"the Age of Diverse Markets" (parte III)

Parte I e parte II.

Os trechos que se seguem são retirados de “Choose Your Customer: How to Compete Against the Digital Giants and Thrive” de Jonathan S. Byrnes e ilustram algo que escrevo aqui há muitos anos. Basta recordar a curva de Stobachoff:

"to determine which parts of its business were making or losing money. When they saw the results, they nearly fell off their chairs:

• About 18 percent of their customers, which we call their Profit Peak accounts, accounted for about half of their revenues but produced over 130 percent of their profits.
• About 30 percent of their customers, their large money-losing Profit Drains, accounted for about one-third of their revenues but drained off about 50 percent of the profits earned by the rest of the company
• About half of the company’s customers were Profit Desert customers who accounted for about 20 percent of the revenues and produced less than 10 percent of the profits."

When Edison’s managers saw this, they immediately understood that their price war strategy was a response to the profit-draining customers’ demands, while they were essentially ignoring their critical high-profit customers.”[Moi ici: Demasiado comum. Recordo a espécie de esquema Ponzi]

 E pensa que só acontece aos outros? E como é na sua empresa? Ainda na passada quarta-feira ao telefone tive uma conversa surrealista, parecia um case-study acerca do que são custos afundados. A diferença é que numa empresa o que acontece com ela fica com ela, o mesmo já não se passa quando o decisor é um ministro.

"the Age of Diverse Markets" (parte II)

Parte I.

Na Age of Diverse Markets o monolitismo do mercado desfaz-se, e o uso de médias começa a ser contraproducente dada a variedade de clientes, ofertas, preços e processos.

"In the past, managers needed only aggregate metrics, while today, they need to understand the relationship between revenue and cost for literally every product sold to every customer every time.

...

The biggest problem in business today is that all too many managers are not embracing the Age of Diverse Markets success elements that will enable them to prosper. Instead, they are doubling down on tactical innovations and tuning up old practices from the Age of Mass Markets—usually with diminishing results."

O meu velho exemplo da média do mercado ser laranja, mas ninguém comprar laranja. Metade compra amarelo e metade compra vermelho.

Na  Age of Diverse Markets, e aqui voltamos ao ponto que está na base do nosso trabalho há muitos anos:

"The key to success in the Age of Diverse Markets is choosing your customer. [Moi ici: Quem são os seus clientes-alvo?] This has three imperatives:

• Choose: Define a defensible strategy that your company can dominate, choose the customers who fit, and say no to those who do not.
• Align: Identify and build the capabilities that will enable your company to achieve high sustained profitability with your chosen customers in your target strategic group (that is, the set of firms pursuing the same strategy), and focus your resources to quickly excel in your strategic direction.
• Manage: Develop your organization so your managers can seamlessly coordinate to identify and support your chosen customers, and to meet their diverse and rapidly evolving needs."

Trechos retirados de “Choose Your Customer: How to Compete Against the Digital Giants and Thrive” de Jonathan S. Byrnes

"the Age of Diverse Markets"

Longe vão os tempos do: qualquer cor desde que seja preto.

Ao longo dos anos tenho escrito sobre Mongo, ou o Estranhistão. A metáfora que uso para ilustrar o abandono do monolitismo do século XX e o advento da variedade e diversidade do século XXI.

"Today, business is transitioning from one major era, the Age of Mass Markets, to another, which we call the Age of Diverse Markets. [Moi ici: Aquilo a que chamo de Mongo, ou o Estranhistão]

...

The Age of Mass Markets, which extended through most of the prior century, was characterized by fast-growing homogeneous markets. [Moi ici: A visão monolítica que a Economia aplica à realidade para a poder matematizar. Depois, chega a modelos e a conclusões sem adesão à realidade e não percebe, e enterra a cabeça na areia]

...

[Moi ici: In the Age of Mass Markets] These companies were characterized by massive economies of scale in nearly every business function (production, distribution, advertising, and so on), which ensured that as they increased their sales, their unit costs dropped, giving them ample profits to invest in getting more sales and in further reducing their costs by increasing the efficiency of their production and distribution systems. Both prices and distribution costs were relatively uniform, so reporting tools based on averages—like aggregate revenues, costs, and gross margins—were sufficient.

The key management imperative was to get big fast. The rules of thumb were that all revenues were good and all costs were bad. [Moi ici: Como não recuar a 2012 e a "Como surgem os Golias e pistas para o aparecimento de Davids". Em Portugal, os mesmos da tríade ainda sonham com empresas grandes. Em Mongo, "Giants invariably descend into suckiness"] Companies segregated their functional departments to individually optimize their revenue-maximizing or cost-minimizing objectives, and they coordinated them at the top through periodic planning sessions and period-end financial reports.

Today’s Age of Diverse Markets, which began its widespread acceleration around 2000, is completely different. Today, there are very few mass markets, while there are more and more diverse markets where product offerings, pricing, and service packages are uniquely configured, if not by individual customer, than at least by highly segmented target markets.

Today, markets are heterogeneous and fragmenting down to the individual customer in many cases. Throughout our economy, pricing is becoming much more varied, both within market segments and even between one customer and the next. In parallel, the cost to serve each customer is becoming increasingly diverse, depending on the customer relationship, product-service mix, and other factors. This change has already overtaken the business-to-consumer (B2C) markets, and it is rapidly transforming the business-to-business (B2B) markets as well."

"In the Age of Mass Markets, products were “king.” To a large extent, companies succeeded by selling the same products to as many customers as possible. In the Age of Diverse Markets, in contrast, customers are “king.” Companies succeed by microtargeting particular customers and tightly specified market segments and providing them with tailored packages of products and related services."

Comecei a reler “Choose Your Customer: How to Compete Against the Digital Giants and Thrive” de Jonathan S. Byrnes. Primeiro, o título. Qual a primeira decisão estratégica? Escolher os clientes-alvo! Recuar ao Verão de 2008 e a Terry Hill e à sua frase "the most important orders are the ones to which a company says 'no'.". Julho de 2007, a primeira vez que usei o marcador "clientes-alvo" aqui no blogue. Apesar de já o fazer em textos anteriores. Segundo, Jonathan S. Byrnes. Um autor que aprecio há mais de 10 anos.

