O mundo a mudar

#Mexico has overtaken China as the U.S.'s main goods supplier 🇲🇽🤝🇺🇸

Global Trade’s "Great War" between the #US and #China is an economic conflict on a scale that hasn't been seen in the modern era.

Mexico's "China Plus One" strategy aimed at reducing the risks of being drawn… pic.twitter.com/sAj1JLAG4V

— OECtoday (@OECtoday) March 7, 2024

Também me mandaram um e-mail com este artigo "Mexico Surpasses China as America’s Top Trade Partner". Tudo alinhado com  "Peter Zeihan, March 5, 2024":

(9' 41'') - it's the perfect partner by any number of measures. If there was one country on this planet that we wanted to have as a trading partner, Mexico is the one we want, and so last year Mexico retook its position as our number one trading partner... 

Sempre a rever o contexto

Ontem no JdN:

"Cerca de 12% do comércio global (mais de um bilião de dólares) passa pelo mar Vermelho todos os anos."

Há dias aqui no blogue em Análise do contexto, again:

"Merchants have worked through the excess inventory that piled up on store shelves and in warehouses over the past 18 months, and are now focusing on replenishing items rather than stocking up on goods to have on hand in case of supply-chain disruptions. The shift marks a return to the "just-in-time" inventory management strategy many companies had employed before pandemic-driven product shortages and volatile shifts in consumer demand prompted a switch to a "just-in-case" stockpiling approach." 

Em Julho de 2022 começava em Já lhe falaram? (parte II) o meu relato da leitura de "The End of the World is Just the Beginning" de Peter Zeihan:

"Perhaps the oddest thing of our soon-to-be present is that while the Americans revel in their petty, internal squabbles, they will barely notice that elsewhere the world is ending!!! Lights will flicker and go dark. Famine’s leathery claws will dig deep and hold tight. Access to the inputs—financial and material and labor—that define the modern world will cease existing in sufficient quantity to make modernity possible. The story will be different everywhere, but the overarching theme will be unmistakable: the last seventy-five years long will be remembered as a golden age, and one that didn’t last nearly long enough at that."

Gostei do livro, embora tivesse ficado de pé atrás com o excessivo americanismo do autor. Por exemplo, no livro e nos seus vídeos Peter não se cansa de dizer que a globalização vai acabar porque a marinha americana vai deixar de patrulhar as águas internacionais para proteger o comércio mundial. Não se cansa de defender que hoje em dia só a marinha americana consegue defender os navios com pavilhão americano em qualquer parte do mundo. 

Pois bem, na semana passada os Houthis demonstraram que nem a marinha americana consegue defender navios de comércio. 

Just-in-time e desglobalização até funcionam bem, mas julgo que não era a intenção dos entrevistados no primeiro texto citado lá em cima.

Dois economistas, três opiniões

"Economists at the Bank of International Settlements looked at data from more than 25,000 companies and found supply chains lengthening as other countries, especially in Asia, became additional stops in trade between China and the US. Companies shifting supply chains away from China are often moving production to countries whose economies are already highly integrated with China, such as Vietnam. Mexico, where investment by Chinese manufacturers has ticked up noticeably in recent years, is also becoming an important link in US-China trade. So it's not so much that the US and Chinese economies are decoupling-they're just coupling in different places.

...

Still, the connectors are proof that talk of the end of globalization is overwrought. Goods and capital still move across borders - even more of them, in fact."

Estes trechos foram retirados de "These Five Countries Are Key Economic; 'Connectors' in a Fragmenting World" publicado pela revista Bloomberg Business Week.

Interessante o que encontramos no WSJ de ontem:

"China passed a significant milestone last fall: For the first time since its economic opening more than four decades ago, it traded more with developing countries than the U.S., Europe and Japan combined. It was one of the clearest signs yet that China and the West are going in different directions as tensions increase over trade, technology, security and other thorny issues.

...

Benefits for the U.S. and Europe include less reliance on Chinese supply chains and more jobs for Americans and Europeans that otherwise might go to China. But there are major risks, such as slower global growth - and many economists worry the costs will outweigh the advantages."

Trechos retirados de "Global Economy Splits Into U.S. vs. China"

"This is a column about two numbers that seem to tell contradictory stories about globalization.

Over the past 15 years, a consensus has developed that globalization has run its course and gone into decline. One popular number supporting this argument: Trade as a share of global output peaked in 2008 at the cusp of the global financial crisis and has never recovered.

But a new metric from a pair of economists, Sharat Ganapati of Georgetown University and Woan Foong Wong at the University of Oregon, tells the opposite story: More goods are traveling greater distances than ever before.

That seems impossible if globalization has truly swung into reverse. So which is right?"

