Parvoíces de um ignorante, cínico, anónimo da província

Li no jornal online ECO, "Vendas da Vista Alegre caem quase 10% em 2023. Lucros sobem para 6,8 milhões de euros".

Uma boa ilustração da máxima:

"Lucro é Sanidade, Volume é vaidade!"

Eu, um ignorante anónimo da província, fico a pensar na relação entre:

"Num ano em que diz ter diminuído a dívida bruta em mais de 8,5 milhões de euros “por redução das disponibilidades”, o grupo Vista Alegre somou um investimento de 15,6 milhões de euros. A maior fatia (9,3 milhões) foi canalizada para a substituição de um forno com maior eficiência energética e para a alteração das linhas de produção na unidade produtiva Cerexport, “procurando responder com melhor eficiência às oscilações dos mercados ao nível da procura”."

E:

"Num comunicado enviado à CMVM, a empresa salienta a “contínua estratégia de aposta nos produtos de marca”"

No artigo do ECO vejo a quebra das vendas de grés, superior a 20%, e relaciono com:

"Entre elas, a Cerexport, uma referência na produção de artigos de Grés  (Forno e Mesa)" 

Eu, um ignorante e cínico de província, fico a pensar que a produção de faiança e cristal subsidia o resto... e recordo as curvas de Stobachoff ... e recordo as palavras de Jonathan Byrnes:

"in my research and consultations with leading companies in more than a dozen industries, I've found virtually every company is 30-40 percent unprofitable by any measure, and 20-30 percent of the business is providing all the reported profits and subsidizing the losses. The potential profit improvement is often 30 percent or more within a year with comparable improvements year after year." 

BTW, qual o peso das vendas de grés no total? Quase 40% em 2023. O que escreveu Jonathan Byrnes sobre isso?

"Some managers argue that it is a good idea to accept business that contributes, even marginally, to covering overhead. However, when you take on a lot of business that contributes only marginally to overhead, in almost all cases it will absorb a significant amount of sales and operations resources that otherwise would have been devoted to increasing your "good" business. And it will remain and grow into the embedded unprofitability that drags down earnings in company after company." 

Quem são os melhores e os piores clientes?

Há milhões de anos que neste blogue desafiamos as empresas a questionarem-se e a focarem-se nos seus clientes-alvo, em vez de tentarem ser tudo para todos e torrarem recursos (não esquecer a curva de Stobachoff) de forma ineficaz e ineficiente.

Um artigo publicado em Dezembro pela Harvard Business Review, "Do You Really Understand Your Best (and Worst) Customers?", fez-me recuar aos anos iniciais deste blogue onde focamos por muitas vezes a nossa atenção na necessidade de escolher os clientes-alvo:

"Companies often look at their business by focusing on geographic regions, specific brands or products, or by sales channel. This makes sense, because this data is always at hand, and organizations are often structured around geography or channels. But by looking at data and business problems from a frame of reference in which the customer is the atomic unit for analyzing revenue and profitability, these firms were able to gain a new perspective on the problem they were facing, either properly diagnosing the problem or stopping themselves from making a bad decision.

As you analyze your firm’s revenues and profits, or as you make plans for the future, what’s your unit of analysis?

...

This lack of focus on individual customer data is often a mistake. Revenues are generated by customers pulling out their wallets and paying for your products and services. Revenue is the sum of the value of all the customer transactions that occurred in a given time period.

Many firms recognize the need to think differently about using customer data, but they do not know where to start. They are often trapped in an old-fashioned view of their business, structured around products or channels. How do you approach the task of getting your people to shift their perspective and start thinking about your firm’s performance using the customer as the atomic unit of revenue and profitability?"

Um conjunto de perguntas que podem ajudar a perceber quem são os clientes-alvo. Primeiro, as que se encontram no âmbito de "Lens 1: Who are our Best and Worst Customers?". 

"How many customers did we have last year? How do these customers differ in terms of their value to the firm? For example, how many customers purchased from us just once last year? How many customers accounted for half of our revenue last year? Half of our profit? If we compare, say, the 10% most profitable customers to the 10% least profitable, what lies behind these differences? To what extent are they driven by differences in the number of transactions, the average value per transaction, and average margin per transaction? Digging deeper, what about differences in the types of products they purchased?

The set of simple analyses that explore how different our customers are from each other lead to a fundamental conclusion: customers are not equal. Most people underestimate just how unevenly revenue and profit are distributed across customers."

Segundo, as que se encontram no âmbito de "Lens 2: How is Customer Behavior Changing?".

Terceiro, as que se encontram no âmbito de "Lens 3: How Does a Cohort of Customers Change Over Time?".

"Much like Copernicus changed the way people thought about the earth’s place in the universe, we have observed that taking a view of the firm’s performance using the customer as the unit of analysis can have a similarly profound impact on the way the firm thinks about assessing performance and planning for growth. This results in a mindset shift for organizations to move from talking about “what makes us money” to “who makes us money.”"

