"Factory workers that source to Shein typically get paid between Rmb7,000 ($982) and Rmb12,000 a month, depending on how many clothes they finish."
"Until a few years ago, Chinese factories supplied the world with Sharpie retractable pens and Oster blenders.No more.Consumer giant Newell Brands now makes those products, and more, at its own plants in the U.S. and Mexico. Many of its other products are made in factories in Vietnam, Indonesia and Thailand.Chris Peterson, Newell's chief executive, said the company's shift reduces its dependence on China at a time when both the Democratic and Republican parties "are getting more protectionist in terms of trade policy."Tariffs are becoming an entrenched tool tying together geopolitics and trade, and they are playing a bigger role in long-term manufacturing and sourcing decisions. Nowhere are they hitting harder than in China, where importers and exporters are navigating an increasingly complicated regime of levies on goods ranging from semiconductors to mattresses....Retail-industry trade groups and some executives warn some items can't be produced anywhere else in the world and that escalating tariffs will simply raise consumer prices and fuel inflation. Analysts at Goldman Sachs estimate that every percentage-point increase in the overall U.S. tariff rate would increase core consumer prices by just over 0.1%."The problem is the best place to make shoes is China," said Ronnie Robinson, chief supply chain officer at Designer Brands, parent company of footwear retailer DSW.Robinson said for every dollar the government adds in tariffs, consumers pay an extra $2 to $4 at the checkout. "The reality is that you and 1 are paying for the tariffs as part of the ticket price when you go into the store and buy," he said.Robinson said Designer Brands sources about 70% of its footwear from China, down from 90% several years ago. He said the company aims to reduce its reliance further to about 50%, but China will remain the company's largest single source of shoes.Peterson said just 15% of Newell's goods rely on products made in China today, down from more than 30% several years ago. He expects that by the end of next year the share will fall below 10%."
E fiquei a pensar em certas desculpas que se dão.
Por exemplo, no JN do passado dia 19 de Agosto, "Concorrência chinesa ameaça indústria nacional". Senti-me a recuar 20 anos atrás:
"As indústrias do têxtil e do calçado atravessam um mau momento. Nos primeiros seis meses do ano houve um aumento das insolvências, com estes dois setores a destacarem-se pela negativa. Taxas de juro em alta, inflação, dificuldade de adquirir matérias-primas e a concorrência que classificam como "desleal" das empresas chinesas estão entre as causas apontadas pelos empresários para o mau momento. Mas, pela primeira vez, algumas das empresas que trabalham mais para o mercado nacional do que para exportação estão a resistir melhor à crise."
So weird!
Números sobre o calçado e o ITV:
"“O têxtil até cresceu em número de clientes, o problema é que eles fazem encomendas mais pequenas”, refere Jorge Machado, presidente da Associação Têxtil e Vestuário de Portugal e da Euratex - Confederação Têxtil Europeia."
"Xi Jinping seeks "high quality" rather than "high speed" growth, [Moi ici: Hmmm, turismo] he told the Chinese Communist Party's Third Plenum, held last week to decide the country's economic policy over the next five years....Mr. Xi seeks to apply this approach to technologically important and advanced sectors as part of his high-quality-growth mantra. The problem is that there is no escaping the iron laws of economics. The massive assistance that the government provided to Chinese firms on solar led to a predictable oversupply of panels domestically and in global markets. Even as global demand fell, Chinese companies ramped up production of panels to remain in business, and this was possible only due to even more subsidies worth billions of dollars. China did achieve its objective of dominating the global solar-panel industry. But applying this state-led approach to an ever-expanding list of advanced and green sectors will only worsen the problems of overcapacity, indebtedness and inefficiency [Moi ici: Hmmm, rings a bell?] that Mr. Xi is seeking to alleviate....If Mr. Xi really wanted to supercharge growth in productivity, wages and household income, he could do it through the systematic transfer of economic access and opportunity away from state-owned firms and nominated national champions toward the much more efficient and innovative private sector. But this would foster a powerful independent business class and undermine Beijing's greater goal of further centralizing power and economic activity under his command.Finally, there is a broader problem that weighs on Mr. Xi's ambition. He openly criticizes predecessors for ideological laxness and impurity and for leaving China vulnerable to domestic and external threats. He insists that letting individuals and firms choose their paths will lead to national distraction and decay."
Trechos retirados do WSJ de 25.07 passado em "China Can't Evade the Iron Laws of Economics"
Do que eu gosto no texto que se segue é a postura tão pouco portuguesa de não usar paninhos quentes e olhar o touro bem de frente.
