Mostrar mensagens com a etiqueta porter. Mostrar todas as mensagens
Mostrar mensagens com a etiqueta porter. Mostrar todas as mensagens

quarta-feira, agosto 17, 2022

Falta de alinhamento ao vivo e a cores

Neste blogue, ao longo dos anos, tenho registado vários casos que são um absurdo em termos de estratégia. Por exemplo:
Ontem encontrei mais um exemplo do que me parece um absurdo em termos de estratégia. Aprendi primeiro com Porter no seu clássico "What is strategy?" (A evolução da ideia de mosaico estratégico (parte III)), e depois com Terry Hill (As mudanças em curso na China - parte II), a importância do alinhamento estratégico. Ou seja, se se quer ter marca de luxo não se pode vender o artigo ao desbarato na feira do preço baixo. Se se quer ser competitivo no custo/preço não se pode ao mesmo tempo investir na diferenciação da marca.

O exemplo em causa estava no DN sob o título, "Carnes da Montana quer chegar às cantinas públicas":
"Marca que representa sete raças autóctones bovinas existentes em Portugal está a inovar oferta e explora novos mercados. [Moi ici: Marca e raças autóctones aponta para diferenciação, qualidade, e baixas quantidades]

Os produtores de sete raças autóctones de bovinos identificadas em Portugal encontraram um novo canal para fazer chegar as suas produções diretamente ao consumidor, através da loja online Carnes da Montanha. Vão lutar para que o produto chegue às cantinas públicas e assim estimule a preservação de um efetivo que é "muito mais do que carne", como descreve Idalino Leão, administrador da empresa. [Moi ici: Produtores de raças autóctones querem escoar a carne através de um canal que não valoriza a qualidade, mas a conformidade. Querem escoar a carne como se fosse uma commodity. Não percebem que o negócio das cantinas públicas é o negócio do preço/custo mais baixo?]
...
"Orgulhoso por poder exibir as nove medalhas de ouro atribuídas a produtos da Carnes da Montanha no último Concurso Nacional de Carnes Tradicionais Portuguesas, que se realizou em junho, em Santarém,"  [Moi ici: Qual o valor destas medalhas? Ou as medalhas não prestam, ou as Carnes da Montanha não sabem como as utilizar. As medalhas se valerem algo devem ser usadas para reforçar a proposta de valor para mercados que valorizam a diferenciação]
...
 "o objetivo é convencer os municípios a usarem estes produtos sempre que nas ementas das cantinas públicas (hospitais, escolas, universidades) esteja previsto o consumo de carne de vaca" [Moi ici: Acham que estas entidades nadam em dinheiro? Compram ao preço mais baixo e, por isso, têm de ser fornecidas por produtores com raças muito eficientes]
...
Segundo o administrador, em Portugal, 60% dos clientes estão em Cascais, Oeiras e Ericeira, 20% no Algarve os restantes no resto do país." [Moi ici: Como não recordar a artesã de Bragança e os outros, têm de mudar de mercado, mas não é para baixo, é para cima. Pena que o administrador seja "também o presidente da Agros e da Confagri", formatado no negócio do preço baixo, não tem nem experiência nem tempo para apostar numa estratégia de preço alto]

domingo, fevereiro 07, 2021

Estratégia e identidade

Na sequência deste artigo "O ano do "Great Reset"" descobri Suzie Scott. 

Ao ler o que ela escreve sobre os humanos, não pude deixar de pensar na transposição para as empresas, enquanto ressoava na minha cabeça uma velha frase de Porter retirada do clássico "What is Strategy?":

"As we return to the question, What is strategy? we see that trade-offs add a new dimension to the answer. Strategy is making trade-offs in competing. The essence of strategy is choosing what not to do. Without trade-offs, there would be no need for choice and thus no need for strategy. Any good idea could and would be quickly imitated. Again, performance would once again depend wholly on operational effectiveness. 

...

Strategy renders choices about what not to do as important as choices about what to do."

Vamos ao que li de Suzie Scott:
"Social identities are formed not only by what we are in life but also by what we are not. The infinite array of selves we cannot be, have never been and cannot imagine becoming form a vast, expansive landscape from which our actual selves emerge. [Moi ici: Isto também faz recordar o espaço de Minkowski - As escolhas que fizemos no passado limitam as escolhas que podemos fazer no futuro.] This is a residual category of nothing: the matter left behind after we carve out defining shapes. It is the scraps of cookie dough thrown in the waste bin; the discarded fabric from which our outfits have been cut. Phenomenologically, this represents the world of lost potential: the bracketed irrelevance of ‘everything else’ that recedes behind those objects that shine forth. Yet this contextual background gives greater meaning to the selves we do become, its negative space emphasising and accentuating their boundaries and contours. It plays a subtle but important role in supporting the construction of identity and enhancing its performance: like a theatrical understudy, its invisible labour is essential to the smooth execution of the show. Just as figures stand out clearly against contrasting backgrounds, so do positive identities comes into sharper focus when defined in negative relational contrast. I know who I am by what I am not, or refuse to be."