"o trabalho, a mudança necessária, as complicações"

Há muitos anos que aqui no blogue escrevo que os políticos e os empresários, na generalidade, são iguais. São iguais porque emergem do mesmo caldo, do mesmo magma cultural.

Os políticos só são mais perigosos porque lidam com os recursos que são da comunidade e, por isso, são em maior quantidade e, mais grave ainda, não têm skin-in-the-game, esbanjam impunemente o que não lhes custa a ganhar, porque ser estúpido ou ignorante não é ilegal (fora o dolo). O impacte dos seus erros leva países inteiros à falência, o impacte dos erros de um empresário apenas levam a sua empresa à falência.

Agora reparem nisto, a propósito da polémica recente sobre a Câmara Municipal de Lisboa:

Pensem, como seria/será uma empresa gerida assim?

Perante asneiras, perante maus resultados, perante reclamações, responder com resignação:

"NÃO DEVIA ACONTECER, NÃO DEVIA TER ACONTECIDO E ESPERA-SE QUE NÃO VOLTE A ACONTECER"

Este "espera-se que não volte a acontecer" é tão ... inclassificável. É o pior da cultura portuguesa. Acreditar que basta ter fé, para que não volte a acontecer. Foi azar! (Há um ditado, francês, que diz qualquer coisa como: é bom que o marinheiro tenha fé, mas também convém que reme)

Outra vez, como seria/será uma empresa gerida assim?

Claro que há empresários que não partilham desta cultura. Por exemplo, o meu parceiro das conversas oxigenadoras. No Whatsapp escreveu-me recentemente:

"Quando fui a São João da Madeira tomar a vacina estimei uma cadência de 15 vacinas por hora/guichet e o centro abriu 45 minutos depois da hora.

...

Enquanto estive à espera, fiz esta projeção, que por baixo poderiam vacinar um minimo de 600, em vez das 480 atuais. Mas numa abordagem mais detalhada, seria possível melhorar mais e com melhor serviço para os clientes e para os enfermeiros."

Gente que olha para os desafios e procura estudar os factos para mudar a realidade e, assim, aspirar legitimamente a resultados futuros desejados diferentes.

Entretanto, ontem à noite durante mais uma leitura de “Organizing for the New Normal” de Constantinos Markides, apanhei isto:

A conjugação "bad outcome x wrong process followed" não obriga a mudar o processo, implica mais controlo... como não recuar mais de 10 anos até isto:

"As instituições que, analisando um qualquer acidente, se ficam pelo modelo de “culpa individual” perdem a possibilidade de alterar o “sistema” e melhorar a segurança pela introdução de novas políticas que tornem novos erros menos prováveis. Ao punir, simplesmente, um indivíduo a organização nega de forma subliminar a sua responsabilidade no evento negativo, mas não o corrige verdadeiramente. É o princípio da negação dos acidentes, que caracteriza as organizações demasiado burocratizadas e sem abertura a qualquer processo de inovação regenerativa. Face a um acidente que ocorre, a tendência é isolá-lo, punir o responsável mais directo, impedir a divulgação do facto e, seguir em frente, após ter tomado medidas limitadas a nível local."

Imaginem as implicações da conjugação de "bad outcome x correct process followed"... o trabalho, a mudança necessária, as complicações... e mais, neste caso não há erro!

Erro existe quando o processo não é seguido! Os serviços não falharam, os serviços cumpriram o que estava previsto.

Quando um mau resultado surge naturalmente de um mau processo, a responsabilidade é de quem tem autoridade para desenhar e aprovar processos. Imaginem uma empresa que não esteja atenta à evolução da legislação (RGPD, por exemplo), também pode argumentar em sua defesa que foi um erro, que foi um lapso?

Há tempos vi como uma empresa tinha tratado a reclamação de um cliente. No fim, concluíam que a empresa não tinha qualquer responsabilidade. O problema tinha sido gerado por um subcontratado. 

Uma excelente forma de evitar... o trabalho, a mudança necessária, as complicações, o olhar para dentro... 

Ainda argumentei: Come on, o cliente não quer saber do subcontratado, o acordo dele é convosco. Não precisam de mudar nada? Nem a forma como escolhem subcontratados? Nem a forma como informam, apoiam ou controlam subcontratados?

"Failure to Communicate the Choices the “Correct” Way”"

Parte I.

Estes trechos que se seguem são preciosos:

"Assuming the firm has made explicit choices on the who–what–how, these choices need to be communicated to the rest of the organization. Often, this communication does not happen at all, or is so ineffective that the strategy remains a mystery to the employees. However, even in the best-case scenario when the organization has made the choices required and top management has spent time and energy trying to communicate these choices in a clear and explicit way, the probability is still high that employees will fail to fully understand what is communicated to them. There are two main reasons for this.

The first reason has to do with the fact that strategies are often communicated at such a general level that employees find it impossible to understand what they mean or what they can do to help implement them.

...

What happens in an organization when the same statement can have (at least) seven possible meanings?

...

There is a second reason that undermines any communication campaign. Simply communicating the choices you have made is often insufficient. What you really need to do is to communicate the choice and the alternatives considered and rejected in favor of the choice. It is the positioning of the choice relative to the alternatives considered that makes the choice clear to people. This means that what you need to say is not: “We have decided to target customer X.” Instead, you should say: “We have decided to target customer X rather than customer Y or customer Z.” Furthermore, for people to appreciate that a difficult choice has indeed been made, the alternatives considered must not only be explicitly communicated to everybody, they must also be credible and viable alternatives.

...

This is why explicitly stating what alternatives you considered (and rejected) is so important for your audience—it helps them see that you are being honest when you say you have made some difficult choices, and makes them appreciate even more the choice made."

Trechos retirados de “Organizing for the New Normal” de Constantinos Markides. 

"Efficiency comes at a price!"

Um bom texto sobre os riscos associados à concentração, "The World's Food Supply Has Never Been More Vulnerable". 