Nem Costa, nem Montenegro, nem mesmo Rui Rocha têm coragem para dizer a verdade.
"Japanese carmakers are alarmed by the rapid development of Chinese electric vehicles and risk becoming "followers" if they do not innovate more quickly, the head of Sony-Honda's joint venture has warned.Yasuhide Mizuno said Japan's companies needed to change their conservative corporate culture and called for a breakthrough in manufacturing to keep up with Chinese rivals, which within a few years have become some of the world's leading vehicle exporters."Chinese competitors are very strong, and I'm very scared of their implementation and execution speed," saidMizuno, chief executive of Sony Honda Mobility, at the company's headquarters in Tokyo. "Japanese carmakers are a bit nervous or sensitive before launching a car. We need to change this kind of behaviour, otherwise China will be first and we will always be followers," added Mizuno, who led Honda's China operations until 2020....Mizuno added that Japanese carmakers should not be complacent after the US quadrupled tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles to 100 per cent, in effect shutting out groups such as BYD and Nio from the market."
Trechos retirados de "Japanese carmakers 'very scared' by China's rapid EV development"
Entretanto, ontem de manhã, mão amiga tinha-me enviado um link para "Chinas Autobauer sind bereits innovativer als viele deutsche Konkurrenten" que defende que as empresas chinesas de carros eléctricos já são mais inovadoras do que as suas congéneres alemãs. Recordar esta "Curiosidade do dia".
"When China launched its one-child policy more than four decades ago, it sped up an evolution toward smaller family sizes that would have happened more gradually.The policy supercharged the country's workforce: By caring for fewer children, young people could be more productive and put aside more money. For years, just as China was opening its economy, the share of working-age Chinese grew faster than the parts of the population that didn't work. That was a big factor in China's economic miracle.There was a price and China is now paying it. Limiting births then means fewer workers now, and fewer women to give birth.A United Nations forecast published on Thursday shows how quickly China is aging, a demographic crunch that the U.N. predicts will cut China's population by more than half by the end of the century."
Trechos retirados de "China Pays Price for Its One-Child Policy"
"In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the U.S. and the global economy experienced a "China shock," a boom in imports of cheap Chinese made goods that helped keep inflation low but at the cost of local manufacturing jobs. [Moi ici: Lembram-se dos experts a dizerem que por cá era por causa do euro? Recordo, O choque chinês num país de moeda forte (parte VI), It's not the euro, stupid! (parte IV) e Acerca da desvalorização interna] A sequel might be in the making as Beijing doubles down on exports to revive the country's growth. Its factories are churning out more cars, machinery and consumer electronics than its domestic economy can absorb. Propped up by cheap, state-directed loans, Chinese companies are glutting foreign markets with products they can't sell at home.
Some economists see this China shock pushing inflation down even more than the first. China's economy is now slowing, whereas, in the previous era, it was booming. As a result, the disinflationary effect of cheap Chinese-manufactured goods won't be offset by Chinese demand for iron ore, coal and other commodities.
...
There are some countervailing forces. The U.S., Europe and Japan don't want a rerun of the early 2000s, when cheap Chinese goods put many of their factories out of business. So they have extended billions of dollars in support to industries deemed strategic, and imposed or threatened to impose tariffs on Chinese imports. Aging populations and persistent labor shortages in the developed world could further offset some disinflationary pressure China exerts this time. "It won't be the same China shock," said David Autor, a professor of economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and one of the authors of a 2016 paper that described the original China shock.
Even so, "the concerns are more fundamental" now, Autor said, because China is competing with advanced economies in cars, computer chips and complex machinery-higher-value industries that are viewed as more central to technological leadership.
...
In 2016, Autor and other economists estimated that the U.S. lost more than two million jobs between 1999 and 2011 as a result of Chinese imports, as makers of furniture, toys and clothes buckled under the competition and workers in hollowed-out communities struggled to find new roles. A sequel of sorts appears to be under way."
A ser verdade, o impacte será sentido sobretudo pelos fabricantes de produtos como máquinas e automóveis.
Trechos retirados do WSJ de 4 de Março passado em "New China Export Boom Cuts Two Ways".
Na capa do WSJ de ontem, "The World's Factory Floor Struggles to Attract Workers":
"The workplace features floor-to-ceiling windows and a cafe serving matcha tea, as well as free voga and dance classes. Everv month, workers gather at team-building sessions to drink beer, drive go-karts and go bowling.
This isn't Google. It's a garment factory in Vietnam.
