Mongo e o "Bud Light Fiasco"

O planeta Mongo da série de banda desenhada Flash Gordon é o lar de várias tribos e reinos com culturas, tecnologias e sistemas distintos. Da mesma forma, a economia pós-século XX é marcada pela complexidade e diversidade da oferta e procura cada vez mais atomizada e apaixonada. Foi disso que me lembrei em 2007 para criar uma metáfora que dura até aos dias de hoje (A cauda longa e o planeta Mongo).

Seth Godin usa uma imagem interessante, o século XX via os clientes como plancton, uma massa homogénea. Eu vejo o século XXI como o tempo de Mongo, ou do Estranhistão, terra de Um número infinito de nichos.

Em Novembro passado escapou-me este artigo sobre Mongo, "Strategy in a Hyperpolitical World":

"So what does that mean for strategy?

We define strategy as the art of making informed choices in a competitive environment. Choices are important when differing paths lead to differential risks and rewards. When the social environment is broadly favorable to business, a company's strategic choices can be justified in purely business terms or, as necessary, finessed with carefully crafted press releases. Today, however, choices must be made on an expanded playing field. They are often complex because the underlying ethical, social, and political issues are constantly evolving and defy simple analysis. To make and implement the best strategic choices in this environment, leaders will have to (1) develop robust principles to guide strategic choices, (2) address ethical issues early, (3) consistently communicate and implement their choices, (4) engage beyond the industry to shape the context, and (5) learn from mistakes to make better choices."

Entretanto, há dias li "The Strategy Lesson from the Bud Light Fiasco": 

"A company’s goal should be to present an offering — supported by compelling messaging — that has advantaged appeal to the biggest circle possible. That may be a relatively small circle — Red Bay Coffee — or a relatively big one — Starbucks Coffee. But it should be as big a circle as the offering can support.

The Temptation

In pursuing the biggest circle supportable, companies are forever tempted to send different messages to different parts of their audience — whether inside or outside the confines of their current circle — in an attempt to strengthen and/or enlarge their circle.

...

this kind of thing is getting ever more dangerous with ever increasing transparency,

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In this age of fuller transparency, brands must think a lot more thoroughly and carefully about the heterogeneity of their Where to Play (WTP), which hangs together now and produces their current market share. But under its apparently calm surface, that overall share hides fault lines — those customers aren’t all the same even if they buy the same product. If a brand isn’t careful, it can take those fault lines that lie benignly beneath the surface and turn them into giant fissures with its actions.

...

The naïve idea — not an unusual one but naïve nonetheless — was that Bud Light could keep all its current customers, and, with this terrific new message, could appeal to some new ones (whether light users or non-users). This kind of naivety has always been dangerous. But it has gotten a lot more so in this hyperpolitical and transparent world.

The Particular Challenge for Broad-Based Companies

It is particularly challenging for broad-based companies and going to get more challenging. The broader-based a company is, the greater heterogeneity its customer base is likely to embody. Every company will have heterogeneity in its customer base. But a giant retailer, like Target, will likely have a greater level of heterogeneity in its customer base than tiny LGBTQ+-friendly clothing retailer, WILDFANG. Ultra Right Beer was launched to woo disaffected Bud Light customers and seemed deliriously happy to hit the $1 million mark in sales. But that is one-five thousandth of the (pre-fiasco) sales of Bud Light. With great size comes more dangerous and pronounced fault lines."

Como não recuar a 2014 e a "-Tu não és meu irmão de sangue!"

O século XX económico (da inauguração da linha de montagem da Ford até à queda do Muro de Berlin) foi um acidente histórico que agora estamos a corrigir, o futuro não é de homogeneidade, mas de heterogeneidade. E mundos heterogéneos não são meigos para com os gigantes. Nunca esqueço: Too big to care.

Num cenário polarizado ...

Há muitos anos que aqui no blogue, praticamente desde a primeira hora, escrevo sobre a importância de seleccionar os clientes-alvo e trabalhar para eles. Por exemplo, em 2006 escrevia sobre o perigo de ser uma Arca de Noé:

• Deixar de ser uma Arca de Noé
• Porque não podemos ser uma Arca de Noé!

A reforçar esta mensagem de focalização nos clientes-alvo, tenho desenvolvido aqui também a metáfora de Mongo, um mundo pleno de variedade e de tribos numa paisagem enrugada:

• 1 Origem de uma metáfora
• Criatividade e Mongo
• Covid, empresas, estratégias e paisagens enrugadas

Às vezes criticam-me porque supostamente no mundo actual as empresas tanto podem servir em simultâneo gregos como troianos. No entanto, continuo na minha, ainda na semana passada li, "Why Mushroom Leather (and Other New Materials) Are Struggling to Scale":

"Compare the number of venture capital firms funding software to the number of venture firms specialising in material innovation or fashion. There are far fewer.

The reasons for the chasm are structural. Once a software solution is invented, the marginal cost to distribute the second, third and one millionth sale are close to zero. By contrast, once a new material is invented, the marginal costs for subsequent units are nearly the same. It is only with learning and scale that costs begin to decrease.

At the same time, building the capacity to produce new materials often requires considerable capital expenditure to build out infrastructure."

Entretanto, ontem li "The Myth of the Mainstream":

"Chasing the mass market is a losing proposition for marketers in a polarized culture. Allying with the subculture that loves you is the best way to drive brand success.

