Mostrar mensagens com a etiqueta byrnes. Mostrar todas as mensagens
Mostrar mensagens com a etiqueta byrnes. Mostrar todas as mensagens

quinta-feira, outubro 13, 2022

O sabotador!!!

Recordar O retrato (parte III)O retrato (parte II) e O retrato

"In our experience, customers are rarely profit drains because of below-market pricing; they’re profit drains because of an excessively high cost to serve, generally caused by relatively minor factors that are unseen and unmanaged. The good news is that this is often relatively easy to fix: You can create a win-win solution for both companies, increasing the customers’ own profitability while converting many into profit peaks. We call this process of joint cost reduction — increasing profitability by lowering the cost to serve rather than raising prices — conditional pricing."

Relacionar com isto de "your interests overlap, but they are not the same":

"The mantra that 'the customer is always king' requires interpretation, I learned. The customer is transactional; your interests overlap, but they are not the same. You provide a good service; you delight the customer, but you maintain margins sufficient for a good living and protect your own interests. [Moi ici: Demasiadas vezes quem negoceia o preço com o cliente, a seguir aceita alterações que sabotam as margens negociadasYou do not necessarily cede to every demand a consumer makes,"

Treco inicial retirado de "3 Strategies for Managing Your Profit-Drain Customers

 

sexta-feira, setembro 23, 2022

O retrato


No modelo do século XX actividade era sinónimo de resultados positivos. 
Em Mongo, actividade não é necessariamente bom sinal, basta recordar os pregos no caixão.

Consigo ver tantas empresas cheias de trabalho, mas que se calhar estão a perder dinheiro. Qual a abordagem que vou seguir com uma delas que me contactou?

1 Listar actividades
  • cartografar as diferentes variantes do processo - ganhar encomendas
  • cartografar o processo que transforma uma encomenda ganha em produto acabado entrado em armazém
  • cartografar o processo que expede o produto acabado e recebe o dinheiro
  • Criar um modelo de custeio com o apoio de empresa de contabilidade
2 Listar clientes

3 Para cada cliente, calcular vendas

4 Para cada cliente e linha de encomenda estimar lucro líquido 
“A margem bruta não prevê o lucro líquido: Vários conjuntos importantes de custos críticos – custos de vendas e marketing, custos operacionais e da cadeia de fornecimento e custos indirectos – não são incluídos no cálculo da margem bruta, e esses custos são decisivos no ambiente de negócios atual (isto é, grande em relação ao lucro líquido, criando uma forte alavancagem de lucro) em que o custo para servir varia muito de cliente para cliente e até mesmo dentro dos clientes.”
5 Classificar clientes em três grupos:

Profit Peaks: clientes de vendas elevadas e lucro elevado (normalmente cerca de 20% dos clientes que geram 150% dos lucros)

Profit Drains: clientes com vendas elevadas e lucro ou prejuízo baixo (normalmente cerca de 30% dos clientes que corroem cerca de 50% dos lucros potenciais)

Profit Drains: clientes com vendas baixas e lucro baixo que geram lucro mínimo

Sem este retrato, nada feito.

Trecho retirado de “Choose Your Customer: How to Compete Against the Digital Giants and Thrive” de Jonathan S. Byrnes

segunda-feira, junho 28, 2021

"the Age of Diverse Markets" (parte VIII)

 Parte Iparte II, parte IIparte IVparte Vparte VI e parte VII. 

"Throughout this book, we argue that all revenues are not equally profitable—some produce high profits, and some actually produce losses. But are all profits equally desirable?

The surprising answer is no—and the key to understanding the difference between “good profits” and “bad profits” is demonstrated in 

The desirability of an investment is not just a function of the likely returns but also a function of the strategic relevance (whether the investment moves the company’s strategy forward). 

...

Consider the upper left quadrant: high returns but low strategic relevance. This quadrant is quicksand. These investments look very attractive, but they take the company’s capital and focus away from its main line of business. All too many companies have unclear and unproductive positioning because they lack the discipline to say no to attractive-looking investments that don’t fit. Ultimately, companies that pursue these types of investments get picked off by highly focused competitors. These are the investments that produce bad profits.

Think about the lower right quadrant: low returns but high strategic relevance. These are investments that would show up at the bottom of a simple capital budgeting ranking, but they are essential to moving the company forward. Here, the watchword is courage, a character trait that is especially critical in today’s transforming business world.

...

The moral of the story is that while investments in the upper left quadrant produce bad profits, investments in the lower right produce “good losses.”"

Trechos retirados de “Choose Your Customer: How to Compete Against the Digital Giants and Thrive” de Jonathan S. Byrnes.

domingo, junho 27, 2021

"the Age of Diverse Markets" (parte VII)

 Parte Iparte II, parte IIparte IVparte V e parte VI.

"Cost reduction provides another landmark example of the power of transaction-based profit analytics. In virtually all supply chain projects, the objective is to reduce costs. The analytical process is to identify the costs that are above average and reduce them to at least average levels. What could be wrong with this?