Trechos retirados de "Is Globalization Over? A New Metrie Says No"

Prepare-se, não seja apanhado desprevenido

Na capa do WSJ de ontem, "The World's Factory Floor Struggles to Attract Workers":

"The workplace features floor-to-ceiling windows and a cafe serving matcha tea, as well as free voga and dance classes. Everv month, workers gather at team-building sessions to drink beer, drive go-karts and go bowling.

This isn't Google. It's a garment factory in Vietnam.

Asia, the world's factory floor and the source of much of the stuff Americans buy, is running into a big problem: Its young people, by and large, don't want to work in factories.[Moi ici: A minha primeira reacção é pensar que isto é um sinal positivo, um sinal do mecanismo dos Flying Geese a funcionar]

That's why the garment factory is trying to make its manufacturing floor more enticing, and why alarm bells are ringing at Western companies that rely on the region's inexpensive labor to churn out affordable consumer goods.

The twilight of ultra cheap Asian factory labor is emerging as the latest test of the globalized manufacturing model, which over the past three decades has delivered a vast array of inexpensively produced goods to consumers around the world.

...

"There's nowhere left on the planet that's going to be able to give you what you want," said Paul Norriss, the

British co-founder of the Vietnam garment factory, UnAvailable, based in Ho Chi Minh City. "People are going to have to change their consumer habits, and so are brands.""

Um extenso artigo e com vários pontos de vista:

• banhista gordo,
• flying geese,
• demografia,
• implicações no futuro do mercado e das marcas,
• tentativa das empresas melhorarem a experiência no local de trabalho,
• para quem não tem filhos, ou vive em casa dos pais, o dinheiro não é tudo.

BTW, "Mexico Steps Up As Largest US Trading Partner"   e  "Chipmakers have plans for new US factories. But not enough workers to run them.":

"Chipmakers are rebuilding the US semicondutor industry with $231 billion in new investments spurred by the enactment of the landmark CHIPS and Science Act a year ago.

But even as Biden officials celebrate the anniversary of that legislation this week, there are mounting concerns about whether enough skilled workers will be there to run these factories once they are online.

Labor shortages have already affected the construction of one major project in Phoenix. Meanwhile, a possible national shortfall could also complicate efforts in the year ahead by

Intel (INTC) in central Ohio, Micron (MU) in upstate New York, as well as other new projects from Texas to Utah.

The issue could prove a headwind for America's efforts to reverse a decades-long decline in semicondutor manufacturing and also complicate a key tenet of Biden's case for reelection."

Tudo vai depender do tal jogo de forças (parte VI)

Há um ano escrevi aqui "Qual o resultado final?"

Qual o resultado final do balanço de forças entre a procura tradicional das empresas portuguesas (sector transaccionável) e a procura na Ásia para satisfazer os mercados que as empresas portuguesas já servem ou podem vir a servir.

Depois, em Setembro de 2022 escrevi "Como eu gostava de saber" (parte I e parte II)

Na sequência desse tema desenvolvi uma série de postais sobre o tema "Tudo vai depender do tal jogo de forças" (parte I, parte II, parte III, parte IV e parte V).

Já em Julho passado fui obrigado a escrever "Inversão de ciclo", perante a evolução dos números das exportações.

Entretanto, ontem no FT encontro "China's factories bear brunt of the economic slowdown":

"From slowing global demand to rising geopolitical tensions and a tentative post-Covid recovery, China's manufacturers are tackling some of the strongest headwinds in years.

...

Factory activity, one of the main pillars of growth during the pandemic, has slowed for four consecutive months to July 31, according to official statistics.

...

Feng Tai Footwear exemplifies the difficulties faced by the low-technology manufacturers on which China's economic success has been built. Before the pandemic it sold some 5mn pairs of shoes a year to clients such as Walmart and Target. This year it will do well to sell 3mn. Orders for the second half of this year are down at least a third compared with last year.

"Our sector is in misery," said chief executive Eddie Lam, who runs more than 10 manufacturing plants in China and employs more than 3,000 workers. "Orders often get cancelled halfway. We are basically at a standstill," he added. The country's monthly export delivery value of goods made with leather, fur or feathers as well as footwear has fallen more than a third from 2019, hitting nearly Rmb17bn ($2.4bn) in May this year.

...

Some clients have asked if the company can set up factories outside China, but Feng Tai has no plans yet.

"The US knows very well it cannot risk decoupling from China," Lam said. "I just don't see the advantage of moving production to south-east Asia with higher supply chain costs and additional investments required.

...

"We have to consider [China] 'plus one' or even more," said Ho, managing director of Tien Sung Group, of global tensions and supply chain disruptions. "We can't put all our eggs in one basket."[Moi ici: Aqui recordo o banhista gordo]"

BTW, este gráfico faz-me lembrar o esquema dos Flying Geese:

Vamos ver se o governo chinês resiste à tentação de, também ele, usar a receita portuguesa: proteger o passado e hipotecar o futuro. Porque como se lê no artigo, é desejo do Presidente Xi Jinping optar por um crescimento "de alta qualidade" que favorece as indústrias de tecnologia em detrimento dos vastos centros de fabrico que produzem bens de consumo básicos.