Recordo a Ecco e a sua fracassada ideia de concentrar toda a sua produção em Bangkok, a concentração de toda a produção de Coca-Cola da Península Ibérica numa única fábrica, a eliminação da refinaria de Leixões, a eliminação da fábrica da UNICER em Loulé. [Moi ici: Como não relacionar o que escrevi sobre o fim da fábrica de Loulé o sucesso da Font Salem)]

Recordo ainda a ideia dos políticos de criarem hospitais-cidade, escolas-cidade, etc.

"Consolidation has made the U.S. meat industry — and the global protein supply — profoundly and unacceptably vulnerable. It will become more susceptible in the years ahead as public health threats and potential cyberattacks continue to loom large, and as climate change increases the risk of natural disasters. Drought, heat, flooding, wildfires, insects, superstorms and weather volatility are raising pressure on our farms and ranches. In short, the cost-saving benefits of agricultural consolidation are increasingly outweighed by the risks of disruption." [Moi ici: Recordo a vacaria com 33 mil vacas]

...

Food-industry experts have long been clamoring for systemic “resilience.” Last April, as the pandemic bore down on meat producers and before he began his second tour as U.S. Department of Agriculture Secretary, Tom Vilsack told me that we’re “better off having multiple plants in multiple locations — smaller facilities to produce enough product. And that may mean a little less profit, but it means that if you have an incident like this that threatens your workforce, you'll always have sufficient operation capacity.” Vilsack reiterated this sentiment Tuesday in a call with reporters: “Efficiency comes at a price, and that price is a lack of resilience when you have a major disruption.""

 

"está tudo relacionado"

Recordo muitas vezes uma frase que Nassim Taleb escreveu no Twitter em 2014:

"Economists fail to get w/ GDP growth that anything that grows without an "S" curve (slowingdown phase) blows up."

Ontem ao passar os olhos pelo livro "The Bed of Procrustes" encontrei:

"Robustness is progress without impatience." 

Entretanto, à noite li "​The '85% Rule': Why a dose of failure optimizes learning": 

"If you have an error rate of 15% or accuracy of 85%, you are always maximizing your rate of learning in these two-choice tasks."

E recordei os velhos nabateus:

BTW, este fim de semana vi num canal do cabo, tipo National Geographic(?), um documentário sobre os Nabateus e a civilização de Petra. Uma parte desse documentário não me sai da cabeça... a parte em que se refere a técnica dos Nabateus para transportar água ao longo de km e km. Eles desenhavam a inclinação das tubagens não para a máxima eficiência de caudal transportado mas para a mais eficaz. A máxima eficiência leva à rotura frequente das tubagens.

Não sei porquê, mas sinto que isto está tudo relacionado. 

 

"businesses often make is that they misjudge the relationship between ..."

Cuidado com os juízos precipitados e com a crença nos jogos de soma nula.

"When radio became popular in the 1920s, the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) battled the new medium, convinced that radio would reduce record sales and, more important at the time, shrink revenue from sheet music. To choke off radio, ASCAP raised its licensing fees by 70 percent in the late 1930s and again in 1940. Broadcasters responded with a boycott. For almost a year, radio audiences in the United States heard virtually no copyright-protected music. All of a sudden, Stephen Foster’s long-forgotten “Jeannie with the Light Brown Hair,” a song in the public domain, filled the airwaves again.

By the 1950s, however, ASCAP’s mistake was readily apparent. Radio was not a substitute for records; it was a complement, a means to advertise music and raise listeners’ appreciation for particular songs. Now the payment streams reversed: instead of charging astronomical licensing fees, record companies paid DJs to play particular songs. The first type of mistake businesses often make is that they misjudge the relationship between two products, seeing them as substitutes when they are, in fact, complements. In hindsight, we see things more clearly, of course. But at the time, the mistake was completely understandable. Wouldn’t you have thought that playing music for free would reduce the demand for records?”

O karma é tramado! 

Trechos retirados de "Better, Simpler Strategy: A Value-Based Guide to Exceptional Performance" 

"It is amazing how many organizations fall into the trap of not making the required choices on strategy"

"Decisions about strategy are the prerogative of top management and cannot be delegated to employees. For example, deciding what customers to target or what products to sell are strategic decisions and must be made by top management. Similarly, changes to strategy are also the domain of top management. You cannot have employees changing the product offering or the customers being targeted without the direct input of their leaders.

...

Employees can have autonomy to act on operational issues that improve what we are already doing, but not on the strategic choices that the organization has made that define its strategic direction.

Obviously, for employees to tell the difference between operational and strategic issues, they must first know what strategic choices the organization has made. This implies that the most important parameter that will guide employees’ behaviors—and the parameter that will allow us to give autonomy without fear of losing control—is our clearly communicated strategy. 

...

a 2013 academic study reported that even in high-performing companies with clearly articulated strategies, only 29 percent of employees knew what their company’s strategy was. This is not an isolated finding—survey after survey reports that employees seem to be in the dark when it comes to their organization’s strategy, despite claims by senior management that their strategy is clear, well communicated, and understood by their employees.

...

Reason #1: Failure to Make the Difficult Choices That Strategy Requires

Strategy is all about making difficult choices—what the organization will do, and more importantly, what it will not do. The question that immediately arises is: “choices about what?” There is no agreed answer to this question, but at the very least there are three choices about strategy that need to be made—the who, the what, and the how. Specifically:

• Who should we target as customers and who should we not?
• What shall we offer these customers and what shall we not?
• How should we achieve all this—what value chain activities should we undertake and what activities should we not?”

...

The biggest strategic mistake that organizations make is not that they miss one or two choices in their decision making; it is that they do not make choices at all.

...

It is amazing how many organizations fall into the trap of not making the required choices on strategy. One reason for this is the fact that these are not easy choices to make—ex ante, there are many possible answers to each one of the three questions.

...

