Mongo e o "Bud Light Fiasco"

O planeta Mongo da série de banda desenhada Flash Gordon é o lar de várias tribos e reinos com culturas, tecnologias e sistemas distintos. Da mesma forma, a economia pós-século XX é marcada pela complexidade e diversidade da oferta e procura cada vez mais atomizada e apaixonada. Foi disso que me lembrei em 2007 para criar uma metáfora que dura até aos dias de hoje (A cauda longa e o planeta Mongo).

Seth Godin usa uma imagem interessante, o século XX via os clientes como plancton, uma massa homogénea. Eu vejo o século XXI como o tempo de Mongo, ou do Estranhistão, terra de Um número infinito de nichos.

Em Novembro passado escapou-me este artigo sobre Mongo, "Strategy in a Hyperpolitical World":

"So what does that mean for strategy?

We define strategy as the art of making informed choices in a competitive environment. Choices are important when differing paths lead to differential risks and rewards. When the social environment is broadly favorable to business, a company's strategic choices can be justified in purely business terms or, as necessary, finessed with carefully crafted press releases. Today, however, choices must be made on an expanded playing field. They are often complex because the underlying ethical, social, and political issues are constantly evolving and defy simple analysis. To make and implement the best strategic choices in this environment, leaders will have to (1) develop robust principles to guide strategic choices, (2) address ethical issues early, (3) consistently communicate and implement their choices, (4) engage beyond the industry to shape the context, and (5) learn from mistakes to make better choices."

Entretanto, há dias li "The Strategy Lesson from the Bud Light Fiasco": 

"A company’s goal should be to present an offering — supported by compelling messaging — that has advantaged appeal to the biggest circle possible. That may be a relatively small circle — Red Bay Coffee — or a relatively big one — Starbucks Coffee. But it should be as big a circle as the offering can support.

The Temptation

In pursuing the biggest circle supportable, companies are forever tempted to send different messages to different parts of their audience — whether inside or outside the confines of their current circle — in an attempt to strengthen and/or enlarge their circle.

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this kind of thing is getting ever more dangerous with ever increasing transparency,

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In this age of fuller transparency, brands must think a lot more thoroughly and carefully about the heterogeneity of their Where to Play (WTP), which hangs together now and produces their current market share. But under its apparently calm surface, that overall share hides fault lines — those customers aren’t all the same even if they buy the same product. If a brand isn’t careful, it can take those fault lines that lie benignly beneath the surface and turn them into giant fissures with its actions.

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The naïve idea — not an unusual one but naïve nonetheless — was that Bud Light could keep all its current customers, and, with this terrific new message, could appeal to some new ones (whether light users or non-users). This kind of naivety has always been dangerous. But it has gotten a lot more so in this hyperpolitical and transparent world.

The Particular Challenge for Broad-Based Companies

It is particularly challenging for broad-based companies and going to get more challenging. The broader-based a company is, the greater heterogeneity its customer base is likely to embody. Every company will have heterogeneity in its customer base. But a giant retailer, like Target, will likely have a greater level of heterogeneity in its customer base than tiny LGBTQ+-friendly clothing retailer, WILDFANG. Ultra Right Beer was launched to woo disaffected Bud Light customers and seemed deliriously happy to hit the $1 million mark in sales. But that is one-five thousandth of the (pre-fiasco) sales of Bud Light. With great size comes more dangerous and pronounced fault lines."

Como não recuar a 2014 e a "-Tu não és meu irmão de sangue!"

O século XX económico (da inauguração da linha de montagem da Ford até à queda do Muro de Berlin) foi um acidente histórico que agora estamos a corrigir, o futuro não é de homogeneidade, mas de heterogeneidade. E mundos heterogéneos não são meigos para com os gigantes. Nunca esqueço: Too big to care.

Não somos plancton

"If we had to highlight a single cause for the rise in inflation, it must be the over-reliance of central banks on what goes by the name of workhorse macroeconomic models. This is not a prediction failure at its heart. It goes deeper. Modern macroeconomics has lost the ability, if it ever had it, to understand the dynamics of the 21st-century global economy."

Em Mongo os clientes não gostam de ser tratados como plancton. 

Retirado da revista The Economist.