The answer is that neither simply reducing higher-than-average costs nor reducing costs across the board will maximize profitability. The reason is that the Profit Peak customers are often more costly to serve—and rightly so because the extra customer service costs are a great investment."

Como não regressar ao Senhor dos Perdões e ao discurso monolítico sobre um todo homogéneo:

"Most strategic analyses are based on an assessment of a company as a whole. This is an artifact of the Age of Mass Markets. So-called strengths-weaknesses- opportunities-threats (SWOT) analysis, and even Michael Porter’s powerful Five Forces framework, illustrate this approach. Profit contour analysis significantly enriches these analytical models because it shows the composition of a company’s component segments and activities, allowing managers to see their underlying patterns of profitability, which have historically been hidden by aggregate, average metrics.

Companies are not monolithic. For example, profit contour analysis indicates how much a company would be helped by better positioning (for example, which segments are helped, which would suffer profit erosion in the absence of repositioning, and which are well positioned already). It also indicates how difficult, costly, or time-consuming the transition will be (for example, what proportion of the products or vendors have to be changed). This is especially important in addressing the specific problems and opportunities that the currents of change pose.

...

In analyzing possible strategic groups in both your current and transformed industry, it is very instructive to focus on the value-to-cost relationship of your major profit segments: Profit Peaks, Profit Drains, and Profit Deserts."

Trechos retirados de “Choose Your Customer: How to Compete Against the Digital Giants and Thrive” de Jonathan S. Byrnes.



quarta-feira, junho 23, 2021

"the Age of Diverse Markets" (parte VI)

 Parte Iparte II, parte IIparte IV e parte V.

"It all starts with choosing your customer, or, as we put it, selecting your strategic group and then aligning and organizing your functional capabilities to meet your diverse and rapidly changing customer needs.

The Manager of the Future must be adept at what we call Value Entrepreneurship, which we define as teaming with peer managers to constantly push the envelope of the company’s customer value footprint in its diverse target market segments in a tight but flexible way. 

...

The Age of Mass Markets was created in the late 1800s and early 1900s when rail, water, and road transportation enabled local markets to integrate into national mass markets. This agglomeration of volume converged with innovations in manufacturing, marketing, and distribution—like assembly line production; mass media like newspapers, radio, and broadcast television; and national networks of distributors—to create massive economies of scale. In this context, the most important strategic imperative was to get big.

All this began to change a few decades ago. The change was largely driven by technology. Computers came into widespread use, the internet was developed, and both wireless networks and narrowcast technologies like cable TV were deployed. These innovations accelerated companies’ ability to reach out directly to customers and microsegment markets and to accumulate data so that they could micro target customers. Manufacturing innovations like small-batch production, robotics, process automation, and additive manufacturing broke down economies of scale, enabling companies to produce niche products and services targeted at individual segments and even at individual customers.

...

While getting big was the strategic imperative in the Age of Mass Markets, the strategic imperative of the Age of Diverse Markets is to adroitly manage complexity. Today, successful companies must be expert at choosing their customer, aligning their resources, and managing their organization to target and meet the needs of the most lucrative, defensible parts of the emerging market in their transforming industry."

Trechos retirados de “Choose Your Customer: How to Compete Against the Digital Giants and Thrive” de Jonathan S. Byrnes.

segunda-feira, junho 21, 2021

"the Age of Diverse Markets" (parte V)


Recordem este velho esquema deste blogue:

E o teor do texto que se segue:
"The pervasive fear felt by so many incumbent company managers is rooted in the false assumption that the currents of change, of which Amazon is emblematic, will completely disrupt industries and leave no place to hide or prosper.
In fact, hundreds of studies of industry profitability in the industrial organization economics literature show the opposite. The most profitable overall industry configuration is one with a relatively small number of competitors, with each having a different strategy and each being very profitable—some serving small customers, others serving large customers; some offering arm’s-length service, others building-integrated customer relationships; and so on. In fact, contrary to popular belief, the industry model of a big winner and a lot of losers consistently provides low overall profits to all industry participants.
Today, the winning strategy is “choose your customer."
...
The overwhelmingly important problem for all too many managers in incumbent firms is that they are stuck in the obsolete strategic paradigm of the fading Age of Mass Markets in which the primary goal is to maximize all revenues while minimizing all costs. In essence, they are choosing all possible customers, which is no choice at all."
Agora reparem neste trecho, parece retirado daqui do blogue:
“Continuing to act on the obsolete assumption that all revenues are good and all costs are bad leads all too many managers to dilute and waste resources trying to hold on to all of their business, rather than choosing their customers and focusing on building their high-profit, defensible business in their target strategic group. This is the single most important issue in business today, and most managers do not even see it.”

Trechos retirados de “Choose Your Customer: How to Compete Against the Digital Giants and Thrive” de Jonathan S. Byrnes.

terça-feira, junho 15, 2021

"the Age of Diverse Markets" (parte III)

Parte I e parte II.

