A velha estória da caneta

No WSJ da passada sexta-feira li "3M Innovation Suffers Dry Spell" de onde sublinhei:

"The 20th century belonged to the unruly minds at 3M.

From its early days, the American manufacturing giant gave its researchers a long leash to chase ideas, many to dead-ends. The hits, though, were indelible: Scotch tape. Masking tape. Videotape. Post-it Notes. N95 masks. Artificial turf. Heart medication. 

3M patented adhesives and abrasives, as well as proprietary coatings and films that reflect light, repel water and insulate against cold and heat-materials at the heart of highway signs, weatherproof windows and stain-resistant clothing and carpets. Its optical film brightened the screens of millions of laptops, smartphones and flat-screen TVs. A cautious air has since settled on the 3M headquarters and research campus in Maplewood, Minn., dampening the restless ambition that built the company, according to some investors and company veterans. There are fewer new products and fewer still have been blockbusters, a dry spell that couldn't have arrived at a worse time.

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Current and former scientists say the strategy makes it more difficult for fresh ideas to survive a gantlet of management naysayers. For decades, 3M released a cascade of new items on the market, confident most would be profitable and a few would become indispensable. The company has retreated from its traditional goal of earning around 30% of revenue from new products.

"Senior management has deluded themselves into thinking they can pick winners and losers, when in reality we need to generate more products so we can get into test markets to see what works," said Robert Asmus, a former 3M healthcare scientist and member of the Carlton Society, the company's highest honor for science and engineering.

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3M's innovation principles took shape more than a century ago under William McKnight, who grew up as a farm boy in South Dakota.

McKnight joined 3M as an assistant bookkeeper a few years after its founding in 1902 and became its president. He helped guide the company from a sandpaper maker to a manufacturer of thousands of industrial, automotive and home products. Though McKnight began his career at the dawn of the assembly line era, he believed in worker autonomy and initiative. "Mistakes will be made, but if the man is essentially right himself, I think the mistakes he makes are not so serious in the long run as the mistakes management makes if it is dictatorial," he said, according to a company history. He instituted what became known as the McKnight principles. One of them allowed researchers to spend 15% of their time on projects unrelated to their everyday tasks even if managers disapproved. The principles championed collaboration, encouraging researchers to share findings. The Post-it Note came about after scientist Art Fry, bedeviled by paper bookmarks falling out of his church hymnal, remembered a semi-sticky adhesive discussed at a company seminar. The product was an instant success after it hit stores in 1980.

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Rob Kieschke, a former research director who left the company last year, said 3M's weakening position in the smartphone display market is a symptom of its troubles. Researchers are encouraged to pursue incremental improvements to existing products rather than novel, swing-for the fences breakthroughs.

"If you start forcing people to eliminate risk, then all you end up doing is what has been done before or what everyone else is doing," said Kieschke, who contributed to more than 20 patents.

3M said it balances work between improving products and creating new ones.

Kieschke and others said the company still feels the influence of prior leaders such as James McNerney, a former General Electric executive who served four years as CEO in the early 2000s. McNerney installed "Six Sigma," a regimen used at GE to measure and standardize business practices but loathed by 3M researchers as a creativity killer. [Moi ici: Aqui o anónimo da província não se deixou enganar]

Under Inge Thulin, who held the CEO job from 2012 to 2018, 3M more than doubled its dividend and spent billions on share buybacks. Research spending went up modestly during that period. Even so, Thulin told investors in 2016 that he wanted higher R&D productivity. 3M makes big investments, he said, "we also expect big returns." Neither McNerney nor Thulin could be reached for comment.

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Such projects have kept talent flowing into 3M, which hires about 40 Ph.D. scientists a year into its corporate labs. Not all of them stay, including Ben Mac Murray, who joined the company in 2018 with a doctorate in materials science and engineering from Cornell University.

He became part of a group working on 3-D printing and was impressed with 3M's capabilities. Yet he felt the pace of product development was too slow. In 2021, he left to work at materials-science company Interfacial, which he said was "quicker in general from idea to product.""

É como uma doença que se apanhou, ao misturar 6 sigma com inovação, e da qual é muito dificil recuperar. Tempo de repensar a melhoria contínua

Cuidado com as modas (parte II)

Parte I.

"The maker of Post-It notes, automotive adhesives and roofing granules said on Tuesday that it would eliminate 6,000 jobs as Chief Executive Officer Mike Roman follows through on a pledge to take a “deeper look at everything we do” after a series of disappointing earnings updates and a more than $50 billion slide in 3M’s market value during his tenure."