Um número infinito de nichos

Ao longo dos anos tenho escrito aqui sobre as plataformas e o "não é winner-take-all". Por exemplo:

•  “It’s a difficult proposition to be all things to all people, as opposed to doing one thing really well” (Agosto de 2021)
• Estratégia em todo lado - não é winner-take-all (parte IV) (Junho de 2021)
• "Scale vs trust" (Janeiro de 20219)
• Estratégia em todo lado - não é winner-take-all (parte V) (Abril de 2017)
• Estratégia em todo lado - não é winner-take-all (parte IV) (Janeiro de 2017)

Sorri ontem ao ler no Twitter:

“The opposite of broadcast: the distribution economics of the internet favor infinite niches, not one-size-fits-all.”
~ David Shields

— Jim O'Shaughnessy (@jposhaughnessy) February 18, 2023

Um número infinto de nichos ... afinal o que é Mongo? Pois, E porque não somos plankton (parte VII)

A paixão pela escala (Parte I)

Ao longo dos anos tenho escrito aqui no blogue sobre o que tenho aprendido no meu contacto com PMEs, e que não vejo descrito nem nos livros de gestão, nem ensinado na academia. Por exemplo, o estilhaçar do modelo mental do século XX, que apenas vê o preço como o factor chave de competição e que, por isso, vê o aumento da dimensão como fundamental para o sucesso. Recordo a minha reacção aos académicos da Junqueira em 2013 - Mas claro, eu só sou um anónimo engenheiro da província.

Hoje, sei precisar melhor a minha mensagem. O problema não é a dimensão (como me criticava o Bruno Fonseca), o problema é o foco num modelo de negócio baseado na competição pelo preço, o que passa inevitavelmente por um desafio de corrida contra o tempo para crescer e reduzir os custos unitários. No passado Sábado li este artigo, "Our Obsession With Scale Must End":

"Our obsession with scalability is getting in the way of unleashing the potential of the 21st century. [Moi ici: O que há anos e anos descrevo como Mongo. O século XX só conhecia uma estratégia, um modelo de negócio baseado nos custos unitários. Os clientes eram vistos como plankton, todos iguais, todos indistintos. O século XXI é o século do regresso às tribos, o regresso à paisagem super enrugada. O regresso a modelos não baseados no preço puro e duro] We’re so fixated on scalability we’ve taken our eye off of delivering value at every scale including the most important scale of one. The Industrial Era did that to us. Reaching the mass market takes precedence over delivering value to each customer. New customer acquisition trumps delivering value to existing customers.

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The Industrial Era brought us the reign of the predominant business model. Every industry quickly became dominated by one business model that defined the rules, roles, and practices for all competitors and stakeholders. We became a nation of share takers clamoring to replicate industry best practices to gain or protect every precious market share point. Companies moved up or down industry leadership rankings based on their ability to compete for market share. 

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Consumers are bringing the era of the predominant business model to an end. Business models don’t last as long as they used to. Predominant business models are crumbling all around us.

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It’s time to end our obsession with scalability. [Moi ici: Quantos "milhares de anos" demorarão até que a academia actualize as suas sebentas escritas no século XX de Metropolis?] There are too many consumer, student, patient, and citizen needs left unmet by predominant business models in every industry. There are too many new business model concepts stuck on white boards and in consulting decks. We are still allowing predominant business models to slow down and block the emergence of new business models that can better meet our needs. It’s time to move from the era of the predominant business model to the era of business model proliferation." [Moi ici: O que significa a proliferação de modelos de negócio? Na parte II desta série abordaremos o tema do horror, o leap of faith necessário para entrar no século XXI] 

The Rules of the Passion Economy (parte VI)

Parte I, parte II, parte III, parte IV e parte V.

"RULE #6: TECHNOLOGY SHOULD ALWAYS SUPPORT YOUR BUSINESS, NOT DRIVE IT....Do what technology and large industry cannot do—not the same thing, only slower. To succeed in the Passion Economy, one should not condemn large-scale business and technology or dismiss them as inferior. Instead, the successful passion-based business owner recognizes the tremendous power of larger firms and their tools of automation and avoids competing directly. [Moi ici: Algo que escrevo aqui no blogue há milhares de anos. Enquanto os grandes automatizam... Mongo é demasiado complexo para automatização eficientista] If your core customer cannot easily distinguish your products or services from those of a larger competitor, you need to shift and offer something else.
...Technology-driven scale creates the space for businesses built on value and passion. Businesses built on great scale, by necessity, cannot richly engage narrow audiences. [Moi ici: Como não recordar a metáfora do plancton] Sure, they can use computer programs to create personalized recommendations or to let customers design their own style of shoe or shirt. But that is not the same as personally guiding a customer to some option he could never have imagined himself, offering a service, rooted in passion, that satisfies needs the customer doesn’t know he has.
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Technology tends toward bigness, so stay small. A central feature of this economy is that technology-driven innovation scales to unimaginable size. Create Facebook or Twitter or a new cell phone and, soon enough, everyone on earth has access to them. Unless you happen to have billions of dollars and a genius for cutting-edge technological innovation, don’t ever bother going big. There is safety in smallness. If you richly serve a small niche in a way that is hard to scale, no big company will ever think to go through the expense of identifying so small a market and serving your customers’ rather particular needs.”

