Foi deste postal "A apologia da batota (parte III)" que me lembrei, quando li este artigo "Discovering New Points of Differentiation" de Ian C. MacMillan e Rita Gunther McGrath, publicado pela HBR em Julho de 1997.
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"Most profitable strategies are built on differentiation: offering customers something they value that competitors don't have. But most companies, in seeking to differentiate themselves, focus their energy only on their products or services. In fact, a company has the opportunity to differentiate itself at every point where it comes in contact with its customers (Moi ici: Recordo-me de um tal Carlsson da SAS e da sua mensagem sobre os momentos da verdade) - from the moment customers realize that they need a product or service to the time when they no longer want it and decide to dispose of it. We believe that if companies open up their creative thinking to their customers' entire experience with a product or service - what we call the consumption chain – they can uncover opportunities to position their offerings in ways that they, and their competitors, would never have thought possible.
…
the first step toward strategic differentiation is to map your customer's entire experience with your product or service. We recommend that companies perform this exercise for each important customer segment.
…
identifying, for each major market segment, all the steps through which customers pass from the time they first become aware of your product (Moi ici: Eu ainda recuo mais, quando é que o cliente sente a necessidade de algo que pode ser colmatado pela nossa plataforma de service? Onde é que ele vai procurar informação? A quem a vai solicitar?) to the time when they finally have to dispose of it or discontinue using it.
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How do people hecome aware of their need for your product or service?
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How do consumers find your offering?
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How do consumers make their final selections?
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How do customers order and purchase your product or service?
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How is your product or service delivered?
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What happens when your product or service is delivered?
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How is your product installed?
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How is your product or service paid for?
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How is your product stored?
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How is your product moved around?
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What is the customer really using your product for?
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What do customers need help with when they use your product?
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What about returns or exchanges?
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How is your product repaired or serviced?
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What happens when your product is disposed of or no longer used?
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Although mapping the consumption chain is a useful tool in itself, the strategic value of our approach lies in the next step: analyzing your customer's experience. The objective is to gain insight into the customer
by appreciating the context within which each step of the consumption chain unfolds.
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What? What are customers doing at each point in the consumption chain
…
Where? Where are your customers when they are at this point in the consumption chain?
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Who? Who else is with the customer at any given link in the chain?
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When? When-at what time of day or night, on what day of the week, at what time of the year-are your customers at any given link in the chain?
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How? How are your customers' needs being addressed?"
O artigo é um verdadeiro manual sobre como começar a pensar em alternativas para fazer batota.
quinta-feira, junho 16, 2011
E isto, encaixa-se no modelo mental veículado pelos economistas e políticos?
"Vietnam Labor Appeal Diminishes on Strikes".
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É tão fácil pintar o mundo a preto e branco. Na Ásia estão os escravos...
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É tão fácil pintar o mundo a preto e branco. Na Ásia estão os escravos...
Poupar não é o mesmo que ganhar
O sr. Costa aprendeu a lição no tempo em que havia escudo, poupar não é o mesmo que ganhar, mas a big-pharma parece que não.
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"Fat pharma: mechanics of cost-cutting":
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"This raises the question of whether, across the industry, cost cutting can continue to make up for sluggish sales. Much overhead has already been removed, and expanding into emerging markets, essential for all the global pharmas, will cost money. Cost of goods and research and development expense ratios have mostly stayed put, and it is hard to see why that would change now. If the savings story is petering out, the industry needs revenue growth more than ever. Given that patents will continue to expire, and that developing new products internally has proven hard, expanding the top line may be difficult to do – without still further consolidation"
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"Fat pharma: mechanics of cost-cutting":
.
"This raises the question of whether, across the industry, cost cutting can continue to make up for sluggish sales. Much overhead has already been removed, and expanding into emerging markets, essential for all the global pharmas, will cost money. Cost of goods and research and development expense ratios have mostly stayed put, and it is hard to see why that would change now. If the savings story is petering out, the industry needs revenue growth more than ever. Given that patents will continue to expire, and that developing new products internally has proven hard, expanding the top line may be difficult to do – without still further consolidation"
Os clientes são o alicerce, o resto é treta
Às vezes fico um pouco desconsertado com os artigos que leio...
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Por exemplo, no artigo "Strategic orientation of niche firms" de Kjell Toften e Trond Hammervoll", publicado no "Journal of Research in Marketing and Entrepreneurship" (Vol. 12 No. 2, 2010) pode ler-se, primeiro esta introdução pacífica:
.
"In the literature, niche markets have been claimed to be more profitable, and the increasing diversity in
consumer tastes and habits and the changing needs of business and organisational markets (Moi ici: Uma descrição de Mongo) seem to favour smaller, nimbler firms that can better tailor their offerings to the fragmented market. Such a market situation, combined with the limited resources available for small firms, favours a niche marketing strategy. A niche firm shares many similarities with small firms in general, but is in particular operating on a limited and easily defended market, offering a highly specialized product, and facing few or no competitors. This is enabled by the possession and use of unique resources and skills that are valued in a limited marketplace.
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The key to efficient nichemarketing is specialization. Such specialization has been suggested to particularly be related to products and customers." (Moi ici: Aqui é que a porca começa a torcer o rabo... então, anda a Service-Dominant Logic a "demonizar" a continuação de uma Goods-Dominant Logic, com o conceito marxista de que o valor é incorporado nos produtos pelo produtor, e vêm os autores escrever que algumas empresas de nicho se concentram no produto como a orientação estratégica.)
...
"effective execution of a niche strategy should be based on products or customers. Strategic orientation is here understood as the strategic directions implemented by a firm to create the proper behaviours for the continuous superior performance. A product orientation implies that the customers will favour those products that offer the most quality, performance or innovative ideas, and where the focus is the product itself. (Moi ici: IMHO isto não faz sentido. O produto não é a orientação... a orientação é sempre mas sempre o cliente. O que acontece é que alguns clientes valorizam acima de tudo o desempenho de uma plataforma de serviço (o produto na terminologia SDL) enquanto que outros preferem a adaptabilidade da plataforma à sua situação concreta) A customer orientation, on the other hand, implies successfully determining the perceptions, needs and wants of individual customers and satisfying them through the design, communication, pricing and delivery of appropriate and competitive offerings."
.
Os autores acabam por confirmar o que comentei:
.
"Product orientation, which also is labelled technological or innovation orientation, holds that customers will favour (Moi ici: "Customers will favour", é sempre o cliente) those products that offer most quality, performance or innovative features. It is associated with investments in technological leadership and with high-quality products or processes.
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Consequently, managers in product-oriented firms focus on making superior products and improving them over time, and this process can be described as an intensive and ongoing newproduct development effort. This strategic orientation assumes that customers are primarily interested in the product itself and buy it on the basis of its quality. The focus on product quality leads to the development of high-quality new products that subsequently renew and invigorate customer markets."
...
"Customer orientation, which also is termed customer centricity, holds that it is of vital importance to understand the perceptions, needs and wants of individual customers and to satisfy them through the design, communication, pricing and delivery of appropriate and competitive offerings. Customer needs and satisfactions represent the prioritized areas for organisational efforts. According to this orientation, the parties in a buyer-seller relationship work dynamically together to define relevant needs and competences, resulting in individual customer solutions."
...
Com esta confusão logo à partida, é claro que as conclusões teriam de dar em nada:
.
"The findings suggest that managers in niche firms are both product- and customer oriented at the same time."
.
Por exemplo, no artigo "Strategic orientation of niche firms" de Kjell Toften e Trond Hammervoll", publicado no "Journal of Research in Marketing and Entrepreneurship" (Vol. 12 No. 2, 2010) pode ler-se, primeiro esta introdução pacífica:
.
"In the literature, niche markets have been claimed to be more profitable, and the increasing diversity in
consumer tastes and habits and the changing needs of business and organisational markets (Moi ici: Uma descrição de Mongo) seem to favour smaller, nimbler firms that can better tailor their offerings to the fragmented market. Such a market situation, combined with the limited resources available for small firms, favours a niche marketing strategy. A niche firm shares many similarities with small firms in general, but is in particular operating on a limited and easily defended market, offering a highly specialized product, and facing few or no competitors. This is enabled by the possession and use of unique resources and skills that are valued in a limited marketplace.
.
The key to efficient nichemarketing is specialization. Such specialization has been suggested to particularly be related to products and customers." (Moi ici: Aqui é que a porca começa a torcer o rabo... então, anda a Service-Dominant Logic a "demonizar" a continuação de uma Goods-Dominant Logic, com o conceito marxista de que o valor é incorporado nos produtos pelo produtor, e vêm os autores escrever que algumas empresas de nicho se concentram no produto como a orientação estratégica.)
...
"effective execution of a niche strategy should be based on products or customers. Strategic orientation is here understood as the strategic directions implemented by a firm to create the proper behaviours for the continuous superior performance. A product orientation implies that the customers will favour those products that offer the most quality, performance or innovative ideas, and where the focus is the product itself. (Moi ici: IMHO isto não faz sentido. O produto não é a orientação... a orientação é sempre mas sempre o cliente. O que acontece é que alguns clientes valorizam acima de tudo o desempenho de uma plataforma de serviço (o produto na terminologia SDL) enquanto que outros preferem a adaptabilidade da plataforma à sua situação concreta) A customer orientation, on the other hand, implies successfully determining the perceptions, needs and wants of individual customers and satisfying them through the design, communication, pricing and delivery of appropriate and competitive offerings."
.
Os autores acabam por confirmar o que comentei:
.
"Product orientation, which also is labelled technological or innovation orientation, holds that customers will favour (Moi ici: "Customers will favour", é sempre o cliente) those products that offer most quality, performance or innovative features. It is associated with investments in technological leadership and with high-quality products or processes.
.
Consequently, managers in product-oriented firms focus on making superior products and improving them over time, and this process can be described as an intensive and ongoing newproduct development effort. This strategic orientation assumes that customers are primarily interested in the product itself and buy it on the basis of its quality. The focus on product quality leads to the development of high-quality new products that subsequently renew and invigorate customer markets."
...
"Customer orientation, which also is termed customer centricity, holds that it is of vital importance to understand the perceptions, needs and wants of individual customers and to satisfy them through the design, communication, pricing and delivery of appropriate and competitive offerings. Customer needs and satisfactions represent the prioritized areas for organisational efforts. According to this orientation, the parties in a buyer-seller relationship work dynamically together to define relevant needs and competences, resulting in individual customer solutions."
...
Com esta confusão logo à partida, é claro que as conclusões teriam de dar em nada:
.
"The findings suggest that managers in niche firms are both product- and customer oriented at the same time."
quarta-feira, junho 15, 2011
Modelos mentais - desaprender para voltar a aprender
Ao ler vários artigos sobre a Service-Dominant Logic, que foram sendo publicados desde 2004, há uma referência bibliográfica constante "Reframing Business - When the Map Changes the Landscape" de Richard Normann.
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Trata-se de um livro que aqui fomos comentando ao longo de 2008 e que ficou na categoria de topo. O subtítulo é delicioso ... quando o mapa, a nossa representação da realidade, altera essa mesma realidade. Aliás, nós nunca chegamos a ter consciência da realidade, nós só sensoriamos o mapa.
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Os nossos modelos mentais são os nossos mapas, são um filtro que nos ajuda a seleccionar e enquadrar os estímulos recebidos, para evitar a "parálise por análise".
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Ainda nesta série de postais reflectimos sobre a importância dos modelos mentais para explicar as diferenças de desempenho entre empresas de um mesmo sector de actividade num mesmo país.
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CK Prahalad e Richard Bettis em "The Dominant Logic: Retrospective and Extension", publicado no Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 16, 1995, em vez de modelo mental escrevem lógica dominante, no entanto a mensagem mantém-se:
"We have come to view the dominant logic as an information filter, shown here as a funnel. Organizational attention is focused only on data deemed relevant by the dominant logic. Other data are largely ignored. (Moi ici: Assim, o mainstream apenas reconhece o que encaixa no filtro) "Relevant' data are filtered by the dominant logic and by the analytic procedures managers use to aid strategy development. These 'filtered' data are then incorporated into the strategy, systems, values, expectations, and reinforced behavior of the organization."
...
Em "Mental Models, Decision Rules, and Performance Heterogeneity" de Michael Shayne Gary e Robert E. Wood, publicado no número de Junho de 2011 da revista Strategic Management Journal defende-se que o desempenho das empresas depende dos modelos mentais dos seus líderes. Quando a realidade muda... o mais certo é o desfasamento entre o modelo mental mantido e a nova realidade. Sim, o mapa pode mudar a realidade. Mas há limites para o poder dos mapas...
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Voltando a Prahalad e Bettis sobre o abandono dos modelos mentais que ficaram obsoletos:
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"In the business world. IBM is an excellent example in which the dominant logic for years revolved around a set of unseen assumptions about the centrality of the mainframe business. At IBM this thinking became embedded in the strategy, reward system, promotion preferences, and resource allocation system so strongly that a catastrophic crisis was necessary even to begin to dislodging it.
...
There has been a great deal written about organizational learning ... In general it is assumed that the learning curve is drawn on 'a clean sheet of paper' in that learning takes place in a neutral environment. This is seldom if ever the case. There is often previous learning 'drawn' on the paper that may inhibit the new learning process. This leads to the concept of unlearning.
...
The dominant logic makes clear that before strategic learning of the kind discussed above can occur, the old logic must in a sense be unlearned by the organization. In this sense there Is an unlearning (or forgetting) curve just as there is a learning curve. ... This need to unlearn may suggest why new competitors often displace experienced incumbents in an industry when major structural change occurs (e.g.. the personal computer revolution). The new entrants in essence are starting with a clean sheet of paper and do not have the problem
of having to run down an unlearning curve in order to be able to run up a learning curve.
.
What seems clear is that strategic learning and unlearning of the kind involving the dominant logic are inextricably intertwined."
.
O subtítulo de Normann faz sentido quando um agente económico percebe, numa realidade em turbulência, que uma ordem nova, mais complexa, está a emergir e antecipa-se a enquadrá-la num novo mapa, para ajudar a actuar melhor na nova realidade. Como se trata de uma antecipação, ainda a realidade não estabilizou e já o agente tem o mapa no seu arsenal de ferramentas.
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Exemplos de modelos mentais a precisar de desaprender muito:
.