Todas as empresas têm uma estratégia, mesmo as que nunca deliberaram sobre ela. Uma estratégia pode ser deliberada, pode ser algo criado, ou pode ser algo que emerge do conjunto das decisões tomadas quotidianamente. Estratégias deliberadas talvez contribuam para uma maior noção de identidade: "Yet this contextual background gives greater meaning to the selves we do become, its negative space emphasising and accentuating their boundaries and contours. It plays a subtle but important role in supporting the construction of identity and enhancing its performance"

Trecho retirado de "The Social Life of Nothing"

quinta-feira, julho 11, 2019

Tail risks can screw you (parte II)

Parte I.

O D. Pedro IV comentou:
"Disclaimer: não conheço o caso em concreto. Mas há um padrão que se tem.vindo a repetir....
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- "Mas porque é que não têm lojas? Porque é que não vendem on-line? Olhe que o mercado está a mudar muito e não podem ficar de fora."
À resposta:
- "porque somos fabricantes e queremos foco completo e especialização nisso"
As pessoas olham com verdadeira desilusão. Senti isso várias vezes. O mundo está cheio de Ícaros, ou se preferirmos de exemplos do princípio de Peter que nos impele sempre a avançar até que saímos da nossa área de experiência e core business.
Exagerando: a necessidade (quase obrigação) de sair da zona de conforto está overrated!"
Por que usei a foto na parte I?
Demasiada gente fica seduzida com o glamour, com o lado solar, e não sabe, ou desvaloriza o sofrimento, o risco, ou o lado lunar.

O comentário avança duas linhas de pensamento. A primeira é acerca da essência da estratégia, a segunda acerca do nível de risco.

1. A essência da estratégia
A essência da estratégia é ser capaz de dizer não. Recordo sempre a lição de Agosto de 2008:
"the most important orders are the ones to which a company says 'no'"
O que não vamos fazer? Quem não vamos servir?
Sem escolher dizer não a certas coisas, não se pode ser excelente a outras, fica-se stuck-in-the-middle.

No texto "Quando falta mão de obra (parte II)" citei:
"Of course, economies of scale can sometimes be required for success in certain markets and for some products, but often they aren’t required and it is ego, not a strong business strategy, that is forcing growth where growth isn’t necessary."
Entre crescer pelo volume ou crescer pelo preço unitário (ou seja, pelo valor acrescentado) não deveria ser um dilema para uma PME. No entanto, quase sempre a pressão pelo crescimento leva a dizer sim a mais coisas do que deviam ser aprovadas. E uma organização começa a dispersar-se, começa a espalhar os recursos escassos por fatias de pão cada vez maiores.

2. Até onde arriscar?
Em princípio parece não haver uma resposta única a esta pergunta. Cada um arrisca até onde a sua paixão pelo risco o leva. No entanto, em Antifrágil Nassim Taleb dá uma pista infalível. Seguir o exemplo dos estóicos:
"combines an aggressive stance toward upside opportunities with a healthy paranoia about large negative outcomes"
Nunca arriscar a casa. Só arriscar até ao limite em que se tudo for perdido, a vida pode continuar. Ou seja:
"Dans une stratégie qui entraîne la ruine; les bénéfices ne compensent jamais les risques de ruine"
Deixa-me arriscar, tenho aqui uma possibilidade fantástica de ganhar uma boa maquia, só tenho de jogar uma vez na roleta russa...



quarta-feira, setembro 13, 2017

A essência da estratégia

Estratégia é ter coragem de assumir que há coisas em que se será mau deliberadamente, e que há coisas em que se procurará ser muito bom.

Num mundo que requer cada vez mais concentração e foco, há cada vez menos espaço para bruce jenners medianos.

Quantas empresas são capazes de assumir este risco de se focarem em algo à custa de menosprezarem outras opções?
"“Ikea is so good at so many things. Why is it so bad at delivery?”
...
ultimately, it comes down to focus:
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Ikea refuses to expose itself to the idiosyncracies of its customers,” [Frances] Frei says. “There is no way they could do their own delivery with that signature Ikea crisp efficiency—there are too many variables. So they make you conform to them.” Ikea makes great stuff cheap—and that is the draw.
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As the authors put it, this is a case study in how a large retailer can succeed by failing. This is the essence of focus. Ikea focuses on cost and the a big part of it is also educating your customers that delivery is not the preferred option to purchase its products and that customer service is not something you should expect. Since this allows the firm to reduce its cost even further (potentially), it is the “definition” of focus: doing something poorly and using it to do something even better."
Como não recordar o clássico "What is strategy?" de Porter:
“The essence of strategy is choosing what not to do,” 

Trechos retirados de "Ikea: Why is it so bad at delivery?"


sexta-feira, junho 23, 2017

"What won’t you be?" (parte II)

Parte I.
"Almost nothing in our daily lives is actually a winner take all competition.
Somewhere, there's someone fitter, faster, thinner, quicker, smarter, more popular or richer than you. And there's someone else fitter, faster, thinner, quicker, smarter, more popular or richer than they are. And you're (far) ahead of someone else who is busy looking at you from behind.
And yet we see people angry because someone's passing their car, or gaining more followers online. They mistakenly believe it's a race. It rarely is.
If you can use your situation as fuel, fuel to dig in and care more and do better, by all means.
But if not, ignore it. Do your work, not theirs."
Trecho retirado de "Winner take all"


quarta-feira, junho 21, 2017

"What won’t you be?"

