Fugir da "rat race" (parte II)

Parte I. 

"Outperforming your more resilient competitors is possible in the short run.

And if you’re lucky a few times in a row, you get access to more capital or more customers and you can do it again, at a bigger scale, leaving your thoughtful, slack-enabled competitors in the dust.

Until you crash.

And you always will. Because optimized systems cannot thrive in a changing world.

If you don’t want to crash, don’t compete in marketplaces where optimization is required."

Trecho retirado de "The paradox of brittle" de Seth Godin.

As PMEs devem buscar uma abordagem mais equilibrada, criando espaço para adaptação e mudanças, ao invés de se focar exclusivamente na eficiência imediata. Isso pode significar ter flexibilidade em processos, stock e operações para lidar com imprevistos e oscilações de mercado. Recordar "Eficiência qb". Uma PME não pode competir directamente em termos de preço ou eficiência, por isso, ela deve evitar esses mercados. Em vez disso, pode optar por nichos onde a personalização, inovação, qualidade e a relação com o cliente são mais valorizados.

As PMEs devem construir operações que sejam duráveis e sustentáveis no longo prazo, com capacidade de absorver choques. Isso pode ser feito através da diversificação de clientes, inovação constante e flexibilidade para ajustar processos conforme necessário.

Ter "slack", ou seja, uma margem de flexibilidade, permite que uma empresa responda a mudanças repentinas, algo essencial para navegar em mercados incertos. Assim, manter uma certa ineficiência controlada, como stocks maiores, equipa de prevenção, ou processos mais flexíveis, pode parecer ineficaz a curto prazo, mas traz vantagens no longo prazo ao permitir que a empresa responda rapidamente às mudanças de mercado ou a crises imprevistas.

As empresas que perseguem a eficiência extrema muitas vezes ficam presas a modelos que não permitem inovação ou adaptação rápida. As PMEs podem-se destacar ao inovar constantemente e oferecer algo diferente aos clientes, seja um produto único, um serviço excepcional ou uma experiência personalizada. Isso torna-as menos vulneráveis à pressão de preços e à optimização desenfreada.

Um sistema optimizado pode ser eficiente em termos de transacções, mas não necessariamente em termos de construir relacionamentos duradouros. As PMEs devem focar-se em criar relações profundas com seus clientes, colaboradores e parceiros. Um relacionamento de confiança é mais difícil de ser abalado por crises de curto prazo, ao contrário de sistemas puramente optimizados e transaccionais.

Sistemas optimizados funcionam bem em ambientes estáveis, mas tornam-se frágeis num mundo em constante mudança. As PMEs devem aceitar que o mundo dos negócios é volátil e imprevisível. Estar preparado para a mudança, em vez de operar sempre no limite máximo de capacidade, pode ser a chave para sobreviver e prosperar em tempos de incerteza. Recordar o exemplo dos nabateus:

"BTW, este fim de semana vi num canal do cabo, tipo National Geographic(?), um documentário sobre os Nabateus e a civilização de Petra. Uma parte desse documentário não me sai da cabeça... a parte em que se refere a técnica dos Nabateus para transportar água ao longo de km e km. Eles desenhavam a inclinação das tubagens não para a máxima eficiência de caudal transportado mas para a mais eficaz. A máxima eficiência leva à rotura frequente das tubagens."

Eficiência qb

 

If you exclude security guards & maintenance personnel, the number of government workers who show up in person and do 40 hours of work a week is closer to 1%!

Almost no one. https://t.co/4IGzbLqP3R

— Elon Musk (@elonmusk) December 5, 2024

Li no FT do passado dia 5 de Dezembro o artigo intitulado "The truth about efficiency":

"The difference between medicine and poison lies in the dose. This truth speaks directly to government reform. As Washington prepares to launch an efficiency crusade, we must remember that efficiency, wrongly dosed, can sicken the very system it means to improve. [Moi ici: Recordo os hospitais-cidade, por exemplo]

...

The forgotten French engineer Jules Dupuit understood this problem. In the early 1800s, before the term "scientist" existed, engineers were the high priests of social arithmetic. As Paris's chief engineer in 1850, he faced a practical issue: how could public projects be efficient while maximising social benefits?

His answer came not through cost-cutting but by understanding how people valued and used the services. Whether maintaining roads or setting water prices, Dupuit recognised that efficiency in public systems had to balance market incentives with fairness and technical requirements with social needs. 

