Dois economistas, três opiniões

"Economists at the Bank of International Settlements looked at data from more than 25,000 companies and found supply chains lengthening as other countries, especially in Asia, became additional stops in trade between China and the US. Companies shifting supply chains away from China are often moving production to countries whose economies are already highly integrated with China, such as Vietnam. Mexico, where investment by Chinese manufacturers has ticked up noticeably in recent years, is also becoming an important link in US-China trade. So it's not so much that the US and Chinese economies are decoupling-they're just coupling in different places.

...

Still, the connectors are proof that talk of the end of globalization is overwrought. Goods and capital still move across borders - even more of them, in fact."

Estes trechos foram retirados de "These Five Countries Are Key Economic; 'Connectors' in a Fragmenting World" publicado pela revista Bloomberg Business Week.

Interessante o que encontramos no WSJ de ontem:

"China passed a significant milestone last fall: For the first time since its economic opening more than four decades ago, it traded more with developing countries than the U.S., Europe and Japan combined. It was one of the clearest signs yet that China and the West are going in different directions as tensions increase over trade, technology, security and other thorny issues.

...

Benefits for the U.S. and Europe include less reliance on Chinese supply chains and more jobs for Americans and Europeans that otherwise might go to China. But there are major risks, such as slower global growth - and many economists worry the costs will outweigh the advantages."

Trechos retirados de "Global Economy Splits Into U.S. vs. China"

"This is a column about two numbers that seem to tell contradictory stories about globalization.

Over the past 15 years, a consensus has developed that globalization has run its course and gone into decline. One popular number supporting this argument: Trade as a share of global output peaked in 2008 at the cusp of the global financial crisis and has never recovered.

But a new metric from a pair of economists, Sharat Ganapati of Georgetown University and Woan Foong Wong at the University of Oregon, tells the opposite story: More goods are traveling greater distances than ever before.

That seems impossible if globalization has truly swung into reverse. So which is right?"

Trechos retirados de "Is Globalization Over? A New Metrie Says No"

Slowbalization

 Imagem retirada daqui.

Slowbalization, uma palavra a entrar no nosso vocabulário.

Inflação e desemprego industrial (parte II)

Ainda a propósito de Inflação e desemprego industrial estes trechos do JdN de 28.02 passado no artigo "Empresas portuguesas mais optimistas, na UE não":

Sinais mistos sobre andamento da economia 

O resultado dos inquéritos de conjuntura da Comissão Europeia não era o antecipado pelos analistas.

"A estabilização do indicador de sentimento económico em fevereiro contrasta com as subidas expressivas do PMI e confirma que a economia europeia vai ter sérias dificuldades este ano", comenta Andrew Kenningham, da Capital Economics. Recorde-se que a atividade empresarial da Zona Euro, medida pelo índice PMI (divulgado na semana passada) acelerou em fevereiro para um pico de nove meses, sugerindo um crescimento económico do início do ano."

E de ontem, "Eurozone economy expands at strongest pace since June 2022". 

Inflação e desemprego industrial

Inflação e desemprego industrial.

Primeiro, a inflação. Nos últimos meses tenho pensado num título que recordava ter ouvido citar há vários anos. Ontem pesquisei-o e cheguei a "Give Sam Walton the Nobel Prize" e encontrei o que procurava:

"The world's largest retailer, Walmart shrugs off the controversy for a simple reason: The stuff it sells is cheap. Beyond its immense buying power (which sucks profit margins from suppliers), its incredibly efficient logistics systems and sourcing from low-wage foreign labor allow Walmart to drive down the cost of making and shipping many of its products. And Walmart is only the most visible example of a far bigger phenomenon: Globally, even in places thousands of miles from the nearest blue-shirted greeter, more efficient production and transportation are reducing the prices of many of the basic goods purchased by the world's poorest people. If that's rapacious, Walmart-style capitalism, let's have more!

...

Walmart’s low prices come in part from relying on efficient production in developing countries. Of course it isn’t just Walmart’s procurement agents who are buying cheap stuff from Asia; pretty much the whole world is, including retailers from Bangalore to Bangui. That’s because manufacturers in China, India, and elsewhere have become particularly adept at producing low-cost versions of goods demanded by "bottom of the pyramid" consumers — otherwise known as the world’s poorest people."

Agora pensem no que acontecerá se a globalização der lugar à desglobalização, der lugar ao nearshoring e ao reshoring como temos referido ao longo dos anos aqui no blogue. O regresso da inflação provocado pelo aumento dos custos de produção (mão de obra mais cara e sistemas de produção menos eficientes).

Agora pensem no que acontecerá se a globalização der lugar à desglobalização, der lugar ao nearshoring e ao reshoring como temos referido ao longo dos anos aqui no blogue. Uma certa reindustrialização do Ocidente:

• O fim da globalização (parte II) (Julho de 2022)
• Quem é este morcão? (Junho de 2022)
• Os suspeitos do costume (Janeiro de 2013)
• A reindustrialização em curso (Dezembro de 2012)

Uma das Consequências da reindustrialização em curso (Fevereiro de 2023) será o aumento da procura por operários, por colarinhos azuis. Por isto, e por causa da política de imigração de Trump/Biden os salários dos colarinhos azuis nos Estados Unidos têm aumentado muito acima do resto do mercado de trabalho.