... devia haver proactividade

Jorge Marrão no Think Tank desta semana recordava que quando mataram o rei D. Carlos, o rei Eduardo VII mandou chamar o embaixador português em Londres e perguntou: mas que raio de país é este em que matam o rei e a primeira decisão é demitir um ministério. Jorge Marrão remata usando este episódio como um exemplo da actuação prtuguesa tipo: evitar ir ao fundo da questão.

Lembrei-me disto ontem durante a caminhada matinal ao ler uma série de artigos sobre a evolução do contexto: Estados Unidos e China/Alemanha.

O FT de quinta e sexta trazia uma página inteira dedicada ao que está a acontecer nos Estados Unidos na sequência da I.R.S..

O FT de ontem trazia na capa e em mais duas páginas o grito de alerta do governo alemão acerca da necessidade da economia fazer o de-risking da China. Mesmo tema no NYT.

O mundo a mudar, o contexto a mudar e ... por cá, comportamos-nos como um protectorado, como dependentes a viver na casa de adultos. Os adultos lidam com o mundo, os dependentes lidam com a sua vida sob os ditames ditados por outros.

Com estas mudanças profundas em curso devia haver foco nas oportunidades e ameaças, devia haver proactividade. 

É impressionante a diferença de ritmo entre os dois lados do Atlântico.

Uma série de postais nos últimos 30 dias aqui no blogue sobre o tema do reshoring:

• Outros sintomas de que o mundo está a mudar 
• Mais sintomas de como o mundo está a mudar
• Sonho ... deliro.

No Domingo passado publiquei o tweet:

"76.3% - Increase in U.S. construction spending, mostly on factories, in May from a year earlier."

Consequências da I.R.S.?

— Carlos P da Cruz 🇺🇦🚜🇳🇱🇬🇪 (@ccz1) July 9, 2023

Ontem apanhei este vídeo de Peter Zeihan:

Além do tema do tweet acima, o vídeo acaba com a referência a dois temas interessantes: 

• a relação entre inflação e reshoring (É transitória ...); e
• Mongo

"doubled construction stuff spending again. So, we were already at record levels three years ago, we've now doubled the record and this is going on from there. Now this does mean we're going to have some more inflation in the short in the midterm because there's no way you double the size of the industrial plant without that, but once we get to the back side of this a few years from now, we will have a supply chain system that is local, that is employed by locals, that serves local customers and uses less energy and less water and has fewer steps and it's largely immune to International shocks"

Algo que me faz pensar no regresso da indústria às cidades. 

Outros sintomas de que o mundo está a mudar

Na última página do WSJ de ontem encontrei "U.S. Sees Boom in Factory Building":

"Congress passed two measures last year that aimed, in part, to build America's manufacturing capacity back up.

...

On Monday, the Commerce Department reported May construction spending figures, with overall spending rising a seasonally adjusted 0.9% from a month earlier. Once again, an important piece of that was spending on construction of manufacturing facilities."

 Entretanto, ontem durante a minha caminhada matinal, li dois artigos sobre um mesmo tema, que poderá vir a ter repercussões na forma como os governos como o português estão habituados a receber dinheiro da UE:

• "Alemania se desindustrializa y sufre un desplome de la inversión extranjera"(1)
• "Germany Needs a New Growth Model" (2)

Da fonte 1:

"una tendencia de cierres que afecta especialmente a las plantas de producción que requieren un alto gasto energético.

...

Los sectores que más economía consumen, como el químico o el metalúrgico, optan por llevarse al extranjero plantas de producción, ante el encarecimiento de la cesta energética y la incertidumbre sobre los suministros.

...

«A la industria alemana le esperan tiempos difíciles», dice el economista de Commerzbank Ralph Solveen, que añade que «en la segunda mitad del año existe la amenaza de una disminución significativa de los pedidos que probablemente contribuya a que la economía se siga contrayendo»."

Da fonte 2:

"the German economic engine is facing structural headwinds, weakening the country in the long term as geopolitical tensions mount.

The exports that powered growth in the 2010s—propelled by Asian demand for German cars, machinery, and chemicals—ran out of steam in 2018

...

Now, while globalization has not gone into reverse, it is changing form, and not in Germany’s favor. China’s car exports are exploding, supplanting Germany as the second biggest exporter  and threatening Japan’s spot at the top of the global auto market. Beijing is also upgrading its machinery sector. Ironically, Berlin has exacerbated the competitive threat that is now emerging with little regard for a level playing field with China. 

...

Germany also made little progress in cutting red tape or reducing unwarranted protections for professional service like tax or legal services, which both stifle competition and keep prices unnecessarily high. This makes it harder to start or scale-up a business."

Mais sintomas de como o mundo está a mudar

Mais sintomas de como o mundo está a mudar. 