Acredito que o uso destas perguntas pode ajudar a analisar os dados para os transformar em informação que pode ser avaliada e usada para a tomada de decisões estratégicas, como perceber que há clientes sérios e honestos, mas que não são clientes-alvo, são mais um prego no caixão.

O sabotador!!!

Recordar O retrato (parte III), O retrato (parte II) e O retrato. 

"In our experience, customers are rarely profit drains because of below-market pricing; they’re profit drains because of an excessively high cost to serve, generally caused by relatively minor factors that are unseen and unmanaged. The good news is that this is often relatively easy to fix: You can create a win-win solution for both companies, increasing the customers’ own profitability while converting many into profit peaks. We call this process of joint cost reduction — increasing profitability by lowering the cost to serve rather than raising prices — conditional pricing."

Relacionar com isto de "your interests overlap, but they are not the same":

"The mantra that 'the customer is always king' requires interpretation, I learned. The customer is transactional; your interests overlap, but they are not the same. You provide a good service; you delight the customer, but you maintain margins sufficient for a good living and protect your own interests. [Moi ici: Demasiadas vezes quem negoceia o preço com o cliente, a seguir aceita alterações que sabotam as margens negociadas] You do not necessarily cede to every demand a consumer makes,"

Treco inicial retirado de "3 Strategies for Managing Your Profit-Drain Customers" 

 

O retrato (parte II)

O retrato (parte I).

Para acelerar o processo, antes de fazer o estudo estatístico previsto na parte I, olha-se para o esquema:

E avança-se com:

• escolher 2 clientes que parecem encaixar-se em cada uma das 3 categorias da figura acima;
• recolher todas as encomendas desses 6 clientes;
• investigar e procurar pistas objectivas para explicar porque é que obtemos os resultados que temos com esses clientes.

Interessante que este tema, tenha sido elegido por Roger Martin para o seu post de ontem, "Shutting Down Losers". Basta olhar para esta imagem dele:

Para recordar a curva de Stobachoff.

"Compared to the academic world, it is almost as hard to stop something that isn’t working, but it is way easier to start something new. Companies start too many things without a lot of thought and struggle mightily with stopping, which is why companies end up continuing lots of things that don’t make sense but form part of the entrenched status quo.

...

[Moi ici: Olhando para o gráfico acima] But whenever I ask about getting rid of the 50% of stuff that takes profits down from 140% to 100%, I get concerted pushback as to why it would be a bad and/or infeasible idea.  [Moi ici: Tão, mas tão comum ...] The arguments take one of two forms, both variants of shared economics.

...

[Moi ici: Só Deus sabe quantas vezes me responderam que não podemos deixar de servir os clientes deficitários porque prejudicaríamos a parte lucrativa do negócio. Lembro-me de mais do que um empresario a expor a sua versão da piada negra "perdemos dinheiro na unidade, mas compensa no agregado". Duhhhhhhh!!!! E eu é que era o burro que não via bem a coisa… 😶] However, if the claim that the wining business would cease winning without continued operation of the losing business is actually true, then the winning business isn’t actually a winning business. In fact, it is not a separable business. The two are one business that (typically) is a mediocre performer. One just looks like it is a winning business because it isn’t being charged the full costs of its operations but rather is being subsidized by the losing business absorbing some of its costs. [Moi ici: Faz-me lembrar as guerras que tinha com um responsável comercial nos anos 90 que não incluía o custo da entrega das emcomendas a clientes a mais de 100 km porque, segundo ele, se incluir esse custo, não ganhamos os projectos] It is important for the combination to be treated as one mediocre business — which is what it actually is. There should be no more heaping of praise on the winning business for winning to such a lovely extent. It is just part of a mediocre business — and in due course, mediocre businesses should be exited."

Por alguma razão Cortez queimou os barcos...

Ontem de manhã, enquanto conduzia a caminho de Guimarães, ouvia nas rádios falar-se da produtividade e do salário mínimo. Tantas generalidades... até me arrepiei. Até me lembrei de uma das cenas mais anedóticas deste blogue, a superior produtividade portuguesa no Luxemburgo, segundo um embaixador do Luxemburgo em Portugal é motivada pela saudade. A sério, não estou a brincar.

Uma das perguntas que não obteve resposta foi: porque é que o salário mínimo e o salário médio estão a convergir?

Primeiro, um exemplo do calçado. O preço médio do calçado exportado em 2020 foi de 27,80 USD. Conheço algumas empresas com um preço médio do calçado que produzem e exportam na casa dos 52 USD. As empresas que vendem a 52 USD pagam salários mais ou menos iguais às que exportam a 27,80 USD. As empresas pagam o que o mercado está a pedir e o que o mercado pede é o que a média das empresas do sector consegue pagar. É uma espécie de lei inversa da que se passa quando um nigeriano, motorista de autocarro, emigra para a Noruega para conduzir autocarros. faz exactamente a mesmo coisa, mas por causa do contexto diferente, passa a ganhar cerca de 16 vezes mais do que na Nigéria. Enquanto não se deixarem morrer as empresas menos produtivas não sairemos da cepa torta.

