"Warns of Margin Threat as Niche Brands Disrupt Industry" (parte II)

Há um mês a parte I.

Agora, outro texto sobre os nichos e sobre o seu poder em "Niche is the New Black in China’s Luxury Landscape":

"Over the last few years, a quiet but steady shift has been taking place among Chinese luxury shoppers. Big logos are no longer a priority, and in their place, niche high-end labels and boutique products have been reshaping the retail landscape and are now becoming the new signifiers of luxury consumption.
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This swing has been propelled by changes within the market itself, which has become younger and increasingly more sophisticated.
...
they’re also looking for authenticity, originality, and a sense of personality. Niche brands often capture all that.”
...
“The smaller you are the easier it is to have a one-to-one conversation,” she said. “As a niche brand, you have to be better than the larger brands at placing the consumer first. [Moi ici: Trabalhar para a miudagem versus trabalhar com o Miguel ou Maria] The more consumer-centric the better. The other very important attribute of being niche is the team you build and how their passion translates into a more special experience for the consumer. [And then there is] the power of the consumers themselves. They have become our most important ambassadors. From the day they discover us, they learn and engage until they become part of who we are.”
...
“Many of the major brands have started looking similar, and innovation has slowed,” she explained, “while smaller labels are offering something novel and exciting to the market. They have a story to share and are captivating customers with that story or journey. Shoppers want more, and niche brands are able to connect on an intimate level with them.” [Moi ici: Este sublinhado final faz-me lembrar este postal ""-Tu não és meu irmão de sangue!""]

Como aumentar a facturação quando não se pode aumentar a produção por falta de pessoas?

Como relacionar "Falta de mão de obra desespera empresas" e esta série "O que aí vem! (parte II)" e parte I, com "O que são os custos de oportunidade" e estes canários na mina (""Warns of Margin Threat as Niche Brands Disrupt Industry""; ""profecia fácil do "hollowing", ou "radioclubização", de como uma marca forte e genuína se transforma numa carcaça, num aristocrata arruinado, fruto de deixarem os muggles à solta""; ""Giants invariably descend into suckiness" (parte XIII)" e "Será o efeito de Mongo?"

E ainda aquele sublinhado de "Acerca da Micam"?

Cada vez mais sinais de que a ascensão dos nichos, o avanço de Mongo, começa a fazer mossa no modelo paradigmático do século XX, o trabalhar para o interior da caixa da normalidade onde estava a maioria dos clientes: o Normalistão:

Em Mongo, também chamado de Estranhistão, a maioria das pessoas não quer ser tratada como plancton, e há que trabalhar para todo o espectro de clientes/nichos porque há cada vez mais gente fora da caixa da normalidade:

A demografia por um lado, e a fiscalidade e o assalto das gerações mais velhas ao bolso das mais novas por outro (ainda esta semana li "Cerca de 90 mil portugueses emigraram em 2017" - lembram-se disto ser motivo de rasgar de vestes no tempo da troika) vão criar um desafio para as empresas: como aumentar a facturação quando não se pode aumentar a produção por falta de pessoas?

Ou subir na escala de valor, ou mudar de ramo, ou deslocalizar para África.

Continua.

"Warns of Margin Threat as Niche Brands Disrupt Industry"

Isto é um bálsamo para o autor deste blogue porque vem suportar as suas ideias à revelia do mainstream e da tríade. Recordar "profecia fácil do "hollowing", ou "radioclubização", de como uma marca forte e genuína se transforma numa carcaça, num aristocrata arruinado, fruto de deixarem os muggles à solta"

"Shares in Beiersdorf dropped more than 10 percent on Wednesday after the maker of Nivea skin cream warned that its operating margin would fall in 2019 as it invests to compete with niche brands that are disrupting the sector.
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Beiersdorf was the latest consumer goods company to reset profit expectations for 2019 after German rival Henkel and Colgate-Palmolive last month, and following Kraft Heinz's write-down last week.
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the future of mass-market labels was being challenged by the rise of small, disruptive brands as consumers increasingly expect more personalised products and services."

 Basta recordar os artigos relacionados com os marcadores até em baixo. Como não relacionar aquele "expect more personalised products and services" com a metáfora do plankton... a vida está difícil para a suckiness dos gigantes: "Mongo, micro-marcas, plancton, suckiness e emprego"

Trechos retirados de "Nivea Maker Warns of Margin Threat as Niche Brands Disrupt Industry"

Mongo, tribos e política (parte II)

Parte I.