Trata-se de um livro que aqui fomos comentando ao longo de 2008 e que ficou na categoria de topo. O subtítulo é delicioso ... quando o mapa, a nossa representação da realidade, altera essa mesma realidade. Aliás, nós nunca chegamos a ter consciência da realidade, nós só sensoriamos o mapa.
.
Os nossos modelos mentais são os nossos mapas, são um filtro que nos ajuda a seleccionar e enquadrar os estímulos recebidos, para evitar a "parálise por análise".
.
Ainda nesta série de postais reflectimos sobre a importância dos modelos mentais para explicar as diferenças de desempenho entre empresas de um mesmo sector de actividade num mesmo país.
.
CK Prahalad e Richard Bettis em "The Dominant Logic: Retrospective and Extension", publicado no Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 16, 1995, em vez de modelo mental escrevem lógica dominante, no entanto a mensagem mantém-se:
...
Em "Mental Models, Decision Rules, and Performance Heterogeneity" de Michael Shayne Gary e Robert E. Wood, publicado no número de Junho de 2011 da revista Strategic Management Journal defende-se que o desempenho das empresas depende dos modelos mentais dos seus líderes. Quando a realidade muda... o mais certo é o desfasamento entre o modelo mental mantido e a nova realidade. Sim, o mapa pode mudar a realidade. Mas há limites para o poder dos mapas...
.
Voltando a Prahalad e Bettis sobre o abandono dos modelos mentais que ficaram obsoletos:
.
"In the business world. IBM is an excellent example in which the dominant logic for years revolved around a set of unseen assumptions about the centrality of the mainframe business. At IBM this thinking became embedded in the strategy, reward system, promotion preferences, and resource allocation system so strongly that a catastrophic crisis was necessary even to begin to dislodging it.
...
There has been a great deal written about organizational learning ... In general it is assumed that the learning curve is drawn on 'a clean sheet of paper' in that learning takes place in a neutral environment. This is seldom if ever the case. There is often previous learning 'drawn' on the paper that may inhibit the new learning process. This leads to the concept of unlearning.
...
The dominant logic makes clear that before strategic learning of the kind discussed above can occur, the old logic must in a sense be unlearned by the organization. In this sense there Is an unlearning (or forgetting) curve just as there is a learning curve. ... This need to unlearn may suggest why new competitors often displace experienced incumbents in an industry when major structural change occurs (e.g.. the personal computer revolution). The new entrants in essence are starting with a clean sheet of paper and do not have the problem
of having to run down an unlearning curve in order to be able to run up a learning curve.
.
What seems clear is that strategic learning and unlearning of the kind involving the dominant logic are inextricably intertwined."
.
O subtítulo de Normann faz sentido quando um agente económico percebe, numa realidade em turbulência, que uma ordem nova, mais complexa, está a emergir e antecipa-se a enquadrá-la num novo mapa, para ajudar a actuar melhor na nova realidade. Como se trata de uma antecipação, ainda a realidade não estabilizou e já o agente tem o mapa no seu arsenal de ferramentas.
.
Exemplos de modelos mentais a precisar de desaprender muito:
- "Rui Moreira reeleito presidente da ACP com expansão do metro como prioridade"
- "Metro de Lisboa com novas ideias para extensão das linhas"
Quando não desaprendemos e a realidade mudou... os modelos mentais fazem de nós bobos (à brasileira) e castram-nos.
Please, não troquem mais impostos por mais subsídios
Ler um artigo que tem como título "Queremos ser uma das maiores empresas do mundo" não abona nada de bom no modelo mental que vou carregando comigo por estes dias.
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Não acredito em crescer por crescer, ainda nesta Segunda-feira relatei as conclusões de quem estudou o assunto e chama a atenção para o perigo do volume.
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No entanto, não pude deixar de ficar a simpatizar com a Innovwave, empresa relatada no artigo do JdN de ontem, quando terminam assim:
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""Nunca tivemos nenhum subsídio, no início candidatámos ao QREN e a forma como aquilo funciona, além de consumir uma série de recursos, nem sempre é da forma mais transparente", afirmou Tiago Gonçalves. Assim, a empresa "não precisa de apoios e subsídios", precisamos de recursos bons", concluiu o responsável."
.
Não acredito em crescer por crescer, ainda nesta Segunda-feira relatei as conclusões de quem estudou o assunto e chama a atenção para o perigo do volume.
.
No entanto, não pude deixar de ficar a simpatizar com a Innovwave, empresa relatada no artigo do JdN de ontem, quando terminam assim:
.
""Nunca tivemos nenhum subsídio, no início candidatámos ao QREN e a forma como aquilo funciona, além de consumir uma série de recursos, nem sempre é da forma mais transparente", afirmou Tiago Gonçalves. Assim, a empresa "não precisa de apoios e subsídios", precisamos de recursos bons", concluiu o responsável."
Quais as experiências valorizadas e procuradas?
Com o tempo, como já referi algumas vezes aqui no blogue, evoluí no entendimento que dou à palavra "proposta de valor".
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Aprendi a usar a palavra com Tracy & Wiersema em "The Discipline of Market Leaders".
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Ao fim de algum tempo, a trabalhar com PMEs, percebi que as propostas de valor puras são situações limite, e excluindo a situação do preço mais baixo, são pouco úteis para uma empresa em concreto.
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Foi daí que aterrei na etapa seguinte. Esqueçam propostas de valor à priori, primeiro, quem são os clientes-alvo?
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A progressão seguinte foi passar da questão "Como satisfazer os clientes-alvo?", para aquela que sigo há cerca de 2 anos "Quais são as experiências que os clientes-alvo procuram e valorizam?"
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Assim, é reconfortante perceber que é esse o conselho de quem dedica a sua vida a estudar o fenómeno da criação de valor.
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Em "Managing the co-creation of value" de Adrian F. Payne, Kaj Storbacka & Pennie Frow, publicado por J. of the Acad. Mark. Sci. (2008) 36:83–96, encontro:
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"Significantly, they point to the emergence of a new logic for value creation where value is embedded in personalized experiences, noting, “early experimenters are moving away from the old industry model that sees value as created from goods and services to a new model where value is created by experiences”"
...
"Korkman argues that value is embedded in customers’ practices and that this value can be enhanced through positive interventions or further development. The supplier’s motivation should be to improve these customer practices in order to build value for the customer and a more valuable role for itself in the customer’s activities.
The importance of recognizing customer processes rests with the need to develop a full understanding of where a supplier’s offering fits within the customer’s overall activities."
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E agora algo de verdadeiramente difícil, mudar o ponto de observação e a perspectiva com que se observa:
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"In traditional business strategy models, suppliers make decisions and choices about which core business or product category they should be operating in. The view is clearly inside–out, as it is based largely on the understanding of current organizational competencies. In S-D logic, business strategy starts by understanding the customer’s value creating processes and selecting which of these processes the supplier wishes to support. The positioning within the customer’s processes defines the support and thus the scope of the value proposition. Planning for co-creation is outside – in as it starts from an understanding of the customer’s value-creating processes, and aims at providing support for better co-creation of value. Value co-creation demands a change in the dominant logic for marketing from ‘making, selling and servicing’ to ‘listening, customizing and co-creating’. It is also cross-functional: It assumes and requires alignment between those organizational functions which make the customer promise and those which deliver the customer promise."
...
"Marketing messages should be based on a clear articulation of the value proposition."
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BTW, a revista "Industrial Marketing Management" publica este mês "Value propositions as communication practice: Taking a wider view" de David Ballantyne, Pennie Frow, Richard Varey e Adrian Payne.
.
Aprendi a usar a palavra com Tracy & Wiersema em "The Discipline of Market Leaders".
.
Ao fim de algum tempo, a trabalhar com PMEs, percebi que as propostas de valor puras são situações limite, e excluindo a situação do preço mais baixo, são pouco úteis para uma empresa em concreto.
.
Foi daí que aterrei na etapa seguinte. Esqueçam propostas de valor à priori, primeiro, quem são os clientes-alvo?
.
A progressão seguinte foi passar da questão "Como satisfazer os clientes-alvo?", para aquela que sigo há cerca de 2 anos "Quais são as experiências que os clientes-alvo procuram e valorizam?"
.
Assim, é reconfortante perceber que é esse o conselho de quem dedica a sua vida a estudar o fenómeno da criação de valor.
.
Em "Managing the co-creation of value" de Adrian F. Payne, Kaj Storbacka & Pennie Frow, publicado por J. of the Acad. Mark. Sci. (2008) 36:83–96, encontro:
.
"Significantly, they point to the emergence of a new logic for value creation where value is embedded in personalized experiences, noting, “early experimenters are moving away from the old industry model that sees value as created from goods and services to a new model where value is created by experiences”"
...
"Korkman argues that value is embedded in customers’ practices and that this value can be enhanced through positive interventions or further development. The supplier’s motivation should be to improve these customer practices in order to build value for the customer and a more valuable role for itself in the customer’s activities.
The importance of recognizing customer processes rests with the need to develop a full understanding of where a supplier’s offering fits within the customer’s overall activities."
.
E agora algo de verdadeiramente difícil, mudar o ponto de observação e a perspectiva com que se observa:
.
"In traditional business strategy models, suppliers make decisions and choices about which core business or product category they should be operating in. The view is clearly inside–out, as it is based largely on the understanding of current organizational competencies. In S-D logic, business strategy starts by understanding the customer’s value creating processes and selecting which of these processes the supplier wishes to support. The positioning within the customer’s processes defines the support and thus the scope of the value proposition. Planning for co-creation is outside – in as it starts from an understanding of the customer’s value-creating processes, and aims at providing support for better co-creation of value. Value co-creation demands a change in the dominant logic for marketing from ‘making, selling and servicing’ to ‘listening, customizing and co-creating’. It is also cross-functional: It assumes and requires alignment between those organizational functions which make the customer promise and those which deliver the customer promise."
...
"Marketing messages should be based on a clear articulation of the value proposition."
.
BTW, a revista "Industrial Marketing Management" publica este mês "Value propositions as communication practice: Taking a wider view" de David Ballantyne, Pennie Frow, Richard Varey e Adrian Payne.
terça-feira, junho 14, 2011
O poder das checklists
Já várias vezes tinha lido sobre este exemplo do poder das checklists mas nunca tinha visto os números concretos:
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"If you ever need a catheter line, try to remember the work of Dr. Peter Pronovost. He's a critical-care doctor at John Hopkins Hospital, and he developed this simple checklist for medical staff to prevent infections from catheter lines:
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The results were dramatic. Line infections declined from 11 percent to 0 percent. In a 15 month period, the study showed that this checklist and the new role of nurses prevented 43 infections, 8 deaths, and saved $2 million."
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Em quantas situações numa PME é possível incorporar checklists?
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Trecho retirado de "Enchantment" de Guy Kawasaki
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"If you ever need a catheter line, try to remember the work of Dr. Peter Pronovost. He's a critical-care doctor at John Hopkins Hospital, and he developed this simple checklist for medical staff to prevent infections from catheter lines:
- Wash hands with soap
- Clean the patient's skin with chlorhexidine antiseptic
- Put sterile drapes over the entire patient
- Wear a sterile mask, hat, gown, and gloves
- Put a sterile dressing over the catheter site
.
The results were dramatic. Line infections declined from 11 percent to 0 percent. In a 15 month period, the study showed that this checklist and the new role of nurses prevented 43 infections, 8 deaths, and saved $2 million."
.
Em quantas situações numa PME é possível incorporar checklists?
.
Trecho retirado de "Enchantment" de Guy Kawasaki
Amor à primeira vista (parte III)
Continuado daqui.
.
Ainda recentemente neste postal recordamos:
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"A pervasive finding in recent research using longitudinal establishment level data is that idiosyncratic factors dominate the distribution of output, employment, investment, and productivity growth rates across establishments."
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É algo em que acreditamos e que está de acordo com a nossa experiência de contacto e trabalho com as empresas.
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Neste artigo "Mental Models, Decision Rules, and Performance Heterogeneity" de Michael Shayne Gary e Robert E. Wood, publicado no número de Junho de 2011 da revista Strategic Management Journal, encontramos um conjunto de conclusões sintonizados com estas ideias que aqui defendemos há muito tempo.
"Our results provide empirical evidence for the links between mental models and performance outcomes and help explain why some managers and not others adopt strategies that are ultimately associated with competitive success. We found substantial variation in the accuracy of decision makers’ mental models and in performance. While it is certainly true that perfect mental models are not necessary to reach high performance outcomes our findings show that decision makers with more accurate mental models of the causal relationships in the business environment achieve higher performance outcomes.
...
Our findings also help address an important challenge facing the strategy field about whether more accurate mental models enable managers ex ante to identify and interpret signals from their business environment that lead to superior strategic choices and performance outcomes. In our experimental study, variation in mental model accuracy is a key source of performance heterogeneity.
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Our findings also show that managers do not need accurate mental models of the entire business environment. Accurate mental models about the key principles of the business environment lead to superior decision rules and performance outcomes.
...
The benefits of partial knowledge about the key principles far outweigh the benefits of other partial knowledge. Our findings are also consistent with prior research showing that experts with richer cognitive representations of the deep structure of problems outperform novices who typically focus on superficial features of problems. An important implication is that managers do not need to develop perfect and complete mental models of complex business environments, but should instead focus on identifying and understanding the key principles. (Moi ici: Claro que existe um outro lado... quando o mundo muda, se continuarmos a acreditar nos nossos modelos mentais... ficamos presos a fórmulas que deixaram de funcionar)
...
Additionally, we find that decision rules stabilize rapidly, which explains why performance plateaus far below the potential achievable level. Rapid stabilization of decision rules is consistent with psychology research on complex problem solving that shows actors learning a new task or solving a novel complex problem quickly automate decision and action rules once they reach functional, satisficing levels of performance. (Moi ici: Daí a importância da liberdade económica para empreender e desalojar incumbentes cristalizados em práticas tornadas obsoletas, ou com um nível de desempenho longe do óptimo) Our results are also consistent with research that finds managers typically interpret information to reinforce their current mental model rather than challenge and update their beliefs.
...
We did not find evidence that more accurate mental models were more important in the higher complexity decision environment.
...
Perhaps in truly simple competitive environments—with smooth payoff landscapes—mental model accuracy may be less important for achieving high performance outcomes. There may also be a level of complexity that overwhelms managers’ capacity to either accurately infer causal relationships in the business environment or apply their mental models to make effective strategic choices."
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Onde é que já viram bonecos como este retirado do artigo?
.
Ainda recentemente neste postal recordamos:
.