Fugir do plancton

Ao longo dos anos tenho seguido notícias sobre a Procter & Gamble. Por exemplo, em Agosto de 2014 escrevi aqui "Porque não somos plankton...". Uma corporação que ao longo dos anos se tem livrado de muitas marcas.

Acerca deste tipo de empresas, tenho escrito sobre a suckiness dos gigantes.

Por isso, foi com interesse que li este artigo no Wall Street Journal de ontem, "P&G Continues to Ride the Shift to Premium Products":

"“We’re looking, as we innovate, to be able to modestly [increase] price and still build value,” he said. “These results required us to overcome several challenges,” he said, citing global economic and political volatility and intensifying competition.
...
P&G’s turnaround has been driven by higher prices, new products and a leaner portfolio of brands. The company has shed mass-market beauty brands and led the industry in a move to raise prices to offset commodity costs and fatten profit margins."

Muito interessante e significativo perceber que um gigante deste calibre descobriu o poder da subida de preços, o Evangelho do Valor.

O estilhaçar do século XX

Continua a minha leitura de "Prime movers" de Rafel Martinez e Johan Wallin.

Segundo os autores, quando pensamos na abordagem da criação de valor devemos olhar para a oferta como o resultado de de três conteúdos:

O potencial de criação de valor ao longo de cada uma das dimensões da oferta dependerá do sistema de criação de calor de cada cliente.

Assumir isto e querer fazer parte do processo de criação de valor do cliente, apostando na co-criação de valor, requer o aumento da granularidade ou resolução, para permitir a diferenciação requerida por cada cliente.

Reparem só nesta linguagem usada:

"Enhanced 'granularity' or 'resolution' was not present in the traditional, 'industrial' logic. There, supply and demand factors were considered at a fairly aggregated level, (generic) products and (mass) markets. For example, car manufacturers didn't think of their customers as individuals, but viewed them as a mass of buyers (markets or market segments) who bought the same product.
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As the potential for interactivity between the firm and its environment increases, being able to specify the contribution of each individual party participating in value co-production is of great help. Instead of throwing products at undifferentiated market 'sinks', in co-productive situations, companies must decide which of their firm-specific capabilities to deploy for each specific customer."

Leio isto e recordo a suckiness dos gigantes.
Leio e isto e recordo o plankton tão querido às Heinz e às Procter & Gamble deste mundo.
Leio isto e recordo Seth Godin:

"The defining idea of the twentieth century, more than any other, was mass.
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Mass gave us efficiency and productivity, making us (some people) rich. Mass gave us huge nations, giving us (some people) power. Mass allowed powerful people to influence millions, giving us (some people) control.
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And now mass is dying."

Voltando a Ramirez e Wallin:

"Customers have different priorities in their value creation, and offerings targeted at them reflect these. The characteristics of the offerings can include low-risk solutions; low-cost solutions; broad relationship-based offerings, co-produced with a distributor or not; co-learning initiatives; facility of integration into customer systems; and so on. As customers' value creation conditions evolve, the offerings — and thus the capabilities brought in to make them possible, must be altered.
...
The more the types of 'fit', the more granularity or resolution is required, also with respect to capabilities. From a customer's point of view, a value constellation has an architecture designed around each individual customer, with manysuppliers targeting this customer with different offerings. The logic is the same: offering architecture will be judged in terms of 'fit' with customer value creation."

Aquele, "The more the types of 'fit', the more granularity or resolution is required, also with respect to capabilities", é poderoso. A explosão de tribos e a progressiva incapacidade dos gigantes para se adaptarem ao estilhaçar do mundo da massa. Mongo! Terra de artesãos.

Já cheguei a pensar que Mongo seria de artesãos e suas cooperativas. Talvez um dia, para já ainda é cedo. Antes dessa fase teremos empresas mais pequenas, pelos padrões do século XX,  focalizadas em nichos. Só que com o fim mitigado da geografia, esses nichos têm alguma dimensão.

Ainda e sempre: Volume is vanity; profit is sanity

Em Agosto de 2014 comecei a associar a metáfora "plancton" à reacção dos consumidores às marcas dos gigantes. Por exemplo aqui, "Porque não somos plankton (parte II)".

Os consumidores, ao deixarem de ser a massa típica do século XX, e ao converterem-se em membros de tribos aguerridas, começaram a abandonar os frutos da suckiness dos gigantes.