Asia, the world's factory floor and the source of much of the stuff Americans buy, is running into a big problem: Its young people, by and large, don't want to work in factories.[Moi ici: A minha primeira reacção é pensar que isto é um sinal positivo, um sinal do mecanismo dos Flying Geese a funcionar]
That's why the garment factory is trying to make its manufacturing floor more enticing, and why alarm bells are ringing at Western companies that rely on the region's inexpensive labor to churn out affordable consumer goods.
The twilight of ultra cheap Asian factory labor is emerging as the latest test of the globalized manufacturing model, which over the past three decades has delivered a vast array of inexpensively produced goods to consumers around the world.
...
"There's nowhere left on the planet that's going to be able to give you what you want," said Paul Norriss, the
British co-founder of the Vietnam garment factory, UnAvailable, based in Ho Chi Minh City. "People are going to have to change their consumer habits, and so are brands.""
Um extenso artigo e com vários pontos de vista:
"Chipmakers are rebuilding the US semicondutor industry with $231 billion in new investments spurred by the enactment of the landmark CHIPS and Science Act a year ago.But even as Biden officials celebrate the anniversary of that legislation this week, there are mounting concerns about whether enough skilled workers will be there to run these factories once they are online.Labor shortages have already affected the construction of one major project in Phoenix. Meanwhile, a possible national shortfall could also complicate efforts in the year ahead byIntel (INTC) in central Ohio, Micron (MU) in upstate New York, as well as other new projects from Texas to Utah.The issue could prove a headwind for America's efforts to reverse a decades-long decline in semicondutor manufacturing and also complicate a key tenet of Biden's case for reelection."
Há um ano escrevi aqui "Qual o resultado final?"
Qual o resultado final do balanço de forças entre a procura tradicional das empresas portuguesas (sector transaccionável) e a procura na Ásia para satisfazer os mercados que as empresas portuguesas já servem ou podem vir a servir.
Depois, em Setembro de 2022 escrevi "Como eu gostava de saber" (parte I e parte II)
Na sequência desse tema desenvolvi uma série de postais sobre o tema "Tudo vai depender do tal jogo de forças" (parte I, parte II, parte III, parte IV e parte V).
Já em Julho passado fui obrigado a escrever "Inversão de ciclo", perante a evolução dos números das exportações.
Entretanto, ontem no FT encontro "China's factories bear brunt of the economic slowdown":
"From slowing global demand to rising geopolitical tensions and a tentative post-Covid recovery, China's manufacturers are tackling some of the strongest headwinds in years.
...
Factory activity, one of the main pillars of growth during the pandemic, has slowed for four consecutive months to July 31, according to official statistics.
...
Feng Tai Footwear exemplifies the difficulties faced by the low-technology manufacturers on which China's economic success has been built. Before the pandemic it sold some 5mn pairs of shoes a year to clients such as Walmart and Target. This year it will do well to sell 3mn. Orders for the second half of this year are down at least a third compared with last year.
"Our sector is in misery," said chief executive Eddie Lam, who runs more than 10 manufacturing plants in China and employs more than 3,000 workers. "Orders often get cancelled halfway. We are basically at a standstill," he added. The country's monthly export delivery value of goods made with leather, fur or feathers as well as footwear has fallen more than a third from 2019, hitting nearly Rmb17bn ($2.4bn) in May this year.
...
Some clients have asked if the company can set up factories outside China, but Feng Tai has no plans yet.
"The US knows very well it cannot risk decoupling from China," Lam said. "I just don't see the advantage of moving production to south-east Asia with higher supply chain costs and additional investments required.
...
"We have to consider [China] 'plus one' or even more," said Ho, managing director of Tien Sung Group, of global tensions and supply chain disruptions. "We can't put all our eggs in one basket."[Moi ici: Aqui recordo o banhista gordo]"
BTW, este gráfico faz-me lembrar o esquema dos Flying Geese:
Vamos ver se o governo chinês resiste à tentação de, também ele, usar a receita portuguesa: proteger o passado e hipotecar o futuro. Porque como se lê no artigo, é desejo do Presidente Xi Jinping optar por um crescimento "de alta qualidade" que favorece as indústrias de tecnologia em detrimento dos vastos centros de fabrico que produzem bens de consumo básicos.
Jorge Marrão no Think Tank desta semana recordava que quando mataram o rei D. Carlos, o rei Eduardo VII mandou chamar o embaixador português em Londres e perguntou: mas que raio de país é este em que matam o rei e a primeira decisão é demitir um ministério. Jorge Marrão remata usando este episódio como um exemplo da actuação prtuguesa tipo: evitar ir ao fundo da questão.
