BINGO!

Lidamos com mitos e mais mitos, e ainda mais mitos. Enganamo-nos uns aos outros deliberadamente ou não.

O chato, o muito chato, são aqueles poucos, de entre nós, que foram amaldiçoados com o castigo supremo... ter memória!

"The Social Impact
None of this is to say that the effects of technology and globalization hasn’t been real. While it’s fine to speak analytically about value shifting here and there, if a task that you spent years to learn to do well becomes devalued, you take it hard. Economists have also found evidence that disruptions in the job market have contributed to political polarization.
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The most obvious thing to do is retrain workers that have been displaced, but it turns out that’s not so simple. In Janesville, a book which chronicles a small town’s struggle to recover from the closing of a GM plant, author Amy Goldstein found that the workers that sought retraining actually did worse than those that didn’t.
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When someone loses their job, they don’t need training. [Moi ici: Recordar "The Predator State" e a caridadezinha ] They need another job and removing yourself from the job market to take training courses can have serious costs. Work relationships begin to decay and there is no guarantee that the new skills you learn will be in any more demand than the old ones you already had.
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In fact, Peter Capelli at the Wharton School argues that the entire notion of a skills gap in America is largely a myth. One reason that there is such a mismatch between the rhetoric about skills and the data is that the most effective training often comes on the job from an employer. [Moi ici: Outro tiro certeiro. Recordar "a formação mais importante que as empresas devem considerar é a formação interna"] It is augmenting skills, not replacing them that creates value.
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At the same time, increased complexity in the economy is making collaboration more important, so often the most important skills workers need to learn are soft skills, like writing, listening and being a better team player."

Trecho retirado de "Value Never Actually Disappears, It Just Shifts From One Place To Another"

Curiosidade do dia

Há dias li este artigo de Paul Krugman, "Jobs and Skills and Zombies", e não conseguia acreditar no que estava a acontecer, lia Krugman e concordava com ele. Tive de aguardar uns dias e reler, para concluir que efectivamente estamos de acordo:

"multiple careful studies have found no support for claims that inadequate worker skills explain high unemployment.
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But the belief that America suffers from a severe “skills gap” is one of those things that everyone important knows must be true, because everyone they know says it’s true. It’s a prime example of a zombie idea — an idea that should have been killed by evidence, but refuses to die.
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for example, that workers who know how to operate a sewing machine are seeing significant raises in wages, but I very much doubt that these are the skills people who make a lot of noise about the alleged gap have in mind."

Na onda do que James Galbraith escreveu em "The Predator State" e que referi, ao longo dos anos em:

• Vamos brincar à caridadezinha (Dezembro de 2008)
• Ainda acerca da formação profissional (Agosto de 2008)

Recordar Mateus 18: 23-35

"Não faças aos outros o que não queres que te façam a ti"

Qualificações vs instituções

Ontem, antes da minha caminhada do final da tarde, li este artigo, "Do topo à base, as empresas precisam de mais qualificações para garantirem o seu futuro", onde encontrei esta pérola:

"Tal como os países, as empresas produzem mais riqueza quanto maiores forem as qualificações de quem as compõe.
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A opinião é unânime entre os especialistas, que apontam o défice de qualificações como uma das debilidades da economia nacional."

Depois, durante a minha caminhada, li mais uns trechos de "Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty" de Daron Acemoglu e James Robinson, nomeadamente o capítulo 2, "Theories that don't work". Nesse capítulo, os autores explicam várias teorias que, segundo eles, não explicam a pobreza no mundo:

• não é por causa da geografia;
• não é por causa da presença ou ausência de recursos naturais;
• não é por causa da adopção ou não adopção de novas tecnologias;
• não é por causa da presença ou ausência endémica de animais ou cereais para alimentação;
• não é por causa de diferenças culturais;
• não é por causas de diferenças religiosas.

Depois destas hipóteses todas aparece mais uma, "The Ignorance Hypothesis":

"The final popular theory for why some nations are poor and some are rich is the ignorance hypothesis, which asserts that world inequality exists because we or our rulers do not know how to make poor countries rich.
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if ignorance were the problem, well-meaning leaders would quickly learn what types of policies increased their citizens’ incomes and welfare, and would gravitate toward those policies. [Moi ici: Atentar no discurso, na exortação de Vasco Cordeiro aos pescadores açorianos. Se se sabe, por que não acontece?]
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The ignorance hypothesis differs from the geography and culture hypotheses in that it comes readily with a suggestion about how to “solve” the problem of poverty: if ignorance got us here, enlightened and informed rulers and policymakers [Moi ici: Ou Patróes e empregados no caso das empresas] can get us out and we should be able to “engineer” prosperity around the world by providing the right advice and by convincing politicians of what is good economics. ... the main obstacle to the adoption of policies that would reduce market failures and encourage economic growth is not the ignorance of politicians but the incentives and constraints they face from the political and economic institutions in their societies."