Interessante este resultado:

"The maker of CoverGirl cosmetics, Clairol hair dye and OPI nail polish is abandoning a revival plan centered on adding businesses and offering new products. The new strategy is to shrink, pay down debt and undo a failed makeover of one of its biggest brands.
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The makeup and fragrance seller, controlled by European investment firm JAB Holding Co., has floundered since acquiring dozens of beauty brands from Procter & Gamble Co. in 2016. Coty stock has lost half its value since the deal, and the company this year took $4 billion in writedowns on the P&G business as it struggled to digest the brands and as drugstore staples such as CoverGirl and MaxFactor fell out of favor.
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“We didn’t execute well because we tried to do too many things at one time,”
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the challenge of absorbing the P&G businesses and an industry shift away from mass-market beauty brands such as CoverGirl overwhelmed the company. Coty tried to remake CoverGirl. It eschewed television ads in favor of hipper socialmedia influencers and sped up product development.[Moi ici: Tenho um postal em redacção sobre o regresso do analógico]"

Os trechos acima foram retirados de "Beauty Giant Coty Tries On a Smaller Size".

Se lerem o artigo vão encontrar uma empresa à la século XX a gerir um negócio onde o essencial é o intangível.

"“They’ve been on a mission to become one of the world’s biggest beauty companies and the way they put the portfolio together was not very thoughtful or carefully curated,” Ms. Bolton Weiser said. “New management have to take a fresh look at everything.”" 

Estavam preocupados a jogar um jogo finito: ganhar quota de mercado a todo o custo:

"The P&G deal was supposed to provide stability. In pitching the transaction to investors, Coty executives said it would create a beauty behemoth overnight that was capable of challenging industry giants Estée Lauder Co s. and L’Oréal SA in makeup, fragrances and hair care. They highlighted two of the hair-care businesses now up for sale, Clairol and Wella, as especially promising." 

Ontem de manhã, ao iniciar a leitura de "The Infinite Game" de Simon Sinek, sublinhei:

"To offer growth as a cause, growth for its own sake, is like eating just to get fat. It pushes executives to consider strategies that demonstrate growth with little to no consideration of any sense of purpose for that growth. Just like it would affect a human being, it should come as no surprise that the organizations that eat to get fat will eventually suffer from health problems. Growth as a cause often results in an unhealthy culture, one in which short-termism and selfishness reign supreme, while trust and cooperation suffer. Growth is a result, not a Cause. It’s an output, not a reason for being."

E volto a 2006 e aquele ditado:

"Volume is vanity; profit is sanity."

exploitation através de local searches quando a paisagem competitiva está em mudança

Em Fevereiro último escrevi ""profecia fácil do "hollowing", ou "radioclubização", de como uma marca forte e genuína se transforma numa carcaça, num aristocrata arruinado, fruto de deixarem os muggles à solta"".

O que fez a Kraft Heinz no início do ano? Escolheu um novo CEO com um passado na indústria cervejeira moldado no sucesso através do volume e eficiência. Agora apanho "Kraft Heinz shares slump on new writedowns and falling sales":

"Kraft Heinz, the Warren Buffett-backed food company, has disclosed another $1.2 billion (€1.07 billion) of write-downs, on top of the $15 billion charge it took earlier this year to reflect how shoppers have been shunning its brands.
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Its shares fell 13 per cent on Thursday morning, taking the decline for the year to 38 per cent." 

Empresa a precisar de um corte epistemológico, a precisar de ir em busca de uma nova estratégia corporativa, opta por continuar a sua busca por óptimos locais na paisagem competitiva enrugada, quando os picos do passado estão a afundar-se por alteração da percepção dos clientes.

Recordar:

• "Warns of Margin Threat as Niche Brands Disrupt Industry" (Março de 2019)  
• O século XX continua por cá (parte III) (Julho de 2017) 
• Porque não somos plankton... (Agosto de 2014)

Relacionar com este texto de Seth Godin "The old media/new media chasm":

"New media tends to be adopted by amateurs first. And it rarely has a mass audience in the early days (because it’s new). But professional content for the masses is precisely what old media stands for. As new media gains traction, the old media doubles down on what they believe to be their value, because they no longer have a monopoly on attention.
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So the Times publishes a snarky, poorly written takedown of podcasts. Not because it’s based on the economic or cultural reality of today, but because their self-esteem requires there to be a chasm between all of these amateur podcasts and the few professional ones that they deign to create and publish.
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Businesses make their own choices and suffer the consequences."

E volto a há dias atrás:

"Três grupos:

• os que agem ao primeiro sinal e partem em exploration de novas alternativas;

• os que por cegueira ou incapacidade continuam a sua vida de exploitation através de local searches; e

• os que assumem a exploitation até ao fim, conscientes de que mesmo assim, terão de fazer a sua mudança, porque os dois primeiros grupos vão libertar quota de mercado, voluntária ou involuntariamente."