There may be additional reasons, but the end result is that organizations consistently and predictably fail to make the necessary choices that strategy requires. Faced with uncertainty, they invest some of their resources going after customer X and some going after customer Y—just to be on the safe side. In the process, they do a disservice to both X and Y (by underinvesting in both), but at least they ensure that they do not make a mistake by choosing one that may turn out to be wrong five or ten years down the road. Similarly, faced with the prospect of upsetting some of their colleagues, they allocate their limited resources to projects and regions that do not fit with the organization’s goals or direction. In the process, they underinvest in the things that deserve their attention, but at least they do not upset their colleagues!

Failure to make choices leads to the first key reason why we have lack of clarity in strategy: Instead of being a clear statement of the (difficult) choices that the organization has made, strategy becomes nothing more than a vague and generic statement that lists all the wonderful things that the firm aims to achieve. It says all the right things so that nobody can really disagree with it, but fails to state the one thing that will offer guidance to employees— the choices the organization has made—exactly because no choices have been made. When you read the annual report of any company, what you get is good-sounding motherhood statements masquerading as strategy statements, a point also made by other academics. These offer no guidance or direction to employees. No wonder these people complain that they have no idea what their organization’s strategy is. They do not know it because the organization does not really have a strategy!"

Trechos retirados de “Organizing for the New Normal” de Constantinos Markides.  

"Advertise the good behaviors, not the bad ones"

Ao ler.

"Small and seemingly trivial changes in the immediate environment or in the way we behave can have a big influence on what people do or how they behave."

Dei uma interpretação diferente daquela que a maioria das pessoas tem. Quem lê esta frase, olha para o futuro e pensa que a melhoria da situação actual pode depender de pequenas mudanças. Pensei, pequenas mudanças no passado podem ter criado a situação dolorosa actual.

Uma exemplo interessante sobre essas pequenas acções:

"Leaders can use this fact to influence their employees. How? By “advertising” the behaviors they want to encourage in their organization. For example, advertise that the majority of your employees are team players rather than complain about those that do not collaborate as much as you want. Similarly, advertise that the majority of your people come to work on time rather than complain about those that arrive to work late. Simply “advertising” the right behavior will encourage everybody to conform to that.

It sounds simple, but the truth of the matter is that we do the exact opposite in organizations: We complain about the lack of cooperation, or people arriving late to work, or not experimenting enough. By doing this, we are advertising the “bad” behaviors and in the process encouraging even good employees to conform to them.

...

Advertise the good behaviors, not the bad ones."

Trechos retirados de “Organizing for the New Normal” de Constantinos Markides.

Estratégia em todo lado - não é winner-take-all (parte IV)

Parte III. 

"Network effects benefit larger companies and their customers. Whoever gets to scale first will have a substantial advantage. Building a network-effects business is a mad rush. But what about the companies that are left behind? What about small firms? 

...

Are there effective strategies for companies that have a limited number of customers? Yes! There are many examples of smaller companies that compete successfully with (and sometimes even displace) larger organizations that benefit from network effects. Some of the smaller firms succeed by creating customer delight that does not reflect scale. Others find success by giving preference to one of the groups on the platform. Serving a small set of customers can also lead to stellar performance.

...

As powerful as network effects can be, it is important to remember that WTP and customer delight are the currency that ultimately counts.

...

Platforms serve multiple groups of customers, and while many create value for all groups, some choices betray the organization’s primary orientation. A travel site that sorts hotels by profit margin primarily serves the lodging industry. A site that sorts by customer reviews has the opposite orientation.

...

If yours is a small company staring at a large platform, it is always worth asking whether you might be able to create meaningful differentiation by focusing on the WTP of the group that is less favored by your competitor. Etsy found success battling the superpower that is Amazon by doing exactly that—maintaining a sharp focus on the success of its sellers.

...

Serving a Small Set of Customers

In all likelihood, this is the most counterintuitive move that platforms make when they compete against larger rivals that benefit from network effects. How can you succeed against big by being small?

...

The key insight here is that every large platform serves many different types of customers. The attraction between the types varies, however, and building a smaller platform for individuals who greatly value one another is a promising strategy.

Failing to pay attention to differences in the mutual attraction of platform participants can have grave consequences. 

...

Underdogs lift WTP in ways that do not depend on scale. Network effects are one way to raise WTP, but there are many others. As long as these alternatives require no substantial investments, the smaller organization is not at a disadvantage in exploiting them.

Underdogs cater to neglected parties. Most platforms favor specific groups—customers or vendors. Serving the unloved group allows for meaningful differentiation.

Underdogs focus on a small group of customers who place a high value on connections with one another."

Isto ainda não é mainstream. A maioria ainda acredita no winner-take-all.

Trechos retirados de "Better, Simpler Strategy: A Value-Based Guide to Exceptional Performance" 

Os perus

A propósito de "Portugueses são os europeus com uma imagem mais positiva da UE, segundo um inquérito" não pude deixar de recordar esta imagem:

"Bruxelas pede "reformas estruturais" a Portugal nas recomendações da primavera. Não o fazia desde 2015". Traduzem vocês ou traduzo eu?

Sim, para as crianças a culpa vai ser de um qualquer futuro Passos.

"a erosão da autoridade do estado"

"Hans Monderman, the Dutch traffic engineer who is credited with revolutionizing our thinking on road design and safety. Imagine having a road or intersection in your town where too many accidents take place. What would you do to improve driving behaviors and reduce the number of accidents? Most people facing such a task will immediately think of putting in place more traffic lights or traffic signs, or more police to monitor the area. But not Hans Monderman. He came up with the concept of the “naked street” based on the principle that the removal of all the things that are supposed to make a road safe—such as traffic lights, road markings, and road signs—would actually make it safer. 

...

And he proposed the removal of all street signs, encouraging people to negotiate right of way by human interaction and eye contact.

He argued tirelessly for more than 20 years in favor of such “naked” roads as safer alternatives to roads full of signs and markings. He often complained that road design in the western world was based on the (mistaken) belief that driving and walking were utterly incompatible modes of transport and that the two should be segregated as much as possible. 

...