Eficiência quando se lida com gente é uma ideia louca

Este texto, "Toyota is not lean", sobre a aplicação do Lean e 6 sigma aos hospitais merece alguma reflexão.
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Primeiro, pelos números que mostra sobre o impacte do Lean e do 6 sigma em muitas corporações que os aplicaram. Recordar a série "Não culpem a caneta quando a responsabilidade é do escritor". Estas ferramentas são poderosas mas só fazem sentido serem aplicadas em contextos em que a eficiência é tudo.
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Segundo, apesar do que pensam os políticos por esse mundo fora, a começar por Portugal, entretidos a criar os tais hospitais-cidade em busca da eficiência redentora, num negócio como o da saúde, a eficiência não é o mais importante.

• "When is a company too big to manage?"
• Um clássico do "To Big To Care"
• Amor versus arame

Decididamente, eficiência quando se lida com gente é uma ideia louca.

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O futuro passa muito mais por reflexões deste tipo "From the industrial economy to the interactive economy".
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Ontem, apanhei estas pérolas de Esko Kilpi no Twitter:

"1/ value creation does not happen at the point of production, but at the point of use
2/ standard, generic solutions to customer problems are no longer as competitive as they have been
3/ transactions are replaced by interactive relationships
4/ greatest value creation is no longer related to resource management, or to production, but rather to the linking of interactions
All in all, production/service generation can no longer happen independently of the customer or of the context of the customer."

Cuidado com as modas!

Recordar o que ao longo dos anos escrevi acerca da caneta.

• Tempo de repensar a melhoria contínua
• "I would suggest that pharma CEOs look to Hollywood for inspiration"

A culpa não é da ferramenta, da caneta, quem a usa é que é o responsável pelo que consegue ou não.

"Revered for decades as one of the world's most innovative companies, 3M lost its innovative mojo when it began using Six Sigma to try to improve its operational efficiency. James McNerney, the CEO named in 2000, was a Jack Welch protégé from GE. He introduced the Six Sigma discipline as soon as he took the helm of the firm, streamlining work processes, eliminating 10% of the workforce, and earning praise (initially) from Wall Street, as operating margins grew from 17% in 2001 to 23% by 2005.
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But when McNerney tried to apply the Six Sigma discipline to 3M's research and development processes it led to a dramatic fall-off in the number of innovative products developed by the company during those years.
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In his book Seeing What Others Don't: The Remarkable Ways We Gain Insight, cognitive psychologist Gary Klein argues strongly that the Six Sigma discipline, eventually embraced by 58 of the Fortune 200 companies, has a significant and often overlooked downside: it does tend to reduce a company's innovative capabilities. Innovation is a creative endeavor, and creativity is inherently unpredictable and un-plannable. If you could plan and schedule creativity, it wouldn't really be creative, would it?
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By 2006, Fortune Magazine reported that 91% of the large enterprises that had implemented Six Sigma had fallen behind the growth rate of the S&P 500, and blaming the phenomenon on a significant falloff in innovation at these firms."

Cuidado com as modas! O que resulta numa empresa com uma estratégia pode ser criminoso numa outra com uma estratégia diferente.
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Recordar os dinossauros do esquema de Terry Hill:

Trechos retirados de "How 3M Lost (and Found) its Innovation Mojo"

A culpa não é da ferramenta é de quem a usa inadequadamente

Quando uma empresa aposta na eficiência para ter sucesso, e pode, os resultados começam a ver-se muito mais rapidamente do que quando a aposta passa pela inovação, moda, marca, serviço à medida.
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Muitas empresas apostam na eficiência quando não o devem fazer. E empatam recursos preciosos e escassos em actividades internas, viradas para dentro, perdendo a janelas de oportunidades que se encontram no exterior.

"In fact, of 58 large companies that have announced Six Sigma programs, 91 percent have trailed the S&P 500 since, according to an analysis by Charles Holland of consulting firm Qualpro (which espouses a competing quality-improvement process).
One of the chief problems of Six Sigma, say Holland and other critics, is that it is narrowly designed to fix an existing process, allowing little room for new ideas or an entirely different approach. All that talent - all those best and brightest - were devoted to, say, driving defects down to 3.4 per million and not on coming up with new products or disruptive technologies."