"Today’s economy, he notes, is “replete with winner-take-all effects [Moi ici: Sabem que acredito que isto é passageiro, uma espécie de doença infantil das plataformas "Estratégia em todo lado - não é winner-take-all (parte V)"] and huge advantages that accrue to the biggest and best-run organizations, to the detriment of upstarts and second-fiddle players.”
...
But is the only strategy in our winner-take-all era to get as big as possible, to aspire to eventually serve everyone, and to meet their every need?...
We’re not trying to meet all needs. So, Amazon’s business strategy is super broad. Meet all needs. I mean, the stuff that will be in Prime in five or ten years will be amazing, right? And so we can’t try to be that — we’ll never be as good as them at what they’re trying to be. What we can be is the emotional connection brand, like HBO or Netflix. So, think of it as they’re trying to be Walmart, we’re trying to be Starbucks. So, super focused on one thing that people are very passionate about.
...
Michael Porter would approve. “The essence of strategy is choosing what not to do,” he writes in his 1996 classic “What Is Strategy?” In Porter’s view, sustainable competitive advantage depends on trade-offs, including the fact that it’s difficult for one company to serve all customers across a wide range of needs.
...
In an era where a small number of huge companies have unprecedented reach and control, Porter’s central question seems more important than ever: What won’t you be?"

Trechos retirados de "How Can Companies Compete with Amazon? Netflix Has the Answer"

domingo, outubro 02, 2016

Crescer não é uma estratégia

Como sabem, não passo de um anónimo consultor da província de um país periférico a caminho do socialismo. No entanto, tento estudar, testar e reflectir sobre o que concluo e observo. Assim, exponho o peito às balas da realidade, não da oratória ou da retórica, confrontando o que penso com o que outros pensam e esperar que um dia a realidade ilustre de forma clara, com a tal vantagem de ver no espelho retrovisor o que antes era conjectura, quem tinha razão.
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Segue-se um primeiro trecho retirado de "A Stout Porter: Business Strategy In the 21st Century" onde o autor defende que o objectivo mais importante no mundo da economia digital é crescer, crescer rapidamente, crescer mais rápido que os concorrentes. Não concordo! Acredito que até na economia digital terá de haver estratégia baseada na heterogeneidade crescente do mercado.
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Recordo "Mongo e as tribos", a heterogeneidade vai, mais tarde ou mais cedo, reclamar a diferenciação. Não esquecer "Estratégia em todo lado - não é winner-take-all" (parte I e parte II). Crescer não é uma estratégia.
"This paper discusses Porter’s principles from our point of view — that of a firm dedicated to investing in promising tech startups in Europe and turning them into long-term leaders on competitive global markets.
...
The Right Goal...
suggest that increasing returns are now the right goal: business strategy should now be all about maximizing a company’s increasing returns to scale.
...
Increasing returns have a major consequence from a strategic point of view: they create a new competitive regime in which a single company ends up grabbing most of the market. When two companies driven by increasing returns compete on the same market, only one of them will be able to survive on the long term and realize a substantial return on its investment.
...
So let’s be clear: bubble or not, the right goal in the digital economy is not to be the market share leader or the most profitable company. It is to take the vast majority of the market, at (almost) any cost."
Nem uma palavras sobre clientes, sobre propósito, sobre razão de ser...

Continua.

terça-feira, novembro 10, 2015

Um gráfico a descrever Mongo (parte II)

Parte I.

Impressionante esta memória de 1979:
"To create high fences around their businesses, brewers couple brand identification with economies of scale in production, distribution, and marketing"(1)
Esta era a perspectiva de quem estava no Normalistão.
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O que se passa em Mongo?
"Craft brewers accounted for 11 percent of U.S. beer production volume in 2014, up from 5 percent in 2010,
...
Craft brewers also grew annual sales to $19.6 billion last year, a 22 percent increase between 2013 and 2014."(2)
 Um mundo completamente diferente.
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(1) - Trecho retirado de "How Competitive Forces Shape Strategy" de Michael Porter
(2) - Trechos retirados de "Why Craft Brewers Are Winning the Beer Wars"

quinta-feira, setembro 03, 2015

Dick Dastardly é um mau exemplo

Do outro lado do Atlântico e do equador, o @AllanMoura  mandou-me este texto "Por que deixar de lado a competição" de onde sublinhei:
"embora seja difícil encontrar um ramo empresarial sem concorrentes, é possível e desejável deixar de lado o sentimento de competição. Isso faz bem não só para a saúde, mas para o negócio também, diz Kiechel. Se a fixação por derrotar os “adversários” se tornar objetivo prioritário, um desempenho indesejado pode levar ao sentimento geral de autodepreciação dentro da empresa, à caça às bruxas na equipe e, principalmente, a deixar para trás os focos principais do negócio.
...
Em outras palavras, concentrar o foco em alguém a quem servir, não derrotar.”"
Um conselho deste blogue e também de Buffett.
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Como não recordar Dick Dastardly!

segunda-feira, agosto 10, 2015

Qual era o grande defeito de Dick Dastardly?