Depois da caminhada, à noite, li este artigo "Where are Greece’s missing exports?", onde encontrei:

"Institutional weaknesses are mainly to blame for Greece’s dire trading performance, with exports around a third smaller than they should be, according to a new paper from staff at the European Commission.
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“Competitiveness depends crucially on a more comprehensive notion of the cost of doing business – which in turn depends on the rule of law, property rights, the ability to enforce contracts, flexible labour market arrangements, the available transport infrastructure and many other factors besides the recorded cost of capital and labour. Customs formalities, administrative procedures, and regulatory transparency are directly linked to the trading process.”"

À luz da hipótese de Acemoglu a explicação para a pobreza das nações reside nas instituições:

"Countries differ in their economic success because of their different institutions, the rules influencing how the economy works, and the incentives that motivate people.
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Inclusive economic institutions foster economic activity, productivity growth, and economic prosperity. Secure private property rights are central, since only those with such rights will be willing to invest and increase productivity.
A businessman who expects his output to be stolen, expropriated, or entirely taxed away will have little incentive to work, let alone any incentive to undertake investments and innovations. But such rights must exist for the majority of people in society.
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This book will show that while economic institutions are critical for determining whether a country is poor or prosperous, it is politics and political institutions that determine what economic institutions a country has."

 Estou a recordar "The Predator State"

O que fazer com estes líderes? (parte II)

O que dizer deste discurso?
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"Presidente da CIP "preocupado" com fim dos direitos especiais do Estado nas empresas"
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Aquele que devia ser o defensor número um da liberdade do mercado, do fim das interferências do Estado nas empresas... aparece com este discurso.
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Recordo Galbraith em "The Rise of the Predator State" (parte II), neste postal sublinhei:
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"In a world where the winners are all connected, it is not only the prey (who by and large carry little political weight) who lose out. It is everyone who has not licked the appropriate boots. Predatory regimes are, more or less exactly, like protection rackets: powerful and feared but neither loved nor respected. They cannot reward everyone, and therefore they do not enjoy a broad political base. In addition, they are intrinsically unstable, something that does not trouble the predators but makes life for ordinary business enterprise exceptionally trying.
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predators suck the capacity from government and deplete it of the ability to govern. In the short run, again, this looks like simple incompetence, but this is an illusion. Predators do not mind being thought incompetent: the accusation helps to obscure their actual agenda."
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Depois, recordo que há 12 mil milhões que vão ser disponibilizados aos bancos e que poderão ser utilizados para comprar empresas ou parcelas do Estado que vão ser privatizadas... há que preparar o terreno que facilite a aceitação dessa actuação.

Não faças aos outros o que não queres que te façam a ti.

Quando li este texto na Vida Económica "Microfil declarada insolvente por dívida de quatro milhões ao BES" não pude deixar de recordar este outro texto, um pouco mais antigo, Mateus 18, 23-35.
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Mas a carambola mental continuou e recordei este postal sobre as ideias de Veblen acerca da predação "The Rise of the Predator State (parte I)" e o livro de Veblen pode ser lido em pdf aqui "The Theory of the Leisure Class".

Deixem as empresas morrer, se querem criar a economia do futuro, deixem de apoiar as empresas do passado

Peres Metelo no DN:
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"Por causa das nossas debilidades de fundo, carregadas há muitos e maus anos: baixo investimento no capital humano conduz a baixa produtividade e incapacidade para a aumentar; logo, baixa competitividade externa e evolução negativa dos termos de troca conduzem ao esmagamento das margens de lucro das empresas exportadoras; logo, mantém-se baixo o nível de poupança, quer das empresas não financeiras quer das famílias; logo, aumenta todos os anos a necessidade de financiamento externo, com acumulação de défices gémeos (o orçamental e o da balança de transacções correntes), e um endividamento líquido externo que já atinge um ano completo de produção no País de bens e serviços finais - vulgo, 100% do PIB." (aqui)

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Aquele ponto de partida é que me faz cócegas... por que é que cerca de 100 licenciados abandonam o país por mês? Como já repeti várias vezes o raciocínio de Galbraith, como é que trabalhadores mais formados contribuem para o aumento da produtividade?

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O aumento da produtividade que precisamos como país:

• um aumento que seja um salto e não umas migalhas incrementais;
• um aumento que proporcione margens muito maiores às empresas; (lembram-se do gráfico de Frasquilho?)
• um aumento que proporcione melhores salários aos trabalhadores; (senão algo está mal, o fim último é a felicidade sustentada dos povos e é isso que o PIB não mede)
• um aumento da competitividade das empresas.

