Curiosidade do dia

Há quase um mês escrevi "Como é que os decisores se adaptarão a esta vertigem evolutiva?". Agora já sei a resposta… não se adaptam; a tarefa deles é cumprir um indicador, não ser eficazes.

Recordo também o que escrevi há cerca de uma semana nesta "Curiosidade do dia".

Vamos a isto. 

Hoje, o Twitter estava em polvorosa por causa desta demonstração de arrogância em "Building Tanks While the Ukrainians Master Drones".

O artigo começa por mostrar um forte contraste entre o que a guerra na Ucrânia revelou e o que a  indústria grande de defesa continua a fazer. Simon Shuster visita a Rheinmetall, à espera de encontrar uma empresa profundamente abalada pela ascensão da guerra por drones, mas encontra, antes, uma liderança que a desvaloriza. 

"Last month, on my way home from Kyiv, I passed through Germany to visit one of the world’s largest weapons manufacturers. My hope was to see its response to the rise of drone warfare. The company, Rheinmetall, is best known for making artillery and tanks; the Ukrainians have fought the Russian army to a virtual standstill by learning how to destroy such old-school armaments with cheaply made drones. I thought I would find the leaders of Rheinmetall seized by the threat of this revolution in military technology. I found no such thing."

O texto abre logo com a ideia de que os ucranianos travaram o exército russo aprendendo a destruir armamento tradicional com “cheaply made drones”, enquanto o CEO da Rheinmetall reage com desdém e fala em “Legos”. 

"When I brought up the drones that Ukraine has used so effectively against Russian tanks, the company’s chairman and CEO, Armin Papperger, was withering in his dismissal. "This is how to play with Legos," he told me.

He did not expect them to disrupt his industry. "What is the innovation of Ukraine?" Papperger asked. “"They don’t have some technological breakthrough. They make innovations with their small drones, and they say, ‘Wow!’ And that’s great. Whatever. But this is not the technology of Lockheed Martin, General Dynamics, or Rheinmetall.""

A tensão central do artigo nasce aqui: a eficácia táctica dos drones baratos já foi demonstrada, mas os grandes actores industriais não parecem dispostos a aceitar facilmente o que isso implica. É impressionante a abstracção face à realidade no terreno:

"That, at least, is the feeling toward tanks that I have developed after several years of reporting in Ukraine, where they are no longer seen as vehicles that keep you safe and kill your enemies. In that war zone, they are slow-moving prey for the drones that fill the sky. I would sooner pull the pin from a grenade than ride around near the front lines in a tank.

When I explained this to my guide, Jan-Phillipp Weisswange, he seemed confused and a little defensive. The sale of armored vehicles makes up a significant part of the business at Rheinmetall. In Russia and Ukraine, soldiers have learned to protect their tanks from drone strikes using improvised nets and boxes, which cover the vehicles like a turtle shell. I asked whether Rheinmetall had developed something like that after four years of war in Ukraine. Weisswange glanced around at the machines on either side of us, all of them waiting for repairs, their tracks unchained and gun barrels angled upward. "No," he said. "We don't have something like that."

Well, why not?

The reasons turned out to be complex. But they help explain why Germany, like Europe and the rest of NATO, is so ill-prepared for not only wars of the future but also the ones raging today."

Ao mesmo tempo, o artigo mostra que:

"Since the Russian invasion in 2022, the Ukrainians have sparked a revolution in military technology. "Their level of innovation is out of this world," Lieutenant General Steven Whitney, a senior Pentagon official, testified this week before the Senate Armed Services Committee."

... e fizeram uma mudança estratégica muito rápida: 

"Produce less tanks. Produce more drones."

O argumento, portanto, não é que o velho arsenal desapareceu; é que o novo centro de adaptação, precisão, alcance e velocidade de aprendizagem se deslocou fortemente para os drones e sistemas associados.

O artigo mostra, depois, que a continuidade das compras de tanques, blindados e outros sistemas pesados não decorre apenas de lógica militar. Resulta também da forma como o Ocidente compra, certifica e financia a defesa. O texto diz que as compras desses sistemas "keep swelling", que é mais fácil alocar rapidamente grandes verbas a “exquisite systems”, e acrescenta que, “as a general rule”, os militares ocidentais dão os maiores contratos a fabricantes estabelecidos. 

"Still, purchases of new tanks and armored vehicles keep swelling the deal book at Rheinmetall, as well as the company's stock price, which has risen more than 15-fold since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Most of that growth came after Trump returned to the White House and began demanding that Europe spend more on defense. NATO members pledged at a summit in December to increase their defense budgets over the next decade to 5 percent of gross domestic product, more than double the previous spending commitment.

To reach that goal, European politicians and military planners need to allocate billions of dollars in a hurry, which is easiest to do by ordering what are known as "exquisite" systems-state-of-the-art machinery such as ballistic missiles, warships, and fighter jets. Most drones are too cheap to move the needle toward NATO's gargantuan spending targets."

Ao mesmo tempo, novas soluções enfrentam barreiras institucionais: para vender à NATO, os ucranianos precisariam de "NATO qualification", e mesmo mudanças de desenho em sistemas alemães exigem nova certificação. Isto dá ao artigo uma segunda camada: não é só uma história sobre tecnologia militar, é também uma história sobre inércia industrial, procurement e protecção dos incumbentes.

No fim, o artigo sugere que a verdadeira disputa não é apenas entre armas antigas e armas novas, mas entre modelos económicos e industriais diferentes. A ascensão dos drones baratos "poses a direct threat" ao modelo de negócio de empresas como a Rheinmetall, precisamente porque estas precisam de continuar a justificar contratos multimilionários para sistemas caros e pesados. O texto termina quase como uma ironia estratégica: 

"Papperger, of course, sees it differently. The rise of cheap drones poses a direct threat to his business model. To continue winning multibillion-dollar contracts for tanks and artillery, he needs to convince his clients that these weapons will remain essential to wars of the future. Ukraine has made that a much greater challenge.

When I asked him whether Ukrainian companies would one day sell their drones to NATO, he sighed and shook his head. They would not make it through the alliance's bureaucracy, he said: "They need a NATO qualification." Western regulators could, in other words, keep them off the European market by requiring licenses that Ukrainian firms might find hard to get.

Even adopting Ukrainian know-how seems difficult in that environment. During our tour of the factory in Unterlüss, my guide explained the complexity of changing anything about the design of a German weapons system. "Any adjustment needs to be recertified by the procurement agency," a department within the Ministry of Defense, Weisswange said. Any change to the material used to make the barrel of a tank, he said, would take at least a year to certify. "The quality controls are very strict, and the costs are very high."