Este texto, "Homophobia and the Modern Trans Movement", ilustra bem o texto de Fukuyama referido na parte I.

This is Minnesota Women's Powerlifting State Champion. Jaycee set a new state record in women's bench and won best overall lifter. Jaycee was born male and took up weightlifting about a year ago and now dominates the state female rankings. Think About It. https://t.co/fGnTuUghHF pic.twitter.com/EJ9rLeceFT

— FairPlayForWomen (@fairplaywomen) February 10, 2019

4) WE are fighting for the right of female athletes to have fair & meaningful competition. If u are a female athlete or sports professional who cares about the future of female sport help strengthen our voice by sharing your story, in confidence, with us. https://t.co/3Xvbtp6Inj

— FairPlayForWomen (@fairplaywomen) February 10, 2019

 

"trying to convert the industry to an on-demand model"

Mais um sintoma de Mongo e das suas tribos cada vez mais pequenas e mais aguerridas, "This clothing factory cuts waste by machine-knitting sweaters on demand":

"Fashion’s trash problem is partly a planning problem
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By one estimate, 30% of the 150 billion garments produced each year are never sold.
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To combat this waste, some startups are trying to convert the industry to an on-demand model. Tailored Industry, a knitwear manufacturing startup based at the Brooklyn Army Terminal in New York City, uses software to connect brands to its 3D knitting machines. At its facility, the company uses Japanese-made knitting machines that can knit the sleeves and body of a sweater simultaneously without any cutting and sewing–another step that reduces waste compared to some other methods of production. The startup still makes larger production runs. But they’re trying to convert more brands to the new approach. (Making clothing on demand costs slightly more per piece than a run of hundreds of items, but companies can save later, in theory, because they don’t have extra costs of warehousing and marking down unsold garments.)
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“Right now, fashion brands are really stuck in long planning cycles,”
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The current process of making samples may take a few months, and a large production run can take several more months. “The whole process takes a year to two years. What really results from that is a lot of overproduction because they’re producing based on the forecast of what they think they need. And what we’re doing is basically bringing the minimum order quantity to zero, so that we can produce exactly what they need when they need it.”"

" The goal isn’t winning; it’s being part of the group"

Nas minhas caminhadas da manhã uma das companhias das últimas semanas tem sido Seth Godin. É um prazer ler Seth Godin em “This Is Marketing”! Um verdadeiro missionário de Mongo: o Estranhistão!

“One can gain status without an oil well or a factory. And one can enjoy as much status by letting someone into the flow of traffic as they can from cutting him off.
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This is the status that comes from the community.[Moi ici: Pertencer a uma tribo!] It is the status of respect in return for contribution, for caring, for seeing and being in sync with others. Especially others with no ability to repay you.
Modern society, urban society, the society of the internet, the arts, and innovation are all built primarily on affiliation, not dominion.
This type of status is not “I’m better.” It’s “I’m connected. I’m family.” And in an economy based on connection, not manufacturing, being a trusted member of the family is priceless.
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What are they showing? What is everyone else doing? Is this the season?
Within competitive markets, there is a race to be the dominant voice, but among the customers that make up that market, the position of leader works because the customers desire to be affiliated with one another.
The leader provides a valuable signal, a notice to expect that everyone else will be in sync. The goal isn’t winning; it’s being part of the group.”

Excerto de: Seth Godin. “This Is Marketing”. Apple Books.

R&D e plancton

Mongo vai ser cada vez mais gigantes-unfriendly, condenados à suckiness:

• por um lado, cada vez mais tribos e mais aguerridas;
• por outro, a crença na quota de mercado como o indicador mais importante.