...

For years, McDonald's seemed to embody everything that was wrong with the American diet. The brand had become a symbol of food choices that were driving escalating rates of obesity and hypertension.

The company spent more than a decade trying to fight this perception among American consumers by targeting them with messaging about its updated menu, which offered healthier alternatives more in line with contemporary diet trends - but to no avail. Year over year, McDonald's sales declined, and its brand perception continued to spiral downward.

...

Finally, the company decided to go on the offensive. Instead of combating the opposition's hate and attempting to win over those in the middle, McDonald's decided to focus on its fans - the people who self-identify as McDonald's devotees despite the vitriol directed at the brand. 

...

In doing so, it tapped into what these devotees love about McDonald's and not only activated their collective consumption but also inspired them to spread the word on behalf of the brand. The result of this strategy was a 10.4% increase in global revenue for McDonald's from 2018 to 2021 and the return of dormant customers: more than a quarter of those who came in to buy the Travis Scott meal, for example, hadn't visited the chain in over a year. Seemingly overnight, McDonald's went from being a cautionary tale to the darling of brand marketing and a case study for advertising effectiveness.

If you want to get people to move, you must choose a side. The notion that you can win by playing to the middle is a misleading myth.

What's going on here? Conventional wisdom would tell us that in a world of increasingly polarized opinions, our best bet is to appease the middle, if only because that's where the majority of the market is. That also seems like a safe bet to many companies, as a middle-of-the-road position is less likely to alienate potential customers.

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The middle doesn't adopt new products with any urgency. They are not the first to respond to marketing communications, nor are they likely to weigh in on a debate between advocates and detractors. They mitigate their own risk of moving out of step with what might be considered generally acceptable by stepping back and observing other people's responses first.

The red herring is that we perceive this indifference as an opportunity to persuade them to one side or the other. But the truth is, they are not typically convinced by any marketing communications. Instead, they, too, take cues from other people - sometimes those who are for you, and at other times those who are against you.

Our chances of successfully influencing behavior increases when we choose to address the people who are most likely to take action.

With this in mind, it becomes abundantly clear that in a polarized scenario, the chances of marketers getting people to move are far greater when we activate the collective of the willing as opposed to trying to convince detractors or even persuade the indifferent."

Sobre a polarização do mercado, recordo Polarização do mercado ou como David e Golias podem co-existir. 

Estratégia versus planeamento

Um extenso artigo, "How to Thwart Strategy Masquerades" a merecer uma leitura. Sublinho alguns trechos:

"Strategy always involves giving up something to get something else better. If we decide to offer only a single class of service, the consequence is that first class passengers will fly elsewhere. If we choose to offer only index funds, the consequence is that investors desirous of managed funds will invest elsewhere. If the opposite of your choice is stupid on its face, it causes no consequences and it is likely to be planning. Planning involves being non-stupid. Strategy involves consequences.

...

Strategy is centrally about compelling the thing you don't control - your customers - to take actions you wish they would take. No matter what you do, you will never be in control of your customers. If you start assuming that just because you want them to buy a certain volume of your offering, they will comply, then you are planning - and you will be sorely disappointed. Control is a planning illusion.

...

Strategy creates a future that does not now exist. That can't be accomplished by using inductive or deductive logic to extrapolate the past into the future. If your discussion focuses on 'what the data tell us we should do that is a planning discussion, not a strategy discussion. Planning doesn't create. Planning organizes."

Diferenciação para fugir à comoditização

No Sábado passado li no NYT, "Switzerland, of All Places, Now Has to Import Cheese":

"The Swiss are proud of their cheese, and most of the cheese they eat are local varieties like Gruyère, Emmental and other hard cheeses from milk from happy cows that are famous all over the world.

...

In fact, the Swiss cheese trade balance has been shrinking for decades, and especially since the market was liberalized in 2007, which allowed the country to trade with the European Union without tariffs or quotas in either direction. Switzerland now exports about 40 percent of the cheese it produces, per industry estimates.

But in each of the first five months of this year, Switzerland imported more cheese by weight than it sold abroad, according to customs data. 

...

[Moi ici: Os números que se seguem são muito interessantes, ilustram como as marcas, como a diferenciação, permite fugir da guerra do preço. Em Maio passado estive em várias cidades suíças e é impressionante encontrar no dia-a-dia o festival de marcas suíças que trazem um valor acrescentado tremendo à simples soma dos custos] The number of dairy farmers in Switzerland has fallen in recent decades, with a drop of more than half over the past 25 years, Mr. Koller said. On top of that, farming operations in Switzerland are small: The average size of a herd is about 27 cows, Mr. Koller said, and dairy farms with more than 100 cows are rare. [Moi ici: Isto quer dizer que se o negócio fosse preço puro e duro os suíços não tinham hipótese. Até as explorações portuguesas já devem ser maiores. Recordo que sem marca, "Milk is the ultimate low-involvement category"]

...

[Moi ici: Segue-se agora um trecho difícil de encontrar em Portugal, basta recordar a malta das conservas ou do leite, "economists say there is no need to panic"] Although an influx of foreign cheese may challenge notions of Swiss national identity, economists say there is no need to panic. Swiss producers have become more specialized in recent years, and the cheeses they export tend to be the higher-value varieties, like Gruyère. Imports are cheaper and softer and largely come from France. (What's called "Swiss cheese" in the United States is an American reproduction of Swiss hard cheeses, known of course for its signature holes.)