Cuidado com as marcas homogéneas

“attention is the most important currency anyone can give a business, and that attention is worth more than revenue or possessions.
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The new “attention-as-currency” may stem from how the world has changed since the industrial revolution, which had led to sellers making all the rules. Now buyers dictate what they want, how they want it, and when. And if they aren’t happy with one seller, they simply take to the internet and post their dissatisfaction, sometimes with reach greater than the seller’s.
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you need to learn how to elicit a strong emotional response to your business, and the personality of your brand, because while it’s easy to forget or lose interest in information, it’s much harder to forget strong emotion. You can do this by allowing your business to have some aspect of your own innate personality or quirks. Fascination in a product or service builds an emotional connection, and emotional connections hold attention.
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the tendency of large companies to be the vanilla ice cream of their market—they project a personality that’s universally acceptable, but bland. For a company of one, being vanilla isn’t going to allow you or your work to stand out. Companies of one have to be the pistachio ice cream of their market. For better or worse, people either absolutely love pistachio or can’t stand its flavor and weird green color. [Moi ici: Em Mongo cuidado com o tentar ser tudo para todos. Justin Bieber dá o exemplo]
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Fascination is the response when you take what makes you interesting, unique, quirky, and different and communicate it. When you start to understand how the world sees your business, you can amplify that understanding by featuring the specific traits that make you, you. When you own and harness aspects of your personality strategically, you can use them as a competitive advantage in a crowded marketplace—like an artisanal bucket of pistachio ice cream that people will gladly pay $25 for (instead of going with the $4 tub of vanilla).
Don’t just ask consumers to pay attention to your business. Instead, start doing the kinds of unique and unusual things that attract attention in order to make your business distinct.”

Trechos retirados de "Company of One: Why Staying Small is the Next Big Thing for Business" de Paul Jarvis.

Quando falta mão de obra (parte II)

Parte I.

“Often, in the pursuit of growth, companies or founders have to battle ... “the Beast.” A company focused on growth often puts into place complicated systems to handle exponential volume and scale, which require more resources (human and financial) to manage, which then require more complex systems to manage the increased resources, and so on and so on. [Moi ici: Recordar a malta da Junqueira]
...
In “killing her own Kraken,” as she put it, she began to radically simplify. Her strategy shifted from “broadcasting light . . . to as many people as possible” to “broadcasting light . . . to the people with eyes to see it.” Not focusing on growth and scale, she believes, was the best way to remove the Beast from her company of one and return her focus to the people who were already paying attention to her work. She likens her decision to stop trying to reach infinitely more people through paid channels to feeding only those people who show up for dinner—the ones who naturally or organically find her work through word of mouth or who are hanging out where her business hangs out. The fact is that she still has hundreds of thousands of ravenous fans showing up for “dinner.
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Of course, economies of scale can sometimes be required for success in certain markets and for some products, but often they aren’t required and it is ego, not a strong business strategy, that is forcing growth where growth isn’t necessary.
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When you feel like you have to start out competing with the largest player in the market, you end up chasing your competitor’s growth instead of bettering your own offering. Sometimes finding and working with a single customer, then adding another, and then another, is a very useful and solid way to begin. And sometimes that can even be the end goal—one where your focus is on the relationship and the paid work at hand. Sometimes the best plan is focused on your current customers’ success, not on chasing leads and growth.
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Instead of scaling production, she focused on raising her prices higher and higher until the demand leveled off to where she could handle orders. She focused on creating an amazing product that was better than the competition—mass-produced snow globes—and was able to charge a huge premium for her work. Because she focused on making the best product, not the most scalable product, she grew her profits quickly without scaling production, which would have also scaled complexity and expenses.
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When you focus on doing business and serving customers in better and better ways, your company of one can end up profiting more from the same amount of work because you can raise the prices until your demand flattens out to where you can handle it.”

Ainda há dias um empresário contava-me, para meu espanto, que andava a desenvolver um produto low-cost... para juntar à gama de produtos existentes. Mais complexidade, mais incoerências internas,  mais risco, mais vendas para ganhar cada vez menos.

Trecho retirado de "Company of One: Why Staying Small is the Next Big Thing for Business" de Paul Jarvis.

Quando falta mão de obra (parte I)

Estive a analisar um inquérito feito a cerca de 20 empresas em 4 concelhos de Trás-os-Montes e a resposta mais comum à pergunta "Quais os problemas que têm internamente?" foi: Falta de mão de obra.

O que tenho escrito por aqui sobre como crescer quando falta mão-de-obra?

Como aumentar a facturação quando não se pode aumentar a produção por falta de pessoas?