In the end, Rheinmetall has a strong incentive to continue making the expensive weapons it has made for much of its history, even if they can be blown apart by drones that cost less than the average smartphone."

Este trecho é o tal que deu mais tweets, é doentio:

"Ukraine now makes more drones than any democracy in the world, and wealthy nations in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East are lining up to buy them. But when I asked the CEO of Rheinmetall what that could mean for his business model, he bristled. "Who is the biggest drone producer in Ukraine?" Papperger demanded. I listed the ones that I had visited in Kyiv two weeks earlier, Fire Point and Skyfall, which make hundreds of thousands of drones a month for the Ukrainian armed forces. "It's Ukrainian housewives, Papperger said of their factories. "They have 3-D printers in the kitchen, and they produce parts for drones," he said. "This is not innovation.""

O valor como arma contra a comoditização

Um dos postais mais importantes para as PME que escrevi, ao longo dos mais de 21 anos deste blogue,  é este, "Pregarás o Evangelho do Valor".

Nele encontramos este gráfico:

Há sempre duas formas de se tentar ganhar mais dinheiro:

• Vender mais barato para atrair clientes.
• Vender pelo mesmo preço ou até mais caro, mas oferecer mais valor que os clientes reconhecem.

Este gráfico mostra o que acontece em cada caso.

• Se baixarmos o preço, parece que vamos vender mais. Mas atenção: para manter o mesmo lucro, precisamos de vender muito mais. Por exemplo, se cortarmos o preço em 20%, podemos ter de duplicar as vendas para não perder dinheiro. Isso é quase impossível para muitas pequenas empresas (não há máquinas, nem pessoas, nem mercado suficiente para isso).
• Já quando aumentamos o preço, mesmo que percamos alguns clientes, o lucro pode ser o mesmo ou até maior. Porquê? Porque não precisamos de vender tanto e ganhamos mais por cada venda.

O gráfico explica que as PME deviam preocupar-se menos em cortar preços ou apenas em reduzir custos e mais em criar valor para o cliente. Se o cliente sentir que o produto ou serviço vale o preço, vai continuar a comprar, mesmo que seja um pouco mais caro.

Não é sempre no preço mais baixo que se ganha. Muitas vezes, o segredo está em oferecer valor, para que os clientes aceitem pagar mais. 

O preço baixo pode dar clientes, mas é o valor percebido que dá lucro.

Recentemente, descobri através de Daniel Priestley estes outros números que vêm reforçar o argumento:

Ora, isto liga-se a um fenómeno mais amplo, a polarização do mercado. Ainda me lembro do momento em que li “The vanishing middle market”. Está quase a fazer 20 anos. Onde descobri o fenómeno do market polarization.

A "market polarization" acontece quando o mercado se divide em dois extremos: por um lado, cresce a procura por produtos e serviços "premium" (de maior qualidade e preço mais elevado) e, por outro, por ofertas "low cost" ou “no-frills” (sem extras, só o essencial e barato). O que fica a perder são os produtos da gama média, que vão desaparecendo porque já não atraem clientes nem pelo preço nem pelo valor acrescentado.

Esta, talvez demasiado longa, introdução serve para contextualizar um artigo publicado no passado Sábado pelo jorrnal The Times, "Strategy Win For United And Delta":

"Airlines in the United States seem to be separating into two groups. Delta Air Lines and United Airlines make lots of money. And then there's everybody else.

Those two airlines have pulled ahead of the pack in recent years after making a few big bets. They expanded loyalty programs and leaned into selling more first- and business-class seats. And they operate lots of international flights. 

That has paid off handsomely. Delta and United have generated most of the industry's profits since 2022. And some experts believe their lead is only expanding.

...

Of course, no airline is unassailable, and the industry is rife with companies that went from roaring success to penury. [Moi ici: Fica o aviso à la Beinhocker,  Sim, as estratégias são como os iogurtes" têm um prazo de validade que só se descobre à posteriori]"

O artigo descreve como a Delta Air Lines e a United Airlines se diferenciaram no mercado norte-americano ao apostar em estratégias voltadas para passageiros mais ricos e frequentes. Ambas expandiram programas de fidelização, aumentaram a oferta de lugares premium (primeira classe e executiva) e intensificaram voos internacionais. Essa aposta tem gerado resultados financeiros robustos: desde 2022, Delta e United concentram a maior parte dos lucros da indústria aérea, enquanto outras companhias lutam com margens estreitas.

A estratégia provou ser estrutural, criando um fosso cada vez maior entre estas duas empresas e as concorrentes. Mesmo companhias low-cost começaram a copiar a fórmula, introduzindo versões premium dos seus serviços. Contudo, o modelo não é imune: uma recessão ou uma mudança estrutural no comportamento dos consumidores poderia colocar pressão sobre esta diferenciação.

O artigo ilustra como uma escolha clara de posicionamento (focar em clientes de maior valor e não em todos) pode criar uma vantagem competitiva sustentável. É uma aplicação prática da ideia de que estratégia é escolher o que não fazer.

Estas companhias escaparam à guerra de preços e da armadilha de ser “mais um” no mercado de voos domésticos ao criar uma experiência distinta, valorizada pelos clientes mais dispostos a pagar, ou seja: diferenciação.

Se todas as companhias aéreas decidiram competir no low-cost, Delta e United escolheram o oposto, explorando o espaço deixado livre no premium. Essa decisão passa no “teste da negação” de Roger Martin. O contrário de uma estratégia é outra estratégia.

O sector aéreo é historicamente visto como uma commodity (“um assento de A para B”), mas a Delta e a United mostram que é possível fugir à comoditização através de diferenciação por experiência, fidelização e valor percebido. Contudo, o risco de voltar à comoditização está presente à medida que rivais low-cost imitam serviços premium.

Curiosidade do dia

No FT da passada quinta-feira li "Stellantis warns on China competition":

"The future of western brands in China is at risk as local carmakers close in on the last remaining stronghold held by the likes of Volkswagen and Toyota, Stellantis has warned Asked at the Financial Times' Future of the Car summit yesterday whether western auto groups would be able to compete with local brands in China, Maxime Picat, Stellantis chief operating officer for Asia-Pacific, Middle East & Africa, said: "I'm quite an optimistic guy; but not on that one."

...

Foreign brands' market share in China stood at 32 per cent in the first two months of this year, less than half the 64 per cent they held in 2020. BYD has overtaken VW's long-held position as the best-selling brand, according to Shanghai consultancy Automobility. But VW and Toyota are still the top two manufacturers of petrol vehicles in China with a combined market share of 34 percent."

No mesmo dia o Twitter brindou-me com este vídeo:

Pois ...