Lembrei-me disto ontem durante a caminhada matinal ao ler uma série de artigos sobre a evolução do contexto: Estados Unidos e China/Alemanha.
O FT de quinta e sexta trazia uma página inteira dedicada ao que está a acontecer nos Estados Unidos na sequência da I.R.S..
O FT de ontem trazia na capa e em mais duas páginas o grito de alerta do governo alemão acerca da necessidade da economia fazer o de-risking da China. Mesmo tema no NYT.
O mundo a mudar, o contexto a mudar e ... por cá, comportamos-nos como um protectorado, como dependentes a viver na casa de adultos. Os adultos lidam com o mundo, os dependentes lidam com a sua vida sob os ditames ditados por outros.
Com estas mudanças profundas em curso devia haver foco nas oportunidades e ameaças, devia haver proactividade.
Originalmente a parte II metia Seth Godin e Porter, mas vamos ter de fazer uma alteração.
No passado dia 5 o WSJ publicou um artigo intitulado "Productivity Drop Blurs Economic Picture" de onde sublinho:
"You would think from May's blowout jobs report the economy was booming.
Here's the puzzle: Other recent data suggest it is in recession.
The dichotomy emerges from the divergent behavior of employment and output, two key indicators of economic activity.
...
The economy has gone through periods where output has expanded faster than employment, but seldom the other way around,
...
What explains these dissonant signals is productivity, or output per hour worked: It is cratering. That raises questions about whether the much-hyped technology adoption during the pandemic and, more recently, artificial intelligence are making a difference.
...
Labor productivity fell 2.1% in the first quarter from the fourth at an annual rate, and was down 0.8% in the first quarter from a vear earlier, the Labor Department said Thursday. That is the fifth-straight quarter of negative vear-over-year productivity growth-the longest such run since records began in 1948.
...
Usually, employment plummets during recessions because as factories, offices and restaurants produce less, they need fewer workers. That clearly isn’t happening.
...
One reason could be labor hoarding. [Moi ici: LOL. Acho esta explicação tão inverosímil] After struggling to hire and train workers during the pandemic-induced labor crunch, employers are now balking at letting them go, even as sales slip, given the labor market's unusual tightness.
...
It's "not that technology got worse in the last year, but that businesses were selling less stuff and they're nervous about their ability to attract employees, so they're holding on to their employees,"
...
A more imminent concern is that when workers produce more, companies can raise wages without increasing prices. When productivity falls, it is harder to keep inflation in check."
Ontem durante caminhada matinal li este artigo e tweetei:
Ui! Os americanos não sabem porque é que a sua produtividade está a baixar! Os académicos avançam com explicações bizarras. Para mim é tão simples que também devo estar errado e não tem nada a ver com “hoarding workers”. Para mim é o efeito oposto ao da receita irlandesa.
— Carlos P da Cruz 🇺🇦🚜🇳🇱🇬🇪 (@ccz1) June 6, 2023
Qual é a receita que proponho para o aumento agregado da baixa produtividade portuguesa? Aplicar a receita irlandesa e seduzir empresas de elevado valor acrescentado a estabelecerem-se em Portugal (ver Parte I por exemplo).
Ora o que andam os americanos a fazer? O Financial Times de ontem dá uma ajuda, Gideon Rachman escreveu uma crónica do tempo que passa com o título "How America is reshaping the world economy". Antes de irmos à crónica pensemos por um momento nos fanáticos do Excel quando chegam ao comando das empresas. O que costumam fazer?
Cortar! Despedir e subcontratar!
Quanto mais a empresa subcontrata mais a sua produtividade cresce.
Agora voltemos a Gideon:
"An unheralded revolution has taken place in America's approach to international economics. As the new thinking emerges, it is reshaping the global economy and the western alliance.
...
The US intends to use a new strategic industrial policy to simultaneously revitalise the American middle-class and US democracy, while combating climate change and establishing a lasting technological lead over China.
...
Many of America's allies fear that the bit that slipped off the table was the interests of foreigners. They worry, in particular, that subsidies worth hundreds of billions of dollars to American industry and clean technology, set out in the Inflation Reduction Act, will come at the expense of producers and workers in Europe and Asia."
Volto agora ao tema do artigo no WSJ, o abaixamento da produtividade. A minha tese é que na base desta evolução estará o regresso aos Estados Unidos de produção anteriormente fabricada na Ásia. Produtos de valor acrescentado mais baixo, mas protegidos do mercado do preço pelo mesmo fenómeno que salvou o calçado português, mas protegidos do mercado do preço pelo medo de uma China que pode invadir Taiwan, mas protegidos do mercado do preço pelos "hundreds of billions of dollars" que subsidiam produções que de outra forma seriam incapazes de competir. Esta produção vem diluir a produtividade anteriormente atingida pela economia americana.