Ontem encontrei este artigo, "There's A White-Collar 'Richcession,' While Blue-Collar And Frontline Workers See Wage Growth And More Job Opportunities" e bate tudo certo:

"Typically, the working class and blue-collar workers are the most impacted in challenging economic climates. However, this time, it's different. The wealthy and high-paid, whitecollar professionals are facing what is being called a "richcession," according to the Wall Street Journal."

"há anos em que décadas acontecem"

Há uma citação atribuída a Lenin:

"Há décadas em que nada acontece, mas há semanas em que décadas acontecem"

A minha versão será:

"Há décadas em que nada acontece, mas há anos em que décadas acontecem" 

Por um lado o impacte das mudanças a nível dos consumidores: 

"During the pandemic, companies had to pivot quickly to meet new consumer demands

...

However, the pandemic was not the most dangerous time for big companies. 

Instead, today is the most fraught for established players, 

...

“Customer loyalty has changed. Customer buying habits have changed. Priorities have changed as well,” says Blank, 

...

With pandemic restrictions changing in the U.S., Blank says, consumer behavior is due to shift again. But how exactly? Well, he’s not so sure. Companies should prepare for many scenarios.

...

 This is a huge opportunity for all the chairs to be rearranged. Market leaders are vulnerable to new entrants. This is a great time to be a new entrant. This is a very dangerous time to be an existing market leader."

Por outro lado as alterações a nível da globalização: The changing nature of globalisation, o impacte da invasão da Ucrânia, a política do Covid zero:

Lições de Hidden Champions (parte V)

Parte I, parte II, parte III e parte IV.

Mais um conjunto de lições a reter dos "hidden champions":

• focalização em clientes-alvo de um nicho e procurá-los em todo o mundo: globalização
• desenvolvimento de fortes relações com os clientes

"How does a company ascend to world market leadership? Certainly not by staying at home and waiting for customers to call on it. Instead, the hidden champions venture into the world and offer their products wherever their customers are. This process of globalization typically takes generations and requires unending stamina. In the preceding chapter we learned that the hidden champions operate in narrowly defined and therefore relatively small markets. To expand these markets, the hidden champions have chosen globalization as the second pillar of their strategy besides focus. This means that they are narrow in the substance of their business and wide in the regional dimension. The hidden champions' world markets are far larger than their respective home markets.

...

The consequences of narrow market definition are even more pronounced for supernichists and market owners. Even in large countries, niche markets can become tiny. The hidden champions would be doomed to remain small without the possibility of regional expansion. Consequently, globalization is the second pillar of their strategy.

...

The narrow market definition based on application, technology, target group or other criteria is coupled with a wide market definition regarding the regional dimension. These are the two major pillars of the hidden champion strategy: specialization in product and know-how combined with breadth in the regional market coverage, normally on a global scale.

...

The hidden champions have extremely close relationships with their customers, due to the complexity of the products and services they offer. Three-quarters of the companies practice direct sales. Five times as many employees in hidden champion companies have regular contact with customers than in large corporations, leading to the pronounced closeness.

...

Many hidden champions cooperate very closely with their top customers and benefit from them as drivers of performance and as references. The customers' demands are aimed primarily at high performance rather than at low prices. The products and services supplied by the hidden champions offer not only top quality with high-tech content, but also increasingly comprehensive advice and systems solutions. Prices are clearly above market level.

...

The hidden champions' relationships with their customers are close and interactive. The main reason is that, in general, they offer complex product and service programs, often even systems solutions. Such programs cannot be sold off the peg, but require detailed consultation processes."

Trechos retirados de "Hidden Champions of the Twenty-First Century Success Strategies of Unknown World Market Leaders" de Hermann Simon. 

O risco de voltar a trabalhar com a China (parte IV)

Parte III, Parte II e parte I.

"The invasion of Ukraine by Russia and sanctions imposed on it for doing so and new pandemic-related shutdowns in China are the latest events to rock global supply chains. Combined with the China-U.S. trade war and other pandemic- and climate-related disruptions, it is certain to accelerate the movement by Western companies to reduce their dependency on China for components and finished goods and on Russia for transportation and raw materials and to lead to more localized, or regional, sourcing strategies. If China decides to back Russia in the Ukraine conflict, it would only fuel that movement.

...

In 2019, just before the pandemic, China accounted for 28.7% of global manufacturing output while the United States accounted for 16.8%

In the last four years, however, the China-U.S. trade war and the supply chain disruptions generated by the pandemic and climate-related events have caused the pace of supply-chain localization to rise significantly. In fact, a January 2020 survey of 3,000 firms, motivated by the China-U.S. trade war, found that companies in a variety of industries — including semiconductors, autos, and medical equipment — had shifted, or planned to shift, at least part off their supply chains from current locations. Companies in about half of all global sectors in North America declared an intent to “reshore.”