...

Dupuit's engineering mindset helped him see that these apparent inefficiencies weren't flaws but features. They helped people make trade-offs between time and money when choosing which bridge to cross, for example.

Society seeks efficiency, often without a deep knowledge of what it is. Efficiency performs endless mutations - now time, now money, now speed, now productivity, now lay-offs, now accountability, now market share, now GDP.

...

Success requires prudence - knowing not just how to be efficient but when to let efficiency yield to other parameters of good governance. When we privilege efficiency above all else, we create brittle systems prone to catastrophic failure."

A eficiência, quando procurada sem equilíbrio, pode enfraquecer os sistemas, tornando-os susceptíveis ao fracasso. As redundâncias incorporadas e as margens de segurança (slack), muitas vezes vistas como ineficiências, são cruciais para a resiliência.

As PMEs, tal como os governos, enfrentam ambientes voláteis. A optimização excessiva em termos de eficiência de custos pode deixá-las vulneráveis ​​a perturbações (por exemplo, rupturas nas cadeias de abastecimento, alterações no mercado). 

A manutenção de stocks de reserva, "buffers", de fornecedores diversificados e de métodos operacionais alternativos pode parecer ineficiente, mas garante a continuidade do negócio durante as crises.

A visão de Dupuit sobre como equilibrar custos, justiça e necessidades sociais é de aplicação directa para as PME, que devem tomar decisões centradas nos clientes-alvo e que promovam a lealdade e a sustentabilidade da relação. Clientes não são súbditos/servos sujeitos aos caprichos das empresas. 

Outro mindset - cada vez mais uma necessidade

No WSJ em "What Went So Wrong With Boeing?" vemos espelhadas as consequências da doença anglo-saxónica, do tal hollowing baseado no eficientismo. No mesmo WSJ de ontem encontrei "Chinese Rivals Dent Mercedes Profit" onde se pode ler:

"... Chief Financial Officer Harald Wilhelm said. Speaking on a call with reporters, Wilhelm said the company seeks to reduce the cost base. This includes the materials that go into its cars and those it uses in factories, as well as labor costs.

...

Wilhelm noted that the company has been able to bring costs down significantly over the last five years without launching a big program, as each division within the business has steadily worked toward achieving individual cost targets.

"I think that was successful, but we need to go a step beyond, so it's going to be tighter, it's going to be tougher for sure," Wilhelm said."

A mesma doença. É claro que é preciso controlar custos mas o risco de isso se tornar o mantra à custa da inovação e do design é bem real.

Querem recuar a Julho de 2023 e ao que intuí acerca do futuro da Mercedes em Uma pena? Recordo, mas de Janeiro deste ano: Não é impunemente. Quem acredita em modelos homogéneos e simplificados da realidade comete o erro de acreditar naquilo a que Schumpeter chamava o "Ricardian vice". Partir de premissas muito simplificadas e, a partir delas, deduzir conclusões aparentemente rigorosas e lógicas, mas sem aplicação adequada às situações reais e dinâmicas da economia.

Há tempos mandaram-me este vídeo de uma outra era:

Cc @ccz1 https://t.co/H10GL4od55

— JoãoMiranda (@joaomiranda) October 15, 2024

Outro mindset.

Voltemos à Boeing. O foco mudou da excelência em engenharia para os indicadores financeiros, levando a uma decadência do mindset e da cultura da empresa. 

Modelos apodrecidos

The Wall Street journal article indicated the Kansas subcontractor, that builds the fuselage made a practice of firing and transferring quality personnel who found too many defects.https://t.co/gxcvlqKMZF

— Gary Heintz (@garyandglendah1) March 12, 2024

Verdade seja dita que a afirmação do tweet não se encontra no texto do artigo "Boeing Response in Alaska Airlines 737 MAX Probe Is Blasted by Feds" no entanto, transpira uma cultura que impressiona:

"The airplane maker hadn't provided the names of 25 employees the NTSB believes may have information about work on a door plug that later flew off a plane during a Jan. 5 flight,

...

Boeing also hasn't provided investigators with documents about factory work related to the door plug's removal and reinstallation in mid-September, she said, adding that certain documents might not exist.

...

Homendy said Boeing has told the NTSB that it hasn't been able to find relevant documents in some cases. She said the safety board has been told Boeing has a process for removing, opening and reinstalling door plugs, but that the company hasn't yet provided the written procedures."