Toda a gente pensa que a diferença de produtividades entre Portugal e a Europa Ocidental tem a ver com eficiência ... come on!!! A diferença resulta de se produzirem coisas diferentes. Recordar "Acerca da produtividade, mais uma vez (parte I)"

Em The "flying geese" model, ou deixem as empresas morrer!!! apresentei a figura:

Reparem como a evolução em cada país se dá quando o grosso do capital e dos trabalhadores avança para outro sector, capaz de suportar margens superiores. Reparem como a evolução não é de vestuário low-cost para vestuário high-price. Ela existe, mas é marginal (recordar a não-bruxaria de ontem). Eu, como consultor, a trabalhar com uma empresa individual que não tem de salvar o país, que tem de fazer pela sua vida, posso apoiar o processo de descoberta e construção que permite que uma empresa tradicional continue num sector tradicional, como o denim japonês, o mais caro do mundo, com margens superiores. No entanto, isso não é escalável para todo um sector. 

Verdade, algumas empresas conseguem fazê-lo, a fabricante de botas de borracha acabou a fazer telemóveis da marca Nokia, ou a Wartsila que começou como uma serração, mas são as excepções à regra. Pela enésima vez vou colocar aqui o que aprendi com Maliranta talvez em 2007, é a primeira citação na coluna de citações à direita do blogue:

""It is widely believed that restructuring has boosted productivity by displacing low-skilled workers and creating jobs for the high skilled."Mas, e como isto é profundo: "In essence, creative destruction means that low productivity plants are displaced by high productivity plants." Por favor voltar a trás e reler esta última afirmação."

Moisés disse ao faraó: Deixa o meu povo partir!

Eu prego no deserto: Deixem as empresas morrer!

Ontem, neste artigo "To Understand The Future Of Diversification, Compare Microsoft And IBM" sublinhei o seguinte trecho:

"IBM is shedding IT services, once a cornerstone of its 1990s recovery.

...

IBM’s IT service business is labor intensive. It has 90,000 employees generating sales of $19 billion, which translates into just over $200,000 per employee. On average even Wal-Mart staff bring in more money. Once the spin-off is completed, IBM can concentrate on higher margin cloud software and solutions.

...

The value creation lens makes it obvious that the IBM spin-off—similar to the other headline grabbing announcements—is fundamentally a decision to move out of an unattractive position. In 2016 Microsoft actually did the same when shutting down the phone hardware business it previously bought from Nokia."

O mesmo artigo refere que a Johnson & Johnson também pretende avançar com um spin-off. Interessante, este blogue tem registado uma década nada abonatória nessa empresa. Recordo "Dá que pensar..." como o exemplo das empresas que abandonam a inovação e se concentram na eficiência operacional, o tal fenómeno do hollowing.

Quando não se tem tempo, nem massa cinzenta para pensar o futuro, e o quotidiano manda ... não se fazem spin-offs, não se fazem escolhas mais ou menos dolorosas ... Ah! Recuar 20 anos e ouvir este, hoje "angolano", director técnico perguntar: "Qual é o truque, qual é o segredo?"

Recordar as curvas de Stobachoff:

Recordar Terry Hill e o Verão de 2008:

"the most important orders are the ones to which a company says 'no'."

 Como é que está lá em cima?

"Once the spin-off is completed, IBM can concentrate on higher margin cloud software and solutions."

Quando não se corta com os produtos do passado, não há foco suficiente no futuro. Por alguma razão Cortez queimou os barcos... 

Querer aumentar a produtividade, ao mesmo tempo que se apoiam as empresas com baixa produtividade... não vai dar em nada.

Agora imaginem a empresa que estando bem, resolve fazer o que a IBM vai fazer, concentrar-se em produtos de margens mais elevadas. Como não existe mercado para comprar a parte "clássica" da empresa, a empresa teria de encolher. Imaginem as manifestações contra uma malvada empresa que estando bem, resolve cortar postos de trabalho e abandonar bons clientes para poder aumentar a produtividade...

"the Age of Diverse Markets" (parte III)

Parte I e parte II.

Os trechos que se seguem são retirados de “Choose Your Customer: How to Compete Against the Digital Giants and Thrive” de Jonathan S. Byrnes e ilustram algo que escrevo aqui há muitos anos. Basta recordar a curva de Stobachoff:

"to determine which parts of its business were making or losing money. When they saw the results, they nearly fell off their chairs:

• About 18 percent of their customers, which we call their Profit Peak accounts, accounted for about half of their revenues but produced over 130 percent of their profits.
• About 30 percent of their customers, their large money-losing Profit Drains, accounted for about one-third of their revenues but drained off about 50 percent of the profits earned by the rest of the company
• About half of the company’s customers were Profit Desert customers who accounted for about 20 percent of the revenues and produced less than 10 percent of the profits."