"A pervasive finding in recent research using longitudinal establishment level data is that idiosyncratic factors dominate the distribution of output, employment, investment, and productivity growth rates across establishments."
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É algo em que acreditamos e que está de acordo com a nossa experiência de contacto e trabalho com as empresas.
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Neste artigo "Mental Models, Decision Rules, and Performance Heterogeneity" de Michael Shayne Gary e Robert E. Wood, publicado no número de Junho de 2011 da revista Strategic Management Journal, encontramos um conjunto de conclusões sintonizados com estas ideias que aqui defendemos há muito tempo.
"Our results provide empirical evidence for the links between mental models and performance outcomes and help explain why some managers and not others adopt strategies that are ultimately associated with competitive success. We found substantial variation in the accuracy of decision makers’ mental models and in performance. While it is certainly true that perfect mental models are not necessary to reach high performance outcomes our findings show that decision makers with more accurate mental models of the causal relationships in the business environment achieve higher performance outcomes.
...
Our findings also help address an important challenge facing the strategy field about whether more accurate mental models enable managers ex ante to identify and interpret signals from their business environment that lead to superior strategic choices and performance outcomes. In our experimental study, variation in mental model accuracy is a key source of performance heterogeneity.
.
Our findings also show that managers do not need accurate mental models of the entire business environment. Accurate mental models about the key principles of the business environment lead to superior decision rules and performance outcomes.
...
The benefits of partial knowledge about the key principles far outweigh the benefits of other partial knowledge. Our findings are also consistent with prior research showing that experts with richer cognitive representations of the deep structure of problems outperform novices who typically focus on superficial features of problems. An important implication is that managers do not need to develop perfect and complete mental models of complex business environments, but should instead focus on identifying and understanding the key principles. (Moi ici: Claro que existe um outro lado... quando o mundo muda, se continuarmos a acreditar nos nossos modelos mentais... ficamos presos a fórmulas que deixaram de funcionar)
...
Additionally, we find that decision rules stabilize rapidly, which explains why performance plateaus far below the potential achievable level. Rapid stabilization of decision rules is consistent with psychology research on complex problem solving that shows actors learning a new task or solving a novel complex problem quickly automate decision and action rules once they reach functional, satisficing levels of performance. (Moi ici: Daí a importância da liberdade económica para empreender e desalojar incumbentes cristalizados em práticas tornadas obsoletas, ou com um nível de desempenho longe do óptimo) Our results are also consistent with research that finds managers typically interpret information to reinforce their current mental model rather than challenge and update their beliefs.
...
We did not find evidence that more accurate mental models were more important in the higher complexity decision environment.
...
Perhaps in truly simple competitive environments—with smooth payoff landscapes—mental model accuracy may be less important for achieving high performance outcomes. There may also be a level of complexity that overwhelms managers’ capacity to either accurately infer causal relationships in the business environment or apply their mental models to make effective strategic choices."
.
Onde é que já viram bonecos como este retirado do artigo?
Um outro tipo de catálogo
Imaginem a situação: começam a pesquisar o catálogo de produtos de uma empresa na internet.
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O catálogo está bem feito, tem pinta!
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Escolhem uma determinada família de produtos e começam a ver os modelos existentes... são tantos... que se acabam por perder. Qual será o mais adequado para mim?
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Quando é que os catálogos vão ser assim? Não em função dos produtos, mas em função das situações da vida dos clientes?
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Há mais de uma década vi um exemplo numa revista da DECO que nunca mais vi em lado nenhum.
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Esqueçam o produto. Pensem em três ou quatro clientes-tipo, pensem na sua vida, pensem nas situações que vive no dia-a-dia...
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Como é que cada produto pode ajudar cada tipo de cliente-tipo?
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Percebem? Um catálogo não para mostrar a gama de produtos... mas para ajudar os clientes na escolha do produto que melhor se ajusta à sua experiência de vida.
.
O catálogo está bem feito, tem pinta!
.
Escolhem uma determinada família de produtos e começam a ver os modelos existentes... são tantos... que se acabam por perder. Qual será o mais adequado para mim?
.
Quando é que os catálogos vão ser assim? Não em função dos produtos, mas em função das situações da vida dos clientes?
.
Há mais de uma década vi um exemplo numa revista da DECO que nunca mais vi em lado nenhum.
.
Esqueçam o produto. Pensem em três ou quatro clientes-tipo, pensem na sua vida, pensem nas situações que vive no dia-a-dia...
.
Como é que cada produto pode ajudar cada tipo de cliente-tipo?
.
Percebem? Um catálogo não para mostrar a gama de produtos... mas para ajudar os clientes na escolha do produto que melhor se ajusta à sua experiência de vida.
segunda-feira, junho 13, 2011
Uma lição de humildade à la Kepler fazia-lhes falta
Ouvir a definição de mercantilismo neste filme, entre o minuto 1 e 1:40... o que nos diferencia?
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.
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Basta recordar a exortação do Presidente para voltarmos para a agricultura... escreve João Miranda num postal a não perder:
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"Num momento em que Portugal atravessa uma situação particularmente difícil, estabeleceu-se entre os responsáveis políticos um estranho consenso: temos que apostar na agricultura. São os mesmos que disseram que tinhamos que apostar nas auto-estradas, na Expo 98, na construção de estádios, na tecnologia, na educação e no TGV, mas nunca cuidaram de garantir que as apostas seriam sustentáveis. É mais uma de uma longa lista de “apostas”, “prioridades nacionais” e “opções estratégicas”. Desta vez mandam-nos cavar para o campo."
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.
.
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Basta recordar a exortação do Presidente para voltarmos para a agricultura... escreve João Miranda num postal a não perder:
.
"Num momento em que Portugal atravessa uma situação particularmente difícil, estabeleceu-se entre os responsáveis políticos um estranho consenso: temos que apostar na agricultura. São os mesmos que disseram que tinhamos que apostar nas auto-estradas, na Expo 98, na construção de estádios, na tecnologia, na educação e no TGV, mas nunca cuidaram de garantir que as apostas seriam sustentáveis. É mais uma de uma longa lista de “apostas”, “prioridades nacionais” e “opções estratégicas”. Desta vez mandam-nos cavar para o campo."
Aprender com os outros
Somos um país de incumbentes!
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Somos um país que protege os instalados...
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Mika Maliranta em "Finland’s Path to the Global Productivity Frontier through Creative Destruction" conta-nos:
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"Without its intense restructuring since (Moi ici: A chamada destruição criativa de Schumpeter) the mid-1980s, Finland would have replicated Japan’s lost decade instead of having its now stellar performance. (Moi ici: Um país de incumbentes... protege os instalados)
...
The change in Finnish productivity growth dynamics coincides with economy-wide deregulation, liberalization, and the opening up of Finland." (Moi ici: Poul, não nos deixes ficar mal)
...
"By intensifying competition in both input and output markets, it provided new incentives for both individuals and companies; by relaxing resource constraints, improving allocative efficiency, and expanding markets, it brought about new opportunities."
...
"Recent research has tried to find reasons for the prolonged slow productivity growth in Japan since the early 1990s; the lack of creative destruction is one plausible explanation. Fukao and Ug Kwon (2006) find that the reallocation of resources from low to high productivity firms has been marginal in Japan. Peek and Rosengren (2005) and Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap (2008) come to similar conclusions, which both studies attribute to malfunctioning financial markets patronizing inefficient incumbents and discouraging entry."
...
"Entry, exit, and resource reallocation among continuing plants explain about one third of the overall productivity growth in Finnish manufacturing since 1975 and virtually all of the productivity acceleration since 1985. The main explanatory factors are increased competition and Finland’s deepening integration into the global economy, assisted on the “supply side” by education and innovation policies.
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(Moi ici: Como refere Diogo Vasconcelos... liberdade, disponibilidade para pensar diferente, arriscar, perder o pé, ter fé em si... é o que vem a seguir)
In a frontier economy, creative destruction is about experimentation, reallocation, and selection among individuals (particularly managers ) and businesses. Consequently, it brings about some personal discontinuities and uncertainties. It would, however, be a mistake to assume that creative destruction would have longer-term negative effects on life satisfaction. At least in Finland, it seems that restructuring has rather promoted perceived happiness. Finns arguably seem to understand that creative destruction provides new opportunities."
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E Sócrates queria copiar a Finlândia... nunca lhe ouvi uma palavra sobre as virtualidades da destruição criativa... só lhe ouvi dizer que era preciso torrar dinheiro para salvar as empresas e o emprego, nabices.
.
Somos um país que protege os instalados...
.
Mika Maliranta em "Finland’s Path to the Global Productivity Frontier through Creative Destruction" conta-nos:
.
"Without its intense restructuring since (Moi ici: A chamada destruição criativa de Schumpeter) the mid-1980s, Finland would have replicated Japan’s lost decade instead of having its now stellar performance. (Moi ici: Um país de incumbentes... protege os instalados)
...
The change in Finnish productivity growth dynamics coincides with economy-wide deregulation, liberalization, and the opening up of Finland." (Moi ici: Poul, não nos deixes ficar mal)
...
"By intensifying competition in both input and output markets, it provided new incentives for both individuals and companies; by relaxing resource constraints, improving allocative efficiency, and expanding markets, it brought about new opportunities."
...
"Recent research has tried to find reasons for the prolonged slow productivity growth in Japan since the early 1990s; the lack of creative destruction is one plausible explanation. Fukao and Ug Kwon (2006) find that the reallocation of resources from low to high productivity firms has been marginal in Japan. Peek and Rosengren (2005) and Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap (2008) come to similar conclusions, which both studies attribute to malfunctioning financial markets patronizing inefficient incumbents and discouraging entry."
...
"Entry, exit, and resource reallocation among continuing plants explain about one third of the overall productivity growth in Finnish manufacturing since 1975 and virtually all of the productivity acceleration since 1985. The main explanatory factors are increased competition and Finland’s deepening integration into the global economy, assisted on the “supply side” by education and innovation policies.
.
(Moi ici: Como refere Diogo Vasconcelos... liberdade, disponibilidade para pensar diferente, arriscar, perder o pé, ter fé em si... é o que vem a seguir)
In a frontier economy, creative destruction is about experimentation, reallocation, and selection among individuals (particularly managers ) and businesses. Consequently, it brings about some personal discontinuities and uncertainties. It would, however, be a mistake to assume that creative destruction would have longer-term negative effects on life satisfaction. At least in Finland, it seems that restructuring has rather promoted perceived happiness. Finns arguably seem to understand that creative destruction provides new opportunities."
.
E Sócrates queria copiar a Finlândia... nunca lhe ouvi uma palavra sobre as virtualidades da destruição criativa... só lhe ouvi dizer que era preciso torrar dinheiro para salvar as empresas e o emprego, nabices.
Incumbentes e Antropologia
Interessante esta entrevista de Diogo Vasconcelos ao JdN:
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"Portugal é uma sociedade assente na protecção do que existe. Das ideias que existem, das pessoas que existem,das empresas que existem."
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Como disse alguém: "Portugal é um país de incumbentes!"
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Isto é demasiado perigoso... basta recordar o exemplo e o efeito da destruição criativa na Finlândia.
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E a coincidência, não há coincidências, todos os acasos são significativos. Aqui, no dia 10, sem ter lido a entrevista, escrevi:
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"Talvez por isso, comecei a olhar para a antropologia de uma outra forma... sim, eu sei, eu adivinho que as universidades vão achar a coisa um pouco bastarda e indigna...
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Talvez seja o momento de as empresas começarem a contratar os serviços de antropólogos... observadores embebidos na vida dos clientes para perceberem, para racionalizarem as experiências que os clientes vivem... mesmo quando não se apercebem delas."
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Na entrevista de Diogo Vasconcelos, publicada a 9 de Junho, encontro:
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"A Antropologia vai ser importante para as empresas como foi o marketing no século XX. Se as pessoas levam a sério esta ideia de co-criar o consumidor, têm que evoluir dos próprios grupos para a research etnográfica.Têm que aprender vivendo com as pessoas, e criando com elas,com um estado de espírito aberto para construir soluções que sejam radicalmente novas"
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"Portugal é uma sociedade assente na protecção do que existe. Das ideias que existem, das pessoas que existem,das empresas que existem."
.
Como disse alguém: "Portugal é um país de incumbentes!"
.
Isto é demasiado perigoso... basta recordar o exemplo e o efeito da destruição criativa na Finlândia.
.
E a coincidência, não há coincidências, todos os acasos são significativos. Aqui, no dia 10, sem ter lido a entrevista, escrevi:
.
"Talvez por isso, comecei a olhar para a antropologia de uma outra forma... sim, eu sei, eu adivinho que as universidades vão achar a coisa um pouco bastarda e indigna...
.
Talvez seja o momento de as empresas começarem a contratar os serviços de antropólogos... observadores embebidos na vida dos clientes para perceberem, para racionalizarem as experiências que os clientes vivem... mesmo quando não se apercebem delas."
.
Na entrevista de Diogo Vasconcelos, publicada a 9 de Junho, encontro:
.
"A Antropologia vai ser importante para as empresas como foi o marketing no século XX. Se as pessoas levam a sério esta ideia de co-criar o consumidor, têm que evoluir dos próprios grupos para a research etnográfica.Têm que aprender vivendo com as pessoas, e criando com elas,com um estado de espírito aberto para construir soluções que sejam radicalmente novas"
Outra vez: Volume is Vanity, Profit is Sanity
Aqui, mencionei as barreiras que um familiar encontra para publicar em revistas científicas portuguesas.
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Por isso, comecei por achar interessante este relato "The Dangers of a Competitor Orientation"... para depois mergulhar no artigo "Competitor-oriented Objectives: The Myth of Market Share" de J. Scott Armstrong e Kesten C. Green, publicado no International Journal of Business, 12 (1), 2007.
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Claro que para nós a conclusão dos autores não é novidade. Há muito que acreditamos que:
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Volume is Vanity, Profit is Sanity.
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Há muito que partilhamos da ideia de Hermann Simon: "Manage For Profit Not For Market Share"
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O que nos causa espécie é como a ideia está entranhada no mainstream:
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"Competitor-oriented objectives, such as market-share targets, are promoted by academics and are commonly used by firms. A 1996 review of the evidence, summarized in this paper, found that competitor-oriented objectives reduced profitability. We describe new evidence from 12 studies, one of which is introduced in this paper. The new evidence supports the conclusion that competitor-oriented objectives are harmful, especially when managers receive information about competitors’ market shares. The evidence appears to have had little effect on managers’ decisions and on what is taught in business schools."
