ele acha mesmo que o futuro do calçado português é a robotização?

Ando a ler um livro perigoso para muitos, "Uncharted: How to Navigate the Future" de Margaret Heffernan.

O livro desmonta todas as crenças no determinismo... seja ele histórico ou do ADN:

"the truth about complex systems is that trying to simplify them doesn’t guarantee that they become more effective; it risks making them less effective. They function best when they are robust, throwing off a vast array of insights and understanding whose value may be realized over time. That means they can look wasteful, producing more than what is needed. But when you don’t know what’s needed, you’re safer with more.

...

Robustness, not efficiency, is ... protection against the unpredictable. In a complex system like science, the fundamental robustness of the ecosystem is variety, [Moi ici: Como não recuar a 2007 e a Hamel e Valikangas] because it facilitates a rich range of insights and discoveries—like penicillin—whose value can emerge even when unplanned. The big danger in confusing a complex system (like science) for a complicated process (like loading bags on planes) is that, in striving for efficiency and predictability, the robustness of the system, its creativity and ability to withstand adversity, is killed off.

...

The thought that you’ve captured all the data is what leads to error. No single, efficient process, profile, or narrative will prove robust enough for an environment characterized by change.

...

The temptation to try to simplify complex systems is how you get them wrong; just like profiling, just like any kind of model, what gets left out or what changes can turn out to be vital. This is why intelligence organizations frequently use multiple teams to examine and analyze the same data in real time: because doing so can tell more than one story. That variety might look inefficient but it imparts adaptability and responsiveness, essential qualities when you know you can’t predict what the future holds."

Pesquisei o link de Hamel e Valikangas em busca do seu conteúdo poético, mas também encontrei:

"No jornal Público de ontem, encontrámos um texto assinado pelo Gestor do Programa Operacional Sociedade do Conhecimento, do que retirámos alguns trechos:

"Portugal tem pela frente a batalha da mudança estrutural."

"Tudo tem que ser diferente. A aposta nos factores dinâmicos de competitividade, numa lógica territorialmente equilibrada e com opções estratégicas claramente assumidas, é um contributo central para a correcção das graves assimetrias sociais e regionais. Falta por isso em Portugal um verdadeiro "choque operacional" capaz de produzir efeitos sistémicos ao nível do funcionamento das organizações empresariais." 

Um Costa e Silva em 2007...

Engraçado porque comecei a escrever este texto motivado por um texto que li no JdN de ontem, "A matriz tecnologias/sectores no processo de reindustrialização", de Luís Todo Bom.

"No caso dos sectores tradicionais, em particular, no têxtil e no calçado, esta nova imersão tecnológica deve ocorrer, com prudência, por passos, em particular no processo de robotização, para que não se verifique, no curto prazo, uma redução substancial do emprego nestes sectores que são, ainda, de mão-de-obra intensiva.

Estranhei que o meu amigo António Costa Silva, engenheiro como eu, com sensibilidade para as novas tecnologias, não tenha proposto esta matriz, no seu estudo prospectivo, no capítulo da reindustrialização.

Espero que as organizações da sociedade civil, em particular as associações empresariais horizontais – AIP e AEP, e o Fórum para a Competitividade –, em articulação com as empresas líderes de cada sector, possam aceitar este desafio, iniciando-se, assim, um processo de reindustrialização que permita aumentar significativamente a competitividade e o valor acrescentado dos nossos produtos industriais."  

Meu Deus... como se pode ser tão top-down? Que conhecimento é que um lesboeta de gabinete tem da realidade das empresas de têxtil e calçado? E aquele "processo de robotização" ... ele acha mesmo que o futuro do calçado português é a robotização?

Ecossistemas, transitoriedade e a morte do regime (parte II)

Parte I.

Isto que se segue deve ser blasfémia para os crentes no Grande Planeador, no Grande Geometra:

"The actors in the system are continuously driving adaptation of the system. By the time we decide what to do, it is quite possible, if not likely, that the system has changed in a way that renders our decision obsolete by the time it is acted upon. And by the time we have figured that out, the system will have changed again. Because of that adaptability, our design principle must be to balance the desire for perfection with the drive for improvement.
.
In a machine model, the pursuit of perfection makes sense. It is sensible to analyze the machine in every detail in order to understand how to maximize its performance and, once that optimum performance level has been achieved, then defend against any attempt to change the way the machine works—because it is performing as well as it possibly can. At this point, any failure in the machine’s performance is likely to be interpreted as pilot error or not giving the machine enough input or time. This is what philosophers call a justificationist stance. There is a perfect answer out there to be sought, and when that perfect answer is found, the search is over. The task then turns from searching for the perfect answer to protecting the perfect answer against any attempt to alter it. It feels noble to aim for, fight for, and protect perfection.
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However, in an adaptive system, there is no perfect destination; there is no end to the journey. The actors in it keep adapting to how it works. In nature, this happens reflexively, as with a tree that turns to the sunlight due to the force of nature, and by growing taller obscures the sunlight for those in its increasing shadow. In the economy, adaptation “happens reflectively. People take in the available inputs and make choices, and those choices influence the choices and behaviors of the other humans in the system.
...
So, although the pursuit of perfection may seem like a noble goal, in a complex adaptive system it is delusional and dangerous. In a cruel paradox, seeking perfection does not enhance the probability of achieving said perfection. In a complex adaptive system, it is not possible to know in advance the organized, sequential steps toward perfection. Guesses can be made. Better and worse vectors can be reasonably chosen. But perfection is an unrealistic direct goal, with the problematic downside of creating a paradise for gamers. As justificationists staunchly defend a system they perceive to be perfect, gamers are only given more time and space to enrich themselves at the system’s long-term expense."

Trechos retirados de "When More Is Not Better" de Roger Martin 

O top-down é uma doença

Quinta-feira à noite enquanto conduzia ouvia este artigo, "O palavrão que vai trazer o futuro às empresas já" e não consegui chegar ao fim horrorizado com o grau de visão top-down tão ao estilo de o Grande Planeador.

Primeiro, o benchmarking com a Alemanha. Portugal não é a Alemanha! O que funciona na Alemanha provavelmente não será adequado para a realidade portuguesa.

Segundo, as empresas não devem mergulhar na Indústria 4.0 só porque está na moda ou há dinheiro público para torrar. As empresas têm ambições, as empresas têm desafios, as empresas têm problemas e constrangimentos e, a Indústria 4.0 pode ajudar quando surgir como uma resposta a desafios/problemas concretos não como algo de intrinsecamente bom independentemente das empresas e da sua orientação estratégica.

A melhoria não começa porque alguém resolve planear uma melhoria, esqueçam o velho PDCA (Plan-Do-Check-Act). A melhoria começam quando se compara o real com o desejado e se resolve mudar (CAPD) (Check-Act-Plan-Do). Recordo Scott Berkun:

"We didn't need a Department of Innovation to achieve the greatest technological achievement in human history: putting a man on the moon. We did create NASA, but its goal was not the vague and distracting mandate to "promote innovation", but to solve a specific set of problems, problems so hard that they demanded a huge amount of innovation."

Ou "For Successful Social Innovation, Start With The Problem, Not The Solution":

1. "Start with the problem, not the solution. If you start with a solution, it may not actually solve the problem.
2. Identify the “binding constraint” that is causing the problem. Be careful of coming up with a solution that doesn’t actually remove that constraint.
3. Work with the user. We think we know what is best, but then we get it wrong. Listen to them and co-create a solution."

Comprem um cão!

Há dias critiquei quem, sem noção da realidade, montava esta extraordinária mistificação:

"É bom que António Costa sublinhe a importância da educação e da ciência, uma feliz recuperação das políticas de Mariano Gago que, ao contrário do que a direita neoliberal apregoava, foram decisivas para que a agricultura, a têxtil ou o calçado sejam o que são hoje."

O economista César das Neves escreveu uma vez sobre aqueles que pedem ao ministro da Economia de turno, que diga aos empresários o que devem fazer, qual a Estratégia que devem seguir. Julgo não errar quando recordo que terá argumentado:

- Se o ministro da Economia soubesse, não dizia a ninguém, despedia-se e ia enriquecer pondo em prática e em proveito próprio esse conhecimento privilegiado.

Neste texto, "Two Very Different Stories About Amazon", encontro este finale de meter medo aos crentes no Grande Arquitecto, no Grande Planeador, no Grande Geometra, no Cybersyn, no Papá-Estado, essa entidade pedo-mafiosa:

"Investing is about making probabilistic decisions with imperfect information about an unknowable future. How we think about that future, and whether our assumptions, extrapolations and projections are remotely accurate determines our investment success or failure."

Malta que vive de direitos adquiridos tem dificuldade em engolir esta dose de incerteza irremediável.

Comprem um cão!

À atenção dos comentadores económicos de bancada

Um texto tão bom mas tão bom!!!