Já li muita coisa mesmo de Michael Porter. Confesso que nunca tinha lido um artigo de 1979, publicado na HBR chamado "The Five Competitive Forces That Shape Strategy".
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Há dias, desafiado por um artigo de Steve Denning, pesquisei o artigo na internet. O artigo deu origem depois a livros que quase todos os estudiosos de estratégia já leram e apresenta o tão famoso modelo de Porter para desenhar estratégias.
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Li a primeira frase do artigo. Parei! E não voltei a fazer qualquer tentativa para o continuar a ler, Denning tinha razão:
"In essence, the job of the strategist is to understand and cope with competition."
Não acredito nisto.
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O objectivo da estratégia não é lidar com a concorrência! O objectivo da estratégia é escolher clientes-alvo e seduzi-los.
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Não admira as gerações de observadores de motards!
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Não admira os decisores paralisados pela observação da concorrência como o rei Saul.
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Qual era o grande defeito de Dick Dastardly?

Sempre tão preocupado com a concorrência nunca usava as suas vantagens competitivas senão para lidar com a concorrência.

quinta-feira, junho 18, 2015

Tão anos 80

A propósito de "At IKEA, Ensuring ‘Quality as an Enabler of Lower Cost’".
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Quais são as três prioridades de qualquer modelo de negócio baseado no low-cost?
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Aprendi essa lição no livro Kaizen de Masaaki Imai, QCD:

  • Quality (aqui como ausência de defeitos e não como sinónimo de mais atributos);
  • Cost; and
  • Delivery.
Michael Porter no histórico artigo de 1996, What is Strategy?, dizia acerca dos japoneses:
"Differences in operational effectiveness were at the heart of the Japanese challenge to Western companies in the 1980s. The Japanese were so far ahead of rivals in operational effectiveness that they could offer lower cost and superior quality at the same time."
O IKEA segue um modelo de negócio que fez do low-cost a sua vantagem competitiva, logo o controlo da qualidade é fundamental.
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Por que é que o IKEA só agora sentiu necessidade de formalizar a chefia do controlo da qualidade? O que terá motivado a mudança?
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BTW, se eu tivesse de concorrer com o IKEA concentrar-me-ia neste ponto:
"The products being tested are ones that will be released at some point in the future. “We are not here today, we’re in 2018,” said Mattias Andersson, a manager at the IKEA test lab, as he led journalists through the lab on a tour last month."
Tão nórdicos, tão certinhos, tão computáveis, tão lentos... tão Sandy.

Imaginem uma Zara a competir com eles: rapidez, moda.
Imaginem um concorrente que aposte na flexibilidade, na customização, na co-criação.
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Não sei é se os seus clientes-alvo estarão dispostos a trocar preço por moda, ou flexibilidade, ou customização, ou co-criação.
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O título do artigo e as figuras:
(do artigo de Porter)
(deste postal)

sexta-feira, maio 08, 2015

Acerca de sectores estáveis e demasiado homogéneos na oferta (parte IV)

Parte I e parte II e parte III.
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Em Junho de 2012 critiquei e classifiquei como errada a opinião do futuro presidente da república em "Agora é que vão começar as decisões políticas".
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Quando há dinheiro, quando há recursos, verdadeiramente não é preciso estratégia. Contudo, quando faltam os recursos, é preciso fazer escolhas, é preciso renunciar... é preciso ter uma estratégia, ter uma política.
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A nossa política passa por:
"baixar impostos, aumentar salários, reduzir importações, aumentar emprego, fazer obras, redistribuir pelos mais fragilizados, acabar com a austeridade, aumentar o défice e reduzir a dívida"
Estão a ver o resultado do teste de Roger Martin?
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Pois!
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Agora, voltemos ao mercado interno e ao sector da saúde. Consideremos este texto "Why Strategy Matters Now" de Michael Porter e Thomas Lee, publicado pelo "The New England Journal of Medicine.
"Until recently, most health care organizations could get by without a real strategy, as most businesses understand that term. They didn’t need to worry about how to be different or make painful decisions about what not to do. [Moi ici: Are you there Mr Rio?] As long as patients came in the door, they did fine, since fee-for-service contracts covered their costs and a little more. Success came from operational effectiveness: working hard, embracing best practices, and burnishing reputations that attracted both patients and talent. Virtually every provider was included in most payers’ networks, and patients could generally seek care wherever they pleased at modest or no extra cost. Most organizations maximized revenue by offering every possible service in volumes as large as possible and expanding the same well-reimbursed services to cross-subsidize less profitable ones. Typically, “strategy” defaulted to having the scale and market presence to secure good rates and be included in networks.
But that era is ending.[Moi ici: Nas estruturas de saúde do Estado ainda estamos na fase dos hospitais-cidade, organizações demasiado complexas para funcionarem, e dos hospitais separados entre si por 30 km e que competem entre si pelas especialidades todas]
...
Many health care organizations today are running near full capacity but have flat or declining revenues. Bargaining power has shifted away from providers.
...
The time has come for health care organizations to rethink the meaning of strategy. Strategy is about making the choices necessary to distinguish an organization in meeting customers’ needs.
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In the new era, strategy must reflect a health care organization’s fundamental purpose: what it is trying to achieve and for whom. Financial margins and growth targets will be the results rather than the drivers of strategy. Historically, organizations could pursue multiple goals, such as meeting all their communities’ health care needs, preserving physicians’ autonomy, educating clinicians, and conducting research. Today, one goal must become paramount: improving value for patients.
...
IPUs need to differentiate themselves from competitors by emphasizing care for certain types of patients — those for whom they can achieve better outcomes and have particular expertise, or those for whom they have similar outcomes as competitors but can deliver care at a lower cost, more quickly, or more conveniently."