...
"The market share myth is likely to remain strong as long as teaching and textbooks, decision aides, popular books, and investors’ decisions ignore scientific evidence on the effects of business objectives. We make the following recommendations:
A. Do Not Advocate Competitor-oriented Objectives in Classes and Textbooks.
Economics textbooks provide valid recommendations with respect to market share. The notion that firms should maximize market share does not seem to be worthy of study by economists, as it is contrary to the theory of the firm For example, Besanko, Dranove and Shanley (2000 98-100) in their textbook, Economics of Strategy, clarify early confusion about the relationship between market share and profitability: “The observed correlation between market share and profitability should not be taken to imply that any strategy designed to boost market share will increase a firm’s profitability … There is no causal mechanism whereby market share leadership automatically translates to profits.” Unfortunately, many business school professors seem to have had little training in economics.
Marketing professors and those who teach business strategy continue to advise students to strive for market share and they develop techniques to help businesses gain market share."
.
Por isso, comecei por achar interessante este relato "The Dangers of a Competitor Orientation"... para depois mergulhar no artigo "Competitor-oriented Objectives: The Myth of Market Share" de J. Scott Armstrong e Kesten C. Green, publicado no International Journal of Business, 12 (1), 2007.
.
Claro que para nós a conclusão dos autores não é novidade. Há muito que acreditamos que:
.
Volume is Vanity, Profit is Sanity.
.
Há muito que partilhamos da ideia de Hermann Simon: "Manage For Profit Not For Market Share"
.
O que nos causa espécie é como a ideia está entranhada no mainstream:
.
"Competitor-oriented objectives, such as market-share targets, are promoted by academics and are commonly used by firms. A 1996 review of the evidence, summarized in this paper, found that competitor-oriented objectives reduced profitability. We describe new evidence from 12 studies, one of which is introduced in this paper. The new evidence supports the conclusion that competitor-oriented objectives are harmful, especially when managers receive information about competitors’ market shares. The evidence appears to have had little effect on managers’ decisions and on what is taught in business schools."
...
"The market share myth is likely to remain strong as long as teaching and textbooks, decision aides, popular books, and investors’ decisions ignore scientific evidence on the effects of business objectives. We make the following recommendations:
A. Do Not Advocate Competitor-oriented Objectives in Classes and Textbooks.
Economics textbooks provide valid recommendations with respect to market share. The notion that firms should maximize market share does not seem to be worthy of study by economists, as it is contrary to the theory of the firm For example, Besanko, Dranove and Shanley (2000 98-100) in their textbook, Economics of Strategy, clarify early confusion about the relationship between market share and profitability: “The observed correlation between market share and profitability should not be taken to imply that any strategy designed to boost market share will increase a firm’s profitability … There is no causal mechanism whereby market share leadership automatically translates to profits.” Unfortunately, many business school professors seem to have had little training in economics.
Marketing professors and those who teach business strategy continue to advise students to strive for market share and they develop techniques to help businesses gain market share."
Uma realidade heterogénea. muito mais complexa do que nos pintam
Neste postal "Lugar do Senhor dos Perdões (parte III)" escrevi:
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"Quando os macro-economistas falam sobre o desempenho, sobre a produtividade de um sector de actividade, como o calçado, como o têxtil, como o mobiliário, falam de um bloco homogéneo, coerente, maciço... como se todas as empresas, imersas no mesmo ambiente competitivo, tivessem o mesmo comportamento"
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Pois bem, acabo de descobrir este artigo "Measuring and Analyzing Aggregate Fluctuations: The Importance of Building from Microeconomic Evidence" de John Haltiwanger:
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"A pervasive finding in recent research using longitudinal establishment level data is that idiosyncratic factors dominate the distribution of output, employment, investment, and productivity growth rates across establishments.
.
Seemingly similar plants within the same industry exhibit substantially different behavior on a variety of measures of real activity at cyclical and longer-run frequencies. In the fastest-growing industries, a large fraction of establishments experience substantial declines, whereas in the slowest growing industries, a large fraction of establishments exhibit dramatic growth."
...
"The observed tremendous withinsector heterogeneity raises a variety of questions for our understanding and measurement of key macro aggregates. Much of macroeconomic research and our measurement of aggregates is predicated on the view that building macro aggregates from industry-level data is sufficient for understanding the behavior of the macroeconomy. The implicit argument is that, at least at the level of detailed industry, the assumption of a representative firm or establishment is reasonable.
...
the accumulating evidence from recent establishment-level studies of employment, investment, and productivity growth suggests that this canceling out is far from complete. It is becoming increasingly apparent that changes in the key macro aggregates at cyclical and secular frequencies are best understood by tracking the evolution of the cross-sectional distribution of activity and changes at the micro level."
.
"Quando os macro-economistas falam sobre o desempenho, sobre a produtividade de um sector de actividade, como o calçado, como o têxtil, como o mobiliário, falam de um bloco homogéneo, coerente, maciço... como se todas as empresas, imersas no mesmo ambiente competitivo, tivessem o mesmo comportamento"
.
Pois bem, acabo de descobrir este artigo "Measuring and Analyzing Aggregate Fluctuations: The Importance of Building from Microeconomic Evidence" de John Haltiwanger:
.
"A pervasive finding in recent research using longitudinal establishment level data is that idiosyncratic factors dominate the distribution of output, employment, investment, and productivity growth rates across establishments.
.
Seemingly similar plants within the same industry exhibit substantially different behavior on a variety of measures of real activity at cyclical and longer-run frequencies. In the fastest-growing industries, a large fraction of establishments experience substantial declines, whereas in the slowest growing industries, a large fraction of establishments exhibit dramatic growth."
...
"The observed tremendous withinsector heterogeneity raises a variety of questions for our understanding and measurement of key macro aggregates. Much of macroeconomic research and our measurement of aggregates is predicated on the view that building macro aggregates from industry-level data is sufficient for understanding the behavior of the macroeconomy. The implicit argument is that, at least at the level of detailed industry, the assumption of a representative firm or establishment is reasonable.
...
the accumulating evidence from recent establishment-level studies of employment, investment, and productivity growth suggests that this canceling out is far from complete. It is becoming increasingly apparent that changes in the key macro aggregates at cyclical and secular frequencies are best understood by tracking the evolution of the cross-sectional distribution of activity and changes at the micro level."
O que fazer com estes líderes? (parte II)
O que dizer deste discurso?
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"Presidente da CIP "preocupado" com fim dos direitos especiais do Estado nas empresas"
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Aquele que devia ser o defensor número um da liberdade do mercado, do fim das interferências do Estado nas empresas... aparece com este discurso.
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Recordo Galbraith em "The Rise of the Predator State" (parte II), neste postal sublinhei:
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"In a world where the winners are all connected, it is not only the prey (who by and large carry little political weight) who lose out. It is everyone who has not licked the appropriate boots. Predatory regimes are, more or less exactly, like protection rackets: powerful and feared but neither loved nor respected. They cannot reward everyone, and therefore they do not enjoy a broad political base. In addition, they are intrinsically unstable, something that does not trouble the predators but makes life for ordinary business enterprise exceptionally trying.
...
predators suck the capacity from government and deplete it of the ability to govern. In the short run, again, this looks like simple incompetence, but this is an illusion. Predators do not mind being thought incompetent: the accusation helps to obscure their actual agenda."
.
Depois, recordo que há 12 mil milhões que vão ser disponibilizados aos bancos e que poderão ser utilizados para comprar empresas ou parcelas do Estado que vão ser privatizadas... há que preparar o terreno que facilite a aceitação dessa actuação.
.
"Presidente da CIP "preocupado" com fim dos direitos especiais do Estado nas empresas"
.
Aquele que devia ser o defensor número um da liberdade do mercado, do fim das interferências do Estado nas empresas... aparece com este discurso.
.
Recordo Galbraith em "The Rise of the Predator State" (parte II), neste postal sublinhei:
.
"In a world where the winners are all connected, it is not only the prey (who by and large carry little political weight) who lose out. It is everyone who has not licked the appropriate boots. Predatory regimes are, more or less exactly, like protection rackets: powerful and feared but neither loved nor respected. They cannot reward everyone, and therefore they do not enjoy a broad political base. In addition, they are intrinsically unstable, something that does not trouble the predators but makes life for ordinary business enterprise exceptionally trying.
...
predators suck the capacity from government and deplete it of the ability to govern. In the short run, again, this looks like simple incompetence, but this is an illusion. Predators do not mind being thought incompetent: the accusation helps to obscure their actual agenda."
.
Depois, recordo que há 12 mil milhões que vão ser disponibilizados aos bancos e que poderão ser utilizados para comprar empresas ou parcelas do Estado que vão ser privatizadas... há que preparar o terreno que facilite a aceitação dessa actuação.
domingo, junho 12, 2011
Na Economia o factor tempo conta, não é um universo newtoniano
"In the prior Age of Mass Markets, which occurred throughout most of the twentieth century, revenue maximization was the win strategy. Companies had relatively uniform pricing (for much of the period, manufacturers could actually set retail prices), cost to serve was relatively uniform as the product was just dropped at the customer’s receiving dock, and economies of scale meant that large production volumes led to diminishing unit costs. And diminishing unit costs meant more profits.
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In this situation, product management was indeed driving the boat. Their job was to maximize revenues. Most consumer product companies were characterized by a relatively small number of high-volume brands. In this situation, the cost of the small “tweaks” in products and packaging were small compared to the huge gains in scale.
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Over the past thirty years, however, our business system has changed enormously. We have entered what I call the Age of Precision Markets. In this new era, companies have instituted complex pricing varying from customer to customer, and even product to product. Cost to serve varies again by customer, and even by product within a customer. Products have proliferated into all ecological niches, and flexible manufacturing and outsourcing have enabled many niche products to achieve minimum efficient scale.
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Today, profit maximization requires a deep understanding of the interaction between pricing and cost to serve on a very granular basis (individual products within individual accounts). It also requires the tight integration of product management with the groups responsible for the second-order costs it so often produces. Chief among these are the critical costs of sales inefficiency and operations complexity – just what the top operations managers and sales reps were so concerned about."
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Trecho retirado de "Unlikely Operations Heroes – Sales Reps" de Jonathan Byrnes.
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In this situation, product management was indeed driving the boat. Their job was to maximize revenues. Most consumer product companies were characterized by a relatively small number of high-volume brands. In this situation, the cost of the small “tweaks” in products and packaging were small compared to the huge gains in scale.
.
Over the past thirty years, however, our business system has changed enormously. We have entered what I call the Age of Precision Markets. In this new era, companies have instituted complex pricing varying from customer to customer, and even product to product. Cost to serve varies again by customer, and even by product within a customer. Products have proliferated into all ecological niches, and flexible manufacturing and outsourcing have enabled many niche products to achieve minimum efficient scale.
.
Today, profit maximization requires a deep understanding of the interaction between pricing and cost to serve on a very granular basis (individual products within individual accounts). It also requires the tight integration of product management with the groups responsible for the second-order costs it so often produces. Chief among these are the critical costs of sales inefficiency and operations complexity – just what the top operations managers and sales reps were so concerned about."
.
Trecho retirado de "Unlikely Operations Heroes – Sales Reps" de Jonathan Byrnes.
Consequências do paradoxo de Kaldor
Continuado daqui.
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Nicholas Kaldor formulou uma série de leis sobre o crescimento. A terceira lei dizia qualquer coisa como isto:
.
O crescimento económico leva ao aumento dos salários, assim, a única maneira das economias maduras manterem, ou aumentarem a sua competitividade, passa por mudarem a forma de competição, ou seja, passarem da competição pelo preço para uma competição baseada noutros factores. Isto requer uma mudança estrutural.
.
Os políticos e a academia acham que a mudança estrutural tem de ser feita pelos trabalhadores, que só trabalhadores mais educados e com mais formação é que criarão uma economia mais competitiva.
.
Pessoalmente prefiro o exemplo finlandês...
.
"It is widely believed that restructuring has boosted productivity by displacing low-skilled workers and creating jobs for the high skilled.
This hypothesis can be tested by taking into account the quality of labour input in productivity decompositions. This can be done by using so-called “linked employer-employee” data. These data allow labour input to be measured in terms of “efficiency units”. It turns out that the basic findings and conclusions remain unaltered after the inclusion of the labour quality aspect in the productivity computations.
In essence, creative destruction means that low productivity plants are displaced by high productivity plants.
.
This is not to say, however, that education and skills are irrelevant from the point of view of economic growth and restructuring. On the contrary, a worker needs to be equipped with modern technology in order to fully utilise his or her skills in a productive way. As a consequence, in order to turn higher skills into higher aggregate productivity, new technologies must be implemented. Labour must be reallocated to those plants that have managed successfully to implement high productivity technologies.
So skill upgrading needs to be accompanied by restructuring through job destruction and creation. In addition, high skills probably facilitate adjustment because skilled workers can easily learn to use the new machines and techniques at their new jobs. From this perspective, the recent findings concerning the high basic skills of Finnish pupils are, of course, encouraging. It seems that workers will be able to adopt new techniques that are created by the current high R&D intensity"
.
É muito difícil fazer uma mudança estrutural. A maior parte das empresas não consegue mudar o seu ADN, mudar os seus modelos mentais, descobrir alternativas mais atraentes, a uma velocidade adequada. Assim, quanto mais fácil for o seu encerramento, mais fácil será o desvio de recursos humanos e materiais para novas experiências.
.
Subsídios e apoios que atrasam esta mudança são um peso imposto à sociedade... são como a ajuda bem intencionada que retira a jovem borboleta do casulo, e que a condena...
.
E voltamos a Dezembro de 2007...
.
Trecho retirado de "Creative Destruction in Finnish Manufacturing"
.
Nicholas Kaldor formulou uma série de leis sobre o crescimento. A terceira lei dizia qualquer coisa como isto:
.
O crescimento económico leva ao aumento dos salários, assim, a única maneira das economias maduras manterem, ou aumentarem a sua competitividade, passa por mudarem a forma de competição, ou seja, passarem da competição pelo preço para uma competição baseada noutros factores. Isto requer uma mudança estrutural.
.
Os políticos e a academia acham que a mudança estrutural tem de ser feita pelos trabalhadores, que só trabalhadores mais educados e com mais formação é que criarão uma economia mais competitiva.
.
Pessoalmente prefiro o exemplo finlandês...
.