"In an industry analysis, we found that the consumer packaged goods sector’s biggest R&D spenders saw no appreciable impact on revenue. That’s troubling for companies whose growth has plateaued over the past five years, as new competitors have challenged established brands.
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At the company level, however, the picture is more nuanced: Even though (true to the industry average) companies that spent heavily on R&D — such as P&G and Unilever — saw no measurable impact on sales, some outfits that spent less on R&D showed a significant positive correlation.
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It turns out, as economist E.F. Schumacher wrote, small really can be beautiful. Of course, incremental innovation — reaping healthy returns with small, iterative improvements — isn’t a new idea.
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But conventional management wisdom, based on years of research, still holds that R&D productivity depends on industrial might: Big companies can spend more on innovation, and as a result, they innovate more — and better. In the consumer products world, at least, our analysis suggests that’s not the case.
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Despite P&G’s huge R&D investment — more than $38 billion from 1998 to 2017, compared with Reckitt Benckiser’s $2 billion over the same period — P&G’s outlay has reaped fewer rewards on a key measure: While P&G spent more than 3% of its annual revenue on R&D compared with 1.5% for Reckitt Benckiser, P&G’s sales grew at a compound annual rate of 3.4% while Reckitt Benckiser’s sales grew almost three times faster, at 9% per year.
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How do we explain our findings? One factor may be that P&G and Reckitt Benckiser seem to embody different philosophies of innovation.
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We see the approach favored by big consumer goods companies like P&G and Unilever as analogous to Isaac Newton’s third law: They behave as if for every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction. In other words, they expect big returns from big investments, so they chase blockbusters.
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Contrast that with what we call a Lorenzian approach to R&D investment, which has parallels to the work of MIT mathematician Edward Lorenz, the father of chaos theory. When examining weather patterns, Lorenz discovered that small actions could have large consequences. A butterfly flapping its wings could lead to the formation of a tornado. Like a weather system that amplifies the impact of a fluttering insect, a complex system of companies, customers, competitors, suppliers, and influencers can amplify or diminish the impact of an innovation. In such a world, big ideas can die, and small ones can thrive, as they do at Reckitt Benckiser.
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The company doesn’t have a big R&D budget nor a staff of laureled scientists. So it opts to spend small but focus on marginal improvements to its best-selling brands. Reckitt Benckiser starts with deep consumer research to determine how its best brands can be improved and how much more consumers would be willing to pay. From a technical point of view, its innovations are incremental. [Moi ici: Desta forma a inovação na P&G aponta para produtos que possam ser vendidos a todos, a preços competitivos, já a inovação na Reckitt Benckiser é capaz de ser mais dirigida para o que permite fazer subir os preços, ou pelo menos estar menos vulnerável à competição pelo preço]

...
Reckitt Benckiser’s R&D projects are less risky and far less costly than those of its bigger competitors. But the company sets an ambitious performance target for each one. It expects a certain percentage of its sales each year to come from new products or better versions of existing ones, and its market-facing executives are rewarded financially when the company hits or exceeds those targets. This pay-for-performance incentive, in turn, motivates the company’s personnel to rally behind R&D-improved products and drive them into the marketplace.
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Make more small bets and fewer big ones. If Newtonians are going to continue to spend heavily on R&D (and in many cases, they should), they need to invest better. This means cutting back on big bets offering very questionable potential returns. Instead, they should focus on smaller bets that are based on a deep understanding of (1) consumers’ desires, (2) the significant value a small innovation can add, and (3) the system of retailers and competitors in which the innovation will be introduced."

Aquele "deep understanding" combina bem com uma outra leitura recente, “This Is Marketing” de Seth Godin:

“We’ve gone from all of us being everyone to all of us being no one.
But that’s okay, because the long tail of culture and the media and change doesn’t need everyone any longer. It’s happy with enough.
Which us?
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In “People like us do things like this,” the “us” matters. The more specific, the more connected, the tighter the “us,” the better. [Moi ici: Mas os gigantes precisam de escala, não podem tratar individualmente, por isso a metáfora do plancton]
What the marketer, the leader, and the organizer must do as their first job is simple: define “us.”

Trechos retirados de "The Promise of Targeted Innovation"

Mongo, tribos e política

As consequências políticas de Mongo aqui e em "Nascidos numa civilização, morreremos numa tribo?" e ainda em "What Gives the Logo Its Legs".

De hoje, este "Pegar a tourada pelos cornos" tem um lado interessante, como escreve Fukuyama, mostra como as tribos se dividem mesmo dentro daquilo que eram os partidos tradicionais.

“We should stop trying to make things so mass appealing”

"“If you’re a marketer or a brand representative, or if you’re trying to build a business, you need to understand that we are talking about feelings most of the time,” said Saint John. “And that’s what we in the 21st century modern world need to figure out: how to connect to our consumers through feelings.”
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In fact, Saint John said that feelings are comparably important to business models and strategies as data and statistics. Instead of relying solely on hard numbers and analyses, she recommended the audience to assess how their customers react to their products and services as these reactions are what would resonate with them and ultimately market the brand.
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A feelings-driven brand also has to move away from trying to appease everyone and making it more personal. She recommended treating the business as if it were a person with its own feelings, behaviors and reactions.
“We should stop trying to make things so mass appealing,” said Saint John. “Make them (the customers) connect to someone in a way that if they were your friend, they would understand.”