Para onde quer que olhemos, sempre o mesmo padrão. Ainda darei maus um exemplo na parte V.

quinta-feira, maio 29, 2014

A propósito da concorrência imperfeita

"The worst mistake in strategy is to compete with rivals on the same dimensions,
...
many businesses still get confused around the definition of the concept, and that even trying to be ‘the best’ means a business is starting in the wrong place strategically.
...
“What I’ve found over the years is that a lot of management teams think about strategy [like this]: strategy is about competing to be the best company in your business [category/industry]. How do you be the best company? Well, you have to figure out the best product, service, supply chain, marketing, customer acquisition process. You’ve kind of got to figure out the ‘answer.’
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That’s exactly the wrong place to start, he said. “If you think about strategy this way, where does that lead you? That leads you to a race to one ideal way of competing, and the problem with that is if there is only one way of competing and everybody has to race to the same place, it’s not going to be pretty.
...
“Even more importantly, what we found in industry after industry is that there is no best way to compete. There are multiple ways to compete, depending on whose needs you’re actually trying to serve. We all know it’s impossible to meet every need of every customer uniquely well. That’s impossible. There’s no one way to deliver value.
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“Strategy starts with a notion that the fundamental question is not how to be the best, it’s actually how to deliver something unique. To the customers you’re choosing to serve. Not because what you’re doing is ‘the best’ but because what you’re doing is delivering distinctive value.
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Strategy is about being unique. That’s ultimately what all successful companies are able to achieve for some period of time."
Trechos retirados de "The worst error in business strategy according to Professor Michael Porter"

sexta-feira, janeiro 10, 2014

Se a tribo dos Qimondos imaginasse...

Li "Bringing home the bacon -Tiny Denmark is an agricultural superpower" e lembrei-me logo de André Macedo, Jaime Quesado e quejandos, a tribo do Qimondos.
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Em "Cuidado com as generalizações, não há "sunset industries"" critiquei a frase:
“Acontece que o abandono progressivo das actividades com baixo valor acrescentado (têxteis, calçado) é uma estrada sem regresso possível e sem alternativa. Vai doer, mas só assim o país ficará mais forte e competitivo.”
Porque metia sectores inteiros no mesmo saco e, voltei a usar a frase que aprendi com Suzanne Berger:
“… there are no “sunset” industries condemned to disappear in high wage economies, although there are certainly sunset and condemned strategies, among them building a business on the advantages to be gained by cheap labor” 
Portugal tinha de acabar com esses sectores para ser um país de futuro... a Dinamarca parece que não se importa de apostar na produção de carne de porco e de leite de vaca...
"Denmark is a tiny country, with 5.6m people and wallet-draining labour costs. But it is an agricultural giant, home to 30m pigs and a quiverful of global brands. In 2011 farm products made up 20% of its goods exports. The value of food exports grew from €4 billion ($5.5 billion) in 2001 to €16.1 billion in 2011. The government expects it to rise by a further €6.7 billion by 2020.
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Why, in a post-industrial economy, is the food industry still thriving? Much of the answer lies in a cluster in the central region of the country. Policymakers everywhere are obsessed by creating their own Silicon Valleys. But Denmark’s example suggests that the logic of clustering can be applied as well to ancient industries as to new ones. (Moi ici: Parece que alguém relacionou os macacos de Hausmann com os clusters de Porter... Ah! Se nos anos 90 tivéssemos tido quem nos apontasse este caminho...) In central Denmark just as in California, innovation is in the air, improving productivity is a way of life, and the whole is much greater than the sum of the parts. Entrepreneurs see the future in meat and milk."
O problema nunca é o sector onde trabalhamos, o problema é, quase sempre, a estratégia seguida. Como é que um sector tão antigo como a agricultura pode suportar salários tão altos? (BTW, não existe salário mínimo nacional na Islândia, Noruega, Finlândia, Suécia e Dinamarca)
"The word on everyone’s lips is “innovation”" 
Subir na escala de valor.

BTW, nem sei como é que o politicamente correcto engole isto:
"the Danish Crown slaughterhouse organises regular tours for visitors, including schoolchildren, with views of the killing line." 

segunda-feira, maio 06, 2013

Acerca da estratégia

"Emergent strategy is the view that strategy emerges over time as intentions collide with and accommodate a changing reality.  Emergent strategy is a set of actions, or behavior, consistent over time, “a realized pattern [that] was not expressly intended” in the original planning of strategy. Emergent strategy implies that an organization is learning what works in practice. Given today’s world, I think emergent strategy is on the upswing.
...
Henry’s emergent strategy ideas simply seem to be more relevant to the world we live in today – they reflect the fact that our plans will fail. This is not to say that planning isn’t useful, but other than some long term technology plans, the day of the 5 year and even 2 year plans has faded and emergent strategy is the reality in most industries that I work with.  You must be much more fleet of foot, strategic flexibility is what we are looking for in most industries. The boundaries are more fluid now. For many, albeit not all, knowing what industry you are in is not as clear cut as it once was. This makes industry analysis less easy.  The value chain (Moi ici: No meu trabalho é fundamental conhecer e caracterizar a cadeia da procura, o ecossistema da procura, muito mais do que a clássica cadeia de fornecimento) is now shared across firm boundaries and at times, in part, in common with competitors."