"Obvious...
We respond to Obvious problems by picking the appropriate Best Practicse. We have looked at all possible game and have figured out the best possible way. They are called Best, because there is always exactly one best response.
...
Complicated...
In complicated problems the relationship between cause and effect is predictable, but (very) hard to predict. Complicated problems are the domain of expert, who are better able to predict what is likely going to happen. Which is exactly what top chess players do. They need to predict what the likely moves of their opponents are going to be. Experts can simultaneously consider more possible options, but also reduce it to a smaller set of scenarios that require more analysis.
.
So the strategy becomes Sense – Analyse – Respond. And because it is impossible figure out if a move is the best move (except check-mate obviously) there are no best practices in the complicated domain.
...
Complex.
Complex problems are completely different again. What sets them apart is that the relationship between cause & effect is only obvious in hindsight. The gaming metaphor for complexity is poker. Unlike chess, which is a game about predicting, poker is game about learning. Learning what cards your opponents have and how they compare to yours. And the high level strategy for chess doesn’t work for poker.
...
Again, taking the poker example that probe can be in the form of betting. If you make a bet you force opponents to respond to it, by folding, calling or raising. This can give you information about their hand. But other probes can be calling out opponents, sensing can be just looking at their demeanours for example.
.
So the most important thing about Complexity is that there is no way to learn (and thus solving the problem) without doing. Just thinking about it isn’t going to solve it. In Complex problems our practices are always evolving based on what we learn. In poker, even if we would play a game with the exact players with the exact same cards would turn out differently, because we learned things not just about the game, but certainly about our opponents.
...
ChaosChaos happens when there is no relationship between cause and effect or they change very quickly. In this case there is no point in probing because any learning does not help us get better.
.
The gaming analogy here is children playing. Anyone who has ever played with kids know that the rules are continuously changing. And there is no point in trying to learn the rules before starting to play. You have to get in and play with them (Act), while making sure are having fun (Sense) and change accordingly if not (Respond).
.
But most often we end up in Chaos because of some crisis. When that happens we need to very quickly stabilise the situation and get back out of Chaos. This happens all the time in business, where we are frequently relying on hero leaders and task forces to get us out of trouble.
...
But the most important learning is that a whole lot of our circumstances are complex. And thus inherently unpredictable. And no amount of thinking is going to solve that."

Pensem nos comentadores económicos de bancada prontos para dar indicações aos empresários de agora, de Mongo, com as boas-práticas do século XX.

Pensem nos comentadores económicos de bancada crentes num governo todo poderoso com um Cybersyn poderoso capaz de tudo prever.

Trechos retirados de "Understanding Complexity"

Sair da frente e não estorvar

Por um lado, lido ao final do dia de ontem:

"existem nos 28 países da União Europeia dois grupos distintos: a) os que optaram por pequenos ou nulos deficits orçamentais, por dívidas públicas inferiores a 60% do PIB, e por oferecerem às suas empresas condições favoráveis de competitividade, nomeadamente com uma legislação laboral flexível, com impostos baixos, e com apoios às despesas de investigação e inovação. Estes países alcançaram, por regra, taxas elevadas de crescimento.
...
b) os países que optaram por grandes deficits orçamentais e elevadas dívidas públicas, ignorando, em boa medida, os factores de competitividade das empresas. Registaram, por regra, taxas de crescimento reduzidas ou mesmo nulas."

Por outro lado, o que ouvi na caminhada matinal:

"Managers at every level in organizations also populate a range, from rank amateurs to reflective artisans. The former, when they go looking for the new insights that will take their companies’ plans or performance to the next level, tend to seize on shiny objects. They chase trends. They look at game-changing work by others — breakthroughs that in hindsight seem inevitable — and just as they look at great photographs, they assume they were the result of fast reflexes and the luck of being in the right place at the right time.
.
More deliberate leaders believe great opportunities must be made, and work at building the layers of creative insight from the back
...
spending most of his energy on setting the stage for his organization to recognize a good idea when it surfaces. Instead of declaring a particular innovation he wants to pursue, he constantly poses key, cornerstone questions. [Moi ici: Como não recordar o tweet recorrente do meu amigo @icyView "obsessão socialista: picking winners and losers"] Two of his favorites are: How can we delight consumers when they buy our products? How can they be more delighted when using them? Everything else builds forward from that.
...
they are framing the background conditions that will allow creative thinking to flourish and be heard — in large part by tamping down their own impulses to be hard-charging, full of answers, and quick to intervene.[Moi ici: Como não recordar Nassim Taleb e os fragilistas ingénuos] Then they attend to the next layer, encouraging questions from themselves and others that will break down outdated assumptions and open up new realms of problem-solving. Having composed those steady-state layers deliberately, they can then wait — impatiently perhaps, but with the confidence that some fleeting, highly valuable insight will materialize. Most important, when that compelling element does cross their line of sight, they will see it for what it is: a flash of brilliance that deserves to be captured, and that will justify all the background work that gave it a proper setting."[Moi ici: Como não recordar a ganância com que os governos portugueses saltam para o saque impostal a tudo o que parece estar a ter sucesso, secando a possibilidade de capitalização tão necessária à subida na escala de valor]

Como não recordar Bloomberg e a mesa:

"You don't get to be in charge, really. You can help set the table, and then get out of the way and let the village/city function the best you can."