Not all the cheese that is imported into Switzerland is consumed there, either. A large chunk of the cheese and curd brought into the country gets refined in Switzerland and then exported.

"The trade diference in cheese itself is not a major thing to worry about," said Martin Mosler, an economist at IWP, an economic policy institute at the University of Lucerne. "We are better than most of the world at the high quality stuff," he said. Switzerland continues to run a healthy trade surplus in cheese by financial value: On average, Swiss cheese exports fetch roughly 10 Swiss Francs per kilo (about $11.60), compared with about six Swiss Francs per kilo paid for imports."

Uma pena ...

O FT de ontem trazia uma pequena peça, "BASF China boss leads race for top job after rival quits"com algo lateral que me deixou a pensar:

"Markus Kamieth, the board member overseeing BASF's operations in China, is backed by Brudermüller, who is to step down in May to join Mercedes-Benz, two people familiar with the matter said. He is the clear favourite after Saori Dubourg, who headed BASF's European business, suddenly left the company in February. Dubourg had advocated a more cautious approach to China, the people said."

Pesquisei e encontrei, "BASF CEO named to become head of Mercedes-Benz supervisory board, carmaker says".

Há muito que cito aqui uma frase atribuída a Napoleão:

Pergunta sincera:

O que quer dizer, acerca do futuro da Mercedes-Benz, que o próximo CEO seja alguém educado no mundo das commodities químicas?

Esse alguém aprendeu uma série de truques, de mnemónicas, de respostas instintivas numa indústria de bolas azuis.

Quer dizer que o futuro estratégico da Mercedes-Benz passa por um mundo de bolas azuis?

Quer dizer que o board da Mercedes-Benz acredita que a empresa tem de operar num mundo de bolas azuis?

Uma pena...

BTW, no meu primeiro emprego, trabalhava no apoio ao desenvolvimento de couro artificial (napa) para a indústria automóvel (painéis de porta e bancos). Na minha memória ficaram dois clientes: o mais inteligente, a VW; e o mais burro, com especificações absurdas, a Mercedes-Benz.

"Como aumentamos os salários?"

O jornal Público de ontem trazia um interessante artigo com o título "A pergunta é: como aumentamos os salários?"".

Claro que uma tentativa de resposta há anos que é esboçada neste blogue. Mergulhemos primeiro no artigo:

"A região norte é a mais exportadora do país. Mas medir o pulso ao estado da nação a partir desse retrato é esquecer que o Norte também é a região mais pobre do pais. O que está a falhar? [Moi ici: Já abordei o tema em Por que é então uma das [regiões] mais pobres de toda a UE?]

Paula, 47 anos, gaspeadeira, Santa Maria da Feira. Trabalha há 32 anos na indústria do calçado, mas há um mês ficou no desemprego, "A meu ver, o que falha é que as empresas tiram o lucro todo para elas. Estávamos a fazer sapatos que chegam a ser vendidos por 800 euros. Isso é o que cada um de nós ganhava de salário num mês." [Moi ici: Recordo as contas deste postal Quantas empresas? (parte III) ]

O preço do sapato na loja não reflecte necessariamente a receita da empresa que o produz, contrapomos. "Mas a empresa ganha mais do que aquilo que nos paga", responde Paula, certa de que a riqueza gerada pelos trabalhadores "é mal distribuída". [Moi ici: A distribuição é a possível, o problema é o que o valor criado é muito limitado. A situação só melhorará quando as empresas existentes forem substituídas por empresas com outros modelos de negócio] Paula ganhava 914 euros iliquidos. Feitos os descontos, levava para casa "800 e pouco". 

...

O que dirão os empresários perante a mesma questão. Por que razão a região mais exportadora e industrializada é também a mais pobre, senhor Albano Miguel Fernandes, da AMF Shoes, em

Guimarães?

"Está a faltar valor acrescentado às exportações. A maioria das empresas de calcado) trabalha em regime de private label, 'vendendo' minutos do seu tempo ou das suas máquinas", responde. [Moi ici: O que o engº Albano está a falar é ... do modelo de negócio. Só que no mesmo sector de actividade, nem todas as empresas conseguem dar esse salto, nem existe mercado para todas elas se derem esse salto]

...

"Vender minutos também é o modelo de muitas empresas noutras indústrias, como no téxtil. "A competição é feroz e por isso dá origem a uma baixa remuneração para as empresas, o que tem por consequência um poder muito limitado para remunerar os seus colaboradores. Estamos também dependentes de grandes multinacionais, que direccionam os seus centro de custos [para] países com sistemas mais competitivos do que o português", [Moi ici: Aqui há que ter cuidado com o uso da palavra competitividade, recordar o Uganda e os quadrantes do primeiro artigo citado lá em cima] 

...