Os trechos que se seguem são retirados de “Choose Your Customer: How to Compete Against the Digital Giants and Thrive” de Jonathan S. Byrnes e ilustram algo que escrevo aqui há muitos anos. Basta recordar a curva de Stobachoff:

"to determine which parts of its business were making or losing money. When they saw the results, they nearly fell off their chairs:

  • About 18 percent of their customers, which we call their Profit Peak accounts, accounted for about half of their revenues but produced over 130 percent of their profits.
  • About 30 percent of their customers, their large money-losing Profit Drains, accounted for about one-third of their revenues but drained off about 50 percent of the profits earned by the rest of the company
  • About half of the company’s customers were Profit Desert customers who accounted for about 20 percent of the revenues and produced less than 10 percent of the profits."
When Edison’s managers saw this, they immediately understood that their price war strategy was a response to the profit-draining customers’ demands, while they were essentially ignoring their critical high-profit customers.”[Moi ici: Demasiado comum. Recordo a espécie de esquema Ponzi]


 E pensa que só acontece aos outros? E como é na sua empresa? Ainda na passada quarta-feira ao telefone tive uma conversa surrealista, parecia um case-study acerca do que são custos afundados. A diferença é que numa empresa o que acontece com ela fica com ela, o mesmo já não se passa quando o decisor é um ministro.


    segunda-feira, junho 14, 2021

    "the Age of Diverse Markets" (parte II)

    Parte I.

    Na Age of Diverse Markets o monolitismo do mercado desfaz-se, e o uso de médias começa a ser contraproducente dada a variedade de clientes, ofertas, preços e processos.
    "In the past, managers needed only aggregate metrics, while today, they need to understand the relationship between revenue and cost for literally every product sold to every customer every time.
    ...
    The biggest problem in business today is that all too many managers are not embracing the Age of Diverse Markets success elements that will enable them to prosper. Instead, they are doubling down on tactical innovations and tuning up old practices from the Age of Mass Markets—usually with diminishing results."
    O meu velho exemplo da média do mercado ser laranja, mas ninguém comprar laranja. Metade compra amarelo e metade compra vermelho.

    Na  Age of Diverse Markets, e aqui voltamos ao ponto que está na base do nosso trabalho há muitos anos:
    "The key to success in the Age of Diverse Markets is choosing your customer. [Moi ici: Quem são os seus clientes-alvo?] This has three imperatives:
    • Choose: Define a defensible strategy that your company can dominate, choose the customers who fit, and say no to those who do not.
    • Align: Identify and build the capabilities that will enable your company to achieve high sustained profitability with your chosen customers in your target strategic group (that is, the set of firms pursuing the same strategy), and focus your resources to quickly excel in your strategic direction.
    • Manage: Develop your organization so your managers can seamlessly coordinate to identify and support your chosen customers, and to meet their diverse and rapidly evolving needs."
    Trechos retirados de “Choose Your Customer: How to Compete Against the Digital Giants and Thrive” de Jonathan S. Byrnes

    domingo, junho 13, 2021

    "the Age of Diverse Markets"

    Longe vão os tempos do: qualquer cor desde que seja preto.

    Ao longo dos anos tenho escrito sobre Mongo, ou o Estranhistão. A metáfora que uso para ilustrar o abandono do monolitismo do século XX e o advento da variedade e diversidade do século XXI.

    "Today, business is transitioning from one major era, the Age of Mass Markets, to another, which we call the Age of Diverse Markets. [Moi ici: Aquilo a que chamo de Mongo, ou o Estranhistão]
    ...
    The Age of Mass Markets, which extended through most of the prior century, was characterized by fast-growing homogeneous markets. [Moi ici: A visão monolítica que a Economia aplica à realidade para a poder matematizar. Depois, chega a modelos e a conclusões sem adesão à realidade e não percebe, e enterra a cabeça na areia]
    ...
    [Moi ici: In the Age of Mass Markets] These companies were characterized by massive economies of scale in nearly every business function (production, distribution, advertising, and so on), which ensured that as they increased their sales, their unit costs dropped, giving them ample profits to invest in getting more sales and in further reducing their costs by increasing the efficiency of their production and distribution systems. Both prices and distribution costs were relatively uniform, so reporting tools based on averages—like aggregate revenues, costs, and gross margins—were sufficient.
    The key management imperative was to get big fast. The rules of thumb were that all revenues were good and all costs were bad. [Moi ici: Como não recuar a 2012 e a "Como surgem os Golias e pistas para o aparecimento de Davids". Em Portugal, os mesmos da tríade ainda sonham com empresas grandes. Em Mongo, "Giants invariably descend into suckiness"] Companies segregated their functional departments to individually optimize their revenue-maximizing or cost-minimizing objectives, and they coordinated them at the top through periodic planning sessions and period-end financial reports.
    Today’s Age of Diverse Markets, which began its widespread acceleration around 2000, is completely different. Today, there are very few mass markets, while there are more and more diverse markets where product offerings, pricing, and service packages are uniquely configured, if not by individual customer, than at least by highly segmented target markets.
    Today, markets are heterogeneous and fragmenting down to the individual customer in many cases. Throughout our economy, pricing is becoming much more varied, both within market segments and even between one customer and the next. In parallel, the cost to serve each customer is becoming increasingly diverse, depending on the customer relationship, product-service mix, and other factors. This change has already overtaken the business-to-consumer (B2C) markets, and it is rapidly transforming the business-to-business (B2B) markets as well."
    "In the Age of Mass Markets, products were “king.” To a large extent, companies succeeded by selling the same products to as many customers as possible. In the Age of Diverse Markets, in contrast, customers are “king.” Companies succeed by microtargeting particular customers and tightly specified market segments and providing them with tailored packages of products and related services."
    Comecei a reler “Choose Your Customer: How to Compete Against the Digital Giants and Thrive” de Jonathan S. Byrnes. Primeiro, o título. Qual a primeira decisão estratégica? Escolher os clientes-alvo! Recuar ao Verão de 2008 e a Terry Hill e à sua frase "the most important orders are the ones to which a company says 'no'.". Julho de 2007, a primeira vez que usei o marcador "clientes-alvo" aqui no blogue. Apesar de já o fazer em textos anteriores. Segundo, Jonathan S. Byrnes. Um autor que aprecio há mais de 10 anos.