When Edison’s managers saw this, they immediately understood that their price war strategy was a response to the profit-draining customers’ demands, while they were essentially ignoring their critical high-profit customers.”[Moi ici: Demasiado comum. Recordo a espécie de esquema Ponzi]

 E pensa que só acontece aos outros? E como é na sua empresa? Ainda na passada quarta-feira ao telefone tive uma conversa surrealista, parecia um case-study acerca do que são custos afundados. A diferença é que numa empresa o que acontece com ela fica com ela, o mesmo já não se passa quando o decisor é um ministro.

"customer profitability analysis" (parte II)

 Parte I.

"Unlike measures that gloss over differences among customers or omit cost-to-serve elements, pocket margin gives a company a clear view of how much revenue each transaction generates, how much it costs the company to generate that revenue, and — crucially — when and why those costs are incurred. And because pocket margin is measured for every transaction, metrics based on pocket margin can provide insight into costs and revenues at any desired level of detail, from individual clients all the way up to broad marketplace segments."

Gosto destes títulos e das mensagens que ilustram: What your customers won’t tell you (but pocket margin can):

• You're losing money on me
• “You’re spending too much to serve me”
•  “I’m in the wrong segment”
• “You should be charging me more for …”
• “Sell me _____ now, and I’ll keep coming back for more”

Trechos retirados de "How profitable are your customers … really?"

"customer profitability analysis"

Interessante e talvez sintomático, talvez não seja obra do acaso, mas fruto das circunstâncias que vivemos com a pandemia, com o crescimento acelerado do online (recordar esta epifania), nos últimos tempos tenho encontrado vários artigos que ilustram a importância de pensar nos clientes-alvo, a importância de perceber a curva de Stobachoff e o seu significado:

"No company can afford a flawed understanding of customer profitability, least of all in a recession when the margin for error (as well as profit) is whisper-thin. The flip side is that improvements in this area can be a very effective way of bolstering the bottom line — and companies can often make those improvements with only a modest initial investment. 

...

A customer profitability analysis, done right, tells you not just which customers are profitable, but why certain customers are more or less profitable than others. At a strategic level, this information can help guide decisions on everything from growth initiatives to marketplace segmentation. And, tactically, the information can suggest a variety of ways to improve profitability, such as lowering the cost to serve, improving the sales force’s bargaining position, and developing more effective prices and promotions.

...

However, many companies that believe they understand customer profitability are actually working with the wrong information. Most use aggregate measures of profitability, typically gross margin, that fail to account for costs that are difficult to measure or that can’t be attributed to individual transactions (such as marketing expenses or distribution costs).

Even when these costs are considered, they’re often computed at an aggregate level using metrics that ignore the nuances of serving particular customers, segments or other populations of interest.

...

Pocket margin refers to the amount left in a company’s “pocket” after all of the costs related to a transaction, as well as the cost of goods sold, are subtracted from the list price. These costs can range from the obvious, such as off-invoice discounts and promotions, to the easily overlooked, such as costs associated with freight, warehousing and other activities that may be generally classified as “overhead.” The costs incurred at each point in a transaction are often graphically represented in a “price waterfall,” a bar chart that depicts the impact of each successive cost-to-serve element on the list price."

Trechos retirados de "How profitable are your customers … really?"

"Who is your right customer"

“Remember, Your focus determines your reality.”
                        (Qui-Gon Jinn em "The Phantom Menace")

After "Why the Customer Isn't Always Right"

"Who is your right customer.
The right customer is one you are prepared to serve in every sense. It is the one you are targeting—not the other way around. You have the capability, you understand what the customer wants and needs, this is the customer around whom you have proactively designed your service offering, and a customer whose business you can realistically win—that is, win and serve profitably.
"Design is about decisions and trade-offs and therefore everything is designed.
...
"Positioning is the art of sacrifice, and it goes for selecting customers as well as defining brands." Selecting customers, like so many things, is both art and science. It is easier to define the customer experience—that is, the one you want your customer to have—than it is to define the customer, because odds are you have more than one right customer.
.
And it is easier to define your wrong customer than it is your right one: By definition. the customer who you are not designed to serve profitably is wrong for you.
...
One way to determine your right customer is to examine your most valuable customers.
...
The stats on retention are compelling: clearly, keeping customers matters. But there's a premise hidden behind those stats, and it might not be true: that all those customers are equally worth retaining.
...
companies focus too much on customer retention rather than deriving maximum value from the right customers."

I recall three criteria for defining target customers in "Quem são os clientes-alvo?" and a warning in "If you don’t know the difference between the right and wrong customers ..."

"It is really important to understand who your valuable customers are, to find ways to enhance their value, extract it for your shareholders, and find more like them," he says. "Given that magical extra dollar, I want to spend it on acquiring great customers—premium customers  [Moi ici: Never the power of Marn e Rosiello's numbers]—and keeping them happy. It is always tougher to change customer behavior than to find new customers similar to your misting top-buyer profiles." 