"A pergunta é: como aumentamos os salários dos portugueses?" José Teixeira, presidente do grupo DST, de Braga, está a falar há cerca três minutos. Até chegar à questão que elegeu como crucial, o gestor invocou "o novo iluminismo de que a Europa precisa" e que "tem de ser agarrado", porque pressupõe "outro modo industrial, social, de relações dos trabalhadores com os accionistas, de usar recursos".[Moi ici: O que ele não diz é que são precisas outras empresas... percebem a enormidade disto? As empresas podem ser mais eficientes, podem ser melhor comercialmente e extrair mais valor, mas originar mais valor... isso só a produzir outras coisas com outro modelo de negócio. Volto a Larreché e aos Flying Geese e o exemplo do calçado em St. Louis, tão rico que pagou uns Jogos Olímpicos de Verão em ... 1904]

...

A empresa [Moi ici: Riopele] continua relevante, apesar de mais pequena. Exporta directamente 98% da sua produção, emprega 1102 pessoas e em 2022 fixou o salário de entrada em 780 euros, 20 euros acima do salário mínimo que, entrou em vigor no inicio de 2023. As despesas de inovação e desenvolvimento equivalem a 20% da receita anual, afiança. Quem conheça a indústria sabe que é uma percentagem que mete respeito. [Moi ici; Eu se dirigisse a empresa até teria vergonha de divulgar estes números. Torrar 20% da receita anual e não conseguir gerar valor acrescentado é um sinal claro de falhanço. O que interessa são os resultados, não o que se gasta. Fizeram-me lembrar a Raporal] Se tivesse voz no debate do estado da nação, a sua mensagem seria: aliviem o IRS dos trabalhadores, isentando os salários até 1200/1300 euros."

Agora voltando atrás no artigo sublinho:

"Quando me chamarem, vão-me propor o salário mínimo. Para quem ganhava 914 euros, não é nada motivador. Vão querer pagar-me o que se paga a um aprendiz. Não é este o futuro que eu desejo para as minhas filhas."

Recordo que em Maio passado escrevi aqui:

"No ECO o meu lado cínico foi despertado em "Calçado entra em 86 escolas para atrair jovens para as fábricas". Como é que o marketing abalroará a experiência que os jovens têm com os familiares que trabalham ou trabalharam no sector do calçado?" 

Sublinho: Como é que o marketing abalroará a experiência que os jovens têm com os familiares que trabalham ou trabalharam no sector do calçado? 

Como se aumentam os salários? A minha resposta amedronta os incumbentes, sobretudo as associações patronais:

• Deixem as empresas morrer! (Não esquecer Spender)
• Criem condições para que empresas acima na cadeia de valor instalem-se no país e promovam um spill-over de valor acrescentado.

Eu sei que as pessoas têm compromissos, têm amigos, têm custos afundados…

Eu sei que promover a mudança a sério tem um custo social no curto prazo que os políticos não estão dispostos a assumir.

Por isso, não vão encontrar respostas mais directas noutro lugar. Por isso, vão encontrar muita conversa da treta.

Investir para entrar na mente dos clientes-alvo

"Each area within the circles is strategically important, but A, B, and C are critical to building competitive advantage. The team should ask questions about each. For A: How big and sustainable are our advantages? Are they based on distinctive capabilities? For B: Are we delivering effectively in the area of parity? For C: How can we counter our competitors’ advantages?

The team should form hypotheses about the company’s competitive advantages and test them by asking customers. The process can yield surprising insights, such as how much opportunity for growth exists in the white space (E). Another insight might be what value the company or its competitors create that customers don’t need (D, F, or G).

...

But the biggest surprise is often that area A, envisioned as huge by the company, turns out to be minuscule in the eyes of the customer."

Acredito que muitas empresas apostam em propostas de valor que caem sobretudo na área B porque se focam nos outputs e não nos inputs. Assim, não investem tempo para entrar na mente dos clientes-alvo e perceber como é que o output é usado como input no processo de criação de valor do cliente.

Trechos retirados de "Strategic Insight in Three Circles".  

Desmascarar clichés

Há dias, no FT apanhei este artigo, "Scaling up or selling out: a German take on a corporate dilemma" sobre duas empresas alemãs a Bayer e a Viessmann. A Bayer e a decisão de comprar a Monsanto, e a Viessman e a decisão de vender parte do negócio à Carrier.

Este anónimo engenheiro da província pronunciou-se sobre o negócio na altura:
 

os tipos da Bayer vão/estão a entrar tão madeira adentro com a compra estúpida da monsanto

— Carlos P da Cruz 🇺🇦🚜🇳🇱🇬🇪 (@ccz1) July 25, 2019

No artigo lê-se:

"Shareholders were unimpressed by the high price as well as debt burden taken on. Moreover, the transaction exposed Bayer to Monsanto’s litigation risk. Bayer was forced to pay $10bn in settlements over Monsanto’s weedkiller glyphosate allegedly causing cancer. Disgruntled investors earlier this year pushed out chief executive Werner Baumann, one of the deal’s masterminds."

Mas o mais importante do artigo para mim é:

"What seems particularly remarkable about the Bayer and Viessmann cases is that they appear to turn clichés about corporate decision-making upside down. Normally, listed groups that are accountable to cold-blooded shareholders are expected to take sober, hardnosed decisions which, if necessary, ditch decades of corporate legacy in a blink. By contrast, tradition-rich family outfits are thought to dither when it becomes necessary to prune a company.

...

But regardless of the ultimate outcome, the political opprobrium and Max Viessmann's tears already show that dismantling a successful company is a difficult decision. That does not mean, however, that it should be dodged."