    quarta-feira, fevereiro 22, 2017

    O velho ditado

    Há um velho ditado que aprendi com uma boutique de vinhos australiana em 2006:
    "e que tal uma “boutique small winery”. Um gestor da "boutique" diz mesmo que é um negócio “high end fashion retailing”, em vez de inundar o mercado com produtos banais, e desesperar numa guerra de preços, atacar nichos específicos. É um prazer ver uma actividade ligada ao sector primário transpirar pensamento estratégico, demonstrar capacidade de distanciamento e de se situar no mercado."
    Ou seja:
    "Volume is vanity, profit is sanity
    Ao longo dos anos tenho chamado a atenção para a curva de Stobachoff que tanto atrai os nórdicos a este blogue. Aprendi com Byrne aquela frase:
    "in a typical company, 30 to 40% of revenues are actually unprofitable, while another fraction of revenues — often more like 20 to 30% — accounts for most of the organization’s profitability."
    E ainda a relação 20/80/30 de Kotler:
    "80% dos lucros de uma empresa são gerados pelos 20 clientes mais rentáveis.
    E os 30? O que querem dizer?
    Os 30 clientes menos rentáveis provocam um corte de metade dos lucros de uma empresa."

    Assim, como não sorrir com este artigo "HTC only wants to make high-end phones, should be worrying for Sony":
    "Sony doesn’t often get credit for for their strategic vision as they more often than not skate to where the puck is, with a delay, rather than to where the puck is going to be. With smartphones this was no different but with their mobile division in disarray, the company did something many pundits thought to be suicide – they exited the entry market and instead focused on high-end devices like the Xperia Z5, Xperia X, and now Xperia XZ. The results? A division that was once reporting over a billion dollars in losses is now recording profits.
    .
    Now mind you there is a lot Sony could be doing to better the situation for themselves but their initial vision was correct – to put aside the volume driven mentality that drove the PC business and many Android makers into the ground and instead focus on profitability."

    terça-feira, novembro 10, 2015

    Acerca da importância do foco (parte III)

    Parte I e parte II.
    "THE STRATEGIC PURPOSE OF SACRIFICEHmm, Sacrifice. Isn’t this just clear prioritization by any other name? The difference between Sacrifice and prioritization is that the latter allows secondary and tertiary targets. Sacrifice means not doing these secondary and tertiary things at all.
    .
    Sacrifice’s value, therefore, is not simply one of concentration of marketing forces externally; it also has an internal value similar to hardpruning a plant: all the energy, all the dynamism in the company becomes devoted to the primary goal.
    ...
    1. Sacrifice concentrates the internal and external expressions ofidentity by eliminating activities that might dilute it.
    2. Sacrifice allows the creation of strong points of difference by changing the organization’s mind-set from pursuing weak universal appeal to a more intense, narrower appeal (and thereby avoiding becoming the ‘‘mush in the middle’’).
    3. Sacrifice generates critical mass for the communication of that identity and those differences by stripping away other secondary marketing activity. This is central to maximizing the Challenger’s consumer presence, given its more limited marketing resources.
    .
    While the Brand Leader perceives its currency to be mass appeal and can afford the dilution of preference that creates because it is compensated for by the convenience of its ubiquity and distribution, Challengers need more extreme actions and gestures - they need to create a greater proportion of ‘‘committed’’ and ‘‘enthusiastic’’ users through real differentiation.
    .
    Challenger currency is therefore not means but extremes: top-box preference scores or nothing.
    ...
    For any brand, positioning is Sacrifice; for a Challenger, it is the path to growth. What it chooses not to do defines who and what it really is."
    Trechos retirados de "Eating the Big Fish" de Adam Morgan.

    segunda-feira, novembro 09, 2015

    Acerca da importância do foco (parte II)