Produtividades: europeia versus americana

No WSJ do passado dia 17.12 este texto "Why the U.S. Is Trouncing Europe" com um tema interessante e de esfregar na cara aos adeptos da caridadezinha:

O velho tema da "caridadezinha" aqui no blogue. Recordo:

• de 2021 - Lerolero 
• de 2008 - Vamos brincar à caridadezinha

Primeiro os ingredientes:

 

"Economists never cite one of the most significant statistics about the U.S. economy. According to data released last week by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, only about 12% of Americans score at the highest levels on internationally administered academic tests, while 34% score at the lowest levels - nearly three low scorers for every high scorer. Germany's figures are nearly even: 18% score at the highest levels and 20% at the lowest. Put another way, Germany's ratio of high to low scorers is almost three times America's. Scandinavia's is five times; Japan's, seven.

These enormous differences have profound economic implications.

...

Yet America excels relative to Europe despite these enormous differences. While Europe has created 14 companies worth more than $10 billion in the past 50 years, with about $400 billion of market value in total, Americans have created nearly 250 such companies, worth $30 trillion. That success has driven up America's middle-class incomes. The median disposable U.S. household income, according to the OECD, is now 25% greater than the median German household and 60% greater than the median household in Italy.

...

The belief that taxing success more heavily will scarcely slow inevitable progress ignores the importance of being first to market and founding successful companies in America rather than the rest of the world, the enormous difference in the training and expected payoffs for successful risk-taking that it creates for America's talented workers, and the motivational effect higher expected payoffs for successful risk-taking have on our talented workers."

Se os economistas europeus realmente acreditam que o "Relatório Draghi" será a varinha mágica que tornará a Europa mais rica que os Estados Unidos, talvez estejam a subestimar a essência do sucesso americano: uma mistura de inovação à solta, tolerância face ao fracasso e uma boa dose de audácia que transforma ideias malucas em empresas bilionárias. Enquanto a Europa redige relatórios de 300 páginas, os americanos já lançaram três startups e uma criptomoeda. Portanto, se o plano europeu é ultrapassar os EUA apenas com novas regulamentações e ajustes fiscais, talvez seja melhor preparar um "Relatório Draghi 2.0" - desta vez com capítulos sobre como adoptar uma mentalidade mais empreendedora, com um anexo explicando como transformar burocratas em visionários e professores de economia em investidores de capital de risco. Afinal, quem sabe? Se o próximo relatório tiver menos fórmulas e mais fé no imprevisível, talvez a Europa tenha sua chance.

Curiosidade do dia

No JdN de ontem de um artigo intitulado "A Alemanha precisa de esteroides":

"A economia alemã está deprimida.

Ponto. Foi o único país do G7 que contraiu no ano passado e, de acordo com as mais recentes projeções do FMI, deverá ser este ano das que menos cresce em todo o grupo das sete economias mais avançadas do mundo. A economista-chefe do Fundo Monetário questionava há dias na rede social X: "O que está a impedir a Alemanha de avançar? Já não são os elevados preços da energia". E ensaiava uma resposta: "Os verdadeiros desafios são o envelhecimento, o subinvestimento e o excesso de burocracia".

Entretanto, há dias, mão amiga enviou-me, "Pension wave brings companies into a swim":

"A wave of pensions is rolling into the German labor market, as the dpa informs. Because the so-called baby boomers will soon retire. But in times of a shortage of skilled workers, German companies are literally running out of time. By the middle of the next decade, around four million employees of the strong birth cohorts of 1954 to 1968 will disappear from the labor market, it is said. According to calculations by the local Chamber of Industry and Commerce (IHK), the Berlin economy alone will lack more than 400,000 skilled workers in around 10 years. However, around 90,000 qualified employees were already missing.

Many also want to retire early

To make matters worse, many older people even want to retire early."

Num cenário polarizado ...

Há muitos anos que aqui no blogue, praticamente desde a primeira hora, escrevo sobre a importância de seleccionar os clientes-alvo e trabalhar para eles. Por exemplo, em 2006 escrevia sobre o perigo de ser uma Arca de Noé:

• Deixar de ser uma Arca de Noé
• Porque não podemos ser uma Arca de Noé!

A reforçar esta mensagem de focalização nos clientes-alvo, tenho desenvolvido aqui também a metáfora de Mongo, um mundo pleno de variedade e de tribos numa paisagem enrugada:

• 1 Origem de uma metáfora
• Criatividade e Mongo
• Covid, empresas, estratégias e paisagens enrugadas

Às vezes criticam-me porque supostamente no mundo actual as empresas tanto podem servir em simultâneo gregos como troianos. No entanto, continuo na minha, ainda na semana passada li, "Why Mushroom Leather (and Other New Materials) Are Struggling to Scale":

"Compare the number of venture capital firms funding software to the number of venture firms specialising in material innovation or fashion. There are far fewer.

The reasons for the chasm are structural. Once a software solution is invented, the marginal cost to distribute the second, third and one millionth sale are close to zero. By contrast, once a new material is invented, the marginal costs for subsequent units are nearly the same. It is only with learning and scale that costs begin to decrease.

At the same time, building the capacity to produce new materials often requires considerable capital expenditure to build out infrastructure."

Entretanto, ontem li "The Myth of the Mainstream":

"Chasing the mass market is a losing proposition for marketers in a polarized culture. Allying with the subculture that loves you is the best way to drive brand success.

...

For years, McDonald's seemed to embody everything that was wrong with the American diet. The brand had become a symbol of food choices that were driving escalating rates of obesity and hypertension.

The company spent more than a decade trying to fight this perception among American consumers by targeting them with messaging about its updated menu, which offered healthier alternatives more in line with contemporary diet trends - but to no avail. Year over year, McDonald's sales declined, and its brand perception continued to spiral downward.

...

Finally, the company decided to go on the offensive. Instead of combating the opposition's hate and attempting to win over those in the middle, McDonald's decided to focus on its fans - the people who self-identify as McDonald's devotees despite the vitriol directed at the brand. 

...

In doing so, it tapped into what these devotees love about McDonald's and not only activated their collective consumption but also inspired them to spread the word on behalf of the brand. The result of this strategy was a 10.4% increase in global revenue for McDonald's from 2018 to 2021 and the return of dormant customers: more than a quarter of those who came in to buy the Travis Scott meal, for example, hadn't visited the chain in over a year. Seemingly overnight, McDonald's went from being a cautionary tale to the darling of brand marketing and a case study for advertising effectiveness.

If you want to get people to move, you must choose a side. The notion that you can win by playing to the middle is a misleading myth.