Mais informação em "Boeing discloses names of 737 MAX employees after NTSB chair faults cooperation" e em "US FAA hits Boeing 737 MAX production for quality control issues"

Entretanto o subcontratado Spirit AeroSystems tem muitas certificações.

Sintomas de apodrecimento de modelos que degeneram sob a pressão da doença anglo-saxónica em empresas too big to fail.

Já escrevi sobre a radioclubização, sobre o hollowing e o eficientismo.

Fluxo e reservatório

O FT de ontem trazia um artigo sobre a evolução dos chips de computador. Por coincidência, também ontem, durante a caminhada matinal vi este video no Youtube sobre o mesmo tema, "The end of Apple Silicon's reign".

O artigo do FT, intitulado "Chip wars set to change the landscape of personal computing":

"One sign that something is stirring has been the flurry of news around CPUsthe general-purpose processors that power PCs and servers. This week, as Apple unveiled its latest high-end Macs, its new M3 chips were very much the focus.

...

Last week, mobile chipmaker Qualcomm unveiled an Arm-based PC chip of its own. It is the first chip based on designs from Nuvia, a start-up founded by some of Apple's top chip engineers that Qualcomm acquired two years ago, and a sign that a real technology race is breaking out in PC chips.

...

Intel, which dominates the market for PC chips, is doing its best not to sound rattled by all of this. Given the high barriers to entry, it has good reason. 

...

All of this sets up a race in the normally staid world of personal computing, with Intel trying to pull off a rapid series of manufacturing upgrades over the next two years to get back in the lead, Apple digging in to protect the clear lead it has established with its Mac chips, and a new wave of Arm-based PCs hitting the market."

E comecei a pensar na impermanência das empresas grandes; as empresas grandes podem reinar por algum tempo, mas há sempre um momento em que falham. Empresas grandes, mais tarde ou mais cedo resvalam para o foco na eficiência, e isso dita a sua queda. E qualquer coisa neste pensamento fez-me pesquisar no blogue e encontrar, de Setembro de 2012, Contrarian, sempre!!!

E ao ler esse postal ... comecei a fazer ligações para o que tenho escrito aqui recentemente, ou tenho lido recentemente:

"Por isso, enquanto muitos continuam a acreditar na vantagem de ser grande, cada vez mais acredito nas vantagens de se ser pequeno, na paciência com a quota de mercado ou com o volume de vendas.

Ser pequeno pode significar: decidir rapidamente; agir ainda mais rapidamente;    experimentar em escala reduzida; estar mais próximo da tribo; corrigir o tiro inicial muito mais rapidamente; ter mais  paciência e não se amesquinhar por causa do próximo relatório de contas; ter mais paixão.

O que mais me entristece e ver empresas pequenas a pensarem como empresas grandes... uma empresa pequena nunca poderá competir de igual para igual com uma empresa grande. Uma empresa pequena devia concentrar-se em tornar-se uma grande empresa.

Uma empresa pequena pode ser uma grande empresa, assim como uma empresa grande pode nunca ser uma grande empresa.

Uma empresa pequena a caminho de ser uma grande empresa é a empresa que reconhece que o seu campeonato não é o da eficiência, mas o da arte, o da originalidade, o da rapidez, o da flexibilidade, o da proximidade, o da autenticidade, o da tradição, o da diferença... o caminho menos percorrido."

Quando era miúdo muito miúdo, ainda nem andava na escola primária, ouvi a minha mãe a comentar com alguém que "somos um fogo", ou seria "somos uma chama". E nunca me esqueci disso, não sei porquê.

Também as empresas são chamas, são transição, são fluxo até que passam a comportar-se como um reservatório, e em vez de aspirarem ao futuro e à novidade, focam-se na defesa do presente. E o futuro morre, mais depressa ou mais devagar, mas morre. E estas empresas não precisam de ser grandes, também podem ser pequenas. 

A lente macro é tão ...

"When the world's business and political leaders gathered in 2018 at the annual economic forum in Davos, Switzerland, the mood was jubilant. Growth in every major country was on an upswing. The global economy, declared Christine Lagarde, then the managing director of the International Monetary Fund, "is in a very sweet spot." Five years later, the outlook has decidedly soured.

...