"When Bayard Winthrop, the chief executive of the retailer American Giant, ordered the batch of shirts that his company would advertise for the Fourth of July, he didn't think much of it. The retailer, which has been producing its apparel solely in factories around the United States for more than a decade, perennially leans into its "Made in America" pitch for Independence Day.

This year's crew-neck T-shirts are fittingly available in red, white or blue with very little embellishment other than getting straight to the point: Letters that read "American Made." They cost $60 each. And they sold out in the first day. Then he ordered another set, which also sold out quickly as well. The company is scrambling to secure its fourth order.

For American Giant, this is shaping up to be its most lucrative Fourth of July yet. The company has been using its "Made in America" status to advertise to consumers since its founding in 2012. But, Mr. Winthrop said, it is now reaching customers at a time when chatter about the global supply chain, re-shoring, trade deal loopholes and sustainability in fashion has moved beyond boardrooms and policy circles. 

Sixty-five percent of U.S. adults said they intentionally bought "Made in America" products over the past year, according to a Morning Consult survey released last month. That's about the same rate of U.S. adults who said they had those same intentions last year.

...

The reality is much of that apparel is made overseas and imported. 

... 

Since the 1990s, production of apparel sold by major American retailers has largely moved overseas, especially to China, which brings heightened tensions between the United States and China into the equation for those companies.

The pandemic also strained the global supply chain, disrupting the reliability of imports. In some cases, retailers are moving production closer to the United States or sourcing a wider share of the goods they sell domestically.

In the past month, lawmakers in Washington have introduced a series of bills seeking to close off a shipping channel that allows companies like the fast-fashion retailers Shein and Temu - both founded in China - from benefiting from a trade rule, which allows them to forgo paying fees at U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Lawmakers argue this would level the playing field for American-based retailers."

Recordar o recente Sonho ... deliro. O paralelismo para Portugal tem de ser ao nível do Made in Europe.

Entretanto, ontem encontrei esta frase:

"The more immersed we become in a changing culture, the more we need to be reminded of what is timeless and fundamental." 

Trechos retirados de "Shirt Maker Has Patriotism Down to a U.S.A. -Made ' Tee" publicado no NYT de 2 de Julho último.

Sonho ... deliro.

Está quase a fazer dois anos que o primeiro ministro foi descrito assim:

"Ao dr. Costa interessa tanto o que se vai passar daqui a três anos, como a mim o que se vai passar daqui a 300. O dr. Costa quer saber da semana que vem. O que é desesperante é que a direita nem a semana que vem percebe."

 Dali só podemos esperar competência(?) no jogo do imediato. Por isso, seria interessante que um bloco central qualquer, para remover reacções epidérmicas, se reunisse para pensar o futuro, e preparar um conjunto de propostas sobre como criar condições para tirar partido da re-industriialização da Europa. Não seria para escolher campeões, não seria para distribuir dinheiro pelos amigos, mas para, na linguagem de Bloomberg como mayor de New York, pôr a mesa.

A revolução está aí:

"A global arms race to reindustrialise is under way, reversing long-established trends in many advanced economies. The forces driving this race - decarbonisation, deglobalisation, remilitarisation - are likely to have lasting implications for the global macroeconomy and may even help it break free from secular stagnation.

...

Underpinning this shift has been a relocation of manufacturing production from west to east and an accompanying reconfiguration of global supply chains. [Moi ici: Recordar "já não precisamos da vossa ajuda" ] This was made possible by successive waves of trade liberalisation, culminating in China's accession into the World Trade Organization in 2001. These trends were then amplified by the activist industrial policies pursued by countries such as China and Singapore, policies typically not matched in the west.

...

The past few years, however, have seen a new industrial age beginning to take shape, with global manufacturing undergoing a revival, in particular in the west. This has been underpinned by three distinct global arms races.

...

This new industrial age is also beginning to reverse some of the secular macro trends of the past. Fractured supply chains are raising global prices, causing inflation targets to overshoot and interest rates to rise. Public and private money is flooding into manufacturing projects, irrigating firms dehydrated by the investment drought. Higher investment plans are also helping absorb the global savings glut, with global real interest rates rising by over 1 percentage point so far.

Most arms races leave no one better off. Today's race to reindustrialise is different. It mav be just the impetus the world needs to break free of its economic and environmental torpor."

Sonho... deliro.

Trechos retirados de "The industrial arms race is just what we need" publicado no FT de ontem.

A lente macro é tão ...

"When the world's business and political leaders gathered in 2018 at the annual economic forum in Davos, Switzerland, the mood was jubilant. Growth in every major country was on an upswing. The global economy, declared Christine Lagarde, then the managing director of the International Monetary Fund, "is in a very sweet spot." Five years later, the outlook has decidedly soured.

...