"It is widely believed that restructuring has boosted productivity by displacing low-skilled workers and creating jobs for the high skilled.
This hypothesis can be tested by taking into account the quality of labour input in productivity decompositions. This can be done by using so-called “linked employer-employee” data. These data allow labour input to be measured in terms of “efficiency units”. It turns out that the basic findings and conclusions remain unaltered after the inclusion of the labour quality aspect in the productivity computations.
In essence, creative destruction means that low productivity plants are displaced by high productivity plants.
.
This is not to say, however, that education and skills are irrelevant from the point of view of economic growth and restructuring. On the contrary, a worker needs to be equipped with modern technology in order to fully utilise his or her skills in a productive way. As a consequence, in order to turn higher skills into higher aggregate productivity, new technologies must be implemented. Labour must be reallocated to those plants that have managed successfully to implement high productivity technologies.
So skill upgrading needs to be accompanied by restructuring through job destruction and creation. In addition, high skills probably facilitate adjustment because skilled workers can easily learn to use the new machines and techniques at their new jobs. From this perspective, the recent findings concerning the high basic skills of Finnish pupils are, of course, encouraging. It seems that workers will be able to adopt new techniques that are created by the current high R&D intensity"
.
É muito difícil fazer uma mudança estrutural. A maior parte das empresas não consegue mudar o seu ADN, mudar os seus modelos mentais, descobrir alternativas mais atraentes, a uma velocidade adequada. Assim, quanto mais fácil for o seu encerramento, mais fácil será o desvio de recursos humanos e materiais para novas experiências.
.
Subsídios e apoios que atrasam esta mudança são um peso imposto à sociedade... são como a ajuda bem intencionada que retira a jovem borboleta do casulo, e que a condena...
.
E voltamos a Dezembro de 2007...
.
Trecho retirado de "Creative Destruction in Finnish Manufacturing"
As histórias que contamos e que ouvimos
"The story that we are telling ourselves is really crucial. What we're telling, the stories that we tell to our selves, they determine the actions that we think work. What we think is possible."
.
E se só ouvimos histórias de desgraças, de coitadinhos, de gente a precisar de apoios e subsídios, de ente que se queixa... então ficamos limitados, moldados a esse mundo.
.
E acreditamos que não há saídas, que não há alternativas...
.
Já ouviram alguém nos media a explicar esta excentricidade?
.
A economia é também feita por isto... a economia é uma construção que emerge do somatório de conversas e histórias que se contam na sociedade. Se as histórias que passam são de desgraças e coitadinhos...
.
E se só ouvimos histórias de desgraças, de coitadinhos, de gente a precisar de apoios e subsídios, de ente que se queixa... então ficamos limitados, moldados a esse mundo.
.
E acreditamos que não há saídas, que não há alternativas...
.
Já ouviram alguém nos media a explicar esta excentricidade?
.
A economia é também feita por isto... a economia é uma construção que emerge do somatório de conversas e histórias que se contam na sociedade. Se as histórias que passam são de desgraças e coitadinhos...
Faleceu Eliyahu Goldratt
Faleceu ontem um dos homens que mais me influenciou a vida profissional, Eliyahu Goldratt. O homem que escreveu "A Meta", o homem que criou a Theory of Constraints.
.
Com Kaplan e Norton iniciei-me no BSC 1.0 e no BSC 2.0, mas ao chegar aí sentia uma insatisfação.
.
Quando conto esta história faço sempre este paralelismo.
.
Quando estudei Filosofia no liceu, adorei Descartes, aquela afirmação "Penso, logo existo" era tão poderosa... tudo o resto podia ser uma mentira, mas eu existia porque pensava, porque tinha consciência de mim...
.
Depois demos a justificação de Descartes para a existência de Deus... Deus é uma ideia perfeita. O Homem é um ser imperfeito. Um ser imperfeito não pode gerar uma ideia perfeita. Logo, Deus tem de existir à priori, não pode ser uma criação humana.
.
Não gostei nada desta justificação... um homem que tinha criado um alicerce tão poderoso para a sua visão do mundo... ficava-se por isto...
.
Quando trabalhava com o BSC no início e chegava ao BSC 2.0, mapa da estratégia e indicadores e olhávamos para as metas:
.
Com Kaplan e Norton iniciei-me no BSC 1.0 e no BSC 2.0, mas ao chegar aí sentia uma insatisfação.
.
Quando conto esta história faço sempre este paralelismo.
.
Quando estudei Filosofia no liceu, adorei Descartes, aquela afirmação "Penso, logo existo" era tão poderosa... tudo o resto podia ser uma mentira, mas eu existia porque pensava, porque tinha consciência de mim...
.
Depois demos a justificação de Descartes para a existência de Deus... Deus é uma ideia perfeita. O Homem é um ser imperfeito. Um ser imperfeito não pode gerar uma ideia perfeita. Logo, Deus tem de existir à priori, não pode ser uma criação humana.
.
Não gostei nada desta justificação... um homem que tinha criado um alicerce tão poderoso para a sua visão do mundo... ficava-se por isto...
.
Quando trabalhava com o BSC no início e chegava ao BSC 2.0, mapa da estratégia e indicadores e olhávamos para as metas:
Surgia logo a pergunta:
.
O que devemos fazer para cumprir estas metas?
.
O conselho de Kaplan e Norton era...
.
.
.
Não, não pode ser
.
.
.
Um brainstorming...
.
O quê?! Depois de todo o rigor intelectual para construir o mapa da estratégia e os indicadores, construir um conjunto de iniciativas estratégicas com base num brainstorming bem intencionado?!!!!!!!
.
Nunca gostei dessa solução até que descobri "Strategic Navigation" de William Dettmer que operacionalizava as ideias de um tal Goldratt e de uma tal de Teoria das Restrições (Theory of constraint) e foi com base no que aprendi com eles que comecei a usar estas relações de causa-efeito
como a base para a identificação das iniciativas estratégicas.
.
.
R. I. P.
sábado, junho 11, 2011
Mas onde é que descobri o paradoxo de Kaldor?
Continuado daqui.
.
Tenho um familiar que escreve com muita regularidade para revistas científicas da sua especialidade. Uma particularidade, essas revistas são sempre estrangeiras. Sempre que tentou publicar em revistas nacionais os pares que fazem a revisão científica bloquearam sempre.
.
Quero com isto dizer que é provável que determinadas ideias sejam bloqueadas e não cheguem a ver a luz do dia simplesmente porque não convém ao establishment.
.
Mas onde é que descobri esse tal paradoxo de Kaldor?
.
Neste artigo "Do some countries in the Eurozone need an internal devaluation? A reassessment of what unit labour costs really mean" de Jesus Felipe e Utsav Kumar", um artigo com várias mensagens familiares para quem lê este blogue:
.
"The problem with Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain is that they are uncompetitive and need to internally devalue – or so the argument goes. This column challenges this conclusion by pointing out that the measure used to back it up – unit labour costs – is flawed and misguided. Europe’s periphery lack of competitiveness is related to the types of products they export and not to the fact that their labour is expensive." (Moi ici: Esta conclusão que sublinhei é tão clara para mim... por que é que mais gente ainda não a descobriu? Por que é que os so-called partidos de esquerda não a defendem? Não a propagam? Não a divulgam?)
...
"Europe’s peripheral countries are in trouble but the problem and solutions are unrelated to their aggregate unit labour costs."
...
"looking at competitiveness from the point of view of unit labour costs puts the burden of adjustment on workers. However, we could equally argue that a country’s presumed loss of competitiveness is due to the fact that “machines are expensive given their productivity”."
...
"It indicates that the purported “loss of competitiveness” by the peripheral countries of the Eurozone is not just a question of nominal wages increasing faster than labour productivity. In all countries, nominal profit rates decreased at a slower pace than capital productivity (Marquetii 2003 documented that, over the long run, capital productivity displays a declining trend. And Glyn 1997 showed that profit rates also display a declining long-term trend)." (Moi ici: Não esquecer estes gráficos, as suas implicações no passado e como a mudança obriga a pensar num futuro diferente)
.
(Moi ici: A cena que se segue é um argumento que também já foi aqui defendido no blogue, os produtos portugueses não competem com os produtos alemães ponto! Isto é tão simples, tão básico, tão fácil de ver... como é que a academia não percebe isto? ... ou não quer perceber... basta ver esta foto e comparar:
)
.
"the comparison of the unit labour costs of the peripheral countries with those of Germany is misplaced. Using disaggregated data (for over 5,000 products exported) we show that the “complexity” of Germany’s export basket is significantly higher than that of the southern European countries and Ireland’s. Table 2 shows that Germany exports a significant share, over 12%, of total world exports of the top 10 most complex products; and over 30% of the top one-third most complex products (those in groups 1 and 2). It is clear that Ireland, Spain, Portugal, and Greece hardly compete directly with Germany in many of the products that they export, and hence comparing their unit labour costs is probably misleading.
German exports are concentrated in the most-complex products of the complexity scale and the least-complex export group represents only 3.4% of Germany’s exports (Table 3). In the case of Greece and Portugal this group represents 33.1% and 21.7%, respectively, as in China."
.
"This analysis leads to the conclusion that if the underlying problem of Europe’s periphery were lack of competitiveness, it should relate to the types of products they export (vis-à-vis Germany) and not to the fact that their labour is expensive (their wage rates are substantially lower), or that labour productivity has not increased (it has significantly). (Moi ici: A mensagem nº 1 ou nº 2 deste blogue. Um das razões porque existe este blogue!!! Esta gente "Sector do calçado vai ter aumento salarial" exporta 95% do que produz a um preço médio de 22€ contra um preço médio dos chineses de 3€. Por que exportam coisas e serviços diferentes!!!!)
.
.
(Moi ici: Ganhem fôlego para o que aí vem a seguir... 1, 2, 3)
.
The problem is that they are stuck in the manufacturing goods also produced by many other countries, especially the low-wage countries. Reducing wages would not solve the problem. (Moi ici: Ponto importante, isto não tem nada a ver com a redução dos salários dos funcionários públicos e das pensões, isso vai ter de acontecer, não por causa deste tema da competitividade, mas por que é um peso muito pesado sobre a economia... o cuco) What would an across-the-board reduction in nominal wages of 20%–30% achieve? The most obvious effect would be a very significant compression of demand. But would this measure restore competitiveness? We argue that it would not allow many firms to compete with German firms, which export a different basket, and in all likelihood it will not be enough to be able to compete with China’s wages.
A consequence of this analysis is that Europe’s peripheral countries should make significant efforts to upgrade their export baskets. Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain should look upward and try to move in the direction of Germany, and not in that of China. Certainly this is not easy and it is only a long-term solution, more so because in a recession firms are unlikely to be willing to enter new products, but it is the way to move forward.
Fourth, it is important to remember that aggregate unit labour costs are not expected to lead to output growth. In the literature, this is referred to as Kaldor’s paradox (Kaldor 1978). Using data for the postwar period, Kaldor found that those countries that had experienced the greatest decline in their price competitiveness (i.e., highest increase in unit labour costs) also had the greatest increase in their market share. Fagerberg (1996) revisited this enduring puzzle by analysing the period 1978–1994 and concluded that the paradox also continues holding for this period."
.
Um artigo fantástico... maked my day!!! Na linha do "pisar formigas num piquenique"
.
Tenho um familiar que escreve com muita regularidade para revistas científicas da sua especialidade. Uma particularidade, essas revistas são sempre estrangeiras. Sempre que tentou publicar em revistas nacionais os pares que fazem a revisão científica bloquearam sempre.
.
Quero com isto dizer que é provável que determinadas ideias sejam bloqueadas e não cheguem a ver a luz do dia simplesmente porque não convém ao establishment.
.
Mas onde é que descobri esse tal paradoxo de Kaldor?
.
Neste artigo "Do some countries in the Eurozone need an internal devaluation? A reassessment of what unit labour costs really mean" de Jesus Felipe e Utsav Kumar", um artigo com várias mensagens familiares para quem lê este blogue:
.
"The problem with Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain is that they are uncompetitive and need to internally devalue – or so the argument goes. This column challenges this conclusion by pointing out that the measure used to back it up – unit labour costs – is flawed and misguided. Europe’s periphery lack of competitiveness is related to the types of products they export and not to the fact that their labour is expensive." (Moi ici: Esta conclusão que sublinhei é tão clara para mim... por que é que mais gente ainda não a descobriu? Por que é que os so-called partidos de esquerda não a defendem? Não a propagam? Não a divulgam?)
...
"Europe’s peripheral countries are in trouble but the problem and solutions are unrelated to their aggregate unit labour costs."
...
"looking at competitiveness from the point of view of unit labour costs puts the burden of adjustment on workers. However, we could equally argue that a country’s presumed loss of competitiveness is due to the fact that “machines are expensive given their productivity”."
...
"It indicates that the purported “loss of competitiveness” by the peripheral countries of the Eurozone is not just a question of nominal wages increasing faster than labour productivity. In all countries, nominal profit rates decreased at a slower pace than capital productivity (Marquetii 2003 documented that, over the long run, capital productivity displays a declining trend. And Glyn 1997 showed that profit rates also display a declining long-term trend)." (Moi ici: Não esquecer estes gráficos, as suas implicações no passado e como a mudança obriga a pensar num futuro diferente)
.
(Moi ici: A cena que se segue é um argumento que também já foi aqui defendido no blogue, os produtos portugueses não competem com os produtos alemães ponto! Isto é tão simples, tão básico, tão fácil de ver... como é que a academia não percebe isto? ... ou não quer perceber... basta ver esta foto e comparar:
.
"the comparison of the unit labour costs of the peripheral countries with those of Germany is misplaced. Using disaggregated data (for over 5,000 products exported) we show that the “complexity” of Germany’s export basket is significantly higher than that of the southern European countries and Ireland’s. Table 2 shows that Germany exports a significant share, over 12%, of total world exports of the top 10 most complex products; and over 30% of the top one-third most complex products (those in groups 1 and 2). It is clear that Ireland, Spain, Portugal, and Greece hardly compete directly with Germany in many of the products that they export, and hence comparing their unit labour costs is probably misleading.
German exports are concentrated in the most-complex products of the complexity scale and the least-complex export group represents only 3.4% of Germany’s exports (Table 3). In the case of Greece and Portugal this group represents 33.1% and 21.7%, respectively, as in China."
.