A lot has happened between then and now: A global pandemic hit; war erupted in Europe; tensions between the United States and China boiled. And inflation, thought to be safely stored away with disco album collections, returned with a vengeance. But as the dust has settled, it has suddenly seemed as if almost everything we thought we knew about the world economy was wrong. [Moi ici: Mas quem é que achava que estava tudo bem?]

The economic conventions that policymakers had relied on since the Berlin Wall fell more than 30 years ago - the unfailing superiority of open markets, liberalized trade and maximum efficiency look to be running off the rails. [Moi ici: Este blogue sempre achou errada a crença absoluta na maximização da eficiência, basta recordar os marcadores eficiência, eficientismo e denominador]

...

Globalization, seen in recent decades as unstoppable a force as gravity, is clearly evolving in unpredictable ways.  [Moi ici: Outra tema caro a este blogue, há mais de 17 anos que escrevemos aqui sobre as forças a minar a globalização. Recordo O regresso dos clientes, Especulação - um epílogo?] The move away from an integrated world economy is accelerating. And the best way to respond is a subject of fierce debate.

...

As the consulting firm EY concluded in its 2023 Geostrategic Outlook, the trends behind the shift away from ever-increasing globalization "were accelerated by the Covid-19 pandemic - and then they have been supercharged by the war in Ukraine."[Moi ici: Nunca esqueço de Maio de 2020 - El coronavirus actúa como acelerador de cambios que ya estaban en marcha]

...

Associated economic theories about the ineluctable rise of worldwide free market capitalism took on a similar sheen of invincibility and inevitability. Open markets, hands-off government and the relentless pursuit of efficiency would offer the best route to prosperity. [Moi ici: Recordo aquilo a que chamo a doença anglo-saxónica, recordo as críticas que fazemos há anos à automatização - Especulação sobre mais um falhanço da automatização, recordo o que escrevo sobre Kevin O'Leary]

...

The story of the international economy today, said Henry Farrell, a professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, is about "how geopolitics is gobbling up hyperglobalization. [Moi ici: O que me impressiona nestas análises é que me parecem demasiado macro. Há mais de uma década que a globalização está a recuar por causa de Mongo, por causa do fim do modelo do século XX, por causa de "We are all weird"]

...

"Ignoring the economic dependencies that had built up over the decades of liberalization had become really perilous," Mr. Sullivan, the U.S. national security adviser, said. Adherence to "oversimplified market efficiency," he added, proved to be a mistake." [Moi ici: O que me impressiona nestas análises é a crença de que a economia é como a física newtoniana, quando a economia é a continuação da biologia"]

Trechos retirados do artigo, "Failures of Globalization Shatter Long-Held Beliefs", publicado no NYT do passado Domingo. 

"Significance is inconvenient"

Volta e meia leio, ou presencio situações que me fazem recuar a 2015:

Cuidado com o eficientismo, essa doença anglo-saxónica.

Ontem, comecei a ler o último livro de Seth Godin, "The Song of Significance: A New Manifesto for Teams" onde sublinhei:

"to find the magic that happens when we are lucky enough to cocreate with people who care.

...

The choices have never been as clear as they are now:

Industrial capitalism (industrialism) seeks to use power to create profits.

Market capitalism seeks to solve problems to make a profit.

Industrial capitalism was built on the extraordinary productivity of the machine age. Feed the machine first, turn everything (including workers and customers) into machines, and scale up the enterprise. It evolved to incorporate the network effect and natural (or unnatural) monopolies to gain more power. It then used that power to capture the efforts of government to create even more power. [Moi ici: Cenas relacionadas com biombos e carpetes, aka cronyism - Cronyism e Two types of cronyism]

...

Market capitalism, meanwhile, continues to create most of the jobs and value worldwide. This is the never-ending work of finding problems and solving them. Market capitalists have no power over customers (or even, in most cases, their employees). Instead, they work to bring effort and insight to a rapidly changing marketplace in service of their customers.

The fork is right here, right now. Perhaps it's time to notice it and to choose a path.

...

the essence of productive consumer-focused industrialism. To create convenience.

To be fair, industrial capitalism works. It creates leverage and productivity then delivers expected results, all while lowering prices and increasing access to goods and services.

The modern world wouldn't exist without the progress that industry allowed, and for many, the safety these jobs offer is a lifeline and a useful way to live.

...

But late-stage industrial capitalism is different. It doesn't know where to stop. [Moi ici: Algo a que chamamos estratégias cancerosas] It not only captures those seeking safety, but also shackles those seeking significance.