Continua.
Recentemente escrevi, O choque chinês, não o euro. Agora, imaginem o impacte da reversão deste choque... por isso, tenho escrito esta série de postais - Tudo vai depender do tal jogo de forças (parte V).
Para reflexão:
"China’s days of being the Western world’s go-to manufacturing hub may be coming to an end. This has serious ramifications for China, and the world. Depending on where you focus, this is a good thing, or a bad thing. In fact, it’s probably both.
...
For those with contacts in China, stories of laid off young people struggling to afford their apartments, taking on two jobs in gig economies, or becoming escorts in karaoke bars is becoming commonplace. This is not the country that the CCP once held together with promise of opportunity and quick climbs up the Chinese social ladder. This is starting to turn into America of the late 1990s-2000s, reeling for China’s take over of American tooling and steel, textiles and furniture manufacturing. Many people here know what that feels like.
...
The problem is geopolitics. [Moi ici: Recordar Taiwan como espelho da Ucrânia - Cash, then value, then growth] That should scare China’s investors more. They know the drill already. Companies are slow walking out of China because of those tensions. This includes Chinese companies investing in Southeast Asia to avoid trade tariffs, sanctions, and growing political risk. [Moi ici: Recordar Lembram-se do "banhista gordo"?]
To keep its business with the Americans (and to a lesser extent, the Europeans) Chinese companies are moving off the mainland.
...
In a country with roughly 900 million workers, many of whom are blue collar and not about to “learn to code”, these job losses tear at the social contract between the CCP and its people. Roughly 17% of Chinese people have a college degree compared to around 36% in the U.S., according to Chinese and U.S. government stats.
...
Either China figures out a way to consume what it produces at home rather than relying on the U.S. consumer, [Moi ici: Eu pensei nisto em 2008. Recordo Especulação. No entanto, Peter Zaihan alerta-nos para o colapso demográfico chinês, O futuro da globalização. Só para ter uma ideia do impacte da coisa repito aqui o número tremendo "The Chinese are going to lose a greater percentage of their population in the next 20 years from aging than Europe did in the Black Plague, according to Peter Zeihan"] or Beijing makes it less attractive for companies to set up shop in Vietnam. If they cannot do those things, the bloodletting will continue. If this trend goes on, it should be seen as a harbinger of worse things to come.
...
China used to make almost all of our clothes. Not anymore. That’s job losses for China.
...
U.S. imports of China made apparel decreased from about $25 billion in 2018 to about $17 billion in 2021, according to a March 2023 report by the International Trade Commission (ITC).
Imports of these goods from China declined but imports from the rest of the world grew by 25.2%. The ITC estimated a sizable decline in apparel manufacturing imports from China of 40% between 2020 and 2021, while U.S. production increased by up to 6.3% in 2021 in response.
The ITC study looked at 10 different sectors. In all 10, China exports to the U.S. fell. Computer equipment from China fell around 7%; furniture imports fell 25%; electronics equipment imports fell by 40%. Automotive parts imports fell a whopping 50%, according to the ITC.
...
China and Hong Kong’s investment into Mexico rose six-fold from $117.1 million in 2015 to nearly $700 million in 2022, according to the Mexican government.
Chinese manufacturing growth might have peaked.
China’s future growth industries could pick up some of this labor, but very little. Robotics will be good for China blue collar labor, but biotech, pharma, and AI will not as making the shift from seamstress to scientist is quite the stretch. So is going from Chinese solar panel maker to AI coder. It is also unlikely that lower skilled office jobs can pick up the blue collar workforce losing out to outsourcing.
...
China is surely not a dying manufacturing power. Europe would be in worse shape, for sure. China can turn the ship around, but if it comes at America’s expense, that will be totally unsustainable.
But China’s days as manufacturer of nearly everything in your house and garden shed look to be pretty much over. That’s a lot of workers whose future is in question for the first time in a generation.
...
the bad news is that the erosion of China’s role as go-to manufacturer will likely become a matter of life and death — for industries, for businesses, for some people."
Trechos retirados de "China's Big Troubles: Its Days As Global Go-To Manufacturer May Be Coming To An End"
"It was January 2022, and Mr. Chan's company, Man Wah Furniture Manufacturing, was confronting grave challenges in moving sofas from its factories in China to customers in the United States. Shipping prices were skyrocketing. Washington and Beijing were locked in a fierce trade war.