Fugir da previsibilidade (parte II)

Há oito dias em Fugir da previsibilidade escrevi:

"Predictability é sinónimo de concorrência perfeita, ou seja lucros raquíticos e empobrecimento.

...

Fugir da previsibilidade é uma forma de criar heterogeneidade e fugir da comoditização, é uma forma de criar valor potencial que pode vir a ser capturado como margem superior."

Ontem, encontrei em "The Song of Significance: A New Manifesto for Teams" de Seth Godin:

"There's a huge difference between the backwardlooking work of quality improvement and the forward-looking dance of making decisions about what happens next.

If you're not willing to produce change, then you really have no options. Cost-reduction through industrial management is your only path forward. We've built world-class systems of gradual systems improvement. The measured quality of cars, computer chips, and even overnight package delivery is stunning."

As PMEs no campeonato do custo mais baixo não têm hipótese. 

"In the case of the industry leader, our research showed an entirely different impact of market overlap. Market overlap seems to counteract the benefits of strategic similarity to the industry leader. This is consistent with our reasoning that dependence on the same type of resources as the industry leader and obtaining them from the same resource pools counteract the legitimacy advantages that small firms obtain through similarity to this prominent firm. In addition to this effect on the supply side, it is reasonable to understand that market overlap with the industry leader could trigger negative effects on small-firm performance due to the need to compete with this rival for the same customers (i.e., demand-side effect). Since the industry leader has a stronger position in common markets, it could attract customers more easily than small firms, having a negative impact on their results. Thus, both demand- and supply-side considerations lead to the same negative effect of market overlap on the relationship between similarity to the industry leader and small-firm performance."

Trecho retirado de "To be different or to be the same when you are a small firm? Competitive interdependence as a boundary condition of the strategic balance perspective" 

"resistance is an emotional process"

"When we ask for help, we want both a solution to the problem and confirmation that everything we have done has been perfect.

A colleague of mine, Neale Clapp, mentioned one day that people entering therapy want confirmation, not change. On the surface, it would be ridiculous for a client to bring in a consultant for help, and then tell the consultant that no change was desired and the client did not really want to learn anything. This would not be rational. But that is the point: resistance is an emotional process, not a rational or intellectual one.

...

Not surprisingly, organizations that are in serious trouble tend to be the most difficult clients. They need to change the most and are least able to do it. For low-performing organizations, the tension of failure is so high that they are unable to take one more risk, and so instead they hold on to their unsatisfactory performance. In these extreme cases, there is probably not much consultants can do to surface the resistance to change. We may just have to accept it."

Julgo que já escrevi sobre este tema, Procrastinação e falta do sentido de urgência, sobre empresas que adiam a aplicação de micro-mudanças ao longo do vector tempo, ampliando o gap entre o que são e o que deveriam ser, até que só uma grande mudança a pode ajudar, mas não há experiência sobre como mudar, e há um medo tremendo de falhar ... mudar significa avançar para algo desconhecido, mudar significa medo.

Trechos retirados de "Flawless consulting: a guide to getting your expertise used" de Peter Block.

Os extremistas

No último livro de Seth Godin, "The Song of Significance: A New Manifesto for Teams" encontrei um texto sobre um tema que me é muito caro: 

"49. Focusing on the Extreme User

Every organization has extremists: the employees, customers, or investors who demand more, pay more, use more, talk more, and share more. These extreme users have great needs and offer greater benefits. They are the heavy users, people with disabilities, the sneezers, and the professionals. They're the committed. The Stanford d.school has argued that focusing on these users teaches the organization lessons that will work for all users. This is contrary to the typical industrial organization, which is happy to lose the extremists if it helps them serve the masses more easily. Find the nerds, the motivated, and the overlooked, and figure out what they need to thrive. That exploration will reveal what others have needed as well but didn't care enough to speak up about."

Isto alinha bem com um texto que encontrei na net recentemente:

Mais uma vez, biologia e economia

"Interestingly, recent research in evolutionary biology has direct relevance for understanding how some organizations survive over time and others fail. [Moi ici: O nosso velho "a economia é a continuação da biologia"] At its heart, evolution refers to change or transformation over time. Natural selection refers to the process where, over time, favorable traits (traits useful for survival) become more common and unfavorable traits become less prevalent. In commenting on this, David Sloan Wilson, an evolutionary biologist, noted that "natural selection is based on the relationship between an organism and its environment, regardless of its taxonomic identity."  Thus, it can readily apply to organizations as well as birds, insects, slime mold, and humans.

The three major underpinnings of evolutionary theory are variation (organisms or organizations differ on traits), selection (these differences sometimes make a difference in the organisms ability to survive), and retention (these useful characteristics can be passed from one generation to another). As environments change over time, the variation in traits can make organisms more or less fit, such that the former are more likely to survive. [Moi ici: A tal paisagem competitiva enrugada que se mexe] As organizations compete and struggle for existence, they clearly vary in ways that make some more competitive than others. Fitness in this case is not the reproductive success of biology but the ability to attract resources (physical, financial, and intellectual). [Moi ici: Recordo "What was the best strategy in the end?"] Less fit organisms die. Thus, survival at the organizational level is a function of the process of variation and selection occurring across business units and the ability of senior management to regulate this process in a way that maintains the ecological fitness of the organization with its environment. [Moi ici: Por isto, o team da caridadezinha, os trabalhadores não tomam este tipo de decisões] This process does not imply random variation but a deliberate approach to variation, selection, and retention that uses existing firm assets and capabilities and reconfigures them to address new opportunities."