...

But the stopwatch comes for all of us.

If we are going to compete with those who seek the perfection of industrial capitalism, we should know that they will out-measure, out standardize, and outmanage us. It's a race to the bottom.

The work of significance embraces the very things that industrialism seeks to stamp out.

Significance is inconvenient.

...

The answer begins simply with: we need to choose."

Esta manhã na capa do JdN leio, "Portugal é o quarto país na Europa com mais hotéis a caminho" ... um exemplo do que é uma estratégia cancerosa que não sabe quando parar, a isto chama-se a Tragédia dos Baldios!

Cuidado com o eficientismo

Há anos que escrevo sobre os que olham para a Economia como se olha para a ciência de Galileu ou de Newton. Em Economia o que é verdade hoje amanhã é mentira, e vice versa.

"By concentrating production in large facilities, companies can achieve economies of scale that lower the costs of production. [Moi ici: Racional típico do século XX em que que a competição pela eficiência e custo unitário era a única possibilidade de ser bem sucedido] Large-scale equipment can be operationally more efficient than smaller units.

...

To be sure, scale does not automatically translate to lower costs. In some industries, production might be undertaken on a small scale with little or no disadvantage, and it’s possible to attain economies of scale at medium-sized production units. At times, scale can even be a problem. [Moi ici: Em Mongo a variedade é mais importante que a eficiência]

...

As we’ve seen during the pandemic, overly centralized production can create fragile supply chains

...

Research has found that companies that are big but less centralized — for instance, ones that own facilities spread across the country or around the world — enjoy more limited advantages. This type of scale can yield benefits in the form of lower costs, as a distributed network can avoid the need to transport goods over long distances, and spreading out production across multiple facilities can mitigate the consequences of a disruption at a single plant. 

...

More recent research supports ... that aggregating many production units under common ownership does not yield significant operational efficiencies. And if local and regional markets are best served through a network of local and regional distribution and production facilities, what is the public benefit of a single national corporation consolidating its ownership in place of many local and regional firms? Scale tied to the aggregation of assets comes with organizational challenges that can cause significant inefficiencies. Top-level management may have a harder time directing a dispersed team of managers, necessitating the creation of additional layers of administration to ensure that the corporation and its disparate parts are run effectively. [Moi ici: Por isso há muito tempo que escrevo que a cultura portuguesa não lida bem com as exigências de gestão das organizações grandes] And this bureaucracy can add costs and be a source of inefficiency on its own."

Trechos retirados de "To Regulate Big Corporations, Understand How They Got That Way"

"the real impacts happen when they act like small ones"

Há anos fixei um tweet de Tom Peters neste postal Too Big To Care que voltei a referir neste outro postal Too big to care.

Ontem, recordei-me dele ao ler Seth Godin em "Is it possible to care at scale?":

"Caring at scale can’t be done by the CEO or a VP. But what these folks can do is create a culture that cares. They can hire people who are predisposed to care. They can pay attention to the people who care and measure things that matter instead of chasing the short term.

Large organizations have significant structural advantages. But the real impacts happen when they act like small ones."

"investments to increase income"

“What people informally call making money refers to profit margins: income minus cost. Making money is thus a function of increasing income and/or reducing cost. Unfortunately, most efforts toward making money focus exclusively on increasing operational efficiency by cutting cost, thereby ignoring any opportunities to reallocate money for processes that use the money more effectively to generate additional income or to reduce cost. As a result, decision makers show surprisingly little interest in investments to increase income (grow bottom-line results), other than through merger and acquisition transactions.”

Trecho retirado de "The Root Cause: Rethink Your Approach to Solving Stubborn Enterprise-Wide Problems" de Hans Norden.

"become that target audience’s “obvious choice” supplier"

Mais um desfile de temas habituais neste blogue: eficientismo, objectivos versus consequências, obliquidade, originação de valor, clientes-alvo, monopólios informais.

"There seems to be consensus that the purpose of a business is to make money. In other words, success is equated with money. Therefore, everything is given a price tag including people, humanity, health, safety, organizational culture, work climate, values, morality, ethics, pride of workmanship, and the environment.

Consequently, based on theories of operational efficiency, decisions are reduced to an analytic process of determining which solution is economic and which is uneconomic. The one that costs less wins.

...

No one denies the necessity for a commercial enterprise to pursue revenue and a healthy profit margin. The criticism against “making money” is that it should not be professed as the purpose of a business system.