What's going on here? Conventional wisdom would tell us that in a world of increasingly polarized opinions, our best bet is to appease the middle, if only because that's where the majority of the market is. That also seems like a safe bet to many companies, as a middle-of-the-road position is less likely to alienate potential customers.

...

The middle doesn't adopt new products with any urgency. They are not the first to respond to marketing communications, nor are they likely to weigh in on a debate between advocates and detractors. They mitigate their own risk of moving out of step with what might be considered generally acceptable by stepping back and observing other people's responses first.

The red herring is that we perceive this indifference as an opportunity to persuade them to one side or the other. But the truth is, they are not typically convinced by any marketing communications. Instead, they, too, take cues from other people - sometimes those who are for you, and at other times those who are against you.

Our chances of successfully influencing behavior increases when we choose to address the people who are most likely to take action.

With this in mind, it becomes abundantly clear that in a polarized scenario, the chances of marketers getting people to move are far greater when we activate the collective of the willing as opposed to trying to convince detractors or even persuade the indifferent."

Sobre a polarização do mercado, recordo Polarização do mercado ou como David e Golias podem co-existir. 

A evolução da produtividade (parte II)

Parte I.

Originalmente a parte II metia Seth Godin e Porter, mas vamos ter de fazer uma alteração.

No passado dia 5 o WSJ publicou um artigo intitulado "Productivity Drop Blurs Economic Picture" de onde sublinho:

"You would think from May's blowout jobs report the economy was booming.

Here's the puzzle: Other recent data suggest it is in recession.

The dichotomy emerges from the divergent behavior of employment and output, two key indicators of economic activity.

...

The economy has gone through periods where output has expanded faster than employment, but seldom the other way around,

...

What explains these dissonant signals is productivity, or output per hour worked: It is cratering. That raises questions about whether the much-hyped technology adoption during the pandemic and, more recently, artificial intelligence are making a difference.

...

Labor productivity fell 2.1% in the first quarter from the fourth at an annual rate, and was down 0.8% in the first quarter from a vear earlier, the Labor Department said Thursday. That is the fifth-straight quarter of negative vear-over-year productivity growth-the longest such run since records began in 1948.

...

Usually, employment plummets during recessions because as factories, offices and restaurants produce less, they need fewer workers. That clearly isn’t happening.

...

One reason could be labor hoarding. [Moi ici: LOL. Acho esta explicação tão inverosímil] After struggling to hire and train workers during the pandemic-induced labor crunch, employers are now balking at letting them go, even as sales slip, given the labor market's unusual tightness.

...

It's "not that technology got worse in the last year, but that businesses were selling less stuff and they're nervous about their ability to attract employees, so they're holding on to their employees,"

...

A more imminent concern is that when workers produce more, companies can raise wages without increasing prices. When productivity falls, it is harder to keep inflation in check."

Ontem durante caminhada matinal li este artigo e tweetei:

Ui! Os americanos não sabem porque é que a sua produtividade está a baixar! Os académicos avançam com explicações bizarras. Para mim é tão simples que também devo estar errado e não tem nada a ver com “hoarding workers”. Para mim é o efeito oposto ao da receita irlandesa.

— Carlos P da Cruz 🇺🇦🚜🇳🇱🇬🇪 (@ccz1) June 6, 2023

Qual é a receita que proponho para o aumento agregado da baixa produtividade portuguesa? Aplicar a receita irlandesa e seduzir empresas de elevado valor acrescentado a estabelecerem-se em Portugal (ver Parte I por exemplo).

Ora o que andam os americanos a fazer? O Financial Times de ontem dá uma ajuda, Gideon Rachman escreveu uma crónica do tempo que passa com o título "How America is reshaping the world economy". Antes de irmos à crónica pensemos por um momento nos fanáticos do Excel quando chegam ao comando das empresas. O que costumam fazer? 

Cortar! Despedir e subcontratar! 

Quanto mais a empresa subcontrata mais a sua produtividade cresce.

Agora voltemos a Gideon:

"An unheralded revolution has taken place in America's approach to international economics. As the new thinking emerges, it is reshaping the global economy and the western alliance.

...

The US intends to use a new strategic industrial policy to simultaneously revitalise the American middle-class and US democracy, while combating climate change and establishing a lasting technological lead over China.

...

Many of America's allies fear that the bit that slipped off the table was the interests of foreigners. They worry, in particular, that subsidies worth hundreds of billions of dollars to American industry and clean technology, set out in the Inflation Reduction Act, will come at the expense of producers and workers in Europe and Asia."

Volto agora ao tema do artigo no WSJ, o abaixamento da produtividade. A minha tese é que na base desta evolução estará o regresso aos Estados Unidos de produção anteriormente fabricada na Ásia. Produtos de valor acrescentado mais baixo, mas protegidos do mercado do preço pelo mesmo fenómeno que salvou o calçado português,  mas protegidos do mercado do preço pelo medo de uma China que pode invadir Taiwan, mas protegidos do mercado do preço pelos "hundreds of billions of dollars" que subsidiam produções que de outra forma seriam incapazes de competir. Esta produção vem diluir a produtividade anteriormente atingida pela economia americana.

Continua.

"all models are wrong, but some are useful."

Há muitos anos li a frase, “Todos os modelos estão errados, alguns são úteis”, desde então tem-me acompanhado e, de certa forma, ajudado a trabalhar com modelos. Um modelo é uma ferramenta, só isso, uma hipótese de lidar com a realidade. Um modelo não é a realidade, algo que muitos esquecem. Um modelo é, de certa forma, uma ilusão. Talvez por isso, tenha abraçado as ideias de Peter Checkland sobre os ovos estrelados, ou as amibas, em vez dos rectângulos arrogantes e pretensiosos. 

Quem trabalha com sistemas de gestão tem de trabalhar com modelos. Por exemplo, os mapas de processos nos sistemas da qualidade com base na abordagem por processos. Ou seja, quem trabalha com sistemas de gestão tem de trabalhar com ilusões. Recentemente comecei a ler o livro "The Upside of Uncertainty" onde os autores nos despertam para o receio que tanta gente tem da incerteza. Talvez por isso muitos esquecem que um modelo é só uma ferramenta e tratam-no como a descrição perfeita da realidade. 

Por que medimos o desempenho dos processos e o desempenho do sistema de gestão? Porque existe incerteza! Porque a realidade é volúvel e pode alterar o que pensávamos. No entanto, há uma outra razão que muitas vezes esqueço de verbalizar. Temos de medir, analisar e avaliar porque o nosso modelo é só uma rede que lançamos à realidade. A realidade é demasiado complexa para ser descrita por um qualquer modelo. A medição, análise e avaliação permite perceber quando é que o modelo se afasta tanto da realidade que deixa de ser útil.