• Parte I;
• Parte II;
• Parte III; e
• Parte IV

Relacionar:

“his job as a business owner is not to endlessly increase profits, or even to defeat the competition, but instead to create better and better products and services that his customers benefit from in their lives and work. Implementation, he’s found, is the key to retaining his customers and persuading them to keep buying—that is, if they’re using what he makes, they see successes in their own business and then keep buying more from him.
...
This goal feels very counterintuitive to what we’re taught about business and success. Society says that business goals should focus on ever-increasing profit and that, as profit increases, so should everything else—more employees, more expenses, more growth. But like many others, Sean feels that the opposite is true—that success can be personally defined, and that while profit and sustainability are absolutely important to a business, they aren’t the only driving forces, metrics, or factors in business success.
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He believes that companies need to focus on becoming better instead of simply growing bigger. His approach is to question the idea that growth is always good and always unlimited.
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When businesses require endless growth to turn a profit, it can be difficult to keep up with increasingly higher targets. Whereas, if a business turns a good profit at its current size, then growth can be a choice, made when it makes sense to succeed, and not a requirement for success.”

Trecho retirado de "Company of One: Why Staying Small is the Next Big Thing for Business" de Paul Jarvis.

Continua.

Lealdade, relações humanas e automatização

A propósito de:

"What Killed Brand Loyalty?
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Consumers are not inclined to be loyal to brands as they once were because the underlying value of loyalty itself is no longer particularly relevant. In the old world, loyalty was good and something we aspired to give and receive across all aspects of life . . . with friends, family, employers, dentists, doctors, bankers, and maybe even the federal government. But generational experiences have made sticking with “tried and true” a sucker bet. Loyalty means remaining the same. Not exploring alternatives. Putting your head in the sand and maybe even missing a beach party."

Verdade! Quando as marcas são as primeiras a sofrer da doença anglo-saxónica, são as primeiras a tratar os consumidores como plancton, são as primeiras a querer automatizar tudo.

Quando as marcas desenvolvem relações humanas acredito que a lealdade ainda possa ter algum valor.

BTW, "Fidelizar o shopper infiel: realidade ou mito?" - tratar o potencial cliente por "shopper" é talvez um sintoma do porque faz sentido não ter lealdade a uma marca.

Trecho retirado de "The Death Of Brand Loyalty: Cultural Shifts Mean It's Gone Forever"

"niche retailers with strong identities" (parte II)

Parte I.

Um exemplo do que quero dizer quando defendo que o futuro das plataformas não é winner-take-all, "Bitchute".

Trabalhar para os extremos é terrível para quem quer triunfar no centrão.

"niche retailers with strong identities"

Tão interessante, tão em sintonia com a visão de Mongo como um mundo de tribos de interesses assimétricos, tão de acordo com "tu não és do meu sangue", tão de acordo com a ambivalência face a Bieber. Ninguém quer ser tratado como plancton. Trechos retirados de "The global village needs walls":

"Facebook has been a giant experiment in understanding humanity. It has proven that we actually don’t want to be part of a global community — we are instead a species of small groups and tribes. If you’re part of everything, you’re not invested in anything, and that feels bad. “Everyone, no exception, must have a tribe, an alliance with which to jockey for power and territory, to demonize the enemy, to organize rallies, and raise flags,”
...
So what does this mean for business? For one, it creates an opening for a smorgasbord of social networks and social businesses.
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“There should be social networks around every conceivable interest,” [Moi ici: Como não recordar o que escrevi, ao arrepio do mainstream, sobre as plataformas universais, não é winner-take-all]
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“The really exciting model is not one company to rule them all, but distributed companies and distributed wealth and revenue, and a social experience built around these supernodes,” said Bianchini, whose company is making a big bet that we’re headed in this direction. Some recent trends seem to bear it out. The number of niche social networks is exploding,
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Such fracturing of the online world is a headwind even Amazon will eventually have to battle. The bigger Amazon gets, the less it feels like it connects with your personal identity — even with algorithms that figure out what you’re most likely to buy.[Moi ici: Recordar o que escrevo sobre o big data e a miudagem]
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Just as microbrews stole customers from giant, least-common-denominator brands such as Budweiser, niche retailers with strong identities are likely to be more of a challenge to Amazon than some other centralized behemoth.[Moi ici: O que escrevo neste blogue desde sempre... cuidado com os gurus da Junqueira]"

"Warns of Margin Threat as Niche Brands Disrupt Industry" (parte II)

Há um mês a parte I.

Agora, outro texto sobre os nichos e sobre o seu poder em "Niche is the New Black in China’s Luxury Landscape":

"Over the last few years, a quiet but steady shift has been taking place among Chinese luxury shoppers. Big logos are no longer a priority, and in their place, niche high-end labels and boutique products have been reshaping the retail landscape and are now becoming the new signifiers of luxury consumption.
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This swing has been propelled by changes within the market itself, which has become younger and increasingly more sophisticated.
...
they’re also looking for authenticity, originality, and a sense of personality. Niche brands often capture all that.”
...
“The smaller you are the easier it is to have a one-to-one conversation,” she said. “As a niche brand, you have to be better than the larger brands at placing the consumer first. [Moi ici: Trabalhar para a miudagem versus trabalhar com o Miguel ou Maria] The more consumer-centric the better. The other very important attribute of being niche is the team you build and how their passion translates into a more special experience for the consumer. [And then there is] the power of the consumers themselves. They have become our most important ambassadors. From the day they discover us, they learn and engage until they become part of who we are.”
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“Many of the major brands have started looking similar, and innovation has slowed,” she explained, “while smaller labels are offering something novel and exciting to the market. They have a story to share and are captivating customers with that story or journey. Shoppers want more, and niche brands are able to connect on an intimate level with them.” [Moi ici: Este sublinhado final faz-me lembrar este postal ""-Tu não és meu irmão de sangue!""]