A lot has happened between then and now: A global pandemic hit; war erupted in Europe; tensions between the United States and China boiled. And inflation, thought to be safely stored away with disco album collections, returned with a vengeance. But as the dust has settled, it has suddenly seemed as if almost everything we thought we knew about the world economy was wrong. [Moi ici: Mas quem é que achava que estava tudo bem?]

The economic conventions that policymakers had relied on since the Berlin Wall fell more than 30 years ago - the unfailing superiority of open markets, liberalized trade and maximum efficiency look to be running off the rails. [Moi ici: Este blogue sempre achou errada a crença absoluta na maximização da eficiência, basta recordar os marcadores eficiência, eficientismo e denominador]

...

Globalization, seen in recent decades as unstoppable a force as gravity, is clearly evolving in unpredictable ways.  [Moi ici: Outra tema caro a este blogue, há mais de 17 anos que escrevemos aqui sobre as forças a minar a globalização. Recordo O regresso dos clientes, Especulação - um epílogo?] The move away from an integrated world economy is accelerating. And the best way to respond is a subject of fierce debate.

...

As the consulting firm EY concluded in its 2023 Geostrategic Outlook, the trends behind the shift away from ever-increasing globalization "were accelerated by the Covid-19 pandemic - and then they have been supercharged by the war in Ukraine."[Moi ici: Nunca esqueço de Maio de 2020 - El coronavirus actúa como acelerador de cambios que ya estaban en marcha]

...

Associated economic theories about the ineluctable rise of worldwide free market capitalism took on a similar sheen of invincibility and inevitability. Open markets, hands-off government and the relentless pursuit of efficiency would offer the best route to prosperity. [Moi ici: Recordo aquilo a que chamo a doença anglo-saxónica, recordo as críticas que fazemos há anos à automatização - Especulação sobre mais um falhanço da automatização, recordo o que escrevo sobre Kevin O'Leary]

...

The story of the international economy today, said Henry Farrell, a professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, is about "how geopolitics is gobbling up hyperglobalization. [Moi ici: O que me impressiona nestas análises é que me parecem demasiado macro. Há mais de uma década que a globalização está a recuar por causa de Mongo, por causa do fim do modelo do século XX, por causa de "We are all weird"]

...

"Ignoring the economic dependencies that had built up over the decades of liberalization had become really perilous," Mr. Sullivan, the U.S. national security adviser, said. Adherence to "oversimplified market efficiency," he added, proved to be a mistake." [Moi ici: O que me impressiona nestas análises é a crença de que a economia é como a física newtoniana, quando a economia é a continuação da biologia"]

Trechos retirados do artigo, "Failures of Globalization Shatter Long-Held Beliefs", publicado no NYT do passado Domingo. 

O mundo a mudar

No FT de ontem matéria-prima para análises de contexto.

Por um lado "China is 'cancelled' for many foreign investors"  onde encontrei:

"Overseas investors are selling shares even in profitable internet companies such as Tencent and Alibaba, while becoming reluctant to back the country's most promising start-ups. Venture capital group Sequoia last week became the latest business to bow to rising tensions between Beijing and Washington, announcing a plan to split its China business into a separate entity. Adding to the flight of foreign capital is an unsteady economic recovery that has deflated Chinese tech stocks that had briefly jumped on hopes for the country's post-pandemic reopening. The downward trend has left employees and investors concerned that the depressed valuations for Chinese tech groups listed in New York and Hong Kong may be long-lasting.

"China is getting canceled and the economy is a dumpster fire," said a Hong Kong-based equity analyst." 

Por outro lado "Clients rush for Asia investment products that exclude China" onde encontrei:

"Global fund managers say they are rushing to meet client demand for new Asian investment products that exclude China as investor appetite for the region's largest economy is hit by slowing growth and mounting geopolitical risk.

...

They said demand had been stoked by worsening US-China tension and a rally for the rest of the region that had left Its biggest market behind.

"Investors are concerned about geopolitics," said Minyue Liu, Investment specialist at BNP Paribas Asset Management.

...

"On geopolitics, there are a lot of different opinions among clients but I think that anyone who thought the US-China tension was going to go away is now very aware that it will not," Lees said. "At the same time, clients are seeing that they can get a lot of exposure to China through other markets like Australia, Japan, and South Korea."

However, the main driver of the trend towards ex-China investment was "economic, not geopolitical","

O mundo a mudar.

Entretanto, no JdN de hoje, na última página pode ler-se "Xi prepara megaplano de estímulo económico"... faz-me lembrar os anos 90 e os dirigentes japoneses. Estímulos económicos são para salvar o sistema financeiro.

A evolução da produtividade (parte II)

Parte I.

Originalmente a parte II metia Seth Godin e Porter, mas vamos ter de fazer uma alteração.

No passado dia 5 o WSJ publicou um artigo intitulado "Productivity Drop Blurs Economic Picture" de onde sublinho:

"You would think from May's blowout jobs report the economy was booming.

