just the Beginning" de Peter Zeihan. 

domingo, setembro 19, 2021

Para reflexão

De um lado "¿Qué fue de la bomba P, la catástrofe de la superpoblación?",  do outro "La "regla del 85": el inusitado futuro demográfico de la humanidad".

Faz-me recordar Paul Feyerabend em "Against Method":

"Knowledge so conceived is not a series of self-consistent theories that converge towards an ideal view; it is not a gradual approach to the truth. It is rather an ever-increasing ocean of mutually incompatible alternatives, each single theory, each fairy-tale, each myth that is part of the collection forcing others into greater articulation and all of them contributing, via this process of competition, to the development of our consciousness. Nothing is ever settled, no view can ever be omitted from a comprehensive account."

O que por sua vez me faz recordar a Via Negativa que aprendi em Antifragile de Nassim Taleb:

"what is called in Latin via negativa, the negative way, after theological traditions, particularly in the Eastern Orthodox Church. Via negativa does not try to express what God is - leave that to the primitive brand of contemporary thinkers and philosophasters with scientistic tendencies. It just lists what God is not and proceeds by the process of elimination." 

Tanta gente cheia de certezas... parecem-se comigo quando eu tinha 18 anos. Entretanto, vivi mais 40 anos. 



quarta-feira, setembro 15, 2021

"It is running out of people"

Ontem à noite o WSJ trazia este artigo, "Depopulation Hits Latvia Economy Hard" onde sublinhei:

"This year, with its population at roughly half of what it was in 1990, Dagda County was deemed too small to support a local government and merged with a nearby county.

“The only people still around here are retired,” said Ms. Frolova, 59 years old. Latvia is on the front line of what could become one of the defining challenges for the industrialized world: It is running out of people.

From Portugal to Singapore and across most of the Americas, birthrates are falling, and population growth in the industrialized world has stalled or reversed. That prospect brings with it the specter of a shrinking labor force, an aging population and stagnant economic growth."

Ontem durante o dia estive numa empresa em Felgueiras em que o empresário me contou que durante as férias de Verão 4 trabalhadores despediram-se para ir trabalhar para a Suiça.

BTW, o meu lado cínico leva a melhor e obriga-me a perguntar: então, o encolhimento da população mundial não é bom para o futuro do planeta? Os governos não afirmam estarmos perante uma emergência climática? Se houver menos humanos ... ergo 


Não vamos pôr os desejos egoístas dos futuros reformados à frente do bem-estar do planeta, pois não?

 

segunda-feira, fevereiro 17, 2020

E se não resulta?

"El sector de la cosmética se lo disputan dos públicos: millenials y selenials. Las primeras, de treinta y tantos, beben de la tecnología y son adictas al maquillaje. Las segundas, mujeres a partir de 50 y que pertecen a la llamada «generación silver», tienen el poder adquisitivo y son las que invierten en productos de valor añadido. Gastan unos 200 euros anuales de media y son las que tiran del sector, «un pilar fundamental para la industria», ya que representan la mitad del gasto, según la directora de Consumer&Market de L’Óreal, Estefanía Yágüez.
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Así lo desvela la consultora Kantar Worldpanel, que ha hecho un estudio sobre el mercado de belleza entre los senior para L’Óreal España. Según sus cifras, las llamadas selenials (mezcla de senior y millenial) acaparan el 47% del gasto en belleza. De los 4.758 millones invertidos en cosmética cada año en España, 2.190 corresponden a este segmento de edad.
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Este fenómeno selenial está «impulsado por una mayor disponibilidad económica, por un aumento del interés por cuidarse y su mayor capacidad de adaptación a las nuevas tecnologías». Es el segmento de población donde más ha crecido el uso de internet. «Se trata de un tipo de consumidora inconformista, con confianza en sí misma, que desea cuidarse y se acepta tal y como es», señala Yágüez.
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En España hay 13 millones de compradores de productos de belleza de más de 55 años, de los cuales 7 millones son mujeres. De cada 10 euros gastados por seniors en cosmética, siete los desembolsan mujeres. Esto las convierte «en el mayor nicho de negocio para el sector».
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Las selenials adquieren cosméticos una media de 22 veces al año, superando los 200 euros anuales. Lo que más compran, según los datos de Kantar, son cremas faciales (el 33%), seguido de perfumes y fragancias (32%) y maquillaje (12%)."
Quantas empresas precisam de descobrir este nicho?
Ainda esta semana cá em casa andaram à procura de calçado para alguém acima desta faixa etária e não é fácil encontrar algo de jeito.

Trabalhar para este nicho, trabalhar para qualquer nicho, implica conhecer o cliente para perceber o que é valor para ele. Não é com design e critérios para jovens que se seduzem selenials.