...

The Ukraine war and closer alignment of China and Russia will modify profoundly the exchange of energy, raw materials, industrial parts, and goods between the Western world, China, and Russia and promise to accelerate the reshoring trend."

Trechos retirados de "How the War in Ukraine Is Further Disrupting Global Supply Chains"

O risco de voltar a trabalhar com a China (parte II)

Parte I. 

"In the long term, the economic effects will follow geopolitics. If the outcome is a deep and prolonged division between the west and a bloc centred on China and Russia, economic divisions will follow. Everybody would try to reduce their dependence on contentious and unreliable partners. Politics trumps economics in such a world. At a global level, the economy would be reconfigured. But in times of war, politics always trumps economics. We do not yet know how.

...

In this new world, the position of China will be a central concern. Its leadership needs to understand that supporting Russia is now incompatible with friendly relations with western countries. On the contrary, the latter will have to make strategic security an overriding imperative of their economic policy. If China decides to rely on a new axis of irredentist authoritarians against the west, global economic division must follow. Businesses have to take note of this."

Quais as consequências económicas para a reindustrialização da Europa? 

Trechos retirados de "Putin has reignited the conflict between tyranny and liberal democracy" 

O risco de voltar a trabalhar com a China

O risco de voltar a trabalhar com a China, mesmo num futuro sem covid, continua a aumentar.

— Carlos P da Cruz 🇺🇦 (@ccz1) February 28, 2022

Mesmo depois do Covid acabar e acabarem as intermináveis quarentenas para quem se desloca à China, quem pensar em voltar à China para encomendar produção terá de equacionar a possibilidade da China invadir Taiwan, e seguirem-se sanções como aconteceu agora com a Rússia.

Emprego, preços e desglobalização

Com o progresso da globalização veio o encerramento de muitas empresas em todo o mundo Ocidental, a chamada desindustrialização, por incapacidade de competir pelo preço com a China primeiro e a Ásia depois. Assim, com o progresso da globalização veio o aumento do desemprego no Ocidente por um lado, e a redução generalizada dos preços por outro.

Com a crise de 2008 começou a desglobalização, o aumento da importância do factor proximidade produção-consumo. Agora, com os confinamentos, com as quarentenas, com as cadeias de fornecimento pouco ágeis num mundo de incerteza... façamos uma inversão daquelas setas:

Os impactes da desglobalização serão:

• mais emprego; (falta de mão de obra) e
• preços mais altos (inflação)

Será que isto pode durar? Neste artigo da revista The Economist, "China’s economy looks especially vulnerable to the spread of Omicron" li:

"Since the end of May, China has recorded 7,728 covid-19 infections. America has recorded 15.2m. And yet China’s curbs on movement and gathering have been tighter, especially near outbreaks (see chart 1). Its policy of “zero tolerance” towards covid-19 also entails limited tolerance for international travel. It requires visitors to endure a quarantine of at least 14 days in an assigned hotel. The number of mainlanders crossing the border has dropped by 99%, according to Wind, a data provider.

...

Businesspeople in Shanghai have started talking about travel restrictions persisting until 2024. The virus is highly mutable. China’s policy towards it, however, is strikingly invariant."

 Acerca do emprego este exemplo "Desemprego do passado dá lugar a falta de mão-de-obra no têxtil no Vale do Ave".

Acerca dos preços este exemplo "Retreat From Globalization Adds to Inflation Risks":

"While supply-chain disruptions, labor shortages and fiscal stimulus have all been blamed for the rise in short-term inflation, another long-term force could also be at work: “deglobalization.”

Economists and policy makers have long argued that globalization helped to lower prices. As trade barriers fell, domestic companies were forced to compete with cheaper imports. Technology and trade liberalization encouraged  businesses to outsource production to low-wage countries.

...

“The reorganization and shortening of supply chains…will have a cost that will be passed down to the vendors and ultimately to consumers,”"

"também eu sou vítima de ideologias" (parte II)

Parte I.

O que escrevi aqui no blogue em Novembro de 2009:

"Há anos, fiz uns trabalhos para empresas produtoras de materiais para a construção situadas no centro do país. Assim que abriu a A24 abriu-se, naturalmente um novo campo de combate, um novo mercado... Vila real e Chaves. Como os produtos de que estamos a falar eram/são commodities o efeito da escala tornava as pequenas fábricas dessa zona presas fáceis para os predadores habituados a mercados mais competitivos e com uma dimensão várias vezes superior.

Portanto, os autarcas que se regozijam com a abertura de auto-estradas em Trás-os-montes e Alto Douro são como os jogadores de bilhar amador, só vêem a próxima jogada, não vêem as consequências das jogadas seguintes... mais desemprego na indústria local e mais desertificação."

O que escreve Reinert?