Trecho retirado de "Lead and disrupt: how to solve the innovator's dilemma" de Charles A O' Reilly III and Michael L. Tushman.  

Cuidado com o eficientismo

Há anos que escrevo sobre os que olham para a Economia como se olha para a ciência de Galileu ou de Newton. Em Economia o que é verdade hoje amanhã é mentira, e vice versa.

"By concentrating production in large facilities, companies can achieve economies of scale that lower the costs of production. [Moi ici: Racional típico do século XX em que que a competição pela eficiência e custo unitário era a única possibilidade de ser bem sucedido] Large-scale equipment can be operationally more efficient than smaller units.

...

To be sure, scale does not automatically translate to lower costs. In some industries, production might be undertaken on a small scale with little or no disadvantage, and it’s possible to attain economies of scale at medium-sized production units. At times, scale can even be a problem. [Moi ici: Em Mongo a variedade é mais importante que a eficiência]

...

As we’ve seen during the pandemic, overly centralized production can create fragile supply chains

...

Research has found that companies that are big but less centralized — for instance, ones that own facilities spread across the country or around the world — enjoy more limited advantages. This type of scale can yield benefits in the form of lower costs, as a distributed network can avoid the need to transport goods over long distances, and spreading out production across multiple facilities can mitigate the consequences of a disruption at a single plant. 

...

More recent research supports ... that aggregating many production units under common ownership does not yield significant operational efficiencies. And if local and regional markets are best served through a network of local and regional distribution and production facilities, what is the public benefit of a single national corporation consolidating its ownership in place of many local and regional firms? Scale tied to the aggregation of assets comes with organizational challenges that can cause significant inefficiencies. Top-level management may have a harder time directing a dispersed team of managers, necessitating the creation of additional layers of administration to ensure that the corporation and its disparate parts are run effectively. [Moi ici: Por isso há muito tempo que escrevo que a cultura portuguesa não lida bem com as exigências de gestão das organizações grandes] And this bureaucracy can add costs and be a source of inefficiency on its own."

Trechos retirados de "To Regulate Big Corporations, Understand How They Got That Way"

Porque é difícil mudar de vida

Quando os "experts" proclamarem que as empresas são viciadas em salários baixos talvez fizesse sentido que reflectissem nas dificuldades da mudança. Parece que Aristóteles terá dito "A quem os deuses querem destruir, eles enviam previamente quarenta anos de sucesso".

"Imagine that you are running a large, mature business with a well-known technology and proven business model. Furthermore, let's assume that because the business is mature and competition is intense, the strategy of the business is to compete on low costs. Imagine, for example, a semiconductor plant at Intel or a manufacturing plant at Toyota. In these instances, the key success factors are around efficiency and productivity, driving costs down (maybe through quality improvement and lean manufacturing), and incremental innovation (faster, cheaper). The skills needed for this include great operational expertise, a disciplined approach, rapid problem solving, and a short-term focus. The formal organization to promote increased efficiency and productivity typically emphasizes a functional organization (manufacturing, engineering, product development, sales, R&D with clear metrics and rewards for incremental improvement and short feedback loops to promote fast learning and the implementation of improved methods. ... this is about exploitation with an emphasis on efficiency, control, certainty, and variance reduction. [Moi ici: "variance reduction" ... como não recuar a Redsigma - O fim da linha] Improvement is a function of ever increasing alignment. With a low cost strategy, the winners are those organizations that are best able to drive out inefficiencies.

...

Now consider the challenge facing the leader of an emerging organization where the future of the business or technology is uncertain - perhaps Twitter or other social media companies. The overarching strategy is to scale quickly based on innovation and flexibility. Here the key success factors are growth, flexibility, and rapid innovation. What types of skills are needed? Clearly technical skills are important, but so is the ability to adapt and move quickly. Given the uncertainty in the technology and the market, the structure of the organization needs to be flat and able to respond quickly to new initiatives. ... The standardization and processes that help a mature organization can be deadly here.

...

To promote speed and flexibility, the culture needs to emphasize norms and values like initiative, experimentation, and speed. ... this is the alignment that promotes exploration. It's about search, discovery, autonomy, and innovation.

A couple of things are worth noting about these examples. First, although the alignments are very different, each is necessary for the successful execution of a particular strategy. When competition is based on efficiency and cost, the winner will most often be the organization that is most successful at reducing variance and promoting incremental innovation. When the market is changing rapidly, the alignment needed to succeed is one that is best able to experiment and adapt quickly. Second, attaining alignment is the primary role of the manager and it isn't easy. Setting up the systems and processes, structuring the work, motivating people and holding them accountable, and promoting constant improvement is a challenge. Third, the alignment that promotes success for one strategy may be toxic for another. And here is the rub: the alignment that makes a mature organization successful can kill an emerging business. And in the same way, the alignment that makes an emerging business work can make a mature business inefficient."

Pois, voltamos a Aristóteles::

"the alignment that has made an organization successful at one point may put it at risk in another. Great companies - those with a proud tradition - are potentially the most vulnerable to what we have labeled the success syndrome"

Não é impunemente que se tem sucesso. Por isso, não é fácil mudar. 