To prove his idea, he undertook a series of experiments where he reconstructed roads by making them narrower and by removing traffic lights and signs. In a famous experiment, he totally redesigned a roundabout (traffic circle) in the town of Drachten, Netherlands by removing all traffic signs, eliminating curbs, and installing art. The result was that traffic accidents all but disappeared. In another experiment in West Palm Beach, Florida, the roads were made smaller and narrower. As a result, traffic slowed so much that people felt safe to walk there. This led to an increase in pedestrian traffic that attracted new shops and apartment buildings. Property values doubled. Successes such as these turned the tide of public opinion on Monderman. Initially vilified as a dangerous maverick, he soon became a traffic engineer “pioneer.”"

Coloco aqui estes trechos a propósito da preocupação de algumas pessoas com a erosão da autoridade do estado. Eu preocupo-me é com a erosão da liberdade de pensamento e de acção dos anónimos. 

Trechos retirados de “Organizing for the New Normal” de Constantinos Markides. 

O poder das estórias

"Make the Need for Change Personal

First, give them all the negative facts about disruption and warn them that if we don’t change, bad things will happen to us. This is the threat framing that is necessary to demonstrate that we are not hiding from reality. But as already pointed out, you should not stop there. Complement this threat framing with a positive reason why we need to change. The key is to make sure this positive reason is personal to every single employee.

...

A statement, however nice or inspiring, will not by itself elicit emotion from people. We therefore need to go beyond simply communicating to people to doing certain other things to support what we say. Here are a few tactics illustrating what we could be doing:

Walk the talk: It should be obvious that we need to support what we are saying with actions. Nothing could be more persuasive to people than seeing their senior leaders behave in ways that support what they are proclaiming, especially when the actions are not cost-free. 

...

Visualization: Things that people see are more likely to evoke emotions than things they hear or read. You should therefore help them visualize what you are trying to sell to them. This suggests that instead of simply telling them, “We need to become customer-centric because that will make our customers happy,” it is better to show them a video of happy customers complimenting the company on its customer responsiveness. Similarly, instead of telling them, “We need to become more innovative because that would save people’s lives,” it is better to bring patients into the organization to tell the employees how your company’s products have saved their lives.

...

Story-telling: Stories and how you tell them are more likely to evoke emotions than a presentation. You should therefore support what you are selling to people with stories."

Uma ilustração do poder das estórias nesta figura:

Quando se apresentam os factos associados a uma medicação e uma estória positiva ou negativa associada, vemos a taxa de aceitação dessa medicação. O caso B é particularmente impressivo!

Outra ilustração:

Trechos retirados de “Organizing for the New Normal” de Constantinos Markides. 

"pensar no que poderia ser"

Algumas pepitas interessantes:

"strategy is a problem-solving tool. Its job is to overcome a gap between the outcomes we experience and the aspirations we hold. [Moi ici: Quando se está preso da rotina, não se levanta a cabeça para pensar no que poderia ser] That gap is a product of the current set of choices that has guided our actions up to this point in time, [Moi ici: Não há acasos, a situação actual é o resultado perfeitamente normal do sistema existente] regardless of whether that set of choices evolved implicitly over time or was the product of an explicit strategy effort.

A new strategy seeks to close the gap by means of a new set of choices. By definition, this needs to be a different set of choices, or it would fail entirely to close the gap that has been produced by the current set of choices. Because strategy is what you do not what you say, that different set of choices need to be manifested in different actions. Otherwise, there is no reason to believe that there will be any progress toward eliminating the gap. To summarize, strategy needs to produce a new set of choices that translates into action and, by doing so, eliminates the problematic gap produced by the existing set of choices.

The heart of strategy is the matched pair of Where-to-Play and How-to-Win (WTP/HTW) choices. There will be no elimination of the problematic gap between outcomes and aspirations without a change in the WTP/HTW pair. You can change one, the other, or both. But if you don’t change them, you haven’t changed your strategy choice.

...

What then is the planning activity that follows your strategy choice? You should create a plan comprised of three elements. First, it should specify and communicate the choices that you personally will be making and the timing of those choices (...). Second, it should specify the choices you will be chartering (...). Third, it should specify your own Enabling Management Systems  for following up on the chartered choices to make sure they are being effected and made consistently with your choices. This is why I argue that the wise and thorough chartering of strategy choices is one of the highest-leverage activities for any executive."

Trechos retirados de "From Strategy to Planning - What’s Next After Strategy?"

Prioridades e ISO 9001

Implementar um sistema de gestão é como lançar e manter uma série de pratos no ar a circular, como um jongleur.

Um prato é, por exemplo, acerca da encomenda, recepção e fornecimento de matérias-primas à produção. Outro prato é sobre as vendas, outro é sobre a produção, controlo e embalamento, outro é sobre ...

O que acontece muitas vezes é que uma vez lançados os pratos... eles caem ao chão...

O sistema de gestão não consegue ganhar vida própria. Alguém tem de estar sempre a dar conta de que os pratos caíram e de que é preciso lançá-los ao ar novamente.

Um dos mecanismos mais importantes para manter o sistema de gestão a funcionar, para manter os pratos no ar, passa por medir e tomar decisões para melhorar.

Um dos webinars que faço para a Advisera é este, "Free webinar – Measurement, analysis, and improvement according to ISO 9001:2015". Os temas são escolhidos com base na procura do tema na internet. Julgo que não faço este webinar desde Outubro passado. Sinal de que o tema não faz parte das prioridades de quem trabalha com sistemas de gestão...

"you need to tell people the bad stuff... However, we cannot stop there. We need to also tell them the positive stuff"

This is my avatar on social media. A tribute to the importance of the sense of urgency, the "burning platform".

"change is hard. It is so hard that even fear of death is not enough to convince people to change for good. Second, scare tactics can be used to create urgency for change, but such tactics will only create change that is short-lived. [Moi ici: There is something of value in these words, something new for me] Unless we continuously engage in “scaring” people, they will slowly overcome their initial fear and revert to old habits. These insights have immediate applicability in business: Yes, we need a sense of urgency to encourage change in our organization, but how we create urgency matters. There is a right way to create urgency for change and a wrong way. Choosing the “right” way is essential if we are to succeed with our transformation program.