"One key feature of technological change during the last century has been the decrease of this transport resistance - sometimes called `the death of distance'. This has clearly made catching up - getting the national economies into increasing return activities - in peripheral countries more difficult."

Na semana passada escrevi em "Cínico":

"Quando me vierem falar de inovação e Indústria 4.0, por favor, foquem-se numa coisa apenas: a margem cresce, sim ou não? E se cresce, como ou porque cresce? E claro, quanto cresce?

...

Há aqui alguma coisa que ajude a aumentar preços?"

O que escreve Reinert?

"Innovations are generally divided into two categories. Microsoft products provide product innovations, produced under huge increasing returns, huge barriers to entry, huge profits, and an ability to pay very high wages. This same innovation hits the hotel industry in Venice as a process innovation, affecting how people book hotels. More perfect information available on the net increases price competition among hotels in Venice and puts pressure on profit margins and the ability to pay high wages. The same process innovation in the airline industry produces similar results. While IT increases wages around Microsoft's headquarters, the same technology puts downward pressures on the wages of air hostesses in Europe.[Moi ici: É a diferença entre trabalhar o numerador ou o denominador, seguir o Evangelho do Valor. É a diferença entre a treta e a realidade]

Although it is well known in innovation economics that product innovations and process innovations often have different effects on employment, not enough emphasis has been given to the fact that innovations may actually reduce value added in certain industries and geographic areas."

Onde é que isto nos está a levar?

Primeiro foi a saída da China e o efeito do banhista gordo.

Agora o impacte do Covid-19 na resiliência das cadeias de fornecimento, "Covid-19 Factory Closures Prompt Some U.S. Businesses to Rethink Vietnam":

"Nike, which makes about half of its shoes in Vietnam, said last week it had lost 10 weeks of production there due to plant closures. Those 10 weeks translate to about 100 million pairs of unmanufactured Nike shoes, according to BTIG LLC, an American brokerage firm. Nike now expects demand for its products to exceed available supply over the next eight months.

“Our experience with Covid-related plant closures suggests that reopening and returning to full scale production will take time,” Matt Friend, chief financial officer of Nike, said last week.

...

A survey conducted at the end of August among nearly 100 representatives of companies in the manufacturing sector by the American Chamber of Commerce in Vietnam found that a fifth had already transferred part of the production to other countries.

“What people realize, whether it’s China or Vietnam, or whatever, you can’t have all your eggs in one basket, you can’t be vulnerable to a country from a chain perspective. procurement, ”said Jonathan Moreno, head of the House manufacturing and supply chain task force.

...

Andrew Rees, CEO of Crocs Inc., the shoe company, said in mid-September that it was moving some production to other parts of the world. He said the company had already planned to migrate some of its production out of Vietnam and was adding facilities in Indonesia and India. “Continuous diversification is basically the name of the game,” he said."

Onde é que isto nos está a levar?

Que jogo de vasos comunicantes está a ser accionado?

 

Trabalhar para nichos mundiais

Na conversa de 116 minutos no Whatsapp no passado Sábado a minha irmã "inglesa" falou-me do livro "Why the Germans Do It Better" de John Kampfner. Ontem, comecei a ouvi-lo:

"It may be global in reach, but it is local in its loyalties. It is one of hundreds of thousands of small and medium-sized enterprises (with turnover of under €50 million and up to 250 workers) in towns across Germany. The Mittelstand employs around three quarters of the country’s workforce and produces more than half the economic output. It is the backbone of the economy and the backbone of society.

...

,,Along with regionalization, family ties and social responsibility, another key aspect of the Mittelstand is its emphasis on specialization. Many of the most successful entrepreneurs find a single product – a particular machine tool or a household appliance. Theirs is a narrow expertise, but they often then end up cornering the global market, focusing relentlessly on acquiring and expanding their customer base, and making sure they stay ahead of the competition.

...

Two statistics stand out. Some 80 per cent of German GDP is derived from family businesses. Two thirds of successful global Mittelstand companies are based in places with fewer than fifty thousand inhabitants.

...

In many other countries in the Western world, industrial and business operations have become very much centralized towards the major cities, whereas in Germany, advanced manufacturing, international footprint and regionalism go together.

Most of all, it is the smaller firms that set Germany apart. The business strategist and author Hermann Simon has coined the term ‘hidden champions’. These are companies, like the ones I’ve mentioned, that devote themselves to a niche. These are success stories of globalization and free trade. The individuals in charge are classic monomaniacs, single-minded and devoted to a single cause or product. They usually shun the limelight."

Falei-lhe disto quando lhe disse qual a receita para as PMEs tugas, nicho com clientes em todo o mundo para ter escala. A velha lição alemã:

• Empresas pequenas concentradas em nichos mundiais (2012)

Again - It's not the euro, stupid!

Sábado à tarde investi algum tempo a ler mais umas páginas de "Windows of Opportunity: How Nations Make Wealth" de David Sainsbury.