Man Wah, one of China's largest furniture companies, was eager to make its products on the North American side of the Pacific.
"Our main market is the United States," said Mr. Chan, chief executive of Man Wah's Mexico subsidiary. "We don't want to lose that market."
That same objective explains why scores of major Chinese companies are investing aggressively in Mexico, taking advantage of an expansive North American trade deal. [Moi ici: Os pró-Biden demonizam a trumpeconomics, os pró-Trump demonizam tudo o que Biden faz, mas na economia Biden segue e amplia o que Trump fez. Como diz Zeihan México, Estados Unidos e Canadá formam um bloco doméstico] Tracing a path forged by Japanese and South Korean companies, Chinese firms are establishing factories that allow them to label their goods "Made in Mexico," then trucking their products into the United States duty-free.
The interest of Chinese manufacturers in Mexico is part of a broader trend known as nearshoring. International companies are moving production closer to customers to limit their vulnerability to shipping problems and geopolitical tensions." [Moi ici: O movimento é muito mais motivado pela economia do que pela política, em minha opinião. Num mundo mais incerto é cada vez mais racional ter a produção perto do consumo. Claro que a erosão da diferença de custos também ajuda.]
Trecho retirado de "Why Chinese Companies Are Investing Billions in Mexico"
Há dias ao ouvir Joe Rogan e Peter Zeihan fixei este trecho:
"The Chinese are going to lose a greater percentage of their population in the next 20 years from aging than Europe did in the Black Plague, according to Peter Zeihan"
É deixar isto afundar lentamente nas profundezas da consciência. Isto é impressionante!
Esta semana começaram a aparecer notícias sobre o suposto primeiro ano em que a população chinesa começou a diminuir, segundo Zeihan isso já acontece há algum tempo, segundo ele os números chineses são adulterados há muito tempo.
No WSJ de ontem pode ler-se:
"As life in China has been restored to normal following the government's lifting of pandemic restrictions, Mr. Liu said Beijing will focus on boosting domestic demand this year, which he said will lead to more imports from the country's trading partners."
Lembro-me de escrever sobre esta possibilidade em Agosto de 2008 em Especulação. O que Zeihan diz é que isto não funcionará, porque a China já não tem a estrutura demográfica capaz de suportar a economia com a sua actual dimensão.
"“In the long run, we are going to see a China the world has never seen,” said Wang Feng, a professor of sociology at the University of California at Irvine who specializes in China’s demographics. “It will no longer be the young, vibrant, growing population. We will start to appreciate China, in terms of its population, as an old and shrinking population.”" (fonte)
Voltando à afirmação inicial, "The Chinese are going to lose a greater percentage of their population in the next 20 years from aging than Europe did in the Black Plague, according to Peter Zeihan", é pensar no impacte, nas consequências disto para o fim da "fábrica do mundo", tendo em conta o efeito do banhista gordo, As banheiras pequenas enchem depressa. Veremos o acelerar do fim da globalização como a conhecemos, veremos a reindustrialização na Europa. STOP! Veremos? Mas a Europa não tem demografia! Veremos a industrialização de África?
um tipo ouve @PeterZeihan, com Joe Rogan, a fazer previsões negativas sobre o futuro da China. Depois, lê: "As imobiliárias chinesas tiveram acesso a um financiamento equivalente a cerca de 15 mil milhões de euros em dezembro, uma subida de 33,4% face ao período homólogo."
— Carlos P da Cruz 🇺🇦🚜🇳🇱🇬🇪 (@ccz1) January 9, 2023
...
"Com uma população em idade trabalhadora cada vez menor, a China, até há pouco tempo a maior história mundial de crescimento, precisa de acelerar o crescimento da produção para recuperar essa posição. No entanto, o maior ênfase de Xi na segurança, poder e controlo vem minar a produtividade, na altura em que a China mais precisa dela. O milagre do crescimento apenas pode sofrer como consequência.A China chegou muito perto da terra prometida. A sua economia moderna estava numa trajetória extraordinária. A agenda de reequilibrio prometeu mais. Mas Xi quebrou essa promessa. A economia política da autocracia atirou água fria à cara daqueles, como nós, que costumavam ser convictos otimistas em relação à China."
Que associei a este artigo recebido recentemente, "Be Ready for the Manufacturing Renaissance" e a vários trechos encontrados aqui e acolá. Por exemplo, no artigo "Brasileiros à conquista de fábricas portuguesas de calçado" no Dinheiro Vivo com:
""a surpresa do ano" está no comportamento dos Estados Unidos, país que ultrapassou a Colômbia e ocupa agora a quarta posição nos maiores destinos das exportações do setor [Moi ici: Calçado e componentes de calçado produzidos no Brasil], com quase nove milhões de dólares (8,5 milhões de euros), um acréscimo de 56% face a 2021."