Um aumento da produtividade com estas características só pode ser da responsabilidade da gestão. Só que a palavra gestão está mal aplicada aqui, precisamos mais de insurgentes visionários que lideram equipas para um futuro desejado novo e diferente do actual e precisamos menos de gestores, de organizadores do status-quo medíocre em que vegetamos e sobrevivendo com uma capacidade competitiva cada vez mais erodida.

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Há dias escrevi este postal "Um revés", ontem, Hable e Hogan no seu livro "The Strategy and Tactics of Pricing", num capítulo dedicado à criação de valor, disseram-me:

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"Sometimes, when an offering has significant intangible value, such as brand strength, received value can exceed true economic value. That's frequently the case with many consumer products when deft advertising and merchandising invest a product with strong emotional values such as prestige, safety, hope, or reassurance. Perceptions rather than physical characteristics provide the differentiated value a product holds for the buyer. Packaged goods with more or less the same physical attributes as the competition nonetheless command price premiuns because their credible superiority claims create the perception of differentiated value,"

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É impossível que uma massa crítica de empresas dê o salto e crie um novo paradigma económico, e crie o mercado de trabalho para quem tem mais qualificações, e proporcione os aumentos referidos acima enquanto continuarmos a gastar recursos a defender as empresas do passado e não criarmos as condições para que a destruição criativa opere.

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E não há como fugir da realidade, a mudança só vai acontecer, só acontece quando pessoas concretas, empresários, fazem o seu caminho de Damasco particular e descobrem a luz... há um outro mundo, há outras estratégias, há outros modelos de negócio, para competir.

O Estado Predador

Quatro! Quatro linhas!!

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Não uma nem duas, quatro linhas de TGV!

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Eis o que acabo de ouvir na rádio... é o estado predador em todo o seu esplendor.

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É tão fácil perceber como é que de uma ideologia se chega naturalmente ao fascismo, quando as grandes empresas e o estado se misturam e assumem objectivos complementares.

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ADENDA: Peço desculpa, afinal são cinco linhas!!!

Como será por cá?

Impressionante desfilar de como se processa a arte de bem predar "What did taxpayers buy senior MPs?"

The Rise of the Predator State (parte III)

Na sequência deste artigo de opinião de Pedro Lomba "Karl Marx tinha razão e os partidos sabem-no", aconselha-se o seu autor a pesquisar a metáfora da predação, como elemento para a compreensão das relações económicas, tendo em conta as ideias the Thorstein Veblen, publicadas em 1899 no livro "Theory of the Leisure Class".
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Recordo The Rise of the Predator State (parte I) e The Rise of the Predator State (parte II). Neste último postal sublinhei:
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"In a world where the winners are all connected, it is not only the prey (who by and large carry little political weight) who lose out. It is everyone who has not licked the appropriate boots. Predatory regimes are, more or less exactly, like protection rackets: powerful and feared but neither loved nor respected. They cannot reward everyone, and therefore they do not enjoy a broad political base. In addition, they are intrinsically unstable, something that does not trouble the predators but makes life for ordinary business enterprise exceptionally trying.
...
predators suck the capacity from government and deplete it of the ability to govern. In the short run, again, this looks like simple incompetence, but this is an illusion. Predators do not mind being thought incompetent: the accusation helps to obscure their actual agenda."
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Aquele primeiro período da citação "In a world where the winners are all connected, it is not only the prey (who by and large carry little political weight) who lose out." veio-me logo à cabeça quando no Público li o trecho que se segue": "O CDS-PP desafiou ontem o Governo a apresentar uma solução para o futuro do Banco Privado Português (BPP) e propôs que seja criada uma comissão arbitral que apure "o que são depósitos ou não" naquele banco."
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E o último período da citação "Predators do not mind being thought incompetent: the accusation helps to obscure their actual agenda" ... a tinta da nova lei sobre o financiamento dos partidos ainda não secou e já pensam em alterações... pois.