    Parte I.
    .
    Entretanto em "Eating the Big Fish" de Adam Morgan encontro todo um capítulo dedicado à importância da renúncia para as PME, segundo uma vertente diferente:
    "In the world of clutter and information saturation that consumers are faced with, the greatest danger facing a brand is not rejection, but indifference.
    ...
    the solution to indifference for a Challenger lies in both a strong identity and, through this, a strong relationship with its consumer base. Inevitably, this means that success for the Challenger brand comes from considering very carefully what it is going to Sacrifice in order to create this relationship and identity. Indeed, the ability to sacrifice and concentrate one’s focus, voice, and actions more narrowly is one of the few advantages a Challenger has. Having to fight a war on two fronts weakens the ability to do either really well and Brand Leaders have to fight on many fronts at once.
    ...
    Challengers recognize, ... that in order to break through, their only currency with the consumer is going to be strong preference. If they achieve simply weak preference or parity preference, all the other attributes the market leader has on its side will swing the vote in its favor: ubiquity, social acceptability, salience, convenience. And to create that strong preference, we as Challengers accept that we will need to do things that reach out and bind certain groups of people very strongly to us. And we will also accept that, in order to create those stronger relationships, these same actions or behaviors may (and probably will) leave other groups cold.
    ...
    The Sacrifices a Challenger makes do not lie in incidentals to the business, such as minor line extensions, a research budget, or the assistant public relations manager. They are instead fundamentals: distribution, messages, audiences, even issues like promotional pricing, or our deliberate lack of it (T-box, unlike the rest of the ready-to-wear category, never offers seasonal discounts). The overriding objective is to have significant impact of the right kind on your core audience, to achieve critical mass for your voice.
    ...
    Although ubiquity in distribution is good for establishment brands like Coca-Cola and AT&T, it is dangerous for Challenger brands looking to create a stronger affinity with a more focused target, be they self-styled fashion rebels, surfing wannabes, or weekend mountain bikers.
    ...
    there is no escape: Strong brands are necessarily simple and single-minded in their communication, even if it means sacrificing what might seem to be important secondary messages.
    ...
    As a Challenger, we have to use our more limited resources (people, time, passion, energy, money) against the few things that will really make a difference, and this means being very clear on both who we are and what we are going to Sacrifice to promote that identity. Focus on the products, experiences, and marketing that will genuinely break through."
    Assim, concentração não só por causa do encaixe do mosaico estratégico (recordar Terry Hill) mas também para reforçar a mensagem de marketing, mas também para criar uma identidade forte.
    .
    Continua.

    sexta-feira, novembro 06, 2015

    Acerca da importância do foco (parte I)

    Quando comecei a trabalhar estratégia com PME chamava a atenção para a importância do foco, da concentração nos clientes-alvo.
    .
    Mostrava como a escolha de diferentes tipos de clientes-alvo implicava apostar em diferentes prioridades contraditórias entre si.

    Depois, conheci Terry Hill e Skinner e a sua plant-within-plant:

    Recordo de 2008:
    "the most important orders are the ones to which a company says 'no'."
    Recordo Jonathan Byrnes:
    "in a typical company, 30 to 40% of revenues are actually unprofitable, while another fraction of revenues — often more like 20 to 30% — accounts for most of the organization’s profitability."
    Recordo Kotler:
    "Philip Kotler no livro “Marketing para o século XXI” chama a atenção para a relação 20/80/30.
    Já ouviu falar dela?
    De certeza que já ouvi falar na relação 20/80.
    80% dos lucros de uma empresa são gerados pelos 20 clientes mais rentáveis.
    E os 30? O que querem dizer?
    Os 30 clientes menos rentáveis provocam um corte de metade dos lucros de uma empresa.
    Pense bem no significado, no impacte, desta relação… "
    Recordo as curvas de Stobachoff:
    Recordo a polarização dos mercados e o "Stuck-in-the-middle".
    .
    Tudo razões para defender que uma PME não pode ir a todas, tem de seleccionar os seus clientes-alvo e tem de se organizar para os servir. Servir bem um tipo de clientes implica não servir bem outro tipo de clientes.
    .
    Entretanto, encontrei mais uma razão para a necessidade de focalizar.
    .
    Continua.

    segunda-feira, dezembro 08, 2014

    Um exemplo de segmentação

    O texto mais antigo que conheço sobre a curva de Stobachoff é um artigo de Kaj Storbacka sobre um banco na Finlândia.
    .
    Um banco que ganhava dinheiro com metade dos clientes para perder muito com a outra metade. Trata-se de um fenómeno muito comum como aprendi com Skinner, Terry Hill, Kotler e Byrnes entre outros, um fenómeno que decorre das empresas não escolherem os seus clientes-alvo e terem a veleidade de ser tudo para todos e, terem a veleidade de serem uma espécie de Arca de Noé, e terem horror a rejeitarem clientes, a rejeitarem encomendas.
    .
    Por isso, saliento este exemplo "Barclays recusa clientes menos abastados"