Mateus 13:9

Recordo "Mongo a bater à porta. Tão bom!!!" e:

"O artigo é um exemplo da tendência que enquadramos no fenómeno a que chamamos de Mongo. Os gigantes, emaranhados com o seu umbigo, muito preocupados com a eficiência e os custos, tentando ser tudo para todos, abrem as oportunidades a novos actores."

Agora encontro "When Patients Become Innovators":

"Patients are increasingly able to conceive and develop sophisticated medical devices and services to meet their own needs — often without any help from companies that produce or sell medical products.
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Unlike traditional producers, who start with market research and R&D, free innovation begins with consumers identifying something they need or want that is not available in the marketplace. To address this, they invest their own funds, expertise, and free time to create a solution. Rather than seeking to protect their designs from imitators, as commercial innovators do, we found that more than 90% of consumer innovators make their designs available to everyone for free.
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The ability of patients to develop new medical products to serve their own needs is growing, and we expect the system to become stronger over time for several important reasons. First, the DIY design tools that patient innovators need are becoming cheaper and increasingly capable. People with fairly rudimentary engineering skills can acquire powerful design software that can run on an ordinary personal computer either for free or for very little money. Second, the materials and tools used to build products from DIY designs are also becoming both cheaper and increasingly capable."

Recordo também "Os humanos são todos diferentes":

“There is no perfect product, because there is no perfect patient” and “It’s a good product, but it’s not right for everyone.”

Recordo também esta leitura de 2007:

"In 1970, 5% of global patents were issued to small entrepeneurs, while today the number is around one-third and rising. When P&G realized this, it saw that its old model of purely internal innovation was suboptimal. Why not tap these entrepeneurs and scientists?"

E esta outra de 2011:

"The mass market — which made average products for average people was invented by organizations that needed to keep their factories and systems running efficiently.
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Stop for a second and think about the backwards nature of that sentence.
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The factory came first. It led to the mass market. Not the other way around."

 E deixo-vos com os industrialistas e a sua tendência para a suckiness.

Como aumentar a facturação quando não se pode aumentar a produção por falta de pessoas?

Como relacionar "Falta de mão de obra desespera empresas" e esta série "O que aí vem! (parte II)" e parte I, com "O que são os custos de oportunidade" e estes canários na mina (""Warns of Margin Threat as Niche Brands Disrupt Industry""; ""profecia fácil do "hollowing", ou "radioclubização", de como uma marca forte e genuína se transforma numa carcaça, num aristocrata arruinado, fruto de deixarem os muggles à solta""; ""Giants invariably descend into suckiness" (parte XIII)" e "Será o efeito de Mongo?"

E ainda aquele sublinhado de "Acerca da Micam"?

Cada vez mais sinais de que a ascensão dos nichos, o avanço de Mongo, começa a fazer mossa no modelo paradigmático do século XX, o trabalhar para o interior da caixa da normalidade onde estava a maioria dos clientes: o Normalistão:

Em Mongo, também chamado de Estranhistão, a maioria das pessoas não quer ser tratada como plancton, e há que trabalhar para todo o espectro de clientes/nichos porque há cada vez mais gente fora da caixa da normalidade:

A demografia por um lado, e a fiscalidade e o assalto das gerações mais velhas ao bolso das mais novas por outro (ainda esta semana li "Cerca de 90 mil portugueses emigraram em 2017" - lembram-se disto ser motivo de rasgar de vestes no tempo da troika) vão criar um desafio para as empresas: como aumentar a facturação quando não se pode aumentar a produção por falta de pessoas?

Ou subir na escala de valor, ou mudar de ramo, ou deslocalizar para África.

Continua.

"Warns of Margin Threat as Niche Brands Disrupt Industry"

Isto é um bálsamo para o autor deste blogue porque vem suportar as suas ideias à revelia do mainstream e da tríade. Recordar "profecia fácil do "hollowing", ou "radioclubização", de como uma marca forte e genuína se transforma numa carcaça, num aristocrata arruinado, fruto de deixarem os muggles à solta"

"Shares in Beiersdorf dropped more than 10 percent on Wednesday after the maker of Nivea skin cream warned that its operating margin would fall in 2019 as it invests to compete with niche brands that are disrupting the sector.
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Beiersdorf was the latest consumer goods company to reset profit expectations for 2019 after German rival Henkel and Colgate-Palmolive last month, and following Kraft Heinz's write-down last week.
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the future of mass-market labels was being challenged by the rise of small, disruptive brands as consumers increasingly expect more personalised products and services."