Quantas empresas estão dispostas a fazer as mudanças que o trabalho para um nicho exige? Parece um bom trade-off? E não há riscos na mudança? O sucesso é garantido? E deitar fora o seguro para abraçar o arriscado? E se não resulta?

BTW, recordar "Anichar".

Trechos retirados de "Las ‘selenials’ sostienen la industria cosmética" publicado pelo El Mundo de ontem.

terça-feira, janeiro 28, 2020

Demografia e segunda-mão

Ontem ouvi grande parte deste podcast, "Adam Minter on Secondhand" e fiquei admirado com os milhões de dólares envolvidos no negócio dos materiais em segunda-mão. À medida que a onda demográfica avança cada vez mais pessoas optam por mudar para casas mais pequenas e desfazer-se de muitos dos seus bens. Algo semelhante ao que li sobre o que acontece no Japão aos bens dos idosos falecidos. Recordo "Dying Alone in Japan: The Industry Devoted to What’s Left Behind" que referi em "Negócio de futuro".

Entretanto, antes tinha lido "By 2023, the secondhand clothes market will double to $51 billion. Here’s why".

Também recordo:

E:
Talvez nesta Europa, ainda mais envelhecida que os Estados Unidos, e para onde exportamos tanto do nosso calçado, este factor também seja relevante para se juntar à lista:
  • Comoditização da posição baseada na flexibilidade e rapidez;
  • Deterioração do actual modelo de negócio baseado nas feiras;
  • Envelhecimento dos antigos clientes-alvo.

quinta-feira, janeiro 16, 2020

Demografia e clientes-alvo

No Financial Times Asia de ontem apanhei este artigo:
Depois, sorri ao ler no Wall Street Journal de ontem o artigo "Aging Japanese Flock to Gyms— For Hot Baths and Small Talk":
"Exercise buff Yukie Watabe just about had it when she went to her fitness club and found older women using the bench-press machine as an actual bench. The women were chatting about how to pickle vegetables at home—a worthy subject for the health-conscious, no doubt, but not quite the vibe Ms. Watabe was looking for. “I complained a couple of times to the staff there. But it seemed they prioritized” the elderly clientele, said Ms. Watabe, 46 years old. She quit the club and now jogs with her husband. Japan’s retired people are taking over establishments traditionally associated with youth and sculpted bodies. The gym of the future, as seen in a country where nearly 30% of the population is over 65, features tai chi classes, lengthy soaks in hot baths and plenty of socializing among folks who have no business meetings to rush back to.
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At Renaissance, only 3% of members were over 60 a quarter-century ago. Today, one in three are in that category and, depending on the location and time of the day, the customers are nearly all elderly, said a spokeswoman.
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Yoshihiko Kato, a 49-year old factory worker in Tokyo, recently quit his fitness club and switched to Anytime Fitness, a Minnesota-based chain with outlets in Japan. It appeals to a younger crowd with 24-hour service and a focus on fitness machines rather than amenities for relaxing.
...
“I’m going to get old too, so I don’t want to complain,” said Mr. Kato. At his previous club, he said, “I was a bit annoyed at how a group of old people were chatting nonstop.” For gym operators, elderly members have helped tone up the bottom line. Japan’s fitness industry in 2018 posted a record $4.4 billion in revenue, and government figures show more than half of that comes from people over 60, who tend to buy pricier full memberships."
E recordei:

"Quando um ginásio coloca pósteres de moças e moços a caminho de algum concurso de culturismo ou de beleza, está a apostar e a dizer ao mercado quem são os seus alvos e, ao mesmo tempo está a dizer aos seniores: nós não somos para vocês.
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Sabem o quanto gosto de associar biologia e economia. Por isso, vejo este desenvolvimento como: os nutrientes existem (os seniores e os gestores que pensam no futuro do SNS) e as espécies existentes (ginásios) não os consomem. A Natureza tem horror ao desperdício. Por isso, cria novas espécies que aproveitam esses nutrientes (recordar que a evolução natural é fugir de restrições)"


"E interrogo-me porque é que nunca vi um ginásio dedicado explicitamente ao sector sénior?
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Têm dimensão, têm tempo livre, têm poder de compra, têm um trabalho concreto por realizar (recuperar/manter e prolongar qualidade de vida, autonomia, autoestima, ...)"



sexta-feira, dezembro 27, 2019

"Longevity will force a shift in responsibility for lifelong learning toward the individual"

Um país cheio de "free riders" e aspirantes a sê-lo.