"This analysis leads to the conclusion that if the underlying problem of Europe’s periphery were lack of competitiveness, it should relate to the types of products they export (vis-à-vis Germany) and not to the fact that their labour is expensive (their wage rates are substantially lower), or that labour productivity has not increased (it has significantly). (Moi ici: A mensagem nº 1 ou nº 2 deste blogue. Um das razões porque existe este blogue!!! Esta gente "Sector do calçado vai ter aumento salarial" exporta 95% do que produz a um preço médio de 22€ contra um preço médio dos chineses de 3€. Por que exportam coisas e serviços diferentes!!!!)
.
.
(Moi ici: Ganhem fôlego para o que aí vem a seguir... 1, 2, 3)
.
The problem is that they are stuck in the manufacturing goods also produced by many other countries, especially the low-wage countries. Reducing wages would not solve the problem. (Moi ici: Ponto importante, isto não tem nada a ver com a redução dos salários dos funcionários públicos e das pensões, isso vai ter de acontecer, não por causa deste tema da competitividade, mas por que é um peso muito pesado sobre a economia... o cuco) What would an across-the-board reduction in nominal wages of 20%–30% achieve? The most obvious effect would be a very significant compression of demand. But would this measure restore competitiveness? We argue that it would not allow many firms to compete with German firms, which export a different basket, and in all likelihood it will not be enough to be able to compete with China’s wages.
A consequence of this analysis is that Europe’s peripheral countries should make significant efforts to upgrade their export baskets. Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain should look upward and try to move in the direction of Germany, and not in that of China. Certainly this is not easy and it is only a long-term solution, more so because in a recession firms are unlikely to be willing to enter new products, but it is the way to move forward.
Fourth, it is important to remember that aggregate unit labour costs are not expected to lead to output growth. In the literature, this is referred to as Kaldor’s paradox (Kaldor 1978). Using data for the postwar period, Kaldor found that those countries that had experienced the greatest decline in their price competitiveness (i.e., highest increase in unit labour costs) also had the greatest increase in their market share. Fagerberg (1996) revisited this enduring puzzle by analysing the period 1978–1994 and concluded that the paradox also continues holding for this period."
.
Um artigo fantástico... maked my day!!! Na linha do "pisar formigas num piquenique"
Surpresas de um auto-didacta
O paradoxo de Kaldor:
.
Este termo está relacionado com a correlação positiva entre a competitividade internacional de vários países e os seus custos unitários do trabalho. Sim, esta gente tem muitos assessores mas nunca lhes devem ter falado neste paradoxo. Este paradoxo foi inicialmente descoberto por Nicholas Kaldor (1908-1986), Kaldor tentava perceber quais as causas do declínio internacional das exportações britânicas depois de 1960.
.
A teoria económica prevê que o sucesso das exportações depende de um nível baixo de preços. A treta a que estamos habituados.
.
Pois bem, Kaldor observou que que as exportações inglesas tinham descido apesar da descida dos custos unitários do trabalho!!!!
.
Mas mais, para cúmulo... e agarrem-se às cadeiras, Kaldor observou que as exportações de vários países, como a Alemanha ou o Japão, tinham aumentado juntamente com o aumento dos seus custos unitários do trabalho.
.
.
Surpresa? Só para quem não lê este blogue.
.
Ou seja, o aumento dos salários, custos e preços não enfraqueciam a posição competitiva do Japão e da Alemanha, mas, pelo contrário, contribuíam para a sua crescente competitividade.
.
Kaldor explicou esta aparente contradição com factores que contribuíam para a competitividade que não o preço: o aumento dos preços das exportações alemãs e japonesas foi acompanhado e mais do que compensado por melhorias em factores de qualidade, de design, de serviço, de ... que minimizavam o efeito do aumento do preço.
.
Os factores de competitividade que não o preço, revelaram-se fundamentais para manter e aumentar a competitividade das economias industriais, com elevados níveis salariais.
.
.
.
Isto dá que pensar...
.
.
.
Que eu, um autodidacta que estuda para tentar perceber o que vai encontrando na sua relação com as empresas, não conhecesse Kaldor e o seu paradoxo, tudo bem. Mas que os macro-economistas não o conheçam... ou não o percebam... I'm amazed!!!!
.
.
.
Este termo está relacionado com a correlação positiva entre a competitividade internacional de vários países e os seus custos unitários do trabalho. Sim, esta gente tem muitos assessores mas nunca lhes devem ter falado neste paradoxo. Este paradoxo foi inicialmente descoberto por Nicholas Kaldor (1908-1986), Kaldor tentava perceber quais as causas do declínio internacional das exportações britânicas depois de 1960.
.
A teoria económica prevê que o sucesso das exportações depende de um nível baixo de preços. A treta a que estamos habituados.
.
Pois bem, Kaldor observou que que as exportações inglesas tinham descido apesar da descida dos custos unitários do trabalho!!!!
.
Mas mais, para cúmulo... e agarrem-se às cadeiras, Kaldor observou que as exportações de vários países, como a Alemanha ou o Japão, tinham aumentado juntamente com o aumento dos seus custos unitários do trabalho.
.
.
Surpresa? Só para quem não lê este blogue.
.
Ou seja, o aumento dos salários, custos e preços não enfraqueciam a posição competitiva do Japão e da Alemanha, mas, pelo contrário, contribuíam para a sua crescente competitividade.
.
Kaldor explicou esta aparente contradição com factores que contribuíam para a competitividade que não o preço: o aumento dos preços das exportações alemãs e japonesas foi acompanhado e mais do que compensado por melhorias em factores de qualidade, de design, de serviço, de ... que minimizavam o efeito do aumento do preço.
.
Os factores de competitividade que não o preço, revelaram-se fundamentais para manter e aumentar a competitividade das economias industriais, com elevados níveis salariais.
.
.
.
Isto dá que pensar...
.
.
.
Que eu, um autodidacta que estuda para tentar perceber o que vai encontrando na sua relação com as empresas, não conhecesse Kaldor e o seu paradoxo, tudo bem. Mas que os macro-economistas não o conheçam... ou não o percebam... I'm amazed!!!!
.
.
sexta-feira, junho 10, 2011
O que fazer com estes líderes?
"Temos que reduzir os custos unitários do trabalho" afirma o presidente da CIP.
.
Estão já imaginar o que vem destas cabeças...
.
"Vida Económica - Acredita que a prometida redução "significativa" da Taxa Social Única será suficiente para relançar o crescimento económico?
António Saraiva - A redução da Taxa Social Única (TSU) é um dos aspectos pela qual podemos reduzir os custos unitários do trabalho. Temos que reduzir os custos unitários do trabalho, mas as formas para lá chegarmos são várias, não pensemos apenas na TSU. A TSU é aquela que é referida no programa da "Troika", mas podemos ser imaginativos e atingir o mesmo objectivo por outras variáveis. (Moi ici: Pergunta desnecessária... mas cá vai: "Por que outros meios?") Desde que atinjamos os mesmos objectivos a maneira como lá chegamos é irrelevante. Aumentar os horários de trabalho em duas horas seria outra forma e não se mexia na TSU. Podemos também ter um imposto social sobre a facturação que permita baixar substancialmente a TSU.
VE - Tem vindo a defender uma maior flexibilidade laboral e a necessidade de redução do custo efectivo do trabalho. As empresas estão preparadas para isso?
AS - Algumas empresas estão preparadas para isso, existem casos até que já se pratica essa alteração. Alguns sectores de actividade já incorporam nos seus contratos colectivos, o novo código do trabalho que permite bancos de horas, flexibilidade funcional e geográfica. Todavia, a maior parte ainda não pratica porque lamentavelmente os sindicatos têm estado estáticos a esta mudança do mundo que foi muito rápida e repentina. E os aparelhos sindicais têm que se adaptar a esta nova realidade."
.
Será que o presidente da CIP sabe qual é a fórmula de cálculos dos custos unitários do trabalho para uma empresa?
Todas as sugestões que dá passam única e exclusivamente pelas variáveis a vermelho:
Passa-lhe completamente ao lado... não faz parte do seu modelo mental (tenho de voltar a este artigo) mexer no preço... mexer no valor potencial do que é criado. Também ele não tem tempo e atenção para outras coisas.
.
Será que ele tem alguma ideia sobre o que se passa com a distribuição de produtividades dentro de um mesmo sector de actividade?
O que penso da mexida na TSU.
.
Estão já imaginar o que vem destas cabeças...
.
"Vida Económica - Acredita que a prometida redução "significativa" da Taxa Social Única será suficiente para relançar o crescimento económico?
António Saraiva - A redução da Taxa Social Única (TSU) é um dos aspectos pela qual podemos reduzir os custos unitários do trabalho. Temos que reduzir os custos unitários do trabalho, mas as formas para lá chegarmos são várias, não pensemos apenas na TSU. A TSU é aquela que é referida no programa da "Troika", mas podemos ser imaginativos e atingir o mesmo objectivo por outras variáveis. (Moi ici: Pergunta desnecessária... mas cá vai: "Por que outros meios?") Desde que atinjamos os mesmos objectivos a maneira como lá chegamos é irrelevante. Aumentar os horários de trabalho em duas horas seria outra forma e não se mexia na TSU. Podemos também ter um imposto social sobre a facturação que permita baixar substancialmente a TSU.
VE - Tem vindo a defender uma maior flexibilidade laboral e a necessidade de redução do custo efectivo do trabalho. As empresas estão preparadas para isso?
AS - Algumas empresas estão preparadas para isso, existem casos até que já se pratica essa alteração. Alguns sectores de actividade já incorporam nos seus contratos colectivos, o novo código do trabalho que permite bancos de horas, flexibilidade funcional e geográfica. Todavia, a maior parte ainda não pratica porque lamentavelmente os sindicatos têm estado estáticos a esta mudança do mundo que foi muito rápida e repentina. E os aparelhos sindicais têm que se adaptar a esta nova realidade."
.
Será que o presidente da CIP sabe qual é a fórmula de cálculos dos custos unitários do trabalho para uma empresa?
.
Será que ele tem alguma ideia sobre o que se passa com a distribuição de produtividades dentro de um mesmo sector de actividade?
O que penso da mexida na TSU.
Pode começar por dar o exemplo
Primeiro: "Não é impunemente que se diz mal"
.
"Por que é que um "outsider", que só ouve os dirigentes associativos do sector têxtil defenderem o passado e invectivarem os asiáticos, há-de apostar em investir o seu futuro no sector têxtil?"
.
Por que é que alguém que só ouve dirigentes do sector a cantar a canção do coitadinho, de que está tudo mal, que faltam apoios e subsídios, que o gasóleo..., que as rações ..., que os adubos... se há-de dedicar à agricultura?
.
"Cavaco Silva defende agricultura para os jovens"
.
"Por que é que um "outsider", que só ouve os dirigentes associativos do sector têxtil defenderem o passado e invectivarem os asiáticos, há-de apostar em investir o seu futuro no sector têxtil?"
.
Por que é que alguém que só ouve dirigentes do sector a cantar a canção do coitadinho, de que está tudo mal, que faltam apoios e subsídios, que o gasóleo..., que as rações ..., que os adubos... se há-de dedicar à agricultura?
.
"Cavaco Silva defende agricultura para os jovens"
Observar é melhor que perguntar
Fonte 1:
.
"Understanding when value for a customer occurs is also an elusive issue, perceived in an individualistic way.
...
We know very little about the process of value creation, when it starts, what it includes, when it ends. Although value creation probably is among the most ill-defined and elusively used concepts in service marketing, and in management in general.
...
it is debatable whether the process of creating value is best described using the verb ‘create’. Creating value gives the impression of a conscious, explicitly considered process. However, in many situations, where value is experienced in an unconscious way, it seems more accurate to say that value emerges out of the use of goods and service activities
...
In our view, when considering value-in-use the best way of understanding value for customers, value creation cannot mean anything else than the customer’s, or any other user’s, experiential perception of the value-in-use that emerges from usage or possession of resources, or even from mental states.
...
All resources and processes are distribution mechanisms for service provision, however without including value in themselves.
...
The firm cannot deliver value, but only make value propositions
...
Fundamentally, the firm is a facilitator of value for the customer
...
The firm can only offer value propositions. Conventional marketing is basically about making promises. A value proposition is a promise about future potential value"
.
Ao chegar aqui, escrevi nas margens do papel:
.
A unidade (aquilo em que as empresas podem trabalhar) não é a criação de valor, as empresas não criam valor. A unidade é a criação de experiências que o cliente experiencia e valoriza.
.
Depois, recordo Damásio: emoções geram sentimentos. E só com o advento do sentido de si é que tomamos consciência dos sentimentos que vivemos.
.
Ora os clientes não usam os produtos/serviços como experiências controladas, os clientes vivem, e é durante essa vida, integrados nessa vida, que usam as plataformas de serviço, as plataformas de facilitação da emergência de valor, mesmo sem tomarem consciência dos sentimentos que elas geram.
.
"Value is an elusive concept. Typically, in the literature value concepts imply some form of an assessment of benefits against sacrifices"
.
Mesmo sem tomarem consciência dos sentimentos que elas geram... quer dizer que se lhes perguntarmos à posteriori vão ter de racionalizar e reconstituir algo que não sentiram conscientemente...
.
Talvez por isso, comecei a olhar para a antropologia de uma outra forma... sim, eu sei, eu adivinho que as universidades vão achar a coisa um pouco bastarda e indigna...
.
Talvez seja o momento de as empresas começarem a contratar os serviços de antropólogos... observadores embebidos na vida dos clientes para perceberem, para racionalizarem as experiências que os clientes vivem... mesmo quando não se apercebem delas.
.
Pois... nem de propósito "Want To Sell Product? Sleep With Your Customers":
.
"I regularly ask CEOs when they've last spent a day in the homes of their core consumers. The best I can usually hope for is that they've intended to but have never found the time. In reality, most executives operate from large offices where they function with all the information that technology can provide." (Moi ici: Veio-me à memória um empresário que, quando ia ao estrangeiro, fazia questão de entrar em lojas onde se vendiam os seus produtos, e ficava horas a observar quem entrava, que idade e sexo tinha, o que fazia, o que experimentava, o que decidia...)
.
Estão a ver big-boss da CP a andar de comboio... estão a ver os decisores da CP a apanhar um suburbano que sai de S. Bento às 19h em direcção a Caíde ou Guimarães?
.
Estão a ver os decisores dos STCP a viajarem normalmente de autocarro? Não para uso pessoal, mas para perceberem o que se passa?
.
.
.
Fonte 2:
.