Na linha de:

• Aproveitar tudo para fugir do lado racional
• "in the future they’ll be about the heart"
• E porque não somos plankton (parte VII)
• "Giants invariably descend into suckiness" (parte XV)
• Plankton?

Trechos retirados de "Feelings, Not Logic: Insights from Bozoma St. John in Digicon 2018"

Qual é a identidade?

Há anos que escrevo aqui que Mongo, um mundo de tribos apaixonadas, não vai ser fácil para as empresas grandes. Recordo, por exemplo:

• "-Tu não és meu irmão de sangue!"
• Uma novela sobre Mongo (parte X)
• Sou de outra opinião

Uma empresa grande que queira servir a tribo vermelha, vai descobrir que não vai ser bem vista pela tribo azul, e vice-versa. E Mongo não aprecia a simetria: Não é imponentemente que se muda.

Ontem, em linha com isto, descobri este texto "No Matter Your Game, Ultimately This 1 Thing Separates You From The Pack":

""The toughest thing is to have an identity."
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It was an insight with implications and value reaching far beyond a single team, pursuit, or time. His point was this - no matter your assets or the odds, there is something deeply powerful about knowing and consciously seeking to cultivate who you are, an investment that pays dividends in how you show up to do whatever it is you do.
...
The New 21st Century Game Plan: Cultural Clarity
Ever-shifting conditions now characterize every environment in which we work, play, and live, and because they do, adaptability is what we most need. What enables it? While many things certainly come into play, at the heart of any successful team is a strong and clear culture. And at the heart of a robust and vibrant culture is identity, both individual and collective. It sounds simple, but somehow we are missing it.
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A 2017 study found that 70 percent of companies will eventually face the impediment of unengaged employees. In that study, a lack of transparency and unclear goals and roles were identified as culprits. But think further, beyond the stats and the typical commentary. Each of these reasons is a symptom of the larger issue of unclear identity."

"Giants invariably descend into suckiness" (parte XIV)

Parte I, parte II, parte III, parte IV, parte V, parte VI, parte VII, parte VIII, parte IX, parte X, parte XI, parte XII e parte XIII.

Mais um subsidio para a justificação de porque é que em Mongo os gigantes estão irremediavelmente condenados à suckiness, agora através das palavras de Seth Godin em "“It’s not for everyone”":

"The stuff that’s for everyone, that’s easy to click, sniff, share, produce and learn–that stuff ends up having no character. It’s not memorable. Tater tots are for everyone.
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But would you miss them if they were gone?
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The goal isn’t to serve everyone. The goal is to serve the right people."

E o que é que Mongo tem em grande quantidade? Tribos apaixonadas que não pactuam com o meio-termo, que são assimétricas.

Recordar:

"Customers often think we are different not because we are different, but because we recognize what makes them different" 

"Giants invariably descend into suckiness" (parte XIII)

Parte I, parte II, parte III, parte IV, parte V, parte VI, parte VII, parte VIII, parte IX, parte X, parte XI e parte XII.

"The problem with GE, it appears, is that it has become a square-peg business in a round-hole world. It’s not that it’s gotten lazy, but that it invested heavily in getting better and better at things people care less and less about. That’s a problem we rarely talk about. We like to believe that success breeds more success, but the truth is that success often breeds failure.
...
From a certain point of view, GE did everything right. It continually improved its operations, brought in outside experts to shake things up and transformed its product development process. It also made strategically sensible acquisitions in an industry it knew well. But the whole time it was getting better and better at things customers wanted less and less. That’s how you get disrupted.
...
It’s a fairly simple equation. If you don’t explore, you won’t discover. If you don’t discover you won’t invent. And if you don’t invent, you will be disrupted."

Pensar na GE é pensar na Procter & Gamble e numa série de gigantes. De que serve a escala quando as pessoas não querem ser tratadas como plankton?

Trechos retirados de "How GE Got Disrupted"

Falta-lhe autenticidade

E 11 anos depois de "Agora vou especular" temos "Super Bock faz ‘spin off’ para produzir cervejas em pequena escala".

Hoje, arrisco dizer que sem torrefacção de dinheiro dos contribuintes não terá grande futuro. Falta-lhe autenticidade, falta-lhe a paixão assimétrica das tribos.