What is the “right” way? ... Specifically, scaring people into change is not the right way. ... scare tactics produced a short-term reaction from people, but that was not sustainable. At least in this case, the change generated—albeit short-term—was in the right direction, in that people stopped smoking and started exercising. But this cannot be taken for granted. Consider, for example, the popular analogy of the burning platform. There is no question that the burning platform creates urgency that leads to action, but what is the nature of that action? It is people jumping into the sea in a panicky and uncoordinated way—surely this is not the kind of urgency that we want in our organization? 

...

To create a sense of urgency, you have to make your people appreciate the imminent threat of disruption and the mortal danger the company is facing.” This suggests that many of us believe that using scare tactics can be an effective way to create urgency—hence the popularity of the “burning platform” analogy. Yet, as we argue above, nothing can be further from the truth. 

...

To create the “right” kind of urgency and get people to change for good, you need to make the need for change positive, personal, and emotional. There are three requirements here and it is important to appreciate what each implies.

The first requirement is to make the need for change positive. This does not mean that we can ignore the bad stuff and focus only on the positive.

...

you need to tell people the bad stuff—that is, the dire consequences of not responding to the disruption. However, we cannot stop there. We need to also tell them the positive stuff—that is, the wonderful things that will happen if we do respond to the disruption. [Moi ici: I must confess I never though much about the importance of presenting the positive side] This is not an either/or choice. Just like it is not enough to use only scare tactics, it is also not enough to just make the need for change positive—we need to do both.

...

The third and most difficult requirement is to make the need for change emotional. This is not the same thing as making the need for change personal. Yes, employees are more likely to connect at an emotional level with a personal rather than an impersonal reason for change, but this is not guaranteed. Work still needs to be done to make even a personal reason for change emotional."

Trechos retirados de “Organizing for the New Normal” de Constantinos Markides. 

Curiosidade do dia

Há muito que penso que os políticos gostam é de temas pelos quais nunca serão julgados como o aquecimento global, pensões e reformas. Por mais asneiras que digam ou façam, as consequências dos seus actos e decisões só serão evidentes passado muito tempo. E a memória dos povos é fácil de manipular. Afinal, por exemplo, foi o Passos que chamou a troika e se comprometeu a privatizar a TAP.

Eu pelo contrário, gosto das situações que põem os políticos num campo de batalha como os generais. Nessas situações, rapidamente se percebe o impacte das decisões tomadas, com poucas hipóteses de as esconderem.

Recordo daqui:

"Esta gente não está habituada a trabalhar com base em dados, trabalha no reino da retórica, no reino da conversa, no reino da ilusão. Quando a realidade lhes vem bater à forta desmascara-os facilmente. BTW, é por isso que os políticos gostam de acções sobre o ambiente. Dificilmente, a realidade virá pedir-lhes contas enquanto estão no poder."

Entretanto, o choque da realidade:

"As pessoas que vierem à final da Liga dos Campeões virão e regressarão no mesmo dia, com teste feito e em situação de bolha, ou seja, em voo charter, deslocação para duas zonas de espera de adeptos, daí para o estádio e depois do jogo de volta para o aeroporto, estando em território nacional menos de 24 horas", disse a ministra quando anunciou o plano para a final. Este era o plano do Governo no papel, mas a realidade está a fintar o que estava delineado."

Algures durante a semana passada ouvi um técnico dizer que seria impossível o Aeroporto Sá Carneiro receber de, e despachar para Inglaterra, 17000 pessoas em menos de 24 horas. Eu sou um vulgar anónimo da província. Pena que os so-called jornalistas presentes durante a comunicação da ministra não tivessem o trabalho de casa feito e pusessem em causa, ao vivo e a cores, a possibilidade de executar o que a ministra prometia.

Performative aspects

 

"Routines are the bedrock of any organisation.[Moi ici: I call them processes like in ISO 9001] By ‘routine’ we mean a repeated performance either by an individual or a collection of people interacting together. Some of these routine behaviours have been deliberately designed and trained into people. Others have emerged without any deliberate intervention by managers. All routines evolve and are a source of incremental change and improvement inside the organisation.

...

Routines have an ostensive aspect and a performative aspect. The ostensive aspect is the basic structure of the routine. For example, consider the routine of dealing with a customer in a car-servicing facility. There is a general structure for this routine which includes greeting the customer, offering a seat and some refreshment, locating the paperwork, checking the work to be done and any other issues, handling the car keys, informing the customer when the car will be ready, etc. This ostensive structure is understood implicitly by experienced customer-service personnel, and it rarely alters significantly. The performative aspect is a particular enactment of the routine, that is, what I did with this customer this morning. Each time someone performs the routine, it will be slightly different, due to a whole raft of reasons, for example, time of day, the mood of the customer, the complexity of the service and repairs, etc. Thus, the performative aspect of the routine is the source of variation.

...

In fairly stable environments, it is likely that the ostensive routines of most competing firms will look very similar. What this means is that the sources of advantage that a particular firm might have will come from the particular performances of these routines achieved by its members. Subtle differences in the way that they enact these routines may well be sources of advantage and if these subtle differences incorporate significant amounts of tacit knowledge, then it is very difficult for competitor firms to replicate these valuable routines. Tacit knowledge is often referred to as know-how, and it is built through experience. ”

Trechos retirados de: Paul Raspin. “What's Your Competitive Advantage?”

Minerar mercados

Em 2015 chamei aos disruptores de mineradores:

"o seu negócio não é low-cost? Então, agradeça aos membros low-cost o trabalho de "mineração" que fazem, eles criam os seus potenciais futuros clientes. Eles "ensinam-lhes" o bê-à-bá da actividade. Depois, alguns ficarão sempre por aí, mas outros ganharão uma paixão e sentirão uma necessidade genuína de subir para outros desafios. É aí que entra a sua empresa, dedicada a servir um grupo que quer mais do que o básico. Para isso, precisa de ter uma estratégia clara e estar alinhado com ela."

Recordo este postal de 2020, "O low-cost como um aliado". 

Agora, em “Organizing for the New Normal” de Constantinos Markides encontro:

"when we look at one specific disruption that is affecting numerous companies: the arrival of a new and disruptive business model in an established market. If there is one thing we know about disruptive business models it is that they grow by attracting two different types of customers: the customers that are currently served by the established companies, and entirely new customers that enter the market for the first time.