"Let me tell you about an experience I once had on a flight from New York to California. As usual, 1 was flying JetBlue. 1 boarded the plane with the other passengers, and the door closed. As we sat there, buckling our seat belts and checking out the televisions in front of us, a middle-aged man with slightly graying hair stood up in the front of the plane. He had on the long apron that all JetBlue flight attendants wear, with his name stitched onto it. "Hi," he said, "my name is Dave Neeleman, and I'm the CEO of JetBlue. I'm here to serve you this evening, and I'm looking forward to meeting each of you before we land.""
.
Fonte 1: "Value Co-creation in Service Logic. A Critical Analysis". Marketing Theory, Vol. 11 (forthcoming 2011) de Christian Gronroos (uma excelente reflexão sobre a "service-dominant logic" ou como ele prefere chamar "service logic")
.
Fonte 2: "The Knack - How Street-Smart Entrepreneurs Learn to Handle Whatever Comes Up" de Norm Brodsky e Bo Burlingham.
.
.
BTW, não posso deixar de recordar o empresário do interior do país que tinha uma empresa de betões betuminosos e que na Alemanha mandava parar o táxi, sempre que passava por uma estrada em obras, para ir apalpar o tapete betuminoso que estavam a ser aplicado. O Eu-Criança a funcionar num adulto é espectacular ... Mongo precisa dele.
.
"Understanding when value for a customer occurs is also an elusive issue, perceived in an individualistic way.
...
We know very little about the process of value creation, when it starts, what it includes, when it ends. Although value creation probably is among the most ill-defined and elusively used concepts in service marketing, and in management in general.
...
it is debatable whether the process of creating value is best described using the verb ‘create’. Creating value gives the impression of a conscious, explicitly considered process. However, in many situations, where value is experienced in an unconscious way, it seems more accurate to say that value emerges out of the use of goods and service activities
...
In our view, when considering value-in-use the best way of understanding value for customers, value creation cannot mean anything else than the customer’s, or any other user’s, experiential perception of the value-in-use that emerges from usage or possession of resources, or even from mental states.
...
All resources and processes are distribution mechanisms for service provision, however without including value in themselves.
...
The firm cannot deliver value, but only make value propositions
...
Fundamentally, the firm is a facilitator of value for the customer
...
The firm can only offer value propositions. Conventional marketing is basically about making promises. A value proposition is a promise about future potential value"
.
Ao chegar aqui, escrevi nas margens do papel:
.
A unidade (aquilo em que as empresas podem trabalhar) não é a criação de valor, as empresas não criam valor. A unidade é a criação de experiências que o cliente experiencia e valoriza.
.
Depois, recordo Damásio: emoções geram sentimentos. E só com o advento do sentido de si é que tomamos consciência dos sentimentos que vivemos.
.
Ora os clientes não usam os produtos/serviços como experiências controladas, os clientes vivem, e é durante essa vida, integrados nessa vida, que usam as plataformas de serviço, as plataformas de facilitação da emergência de valor, mesmo sem tomarem consciência dos sentimentos que elas geram.
.
"Value is an elusive concept. Typically, in the literature value concepts imply some form of an assessment of benefits against sacrifices"
.
Mesmo sem tomarem consciência dos sentimentos que elas geram... quer dizer que se lhes perguntarmos à posteriori vão ter de racionalizar e reconstituir algo que não sentiram conscientemente...
.
Talvez por isso, comecei a olhar para a antropologia de uma outra forma... sim, eu sei, eu adivinho que as universidades vão achar a coisa um pouco bastarda e indigna...
.
Talvez seja o momento de as empresas começarem a contratar os serviços de antropólogos... observadores embebidos na vida dos clientes para perceberem, para racionalizarem as experiências que os clientes vivem... mesmo quando não se apercebem delas.
.
Pois... nem de propósito "Want To Sell Product? Sleep With Your Customers":
.
"I regularly ask CEOs when they've last spent a day in the homes of their core consumers. The best I can usually hope for is that they've intended to but have never found the time. In reality, most executives operate from large offices where they function with all the information that technology can provide." (Moi ici: Veio-me à memória um empresário que, quando ia ao estrangeiro, fazia questão de entrar em lojas onde se vendiam os seus produtos, e ficava horas a observar quem entrava, que idade e sexo tinha, o que fazia, o que experimentava, o que decidia...)
.
Estão a ver big-boss da CP a andar de comboio... estão a ver os decisores da CP a apanhar um suburbano que sai de S. Bento às 19h em direcção a Caíde ou Guimarães?
.
Estão a ver os decisores dos STCP a viajarem normalmente de autocarro? Não para uso pessoal, mas para perceberem o que se passa?
.
.
.
Fonte 2:
.
"Let me tell you about an experience I once had on a flight from New York to California. As usual, 1 was flying JetBlue. 1 boarded the plane with the other passengers, and the door closed. As we sat there, buckling our seat belts and checking out the televisions in front of us, a middle-aged man with slightly graying hair stood up in the front of the plane. He had on the long apron that all JetBlue flight attendants wear, with his name stitched onto it. "Hi," he said, "my name is Dave Neeleman, and I'm the CEO of JetBlue. I'm here to serve you this evening, and I'm looking forward to meeting each of you before we land.""
.
Fonte 1: "Value Co-creation in Service Logic. A Critical Analysis". Marketing Theory, Vol. 11 (forthcoming 2011) de Christian Gronroos (uma excelente reflexão sobre a "service-dominant logic" ou como ele prefere chamar "service logic")
.
Fonte 2: "The Knack - How Street-Smart Entrepreneurs Learn to Handle Whatever Comes Up" de Norm Brodsky e Bo Burlingham.
.
.
BTW, não posso deixar de recordar o empresário do interior do país que tinha uma empresa de betões betuminosos e que na Alemanha mandava parar o táxi, sempre que passava por uma estrada em obras, para ir apalpar o tapete betuminoso que estavam a ser aplicado. O Eu-Criança a funcionar num adulto é espectacular ... Mongo precisa dele.
quinta-feira, junho 09, 2011
O que resultou no passado algures vai deixar de resultar
A revista strategy+business acaba de publicar mais um interessante artigo "Consumer Packaged Goods: Escaping the Consolidation Mentality" de Steffen Lauster, Elisabeth Hartley e Samrat Sharma.
.
"Holding fast to the two myths that have long dominated strategy in consumer-oriented industries — that bigger companies win, and that one or two players control every product category — can get a firm into trouble. A capabilities-driven strategy can provide a better path to profit."
.
Some strategic concepts, if they’re regarded as sacrosanct, may lead an entire industry in the wrong direction. Something of that sort has happened during the past two decades in the consumer packaged goods (CPG) industry. Two of the most influential strategy ideas are so widely held, so intuitively appealing, and so seemingly pragmatic that they are very hard to give up. Yet they can also be very dangerous to follow.
.
Both of these misleading ideas have to do with consolidation: the premise that, when it comes to business strategy, bigger is better. (Moi ici: Crescer por crescer é uma estupidez, no meu modelo mental. Custa tanto... mudar pessoas, mudar processos, mudar de clientes, muitas vezes para ter menos rentabilidade) Since the 1980s, the conventional wisdom has held that shareholder returns accrue most to companies with huge brands and the scale to compete in emerging markets. Many CPG leaders have assumed that their chances of winning, in every region and every product segment, were enhanced by size. More salespeople, a bigger distribution footprint, a bigger advertising budget — these were the ingredients of success.
.
This perception gave rise to the second misleading idea: Consolidation is inevitable. For years, experts predicted that most consumer packaged goods segments would end up like carbonated beverages, razor blades, and diapers — with just two or three big rivals, a handful of niche players battling over the scraps, and a few private-label brands for value consumers."
.
O que os autores propõem é como lidar com...
.
.
.
Mongo!!!
.
"To be sure, some players, such as Procter & Gamble, use their size and scale to great advantage, particularly in emerging markets or new growth areas. But in reality, the industry is much more diverse and dynamic than the conventional wisdom would suggest. Most CPG categories — including staples such as food, personal care products, and cleaning supplies — are in a constant state of evolution. They move from consolidation to fragmentation, and some can cycle back, time and time again.
In such an environment, there are many ways to prosper, with each successful company finding its own path: some end up large, some small, some global, some regional. But none of the paths taken involve growth for the sake of scale alone. Instead, they require the kind of growth that leads to profitability. This in turn requires coherence. (Moi ici: Sempre o alinhamento, sempre a concentração)
.
Coherence is a company’s ability to concentrate its resources and collective intelligence, and marshal all of them in the service of a well-aligned group of products and services with a focused strategic direction.
...
Because of the consolidation mentality, many executives of CPG companies have overlooked the value of coherence. They have focused on sheer size and scale instead. But size and scale are no longer as critical as they once were — at least not in the mature markets of industrialized nations.
...
Coherence seems to be particularly important in consumer products companies, where there is always a temptation to react opportunistically to changing markets, with brand extensions, new products, or acquisitions.
...
A coherent company — for that matter, a company that is simply more coherent than its competitors — can focus its investments on relatively few capabilities, increasing its mastery of those critical areas. It gains in efficiency; it doesn’t waste time, money, and attention on capabilities in domains where it doesn’t need to outdo its rivals and a modicum of competency is sufficient. A coherent company also makes more prudent portfolio decisions, applying the lens of capabilities as it decides which products or services to acquire and which to divest.
...
if the advantages of size, international penetration, scale, and retailer satisfaction were really so great, one would expect bigger companies to do better than the vast majority of their smaller peers. Instead, they are on par with most smaller companies and far behind a few in the important area of total shareholder returns.
...
In recent years, the CPG industry has undergone a sea change in its structure. Some product categories are consolidating, but many are fragmenting instead: They are splitting the customer base among more, rather than fewer, competitors.
...
(Moi ici: E agora umas recomendações muito interessantes. Mongo, Mongo, Mongo!!!)
.
If you are a small company in a fragmenting category, focus not on expansion into other categories, but on distinguishing your existing products in ways that customers value. Build or develop capabilities related to the features that your customers value most.
...
If you are in a consolidated category, you might be able to take over the market by changing the category’s dominant value proposition to something that you do uniquely well.
...
If you are pursuing organic growth (without M&A), seek “scale at the shelf,” not across categories. In other words, establish multiple brands at diverse price points, each with its own proposition."
.
Eu adoro isto! Tudo o que promova a erosão da ideia que o futuro é dos grandes, é bem vindo!!! Viva a agilidade das PMEs, viva a diferenciação!!!
.
"Holding fast to the two myths that have long dominated strategy in consumer-oriented industries — that bigger companies win, and that one or two players control every product category — can get a firm into trouble. A capabilities-driven strategy can provide a better path to profit."
.
Some strategic concepts, if they’re regarded as sacrosanct, may lead an entire industry in the wrong direction. Something of that sort has happened during the past two decades in the consumer packaged goods (CPG) industry. Two of the most influential strategy ideas are so widely held, so intuitively appealing, and so seemingly pragmatic that they are very hard to give up. Yet they can also be very dangerous to follow.
.
Both of these misleading ideas have to do with consolidation: the premise that, when it comes to business strategy, bigger is better. (Moi ici: Crescer por crescer é uma estupidez, no meu modelo mental. Custa tanto... mudar pessoas, mudar processos, mudar de clientes, muitas vezes para ter menos rentabilidade) Since the 1980s, the conventional wisdom has held that shareholder returns accrue most to companies with huge brands and the scale to compete in emerging markets. Many CPG leaders have assumed that their chances of winning, in every region and every product segment, were enhanced by size. More salespeople, a bigger distribution footprint, a bigger advertising budget — these were the ingredients of success.
.
This perception gave rise to the second misleading idea: Consolidation is inevitable. For years, experts predicted that most consumer packaged goods segments would end up like carbonated beverages, razor blades, and diapers — with just two or three big rivals, a handful of niche players battling over the scraps, and a few private-label brands for value consumers."
.
O que os autores propõem é como lidar com...
.
.
.
Mongo!!!
.
"To be sure, some players, such as Procter & Gamble, use their size and scale to great advantage, particularly in emerging markets or new growth areas. But in reality, the industry is much more diverse and dynamic than the conventional wisdom would suggest. Most CPG categories — including staples such as food, personal care products, and cleaning supplies — are in a constant state of evolution. They move from consolidation to fragmentation, and some can cycle back, time and time again.
In such an environment, there are many ways to prosper, with each successful company finding its own path: some end up large, some small, some global, some regional. But none of the paths taken involve growth for the sake of scale alone. Instead, they require the kind of growth that leads to profitability. This in turn requires coherence. (Moi ici: Sempre o alinhamento, sempre a concentração)
.
Coherence is a company’s ability to concentrate its resources and collective intelligence, and marshal all of them in the service of a well-aligned group of products and services with a focused strategic direction.
...
Because of the consolidation mentality, many executives of CPG companies have overlooked the value of coherence. They have focused on sheer size and scale instead. But size and scale are no longer as critical as they once were — at least not in the mature markets of industrialized nations.
...
Coherence seems to be particularly important in consumer products companies, where there is always a temptation to react opportunistically to changing markets, with brand extensions, new products, or acquisitions.
...
A coherent company — for that matter, a company that is simply more coherent than its competitors — can focus its investments on relatively few capabilities, increasing its mastery of those critical areas. It gains in efficiency; it doesn’t waste time, money, and attention on capabilities in domains where it doesn’t need to outdo its rivals and a modicum of competency is sufficient. A coherent company also makes more prudent portfolio decisions, applying the lens of capabilities as it decides which products or services to acquire and which to divest.
...
if the advantages of size, international penetration, scale, and retailer satisfaction were really so great, one would expect bigger companies to do better than the vast majority of their smaller peers. Instead, they are on par with most smaller companies and far behind a few in the important area of total shareholder returns.
...
In recent years, the CPG industry has undergone a sea change in its structure. Some product categories are consolidating, but many are fragmenting instead: They are splitting the customer base among more, rather than fewer, competitors.
...
(Moi ici: E agora umas recomendações muito interessantes. Mongo, Mongo, Mongo!!!)
.
If you are a small company in a fragmenting category, focus not on expansion into other categories, but on distinguishing your existing products in ways that customers value. Build or develop capabilities related to the features that your customers value most.
...
If you are in a consolidated category, you might be able to take over the market by changing the category’s dominant value proposition to something that you do uniquely well.
...
If you are pursuing organic growth (without M&A), seek “scale at the shelf,” not across categories. In other words, establish multiple brands at diverse price points, each with its own proposition."