Por que escrevo isto? Por causa de uma crítica ao livro "Escape From Model Land: How Mathematical Models Can Lead Us Astray and What We Can Do About It" de Erica Thompson, publicada no passado dia 28 de Dezembro no WSJournal.

"We live in an information age, as the cliché has it-really an age of information overload. But “measured quantities do not speak for themselves,” observes Erica Thompson, a statistician and a fellow at the London School of Economics. Data, she notes, are given meaning “only through the context and framing provided by models.” [Moi ici: Tenho uma interpretação um pouco diferente. Medimos. Analisamos, qualquer estagiário faz isso se for ensinado. Ou seja, como trabalhar os dados brutos e transformá-los em algo que possa ser avaliado. Avaliamos, já usamos o modelo para analisar os dados. Agora, usamos o contexto interno e externo para avaliar o desempenho e a continuação da confiança no modelo. Aquele pormenor de saltar do ciclo SDCA para o ciclo PDCA - "Avancemos agora para a Figura 2." Quando decidimos que precisamos de dar o salto é quando percebemos que o modelo que temos já não permite esperar um desempenho aceitável, temos de o melhorar.]

When we want to know how rapidly a new infectious virus is likely to spread, we turn to mathematical models. Models are used by climate scientists to project global warming; by options traders to price contracts; by the Congressional Budget Office to forecast the economic effects of legislation; by meteorologists to warn of approaching storms. Without models, Ms. Thompson says, data "would be only a meaningless stream of numbers."

Ubiquitous and persuasive, models also drive decisions-one reason why, in Ms. Thompson's view, they require our urgent attention. She tells us that, as a graduate student studying North Atlantic storms, she noticed how different models predicted different overall effects and produced contradictory results. She started to reflect on the role of models as metaphors, tools for understanding, and expressions of sociopolitical power. "Escape From Model Land" offers a contemplative, densely encapsulated summary of her reflection and research.

[Moi ici: O parágrafo que se segue é precioso] Models seek to represent the real world, but they live outside it. Indeed, they exist in their own "wonderful place,' what Ms. Thompson dubs "Model Land." In Model Land, the assumptions of a model are considered "literally true," enabling expansive exploration and ambitious predictions. The problem is that Model Land is easy to enter but difficult to escape. Having built "a beautiful internally consistent model," Ms. Thompson writes, it can be "emotionally difficult to acknowledge that the initial assumptions on which the whole thing is built are literally not true."

 ...

There are all sorts of ways that models can lead us astray. A small measurement error on an input can lead to wildly inaccurate forecasts-a phenomenon known as the Butterfly Effect. Fortunately, this type of uncertainty is often manageable. Far more problematic are what Ms. Thompson calls "unquantifiable unknowns" -things that are left out of a model's calculation because they can't be anticipated, such as the unexpected arrival of a transformative technology or the abrupt collapse of a robust market.

...

[Moi ici: Outro parágrafo precioso] Beyond the inherent inability of models to account for the unaccountable, models also reflect the biases of their creators. We may be inclined to regard models as objective expressions of truth, yet they are deliberately constructed interpretations, imbued with the values and viewpoints of the modelers-primarily, as Ms. Thompson notes, well-educated, middle-class individuals. During the pandemic, models "took more account of harms to some groups of people than others," resulting in a "moral case" for lockdowns that was "partial and biased." Modelers who worked from home while others maintained the supply chain often overlooked "all of the possible harms" of the actions their models were suggesting. And even when models try to describe the effects of different courses of action, human beings must ultimately weigh the benefits and harms. "Science cannot tell us how to value things," Ms. Thompson says. "The idea of 'following the science' is meaningless."

...

The statistician George Box once observed that "all models are wrong, but some are useful." For Ms. Thompson, the real utility of models is as a tool for exploration rather than a mechanism to divine the truth or predict the future. "The process of generating a model changes the way that we think about a situation," she writes; it "strengthens some concepts and weakens others." Recalling President Eisenhower's legendary maxim-that "plans are useless, but planning is indispensable"--she argues that relying on models solely for their output misses the indispensable value of the process of model development: of trade-offs, and the agility to adapt if foundational assumptions unexpectedly change.

While acknowledging our "overenthusiasm for mathematical solutions," Ms. Thompson emphatically counsels not abstinence but discipline and humility. Clarity about the purpose of the model matters, she says: An epidemiological model may inform us about viral transmission and hospital pressure but not about the economic effects of closing businesses. Modelers should acknowledge the value judgments implicit in their models, explain what makes a model "good" and describe relevant limitations. But it's up to us to learn from models without being drawn in by their seductive elegance and to ensure that the lessons from Model Land find substantive expression where it actually matters: in our messy, material, magnificent world."

How can we use the process approach (part IVa)

Part I, part II, part IIIa and part IIIb.

5.Processes and strategy

5.1 Anything about strategy in ISO 9001 and ISO 9000?

ISO 9000:2015 defines strategy as:

plan to achieve a long-term or overall objective

When you remember the old article from Henry Mintzberg, The Strategy Concept I: Five Ps for Strategy, published in October 1987 by California Management Review. 

Summarizing the strategy in a plan is too little, too poor. 

What about ISO 9001:2015, where does the strategy come in? 

Clause 4.1:

The organization shall determine external and internal issues that are relevant to its purpose and its strategic direction

Interestingly, not many people realize that relevant external and internal issues and their classification are a function of strategic orientation.

Clause 5.1.1:

ensuring that the quality policy and quality objectives are established for the quality management system and are compatible with the context and strategic direction of the organization;

OK, alignment of quality policy with context and strategic direction.

Clause 5.2.1:

is appropriate to the purpose and context of the organization and supports its strategic direction;

Again, alignment of quality policy with context and strategic direction. Quality policy should derive from strategic orientation.

Clause 9.3.1:

Top management shall review the organization’s quality management system, at planned intervals, to ensure its continuing suitability, adequacy, effectiveness and alignment with the strategic direction of the organization.

OK, this is understandable, it is peaceful. 

That’s it!!!

Not very useful as a guide to work with strategy.

Let us try another door. One of the quality management principles is customer focus. ISO 9000:2015 states:

The primary focus of quality management is to meet customer requirements and to strive to exceed customer expectations.

One of the things that worries me about ISO 9001 is that it uses the language "customer" instead of "target customer".

Seth Godin in his book “We Are All Weird” writes:

"The mass market — which made average products for average people was invented by organizations that needed to keep their factories and systems running efficiently.

Stop for a second and think about the backwards nature of that sentence.