Trechos retirados de "Lead and disrupt: how to solve the innovator's dilemma" de Charles A O' Reilly III and Michael L. Tushman. 

Acerca dos ecossistemas (parte II)

Ainda na sequência de Acerca dos ecossistemas temos:

"companies that focus only on the value they create, and not the value they bring, will set themselves up for disappointment.

...

getting things done in ecosystems requires being nimbler and more responsive to everything from customer needs to managing tricky relationships with partners that might otherwise be competitors. 

...

To be sure, competing in ecosystems won't come easily to top leadership teams that are used to static industry boundaries and traditional, zero-sum- game forms of competition. But they had better learn fast. As ecosystems become more of a differentiating factor that separates out high performance, companies that already have an edge will be well placed to extend it."

Trechos retirados de "Tapping ecosystems to power performance" 

Confundir efeito com causa (parte I)

Há dias, neste postal, Emprego, marketing e subida na escala de valor, escrevi algo que me tem martelado o cérebro:

"Parece que o ministro da Economia não percebe a pirâmide dos Flying Geese: "A questão dos salários é decisiva para o futuro dos trabalhadores e das empresas. Se tivermos salários baixos, a economia nunca se vai desenvolver. Esse problema está umbilicalmente ligado com algum esforço que tem vindo a ser feito para aumentar os salários""

Este trecho: "Se tivermos salários baixos, a economia nunca se vai desenvolver" ...

Será que ele pensa que se os salários aumentarem a economia desenvolve-se? Julgo que ele está a confundir efeito com causa. Por que a economia não se desenvolve, não evolui, os salários continuam baixos porque não há produtividade que sustente o seu aumento. Os salários baixos são mais um sintoma de uma economia subdesenvolvida do que a causa direta de sua falta de crescimento.

Qualquer empresa tem uma estratégia, mesmo que a própria gestão de topo não tenho consciência dela. Uma estratégia bem sucedida assenta num alinhamento interno. Recordo: Alinhamento das operações com a estratégia (Março de 2011).

Recordo também o tema da competitividade, uma empresa pode ser competitiva e estar a empobrecer progressivamente, Não, não pode ser uma repetição do que já se faz (Agosto de 2022).

O que acontece quando o contexto muda?

O que acontece quando se tem de aumentar a produtividade? Recordo Marn e Rosiello e Simon e Dolan e o Evangelho do Valor.

A empresa portuguesa-tipo, do sector transaccionável, não tem hipóteses se se põe a competir pela eficiência e essa é a reacção fácil e instintiva.

Subir na escala de valor implica apostar na "exploration"

Continua.

Diferenciação, lucro e PMEs

"This article explores the nature of differentiation in microenterprises... Using a combined sample of nearly 10,000 microenterprises across eight developing countries, I estimate that a standard deviation increase in differentiation is associated with approximately an 11 percent increase in revenues and an eight percent increase in profit, [Moi ici: Acerca da importância da estratégia ... gente preocpada com os outputs, em vez de dar primazia aos inputs ou outcomes] relative to the sample mean. ... Finally, I estimate the impact of common policy interventions on microenterprise differentiation. The results suggest that standard business skills training interventions have little effect on differentiation [Moi ici: Sintomático... faz-me lembrar a conversa do excel. BTW, ainda esta semana visitei a Viarco] and that access to individualliability microfinance may actually decrease it. 

...

Due to the difficult conditions under which many microenterprises operate, it is broadly assumed differentiation will be difficult to achieve, as proprietors cope with constraints on financial and cognitive resources.

...

The goal of the empirical exercise is to shed light on which constraints are most crucial in limiting microenterprises' ability to differentiate, and whether or not these constraints can be released. The results provide clarity on the shape of the relationship between differentiation and performance in microenterprise, which types of microentrepreneurs are most likely to differentiate, and what impacts existing policy interventions have on differentiation outcomes.

...

I find that propensity to differentiate decreases with age in a strikingly linear relationship. Differentiation also increases with years of education, with a particular boost after secondary school. 

...

From a practitioner standpoint, this work aims to demonstrate the relevance of strategic positioning in microenterprises. [Moi ici: Algo que procuramos fazer neste blogue desde o primeiro momento. Infelizmente todas as semanas encontro exemplos de PMEs que querem ser tudo para todos] While strategy and management researchers have posited that differentiation could be an effective source of competitive advantage in this population of businesses, these constructs are not salient in most policy-adjacent work. Indeed, the words "differentiation", "strategy", or "positioning" cannot be found in any of several excellent research summaries of policy programs directed at microenterprises. [Moi ici: Tão interessante!] While this analysis does not demonstrate a causal relationship, the robust association between differentiation and performance described in the results warrants an examination of a) whether an cost-effective interventions can successfully help microentrepreneurs achieve a more differentiated offering, and b) if such differentiation then translates causally to improved performance. The results of this analvsis provide suggestive evidence as to what tvpes of interventions mav prove impactful and which population of microentrepreneurs might be most effective to target."

Trechos retirados de "Differentiation in Microenterprises"

Momento, preço, valor, modelo de negócio e futuro

O que se segue é-me doloroso. Amanhã escreverei sobre emigração qualificada, marketing gerador de cinismo e sucesso de uns inocentes como sinal de fracasso da comunidade.