Rather, earning a profit margin is not the purpose of a business but a “prerequisite” for operating a sustainable business. Please do not disregard this distinction between purpose and prerequisite as a matter of semantics, for it is nothing of the sort. Profits are the applause for a job well done, and receiving a standing ovation is the cry for an encore. It is a show of being in demand; it is the proof of a success!

...

The price people are willing to pay for a product or service is equal to the perceived use value they anticipate receiving from their purchase or investment. Because not everyone has the same perception of what constitutes use value, not everyone is a prospective buyer of your brand or your kind of product or service—hence the recognition of market segmentation and the identification of different target audiences.

Rather than creating use value similar to one’s competitors, different expressions of use value can be created by changing the business’s transformation process.

...

The profit margin is thus equal to the utility that a product or service delivers to its intended target audience. Therefore, the challenge of any business, with the exception of monopolies and oligopolies, is to add more utility to its value proposition targeting a specific audience than its immediate competitors. In other words, pursuing this strategy to become that target audience’s “obvious choice” supplier—and thus standing out as the only choice in the hearts and minds of your market segment."

Trecho retirado de "The Root Cause: Rethink Your Approach to Solving Stubborn Enterprise-Wide Problems" de Hans Norden

Uma surpresa boa!

A leitura de "The Root Cause: Rethink Your Approach to Solving Stubborn Enterprise-Wide Problems" de Hans Norden está a ser uma surpresa, por vezes brutal. Toda uma série de hibridações que desenvolvi ao longo dos anos a aparecerem-me, página após página em lingua inglesa.

Já vi muita gente a usar o modelo de cadeia de valor de Porter de muita maneira, mas não assim:

“The value chain is a representation of the process by which input variables are transformed into output variables. Therefore, the value chain’s design, organization or structure, implementation or operation, maintenance, and management are a function of its competitive advantage.

Within the value chain, each business function has its own objective that contributes to and supports the realization of the overall purpose of the value chain.”

O modelo de Porter usado como uso os mapas de processos!

Olhar para as organizações como seres vivos, organismos e não mecanismos:

“Note the difference in perception of a business, and therefore its value chain, as an organism or as a mechanism. The specifications and design of individual component parts that constitute a value chain are less important than their intricately interdependent and synergistic relationships, which determine a business’s character and nature as an organic whole.”

A linguagem que aprendi com Goldratt e Dettmer 

“It makes sense to distinguish between the desired state and the current state when they are misaligned—when the value chain experiences change. The root cause can originate from outperforming the aim or by easing up on the aim, or by changing the benchmark for success.”

A doença do eficientismo, a doença de saltar para soluções sem perceber as causas: 

“Beware of managers with a finance background who are prone to perceive this altered state as a financial problem in need of a financial solution, which usually means increasing operational efficiency. The unfortunate effect of treating symptoms is ignorance about the magnitude of the problem, jumping to conclusions that might even aggravate the problem, and allowing the problem to linger and fester. As a result, problems will persist, recur, or become a latent condition that can wreak havoc when least expected and tend to arrive at a critical moment in the business’s future.”

"what we are looking for are neither heroes, nor processes"

"What About Processes?

The key to all of this debate for the present day is the inability of some innovating organizations to ever get sufficiently close to their customers to really know what they want. That’s when heroes are needed, especially in organizations that are seen as being inflexible, often when involved in the production of high-volume, standardized offerings, or what Eric von Hipple refers to as “manufacturer-dominated” firms. This takes us directly back to Steve Blank’s observation that organizations whose processes are not designed for non-standard work, require individuals to move these organizations into market responses that they would otherwise not consider. Innovation heroics are, indeed, a symptom of a lack of preparedness for surprise, and as surprise becomes more frequent, as the unfamiliar becomes more present, and as time to market continues to shorten, something needs to be added to organizational culture to reduce a reliance upon what would otherwise require an inexhaustible supply of candidate heroes. Let’s be clear, however, that what we are looking for are neither heroes, nor processes; heroes are an admission of process failure, and most processes are not sufficiently flexible for whatever the future is likely to bring.

...

What is needed is a shared understanding of principles that authorize a natural way for the organization to allow unscheduled innovation to happen, and a trust in the employees to make the right choices. This is not heroic, and processes are not involved, either. Instead, it is a combination of beliefs, understanding and staff buy-ins so that the organization is prepared to take surprises in stride."