Continuação desta serie - Tudo vai depender do tal jogo de forças (parte V)
"U.S. manufacturing orders in China are down 40 percent,...Unlike the decrease in orders out of China, trade data analyzed by Project44 indicates that the Europe-to-U.S. route is "one of the possibly most surprising and certainly most significant developments since early 2020," Brazil said."This sharp rise cannot be explained by the pandemic alone. But a strategic shift from over-dependency on trade with China and geopolitical tensions over Russia are the main drivers of the EU-U.S. trade boom," he said....This year, the U.S. has imported more goods from Europe than China – a big shift from the 2010s, according to Project 44."For their part, Europe's manufacturers battling sky-high energy prices and inflation are increasingly exporting to and investing in the U.S.," Brazil said.Germany's exports to the U.S. were almost 50% higher in September year over year. Germany's mechanical engineering sector has boosted its exports to the U.S. by almost 20% in a year over year comparison of the first nine months of 2022, according to Project 44."
"WSJ said Apple is "telling suppliers to plan more actively for assembling Apple products elsewhere in Asia, particularly India and Vietnam, they say, and looking to reduce dependence on Taiwanese assemblers led by Foxconn.""
Recordar o efeito do banhista gordo - As banheiras pequenas enchem depressa
Lembro-me de há muitos anos ter lido algures que a Wal-Mart e a China deveriam receber um prémio qualquer do governo americano pelo quanto ajudavam a controlar a inflação.
Em Maio de 2020 citava aqui:
"The deflationary environment created by rising Chinese exports and globalisation is over."
Algo que em Dezembro de 2021 traduzi aqui:
"Com a crise de 2008 começou a desglobalização, o aumento da importância do factor proximidade produção-consumo. Agora, com os confinamentos, com as quarentenas, com as cadeias de fornecimento pouco ágeis num mundo de incerteza...
...
Os impactes da desglobalização serão:
- mais emprego; (falta de mão de obra) e
- preços mais altos (inflação)"
Ontem em "Who will pay for the shift from efficiency to resilience?" encontrei:
"Are we entering a new era of wealth redistribution? Or will the imbalances between capital and labour that have characterised the past half century of economic history linger on?
...
In many OECD countries, there has been a decoupling of productivity and wages over the past 40 years, during which time business has claimed a larger share of national income gains.
...
Deglobalization, which will favor local labor markets in some industries, is beginning to shift that dynamic. So will the aging population, which will create a structurally tighter labor market as well as millions of new onshore healthcare jobs. [Moi ici: Escrevi aqui sobre como a demografia criará uma ou mais gerações de "Figos" - "Escrevi aqui algures que um dia seríamos (os nossos descendentes) todos tratados como Figos."]
But the third part of the capital and labor story is the increasing pressure on companies to empower consumers and the state at a time of rising costs. Inflation happens for all sorts of reasons, but one of a them is a shift in economic focus from efficiency to resilience. [Moi ici: O que escrevo aqui desde 2008 sobre nearshoring and reshoring e ultimamente sobre o risco político] Both the public and private sectors want to buffer themselves against climate change, geopolitics and market shifts. Changes in supply chains, reserve currency allocations and tax policies are all part of this. But resilience costs money. The question is: who is going to pay?"
Portanto, cuidado com o apagador usado pelos mata-borrões que não passam de fragilistas encartados.
Mais um factor a juntar ao que tem acontecido:
China's major manufacturing hub Sichuan province has ordered all factories to shut down for 6 days to ease a power shortage. Sichuan is key for semiconductor/solar panel industries & China's lithium mining hub. Will hit Foxconn, Intel, Apple, Tesla-supplier factories & more @cnn pic.twitter.com/jDTnGdvOwl
— Selina Wang (@selinawangtv) August 16, 2022
Power restrictions have been imposed Chongqing and the provinces of Zhejiang and Jiangsu, raising concerns over the effect on global supply chains and the Chinese economy.https://t.co/H4Ch3W0iH0
— Nikkei Asia (@NikkeiAsia) August 17, 2022
banhista gordo ... não esquecer https://t.co/jY1jq3Q0nM
— Carlos P da Cruz 🇺🇦🚜🇳🇱🇬🇪 (@ccz1) August 17, 2022
A propósito de banhista gordo, recordo: As banheiras pequenas enchem depressa
A frequência dos postais pode baixar nos próximos dias dada a época que vivemos.