"With the economy at a turning point, companies should be thinking more critically about growth—concentrating on growing better rather than simply getting bigger. [Moi ici: Como bebi por volta de 2007 em "Manage for profit, not for market share" e depois demorei a refinar com Marn e Rosiello para seguir a máxima "Volume is Vanity, Profit is Sanity" desde 2006]

...

As inflation and costs have risen, it has become harder for most businesses to grow.

Yet that is exactly what makes this the right moment to think critically about growth. 

...

“If you want to find growth in a world where costs are rising, the key is to understand what customers really value today and what they will value in the future.” [Moi ici: Que tempo, que espaço, que paz de espírito é guardada para esta reflexão profunda e de longo prazo? Então com empresas familiares é muitas vezes doloroso ... A única pessoa que pode dedicar tempo a isto está a conduzir um empilhador para arrumar paletes, ou está a substituir um operário especializado que está de baixa... e quem pensa no futuro da empresa? Quem encara de frente o monstro da erosão competitiva?]

...

Understanding how to identify and unlock better growth is the key to sustainable success in business.

...

If value is key, we need to ask what value really means.

...

you can’t even begin to form your growth strategy until you stand in the customer’s shoes and understand how people make trade-offs between price and something much more subtle which is perceived value.” [Moi ici: Claro que isto implica escolher, conhecer quem são os clientes-alvo. Claro que isto implica pôr o output nos bastidores e dar primazia aos outcomes ou inputs e isso é areia demais para muita camioneta]

Some companies tend to confuse value with price, although they are very different concepts. The problem is that price is easy to state, but value is harder to calculate. 

...

“Firms need to understand that pricing should be a strategy, not a tactic,”  [Moi ici: Citação poderosa. Muitas vezes, demasiadas vezes usamos o preço como táctica, como resposta ao próximo desafio imediato e não como estratégia. Ainda recentemente vi este trecho como exemplo do preço como estratégia]

...

“You need to think about what information you are trying to convey with price, because price not only captures value for the consumer, it can also create value for the firm.” [Moi ici: "also create value for the firm" nem comento. Não posso comentar... demasiados casos de destruição de valor, de desperdício de recursos, de irresponsabilidade infantil]

...

Many things influence value—including brand, quality and not just what is offered to the customer, but how it is offered and when. [Moi ici: Também relacionado com o o tema da primazia dos outcomes sobre os inputs, porque o foco deixa de ser o produto acabado e passa a ser a situação do cliente-alvo, o seu contexto, os seus objectivos]

...

Growth for growth’s sake is a recipe for staff burnout and overall corporate exhaustion: sustainable growth should be about creating opportunities for everyone.

Knowing how to explain value to your customers and understanding how your customer data can tell you exactly what value people are prepared to pay for and what to forego is the essence of a balanced strategy for sustainable growth

...

The trade-offs that underlie growth strategy go to the heart of a company, shaping the kind of business it wants to be. “Better growth is about finding a growth model that treats volumes and margins in a way that keeps stakeholder interests in balance and reduces the pressure in the business,” 

...

“What we find with companies that adopt a pure volume mindset and market-share mindset is that they often fail to see the real implications for growth,” adds Dr. von der Gathen. “It is what we call getting ‘too hungry to eat.’ Sales are growing, but the company doesn’t have enough inherent revenue stability or profitability, and eventually their business model runs out of juice.” [Moi ici: Que sina!!!]

Creating better growth opportunities

Better growth, therefore, is about building business models with long-term, sustainable revenues and the headroom for innovation. It is about going beyond the math of market share and sales volumes, and finding a growth model designed to nurture the business as a real value-provider."

Entretidos e amparados pelas esmolas dos apoios comunitários, as dores de parto necessárias para a ascensão a um novo nível do jogo não passam de picos de urtigas mansas. 

Trechos retirados de "How businesses can unlock better growth" 

Acerca dos ecossistemas

Parece que o tema dos ecossistemas de partes interessadas continua a bombar.

"Ecosystems for the rest of us"

"Digitally enabled ecosystems are a vital part of the modern business landscape. They open the door to new customers and markets, and broaden and enhance a firm’s value proposition through the seamless bundling and integration of goods and services. Last but not least, ecosystems help companies become more innovative. It’s little wonder so many want to get involved."

"Ecosystems"

"Participating in ecosystems allows organizations to reach new customers by complementing (or even replacing) traditional value chains with environments in which companies work with multiple partners in different ways to create value."

"How to Create a Stakeholder Strategy"

"firms can use data—which is increasingly accessible and rigorous—to craft and implement effective growth strategies that recognize the complex interdependencies among stakeholders, create mutual benefits for them, and increase the net value generated collectively for their constituents."

Recordo um dos primeiros postais sobre o tema aqui no blogue em 2007, Subir na escala de valor e este resumo de 2016, Balanced Scorecard (parte V). 

Cuidado com as modas (parte II)

Parte I.

"The maker of Post-It notes, automotive adhesives and roofing granules said on Tuesday that it would eliminate 6,000 jobs as Chief Executive Officer Mike Roman follows through on a pledge to take a “deeper look at everything we do” after a series of disappointing earnings updates and a more than $50 billion slide in 3M’s market value during his tenure."