    segunda-feira, novembro 17, 2014

    Fugir da comoditização

    Um excelente exemplo de fuga à comoditização com a subida na escala de valor:
    "Some professions, however, are already demonstrating ways to embrace failure. For example, there’s an uncharacteristic explosion of creativity among accountants. Yes, accountants: Groups like the Thriveal C.P.A. Network and the VeraSage Institute are leading that profession from its roots in near-total risk aversion to something approaching the opposite. Computing may have commoditized much of the industry’s everyday work, but some enterprising accountants are learning how to use some of their biggest assets — the trust of their clients and access to financial data — to provide deep insights into a company’s business. They’re identifying which activities are most profitable, which ones are wasteful and when the former become the latter. Accounting once was entirely backward-looking and, because no one would pay for an audit for fun, dependent on government regulation. It was a cost. Now real-time networked software can make it forward-looking and a source of profit. It’s worth remembering, though, that this process never ends: As soon as accountants discover a new sort of service to provide their customers, some software innovator will be seeking ways to automate it, which means those accountants will work to constantly come up with even newer ideas. The failure loop will continue to close."
    Este exemplo fascina-me porque, empresa atrás de empresa, vejo reveladoras curvas de Stobachoff e as previsões de Jonathan Byrnes e, acho esta abordagem tão necessária e útil. As empresas precisam de destrinçar o crescimento saudável do crescimento envenenado, precisam distinguir os clientes bons dos clientes maus e, perceber que um cliente honesto, que paga tudo como combinado e quando combinado, pode ser mau para o negócio.
    .
    Claro, os que defendem o passado em vez de conquistar o futuro, vão querer impor barreiras à entrada, vão fazer lobby junto dos poderes para se criar mais legislação que traga trabalho, vão pôr o complicómetro a funcionar e desviar-se do essencial: co-criar valor com os clientes.
    .
    Aposto que o Nuno anda por estes caminhos da co-criação
    .
    Trecho inicial retirado de "Welcome to the Failure Age"
    .
    Este texto "It’s All for Your Own Good", sobre o "nudging" indicado no FB pelo João Pereira da Silva também tem algo a ver com isto.

    sábado, novembro 01, 2014

    Também é preciso ganhar dinheiro

    Mais uma vez o aviso, conhece os seus clientes? Sabe se aquele cliente que lhe encomenda milhares de unidades todos os meses é realmente um bom cliente?
    "Businesses are always on the hunt for customer feedback.
    ...
    People got so caught up in trying to improve quality they sometimes forgot that a business has to make money, too. [Moi ici: Tão comum!!!]
    ...
    Let’s have employees monitor customer feedback and make improvements in response to it while also watching key financial indicators and taking actions to move them in the right direction. Every executive knows — or should know — that good business decisions require both kinds of input. If companies are going to ask front-line employees to make more decisions themselves, the front-liners will need to know how to keep customers happy and what it costs to do so.
    ...
    Front-line employees don’t need to become statisticians. The folks in finance can perform the analyses that show them which tradeoffs are worth making and why. But now the front-liners will be thinking like businesspeople, understanding from the data when they can afford to give the customer an extra benefit and when they can’t. Their decisions will be that much better, and the company won’t go broke trying to satisfy every customer’s wish, at any cost."
    Recentemente "encomendei" dois serviços sobre este tema, a um financeiro para fazer as contas e a um informático para automatizar as contas.
    .
    Como não recordar Jonathan Byrnes e "Islands of Profit in a Sea of Red Ink: Why 40 Percent of Your Business Is Unprofitable and How to Fix It"

    Trechos retirados de "Track Customer Experience, but Don’t Forget the Financials"

    quarta-feira, março 26, 2014

    "the false assumption that more sales equals more profits"