Keeping nonpremium customers happy is fine as long as they remain profitable,  [Moi ici: Never forget Stobachoof curve] but that is not where you should focus your efforts. There is a natural tension between staying focused on that sweet spot—the groups of customers for whom you are perfect and who am perfect for you—and the pursuit of growth. By focusing on customers with the greatest potential in terms of repeat purchases and large average transactions, marketing and customer service efforts (and costs) can be allocated where they matter most. Growth focused solely on building a larger customer base may be the wrong strategy.  [Moi ici: I never forget my 2006 lesson]

Volume is Vanity

Profit is Sanity

Trechos retirados de "Woo, Wow and Win" de Thomas Stewart e Patricia O'Connel.

Quem são os clientes-alvo?

Quase desde o início deste blogue que o uso a terminologia "clientes-alvo". Este postal, "O cliente-alvo", é de Julho de 2007 (o primeiro em que usei o marcador).

Em "Prime movers" de Rafel Martinez e Johan Wallin, encontro uma reflexão interessante e sistemática sobre os clientes-alvo.

Quais as três razões básicas para classificar um cliente como um cliente-alvo?

O primeiro critério para determinar que um cliente é um cliente-alvo é fazer parte do grupo daqueles que fornecem uma parte desproporcional do lucro da empresa (medido pelas vendas anuais menos os custos dos produtos/serviços vendidos). Aqui é fundamental que os custos indirectos sejam alocados a cada cliente o melhor possível. (Recordar as curvas de Stobachoff. Segundo os autores, em análises feitas pela sua empresa de consultoria, em demasiados casos cerca de 40% dos clientes das empresas dão prejuízo, e às vezes cerca de 5% dos clientes podem representar cerca de 360% do lucro líquido.)

Como a maioria das empresas não possui um sistema de contabilidade baseado no cliente e, em vez disso, possui um sistema baseado em produtos, elas não sabem o quão lucrativo é um determinado cliente. Como elas não sabem que clientes são rentáveis e quais não o são, elas não podem determinar quais são os "alvo" de acordo com este critério.
Como as diferentes linhas de produtos geram diferentes níveis de lucro, o que internamente é considerado um subsídio cruzado 'interno' entre linhas de produtos, geralmente acaba como um subsídio cruzado externo entre os clientes.
...
Muitas empresas descobrem que, sem querer, se tornaram em máquinas que permitem que alguns clientes subsidiem outros.

O segundo critério para determinar que um cliente é um cliente-alvo passa por identificar os clientes que, de fato, definem as regras para os outros. Os clientes-referência. Pena que muitas empresas ignorem quem são os seus clientes que servem de referência.

O terceiro critério para a definição dos clientes-alvo passa por identificar aqueles clientes que forneçam importantes oportunidades de aprendizagem ao fornecedor.

Este último critério tem tudo a ver com:

"Customer contacts are thus the R&D of the co-productive economy. Finding out which are one's most sophisticated customers - the ones one can learn most with - is thus a crucial piece of information."

Acerca do papel da estratégia (parte IV)

Parte I, parte II e parte III.

Voltemos à Parte I, e ao exemplo da empresa 4:

"empresa a querer mudar de concorrentes, sinónimo de querer subir na escala de valor - ainda precisa de perceber que existem diferentes tipos de clientes e que recusar encomendas não é pecado."

Escrever "empresa a querer mudar de concorrentes" significa que a empresa não gosta do campeonato onde se descobriu. Por exemplo, pode ser um cenário deste tipo:

Ou seja, quer subir na escala de valor. Será que desempenho é o vector a ter em conta?

Assim de repente vêm-me à cabeça:

• Os macacos não voam - não se pode pensar que "out of thin air" se vai competir com o cadastro alemão em termos de marca associada a desempenho e fiabilidade;
• Proposta de valor baseada na inovação > 5 anos "Kaplan e Norton afirmam que a aposta na eficiência dá resultados num espaço de 6 a 24 meses, a aposta no serviço começa a dar resultados ao fim de 24 a 48 meses e que a aposta na inovação pode só vir a dar resultados ao fim de 8/10 anos, há uma marca por criar, uma tradição por inculcar";
• Ganham os alemães. "there is an asymmetry in competition across tiers. Price cuts by higher quality tiers are more powerful in pulling customers up from lower tiers, than lower tier price cuts are in pulling customers down from upper tiers; i.e., customers "trade up" more readily than they "trade down.""
• Teoria dos jogos e não jogar em tabuleiros em que os outros mandam: "Lesson #1: Do not play a strictly dominated strategy"

Talvez a aposta em vectores alternativos: Flexibilidade? Rapidez? Nichos? 

Recordo que estratégia a sério terá de passar por um trade-off forte, por causa das fiambreiras.

Um princípio a respeitar: começar a partir daquilo que já se tem. Por isso, convido a começar pelo concreto, em vez de elucubrações abstractas bem intencionadas: "Do concreto para o abstracto e não o contrário". E uma boa forma de partir do concreto passa por perceber quem são os clientes actuais que já dão a rentabilidade desejada. Recordar a curva de Stobachoff.