Num país com esta distribuição etária:
É cada vez mais comum ouvir polícias, professores, enfermeiros, motoristas, ... dizerem que trabalhar até aos 66 anos é uma violência ... e eu, quando os oiço, penso sempre:

- Por que é que um operário tem de saltar de emprego para emprego, por causa das vicissitudes da economia, até chegar à idade da reforma e um polícia/enfermeiro/professor/...  não pode terminar a carreira de polícia/enfermeiro/professor/... e mudar de profissão e fazer algo mais até chegar à idade da reforma?

Entretanto, o @walternatez enviou-me esta imagem

retirada de "The Corporate Implications of Longer Lives". O texto é também um argumento para o advento de uma economia baseada em empresas mais pequenas e mais próximas.
"People are living longer and working longer — but few organizations have come to grips with the opportunities and challenges that greater longevity brings.
...
There is growing awareness that increasing longevity will have major implications for how people manage their work lives and careers. Rising life expectancy means the level of savings required to provide a reasonable income for retirement at age 65 is becoming increasingly infeasible for most people. We predict that, given the average level of savings in advanced economies, many people currently in their mid-40s are likely to need to work into their early to mid-70s; many currently in their 20s (many of whom could live to be over 100) will be working into their late 70s, and even into their 80s.[Moi ici: Pensam que isto só acontece ou acontecerá nos outros países?. Pensem outra vez!]
Across the world, people are becoming more conscious of their lengthening working lives — but frustrated by their working context.
...
The purpose of our research was to consider the impact of longevity on individual and corporate practice.
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Most companies, especially those operating in the advanced economies, still view life in terms of three stages: full-time education, full-time employment, and then a “hard stop” retirement around the age of 65. This is the life structure that emerged in advanced economies in the 20th century and continues to underpin much thinking about the workforce. Although this structure worked when life expectancy was 70, it cannot be stretched to support a healthy 100-year life.
...
In response to the pressures resulting from longer working lives, individuals are starting to experiment with new stages of life and creating different career structures.
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The generation just entering the workforce has the longest expected lifespan in history, perhaps 10 to 15 years beyond that of the generation approaching retirement. In contrast to older workers, many younger workers are aware that their working lives are apt to involve many different jobs in a variety of sectors. A long and shifting career will force them to create a sense of coherence with their values and preferences, and to adapt and develop new skills and interests.
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Members of this group are beginning to focus on options, which become more valuable as the time horizon over which they can be exercised becomes longer.
...
A primary focus during the traditional work-oriented stage of life has been financial matters: earnings, retirement savings, and home ownership. However, as life extends and careers become longer, different types of assets take on new importance.
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The first category is productive assets: the individual’s skills, knowledge, reputation, and professional networks. It is these productive assets that will enable a 40-year-old to find interesting work during a career that spans several more decades.
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The second category consists of what we call vitality assets, which include strong mental and physical health, a good work-life balance, and powerful regenerative relationships. Having such assets will enable people approaching the traditional retirement age to continue working.
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The final category, which we believe will become increasingly important, is what we call transformational assets, which involve self-knowledge and the types of diverse networks that support personal change and transitions.
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As traditional life patterns become less relevant to many people’s needs, individuals will want to pursue working lives that are more flexible and multistaged. However, this desire for flexibility will clash with current corporate practices and processes. Specifically, we anticipate three tension points, involving: (1) people’s desire for personalization; (2) their interest in flexibility; and (3) their desire not to be pigeonholed on the basis of age.
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People want personalization; corporations want conformity.
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People want flexibility; corporations want standardization.
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People want to be age-agnostic; corporations want age markers.
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Given that people are living longer, many want opportunities to contribute throughout their long working lives. Careers have many different stages, each with different aims and different needs. How people sequence the stages will be based on their own motivations, preferences, and financial requirements — not just their age.
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In a three-stage life, the core of the employee-employer relationship was tangible assets. Corporations found that the best way to recruit and retain workers was to offer a promise of tiered earnings based on promotion and length of service, along with the prospect of a pension to finance retirement. However, for many employees, this dominant role of tangible assets has been waning in recent years.
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As working lives become longer, the need for lifelong learning will increase. As working lives become multistaged and the sequence of those stages becomes more customized, individuals will take an interest in skills with value that extends beyond the current employer and sector. This will weaken the one-size-fits-all approach to learning and development. Instead, there will be a growing need for more decentralized and flexible approaches to learning, curated more by individuals than by employers. Skills and knowledge that are portable and externally accredited will be particularly valuable. Longevity will force a shift in responsibility for lifelong learning toward the individual."
E recuo a Janeiro de 2008 para recordar:
"A formação profissional de cada um, é um assunto demasiado importante para ser delegado em regime de outsourcing a quem quer que seja."