...

When it arrives, the new business model attracts customers that are different from the customers of the core business. 

...

These “different” customers are what sustain the new business model in the short term, but the innovators who introduced the business model keep improving it year after year until it reaches a point that it becomes “good enough” for the customers of the core business. That’s when these core customers begin to switch to the new model and that is when the cannibalization of the core business begins."

 

Curiosidade do dia

Um país dois sistemas.

Para os estrangeiros:

Sen palabras eh pic.twitter.com/EpwuhW5lQw

— Alberto Mancebo (@AlbertoMancebo) May 28, 2021

"A dois dias da Final da Champions, há zonas da cidade do Porto que estão ainda transformadas em estaleiro. É o caso do parque de estacionamento junto à Alfândega, na zona de Miragaia, onde está a ser montado uma fan zone para adeptos do Manchester City. O espaço albergará barraquinhas de comes e bebes, sanitários e também um ecrã gigante." (aqui)

Para os mansos do costume:

Polícia vai reforçar a fiscalização nas praias durante o fim de semana para evitar enchentes

Tudo para acabar em violência um destes dias.

Portugal é, cada vez mais um país que me envergonha...

 

Mudar? Come on

Todos sabemos que Passos Coelho chamou a troika.*

Todos sabemos que aplicou a austeridade porque quis.*

Todos sabemos que havia outra alternativa.**

Quando um país chega à situação de pré-bancarrota e precisa de mais dinheiro tem de acordar as condições em que quem empresta aceita conceder mais um empréstimo.

O governo de Sócrates negociou as condições e chegou-se a um acordo.

Houve eleições, outro governo foi constituído e teve de aplicar o acordado.

Com o país à beira do abismo seria de esperar que o país mudasse de vida. E enquanto a troika andou por cá assim foi, ou antes assim parecia. À primeira oportunidade, assim que surgiu um alívio, voltámos às velhas práticas indiferentes ao destino onde nos voltarão a levar. Não é uma questão de se, mas de quando.

Interessante como no caso grego o acordo e a mudança foi feita pela extrema-esquerda e uma vez finda a legislatura o novo governo continuou o mesmo projecto. E agora, pasme-se, parte importante do dinheiro da bazuca para a Grécia será para ... compensar a baixa de impostos. Já estão no bom caminho e vão voltar a ultrapassar Portugal.

Nós por cá já estamos, no que depende de nós, pior do que em 2011. Confesso que não sei como será quando aquilo que não depende de nós, política do BCE e taxas de juro, tiverem de mudar forçados pelas circunstâncias.

Tudo isto a propósito da conversa com João César das Neves ontem. Alguém que ao fim de 30 anos percebeu que não mudamos ponto. Por isso, não perde tempo à espera que mudemos. Talvez por aquilo a que Nuno Garoupa chama de “displicência de Bruxelas”.

Entretanto, esta manhã na minha caminhada matinal leio este texto e percebo que tudo se encaixa em mais uma mensagem do Cosmos para me educar acerca da natureza humana.

"In his book Change or Die, Alan Deutschman reports a truly amazing statistic: After undergoing coronary artery bypass grafting, most people—not surprisingly—attempt to improve their health by undertaking radical changes to their lifestyle, for example eating a healthier diet or quitting smoking or exercising more. However, people slowly start to drift back to old habits and—here is the amazing thing—90 percent end up with the same lifestyle as before within two years of their operation. Take a moment to absorb this information. There are two insights that immediately pop out. First, change is hard. It is so hard that even fear of death is not enough to convince people to change for good.”

Trecho retirado de “Organizing for the New Normal” de Constantinos Markides

* Para os mais distraídos, estou a ser irónico.

** O "amigo" bicicletas já virou adepto da TINA (there is no alternative), o tal que durante a troika dizia que a solução era o crescimento.

"increase WTP or decrease WTS"

"The difference between WTP and price is value for the customer.

...

In value-based thinking, price is not a determining factor of WTP. We often use WTP and price interchangeably. But it is useful to keep them separate.

...

If we want to understand why some companies are much more profitable than others, a useful starting point is to identify the reasons why the middle section of the value stick—the firm’s margins—is slim for some companies and fat for others.

...

Value sticks illustrate that there are only two avenues for companies to create value: increase WTP or decrease WTS. Every strategic initiative needs to be evaluated against these two metrics. Unless an activity increases WTP or decreases WTS, it will not contribute to the firm’s competitive standing.

...

Unless an initiative promises to increase WTP or decrease WTS, it is not worth pursuing.

...

Companies compete for customers by creating superior customer delight. Many companies strive to be best in class. But having better quality and higher WTP is no guarantee for success. What matters is the difference between WTP and price—in other words, customer delight.

...

In competition, more generous margins (and greater profitability) reflect an ability to create superior customer delight, greater employee satisfaction, and more generous supplier surplus.

...

Strategists think in differences. Exceptional product quality and outstanding working conditions do not confer a lasting advantage if they can be matched easily by rival firms."

Trechos retirados de "Better, Simpler Strategy: A Value-Based Guide to Exceptional Performance" 

A Venezuela somos nós

 A Venezuela somos nós, ao nosso ritmo próprio:

A economia das carpetes e dos biombos no Observador a vivo e a cores

A propósito deste tweet:

Lembrei-me da relação estranha que o nome Espírito Santo tem com a concorrência. Por isso, a minha mente recuou a 2007 e a este postal "Big Man economy em todo o seus esplendor".

A certa atura nesse postal escrevi:

"Esta argumentação é tão ridícula, tão ridícula... escolhem os negócios protegidos da concorrência internacional, apostam nas indústrias de bens não transaccionáveis, e depois quando a maré muda, não sabem o que é competir num mundo de excesso de oferta, virando-se logo para o papá estado!!! 

Bem vindos ao mundo quotidiano do senhor Manel merceeiro, da dona Elvira operária, do senhor Andrade pescador, dos agricultores, dos industriais que não jantam com o poder, dos empresários sem contactos telefónicos nos governos."