 Basta recordar os artigos relacionados com os marcadores até em baixo. Como não relacionar aquele "expect more personalised products and services" com a metáfora do plankton... a vida está difícil para a suckiness dos gigantes: "Mongo, micro-marcas, plancton, suckiness e emprego"

Trechos retirados de "Nivea Maker Warns of Margin Threat as Niche Brands Disrupt Industry"

Contrarian!

A propósito de "Robôs e outras coisas que vale a pena discutir" e de "“Robôs” eliminam 1,1 milhões de empregos em Portugal até 2030, avisa estudo da CIP" fico com a habitual sensação de quem escreve estes textos e estes relatórios não vive no mesmo mundo que eu.

Esta semana em conversa com empresa metalomecânica senti alguma incomodidade quando abordamos o robô de soldadura. Adquirido como a última coca-cola no meio do deserto tem-se revelado um destruidor de produtividade. O mesmo tema que já tenho apanhado no calçado, quando tentam introduzir robôs.

Há dias citei aqui um texto sobre os robôs e a automação na Toyota, ""Anyone can buy robots" o pior é o resto":

"Only those robots that work really well and are cost-effective still have a chance of keeping their jobs at Toyota under Kawai. He explains: After looking at the robots that weld together the base of the Toyota Land Cruiser, he noticed that the welding seam was too wide and had a few defects. "I shut down the entire robot line and I said: 'We'll do it manually again,'" says Kawai. Unlike the robots, human workers could see where a groove to be welded was one millimeter wide and where it was only half a millimeter wide and could then react flexibly. "The use of welding wire alone has decreased by 10%," he says with pride."

O que encontro sistematicamente, no calçado e na metalomecânica, são empresas que compram robôs a pensar que só precisam de os instalar e, depois, só precisam de tirar as pessoas e a produtividade sobe.

Por exemplo, esquecem-se das matérias-primas... concluía a empresa metalomecânica. Continuamos a comprar o tubo onde sempre o compramos, só que agora com o robô... se um tubo vem ligeiramente ovalizado é logo um problema. O robô faz a soldadura, mas ela fica imperfeita e tem de ser corrigida por um soldador. Resultado, produção mais lenta e mantemos o humano. Se queremos "mais qualidade, mais rigor" no tubo, temos de meter alguém a fazer controlo da qualidade, a usar equipamento de medida mais sofisticado, e eventualmente a comprar matéria-prima mais cara.

O mesmo no calçado. Trabalham com peles. Pele é uma matéria-prima natural, quem garante espessuras dentro de limites exigidos por um robô? Recomendo a leitura de "Os Robots na Industria do Calçado. Muitas vantagens, algumas dificuldades."

Outro factor que é esquecido nas análises, lá de cima e nas outras, é que nós estamos a fugir do século XX, nós estamos a fugir do Normalistão e a embrenharmo-nos em Mongo, o Estranhistão. Recordo:

• Coisa de loucos (Maio de 2018)
• Seru (parte III) (Julho de 2017)
• Não acredito nestas relações simplistas (Julho de 2017)
• Cuidado com a automatização (Abril de 2017)
• Para recordar... (Outubro de 2016) de onde retiro:

"In principle, the production of virtually any component or assembly operation could be robotized and moved to high-wage countries—but only so long as demand is great enough, and design specifications stable enough, to justify huge scale and hundreds of millions, if not billions, in upfront investments." [Moi ici: Mongo mina logo dois dos pressupostos - tamanho da procura e estabilidade. Mongo é terra de tribos e de modas, terra de velocidade e instabilidade. Terra de gente que não quer ser tratada como plancton. Terra de gente que não se sente atraída pela suckiness.]

• Mongo, diversidade e o fim da mass production (Julho de 2016) 
• "mas o essencial é que o mercado de massas desapareceu" (Agosto de 2015) de onde retiro:

"People will be surprised - “[the use of robots] won’t be as disruptive as the hype today would suggest,” he continues.
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“The more a robot can do, the more it will cost – humans should be able to still be less expensive than robots. Plus robots for the foreseeable future will have to specialise, and we humans don’t – we’re more flexible.”

•  Um mesmo processo automatizado é demasiado rígido para Mongo (Abril de 2014) de onde retiro:

"Toyota has found that the race to reduce the human element can end up making processes less efficient."

Por que é que esta corrente de pensamento não é mais divulgada? Vende menos, por ser mais optimista e menos alarmista?