    É sempre bom encontrar um texto de Byrnes:
    "Strategic account management in the most forward-thinking companies is undergoing a transformation that is increasing sales effectiveness and company profitability by 33% or more.
    .
    The most effective strategic account managers are shifting their focus from maximizing sales and gross margins, to going directly after major net profit increases in key accounts – without the false assumption that more sales equals more profits. In fact, nowhere is this false assumption a bigger mistake than in major account management.
    ...
    What can a strategic account manager do?
    Sell profits, not revenues
    The most important factor in strategic account management is the vast difference between selling revenues and selling net profits. Most selling systems simply assume that these are equivalent, but nothing could be further from the truth. [Moi ici: Isto é sacrilégio para tanta gente]
    ...
    Good accounts, bad accounts.
    The key to sorting your good accounts from your bad accounts – and your good products from your bad products – is profit mapping.
    ...
    If, as with nearly all companies, 15% of your accounts are providing 150% of your profits, your most important objective is to secure and grow these Island of Profit accounts. Yet if they are providing only 30% of your revenues, in most companies they will be getting only 30%, or less, of your “love.”
    ...
    These high-profit key customers are your most important asset. In fact, they probably are not even getting as much attention as your large accounts that are unprofitable, because your big, low-profit customers are always pushing and complaining.
    .
    As a strategic account manager, you have three very important “profit levers” to turbocharge the profitability of your Islands of Profit strategic accounts: (1) profiling and account selection; (2) pricing and product portfolio; and (3) supply chain integration.
    Profiling and account selection...
    In most situations, the Islands of Profit customers have remarkably similar profiles, needs and views – and these are very different from the overall customer base, and even from the other major accounts. By aligning your company’s products, services, and positioning with your most profitable customer segment, you can directly drive strong profitable growth from the start.
    ...
    Pricing and product portfolio.
    Once you have identified your Islands of Profit customers, you can look at your own business’s best practice in pricing and constructing a product portfolio for these customers.
    Here, you can do a comparative analysis of what you are selling to the different market segments of your most profitable customers. Every sales rep is different, and every customer interaction is different. Yet very clear best practices emerge, and nearly always raise a revealing “aha moment.”
    ...
    Supply chain integration.
    For strategic accounts, supply chain integration is a prime sales and profitability weapon. I have explained this in my writings (for example, see Profit from Customer Operating Partnerships).
    .
    Supply chain integration gives you three critical benefits.
    .
    First, you reduce your key customer’s cost of operations, often by 40% or more. These savings stem from reduced inventories, duplication of services, and other factors.
    .
    Second, your own sales grow, often by 35% or more in your highest-penetrated accounts. This very fast, massive sales growth is driven by the huge customer cost savings, and by the operating level relationships that develop between your grass-roots operations staff working in the customer, and the customer’s counterpart operations managers.
    .
    Third, your own cost of operations drops, often by 30% or more. These savings occur because you now can control and stabilize your key customers’ order patterns, enabling you to reduce inventory, shipment frequency, and expedited movements. Importantly, this major saving enables you to keep your prices stable, and still strongly grow your profits.
    ...
    Yet, if you can’t identify your Islands of Profit customers, you should rightly fear simply responding positively to any large customer request for supply chain integration – especially since your Coral Reef customers (large and unprofitable) are most often the ones that are most aggressive in pushing for these advanced services with no intention of adequately paying for them.[Moi ici: A famosa pedofilia empresarial]
    .
    And if you devote your precious resources to supply chain integration with your Coral Reef customers, you are not only buying a cannon – you are walking into quicksand."

    Trechos retirados de "How to Turbocharge Your Strategic Account Management"

    sexta-feira, novembro 23, 2012

    Para acabar com o deixar dinheiro em cima da mesa - parte IIa

    E voltamos a Reed Holden e Mark Burton em "Pricing with Confidence" e ao problema de deixar dinheiro em cima da mesa.
    .
    A segunda regra que os autores propõem é "Perceber o valor que se oferece ao cliente".
    .
    Costumo escrever aqui no blogue que os empresários portugueses se subestimam em demasia e, por isso, deixam dinheiro em cima da mesa. Se calhar é outro erro que cometo ao generalizar... se calhar não são só os empresários portugueses.
    .
    Os autores comparam a negociação entre um cliente e um comercial a um jogo de poker.
    "“How do you win at poker?”
    The best poker players win by being good at bluffing. Every price negotiation game has an element of bluffing. Both customers and suppliers do it, but the customer usually has an advantage because his bluff—walking away—is more credible. It’s a bluff that few sales professionals want to risk. Customers know this and use it to their advantage. Salespeople respond with lower prices because they are afraid of the consequences—a lost customer—if they don’t. In short, they lack the confidence that their pricing strategy is sound. They lose sight of the important value they offer to the customer. Salespeople forget that this is all just a poker game. They take the safe route and offer a discount. The customers gleefully sweep the money off the table. They do it because they know how to bluff."
    A segunda regra que os autores propõem passa pelos comerciais perceberem qual a percepção de valor que emerge na vida do cliente ao integrar a oferta com os seus recursos. Dessa forma, a capacidade dos clientes fazerem bluff é eliminada.
    .
    Como é que as empresas definem o valor que os seus clientes vão percepcionar?
    .
    A maior parte, quando fala de valor fala de algo muito enevoado, pouco claro, em suma, um chavão. Sem perceber, sem definir claramente qual é o valor, é impossível fugir ao jogo do bluff comandado pelo cliente. Sem perceber qual é o valor, qualquer necessidade dos clientes transforma-se numa prioridade, quando tudo é prioritário... nada é prioritário e a confusão instala-se.