Here's the puzzle: Other recent data suggest it is in recession.

The dichotomy emerges from the divergent behavior of employment and output, two key indicators of economic activity.

...

The economy has gone through periods where output has expanded faster than employment, but seldom the other way around,

...

What explains these dissonant signals is productivity, or output per hour worked: It is cratering. That raises questions about whether the much-hyped technology adoption during the pandemic and, more recently, artificial intelligence are making a difference.

...

Labor productivity fell 2.1% in the first quarter from the fourth at an annual rate, and was down 0.8% in the first quarter from a vear earlier, the Labor Department said Thursday. That is the fifth-straight quarter of negative vear-over-year productivity growth-the longest such run since records began in 1948.

...

Usually, employment plummets during recessions because as factories, offices and restaurants produce less, they need fewer workers. That clearly isn’t happening.

...

One reason could be labor hoarding. [Moi ici: LOL. Acho esta explicação tão inverosímil] After struggling to hire and train workers during the pandemic-induced labor crunch, employers are now balking at letting them go, even as sales slip, given the labor market's unusual tightness.

...

It's "not that technology got worse in the last year, but that businesses were selling less stuff and they're nervous about their ability to attract employees, so they're holding on to their employees,"

...

A more imminent concern is that when workers produce more, companies can raise wages without increasing prices. When productivity falls, it is harder to keep inflation in check."

Ontem durante caminhada matinal li este artigo e tweetei:

Ui! Os americanos não sabem porque é que a sua produtividade está a baixar! Os académicos avançam com explicações bizarras. Para mim é tão simples que também devo estar errado e não tem nada a ver com “hoarding workers”. Para mim é o efeito oposto ao da receita irlandesa.

— Carlos P da Cruz 🇺🇦🚜🇳🇱🇬🇪 (@ccz1) June 6, 2023

Qual é a receita que proponho para o aumento agregado da baixa produtividade portuguesa? Aplicar a receita irlandesa e seduzir empresas de elevado valor acrescentado a estabelecerem-se em Portugal (ver Parte I por exemplo).

Ora o que andam os americanos a fazer? O Financial Times de ontem dá uma ajuda, Gideon Rachman escreveu uma crónica do tempo que passa com o título "How America is reshaping the world economy". Antes de irmos à crónica pensemos por um momento nos fanáticos do Excel quando chegam ao comando das empresas. O que costumam fazer? 

Cortar! Despedir e subcontratar! 

Quanto mais a empresa subcontrata mais a sua produtividade cresce.

Agora voltemos a Gideon:

"An unheralded revolution has taken place in America's approach to international economics. As the new thinking emerges, it is reshaping the global economy and the western alliance.

...

The US intends to use a new strategic industrial policy to simultaneously revitalise the American middle-class and US democracy, while combating climate change and establishing a lasting technological lead over China.

...

Many of America's allies fear that the bit that slipped off the table was the interests of foreigners. They worry, in particular, that subsidies worth hundreds of billions of dollars to American industry and clean technology, set out in the Inflation Reduction Act, will come at the expense of producers and workers in Europe and Asia."

Volto agora ao tema do artigo no WSJ, o abaixamento da produtividade. A minha tese é que na base desta evolução estará o regresso aos Estados Unidos de produção anteriormente fabricada na Ásia. Produtos de valor acrescentado mais baixo, mas protegidos do mercado do preço pelo mesmo fenómeno que salvou o calçado português,  mas protegidos do mercado do preço pelo medo de uma China que pode invadir Taiwan, mas protegidos do mercado do preço pelos "hundreds of billions of dollars" que subsidiam produções que de outra forma seriam incapazes de competir. Esta produção vem diluir a produtividade anteriormente atingida pela economia americana.

Continua.

Quem vai voltar a ser a China da UE? (parte II)

A propósito de “Quem vai voltar a ser a China da UE?”, mão amiga fez-me chegar um e-mail com um convite para este webinar:

Quem vai voltar a ser a China da UE?

"Schneider Electric, one of the world's largest makers of electrical and automation products, is shifting some manufacturing closer to the U.S. from factories in Asia and Europe as it pushes ahead with a regional manufacturing strategy.

The moves are meant to position the France-based company, which makes goods such as light switches, electric-vehicle chargers, home-automation systems and data-center equipment, to meet growing demand in North America and to compete for federal subsidies aimed at expanding manufacturing in the U.S.

…

The company said it has started working with North American suppliers and is encouraging some of its suppliers elsewhere to set up factories in the region as it builds a local supply chain for materials such as nickel and lithium.

The company said it makes more than 80% of the products it sells in the U.S., Mexico and Canada in North America, with the rest made in factories across China, India, Southeast Asia and Europe. It will continue manufacturing in Asia and Europe but aims to have the finished goods go to customers in those regions instead of shipping the products around the world.