Primeiros trechos retirados de "É urgente uma política que promova o crescimento económico"
.
Segundos trechos retirados de "What Great Leaders Can Learn from Great Photographers"

Cuidado com as fantasias do Excel

Há os políticos que escrevem cenários para uma década mas que não duram 6 meses.
.
Há os comentadores que sonham com políticos cheios de certezas e cheios de conhecimento privilegiado que indicam o caminho único para o futuro
.
Depois, há os que como este anónimo engenheiro da província têm medo dos Grandes Planeadores, os Grandes Geometras, e preferem a humildade do fuçar, a alternativa do concreto, o reconhecimento do anything goes, o MacGyver versus Sandy. Economia não rima com ciência newtoniana, é tudo transitório

Por tudo isto, gostei muito de "When Strategy Becomes Fantasy":

"Ironically, when managers think they have all the answers, strategy can turn into fantasy.
.
Many organisations have an obsession with certainty, a must-know attitude to strategic initiatives.
...
Companies, therefore, often end up dedicating more energy towards maintaining the illusion of pursuing a strategic aspiration than actually trying to make a strategic aspiration real.
...
As a strategic aspiration moves from an idea to the active pursuit of that idea, a feedback loop starts to form. This feedback loop generates data about the feasibility and worthiness of the aspiration. Feedback is also produced about the organisation’s delivery capabilities. People in leadership roles can be receptive to this data or they can manipulate, normalise and post-rationalise the data.
...
Inevitably, the inherent uncertainty in a strategic initiative means that true understanding of the underlying business problem is going to emerge as the project progresses.
.
But from my observations, the unearthing of this uncertainty threatens fragile ego-identities. The more fragile the egos in positions of power, the more fertile the soil for a shared fantasy to take hold, i.e the more defended and narcissistically oriented the people in leadership roles, the more vulnerable the company is to fantasy usurping a reality based pursuit of a strategic aspiration.[Moi ici: Acabo de me lembrar de Weick e da genial estória do oficial húngaro nos Alpes que salvou os seus colegas porque tinha um mapa ... dos Pirinéus. Outro exemplo do fuçar, do começar pela acção.]

...
A shared fantasy’s best ally is the belief that no one has time to think. [Moi ici: Estão a ver onde isto nos leva? Indicadores para quê? Reunir para quê?] It is almost a dead giveaway that a group is entrapped in a shared fantasy if they are running from meeting to meeting, fire fighting, exhausted and mentally unavailable.
...
Reflection brings awareness to one’s situation, which for some companies can be very painful. As Ronald Heiftz says, “There is no such thing as a broken system. The system is working for someone.” Bringing greater awareness into an organisation participating in a shared fantasy means going against the system that is “working for someone.”
...
Without maintaining time for reflection, I believe the strategy realisation process will likely succumb to the grips of fantasy and ultimately fail. Worse, the path to failure will likely be one of significant suffering."

O artigo é muito mais rico e extenso e merece uma ou duas leituras integrais, para começar.

À atenção dos crentes no Grande Planeador

"I realized that without a deep understanding of human psychology, without the acceptance that we are all crazy, irrational, impulsive, emotionally driven animals, all the raw intelligence and mathematical logic in the world is little help in the fraught, shifting interplay of two people negotiating.
.
Yes, perhaps we are the only animal that haggles—a monkey does not exchange a portion of his banana for another ’s nuts—but no matter how we dress up our negotiations in mathematical theories, we are always an animal, always acting and reacting first and foremost from our deeply held but mostly invisible and inchoate fears, needs, perceptions, and desires.
.
That’s not how these folks at Harvard learned it, though. Their theories and techniques all had to do with intellectual power, logic, authoritative acronyms like BATNA and ZOPA, rational notions of value, and a moral concept of what was fair and what was not.
.
And built on top of this false edifice of rationality was, of course, process. They had a script to follow, a predetermined sequence of actions, offers, and counteroffers designed in a specific order to bring about a particular outcome. It was as if they were dealing with a robot, that if you did a, b, c, and d in a certain fixed order, you would get x. But in the real world negotiation is far too unpredictable and complex for that. You may have to do a then d, and then maybe q."