Isto a propósito deste artigo no Caderno de Economia do semanário Expresso de ontem, "Têxtil volta a ter empresas em lay-off":
""Na indústria têxtil há cada vez mais clientes a atrasarem ou a suspenderem encomendas e já temos algumas empresas em lay-off ou a jogar com a antecipação de férias", diz ao Expresso Mário Jorge Machado, presidente da ATP Associação Têxtil e Vestuário de Portugal, preocupado com a evolução de um sector que pede o regresso de mais apoios, [Moi ici: Sempre a mesma doença portuguesa] num regime equivalente ao que foi adotado no pico da pandemia de covid. "Temos os consumidores assustados com a guerra, a inflação, a questão energética, a subida das taxas de juro. O retalho começa a retrair-se e a indústria sente também esse impacto", explica o empresário e dirigente associativo para defender "um quadro mais flexível, que facilite a reação rápida das empresas às flutuações da economia".
É verdade que os números da exportação continuam a ser positivos: até maio, as vendas ao exterior tiveram um crescimento homólogo de 19%, para os €2,6 mil milhões (mais 17% face a 2019), mas a evolução relativa ao volume tem vindo a abrandar mês após mês, acumulando agora um saldo positivo de 6%, e "a faturação é sempre reflexo de decisões de encomendas entregues alguns meses antes" sublinha, para garantir que o momento atual "é de arrefecimento".
A tendência é transversal a todos os segmentos da indústria têxtil, mas nesta fase as empress mais afetadas são as de acabamentos, tinturarias, tecelagem, tricotagem e algumas confeções, precisa. Do lado dos clientes, o abrandamento é especialmente sentido na Europa, com destaque para a Alemanha, e nos EUA."
Outras leituras:
Há dias em E Zeihan chega a Mongo! citei:
"4. Supply chains will be much shorter.
...
5. Production will become colocated with consumption.
...
6. The new systems will put premiums on simplicity and security just as the old system put premiums on cost and efficiency."
Agora leio, por um lado os sintomas do impacte da incerteza no retorno dos inventários, "Why Fashion’s Inventory Problem Is Back (And How to Solve It)" e, por outro lado, o aumento do risco da aposta no custo mais baixo, "Navigating Retail’s New Era of Risk":
"On closer inspection it’s clear that today’s global supply chains are the product of centuries of growth but little meaningful evolution when it comes to risk management.
...
The High Risk of Low Cost
Although separated by almost 200 years of history, the cotton famine of the 1860's and the supply chain crises of today share the same root cause: a myopic and often perilous focus on lowest landed unit cost. Procuring vast quantities of cheap goods has driven and continues to drive most of today's top brands because most see price as the cornerstone of competitiveness. However, as supply chain expert John Thorbeck often says, we operate in an era where business leaders must once and for all appreciate that the singular pursuit of low cost comes with an extraordinary number of risks that make businesses far less competitive, the first being the risk to financial capital.
...
It is also logical to assume that risks to global supply chains will become more frequent and profound as we become increasingly interconnected as a global community.
...
If reducing unit cost was the competitive advantage of the past, eliminating risk is the competitive advantage of the future."
Interessante, como regresso sempre a Maio de 2020 e a El coronavirus actúa como acelerador de cambios que ya estaban en marcha. Pois, em 2008... Para reflectir
Outras leituras:
"Fico a pensar ... Qual é, qual deve ser o papel de uma associação empresarial nesta teia de interesses conflituantes?"
"The conventional wisdom at this time is that most of the world has moved on from the pandemic (except for China); therefore, supply chains will return to “normal.” Unfortunately, this is not the case. The world has permanently changed and supply chains are going to face continuing challenges for decades to come. Among those challenges are:
- Supply chains will remain under constant threat of disruption for the next decade
- Supply chains operate best when the world is peaceful and stable
- A smoothly running supply chain requires “buffer stock,” which is challenging with declining population demographics
- There is a conflict between environmental, social and governance (ESG) goals and supply chains optimized for cost and speed. If we prioritize ESG, we will need to contend with supply chain risks
- Supply chain technology will become the big venture capital category winner as companies continue to make investments in technologies that can help them mitigate their supply chain challenges
...Cheap labor is becoming scarcer, particularly in Asia. This is largely due to aging populations – the average age continues to increase and there are fewer people to work in these manufacturing jobs....Companies will look closer to home for product sourcing. They will prioritize production in countries that are far more stable and friendly to the United States."
O que é que as associações empresariais estão a fazer para tirar partido deste contexto? Ainda têm de fazer esta evolução "We start to see bridges".