Unscaled

"Throughout the twentieth century, technology and economics drove a dominant logic: bigger was almost always better. Around the world the goal was to build bigger corporations, bigger hospitals, bigger governments, bigger schools and banks and farms and electric grids and media conglomerates.[Moi ici: Recordar os hospitais-cidade, as escolas-cidade e as máquinas-monumento] It was smart to scale up—to take advantage of classic economies of scale. At the twenty-first century, technology and economies are driving the opposite—an unscaling of business and society. This is far more profound than just startups disrupting established firms. The dynamic is in the process of unraveling all the previous century's scale into hyperfocused markets. Artificial intelligence (Al) and a wave of Al-propelled technologies are allowing innovators to effectively compete against economies of scale with what I call the economies of unscale. This huge shift is remaking massive, deeply rooted industries such as energy, transportation, and healthcare, opening up fantastic possibilities for entrepreneurs, imaginative companies, and resourceful individuals..
If you feel that work, life, and politics are in disarray, this transformation is why. We are experiencing change unlike any since around 1900, when, as I will detail later, a wave of new technologies, including the car, electricity, and telecommunication, transformed work and life. Right now we are living through a similar ground-shaking, tech wave, as AI, genomics, robotics, and 3D printing charge into our lives. Artificial intelligence is the primary driver, changing almost everything, much like electricity did more than one hundred years ago. We are witnessing the birth of the AI century. A an economy driven by AI and digital technology, small, focused, and nimble companies can leverage technology platforms to effectively compete against big, mass-market entities. The small can do this became they can rent scale that companies used to need to build. The small can rent computing in the cloud, rent access to consumers on social media, rent production from contract manufacturers all over the world—and they can use artificial intelligence to automate many tasks that used to require expensive investment in equipment and people.
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Because AI is software that learns, it can learn about individual customers, allowing companies built on rentable tech platforms to easily and profitably make products that address very narrow, passionate markets—even markets of one. The old mass markets are giving way to micromarkets. This is the essence of unscaling: technology is devaluing mass production and mass marketing and empowering customized microproduction and finely targeted marketing. The old strategy of beating competitors by owning scale has in many cases become a liability and burden. Procter & Gamble, with all its magnificent resources, finds itself vulnerable to a newcomer like the Dollar Shave Club, which can rent much of its capabilities, get to market quickly, target a narrow market segment, and change course easily if necessary."

Been there, wrote that, bought the T-shirt!

Trecho retirado de "Unscaled: How A.I. and a New Generation of Upstarts are Creating the Economy of the Future"

"O que passa-se?" (parte II)

Parte I.

O artigo continua com um exemplo já conhecido aqui do blogue, a Local Motors (postal de 2012, outro de 2016 e outro de 2017).

"A small U.S. startup called Local Motors offers an intriguing glimpse into the future of manufacturing. The company manages five so-called microfactories around the world, which primarily use 3D-printing equipment to produce such modern-day curios as Olli, a self-driving shuttle bus with IBM Watson artificial intelligence that can be hailed via a smartphone app and follows voice instructions; a cargo-carrying drone for Airbus dubbed the Zelator; and the world’s first 3D-printed car, the Strati — road-worthy if not a speedster — built live in 44 hours at the International Manufacturing Technology Show.
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But the 3D-printing aspect of Local Motors’ business model is just a small part of what makes this company worth examining. The company is also crowdsourcing production designs from a network of global participants,
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As the microfactory concept evolves, Local Motors will build new plants wherever its customers are located, and each manufactured item will effectively be one of a kind, built to suit the tastes and requirements of individual consumers. Scale is replaced by potential savings from engineering, design, parts, labor, and efficiency in a 3D microfactory. Local Motors describes this approach as making money from scope. In other words, it offers useful, attractive, bespoke products to customers who are within shouting distance of its factories, at a price that matches the distinctive value of the item.
Local Motors is still a nascent business — and may or may not ultimately succeed — but at its core it reflects a vital shift in production dogma that manufacturers of all sizes will have to reckon with in the coming years. After decades of chasing lower production costs and scale by extending factory footprints and supply chains deeper into emerging nations and distributing products around the world in huge quantities over complex logistics networks, manufacturers are finding that their globalized approach is losing its viability. In particular, their centralized management structure, lengthy supply chains, lack of product variety, and long shipping times are impeding regional agility — and, in some cases, placing them at a disadvantage to local competition.
Instead, the new strategic archetype for successful manufacturers will be based on a relatively simple idea: The most efficient manufacturing setup is the one that makes goods in appropriate volumes to meet demand at the point of demand, with plenty of room for local and individual customization. Much of this concept will be driven by advances in technology — 3D printing, factory innovations, e-commerce, data analytics, and the Internet of Things, to name a few
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Moreover, the impact of the point-of-demand model will not be limited to the business-to- consumer environment. Suppliers in the business-to-business realm will also be under pressure to improve responsiveness as part of the campaign by their customers — that is, manufacturers — to shorten the value chain and more proactively serve the end consumer.
The implications are problematic for some companies: Manufacturers that are today highly invested in a global factory network of multiple large centralized plants, managed by traditional operating systems, organizations, and processes, may find their business models becoming obsolete faster than they ever expected. [Moi ici: Recordar esta reflexão de 2014] However, the nimblest manufacturers stand to reap significant gains from this new model. As their supply systems become more responsive and as customer demand becomes less of a guessing game, inventory inefficiencies and the carrying costs of warehousing products in bulk — only to ultimately jettison some of them as dead stock — will decline. In addition, savings will be generated by the reduction in expensive long-range production planning and supply chain management. And for companies able to outpace rivals in producing products that are best suited to customer needs — making these items available when customers want them — sales margins should rise markedly."