Trecho retirado de "Never Split the Difference Negotiating As If Your Life Depended On It" de Chris Voss, Tahl Raz

Vendedores de banha da cobra

Uma mistura de "os macacos não voam" com crença no poder divinatório dos governos (o Grande Planeador, o Grande Geometra) em "Industry clusters: The modern-day snake oil":

"A recent study provides one more argument against government officials who tout “industry clusters” as the Holy Grail of regional growth and innovation.
.
The formula for creating these clusters is always the same: Pick a hot industry, build a technology park next to a research university, provide incentives for businesses to relocate, add some venture capital and then watch the magic happen. But, as I have noted before, the magic never happens.
...
 the key drivers of innovation in Norway are the communication channels that local entrepreneurs maintain to the outside world and their open-mindedness toward foreign cultures, change and new ideas. Companies that are “regionally minded” — that maintain ties only with players within the same cluster — are four times less likely to innovate than the globally connected. The study found that regional and national clusters are “irrelevant for innovation.”"

O fundamental é haver gente com coragem para empreender:

"rather than obsess over clusters, we need to start obsessing over people. We need to remove the obstacles to entre­pre­neur­ship — such as knowledge of how to start companies, fear of failure, lack of mentors and networks, government regulations and financing. And we need to repair our university research commercialization system so that research breakthroughs translate into invention. That’s the correct formula for nurturing regional growth." 

 Da próxima vez que ouvir um autarca e/ou um ministro a prometer magia a partir destes clusters top-down, lembre-se deste texto:

Shit Happens!

Ainda a propósito da subida, e existência, de um salário mínimo, li num comentário ao texto "A subida do salário mínimo" a seguinte expressão:

"essa noção de “limpeza” faz lembrar a eugenia, não faz sentido nenhum, mais vale chamar-lhe: barreira à entrada a trabalhadores e micro-empresários , proteccionismo das grandes empresas"

Aquela palavra, eugenia, tem andado na minha cabeça desde então. Esta manhã, numa zona industrial, enquanto fazia tempo caminhando - e via mais um cão de caça abandonado - recuperei uma frase de Valikangas:

"Life is the most resilient thing on the planet. I has survived meteor showers, seismic upheavals, and radical climate shifts. And yet it does not plan, it does not forecast, and, except when manifested in human beings, it possesses no foresight. So what is the essential thing that life teaches us about resilience?
Just this: Variety matters. Genetic variety, within and across species, is nature's insurance policy against the unexpected. A high degree of biological diversity ensures that no matter what particular future unfolds, there will be at least some organisms that are well-suited to the new circumstances."

Já repararam que com o cataclismo que dizimou os dinossauros foram os mamíferos que triunfaram? Não estavam os dinossauros mais bem preparados para o mundo que existia?
.
Sim mas...
.
Shit Happens!
.
E quando algo de imprevisto acontece... de nada serve ser campeão da exploitation quando o que se quer é capacidade de exploration.
.
Já repararam que o modelo seguido pelas empresas mais ineficientes do sector do calçado, quando o que estava na moda era vender minutos, foi o modelo que emergiu e triunfou quando a produção nacional chocou contra a globalização na produção e contra os centros comerciais na distribuição?
.
É impressão minha ou há uma dose de arrogância divina nesta capacidade de decidir, como Grande Planeador, quem tem direito a viver e quem tem de ser condenado?

Versão Beta (parte II)

Parte I.
.
Acho muito interessante esta vida própria que os ex-centros comerciais tomam, numa espécie de versão beta, após o falhanço do propósito inicial:

"Igrejas, escolas, faculdades e centros médicos. Os muitos centros comerciais abandonados nos Estados Unidos da América estão a ganhar uma vida nova, com as respetivas infraestruturas a serem aproveitadas para servir outras funcionalidades. Contam-se, ao todo, mais de 200 shoppings que estão a sofrer facelifts e a mostrar que, afinal, servem para mais do que uma tarde bem passada nas compras."

Há aqui qualquer coisa de evolução ao estilo da biologia. Falha uma tentativa, experimenta-se outra. E as alternativas não se definem por decreto, vão-se definindo espontaneamente e de forma não centralizada.

Trecho retirado de "EUA: Há shoppings transformados em igrejas, centros médicos e faculdades"

Treta e mais treta!

Apesar de não concordar com a ideia de que a seguir a uma falência, a austeridade deve ser evitada, li com interesse o que se escreve aqui "Welcome to the Hunger Games, Brought to You by Mainstream Economics".
.
Lentamente, muito lentamente, demasiado lentamente, lá vão surgindo brechas no pensamento único que defende que a culpa da situação actual na zona euro decorre dos "baixos"salários alemães.
.
Continuo a crer que o abaixamento de salários para tornar mais competitivos os sectores exportadores é conversa da treta. Contudo, continuo a crer que pode fazer a diferença entre mais ou menos desemprego nos sectores não-transaccionáveis.
.
Algo que sempre achei e continuo a classificar como absurdo é a ideia de que as economias da Europa do Sul competem de igual para igual com a economia alemã, mais treta da grande.