The factory came first. It led to the mass market. Not the other way around.”

“For a hundred years, industrialists have had a clearly stated goal: standardized workers building standardized parts”, [Another text by Seth Godin, from his blog]. This resulted, as a business model, while demand was bigger than supply. When demand is bigger than supply, the boss, the one calling the shots, is the one who produces. And when that is the case, whoever is more efficient wins. Everyone tries to compete for the lowest cost. 

In this world, the competitive landscape can be compared to a single mountain and all competitors try to climb that mountain, the higher they rise, the higher the yield, but the higher they climb, the fewer the number of companies that survive, because in this landscape of a single mountain, the one that wins is the one that uses the effect of scale, grow in volume to lower unit costs and be more competitive.

As soon as supply started to exceed the level of demand, the economic world began a transformation towards more variety. In terms of the competitive landscape, this translates into many, more and more mountains. And those who climb one do not compete with those who climb the other:

In an economic world full of different peaks in a rugged landscape there are many types of customers. Different customers look and value different things. 

Let us stay away from statistics and look customers in the eye, literally and metaphorically. If we look at customers who value price above all else, what satisfies them? 

Satisfied customers do not happen by chance, they are the normal and natural result of work done upstream to achieve the results they value. 

What do we have to do upstream to produce these results in a perfectly normal, systematic, and sustainable way? 

This market is highly competitive, different competitors seek to improve their efficiency, whoever is more efficient wins, whoever stretches the frontiers of operational excellence wins. 

Amateurs cannot compete with paranoid competitors.

Now, let's look at another type of customer, the one who wants tailor-made service, or a customized product. What do they value? 

What kind of priorities are behind these results?

Finally, let's look at another type of customer, the one who wants innovation, or values design above all. What do they value? 

Again, what kind of priorities are behind these results?

Now imagine an organization that wants to serve the three types of customers at the same time

What a big mess it will be! A typical stuck-in-the-middle situation.

The following figure is taken from an article called “Using Product Profiling to Illustrate Manufacturing-Marketing Misalignment” by Terry Hill, Rafael Menda, and David Dilts and published in July 1998.

One can look into an organization and evaluate its products and markets, its manufacturing structure, and its infrastructure. 

For example, about the products and markets: organizations can have wide or narrow product ranges, high or low rate of new product introductions. High or Low frequency of schedule changes. And different order winners, the most relevant topic at the eyes of certain groups, certain segments of customers.

For example, for manufacturing: organizations can have small or large production run sizes, high or low set-up frequencies, low or high set-up costs.

For example, for infrastructure: organizations may be designed to new product introductions or for process improvements to improve efficiency. Manufacturing Managers’ tasks may be dedicated to schedules or to quantity.

Let us see two examples.

The blue company is a company that bets on innovation, they have a wide range of products, they have a high rate of new product introductions, They are flexible enough to accommodate and thrive in the middle of a high frequency of schedule changes. Customers love the innovative products and the brand. Their manufacturing is aligned by being able to run small production sizes, handle a high frequency of set-ups and their cost is low. Infrastructure is aligned with product introductions and meeting schedules.

On the other side, one can think about a green company. A company that bets on low cost to compete on price, they have a narrow range of products, they have a low rate of new product introductions. A new product introduction is a headache, is more entropy. They try to minimize the frequency of schedule changes, which reduces throughput, that reduces efficiency. Customers love their low prices. Their manufacturing is aligned by being able to run large production sizes without stop, they minimize set-ups, and their cost is high. Infrastructure is aligned with efficiency and process improvements process in and throughput.

Different organizations, different strategies, different processes, different mindsets.

Now consider the example of a third company, a company that has a weak or unclear strategy, a company not aligned.

They have a wide product range, an average rate of new product introductions, an average frequency of schedule changes, and their order winners are based on price. Things don’t fit nicely together

They run small to average production run sizes and average set-up frequency and cost.

Their mind is in searching for efficiency but at the same time, they look to meet schedules to satisfy different customers looking for different products in small quantities.

This company is a mess, is stuck in the middle trying to serve everybody and fighting with conflicting priorities.

Continue.

Acerca dos monopólios informais (I)

Consideremos aqui o Facebook, a Apple como exemplo de monopólios. Basta atentarem no cabeçalho deste blog para lerem "monopólios informais":

"there is a huge incentive to attack the luxurious market of an existing monopolist — and innumerable companies do so. The monopolist must understand that these insurgents can’t help themselves: the opportunity is too attractive.

But taking on the monopolist at the heart of its business is rarely their approach. The dominant approach is to chip away at the edges of the monopoly. Think of the monopolist’s business as a circular disk. At the center is the perfect customer who thinks the monopolist’s offer is perfect. As you move away from the center, the offering is ever less perfect to those customers. And that is where insurgents attack: not at the center but at the fringes. And they win fringe customers.

When MCI and Sprint attacked AT&T’s monopoly, they didn’t attack the core of middle-American residential customers. They went after large businesses, who were being vastly overcharged relative to cost to serve, in order for AT&T to subsidize undercharged rural customers. Facebook’s insurgents aren’t attacking the core of its business. They are picking off customers who are hyper-sensitive to privacy issues (MT Social) or hyper-sensitive to ads (MeWe) or want to get credit for their participation (Minds) or they are searching for ideas/inspiration (Pinterest). If successful, that insurgent becomes the new monopolist for that niche — some of which are too small to be profitable, others not.

But the result is that the original monopolist’s territory becomes ever smaller as it is dynamically segmented around the edges. Ironically, the same thing happens in due course to the new entrants’ monopolies. So, dynamically over time, markets keep segmenting and segmenting into shrinking monopolies. It is inexorable."

Trechos retirados de "The Two Rules that Monopolists Ignore at their Peril" 

Em que lado do teste do lápis está a sua empresa?

Há anos que recomendo às PMEs a ARTE!

Por exemplo:

• Arte, sempre a arte (Maio de 2018)
• O futuro da economia é a arte (Abril de 2018) 
• A ascensão do artesão e da arte na produção (parte II) (Abril de 2017)
• Qual a alternativa? (Maio de 2016)
• O papel da arte! (Abril de 2016)
• Arte e PME (Novembro de 2015)
• Acerca da paixão nas PME (Março de 2015)
• Passion Rules!!! (Maio de 2011)
• Há sempre uma alternativa (parte II) (Maio de 2011)
• Paixão e relações amorosas (Fevereiro de 2011)

Há muitos anos que uso a frase:

Há anos que descobri o caso da Viarco:

• Inovação na ponta do lápis (Agosto de 2009)
• Mandamentos para os gestores das unidades com futuro (Novembro de 2009)
• "Nós fazemos as contas ao contrário" (Setembro de 2014)

Estou já na fase final da leitura de um livro simplesmente delicioso, "The Passion Economy: The New Rules for Thriving in the Twenty-First Century" de Adam Davidson. O capítulo 9, “Don’t be a commodity” é acerca de uma empresa que produzia o produto mais commodity que se possa imaginar, lápis escolares, e que depois de ser esmagada pelos chineses deu a volta por cima.