Uma lição magistral sobre o que aconteceu nos últimos 30 anos a nível do comércio mundial. Uma lição que devia ser lida pelos tótós que defendem que o euro foi o responsável pelo desempenho do nosso país. Sainsbury dá como exemplos a China, a Polónia e a Índia. Em 2015 a China tinha 20% da manufactura mundial... em 1990 tinha 3%.

Primeiro, a drástica limitação da influência do estado na economia e a abolição de preços fixados pelo governo, deixando isso ao cuidado do mercado. E isso coincidiu com uma janela de oportunidade:

• a liberalização do comércio mundial;
• novas formas de transporte; e
• o desenvolvimento de cadeias de fornecimento globais CFG.

O efeito do aparecimento do contentor nos anos 60 e a sua progressiva generalização nos anos 70 e 80. O frete aéreo tornou-se comercialmente viável com a ascensão das DHL e UPS deste mundo.

O crescimento das CFG, facultado pelo avanços revolucionários na transmissão, armazenamento e processamento de informação (lembro-me de ler isto numa The McKinsey Quarterly em 2004 ou 2005) baixaram os custos de comunicação. O custo das chamadas telefónicas baixou, o número de telefones móveis explodiu, e nos anos 90 a internet baixou ainda mais o custo de movimentar ideias. Isto permitiu que etapas de produção que no passado tinham de ser feitas por perto pudessem agora ser feitas em diferentes países sem perda de tempo e eficiência.

Assim que as CFG começaram a ganhar força muitos países em vias de desenvolvimento decidiram que as barreiras ao comércio que usavam para proteger as suas empresas, impediam-nos de ganhar o seu quinhão de offshored jobs. Assim, por volta de 1990 começaram a cortar nessas tarifas com entusiasmo. 

Algo que me fez recordar Portugal e os vistos gold:

"In the late 1980s, developing countries not only cut tariffs, they also developed a new relationship to foreign direct investment (FDI). Up to this point, they had had a love/hate relationship with FDI. Though they liked foreign investment, they feared the impact it might have on the performance of their own companies. In almost all developing countries, the balancing of these pros and cons had led to regulation of FDI. This attitude changed, however, in the late 1980s, and can be seen in the growth of bilateral investment treaties (BITs)."

 Quando escrevo aqui no blogue sobre a importância do investimento directo estrangeiro (aqui e aqui, por exemplo) é por causa disto, para poder queimar etapas, já que os macacos não voam, e no entretanto, contaminar outras empresas como fornecedoras de proximidade:

"Internalised technology transfer provides access to state-of-the-art technologies, along with brand names and entry into global markets. It is, therefore, very effective way to transfer and operationalise new technologies for export competitiveness."

Por fim, recordo Bloomberg e o setting the table:

"The third factor that helped developing countries build up their capabilities was the management of technology diffusion by governments"

E os tótós que culpam o euro... queriam o escudo para, à custa da ilusão monetária, competir com os custos chineses... uma tolice pegada. 

BTW, acho que isto "Suez blockage will accelerate global supply chain shift, says Maersk chief" está a acontecer há alguns anos, a estória das cadeias de fornecimento por continentes e não globais, mas é como os nenúfares no lago, temos 47 dias incipientes pela frente.

Teorias da conspiração

"El coronavirus actúa como acelerador de cambios que ya estaban en marcha...”

Primeiro, recomendo a leitura deste postal de Julho de 2018, "Qual é a teoria da conspiração?" que termina assim:

"Qual é a teoria da conspiração?
.
10 anos depois do pico da globalização, 10 anos depois da maré ter mudado, 10 anos depois de se começar a falar em reindustrialização do Ocidente é que se inicia uma guerra de taxas alfandegárias? Quem é que tem a ganhar com isso?
.
As empresas que foram para a China mantiveram-se em jogo com base no preço/custo e nunca foram obrigadas, ou sentiram necessidade de um esforço de subida na escala de valor. Agora que o modelo baseado na China deixa de ser viável até para essas empresas grandes, elas percebem que não têm ADN competitivo para outra forma de competição. Por isso, sentem que precisam de tempo para arranjar uma alternativa. Nada que uma mão amiga no poder político não possa fazer: criar uma barreira alfandegária protectora."

Depois, "Coronavirus: China faces an economic reckoning as Covid-19 turns world against globalisation":

"One of the more worrying consequences of the coronavirus is that it looks likely to become a catalyst for deglobalisation.
.
At the centre of this will be the decoupling of the Chinese economy with developed economies and the US in particular. The world’s three largest free economies – the European Union, the United States and Japan – are all drawing up separate plans to lure their companies out of China.
...
US President Donald Trump’s top economic adviser Larry Kudlow has said the government should pay the costs of American firms moving manufacturing back from China onto US soil...
While these are recent moves, the truth is the debate on globalisation – and deglobalisation – began more than a decade ago in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008.
...
Exports of goods and services accounted for 19.51 per cent of China’s GDP last year, according to the World Bank. While that figure is declining, it is still sizeable. Based on this, a 10-percentage-point decline in China’s exports might mean a decline of about 2 percentage points in GDP growth on average.
.
Exports employ 180 million workers, so any hit to the sector would also have a knock-on effect on investment, incomes, consumption and employment."