Baixar a facturação para aumentar o lucro

Pelo que consegui apurar a facturação de 2017 desta empresa foi superior à facturação de 2016 que, por sua vez, tinha superior à facturação de 2015. Agora:

"Com um volume de negócios que, em 2017, rondou os 12 milhões de euros, a Anbievolution by Luís Andrade deverá, já este ano, reduzir para cerca de metade o seu volume de negócios. «Este ano o meu pai decidiu que não vamos trabalhar com a Inditex, vai ser completamente diferente. O volume de negócios deverá baixar para metade ou menos. Mas queremos, só com essa faturação, fazer o dobro do lucro», revela, ao Portugal Têxtil, André Andrade, responsável de marketing e vendas e a segunda geração a envolver-se no negócio."

É a isto que se chama tomar uma decisão estratégica: uma decisão que dói, uma decisão que outros não tomariam, uma opção cujo inverso não é estúpido, por isso é uma estratégia a sério. Porter dizia que em estratégia é tão ou mais importante ser claro quanto ao que se decide não fazer como em relação ao que se decide fazer. Como não recordar Terry Hill:

"the most important orders are the ones to which a company says 'no'"

Trecho retirado de "Anbievolution subtrai para multiplicar"

Nota de 05.03.2019: https://paste.pics/d28343a21ecee7a62efdd7dad4702461

Indicadores e e estratégia

Esquema da primeira folha que vai animar a reunião de hoje:

O balanced scorecard.
A importância de indicadores relacionados com a estratégia.
O que ter em conta ao desenhar uma estratégia.
Diferenciação e perceber quem são os clientes-avo.
Curva de Stobachoff.

"the art and science of negotiations of value versus price"

"The selection of the right accounts … Personally, large accounts can be critical, but they could be 100% transactional. If after a journey of 3 to 5 years you don't have a share of these large, critical customers that are open to talking value, you should keep that customer on the list or large customers, but not on the list of strategic accounts. A strategic account has to have some openness value.
.
That being said, some strategic accounts will buy a lot of stuff transactionally, but key are the dynamics and the journey: Do I have a share at my strategic accounts that's based on value creation and quantification? Is that share growing out of the total sales to that customer? These are the key metrics you have to look at to encourage you to continue along the value journey. But: if after 3 to 5 years you are 100% transactional, you have to cut your costs and abandon value creation and quantification.
…
You have to set a time frame. I see a lot of Sales Account Managers not walking away. But what do they do? They try to give their customers even more value, assuming that eventually they'll be willing to pay for that value. So, I think that, as you said, after a preset time, if you can't convince them, you should walk away and stop delivering the value. Don't try to deliver more value where it is not recognized or not being paid for.
…
There are organizations where procurement is focused on price and price only. Are there things you can do to get them to start thinking that maybe they should do things differently?
…
If you look at companies, they typically will tell you that out of 100 Sales Account Managers, they have that least half or more who let the price go; they don't find the value because they’re convinced that competitors will catch up, but they haven't even checked it. So I would really say that in the end, the art and science of negotiations of value versus price will have the biggest impact on whether the customer recognizes the value you bring.
…
Understanding your competitors’ value and how much more you bring versus your competitors - that's going to be the key to negotiating for value and getting paid for it.”

E a sua empresa costuma estudar os dados das vendas? Stobachoff rings a bell?

Ás vezes descubro que as empresas não têm percepção do que está a acontecer por debaixo do valor das vendas globais do ano.

A quem vendem? O que vendem? Com que margem? Que quantidades?

Não é fácil.

Trechos retirados de "Value First Then Price" editado por Andreas Hinterhuber e Todd Snelgrove.

Um choque!

Um choque!

Perceber que na Alemanha e no todo poderoso sector da engenharia também se verifica, e com números impressionantes, o fenómeno dos clientes não rentáveis:

• "To what degree are suppliers aware of the profitability of customer relationships?

• Are unprofitable customer relationships a common phenomenon among business-to-business suppliers?

• To what degree does profitability influence customer management strategies?

• Are suppliers ready to terminate unprofitable customer relationships or are there differences in their willingness to make the final move?

...
Empirical data were gathered among sales managers in the German mechanical
engineering industry.
...
Still, being in charge of managing customer relationships, we expected our respondents to at least intuitively know, which relationships are profitable, regardless of the measurement techniques they apply. On average, respondents estimated 75 per cent of their customer relationships to be profitable. As shown in Figure 2, unprofitable relationships are a common phenomenon among the responding firms. Nearly a fifth of respondents (17.5 per cent) claim that more than half of their customer portfolio is not profitable.
It appears that few firms have a systematic approach to managing unprofitable customers. Only a third (33.7 per cent) uses minimum requirements concerning the profitability of customers such as minimum gross margins. Only a fifth (21.2 per cent) claims to have guiding principles on the handling of unprofitable customers.

...