Trechos retirados de "Porter or Mintzberg: Whose View of Strategy Is the Most Relevant Today?"

domingo, maio 05, 2013

Acerca da estratégia

" “the core idea of strategy is to provide an overarching view on how a particular company is going to succeed in the marketplace.”
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strategy is really a “mindset” that views “business life as not entirely random; stochastic but not random. While it may be absolutely necessary to revisit and revise choices more often than convenient, the assumption holds that effortful, determined, revisable strategy is better than simply letting happen whatever will happen.”
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Strategy is about trying to take control and trying to win. Strategy is about trying to predict the future or at least enough of that future that will give you a competitive advantage. Strategy is about being specific. It is about helping you get from A to C by doing B. It’s about putting your cards on the table, placing your bets.
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More than choosing what to do, it is about choosing what NOT to do. Because today, more than ever, there are far more things that you could do — but shouldn’t. These things distract and create complexity. They take valuable time and resources away from what really matters. Strategy is about understanding what really matters and acting on it.
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strategy is about answering the following questions:
  • What business or businesses should you be in?
  • How do you add value to your businesses?
  • Who are the target customers for your businesses?
  • What are your value propositions to those target customers?
  • What capabilities are essential to adding value to your businesses and differentiating their value propositions?"

Trechos retirados de "How Do You Know You Do Not Have a Strategy?"

quinta-feira, março 07, 2013

Cheio de sumo para a realidade portuguesa pré-troika, no tempo dos campeões nacionais

Escrito em 2001 acerca da realidade canadiana, cheio de sumo para a realidade portuguesa pré-troika:
"the study revealed a number of weaknesses in the microeconomic business environment that afflicted much of the economy. The absence of intense local rivalry combined with customers who were not demanding produced weak pressures for firm productivity and upgrading.
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We found many firms content to compete in Canada Portugal, with little orientation toward global competition. Those firms that did compete internationally tended to focus on the U.S. Espanha/Angola and pursue strategies that depended on natural resource advantages or lower labor costs than other G-7 competitors instead of sophisticated products and processes. Rather than seek out the most demanding customers both at home and abroad, Canadian Portuguese firms were inclined to serve the less demanding segments....We recommended that governments move aggressively to restore a favorable macroeconomic context for Canadian business by tackling the budget deficit and reducing personal and corporate tax rates. We also recommended that governments eliminate the barriers to inter-provincial trade and investment that relaxed competitive pressures and fractured an already small economy....we recommended that governments pursue policies to enhance the intensity of domestic competition rather than try to produce national champions shielded from competition in the home market....While some laud the lower Canadian dollar as enhancing competitiveness by decreasing the relative prices of our exports, the true effect is exactly the opposite. A low Canadian dollar dulls the incentive for upgrading and competing on any basis other than lower price. In addition, in the Canadian context, the low dollar makes investment in upgrading more expensive. Approximately 70% of Canada’s installed machinery and equipment is imported. Consequently, the low dollar during the 1990’s made machinery and equipment imports dramatically more expensive, which is likely to have contributed to a fall in the growth rate of capital stock per worker, thus making labour productivity growth still more difficult to achieve....Research on firm-level competitiveness has revealed the critical importance of a distinctive strategy. Firm-level competitive advantage rarely results from benchmarking against competitors and replicating their choices. Rather, competitiveness results from making a set of choices that produces a distinctive positioning and is manifested in a tailored system of activitiesThis activity system creates customer value distinct from competitors and makes replication by competitors difficult by confronting them with painful trade-offs...If the nation is to move forward, a greater proportion of Canadian Portuguese firms must make an alternative set of choices. These are shown on the right column in the figure.



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All industries today are “high-tech”, and can employ advanced technology. Every firm has the opportunity to develop competitive advantages building on unique strategic positions."

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Trechos retirados de "Canadian Competitiveness: A Decade after the Crossroads" de Michael Porter e Roger Martin.