Que rearranjos vão emergir? (parte III)

Parte I e parte II.

A revista The Economist de 8 de Fevereiro último, no artigo "A long game" publicou o seguinte gráfico:

Uma evolução interessante, quer para os EUA, quer para a China.

Que impacte terá este choque do coronavírus nestas cadeias de fornecimento?

Duas notas:

• Coronavirus exposes downside of global dependence on China
• Coronavirus live updates: UK declares 'serious and imminent threat' to public health – latest news (só Graça Freitas continua a dançar e a saltar de nenúfar em nenúfar)

Que rearranjos vão emergir? (parte II)

Parte I.

"Hyundai said it had to shut down all its car factories in South Korea after running out of components from China as disruptions caused by the coronavirus outbreak rippled through the global manufacturing supplychains.
.
The world’s fifth-biggest carmaker by sales said it was searching for new sources of engine wire-harness after problems in the supplies of the core electric componentry from China, as executives at several carmakers and auto suppliers warned plants in Europe and the US are only weeks away from being forced to close.
...
Pressure is building on supply companies to maintain output and protect staff, with parts makers Continental and Thyssenkrupp both holding crisis meetings earlier this week.
.
“We are working closely with our suppliers and customers to minimise any disruptions,” said Continental, which runs 50 sites in China, and makes parts for most main European carmakers."

Entretanto, em linha com o que me contaram ontem ao almoço - "Coronavirus disrupts display panel production in China, spurring supply shortfalls and rising prices"

A pergunta mantem-se no ar. Que rearranjos irão emergir como consequência do crescente proteccionismo, aumento de salários na Ásia, exigências de Mongo e da rapidez/flexibilidade, e desta crise?

Trechos retirados de "Carmakers struggle with supply chain disruption" publicado no FT de ontem.

Que rearranjos vão emergir?

A economia actual é isto:

Um mecânico italiano que esteve há dias na China a reparar máquinas e agora estava a reparar máquinas em várias empresas de Felgueiras.

Há dias no Twitter ironizei:

ainda bem que o coronavirus não se transmite através dos bens fabricados na China e em exposição brevemente nas prateleiras de Primavera-Verão

— Carlos P da Cruz (@ccz1) January 28, 2020

Agora em "When China Coughs, Supply Chains Fall Ill" publicado no Wall Street Journal de ontem:

"As the spread of the new coronavirus in China causes more factory shutdowns, the effect on global industrial supply chains could linger for years. China now makes up more than twice the share of global merchandise exports it did in 2003, when the SARS virus hit. Guangdong province alone exported more in 2018 than China did as a whole 17 years ago.
.
Manufacturers already gripe about the effect of the Lunar New Year holiday, which falls in January or February, on their business as Chinese factories shutter. But the public-health response to the virus this year effectively means extending the holiday. China’s industrial output could be running at a similarly low level for a much longer period.
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Global supply chains are considerably more complex than they were in 2003, shortly after China’s accession to the World Trade Organization. Even items with a marginal quantity of Chinese content will be affected as production is halted.
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The current lockdown is of a scale beyond either SARS, floods in Thailand or the earthquakes in Japan. China’s industrial heft leaves global manufacturers in a quandary with no obvious parallel, even with shutdowns only just beginning. The impact may be felt for years to come."

Já no NYT li "Coronavirus Outbreak Tests World’s Dependence on China":

"Apple is rerouting supply chains. Ikea is closing its stores and paying staff members to stay home. Starbucks is warning of a financial blow. Ford and Toyota will idle some of their vast Chinese assembly plants for an extra week.
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The mysterious coronavirus that has killed more than a hundred people and sickened thousands has virtually shut down one of the world’s most important growth engines. Desperate to slow the fast-moving virus, the Chinese authorities have extended the country’s national holiday to Feb. 3, and crippled land, rail and air transport. Entire cities have shut down.
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Automakers like General Motors and Nissan plan to close their factories until the week of Feb. 3 to comply with the longer mandated holiday, while Toyota and Ford said this week that they would close some of their factories a week longer than that because of virus-related disruptions. Companies like G.M., Honeywell, Facebook and Bloomberg restricted travel for employees in China and established their own self-quarantine measures.
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Wuhan in particular appeals to major companies because it is a major national transport hub. The auto industry, including General Motors, Honda, Nissan and many others, have set up shop there, and many of their suppliers have followed. It is the home to more than one third of all French investment in China.
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In Thailand, Chinese sightseers spend nearly $18 billion annually, totaling about a quarter of tourist spending.
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“Chinese tourists are the No. 1 tourists to Thailand,” said Yuthasak Supasorn, the governor of the Tourism Authority of Thailand."