…

The company is restructuring its supply chain at a time when many businesses are looking to bring manufacturing closer to the U.S. after disruptions, stockouts and shipping delays during the Covid-19 pandemic highlighted the fragility of far-flung supply chains, said Kamala Raman, an analyst at research firm Gartner. Geopolitical tensions between the U.S. and China have also prompted concerns from government and business officials about the national-security risks of manufacturing crucial and highly technical items such as semiconductors overseas”

Trechos retirados do WSJ no artigo "Schneider Electric Expands Its North American Manufacturing"

Confundir efeito com causa (parte II)

Confundir efeito com causa (parte I) 

Por causa do fácil versus o difícil temos:

• as frases de Maliranta e de Nassim Taleb que ao longo dos anos vamos citando aqui no blogue;
• a pirâmide do flying geese

Há dias escrevemos este postal, Emprego, marketing e subida na escala de valor, onde abordamos o tema da destruição de emprego qualificado e o crescimento do emprego não qualificado. Nestes postais, Tudo vai depender do tal jogo de forças (parte V), e Turn, turn, turn - versão de 2023, abordo o impacte da saída da produção industrial na China.

Ontem, no WJS encontrei "The Disappearing White-Collar Job" onde li:

"For generations of Americans, a corporate job was a path to stable prosperity. No more.

The jobs lost in a monthslong cascade of white-collar layoffs triggered by overhiring and rising interest rates might never return, corporate executives and economists say.

...

"We may be at the peak of the need for knowledge workers," [Moi ici: Típico pensamento anglo-saxónico] said Atif Rafig, a former chief digital officer at McDonald's and Volvo. "We just need fewer people to do the same thing."

Long after robots began taking manufacturing jobs, artificial intelligence is now coming for the higher-ups-accountants, software programmers, human-resources, specialists and lawyers-and converging with unyielding pressure on companies to operate more efficiently.

...

During past periods when higher interest rates pitched the U.S. economy into recession, job losses were often led by industries most sensitive to rate changes, such as manufacturing and construction.

...

Layoffs in the information sector were up 88% in March from a vear earlier and up 55% in finance and insurance, the data show. For manufacturing, they were up 25% ever the same period.

Companies are for the moment focused on keeping bluecollar employees-restaurant servers, warehouse workers, drivers and the like-who remain in short supply, according to economists and humanresources specialists.

...

Whole Foods and Disney announced layoffs in recent weeks that largely hit corporate staff while sparing such customer-service jobs as grocery clerk and hourly theme park attendant. 

...

Payroll data from more than 300,000 small- and medium-size businesses showed that wages for new hires had generally declined in April from a year ago but fell most rapidly in white-collar professions, such as finance and insurance"

O desconhecido difícil para os agentes portugueses é conhecido fácil para agentes estrangeiros - daí  Tamanho, produtividade e a receita irlandesa.

Já há uns tempos que sinto que estamos a ficar maduros para uma revolução semelhante à que Cavaco encabeçou quando libertou a economia à iniciativa privada (bancos, televisões, jornais, empresas nacionalizadas com o 11 de Março...) pena que alguns se distraiam com a engenharia social.

Slowbalization (parte II)

E se for mais do que isso? 

"A.P. Moller-Maersk on Thursday posted a sharp drop in first-quarter net profit as inventory corrections in Western economies sent shipping demand falling, pushing freight rates and volumes lower.

The Danish shipping giant expects the destocking effort, the result of an enormous inventory buildup last vear that left retailers swamped with goods, to wind down by the end of the second quarter but that trade volumes are still contracting.

"So far we don't see a strong move towards normalization. Some customers are getting to the end of destocking, but it's not consistent," Chief Executive Vincent Clerc said."

Recordo os recentes:

• Turn, turn, turn - versão de 2023
• Slowbalization
• O choque chinês, não o euro

Trecho retirado de "Maersk Hit by Drop In Freight Demand" publicado no WSJ de ontem.

Turn, turn, turn - versão de 2023

Recentemente escrevi, O choque chinês, não o euro. Agora, imaginem o impacte da reversão deste choque... por isso, tenho escrito esta série de postais - Tudo vai depender do tal jogo de forças (parte V).

Para reflexão:

"China’s days of being the Western world’s go-to manufacturing hub may be coming to an end. This has serious ramifications for China, and the world. Depending on where you focus, this is a good thing, or a bad thing. In fact, it’s probably both.

...

For those with contacts in China, stories of laid off young people struggling to afford their apartments, taking on two jobs in gig economies, or becoming escorts in karaoke bars is becoming commonplace. This is not the country that the CCP once held together with promise of opportunity and quick climbs up the Chinese social ladder. This is starting to turn into America of the late 1990s-2000s, reeling for China’s take over of American tooling and steel, textiles and furniture manufacturing. Many people here know what that feels like.

...