Conseguem imaginar como isto vai mudar o paradigma económico? Conseguem visualizar o fim do mundo criado pelo século XX?

"O que passa-se?"

Normalmente aqui no blogue, chamo a atenção para a cegueira das empresas de consultoria grandes, parece que escondem dos seus clientes grandes o impacte de Mongo na sua actividade.

Julgo que é a primeira vez que encontro um texto de uma consultora grande sobre Mongo e as suas implicações na economia, nos ecossistemas e na dimensão das empresas.

"In the next manufacturing revolution, spurred on by technologies that reinvent the way a factory can create products, such as 3D printing and robotics, companies will also need to rethink what they make and where they make it. Products will come off the assembly line in small, highly customized batches, like a high-tech version of old-fashioned craftsmanship. [Moi ici: Digam lá se isto não é uma entrada à matador com Mongo em toda a linha!!! Desde os pequenos lotes até aos artesãos tecnológicos longe das máquinas-monumento tão queridas dos que pensam que o Normalistão do século XX automatizado será o paradigma produtivo do século XXI]
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The revolution is on its way, and within the next five to 10 years, manufacturers in all industries will find themselves in a race to efficiently produce products at the point of demand — that is, where their customers are — and to deliver these items when their customers want them, personalized to their customers’ individual tastes. They will have to make strategic choices to stay competitive, investing in technology that allows them to continually analyze data about their customers’ preferences and buying habits so they can adapt quickly to changes in market conditions. Factories will be smaller, [Moi ici: Imaginem os cromos da Junqueira ao ler estas blasfémias!] operating with minimal lead times and shorter value chains. Management will be decentralized, the supply chain will be simplified and shortened, and the distance separating the manufacturer from its customers will be sharply reduced.
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Although technology will enable this new manufacturing model, customers will compel its adoption. In emerging markets as well as developed regions, customers increasingly expect products that match local cultural preference rather than homogeneous global brands and business-to-business services. The auto industry pioneered this localized model as long ago as the 1980s, when Japanese automakers entered the U.S. market with cars tailored to American tastes. But only recently have other industries taken up this approach — with refrigerators, toothpaste, furniture, clothing, and software that are designed for each region. The popularity of e-commerce has changed the customer experience, giving people more information about products and competitors’ products, pricing, and, through peer reviews, quality. For the first time, customers can reasonably demand from mass producers products that look and feel like they were made next door.
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Nimble manufacturers will reap significant gains from the point-ofdemand model. As their supply systems become more responsive and as local customer demand becomes less of a guessing game, inventory inefficiencies and the carrying costs of having to warehouse products in bulk will decline. The expense of supply chain management and production planning will drop as well. And companies able to produce personalized products that are best suited to customer needs when customers want them will enjoy higher sales margins. By contrast, as point-of-demand manufacturing takes hold, companies that operate global factory networks with large centralized plants, managed by traditional operating systems, organizations, and processes, may find that their business models are outmoded."

Ao chegar aqui recordei, "Pedro Nuno Santos quer Estado como motor do desenvolvimento", porque estava a nascer em mim um outro pensamento, o oposto... o que esperar de um contrarian-militante! O que seria a orientação geral de um governo para facilitar a transição para este tipo de sociedade?

Empresas pequenas, DIY, empreendedorismo verdadeiro não treta para sacar Portugal 2020, fiscalidade normanda, legislação laboral, democratização da produção.