.
Eu adoro isto! Tudo o que promova a erosão da ideia que o futuro é dos grandes, é bem vindo!!! Viva a agilidade das PMEs, viva a diferenciação!!!
Somos o que fazemos...
Quem somos?
.
Para uma empresa, como é que cada um responderia à pergunta: Quem somos?
.
Uma empresa não é um edifício, não é um conjunto de máquinas... será uma vontade? E há uma vontade ou umas vontades?
.
Como é que um colectivo se revê e identifica? E por que é que isso é importante? E como isso funciona como uma regra de decisão, como um facilitador ou um limitador?
.
Interessante artigo "Innovation strategy and identity: A case study from the food industry" de Thomas Hoholm e Fred Hjalmar Stronen, publicado pelo European Journal of Innovation Management em Junho de 2011.
.
"Identity can be used as an explanation for why some actions are deemed to be strategic while others are not, hence enforcing or limiting innovation. We find that identity needs to be considered both as a ‘soft’ and a ‘hard’ concept in the process; providing stability while at the same time being up for re-negotiation. By understanding strategizing and innovating as situated and heterogeneous processes, we identify how identity becomes a stabilizer and an organizer during emergent strategy processes, and reveal tensions between creative recombination and conservative reproduction."
...
"These two examples show how both new product development and taking on an existing product may challenge the existing view on what the members construct as the firm’s identity.
...
New products, whether innovations or established products in other markets, were considered strategic or nonstrategic related to the identities of professions (product developers, chefs, marketers, management), of owners (farmers’ cooperative), of consumers (brand associations) and of industrial production (production facilities). By looking at the product ingredients and their connotations, the product was viewed by the different groups as completely different."
...
"From the insight in these two cases, identity could be conceptualized as both a ‘hard’ and a ‘soft’ concept. Identity is hard, as it represents history and is embedded and stabilized both by material and social relations (physical facilities, technologies, work practices, economic interests, etc). It materializes in various situations, being something the actors really believe in and guiding interpretation and action in various specific everyday situations. But identity is also a soft concept, as identities are continuously fluctuating and under negotiation, thus never fully stable. Identities, as well as the balance between multiple identities, change between situations, between individuals and groups, and between professions. What we can see is how the same persons in these two stories relate to different identities, and thereby draw on various interpretations and negotiations of what the strategy is, depending on each specific context and situation."
...
"Identity in an organization forms the basis of how they regard the appropriateness of potential future actions.
...
Individuals form their sensemaking and their ideas on what is legitimate in various based on their identities."
.
E conjugar este artigo com:
.
Nós não conhecemos a realidade, nós só conhecemos a nossa interpretação da realidade.
.
E ainda, conjugar com "What Business Are You In? Business As Social Constructs" um excelente artigo que chama a atenção para a importância da nossa construção da realidade:
.
"In a company, the business model is defined by a dominant group of people. They have a common understanding of what business they are in and how they create value. However, the business model is not an absolute reality. It’s a social construct of dominant opinion makers, e.g. your top management. This is important to understand.
By taking a different look (Moi ici: Parece fácil... mas para quem está dentro, para quem está embebido numa identidade... é tão difícil) at your business, and thereby challenging your dominant logic, you can identify more and different strategic options for your firm"
.
Para mudar temos de ser capazes de simultaneamente, na mesma mente, trabalhar com o que somos e com o que temos de vir a ser.
.
Para uma empresa, como é que cada um responderia à pergunta: Quem somos?
.
Uma empresa não é um edifício, não é um conjunto de máquinas... será uma vontade? E há uma vontade ou umas vontades?
.
Como é que um colectivo se revê e identifica? E por que é que isso é importante? E como isso funciona como uma regra de decisão, como um facilitador ou um limitador?
.
Interessante artigo "Innovation strategy and identity: A case study from the food industry" de Thomas Hoholm e Fred Hjalmar Stronen, publicado pelo European Journal of Innovation Management em Junho de 2011.
.
"Identity can be used as an explanation for why some actions are deemed to be strategic while others are not, hence enforcing or limiting innovation. We find that identity needs to be considered both as a ‘soft’ and a ‘hard’ concept in the process; providing stability while at the same time being up for re-negotiation. By understanding strategizing and innovating as situated and heterogeneous processes, we identify how identity becomes a stabilizer and an organizer during emergent strategy processes, and reveal tensions between creative recombination and conservative reproduction."
...
"These two examples show how both new product development and taking on an existing product may challenge the existing view on what the members construct as the firm’s identity.
...
New products, whether innovations or established products in other markets, were considered strategic or nonstrategic related to the identities of professions (product developers, chefs, marketers, management), of owners (farmers’ cooperative), of consumers (brand associations) and of industrial production (production facilities). By looking at the product ingredients and their connotations, the product was viewed by the different groups as completely different."
...
"From the insight in these two cases, identity could be conceptualized as both a ‘hard’ and a ‘soft’ concept. Identity is hard, as it represents history and is embedded and stabilized both by material and social relations (physical facilities, technologies, work practices, economic interests, etc). It materializes in various situations, being something the actors really believe in and guiding interpretation and action in various specific everyday situations. But identity is also a soft concept, as identities are continuously fluctuating and under negotiation, thus never fully stable. Identities, as well as the balance between multiple identities, change between situations, between individuals and groups, and between professions. What we can see is how the same persons in these two stories relate to different identities, and thereby draw on various interpretations and negotiations of what the strategy is, depending on each specific context and situation."
...
"Identity in an organization forms the basis of how they regard the appropriateness of potential future actions.
...
Individuals form their sensemaking and their ideas on what is legitimate in various based on their identities."
.
E conjugar este artigo com:
.
Nós não conhecemos a realidade, nós só conhecemos a nossa interpretação da realidade.
.
E ainda, conjugar com "What Business Are You In? Business As Social Constructs" um excelente artigo que chama a atenção para a importância da nossa construção da realidade:
.
"In a company, the business model is defined by a dominant group of people. They have a common understanding of what business they are in and how they create value. However, the business model is not an absolute reality. It’s a social construct of dominant opinion makers, e.g. your top management. This is important to understand.
By taking a different look (Moi ici: Parece fácil... mas para quem está dentro, para quem está embebido numa identidade... é tão difícil) at your business, and thereby challenging your dominant logic, you can identify more and different strategic options for your firm"
.
Para mudar temos de ser capazes de simultaneamente, na mesma mente, trabalhar com o que somos e com o que temos de vir a ser.
E se o nosso sector mudou mesmo e mudou de vez?
Realmente!
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Quando gente com capacidade, gente inteligente, faz parte de uma empresa incluída num sector em mudança, é tão fácil ficar entretido a rentabilizar a estrutura do passado nos novos tempos, é tão fácil ser incapaz de ver que a mudança é estrutural e mais vale repensar a empresa.
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Realmente... quem está de fora, com uma mente mais liberta, pode fazer experiências mentais com muito mais facilidade.
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Focamos-nos no urgente, no que tem de ser feito de imediato e não deixamos tempo, e tempo de qualidade, para parar e pensar no que é realmente importante... como se diz, somos uma espécie optimista por natureza.
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Quando gente com capacidade, gente inteligente, faz parte de uma empresa incluída num sector em mudança, é tão fácil ficar entretido a rentabilizar a estrutura do passado nos novos tempos, é tão fácil ser incapaz de ver que a mudança é estrutural e mais vale repensar a empresa.
.
Realmente... quem está de fora, com uma mente mais liberta, pode fazer experiências mentais com muito mais facilidade.
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Focamos-nos no urgente, no que tem de ser feito de imediato e não deixamos tempo, e tempo de qualidade, para parar e pensar no que é realmente importante... como se diz, somos uma espécie optimista por natureza.
quarta-feira, junho 08, 2011
Amor à primeira vista (parte II)
Continuar aqui.
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"Understanding why some firms and not others adopt strategies ultimately associated with competitive success is of central importance to strategy scholars. In addressing one aspect of this issue, research examining the role of managerial cognition has shown that managerial mental models are a critical determinant of strategic choices." (Moi ici: Partilho desta corrente. O meu contacto com as empresas, com os empresários e com os gestores, reforçou em mim, ao longo dos anos, a crença de que o fundamental para explicar a variabilidade, a distribuição de produtividades das empresas dentro de um sector de actividade, está nos modelos mentais de quem comanda ou gere)
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"Managerial mental models are simplified knowledge structures or cognitive representations about how the business environment works. There is substantial evidence that mental models influence decision making through managers' efforts to match strategic choices to their understanding of the business environment." (Moi ici: O "perigo" que isto representa num mundo carregado de amadores a jogar bilhar... ou vantagem para quem percebe de relações de causa-efeito... bom para batoteiros!!!)
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"An alternative possibility is that complexity, uncertainty, and change in business environments overwhelm managers' capacity to take advantage of any richer understanding about the situation. Under such circumstances, competitive advantage would be driven by initial conditions, random environmental shocks, and lucky managerial responses rather than the result of accurate mental models underpinning managerial foresight or strategic insights.
...
We also investigate the impact of partial knowledge - in contrast to accurate mental models of the complete business environment - on performance outcomes. Recent simulation-based research suggests that even partial knowledge of the business environment may dramatically improve performance." (Moi ici: A coisa promete)
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Trechos retirados de "Mental Models, Decision Rules, and Performance Heterogeneity" de Michael Shayne Gary e Robert E. Wood, publicado no número de Junho de 2011 da revista Strategic Management Journal.
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Continua.
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"Understanding why some firms and not others adopt strategies ultimately associated with competitive success is of central importance to strategy scholars. In addressing one aspect of this issue, research examining the role of managerial cognition has shown that managerial mental models are a critical determinant of strategic choices." (Moi ici: Partilho desta corrente. O meu contacto com as empresas, com os empresários e com os gestores, reforçou em mim, ao longo dos anos, a crença de que o fundamental para explicar a variabilidade, a distribuição de produtividades das empresas dentro de um sector de actividade, está nos modelos mentais de quem comanda ou gere)
...
"Managerial mental models are simplified knowledge structures or cognitive representations about how the business environment works. There is substantial evidence that mental models influence decision making through managers' efforts to match strategic choices to their understanding of the business environment." (Moi ici: O "perigo" que isto representa num mundo carregado de amadores a jogar bilhar... ou vantagem para quem percebe de relações de causa-efeito... bom para batoteiros!!!)
...
"An alternative possibility is that complexity, uncertainty, and change in business environments overwhelm managers' capacity to take advantage of any richer understanding about the situation. Under such circumstances, competitive advantage would be driven by initial conditions, random environmental shocks, and lucky managerial responses rather than the result of accurate mental models underpinning managerial foresight or strategic insights.
...
We also investigate the impact of partial knowledge - in contrast to accurate mental models of the complete business environment - on performance outcomes. Recent simulation-based research suggests that even partial knowledge of the business environment may dramatically improve performance." (Moi ici: A coisa promete)
.
Trechos retirados de "Mental Models, Decision Rules, and Performance Heterogeneity" de Michael Shayne Gary e Robert E. Wood, publicado no número de Junho de 2011 da revista Strategic Management Journal.
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Continua.
Bake a Bigger Pie
“There are two kinds of people and organizations in the world: eaters and bakers. Eaters want a bigger slice of an existing pie; bakers want to make a bigger pie. Eaters think that if they win, you lose, and if you win, they lose. Bakers think that everyone can win with a bigger pie.”
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Trecho retirado de "Enchantment" de Guy Kawasaki
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Trecho retirado de "Enchantment" de Guy Kawasaki
Mais um exemplo
Ontem contaram-me o caso desta marca portuguesa Dkode.
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200 mil pares vendidos com marca própria... estão mesmo a precisar da redução da TSU.
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Parabéns!
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200 mil pares vendidos com marca própria... estão mesmo a precisar da redução da TSU.
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Parabéns!
Acerca dos clientes
"The biggest problem in getting to know our customers is that they don’t know themselves".
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Já experimentaram... acordam durante a noite para ir à casa de banho. Se olharem para um relógio de ponteiros para ver as horas ficam menos despertados do que se olharem para um relógio digital. Diferentes meios de comunicação, entram por diferentes canais.
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Consumir não é necessariamente racional... consumir é a perspectiva do fornecedor. Para o cliente, na sua perspectiva, não se consome, vive-se.
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Já experimentaram... acordam durante a noite para ir à casa de banho. Se olharem para um relógio de ponteiros para ver as horas ficam menos despertados do que se olharem para um relógio digital. Diferentes meios de comunicação, entram por diferentes canais.
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Consumir não é necessariamente racional... consumir é a perspectiva do fornecedor. Para o cliente, na sua perspectiva, não se consome, vive-se.
Amor à primeira vista
Foi um caso de amor à primeira vista, bastou ler o abstracts.
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Este artigo "Mental Models, Decision Rules, and Performance Heterogeneity" de Michael Shayne Gary e Robert E. Wood, publicado no número de Junho de 2011 da revista Strategic Management Journal.
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"This paper focuses on the role of managerial cognition as a source of heterogeneity in firm strategies and performance. We link differences in mental models to differences in decision rules and performance in a management simulation. Our results show more accurate mental models lead to better decision rules and higher performance. We also find that decision makers do not need accurate knowledge of the entire business environment; accurate mental models of the key principles are sufficient to achieve superior performance. A fundamental assumption in much of strategic management is that managers who have a richer understanding about organizational capabilities and the dynamics of industry structure can improve the performance of their firms. Our findings provide empirical evidence supporting this assumption and show that differences in mental models help explain ex ante why managers and firms adopt different strategies and achieve different levels of competitive success."
.
Continua.
.
Este artigo "Mental Models, Decision Rules, and Performance Heterogeneity" de Michael Shayne Gary e Robert E. Wood, publicado no número de Junho de 2011 da revista Strategic Management Journal.
.
"This paper focuses on the role of managerial cognition as a source of heterogeneity in firm strategies and performance. We link differences in mental models to differences in decision rules and performance in a management simulation. Our results show more accurate mental models lead to better decision rules and higher performance. We also find that decision makers do not need accurate knowledge of the entire business environment; accurate mental models of the key principles are sufficient to achieve superior performance. A fundamental assumption in much of strategic management is that managers who have a richer understanding about organizational capabilities and the dynamics of industry structure can improve the performance of their firms. Our findings provide empirical evidence supporting this assumption and show that differences in mental models help explain ex ante why managers and firms adopt different strategies and achieve different levels of competitive success."
.
Continua.
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