"I came to think of them as exemplifying the single most important rule for thriving in a twenty-first-century economy. The rule applies to manufacturers, but also to bankers and artists and teachers and middle managers at large corporations. The rule is simple: Do not be a commodity.
.
Commodities fit a few key criteria. They are undifferentiated. That means that people who buy them don’t see any qualitative difference between competing versions. Instead, commodities are bought based on price and convenience. Most people gravitate toward buying the cheaper dish soap, the cheaper lumber, or the cheaper light bulb instead of the more expensive version on the same shelf.
...
General Pencil had so many orders from so many school districts that it no longer needed to be at the cutting edge of innovation.
The American pencil business had by then become what economists call a mature business.
...
This sleepy world was overturned in the 1990s when something entirely new began to happen. Ships arrived in the nearby Port Newark with huge containers filled with pencils made in China. These pencils looked identical to the ones General made.
...
[Moi ici: Anos depois, a filha do dono da empresa de lápis teve uma ideia] In that moment, Katie realized that she had come upon an enormous hole in the U.S. pencil market. She couldn’t possibly be the only person who wanted a solid, reliable drawing utensil, something between the two extreme options. [Moi ici: Os dois extremos eram os láis chineses de um lado e os de engenharia, de origem alemã] Parents, she knew, would happily pay a reasonable premium for pencils custom-made for their kids. She picked up the phone, called her dad, and offered him an idea that might just save the family business.
Katie eventually created a line of kits that included drawing supplies and instruction books based on her classes.
...
There would be kits with entire lines of colored pencils, and there would be kits with charcoals for high schoolers who had more ambitious goals and wished to develop more comprehensive skills.
...
The companies that shipped container loads of Chinese pencils were too large and distant to worry about such a niche market. They were still satisfied selling commodities. The German companies, which needed to maintain their professional reputation, were reluctant to dilute their brand image by focusing on children. [Moi ici: Como não recordar o truque de Roger Martin para avaliar se uma estratégia é mesmo uma estratégia. O contrário de uma estratégia a sério não é estúpido, mas representa uma brutal fricção para quem a queira seguir] This is why Katie was able to charge a dollar apiece for her pencils. The parents who buy General Pencil kits for their kids are happy to pay a premium, since they are getting a product precisely designed for them.
...
I have come to think of “the pencil test” whenever I am confronted with a question of how best to thrive in a rapidly changing global economy. There is no product more commoditized, more easily reproducible, than the simple No. 2 pencil. Yet General Pencil was able to get out of commodity competition. It was able to thrive and profit by identifying a specific audience with clear needs and serving that audience thoroughly. [Moi ici: Qualquer empresa em Portugal está de um lado ou do outro do teste do lápis. Ou são uma commodity ou são algo com valor acrescentado para um grupo de clientes-alvo que outras empresas nunca poderão oferecer porque estragaria o seu modelo de negócio]
...
[Moi ici: Depois, vem o final do capítulo para fechar este postal, tal como ele começou, a arte] Katie was far more of an artist than an industrialist. Her passion lay in sketching nature, not in looking at spreadsheets, worrying about the rising cost of graphite and the bottleneck at their Midwest distributor. That was stuff her dad loved and would never be for her.
But while working with her dad developing the pencil kits, she found herself becoming fascinated by some of the very things she assumed she’d hate. Distribution, she realized, isn’t just a dull corporate word; it’s the way she can get pencils in the hands of children and artists. Finance isn’t a deathly dull spreadsheet; it’s a language that allows her to make better decisions about the experiments she wants to conduct, and it guides her as she invents different kinds of kits and assesses which ones have successfully found a market. She would never make distribution and finance the core of her work. General Pencil has plenty of experts in those areas. But she learned that there could be as much joy and creativity in business as there is in art."

BTW, neste artigo de Julho de 2011, "Uma Sildávia na América", comentei o estado da empresa antes do tal telefonema de Katie

“The core problem is uncertainty”

"It was expected, perhaps, but still startling. In its 22nd Annual Global CEO Survey, PwC asked 1,378 top business leaders from around the world which territories (excluding their own) they considered the most important for their company’s growth prospects in the next 12 months. The world’s chief executives were noticeably noncommittal. As many as 15 percent of them answered “don’t know” in 2019, up from 8 percent the previous year.CEOs in the United States were even more dubious: 14 percent of them didn’t consider any other markets suitable for growth, up from only 2 percent in the 2018 survey.
...
This shift in attitude is already reflected in business investment. Of the 31 percent of CEOs who said they were “extremely concerned” about trade wars, 45 percent said they were shifting their supply chain strategy, and 25 percent said they were shifting their growth strategies to other territories.
...
Fundamental aspects of the global economy have been shifting for more than a decade. Elements undergoing change include costs for manufacturing (including labor costs, which are rising), new technological platforms (such as those associated with Industry 4.0), stronger suppliers and other businesses in emerging markets (which are maturing), middle-class consumer populations around the world (which are growing rapidly in emerging markets and shrinking in other places), and political and regulatory uncertainties.
...
A new model of market expansion strategy — we call it “internationalization” — is replacing the globalism of the early 2000s. This model acknowledges that the global business ecosystem now includes many small and medium-sized enterprises and ambitious family businesses, often based in emerging markets, linked together by collaborative supply chains and platforms. At the same time, larger companies with established global supply chains have realized that they need to bring their operations closer to the demand they are targeting. The trade tensions of 2019 have heightened awareness of these dynamics, and accelerated the business response to them.
...
To be sure, global trade will still thrive, but there will be more regional concentration. Rather than shipping goods around the world from cheaplabor hubs, companies manufacture goods for Asian customers in Asia, for European customers in Central Europe, and for North American customers in Latin America. They develop regional footprints, sourcing from more locations."

Interessante:

"The World Trade Organization (WTO) published a report in June 2019 showing that G20 nations had implemented 20 new restrictive trade measures between October 2018 and May 2019, including higher tariffs, import bans, and new customs procedures for exports.
...
All this has had a chilling effect on international commerce. Imports by G20 economies were 1.2 percent lower in the first quarter of 2019 than they were a year earlier, whereas exports were only marginally (0.4 percent) higher, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development figures show. “The core problem is uncertainty,” said Piyush Gupta, chief executive of Singapore’s largest domestic bank, DBS, in an interview with strategy+business. “There’s a general environment of skittishness.”"