Esta transição vai acontecer, inevitavelmente, pedida, ordenada pelos clientes, pelas tribos de Mongo. E teremos governos cada vez mais incapazes de perceber o que se passa, questionando-se, "O que passa-se?", cada vez mais crentes nas virtudes do Normalistão, num mundo que se afasta cada vez mais desse paradigma.

Trechos retirados de "Manufacturing’s new world order: The rise of the point-of-demand model"

O papel das redes e as organizações de Mongo

Em Mongo, terra de tribos e de artesãos, as organizações vão ser diferentes das criadas para o Normalistão.

"network forms of organization - typified by reciprocal patterns of communication and exchange - represent a viable pattern of economic organization.
…
Pre-existing networks of relationships enable small firms to gain an established foothold almost overnight. These networks serve as conduits to provide small firms with the capacity to meet resource and functional needs.
…
I have a good deal of sympathy regarding the view the economic exchange is embedded in a particular social structural context. Yet it is also the case that certain forms of exchange are more social - this is, more dependent on relationships, mutual interest enter, and reputation - as well as less guided by a formal structure of authority. My aim is to identify a coherent set of factors the make it meaningful to talk about networks as a distinctive form of coordinating economic activity.
…
When the items exchanged between buyers and sellers processed qualities that are not easily measured, and the relations are so long-term and recurrent that it is difficult to speak of the parties as separate entities, can we still regard is as a market exchange? When the entangling of obligation  and reputation reaches a point that he actions of the parties are interdependent, but there is no common ownership or legal framework, do we not need a new conceptual toolkit to describe and analyze this relationship?
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Network forms of exchange, however, entail indefinite, sequential transactions within the context of a general pattern of interaction. Sanctions are typically normative rather than legal.
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In networks, the preferred option is often one of creating indebtedness and reliance over the long haul. Each approach does devalues the other: prosperous market traders would be viewed as petty and untrustworthy shysters in networks, while successful participants in networks who carried those practices into competitive markets would be viewed as naïve and foolish. Within hierarchies, communication and exchange is shaped by concerns with career mobility - in this sense, exchange is bound up with considerations of personal advancement.
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Networks are “lighter on their feet” than hierarchies. In network modes of resource allocation, transactions occur neither through discrete exchanges nor by administrative fiat, but through networks of individuals engaged in reciprocal, preferential, mutually supportive actions. Networks can be complex: they involve neither the explicit criteria on the market, nor the familiar paternalism of the hierarchy, basic assumption of network relationships is that one party is dependent on the resources controlled by another, and that there are gains to be had by the pooling of resources. In essence, the parties to a network agreed to forego the right to pursue their own interests at the expense of others.
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In networks forms of resource allocation, individual units exist not by themselves, but in relation to other units. These relationships to establish and sustain, thus they constrain both parters ability to adapt to changing circumstances. As networks evolve, it becomes more economically sensible to exercise voice rather than exit. Benefits and burdens come to be shared. Expectations are not frozen, but change as circumstances dictate. A mutual orientation - knowledge which the parties assume each has about the other and upon which day draw in communication and problem solving - is established. In short, complementarity and accommodation are the cornerstones of successful production networks. … the “entangling strings” of reputation, friendship, interdependence, and altruism become integral parts of the relationship.
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Networks are particularly apt for circumstances in which there is a need for efficient, reliable information. The most useful information is rarely that which flows down the formal chain of command in an organization, or that which can be inferred from shifting price signals. Rather, it is that which is obtained from someone whom you have dealt with in the past found to be a reliable. You trust best information that comes from someone you know well. … information passed through networks is “thicker” [Moi ici: Como não associar este "thicker" ao densificar das relações em Normann] than information obtained in the market, and “freer” than communicated in a hierarchy. Networks, then, are especially useful for the exchange of commodities whose value is not easily measured. Such qualitative matters as know how, technological capability, a particular approach or style of production, a spirit of innovation or experimentation, or a philosophy of zero defects are very hard to place a price tag on. They are not easily traded in markets nor communicated through a corporate hierarchy. The open-ended, relational features of networks, with their relative absence of explicit quid pro quo behavior, greatly enhance the ability to transmit and learn new knowledge and skills."

"Neither Market Nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization" de Walter Powell, publicado por Research in Organizational Behavior, Janeiro de 1990.

Revolta contra a suckiness

À medida que nos embrenharmos em Mongo, esse universo económico repleto de tribos, assistiremos a um cada vez maior número de organizações e fenómenos como o retratado em "Consumers’ collective action in market system dynamics: A case of beer".

