Acerca dos monopólios informais (II)

Parte I.

"How does a little monopolist grow its monopoly from a tiny one to a big enough one to be economically survivable, then attractive, then a money machine? It is by delighting its customers. And it isn’t altruistic. It needs more customers to get the economic model to work. And each customer benefits from the attempt to get the next one in order to make the economics work. It is a win-win!

But then the monopolist gets to the point of making the economics work, and beyond there, the monopoly becomes a magnificent profit machine. At that point, another customer would be perfectly nice, but who really cares? The monopolist is rich beyond its wildest dreams.

At that point, unless the monopolist remembers Rule #2, customers go to the back of the line. They just cease to matter. In fact, they become an irritation that gets in the way of self-actualization, which is the thing that really matters to the monopolist. And then the monopolist comes up with clever ways to make more money by abusing them. Sell their data to nasty people. Force them to sign restrictive contracts. Bias search results that they used to count on for their objectivity. It goes on and on. (The analog for businesses with only a small core of monopoly customers is to take those customers completely for granted while making luxurious offers to attract new customers.)

And then the monopolist starts the slow downward spiral. It is a very slow death. Again, the future is already here; it is just not evenly distributed. Customers will appeal to the government for help (ask AT&T, IBM and Microsoft). Or they will use a different device because it doesn’t use the monopoly operating system. Or they will abandon the monopolist’s service just to prove a point. In due course, the economics crater."

Trechos retirados de "The Two Rules that Monopolists Ignore at their Peril" 

Acerca dos monopólios informais (I)

Consideremos aqui o Facebook, a Apple como exemplo de monopólios. Basta atentarem no cabeçalho deste blog para lerem "monopólios informais":

"there is a huge incentive to attack the luxurious market of an existing monopolist — and innumerable companies do so. The monopolist must understand that these insurgents can’t help themselves: the opportunity is too attractive.

But taking on the monopolist at the heart of its business is rarely their approach. The dominant approach is to chip away at the edges of the monopoly. Think of the monopolist’s business as a circular disk. At the center is the perfect customer who thinks the monopolist’s offer is perfect. As you move away from the center, the offering is ever less perfect to those customers. And that is where insurgents attack: not at the center but at the fringes. And they win fringe customers.

When MCI and Sprint attacked AT&T’s monopoly, they didn’t attack the core of middle-American residential customers. They went after large businesses, who were being vastly overcharged relative to cost to serve, in order for AT&T to subsidize undercharged rural customers. Facebook’s insurgents aren’t attacking the core of its business. They are picking off customers who are hyper-sensitive to privacy issues (MT Social) or hyper-sensitive to ads (MeWe) or want to get credit for their participation (Minds) or they are searching for ideas/inspiration (Pinterest). If successful, that insurgent becomes the new monopolist for that niche — some of which are too small to be profitable, others not.

But the result is that the original monopolist’s territory becomes ever smaller as it is dynamically segmented around the edges. Ironically, the same thing happens in due course to the new entrants’ monopolies. So, dynamically over time, markets keep segmenting and segmenting into shrinking monopolies. It is inexorable."

Trechos retirados de "The Two Rules that Monopolists Ignore at their Peril" 

Centros de decisão nacional

"His most provocative thesis, excerpted in a popular WSJ column, declares that "competition is for losers" and entrepreneurs should embrace monopolies. This is an ingenious framing device—just controversial enough to arouse debate, but commonsense enough to make an incrementalist acknowledge its virtue. Thiel is not suggesting that capitalism is bad. He's saying that, precisely because capitalism is wonderful for consumers, it's hell for companies. Truly competitive industries, like Manhattan restaurants, see their profits gobbled by rivals and fickle eaters."

Esta manhã li um texto em que o autor defendia que quanto maior um conselho de administração, quanto mais membros integrar, maior será a tendência desse conselho para não arriscar, para escolher projectos menos arriscados.
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Assim, as empresas com conselhos de administração mais povoados terão, tendencialmente, rentabilidades mais baixas. Algo que por acaso encontrei no mês passado:

"Large corporations with small boards (around nine to 10 directors) outperformed their peers on shareholder return by 8.5 percentage points, while firms with large boards (13 to 14) underperformed peers by 10.85 percentage points,"

A não ser que... essas empresas consigam remover muito do risco dos seus projectos.
Como?
Como?!
Manipulando, manobrando, influenciando os governos para que as protejam.
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Onde é que eu já vi isto?

Trecho inicial retirado de "Peter Thiel's Zero to One Might Be the Best Business Book I've Read"

Em busca de um monopólio.

Este artigo "The Comparative Advantage Theory of Competition" (de Shelby Hunt e Robert Morgan) impressionou-me.
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Impressiona-me hoje, em 2008, que em 1995 ainda alguém tivesse que perder tempo a enterrar a teoria neoclássica da competição perfeita.
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Impressionou-me "perfect competition is the only theory of competition that college students ever see"...
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Percebi o racional de algumas intervenções de Francisco Louçã: "abnormal profits" como "profits different from that of a firm in an industry characterized by perfect competition"
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Todo o trabalho que desenvolvo nas organizações tem um fito, procurar "abnormal profits".
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Como?
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Procurando dinamitar as situações de "perfect competition".
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Só se pode aspirar a rentabilidades superiores se se conseguir ser diferente dos outros. Ser diferente implica um afastamento da situação de competição perfeita.
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Quando uma organização adquire uma posição de vantagem comparativa sustentada, por exemplo, o bar de praia que melhor atende, melhor serve os clientes num raio de 10 km, de certa forma cria um monopólio, não está no mesmo campeonato dos que servem mal, dos que são mal educados, dos que têm falta de higiene, dos que têm falta de pessoal, dos que...
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É este tipo de monopólios que ajudo a criar.