The problem is geopolitics. [Moi ici: Recordar Taiwan como espelho da Ucrânia - Cash, then value, then growth] That should scare China’s investors more. They know the drill already. Companies are slow walking out of China because of those tensions. This includes Chinese companies investing in Southeast Asia to avoid trade tariffs, sanctions, and growing political risk. [Moi ici: Recordar Lembram-se do "banhista gordo"?]

To keep its business with the Americans (and to a lesser extent, the Europeans) Chinese companies are moving off the mainland.

...

In a country with roughly 900 million workers, many of whom are blue collar and not about to “learn to code”, these job losses tear at the social contract between the CCP and its people. Roughly 17% of Chinese people have a college degree compared to around 36% in the U.S., according to Chinese and U.S. government stats.

...

Either China figures out a way to consume what it produces at home rather than relying on the U.S. consumer, [Moi ici: Eu pensei nisto em 2008. Recordo Especulação. No entanto, Peter Zaihan alerta-nos para o colapso demográfico chinês, O futuro da globalização. Só para ter uma ideia do impacte da coisa repito aqui o número tremendo "The Chinese are going to lose a greater percentage of their population in the next 20 years from aging than Europe did in the Black Plague, according to Peter Zeihan"] or Beijing makes it less attractive for companies to set up shop in Vietnam. If they cannot do those things, the bloodletting will continue. If this trend goes on, it should be seen as a harbinger of worse things to come.

...

China used to make almost all of our clothes. Not anymore. That’s job losses for China.

...

U.S. imports of China made apparel decreased from about $25 billion in 2018 to about $17 billion in 2021, according to a March 2023 report by the International Trade Commission (ITC).

Imports of these goods from China declined but imports from the rest of the world grew by 25.2%. The ITC estimated a sizable decline in apparel manufacturing imports from China of 40% between 2020 and 2021, while U.S. production increased by up to 6.3% in 2021 in response.

The ITC study looked at 10 different sectors. In all 10, China exports to the U.S. fell. Computer equipment from China fell around 7%; furniture imports fell 25%; electronics equipment imports fell by 40%. Automotive parts imports fell a whopping 50%, according to the ITC.

...

China and Hong Kong’s investment into Mexico rose six-fold from $117.1 million in 2015 to nearly $700 million in 2022, according to the Mexican government.

Chinese manufacturing growth might have peaked.

China’s future growth industries could pick up some of this labor, but very little. Robotics will be good for China blue collar labor, but biotech, pharma, and AI will not as making the shift from seamstress to scientist is quite the stretch. So is going from Chinese solar panel maker to AI coder. It is also unlikely that lower skilled office jobs can pick up the blue collar workforce losing out to outsourcing.

...

China is surely not a dying manufacturing power. Europe would be in worse shape, for sure. China can turn the ship around, but if it comes at America’s expense, that will be totally unsustainable.

But China’s days as manufacturer of nearly everything in your house and garden shed look to be pretty much over. That’s a lot of workers whose future is in question for the first time in a generation.

...

the bad news is that the erosion of China’s role as go-to manufacturer will likely become a matter of life and death — for industries, for businesses, for some people."

Trechos retirados de "China's Big Troubles: Its Days As Global Go-To Manufacturer May Be Coming To An End"

Slowbalization

 Imagem retirada daqui.

Slowbalization, uma palavra a entrar no nosso vocabulário.

É complicado ...

Li ontem "Costa: "Portugal tem muito a ganhar com a reorganização à escala global das cadeias de valor"".

É complicado ...

Choca com a minha experiência do mundo? Não!!!

Ainda ontem contava o caso de empresa exportadora, há cerca de um ano, aumentou os preços para, polidamente, mandar embora um cliente. E ele foi. Entretanto, já no primeiro trimestre deste ano, esse ex-cliente voltou a bater à porta disposto a aceitar os tais preços. Ainda ontem mostrava os dados da tabela neste postal Evolução das exportações. Recordar ainda de Novembro último A grande reconfiguração

Então, por que é complicado?

Porque é mais do mesmo. Porque me faz lembrar a Lituânia e o postal Ultrapassados pelo Leste. O meu interlocutor ontem contava-me que tinha estado a observar uma equipa da concorrência a trabalhar. Pormenor, não viu um português, só chilenos e brasileiros.

É complicado porque o que penso não é linear, tem um lado positivo e tem um lado negativo. O lado positivo é dar trabalho a quem já está no terreno. O lado negativo é ser mais do mesmo, é continuarmos a ser um país que não consegue aumentar a produtividade agregada. Não porque os patrões ou os empregados sejam maus ou preguiçosos, mas porque o aumento da produtividade (num país onde a escala não funciona, país de PMEs) é limitado pelo preço máximo que se possa praticar ... como não recordar a foto e o texto de A brutal realidade de uma foto:

Com mais do mesmo teremos os portugueses a continuar a emigrar em busca de melhor remuneração.

É complicado.