In order to learn more about suppliers’ motivation not to end unprofitable customer relationships, the respondents were asked to rate several predefined statements on a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 to 7.
...
The vast majority of respondents regard possible future contributions of the customer as a main reason not to terminate currently unprofitable relationships (statement 1). The fact that the majority of respondents agree with the statement that “it is always more expensive to attract a new customer than to keep an old customer” (statement 10) suggests that they have a rather cautious or passive view concerning the issue of ending unprofitable business relationships.
...
Information on customer profitability is scarce in the industry and the methods we examined to measure it are not commonly applied. As knowledge of methods to evaluate customers and their implications is incomplete, firms and their staff have only modest or no reliable knowledge about the value and profitability of their customers. ... very few marketing practitioners are able to provide meaningful estimates of the profitability of their individual customers.
Most respondents confirm that unprofitable relationships are a common feature of the market. Nearly a fifth of respondent firms have to cope with a customer base more than half of which is not (yet) profitable. This means that the other half has to cover up for losses to ensure the supplier’s overall profitability. This might be particularly difficult to achieve during an economic downturn. Given the striking number of unprofitable customer relationships, we have to consider the possibility that industries such as mechanical engineering might often be faced with relatively low profitability. This industry revolves around high capital investments, high costs to serve individual customers, and the need to establish long-term relationships."

Como será por cá? Quando uma empresa não tem uma estratégia clara, quando uma empresa não comunica essa estratégia, quando uma empresa não tem uma estrutura de capital saudável cai nesta armadilha da incapacidade para dizer não, para receber no curto prazo algum dinheiro para se manter à tona e, acaba por se enterrar ainda mais no médio prazo.


Trechos retirados de Sabrina Helm Ludger Rolfes Bernd Günter, (2006),"Suppliers' willingness to end unprofitable customer relationships", European Journal of Marketing, Vol. 40 Iss 3/4 pp. 366 - 383

"dealing with unprofitable customers" (parte II)

Parte I.

Gosto desta linguagem da SDL para explicar o fenómeno dos clientes que destroem valor:

"By identifying and considering a range of stakeholders, firms can gain competitive advantage by engaging not only with customers but also other partners to encourage intergroup engagement [Moi ici: Ecossistema]
...
The SDL literature states that value is created within a service system. The firm uses its operant resources to interact with other actors in the service system and, in particular, engages with customers’ value creation as actor-to-actor. These interactions, providing they are positive, lead to an improvement in the well-being of the service system as a whole, wherein the customer and value co-creation become embedded.
.
Value destruction, however, arises from incongruent elements of practice, which depart from the shared understandings of practice among firm, customer and service system. If these understandings are not shared, value is destroyed rather than created and leads to the decline in the well-being of at least one of the systems and brings about an asymmetry in the service system. Instead of gaining competitive advantage through the action of the actors, the firm and the wider system are placed at a disadvantage.
...
Although it has been suggested that the firm thinks of its consumers as equipped with the full range of operant resources to co-create value, it may only be ‘good’ customers who are able and willing to apply the specialized skills and knowledge to gain value-in-use. The firm has customers or prospective customers who are unwilling to provide reciprocal resources who fail to understand the reciprocity of the value proposition, who are unable to acquire the skills and resources to be effective resource integrators or, who ‘may botch...’. All of these suggest that in terms of value co-creation, customer operant resources may not necessarily interact beneficially with the operand resources of the firm as required by SDL. In these circumstances, these customers may not gain value-in-use so that the firm’s service propositions will have negative value for them, both experiencing a loss. If certain customers are unwilling or unable to use their operant resources to co-create value, they cannot act as the fundamental units of exchange and hence collaborative value-creating partners. The firm may provide opportunities for these customers to learn how to develop their operant resources to co-create, but if it encounters repeated instance of value destruction, it may have to discontinue further investment in that customer and discourage further interactions.
...
The destruction of value is not limited to the firm/customer dyad but resonates throughout the service system."

Continua.

Trechos retirados de "Selective demarketing: When customers destroy value" publicado por Marketing Theory 1–18, 2016

"dealing with unprofitable customers"

Para quem descobriu as curvas de Stobachoff em 2011. Para quem acredita no tecto de vidro, para quem usa o marcador "clientes-alvo" desde 2007, é claro que o desafio de lidar com clientes que destroem valor é aliciante. Não esquecer Byrnes.