Este último sublinhado tem presença assídua no blogue quando refiro a economia das carpetes e dos biombos (2021), ou em 2009. 

Esta manhã no programa "Explicador" da rádio Observador oiço Correia de Campos ao minuto 13:27 descrever como é fácil a um grande empresário (quem segue este blogue que para mim grande empresário, ou grande empresa, não é a mesma coisa que empresário grande, ou empresa grande. Por exemplo, para mim um verdadeiro grande empresário - adjectivo não substantivo - não telefona a ministros ponto) telefonar a um ministro da Economia, ou da Segurança Social para resolver os seus assuntos. E Correia de Campos disse isto com a maior naturalidade...

"The difference between leading and lagging companies in the same industry"

Sei que é um tema que já abordo aqui no blogue há mais de 10 anos: há mais variabilidade no retorno do investimento dentro de um sector económico do que entre sectores económicos. Não esquecer os catequistas. No entanto, estes trechos vão servir de trampolim para o que aí virá em próximos postais:

"I know it is probably poor storytelling, but I am tempted to share the good news right up front. I am incredibly optimistic about the potential of most companies to create more value and substantially improve their financial performance. And no, this is not just wishful thinking. My optimism is grounded in careful analysis of the data. Select any segment of the economy, and you will see that the very best companies in that segment dramatically outperform other firms. If the average company made even modest advances, value created and profits would soar.

...

When I meet with executives whose companies achieve less-than-stellar performance, the typical conversation quickly turns to industry dynamics. They explain that their industry is disrupted by digital technology, how they face tough import competition, and why talent is difficult to hire and retain. The executives are right. Profitability can indeed change substantially from one industry to the next. Some industries are blessed with high average returns, others decidedly less so.

...

The difference between leading and lagging companies in the same industry is typically far greater than the variation across industries.

...

there is more than twice as much room to grow profitability inside an industry as opposed to across industries. From the standpoint of profitability, industries are fairly similar. Companies inside an industry, however, tend to be very different."

Trechos retirados de "Better, Simpler Strategy: A Value-Based Guide to Exceptional Performance" 

Iniciativas, a operacionalização da transformação

"Value creation takes place in an uncertain world. We cannot predict the future, and in order to survive, firms need to be able to respond to unfolding circumstances. As we have stressed, we need to work with the complexities of the real world, and not assume these away, or pretend to ignore them.

An initiative may have a positive impact in one part of the system, but result in negative impacts elsewhere. 

...

significant change in an organisation typically occurs in two circumstances: a crisis, or a change of leadership, which is often preceded by a crisis. This is not surprising as to change an organisation that is ticking along in an acceptable way is a daunting prospect. “If it ain’t broke don’t fix it’ would be the way most people would think. The idea that managers will enact ‘transformational change’ outside of a crisis is frankly unlikely.

...

Firstly, we need to have a clear description of the initiative: what is involved in the change being proposed. The expected or hoped for outcomes of the initiative should also be set out which can help us figure out what feedback is required to monitor the impact of the changes on the wider value system. Some thoughts as to the time frame of the change process will help, that is, is it weeks, or months before we would expect to see some effects?

It will be necessary to identify, at least initially, the resources required to kick-start the change process, and who owns the initiative. If there are expected synergies with other initiatives, these could be set out and monitored and it would be essential to highlight potential risks associated with the changes.

The first initiative will require a significant amount of change energy. The idea is new, it will need management support, and those involved will need to move out of some familiar routine ways of behaving. But once the initiative gets established, it requires a lot less energy to sustain it as the new practices become embedded into routine ways of working.

...

Value is created by combining inputs with existing assets to create products and services. Operations activities are those where the firm has most influence. Relationships with suppliers and customers can be influenced by what happens in the value creation process, but the firm has no direct control over what suppliers or customers choose to do. [Moi ici: Este sublinhado é incompreensível para quem vive fora do sector privado. "Como é possível estabelecer objectivos para as vendas quando não é possível obrigar os clientes a comprar]

The value activities ‘inside’ the firm generate outcomes with respect to customers, costs and prices."

Trechos retirados de: Paul Raspin. “What's Your Competitive Advantage?”

"Value created"

"Willingness-to-pay (WTP) sits at the top end of the value stick. It represents the customer’s point of view. More specifically, it is the most a customer would ever pay for a product or service. If companies find ways to improve their product, WTP will increase.

Willingness-to-sell (WTS), at the bottom end of the value stick, refers to employees and suppliers. For employees, WTS is the minimum compensation they require to accept a job offer.

...

The difference between WTP and WTS, the length of the stick, is the value that a firm creates.

...

Companies that excel at creating value focus squarely on WTP and WTS. Every significant initiative is designed to either enhance the customer experience—that is, increase consumers’ WTP—or make it more attractive for vendors and employees to work with the company, in other words, decrease their WTS.

...

Companies that outperform their peers increase WTP or decrease WTS in ways that are difficult to imitate.

...

It is surprising, perhaps, but true nevertheless: the companies that perform best do not think about themselves first and foremost. They dream up ever better ways to create value for others. Think value, not profit, and profit will follow."

Trechos retirados de "Better, Simpler Strategy: A Value-Based Guide to Exceptional Performance" 

Média versus discrepantes

Um excelente conselho de Roger Martin, mais um, acerca de pensar estratégia.

"I am utterly tired of the modern strategy focus on averages, whether means, medians, or modes.

...

In world of strategy, all analytical guns have long been trained on means, medians, and modes.

...

The flip side of obsession with averages is aversion to the outliers. They are largely ignored if not entirely suppressed.

...

There is a cost to this aversion. While the mean tells you about what is operating today, outliers give you hints about the future.

...

The problem is that our analytical mindset and toolbox has migrated away from paying attention to the outliers. 

...

The single most important thing to do is to think consciously and carefully about when you pay attention to averages and when to outliers. When you want to hone and refine what is, focus on the averages and ignore the outliers. Outliers will distract you when creating improvement for the middle of the distribution is your goal.

...

If you want to figure out what could be, you have to pay attention to the outliers."

Trechos retirados de "Strategists: Stop Obsessing about Averages"