Como Seth Godin explicitou e citei em "We Are All Weird - Um manifesto sobre Mongo":

"The mass market — which made average products for average people — was invented by organizations that needed to keep their factories and systems running efficiently.
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Stop for a second and think about the backwards nature of that sentence.
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The factory came first. It led to the mass market. Not the other way around.
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The typical institution ... just couldn’t afford mass customization, couldn’t afford to make a different product for every user."

Foi o século XX que uniformizou os gostos, e Mongo será o regresso ao estado humano natural, a explosão contínua da variedade de gostos, e a ascensão das tribos ("Giants invariably descend into suckiness" (parte XI e parte X)).

O horror a ser tratado como plancton descrito no artigo:

"So it was lager beer, right? The provincial breweries copied Carlsberg and Bryggerigruppen, and more and more types of beer disappeared from the market, and there was no innovation at all. (Anders)
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The predominant institutional logic was organized around a belief in standardization and mass produced products. The belief affected forms of production, product variety, and institutionalized taste structures. From this institutionalized condition, DØE was formed to challenge this hegemonic institutional logic. One way the challenge manifested itself was by giving the current institutional condition a face, making a scapegoat of the incumbents’ effect on taste structure:
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I wrote a manifest, where I wrote many good things about beer and why one should drink interesting beers instead of just boring Tuborg ... really disparaging the old breweries there, at that time. (Anders)
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The interviews and archival material demonstrate that the association directed its energy and thrust toward this one common reference point. It was argued that the large breweries relied on the mentality that ‘‘big is beautiful and efficient’’. This critique of incumbents is illustrative of the onset of processes of deinstitutionalization and delegitimization. Several informants allude to the monotonous and standardized condition of the products that prevailed in the market and hence provoked a rally based on the position that the supply restricted the development of a more advanced consumption and taste culture: DØE was, as expressed through the AleMail communication list, a community for ‘‘everybody that is devoted to beer beyond the ordinary ‘down-the-throat’ culture’’"

Mongo já vem desde, pelo menos 2007: "A cauda longa e o planeta Mongo"

"Giants invariably descend into suckiness" (parte XI)

Mais uma achega sobre porque Mongo não é amigável para gigantes:

"the artisan is someone like me: You cannot be a promiscuous entrepreneur if you're an artisan. And also, you know where to stop. The problem is Steve Jobs stopped at the product line. The typical artisan knows where to stop.
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Food is artisinal. And every single successful restaurant owner I know goes past the first restaurant and opens a second restaurant -- they go to the point of bankruptcy, typically. And I've seen that happen. Artisans typically have the instinct to stop. They say, "OK, I'm satisfied with this."
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Whereas if you hire someone [like] McKinsey, they'll end up making you keep going beyond and doing shit. They want you to expand until you end up in bankruptcy.
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Stoffel: So an artisan is someone who knows when to stop. That's one of your filters.
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Taleb: Exactly.
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Stoffel: Because you're producing to produce, and not because of something you love?.
Taleb: Exactly. You're going beyond your hobby point. You see, an artisan, as you notice, it becomes a hobby. So the distinction between hobby and work is blurred for an artisan. What happens sometimes is a hobbyist starts out, is doing OK, and then it turns into work."

"Giants invariably descend into suckiness" (parte X)

Trechos retirados de "Motley Fool Interview: Nassim Nicholas Taleb"

"Giants invariably descend into suckiness" (parte X)

Se reflectir um pouco. consigo relacionar "Anónimo engenheiro da província, mas à frente" que de certa forma lida com o fenómeno a nível agregado, com postais que mostram sintomas numa forma mais granular:

• "Giants invariably descend into suckiness" (parte IX) (grande título que roubei de um tweet de Tom Peters)
• Acerca da lealdade às marcas
• E porque não somos plankton (parte VIII)
• Grandes marcas e marcas grandes em Mongo (parte II)
• Um exemplo
• Mongo não é um mundo gigantes-friendly (parte III)
• Leu aqui há vários anos...

Caro Paulo, lembra-se da nossa conversa sobre as ideias de Simondson?

Ao contrário de Simondson, acredito na frase acima. Agora isto não quer dizer que as marcas dos gigantes têm a mesma força que no tempo pré-Mongo. As tribos não são massa e as tribos não são amorfas.

Recomendo vivamente a leitura e pesquisa de "P&G is in trouble" (recordo logo dois postais escritos em Agosto de 2014 na "veranda" de um bungallow na Sierra de la Colebra)