Ainda acerca da formação profissional

Já por vários vezes aqui escrevi acerca da formação profissional brandida como arma política (aqui, aqui e aqui, por exemplo).
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Este meu pensamento está completamente deslocado da religião que pontifica no mainstream que nos governa. Assim, foi com surpresa que encontrei estas palavras no livro de Kames K. Galbraith "The Predator State - How Conservatives Abandoned the Free Market and Why Liberals Should Too":
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"Job training is a canonical example of the well-brought-up liberal's (atenção à conotação americana para o termo) urge to make markets work. The policy follows from an argument about the nature of unemployment and low wages, and as with neraly all similar exercices, the argument begins by assuming the existence of a market. In this case, the market is known as the "labor market," and it supposedly matches demand for labor, which comes from businesses, to the supply offered by individuals. If individuals lack the minimal skills that business requires, they cannot compete for jobs. Unemployment must result. The purpose of job training therefore is to move individuals into a position from which they can effectively compete for available employment.
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In this analysis every detail is correct: there are businesses that require labor, and there are individuals who would like jobs but do not qualify for them. It is true that a job-training program can help. Yet the sum of these details falls far short of the claim made for them as a whole. It does not follow that job-training programs reduce unemployment or poverty. It is not even clear that they foster the creation of a single additional job.
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The problem is that poverty and unemployment are not much influenced by the qualities and qualifications of the workforce. They depend, rather, on the state of demand for labor. They depend on whether firms want to hire all the workers who may be available and at the pay rates that firms are willing, or required, to offer, especially to the lowest paid.
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Firms in the happy position of strongly expanding markets and bright profit prospects can almost always find the workers they need, either pulling directly from the pool of the unemployed or poaching qualified workers from other firms (or nations). For such firm, the costs of rudimentary job training for unskilled and semiskilled positions are secondary (como se prova facilmente com o exemplo dos portugueses que emigram para a Alemanha ou Suiça); if workers with appropriate training are not readilly available, they can be trained in-house. Conversely, firms facing stagnant demand and bleak prospects do not add workers simply because trained candidates happen to be available.
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Job traing in most offices is extremely specific to that office: its systems, its bosses, its routines. Generic training programs, the only kind government can provide, cannot duplicate this function.
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if companies are not hiring, job training is irrelevant.
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if you really want to reduce unemployment and poverty, it is obvious from recent history that job training has nothing to do with it." (a não ser na cosmética dos número do desemprego, já que quem frequenta a formação não contribui para os números do desemprego).

The Rise of the Predator State (parte II)

Continuado daqui.
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Segundo Galbraith a predação é inimiga dos negócios honestos e independentes, negócios que apenas querem competir e vender pelos seus próprios meios e vantagens competitivas.
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"In a world where the winners are all connected, it is not only the prey (who by and large carry little political weight) who lose out. It is everyone who has not licked the appropriate boots. Predatory regimes are, more or less exactly, like protection rackets: powerful and feared but neither loved nor respected. They cannot reward everyone, and therefore they do not enjoy a broad political base. In addition, they are intrinsically unstable, something that does not trouble the predators but makes life for ordinary business enterprise exceptionally trying.
...
predators suck the capacity from government and deplete it of the ability to govern. In the short run, again, this looks like simple incompetence, but this is an illusion. Predators do not mind being thought incompetent: the accusation helps to obscure their actual agenda."

The Rise of the Predator State (parte I)

Chegou-me recentemente às mãos o livro "The Predator State - How Conservatives Abandoned the Free Market and Why Liberals Should Too" de James K. Galbraith.
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Decidi fazer uma leitura não sequencial dos capítulos do livro. Um capítulo que logo cativou a minha atenção foi o décimo "The Rise of the Predator State".
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O autor remete-nos para a metáfora da predação, como elemento para a compreensão das relações económicas, tendo em conta as ideias the Thorstein Veblen, publicadas em 1899 no livro "Theory of the Leisure Class".
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"Veblen's vision of an essentially stable order, yet dominated by a predatory and unproductive class, was plainly too subversive for the marketeers, yet it was also too cynical for the Marxists. And so it was effectively squeezed out of existence between them.
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my father saw an economic world dominated by large interlocking organizations; his achievement as an economist was to analyze that world.
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It was a world in which Veblenian predation was possible, but in which the predatory instinct might come under enduring organizational control. But as wr have seen, the project of using private organizations to tame personal power failed: the imperative of technological control over production processes was simply not strong enough, especially in an age of globalization, to keep the system in place. Power was again dispersed: to finance, to the tech firms, and to the CEOs.
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This dispersion of power led to the reconnection of power with particular persons, and this, in turn, to a result that would not have surprised Veblen: the reemergence of predation, predatory conduct, and pathologically predatory conduct as a central theme in business life. Once power passes back from organizations to individuals, what are they going to do with it? Organizations may have complex social and technical objectives. Individuals generally do not. As Veblen told, for the leisure class, accumulation is mainly a way of keeping score.
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But as power ebbed from the corporation in the late 1970s and 1980s and become vested, once again, in free-acting individuals of the type we have described, the basis for collaboration between comparatively progressive elemets within business and a broadely progressive state temded to disappear. Instead, business leadership saw the possibility of something far more satisfactory from their point of view: complete control of the apparatus of the state.
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those who saw the economic activities of the government not in ideological terms but merely as opportunities for private profit on a continental scale.
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This is the Predator State.
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Whereas in The New Industrial State the organization existed principally to master advanced technologies and complex manufacturing processes, in the Predator State the organization exists principally to master the state structure itself.
None of these enterprises has an interest in diminishing the size of the state, and this is what separates them from principled conservatives. For without the state and its economic interventions, they would not themselves exist and could not enjoy the market power that they have come to wield. Their reason for being, rather, is to make money off the state - so long as they control it. And this requires the marriage of an economic and a political organization, which is what, in every single case, we actually observe."