quarta-feira, novembro 21, 2012

A economia não tem de ser um jogo de soma-nula

A propósito da falência da empresa de consultoria, Monitor, criada por Michael Porter recomendo a leitura deste artigo "What Killed Michael Porter's Monitor Group? The One Force That Really Matters" de Steve Denning.
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Para começar, não creio que Steve Denning tenha razão na mensagem que atribui a Porter, julgo que Denning simplifica e acaba por caricaturar a mensagem de Porter. Basta pesquisar o que tenho escrito ao longo dos anos sobre as ideias de Porter para perceber:
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Escreveu Denning:
"Why go through the hassle of actually designing and making better products and services, and offering steadily more value to customers and society, when the firm could simply position its business so that structural barriers ensured endless above-average profits?"
Escreveu Porter:
"How can you deliver a unique value to meet an important set of needs for an important set of customers?"
Prefiro esquecer a diatribe contra as ideias de Porter e concentrar-me em algumas ideias interessantes que Denning defende (e que, ao contrário do que escreveu, Porter também defendeu, basta pesquisar neste blogue). Muitos políticos e comentadores precisavam de perceber este conceito que se segue:
"By defining strategy as a matter of defeating the competition, Porter envisaged business as a zero-sum game. As he says in his 1979 HBR article, “The state of competition in an industry depends on five basic forces… The collective strength of these forces determines the ultimate profit potential of an industry.” For Porter, the ultimate profit potential of an industry is a finite fixed amount: the only question is who is going to get which share of it.(Moi ici: Este é o discurso dos proteccionistas, a riqueza capturada pelos chineses é a riqueza que os europeus não podem capturar... como se o bolo não pudesse crescer, como se a riqueza não tenha crescido e crescido e crescido com o comércio desde que os humanos dominaram o fogo)
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Sound business is however unlike warfare or sports in that one company’s success does not require its rivals to fail. (Moi ici: A propósito desta frase que muito boa gente devia meter na cabeça, recordar estas palavras de Porter "Ao contrário do desporto ou da guerra, nos negócios, as empresas podem ganhar sem necessitarem de aniquilar os seus rivais."Unlike competition in sports, every company can choose to invent its own game. A better analogy than war or sports is the performing arts. (Moi ici: Como seria diferente e muito mais saudável o debate sobre a produtividade e a competitividade se esta analogia fosse interiorizada... se Hilary Austen fosse mais lida, por exemplo) There can be many good singers or actors—each outstanding and successful in a distinctive way. Each finds and creates an audience. The more good performers there are, the more audiences grow and the arts flourish. What’s gone wrong here was Porter’s initial thought. The purpose of strategy—or business or business education—is not to defeat one’s rivals. (Moi ici: Algo que aprendi com Porter foi a fugir da competição perfeita, da guerra directa, "“Managers who think there is one best company and one best set of processes set themselves up for destructive competition. "The worst error is to compete with your competition on the same things," Porter said. "That only leads to escalation, which leads to lower prices or higher costs unless the competitor is inept." Companies should strive to be unique, he added. Managers should be asking, "How can you deliver a unique value to meet an important set of needs for an important set of customers?""The purpose is business is to add value for customers and ultimately society."
Outra ideia interessante de Denning:
"The business reality of today is that the only safe place against the raging innovation is to join it. Instead of seeing business—and strategy and business education—as a matter of figuring out how to defeat one’s known rivals and protect oneself against competition through structural barriers, (Moi ici: Esta é a conversa e o pensamento dos que falam na necessidade de proteger os "campeões" nacionais, as empresas do regime) if a business is to survive, it must aim to add value to customers through continuous innovation and finding new ways of delighting its customers."
E acerca do futuro da consultoria sobre estratégia:
"Does strategy consulting have a future? When rightly conceived as the art of thinking through how companies can add value to customers–and ultimately society–through continuous innovation, strategy consulting has a bright future. The market is vast because most large firms are still 20th Century hierarchical bureaucracies that are focused on “the dumbest idea in the world”: shareholder value. They are very weak at innovation."
BTW, acreditar que a Monitor defendia a ideia de que existem "vantagens competitivas sustentáveis alicerçadas em betão" parece-me um bocado forte. Deste clássico e deste outro "The Geometry of Competition" de Bruce Chew o que retiro é que existem posicionamentos competitivos transitoriamente sustentáveis através de decisões que assentam em trade-offs difíceis de reverter... prometer alicerces de betão, não.

quarta-feira, setembro 05, 2012

Real and fake productivity

Recordando "Acerca da produtividade, mais uma vez" e o marcador "gato vs rato" muito interessante este artigo "A New Look at U.S. Economic Competitiveness"  e o conceito de "real and fake productivity":
"U.S. competitiveness [is] the ability of firms in the U.S. to succeed in the global marketplace while raising the living standards of the average American."
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"For an economy to stay competitive, productivity needs to increase continuously. Productivity needs to rise fast enough for firms to make more money each year. And it needs to rise fast enough for workers to earn more, on average, each year. This sets a high bar."
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"To discuss the productivity of a national economy we need to distinguish "real" productivity from "fake" productivity.  Real productivity measures how much actual dollar value someone can produce through their work effort. Fake productivity measures how much an employer can drive down wages by negotiating, offshoring, outsourcing, etc.
If an economy delivers gains in fake productivity but not real productivity, that simply means that money has shifted from one group in that economy (mostly workers) to another group (mostly managers and investors.) Such gains do not increase the total size of the pie. Past a certain point, fake productivity gains actually shrink the pie, because lowered wages prevent people from giving their children the education they’ll need for a well-paying job." 

domingo, junho 17, 2012

A experiência é o produto (parte II)