"The surge in imports created deficits on the trade balances of the Southern European economies, but these imbalances had nothing to with rising relative unit labor costs or “excessive” wage growth in the periphery."

Mesmo que os salários na Europa do Sul não tivesse subido um cêntimo, durante a primeira década do século XXI, mesmo assim, muita da indústria exportadora da Europa do Sul teria o mesmo destino, a falência às mãos da concorrência com a China. Interessante como no texto não há nem uma palavra sobre o impacte da China na competitividade das indústrias da Europa do Sul.

"First, Germany’s superior export performance has nothing to do with labor cost competitiveness. Demand for Germany’s exports has not been sensitive to changes in the cost of labor, as we show and as other studies (including ones by IMF, World Bank and ECB economists) confirm. German firms do not compete on “costs” but on factors other than price: things like product design, quality, high-tech content, and reliability."

E, por isso, é que a China não teve um impacte tão grande na Europa do Norte.
.
Há algumas passagens que me fazem duvidar da honestidade intelectual das pessoas:

"To illustrate, the ECB sent a letter to the Spanish government in August 2011 asking for wage cuts and the creation of “mini-jobs” to address the issue of youth unemployment in exchange for buying Spanish government bonds in the secondary market. These “mini-jobs” would pay salaries below the Spanish minimum wage. How to square this with the aim to turn Spain into a more competitive economy? I don’t know, unless one wants Spain to directly compete with China."

Qual a percentagem do PIB espanhol que está associado a sectores não-transaccionáveis?
.
Ou socialismo adepto do Grande Planeador:

"Europe needs a hand-on industrial policy with government investment in innovations like renewable energy systems, public transport and education and health. Countries like Greece in the periphery need help in the task of industrial restructuring and upgrading. Resources should be going from countries like Germany to them instead of the other way around."

Quem é que sabe que indústrias é que vão ter futuro?
A velha ideia, desmascarada tão bem por Spender, (recordar a série "Shift happens!") de que um negócio não está repleto de incerteza, de que não depende do contexto e da idiossincrasia de quem investe, de que basta escolher o negócio e obter os recursos. Treta!

Aprender com Darwin (parte III)

Parte I e parte II.
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Outro exemplo da vantagem da aprendizagem, do bottom-up, da humildade da tentativa e erro:

"Este foi o primeiro núcleo da Refood, a associação criada em 2011 por Hunter Halder, o norte-americano a viver em Portugal há 20 anos e que um dia se perguntou porque é que havia gente com fome e restaurantes a deitar fora comida, e decidiu fazer alguma coisa em relação a isso....“Comecei a estudar a zona e encontrei 285 potenciais doadores”, conta. “Pensei ‘como vou fazer isto, de bicicleta?’ Não vou. [Moi ici: Começar de pequeno, fugir dos grandes planos e projectos mirabolantes] Então comecei a cortar, a reduzir o tamanho da área, mas ainda não era possível e cortei mais, até que fiquei com sete quarteirões e 45 fontes de alimentos. Vi as horas de fecho, dividi em dois turnos, e disse ‘é possível’”. [Moi ici: Pragmatismo, pés no chão, realismo, ver o filme todo]
.Só depois começou a contactar os cafés e restaurantes. Dos 45, 30 acabaram por dizer que sim. ??Primeiro falei com o Carlos, da pastelaria em frente a minha casa, e perguntei ‘olha lá, ao fim do dia tens coisas que sobram, que vão para o lixo?’, ele disse que tinha muito pouco, sopa, pão, alguns bolos, mas nunca sobras do almoço. E eu disse ‘se passar aqui ao fim do dia, dás-me o que sobra?’, ele disse que sim mas que era pouco.” Conquistada a primeira porta, seguiu para as outras. ...Entretanto, o núcleo inicial do Refood (o nome foi uma ideia do filho de Hunter, Christopher Halder, co-fundador) começou a crescer. Ao fim de seis meses havia 30 voluntários a percorrer os sete quarteirões, e o projecto já começava a chamar a atenção. ...No computador de Hunter podemos assistir ao que, espera o fundador, será o futuro da Refood: as bolinhas vão-se multiplicando, assinalando o aparecimento de novos núcleos, também já noutros pontos do país. “Há várias equipas no terreno a preparar os núcleos, mas é um processo que demora uns nove meses, para identificar todos os potenciais doadores, os potenciais beneficiários, trabalhando com os agentes sociais que já estão no terreno, evitando que haja duplicações, e procurando um lugar para a sede do núcleo.”"

A beleza da iniciativa privada descrita em "A ideia mais simples, afinal, era possível"
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BTW, reconfortante, perceber que ainda há organizações em que "voluntário" é mesmo voluntário e não mais um eufemismo.