Trechos retirados de "A New Look For Innovation: Less Heroes, Fewer Processes" 

País de funcionários, de kits, de monumentos à treta, de diletantismo

"“Para termos dinamismo demográfico, eventualmente teremos de ter mais imigração. Mas é preciso também mais eficiência”, disse o ex-ministro Augusto Mateus, um dos oradores do certame, levantando a questão da fraca produtividade em Portugal. O nosso país é um dos que apresenta menores níveis de produtividade real por hora trabalhada, integrando os seis Estados-membros com menor capacidade de gerar riqueza, situando-se em cerca de 65% da média europeia. “Precisamos de trabalhar melhor”, resumiu Augusto Mateus.

O escritor e cronista Henrique Raposo, outro dos convidados do debate, insiste na questão da produtividade: “Não conheço nenhum país em que seja tão difícil articular o trabalho com a família. Na Alemanha começava a trabalhar às 8 da manhã e saía às 4. Mas acabava sempre por sair mais tarde, até que me disseram: ‘Tens de sair às 4, para tratares da tua vida. Se não trabalhaste como deve ser até às 4 é porque não foste produtivo.’”"

Aumentar a produtividade à custa da eficiência?

Come on ... ainda não saímos do modelo mental dos engenheiros?

Eheheheh pedir a opinião a Henrique Raposo sobre produtividade.

Lamento que Augusto Mateus use uma linguagem que induza em erro. O foco não deve ser o aumento da eficiência, mas sim o aumento da eficácia. O foco não deve ser trabalhar melhor para produzir o que já se faz, mas trabalhar para produzir coisas diferentes.

O aumento da produtividade que precisamos só pode ser obtido à custa de produzir coisas diferentes que podem ser vendidas com preços unitários bem superiores. Basta olhar para o exemplo do Japão, Taiwan ou de Hong Kong e o flying geese (The "flying geese" model, ou deixem as empresas morrer!!!:

BTW, alguém mediu o impacte dos kits produtividade? 

Um país de planos e de relatórios, em que o objectivo é cumprir o plano, indepedentemente de conseguir algum resultado. Aliás, nem há desafios, metas, resultados a atingir: só monumentos à treta!

Pôr o pescoço no cepo não faz parte da matriz mental portuguesa, país de funcionários.

Trechos retirados de "Abrir as portas aos imigrantes pode ser uma solução para Portugal"

"an obsession with creating value and outcomes for customers and users"

Parece retirado deste blogue: 

"The new management innovation is very different. Instead of an industrial-era focus on internal efficiency and outputs, the primary preoccupation in the new age is external: an obsession with creating value and outcomes for customers and users. Instead of starting from what the firm can produce that might be sold to customers, digital firms work backwards from what customers need and then figure out how that might be delivered in a sustainable way. Instead of limiting themselves to what the firm itself can provide, the firm often mobilizes other firms to help meet user needs."

Trechos retirados de "Why Management Innovation Is Hiding In Plain Sight" 

"customer service is getting worse"

"Yes, customer service is getting worse. Companies treat customer service as a cost and as Zeynep Ton has explained over and over, the outcome is predictable.

...

In fact, there is industry-speak for this it's called 'containment." It represents "the percentage of users who engage with an automated system and end their interaction without transferring to a voice or live chat agent. The goal is to prevent you from ever contacting a person, and companies have gotten very smart about this.

...

All of this gets at a growing  problem that I don’t think corporate types factor into their customer service equation.  It’s easy to figure out that a typical service encounter costs $5.  What is a lot harder to measure is the upside of providing excellent service (not to mention the upside of not turning up in slightly snarky articles penned by business school professors)."

Em linha com o meu aviso em Every visit customers have to make ...

Trechos retirados de "The better your automated customer service options, the worse your customer service experience" 

Uma transição por fazer ...

"The new management innovation are very different. Instead of an industrial-era focus on internal efficiency and outputs, the primary preoccupation in the new age is external: an obsession with creating value and outcomes for customers and users. Instead of starting from what the firm can produce that might be sold to customers, digital firms work backwards from what customers need and then figure out how that might be delivered in a sustainable way. Instead of limiting themselves to what the firm itself can provide, the firm often mobilizes other firms to help meet user needs."

Quem acompanha este blog desde 2004 pode facilmente recordar o quanto estes temas fazem parte da narrativa desde o início.