Trechos retirados de "Growth strategies for an uncertain world"

Heterogeneidade dos mercados (parte II)

Em "Heterogeneidade dos mercados" sublinhámos, com o exemplo da China, que se pode ser muito bom a produzir e a exportar um produto e, no entanto, precisar de importar esse produto para outra segmento de mercado.

Outro exemplo que poderia ter utilizado no texto inicial é o do mobiliário. Portugal exporta mobiliário caro, e importa mobiliário barato.

Um outro exemplo que acrescento agora é "Fast Fashion Must be High-End to Compete in China". Podemos logo relacionar o título com o exemplo do calçado. Os chineses produzem calçado barato, não precisam de importar calçado barato. Daí que o preço médio de um par de sapatos importado pela China é substancialmente superior ao preço médio do calçado importado por países como a Alemanha, França ou a Holanda:

Voltando ao artigo sobre a fast fashion na China:

"While overseas fast fashion brands were quick to enter the Chinese market, they’ve had a hard time competing with local online retailers on websites like Tmall and Taobao. Chinese tastes have also shifted toward more elevated options, which offers an opportunity to high-end, fast fashion brands but hurts entry-level fast fashion. McKinsey & Company’s research suggests that more than 75 percent of China’s urban consumers will enter the middle-class bracket by 2022.
...
“Chinese consumers have easy access to a variety of home-grown and affordable fashion brands online that pose a bigger challenge to brands like H&M and Zara,” says Ray Ju, the New York-based senior consultant of the global brand consultancy Labbrand. As this consumer steps into a new bracket, they are looking for new options that they can’t already find online: clothing with an affordable price point but with higher quality and design.
.
Local customers have shown waning interest in fast fashion in recent years, complaining about bad quality and uncompetitive prices compared to local brands on Taobao."

O “Mendelian executive” - o mecanismo (parte I)

Ontem, durante uma caminhada matinal comecei a ler "Mendel in the C-Suite: Design and the Evolution of Strategies" de Daniel A. Levinthal e publicado em 2017 por Strategy Science 2(4):282-287.

Levinthal escreve de uma forma muito atractiva.

"The question of “where do good strategies come from” is arguably a subset of the broader question of why things are the way they are. At its most basic level, as with respect to the question of life on planet earth, we have two general classes of answers: one invoking some form of intentional design and the other invoking a Darwinian process of descent with variation and a contested selection process. The argument developed here tries to set forth a middle-ground perspective of a Mendelian executive. This “Mendelian executive” operates with a degree of intentionality; but, unlike the conception of rationality in neoclassical economics, this intentionality is limited. Furthermore, the emphasis is more on the design of experimental processes than on the design of specific paths forward. [Moi ici: Desenhar caminhos específicos é demasiada arrogância. É menos inseguro fazer pequenas expriências e ir tacteando] While circumscribed, this intentionality and design sets this Mendelian executive apart from a pure Darwinian process. Both orientations highlight the role of path dependencies. However, the intentionality of the Mendelian executive allows for the conscious exploration of adjacent “spaces” rather than the happenstance of random variants. Furthermore, the argument developed here highlights the role of intentionality with respect to the selection and culling of strategic initiatives. The firm is viewed as operating an “artificial selection” environment in contrast to selection as the direct consequence of the outcome of competitive processes. [Moi ici: Tanto a paisagem competitiva evolui e afecta as organizações, como estas podem procurar espaços competitivos alternativos] While these outcomes may inform the artificial selection process, the two criteria need not be the same.
...
While not controlling these processes, perhaps to some degree we can engage in some intentional engineering of these evolutionary processes. Consider, for instance, the frequently discussed need for organizations to balance processes of exploration and exploitation. Such manipulation is unlikely to be a precise engineering of the evolutionary process, but rather a reflection of a broad awareness of the effect of alternative organizational policies on the dynamics of firm evolution, as these policies tilt the “needle” of the exploration/exploitation balance in one direction or another.
...
An important dichotomy in arguments regarding the specification of business strategies is the degree to which action is identified a priori as a result of “offline” reasoning and consideration versus an ex post assessment of “online” trials. In this regard, it is import to note that a Darwinian process is one extreme of online trials. The Mendelian executive straddles both online and offline forms of learning and strategy identification. The experimental variants are not random acts but rather conscious choices of potentially promising initiatives. Furthermore, the Mendelian view melds an offline sensibility with regard to the ex post evaluation of online trials. A purely evolutionary or Darwinian mechanism operates through a contestation of relative fitness and what is fundamentally a myopic selection process. By contrast, the Mendelian executive may make conscious choices of what might constitute the dimensions of merit by which initiatives are evaluated. Furthermore, that calculus of evaluation may constitute forward-looking indicators of merit. The ultimate value of the contemporaneous realization of any initiative is inevitably speculative, but speculation is conscious and explicit. From an evolutionary perspective, there are two basic mechanisms at work: processes of variation and selection. We can consider the work of the Mendelian executive with respect to both of these processes. We tend to associate variation as the consequence of some stochastic process, but variation may have considerable elements of planning and intentionality. [Moi ici: Variação ou variedade?] Variation may be considered from the perspective of individual ideation; the internal ecology of initiatives within the firm; and the role of path dependence, “pivots,” and adjacencies.
...
Yet, in the Mendelian perspective developed here—situated between classic images of design and intentionality and a Darwinian process of random variants and contested selection—the interpretation of experimental outcomes plays a prominent role. It is common to contrast learning processes with processes of selection. Our typical conceptions of learning processes are based on notions of reinforcement learning in which the proclivity to engage in a particular act is reinforced or diminished as a consequence of the association between that act and an observed outcome. However, in the strategy context, outcomes in terms of an ultimate consequence of a strategic action are typically rather distant in time from the “act.” Given this “distance,” the time between initiating a new product, mode of competing, entry into a new geography or market space, and the ultimate feedback regarding the wisdom of such an effort, interim judgments play a critical role in any adaptive efforts. [Moi ici: O papel dos indicadores do balanced scorecard como forma de avaliar se a execução da estratégia está a ocorrer como previsto e se os resultados estão a caminhar para o desejado]
...
when organizations define milestones and metrics around key success factors, they are constituting an artificial selection environment that guides the cultivation of initiatives within the firm. The virtue of such shaping rewards is that they may substantially speed up the feedback process relative to the feedback from the environment as to whether a given action or strategy is pushing forward along a promising track."

Continua.