É preciso aprender com Darwin (parte II)

Parte I.
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Em vez dos planos grandes, a humildade do experimentador:

• "Embrace Your Ignorance"
• "A Testable Idea Is Better than a Good Idea"

"the successful innovators I observed spent less time on identifying and developing good ideas and more time testing their hypotheses. In fact, these teams and groups made the testable business hypothesis the center of their innovation effort."

É preciso aprender com Darwin

Por que é que em Mongo as PME, ainda que com menos recursos que as empresas grandes, têm tudo para serem as líderes?
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Porque as empresas grandes pensam em grande, porque as organizações grandes e com muitos recursos gostam de planos grandes. Elaboram planos enormes, muito detalhados e ficam escravas desses planos, apesar da realidade evoluir a uma velocidade tremenda.
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Este é mais um exemplo desta mentalidade "Newest U.S. Stealth Fighter ‘10 Years Behind’ Older Jets"

"“Because all of the subsystems depend on each other, requirements aren’t allowed to change after the design is ‘finalized.’ It’s not a big deal, unless it takes 20 years to field the jet… then it’s a problem.”
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The end result is that when the F-35 finally becomes operational after its myriad technical problems, cost overruns, and massive delays, in some ways it will be less capable than current fighters in the Pentagon’s inventory."

Depois disto apetece dizer, os inimigos da América não precisam de fazer nada, os americanos fazem por eles o trabalho. Como é possível pessoas racionais, suportadas pelos consultores mais capazes, aceitarem este tipo de procedimento... fechar umas especificações e não ocorrer que 20 anos depois essas especificações estariam mais do que ultrapassadas.
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Portanto, quando pensar nas dificuldades que a sua PME tem pela frente, lembre-se que as empresas grandes dão estes bónus muito generosos, está na sua natureza.
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É preciso aprender com Darwin, e dar lugar à tentativa e erro, e trabalhar com planos mais pequenos dedicados a tratar um módulo de cada vez e, aprender com o feedback da realidade.

• Para os adeptos do Grande Planeador...
• Ainda há quem acredite no Grande Geómetra, no Grande Planeador
• E a "Via Negativa"? (parte I)
• O Grande Planeador
• 
  

Shift happens! (parte VIII)

Parte I, parte II, parte III, parte IV, parte V, parte VI e parte VII.

"A new economics of experimentation is transforming innovation investment opportunities worldwide. Simple, fast, and frugal experiments inspire creativity and capability in a way that better analytics and planning can't. In networked industries and global markets, experimentation has become as much an asset class as a core competence."

Isto, enquanto muitos continuam, cristalizados no que aprenderam e fazia furor quando tinham vinte anos, a pugnar pelo estado-grande-planeador, estado-grande-geometra, estado-grande-geometra, estado-grande-estratega.
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Trecho retirado de "The Innovator's Hypothesis" de Michael Schrage.

Shift happens! (parte VII)

Parte I, parte II, parte III, parte IV, parte V e parte VI.
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Decididamente, o livro "Business Strategy - Managing Uncertainty, Opportunity, and Enterprise" de  J.-C. Spender é muito bom!!!

"A BM [business model] is not a rigorous or coherent theory of the firm for it must frame and engage uncertainties if it is to lead to the possibility of adding value.
...
Thus a BM is never determined by outside circumstance, only by the strategic work of its construction. Nor is it detachable from its context; to the contrary it is an ever-evolving pattern of shaped interaction between the human beings who share and comprise the context. [Moi ici: Onde é que o Estado-Planeador tem em conta esta interacção idiossincrática?] It is typically incomprehensible to those who have not inhabited its context, time, and history.
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Nor is it fully expressible. It is organic, tacit, and vitalized, a dynamic form of knowing that is forever a “work in progress” as it responds to the strategist’s unfolding experience of applying the BM in its shifting context. But, equally, it is not organic in the strict biological sense of having a form of vitality that is independent of the human elements that, interacting through the BM, bring it to life. Its only vitality is that of the human beings involved, their practice of projecting their imagination into the context as intentional value-adding practice.
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The uncertainties in the socio-economy open up an economic space for the firm’s value-adding processes. Another way to put this is that firms exist only when their markets (shorthand for “the broader socio-economy”) “fail” to be fully determined because, perhaps, full information is not fully available to all economic actors. [Moi ici: Onde é que o Estado-Planeador tem em conta estas incertezas?] Real markets are not fully prescriptive, and they cannot determine the nature of the firm. There are other “causes” or determinants. Typically the firm has features and aspects imprinted on it by the imagination of its creators."

Shift happens! (parte V)

Parte I, parte II, parte III e parte IV.