O que escrevo acerca do eficientismo, da lição de Marn e Rosiello (o burro era eu), do Evangelho do Valor. O que escrevo acerca de começar pelo fim e isso é olhar para a menina do olho dos clientes-alvo e, a partir do que procuram e valorizam, andar para trás e preparar a organização para entrega sistemática desses inputs (recordar input, não output). E o que escrevo sobre os ecossistemas da procura depois da experiência de 2004 em que o tema emergiu naturalmente de um desafio profissional em mãos, antes de começar a ler sobre o tema.

Quantas empresas ainda precisam de fazer esta transição...

Trecho retirado de "Why Management Innovation Is Hiding In Plain Sight" 

"it’s a chance to make a difference"

Um bom texto, mais um de Seth Godin:

"Interactions with the people who are enrolled and giving you the benefit of the doubt are a form of avocado time. They shouldn’t be optimized for efficiency or even leverage. Instead, it’s a chance to make a difference."

Como não relacionar com Stephen Covey e não só em "Every visit customers have to make ..."

Every visit customers have to make ...

"Efficiency with people is ineffective. With people, fast is slow and slow is fast." - Stephen R. Covey #Efficiency #Effectiveness #7Habits #QOTD pic.twitter.com/0tFMw7eENd

— Stephen R. Covey (@StephenRCovey) February 9, 2021

Sim, segunda metade dos anos 90, aprendi esta lição com este senhor. Influenciou postais como:

• Small is better (Abril de 2010) 
• "aposta noutro mindset" (Julho de 2015)
• "the connection economy is all about being human" (Maio de 2016)

E fez-me criticar esta nota desde a primeira vez que a vi:

"Quem não aposta no "cheaper" e no "cost", aposta na interacção, aposta na co-criação, aposta noutro mindset... eu diria, "Every visit customers have to make are an opportunity for interaction and co-creation"

Nunca esquecer, Golias pode apostar e ganhar com a automação porque está no seu ADN; contudo, David não tem qualquer vantagem em seguir esse caminho, tem muito mais a perder do que os euros que poupa."

"We become what we do"

Comecei a ouvir o último livro de Seth Godin durante as viagens de carro para fora de Gaia. Seth Godin é um autor que escreve para os humanos de Mongo, os humanos que fogem do século XX e abraçam a arte em todas as suas facetas.

BTW, recordar o que escrevemos aqui ao longo dos anos sobre a arte e o eficientismo. Por isso, apelar à arte fere o mindset assente no século XX.

"For the important work, the instructions are always insufficient. For the work we’d like to do, the reward comes from the fact that there is no guarantee, that the path isn’t well lit, that we cannot possibly be sure it’s going to work.

It’s about throwing, not catching. Starting, not finishing. Improving, not being perfect.

No one learns to ride a bike from a manual.

...

Art is what we call it when we’re able to create something new that changes someone.

No change, no art.

...

It’s a form of leadership, not management. A process without regard for today’s outcome, a commitment to the journey.

You were born ready to make art. But you’ve been brainwashed into believing that you can’t trust yourself enough to do so.

You’ve been told you don’t have enough talent (but that’s okay, because you can learn the skill instead).

You’ve been told you’re not entitled to speak up (but now you can see how many others have taken their turns).

And you’ve been told that if you can’t win, you shouldn’t even try (but now you see that the journey is the entire point).

Art is the generous act of making things better by doing something that might not work.

...

“If we believe that it’s not our turn, that we’re not talented enough, we’ll do whatever we can to make that story true. We’ll sit back and wait to be chosen instead. [Moi ici: Algo que li recentemente como sendo o efeito Forer]

That’s backward.

Most of the time, the story we live by came from somewhere. It might be the way we were raised, or it could be the outcome of a series of events. Burn yourself on the stove and you might persuade yourself that you should go nowhere near a stove. Grow up in a home with low expectations and it’s possible you’ll begin to believe them. The story we tell ourselves leads to the actions we take.

If you want to change your story, change your actions first. When we choose to act a certain way, our mind can’t help but rework our narrative to make those actions become coherent.

We become what we do.”

Trechos retirados de "The Practice" de Seth Godin.

“Or consider the Forer effect. This is the strong tendency that subjects show to believe feedback from personality tests, regardless of whether those results are bogus.”

Trecho retirado de "Uncharted" de Margaret Heffernan.