Parte I.
"For decades, businesses have sought technology, features, and optimizations to maintain or increase an advantage over their competitors. But the value of investing solely in these things has reached an end. The experiences people have with your products and services is the real differentiator, a strategy that must be explored and embraced in our changing world.
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In the 20th century, in addition to an emphasis on computerization and globalization, business management focused heavily on optimization. The early days of business management began with economic theory and the work of Fredrick Taylor, who performed time and motion studies in factories to scientifically examine and select the most efficient working methods....If we fast-forward to the latest trends in business management from the past decade, you’ll see the same focus on optimization in the popular Six Sigma and Business Process Reengineering (BPR) practices."
A nossa velha busca neste blogue, à procura de um Ananias capaz de abrir os olhos a gente colada à mentalidade do século XX, resgatar os habitantes de Magnitograd de um mundo a laranja e branco, onde a eficiência reina e a resposta intuitiva é, reduzir custos, para se ser mais competitvo.
"....Because techniques of operational efficiency such as Dell’s lean, supply chain management have become increasingly well-known and easily practiced, they’re no longer the big competitive advantages they used to be. Aiming to be better at an activity that everyone else has mastered isn’t a strategy. Strategy is about tradeoffs—purposefully choosing tactics different than those used by your competition. Strategy means saying no to some activities so you can excel at others. And the result of these strategic tradeoffs is products and services that are clearly distinguished in customers’ minds, with meaningful differences that can’t easily be replicated by others. .Today, as the benefits of organizational efficiency have decreased, businesses are looking for new approaches to create value for customers and for themselves. The narrow focus on the bottom line—and all the post-profit savings that were created by being efficient—has changed to a focus on the top line, where revenues can be increased by finding new customers and defining new offerings."
No final dos anos 80 do século passado, enquanto membro de uma equipa de 6 jovens engenheiros encarregados de tratar do aprovisionamento de válvulas, bombas, manómetros, reservatórios e pouco mais, para uma extensão da nossa fábrica, aprendi a lição muito rapidamente:
  1. Recolher as especificações do item do caderno de encargos da casa-mãe;
  2. Redigir e enviar um fax pedindo proposta (ainda não havia e-mail);
  3. Receber as propostas, estudá-las e pedir esclarecimentos;
  4. Redigir mapa comparativo das propostas;
  5. Justificar escolha e enviar para a chefia directa.
O método era espectacular, recordo-me de comparar bombas centrífugas e perceber que a bomba mais cara, mesmo que fosse dada, ao fim de um ano era mais cara dado o elevado consumo energético. O que me atazanava a cabeça era quando uma proposta fugia do esquema e apresentava atributos que mais nenhuma outra apresentava. Não apresentam porquê? Não têm? Não consideram relevante? Será que têm? Devo contactá-los a pedir para complementarem a informação?
"It’s the marketing MBA’s favorite tool. It gets rolled out at meeting after meeting in all of its analytical, bean-counting glory: the dreaded feature matrix, a document created by some assistant-of-something who compiled a list of all of the companies that might be considered competitors, cataloged all of their products’ “features,” and tallied the results in a giant matrix.It’s a very logical, thorough approach. By comparing you to your competitors apples-to-apples and oranges-to-oranges, you find where you’re ahead, where you’re lagging, and where you’re absolutely not represented. Unfortunately, the typical response is to focus on the deficient or missing “features.” That makes sense: who would want to face the new VP when he’s smoldering over the competitor’s market-leading Automated Configuration Wizard that you don’t even have a response to? The natural response is to seek parity with your competition."
O que estava na base da justificação da minha escolha? (passo 5 acima).
Recomendava a proposta com o preço mais baixo... É aço inox 316 SL? É! É de 14 polegadas? É! É de borboleta? É!..... Se é tudo igual, o que é que diferencia as propostas? O preço!!!
"But what is parity? It’s sameness. It’s removing differentiation between you and the competition. It’s looking only to your competitors for what defines your offering. From your customer’s viewpoint, if you’ve reached parity with your rivals then there’s no discernable difference between you and anyone else. The experience can become so banal and impotent that it either ceases to exist, or only the negative aspects of the experience (usability issues, for example) are notable. Avoid the pitfall of parity. Avoid the feature wars, vying to have more bullet points on your packaging and spec sheets than your rivals.Different is good. Competitive strategy is based on doing things differently than your competitors, and demonstrating the worth of those differences to customers."
E voltamos a Youngme Moon e ao seu "Different" e ao perigo da satisfação dos clientes se tornar num enorme nivelador
"So if reaching parity—being as good as others—is a bad idea, isn’t being the best a great idea? Maybe not. Striving to be the best at everything, to be the best in your industry, can be an all too common misstep. The problem with this thinking is that you can’t be the best at everything, and besides, being the best depends entirely on who’s doing the judging."
Porter, como recorda recentemente Joan Magretta, aconselha a fugir da batalha por ser o melhor. Aconselha antes abraçar o desafio de ser diferente!!!
"Strategies of parity are low value and short-lived. Strategies of delivering new offerings for novelty’s sake won’t survive much further than the infomercial. These approaches center on features and technologies rather than focusing on the one thing that really matters—the experience. But even though experience matters to everyone, we almost always losesight of it in product development.to the customers the experience they have is the only thing that matters. Customers rightfully have little appreciation for the technical workings of a product. Beyond the interface, everything else might as well be magic. Think about a light switch. You flip a switch; a light turns on. How many of us care how it works? Or you put things in the refrigerator, and a day later, when you take them out, they’re cold. Magic. You pick up a handset, press seven or ten digits, and are talking to someone far away. Magic."
A experiência é o produto!
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Trechos retirados de "Subject to Change" de Peter Merholz, Todd Wilkens, Brandon Schauer e David Verba.