"As economists probe deeper into profit they conclude that, in the long run, given perfect markets, all economic profits get competed away, so profits only arise in the short/medium term and/or in imperfect markets. In which case the profit reflects a return grounded in some market inefficiency or monopoly that might arise through government action, information asymmetries, or innovation.
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pure profit could only arise from engaging uncertainty with imaginative practice, leading to what some call the “uncertainty theory of profit.” [Moi ici: Comparar este parágrafo com a essência na base do texto do Público referido na Parte I desta série]
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Perfect markets that have equilibrated allow no uncertainty—or profit. Innovations engage and´resolve previous uncertainties—in which event innovations generate pure profit.
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The “uncertainty theory of profit” is pretty vacuous if the relevant uncertainty cannot be defined. Strategizing in pursuit of profit therefore begins with analyzing the relevant uncertainties and goes on to analyzing engaging them, thereby going beyond merely asserting, as Knight does, uncertainty’s central place in profit-making. Profit arises from the creative ways strategists engage selected uncertainties and manage the resulting practice.
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uncertainties arise only from the different ways in which we humans know. Neither firms nor situations are uncertain, the term is a reflection of how people feel about what they know." [Moi ici: Comparar este parágrafo com a essência na base do texto do Público referido na Parte I desta série e com a frase feita de que o governo deve definir uma estratégia para o país. Recordar os marcadores "Grande Planeador" e "Grande Geometra"]

Há dias o amigo Paulo Peres, no Twitter, escreveu, citando Max De Pree:

"A primeira responsabilidade de um líder é definir a realidade. A última é dizer obrigado." 

Depois, concordamos que a frase ficaria melhor com:

"A primeira responsabilidade de um líder é definir uma realidade. A última é dizer obrigado."

Precisamente por esta última citação: "Neither firms nor situations are uncertain, the term is a reflection of how people feel about what they know"
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Trechos retirados de "Business Strategy - Managing Uncertainty, Opportunity, and Enterprise" de  J.-C. Spender.

Exemplo de liberalismo associativo e antifragilidade (parte II)

Não há uma resposta única, não há o CAMINHO, a ESTRATÉGIA, há uma panóplia de alternativas, todas válidas, função de passados, função de experiências, função de idiossincrasias, função de ...

"There's no right answer. Not everyone should run a national painting franchise business. The key insight is to feel the pain that an organizational choice leads to and fix that instead of merely chasing demand and embracing each opportunity (no matter how juicy) as it comes along.
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The key things to focus on, I think, are:
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Cash flow
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Demand enhancement
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Increasing the ability to keep your promises by investing in a pipeline of talent
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And most of all, reminding yourself why you're doing this in the first place."

Recordar "Exemplo de liberalismo associativo e antifragilidade"
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Trecho retirado de "Organizing for growth"

"the proper way to model the behavior of rational agents, interacting in more or less efficient markets"

"As Michael Lewis reported gleefully in The Big Short, there were investors who made hundreds of millions of dollars betting on the upcoming disaster [a crise de 2008]. But those people were not economists. For the case of the mainstream economists, it was actually true that “no one could have known.” If you were the sort of person who could have known— or, even worse, who did know—then by definition you were not a mainstream economist. Therefore, you were “no one” in the eyes of those who were the guardians of professional identity.
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To analyze the world in this way requires, in effect, the redefinition of human experience into a special language. That language must have a vocabulary limited to those concepts that can be dealt with inside the model. To accept these restrictions is to be an economist. Any refusal to shed the larger perspective—a stubborn insistence on bringing a broader set of facts or a different range of theory to bear—identifies one as “not an economist.” In this way, the economists need only talk to one another. Enclosed carefully in their monastery, they can speak their code, establish their status rankings and hierarchies, and persuade themselves and one another of their intellectual and professional merit. A community and a line of argument constructed in such a manner are unlikely to be well prepared for an event like the Great Financial Crisis.
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The café society of the academic economist is not about taking on the problems of the larger world.
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Within their charmed circle, there was little debate over dangers, risks, challenges, and the appropriate policies associated with such developments in the modern world as globalization, financialization, inequality, or the rise of China. History and law played as small a role as geophysics and political geography, which is to say almost no role at all. It was, rather, a chummy conversation over the proper way to model the behavior of rational agents, interacting in more or less efficient markets. And if you didn’t think that question was the central one, well, you weren’t really an economist, were you?...
The beauty in question was the “vision of capitalism as a perfect or nearly perfect system.” ... Do biologists, for example, spend their time pondering the “beauty” of a “vision” of the living world as a “perfect system”? Do geologists worry about whether the beauty of rock layers is or is not perfect? The very mind-set is mystical."

Trechos retirados de "The End of Normal" de James K. Galbraith