Que impacte é que isto pode ter nas cadeias de fornecimento mundiais? Que rearranjos vão emergir?

“The core problem is uncertainty”

"It was expected, perhaps, but still startling. In its 22nd Annual Global CEO Survey, PwC asked 1,378 top business leaders from around the world which territories (excluding their own) they considered the most important for their company’s growth prospects in the next 12 months. The world’s chief executives were noticeably noncommittal. As many as 15 percent of them answered “don’t know” in 2019, up from 8 percent the previous year.CEOs in the United States were even more dubious: 14 percent of them didn’t consider any other markets suitable for growth, up from only 2 percent in the 2018 survey.
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This shift in attitude is already reflected in business investment. Of the 31 percent of CEOs who said they were “extremely concerned” about trade wars, 45 percent said they were shifting their supply chain strategy, and 25 percent said they were shifting their growth strategies to other territories.
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Fundamental aspects of the global economy have been shifting for more than a decade. Elements undergoing change include costs for manufacturing (including labor costs, which are rising), new technological platforms (such as those associated with Industry 4.0), stronger suppliers and other businesses in emerging markets (which are maturing), middle-class consumer populations around the world (which are growing rapidly in emerging markets and shrinking in other places), and political and regulatory uncertainties.
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A new model of market expansion strategy — we call it “internationalization” — is replacing the globalism of the early 2000s. This model acknowledges that the global business ecosystem now includes many small and medium-sized enterprises and ambitious family businesses, often based in emerging markets, linked together by collaborative supply chains and platforms. At the same time, larger companies with established global supply chains have realized that they need to bring their operations closer to the demand they are targeting. The trade tensions of 2019 have heightened awareness of these dynamics, and accelerated the business response to them.
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To be sure, global trade will still thrive, but there will be more regional concentration. Rather than shipping goods around the world from cheaplabor hubs, companies manufacture goods for Asian customers in Asia, for European customers in Central Europe, and for North American customers in Latin America. They develop regional footprints, sourcing from more locations."

Interessante:

"The World Trade Organization (WTO) published a report in June 2019 showing that G20 nations had implemented 20 new restrictive trade measures between October 2018 and May 2019, including higher tariffs, import bans, and new customs procedures for exports.
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All this has had a chilling effect on international commerce. Imports by G20 economies were 1.2 percent lower in the first quarter of 2019 than they were a year earlier, whereas exports were only marginally (0.4 percent) higher, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development figures show. “The core problem is uncertainty,” said Piyush Gupta, chief executive of Singapore’s largest domestic bank, DBS, in an interview with strategy+business. “There’s a general environment of skittishness.”"

Trechos retirados de "Growth strategies for an uncertain world"

O backshoring do calçado em Espanha

Um artigo interessante sobre a evolução do offshoring e backshoring do calçado espanhol. "Offshoring in the Spanish footwear industry: A return journey?" de Carmen Martínez-Mora e Fernando Merino, publicado por Journal of Purchasing & Supply Management 20 (2014) 225–237.

O crescimento do backshoring é um tema querido a este blogue desde quando ainda ninguém falava nele (2006 e 2010, por exemplo).

Um artigo que documenta as observações que fomos fazendo aqui sobrea a evolução portuguesa. Com uma diferença. Espanha tem marcas com tradição e dimensão e fez deslocalizações. Portugal sempre foi mais terra de subcontratação. No entanto, as razões que levaram ao regresso dos clientes em Portugal, são as mesmas que levaram ao retorno de parte da produção espanhola à Europa.

BTW, lembram-se das previsões de quem não andava no terreno? Dois exemplos: Sérgio Figueiredo no Jornal de Negócios e André Macedo no Diário de Notícias)