    Holden e Burton escrevem para o mundo do B2B:
    "Regardless of how customers talk about the subject, in a business-to-business context, dollars that fall to the customer’s bottom line when it uses your offering is the true measure of financial value. Businesses are profit-making entities. Their actions and who they purchase goods and services from are driven by a desire to improve profits. They accomplish this by purchasing from suppliers that excel at helping them meet their profit goals. The equation is simple: Decrease your customers’ total costs and/or increase their revenues and you increase their profits. ... If you lack the ability to connect what benefits your offering delivers to how it will improve profits for your customers, you are operating at a huge disadvantage. If you can’t articulate your value in dollars and cents, you won’t get paid for it."
    Assim, a chave para fugir ao bluff do cliente passa por perceber como é que a oferta da sua empresa cria valor financeiro para o cliente. Infelizmente muitas conversa começam pela pergunta "O que acha do nosso preço?"
    "The better questions center on their requirements, the benefits provided by your offerings, and how the two interrelate. The key is to understand your value to your customers and then use this to manage their willingness to pay. By showing that you understand your value and demonstrating that your prices are reasonable given that value, you change the discussion. It is no longer just about price but about value and price.
    Some of our clients are tempted to ask their customers if they are satisfied with your prices. This question also is a mistake. The truth is you don’t want customers to be totally satisfied with your prices. If a customer is satisfied, your prices are likely too low. A better scenario is when customers acknowledge that your prices are fair or reasonable. If you sell high-value products with lots of service and support, you might want customers to acknowledge that, yes, your prices are high, but on the whole you are worth it."
    Esta última frase faz-me lembrar as empresas com elevados "grau de satisfação dos clientes" durante anos a fio e que estão à beira da falência.
    .
    Continua.


    sexta-feira, novembro 09, 2012

    Para acabar com o deixar dinheiro em cima da mesa - parte Ib

    Continuado da Parte I.

    Ainda sobre a primeira regra, para acabar com o dinheiro deixado em cima da mesa das negociações, "Rule One: Replace the Discounting Habit with a Little Arrogance", retirada de "Pricing with confidence - 10 ways to stop leaving money on the table" de Reed Holden e Mark Burton, vamos encontrar um tema recorrente aqui no blogue:

    "One of the problems that leads to discounting is salespeople and managers who look for every opportunity to sell something. They don’t stop and ask whether any particular customer or order is good or bad for the business. This is one of the root causes that leads to excessive discounting: selling to customers who don’t and will never value the things you do as a firm. To make matters worse, these may be the customers who switch vendors, complain about everything, and extract all sorts of extra services that they don’t pay for. Why do we continue to serve them? Because we are trained to satisfy the customers, whatever it takes. Whether it’s smart—in other words, profitable—to continue to serve individual customers rarely enters the conversation."
    ...
    "The correct response is to take a step back. Within the global view of possible markets, identify which customers and markets you cannot serve at a profit. If some customers are marginally profitable, but others are significantly more profitable, is your company better off serving the former, or are you better off focusing resources on the more profitable opportunities? It’s a matter of defensive strategy.
    It’s simply better for you that unprofitable customers are served by your competitors. It’s one less burden for you and one more for them. It’s important to determine which doors you do or don’t want your salespeople knocking on. If you don’t identify these doors, salespeople will waste their time and sell to customers that don’t value your offerings."
    ...
    The reality is that serving a large percentage of customers represents a loss for the business. The challenge, of course, is for a company to distinguish between the customers it can serve at a profit and those it cannot."
    ...
    "Because they are desperate for business, most managers don’t want to fire customers. We don’t like to do it either. The goal, of course, is to convert unprofitable customers into profitable ones. Before making a unilateral decision, we recommend that you have a candid conversation with the customers. Tell them why the relationship is not sustainable in its present form and let them know you are prepared to end the relationship. Some percentage of those bottom customers (larger than you may think) will understand and offer to keep doing business with you on some new terms."
    Tantas e tantas vezes voltamos ao tema, ele é decisivo: quem são os clientes-alvo? Que procuram e valorizam?
    .
    Como é a curva de Stobachoff da sua empresa? Qual a  percentagem de clientes com os quais a sua empresa perde dinheiro? Não tem clientes que geram prejuízo? A sério? Kotler e Byrnes apontam para cerca de 40% a quantidade de empresas americanas com clientes que dão prejuízo.

    sexta-feira, novembro 02, 2012

    Alfaiates, uma profissão com futuro

    ""Somos uma espécie de alfaiates no mundo das cadeiras. Fazemos o fato à medida."
    Uma metáfora aqui usada ao longo dos anos:

    Ser alfaiate é uma profissão de futuro e com futuro...

    Espero estar enganado, espero que seja só uma questão de linguagem, a leitura do artigo não deixa de me fazer pensar ...
    .
    A par do fato à medida, e do prémio internacional, e do nicho do mobiliário para infantários e lares, também encontramos:
    "Fazemos o fato à medida. Isso obriga-nos a ter uma grande flexibilidade porque, ao mesmo tempo que temos produção em massa, temos de saber responder às exigências específicas do cliente que quiser ter cadeiras personalizadas"."
    O que será que isto quer dizer? Espero que não produzam no mesmo espaço, com os mesmos recursos, humanos e tecnológicos, para ambos os mercados. Espero que os comerciais sejam diferentes...
    .
    Se não for assim, a margem que se ganha de um lado... é consumida do outro ou  vice versa. Por isso é que Byrnes descobre os números que descobre, por isso é que a curva de Stobachoff é importante.
    .
    Trecho retirado de "Ela é a alfaiate das cadeiras"