"Selective demarketing is a strategic option for a firm to manage customers who are or are likely to be a poor fit with its offering.
...
these customers effectively destroy value by misusing or misunderstanding how to integrate their operant resources with those of the firm.
...
A firm interacts with selected customers to co-construct a consumption experience from which the customer gains value-in-use or co-creates value. The firm directs its marketing efforts at identifying new customers with whom it may be able to co-create value and seeks to extend value co-creation opportunities with existing customers. However, the business environment is far from static; changes occur for the firm, its customers and members of its network. The firm, as a result, may decide to withdraw from existing markets and/or to prioritize new customer groups. Such actions have been labelled selective demarketing, the aim of which is to reduce demand from certain classes of customer. These segments or customer classes may be considered relatively unprofitable or undesirable in terms of their impact on other valued segments of the market, becoming candidates for selective demarketing.
...
some customers effectively destroy value by misusing or misunderstanding how to integrate their operant resources with those of the firm. By destroying value, these customers may be suitable for selective demarketing.
...
Serving some customers may engender high psychological as well as financial costs such as disruptive or aggressive customers encountered by airlines prompting firms to seek ways of encouraging them to go elsewhere. Firms may have up to 30% of their customers making a negative contribution in B2C situations, rising to a half of customers, in a study of German engineering firms.
...
It has been asserted that resource allocation decisions at the market or segment level can result in suboptimal strategies; therefore, firms should allocate resources at the individual customer level instead
...
The firm can then identify those customers who do not generate a desired level of return and may encourage these customers to spend more or reduce the quantity of sales communications
...
By not dealing with unprofitable customers, the firm is failing to optimize its resources. This failure is likely to affect its stakeholders – it has already been noted that serving unprofitable customers raises costs for profitable customers – with costs resonating within the stakeholder system. Although the mandate for selective demarketing is increasingly being accepted, firms are caught in something of a dilemma. On one hand, they have a proportion of customers who generate insufficient revenue and affect stakeholders as well as the firm itself. On the other hand, the repercussions of eliminating these customers either directly or indirectly damages the firm’s reputation. It is, therefore, not surprising that firms may hang back from selectively demarketing but at the same time, the decision not to take action against unprofitable customers is damaging to the firm and its system."

Continua.

Trechos retirados de "Selective demarketing: When customers destroy value" publicado por Marketing Theory 1–18, 2016

Foco e mosaico de actividades (parte II)

Parte I.

"Two archetypes describe companies that aspire to a coherent strategy but struggle to develop one:
.
4. Portfolio-constrained companies offer a diverse group of products and services, which makes it very difficult to agree on company-wide priorities (although they’d like to do so).
.
5. Unfocused companies are pretty good at a lot of things, but not great at anything [Moi ici: Como não recordar Bruce Jenner] — and thus, although they value coherence, they struggle to choose which capabilities to prioritize."

O medo de deixar alguns clientes para a concorrência... ai a curva de Stobachoff


Trechos retirados de "11 Types of Strategic Maturity: Which One Describes Your Company?"

"não saem da cepa torta"

Ler este texto "What’s the Second Job of a Startup CEO?":

"A CEO’s first job is to build a product users love; the second job is to build a company to maximize the opportunity that the product has surfaced; and the third is to harvest the profits of the core business to invest in transformative new product ideas.
...
As a Phase 2 CEO, you need to transition from “Doer-in-Chief” to “Company-Builder-in-Chief.” This is how you scale as a CEO, and CEO scaling is the first step in company-building. For most founders, this is very difficult. When you’ve been a successful Doer-in-Chief, it’s hard to stop. It’s hard to stop coding, designing product specs, and interacting with customers on a daily basis. It’s hard to stop answering support tickets, doing all the product demos, and debugging the latest build. It’s even hard to delegate the random and sometimes menial tasks that you’ve accumulated over the years because they were “no one’s job.” But you have to stop doing all of these things so that you can safeguard your time for high leverage tasks that only CEOs can do."

Lê-lo e pensar nas muitas PME que não saem da cepa torta porque, sem o percepcionarem, estão prisioneiras do tecto de vidro. Talvez por causa desta dificuldade em passar do perfil da fase 1 para o perfil da fase 2.

O velho ditado

Há um velho ditado que aprendi com uma boutique de vinhos australiana em 2006:

"e que tal uma “boutique small winery”. Um gestor da "boutique" diz mesmo que é um negócio “high end fashion retailing”, em vez de inundar o mercado com produtos banais, e desesperar numa guerra de preços, atacar nichos específicos. É um prazer ver uma actividade ligada ao sector primário transpirar pensamento estratégico, demonstrar capacidade de distanciamento e de se situar no mercado."

Ou seja:

"Volume is vanity, profit is sanity" 

Ao longo dos anos tenho chamado a atenção para a curva de Stobachoff que tanto atrai os nórdicos a este blogue. Aprendi com Byrne aquela frase:

"in a typical company, 30 to 40% of revenues are actually unprofitable, while another fraction of revenues — often more like 20 to 30% — accounts for most of the organization’s profitability."

E ainda a relação 20/80/30 de Kotler:

"80% dos lucros de uma empresa são gerados pelos 20 clientes mais rentáveis.
E os 30? O que querem dizer?
Os 30 clientes menos rentáveis provocam um corte de metade dos lucros de uma empresa."

Assim, como não sorrir com este artigo "HTC only wants to make high-end phones, should be worrying for Sony":

"Sony doesn’t often get credit for for their strategic vision as they more often than not skate to where the puck is, with a delay, rather than to where the puck is going to be. With smartphones this was no different but with their mobile division in disarray, the company did something many pundits thought to be suicide – they exited the entry market and instead focused on high-end devices like the Xperia Z5, Xperia X, and now Xperia XZ. The results? A division that was once reporting over a billion dollars in losses is now recording profits.
.
Now mind you there is a lot Sony could be doing to better the situation for themselves but their initial vision was correct – to put aside the volume driven mentality that drove the PC business and many Android makers into the ground and instead focus on profitability."