"During the 1990'0 and the first decade of the twenty-first century, outsourcing and offshoring became one of the most important changes made by companies throughout the world. Many companies outsourced tasks which were formerly internalised in order to gain competitiveness through reduced costs or increased flexibility or efficiency. Meanwhile, many activities located in developed countries were transferred to other places; production processes were no longer geographically concentrated in one location but were split up into phases which were each located where the advantages to be gained were greatest.
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However, in more recent years, it has come to light that this relocation of production activities is being reconsidered by some industry leaders which has given rise to cases of "repatriating manufacturing to the country of origin". These cases have been called 'reverse offshoring', 'reshoring, 'backshoring', insourcing' or inshoring as opposed to outsourcing/offshoring.
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Three of the four comapnies that have not offshore their production justify this with one main reason: the range of footwear that they produce. The fourth company explained that it was due to the size of the firm. Table 3 summarises the character-istics of these companies. The three companies (Wonders, Pedro Mirages and NordikaT) manufacture only one type of footwear, the mid-high range, and have not considered the possibility of extending their collection with lower-end lines. To produce this type of footwear, highly-skilled labour is required and the companies do not believe that they would be able to maintain the high quality levels that they achieve in Spain if they produced their output in low-wage countries. As production is located in the company's own factory or outsourced to other factories nearby, the company is able to control the entire manufacturing process and guarantee the desired quality levels. These companies commented that they benefit from lower transaction costs due to the geographical proximity (which goes hand-to-hand with more fluid relationships) to the companies that carry out the production activities.
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The fourth company that has not offshored production, Pedro Iniesta - Biostep, provides qualitatively different reasons for this decision. This company's product can be classified within the mid-range, and competes basically on price. As we shall see later, most of the offshoring in this segment was motivated by efficiency reasons (the search for alternative locations to Spain that provide comparative advantages in production costs). The location that offered the lowest costs was Southeast Asia, particularly China. The manufacturing structure of the sector in China requires large batches to be ordered and Pedro Iniesta - Biostep, due to its small size, could not order these large volumes, and continued to manufacture all of its production in Spain. The company has been able to maintain its presence in the domestic and export markets although with a reduction in sales. Other similar firms (with mid-range footwear which did not offshore their production), were not able to survive the price competition of footwear manufactured in countries with lower costs causing them to close during the last ten years.[Moi ici: A mesma mortandade que ocorreu por cá e que descrevemos graficamente em "O emplastro iluminado"]
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When Spain joined the EEC in 1986 and any remaining trade barriers with the member countries were dismantled, the position of Spanish footwear companies did not weaken. This was because the strategy widely used at that time consisted in abandoning the low-range lines which many companies had produced in the past and. specialising in another type of higher range footwear with greater differentiation and value added. This strategy enabled them to compete in the European markets and to maintain their share of the domestic market based on elements other than price. As could be expected, during these years, many footwear manufacturers that produced low-range products and competed on price closed down.
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However, in the mid-1990s, when China was negotiating for membership in the World Trade Organisation, Spanish companies became concerned about the future threat to their positioning. The incorporation of China would lead to a huge increase in exports to Europe of the shoes produced by the foreign multinationals in the sector, mainly from Europe and America, which offshored their production to Southeast Asia? This output was characterised by highly competitive prices and a moderate level of quality due to the comparative advantages in production costs, especially labour. and the enormous scale of this industry in some countries. Responding to these structural changes in the industry, the majority of the larger Alicante-based footwear companies began a process of offshoring production to Southeast Asia between the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s.
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The aim of the companies that outsourced the production of their mid-range lines abroad was to obtain the highest possible growth in sales, based on the increased price competitiveness derived from the lower costs in foreign countries. The revenue obtained from this growth was used to increase investment in those activities carried out within the companies in Spain, such as design, product innovation, marketing, distribution. quality control and the manufacture of high quality footwear. With this strategy, these activities became the core business and internal departments were created or expanded and had a strategic role.
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Panamá Jack and Ras Shoes encountered problems in developing their offshoring strategy due to the type of their output and the characteristics of the industrial structure of the foreign country. Problems arose because they only made small orders and their high and mid-high ranges of footwear required the almost permanent presence of highly qualified technical and managerial staff to supervise quality levels. These companies concluded that offshoring production to China was only profitable if large orders were made as the costs involved in transferring staff were too high for small quantities. Also, large volumes of stock were permanently accumulated in Spain as the minimum quantifies established by the foreign countries were not compatible with the sales of the companies which comprised small quantities of a wide range of models. For these reasons both companies abandoned the strategy and have reshored all of their production activities to Spain and have no intention of manufacturing abroad again.
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The main differences between firms reside in the relationship between the current strategy and the decisions previously made with regard to offshoring. Those companies that order small quantities have reshored all of their production to Spain. However, those that order larger quantities are increasing their manufacturing operations in Spain or nearby countries but complementing this with offshoring and have no intention to abandon this strategy. Summing up, the different "reshoring" strategies observed can be explained by three main reasons. First, the volumes that are outsourced abroad; second, the type of product that is offshored; and third, the improvement in distribution which is also related to volume but also to lead times. From a more general perspective, our results show that reshoring in the footwear industry does not constitute a correction of prior misjudgements.
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First, the cost differential between China and Spain has narrowed due to the evolution of the economies of Southeast Asia. In addition, the demand for smaller batches makes it difficult to exploit scale economies in China or even to gain access to the Chinese shoemakers at a reasonable price. Second, transportation costs have become a key element in this case not because of changes in traditional issues linked to logistics,  but because the demand of the final goods has changed. This new demand introduces conditions (lead times, batch sizes. etc.) that the existing logistic structure does not cater for and even seems to evolve in the opposite direction with the introduction of steam shipping, larger vessels, etc.
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From the results of the study, we can conclude that the reshoring process most likely constitutes a permanent relocation of footwear manufacturing in Spain. This strategy has increased the competitiveness of firms engaged in the mid-range footwear segment and can be expected to prevail in the long term as it fulfils the need to serve new collections with greater frequency. However, if Spanish unit labour costs rise, these increases in production in Spain could be redirected to other nearby countries such as Morocco or Portugal where batch size is not important In any case, the results of the study indicate that part of the offshoring wave should be undone."