A culpa não é da ferramenta é de quem a usa inadequadamente. E é isto que critico no mundo da Qualidade, a promoção de certas ferramentas, independentemente da sua coerência com a orientação estratégica das empresas.
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Trecho retirado de "New rule: Look out, not in."
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Recordar "Tempo de repensar a melhoria contínua"

Erros e inovação (parte II)

Na sequência de "Erros e inovação" este texto de Harold Jarche, "Error reduction interferes with gaining insights":

"Fifty-eight of the top Fortune 200 companies bought into Six Sigma, attesting to the appeal of eliminating errors. The results of this “experiment” were striking: 91 per cent of the Six Sigma companies failed to keep up with the S&P 500 because Six Sigma got in the way of innovation. It interfered with insights."

Depois, com base na Cynefin Framework, Jarche mostra o porquê do problema, complexo é diferente de complicado.

Criatividade e 6 sigma

"Insight is the opposite of predictable. Insights are disruptive. They come without warning, take forms that are unexpected, and open up unimagined opportunities. They are disorganizing. Insights disrupt progress reviews because they reshape tasks and even revise goals. They carry risks —unseen pitfalls that can get managers in trouble.
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Creativity was connected in the participants’ minds with uncertainty. When people were motivated to reduce uncertainty they gave lower evaluations to creative ideas. Managers dislike uncertainty and unpredictability, and therefore distrust creativity. (Moi ici: Impossível não relacionar logo com o que aconteceu à 3M quando se meteu com os 6 Sigma)
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The perfection trap is to try to reduce or eliminate errors. Organizations naturally gravitate towards reducing errors. Errors are easy to define, easy to measure, and relatively easy to manage.
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The quest for perfection, error-free performance, is right up there with the quest for predictability. These are both inherent in running an organization that depends on managing people and projects. In well-ordered situations, with clear goals and standards, and stable conditions, the pursuit of perfection makes sense. But not when we face complex and chaotic conditions. (Moi ici: A vantagem dos latinos sobre os anglo-saxónicos está aqui)
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Managers know how to spot errors. They don’t know how to encourage insights other than hanging inspirational posters on the walls.
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Unfortunately, the actions that organizations take to reduce errors can actually impede insights. They drain the attention and energy of the employees into error-reduction rituals that crowd out the mindset needed for insights."

Trechos retirados de "Insights Vs. Organizations"

Erros e inovação

Em linha com o que escrevemos há anos e anos, desde "Não culpem a caneta quando a culpa é de quem escreve" (2007) ou "O perigo da cristalização" (2008), o novo livro de Gary Klein, " Seeing What Others Don’t", de certeza uma das próximas leituras, reforça a ideia:

"“Six Sigma shouldn’t be abandoned, it needs to be corralled.”"

Harold Jarche faz aqui a sua análise.

"Too often in organizations, management only focuses on reducing errors, Klein cites the overemphasis on practices like Six Sigma over the past 30 years as being detrimental to overall innovation;"

Concentram-se na execução e esquecem-se do posicionamento.

Recordar o caso da ferramenta

No caso da ferramenta, a culpa não é da ferramenta, a culpa é do que fazemos com ela.
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A culpa não é da caneta, é do que resolvemos escrever com ela.
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Assim, não sou tão radical quanto este artigo "Six Sigma Is Draining Employees’ Creativity"
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O Six Sigma não é para empresas que vivem da criatividade.
O Six Sigma é capaz de ser muito útil numa cozinha McDonald's.
Acham que a McDonald's quer criatividade nas suas cozinhas?
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Recordar "Não culpem a caneta quando a culpa é de quem escreve!"

Estava escrito nas estrelas

Encontrei um precioso livro, "The Power of Communication", de Helio Fred Garcia, um livro que recomendo vivamente a muito boa gente.
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Antes de abordar a temática da comunicação há uma história interessante que quero sublinhar. A história de Bob Nardelli à frente da Home Depot.
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A Home Depot era uma cadeia de lojas reconhecida pela qualidade do seu serviço, pelo funcionários sempre presentes e prestáveis, estão a imaginar a cena.
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Quando Jack Welch deixou o cargo de CEO da GE um dos preteridos foi Nardelli (já agora, o outro foi Jim McNerney que foi fazer estragos para a 3M) que, assim que soube que tinha sido preterido aceitou um convite para CEO da Home Depot.
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Ao chegar aqui, adivinhei logo a história que ia acontecer à pobre Home Depot... a GE é a pátria do 6Sigma, do lean e de todas essas ferramentas e filosofias que são muito válidas para aumentar a eficiência mas que são desastrosas para uma empresa que vive de uma proposta de valor que não a do preço mais baixo (por isso é que McNerney deu cabo da cultura de inovação da 3M, ou, pelo menos, deu-lhe uma forte machadada).
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Vamos ao relato:
"By early December 2000, Bob Nardelli was chief executive officer of Home Depot. He inherited a company with a freewheeling, customer-focused culture. Store managers enjoyed great freedom with little oversight. It was sometimes referred to as a “cowboy” culture.
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Mr. Nardelli launched three initiatives that each put great stress on the company, its culture, and, ultimately, its investors: centralization, cost containment, and diversification. He centralized operations and disempowered store managers. (Moi ici: Quando quero dar o exemplo de uma empresa eficiente mostro um filme de uma paragem no "pit" da Formula 1. Reparem:

Ninguém pensa, está tudo treinado, tudo automatizado. Não há criatividade na fase de execução, é só executar o que alguém desenhou. Não há "artistas" nem prima-donas, planeamento central. Eficiência, eficiência, eficiência!) For example, he collapsed nine regional purchasing departments into one unit, based in the company’s Atlanta headquarters. He placed a human resources manager, selected in Atlanta, in each store. He reduced the number of employee evaluation forms across the com- pany from 157 to 2. In other words, he moved the company from a place with significant autonomy and replaced it with a command-and- control culture. The changes caused resistance among the workforce.
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Mr. Nardelli undertook significant cost-containment initiatives. He replaced full-time tradesmen (plumbers, carpenters, etc.) walking the floor of Home Depot stores with part-time salespeople. He intro- duced self-checkout lanes. He abandoned Home Depot’s very popular no-receipt, no-time-limit, cash refund policy. And he introduced Six Sigma, the dominant management discipline at GE. The effect on customers was pronounced. Co-founders Bernie Marcus and Arthur Blank had walked the floor of Home Depot stores preaching that employees should “make love to the customers.” Under Mr. Nardelli’s cost cutting, the love was nowhere to be found. Customer service complaints skyrocketed as the quality of salespeople’s advice and service declined.
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Rivals, such as the newer and often more tidy Lowe’s, attracted customers who left Home Depot.
.Employees also bristled under increasing pressure and decreasing autonomy. The introduction of Six Sigma plus the arrival at corporate headquarters of former GE executives into Mr. Nardelli’s inner circle led some employees to call the company “Home GEpot.”
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But it was Mr. Nardelli’s diversification strategy that proved most controversial. (Moi ici: Uma empresa criada para servir uns clientes-alvo... trucidada ao tentar chegar a outros. E que outros? Os que estão na mente de quem trabalha com o 6Sigma... os do preço mais baixo. Em vez de B2C passaram para o B2B) He sought to expand Home Depot’s market by expanding both its customer base and its product offerings. Home Depot entered the market for large home appliances such as stoves, refrigerators, and washing machines. It developed service businesses, such as home installation and repair, a shift from the do-it-yourself model to a we-do-it-for-you model. But most significantly, he expanded into the business of contractor services, providing large-volume materials for construction sites, marketing not to the do-it-yourself home market but to the professional builder market."
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Claro que as medidas no curto-prazo deram resultado, medidas deste tipo no curto prazo dão quase sempre resultado. Contudo, o veneno já lá estava a actuar. Em 2006, quando Nardelli, saiu a cotação das acções estava 6% mais baixa... mas a cotação da arqui-rival Lowe tinha subido 173% no mesmo período.
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"Mr. Nardelli was converting Home Depot from a customer-focused retailer into a diversified, low-margin, business-to-business company similar to what Mr. Nardelli had left at General Electric."
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Em Portugal já vi acontecer cenas destas sobretudo ao nível da consultoria. Empresas bem sucedidas porque não estão no mercado do preço mais baixo, porque estão no mercado da arte: da inovação, da pequena série exclusiva, do pormenor... contratam serviços de especialistas em optimização de processos produtivos que estão habituados a fazer um excelente trabalho em  fornecedores da indústria automóvel.

Tempo de repensar a melhoria contínua

Mais uma vez o anónimo engenheiro de província... eu bem vos disse:

• Jun 2007 - "Não culpem a caneta quando a culpa é de quem escreve"
• Mar 2008 - "O perigo da cristalização"
• Fev 2009 - "Não culpem a caneta quando a culpa é de quem escreve"
• Set 2010 - "Seis Sigma e Inovação. Para mim não cola"
• Out 2011 - "Não culpem a caneta quando a culpa é de quem escreve"

Atentem neste texto de Ron Ashkenas "It's Time to Rethink Continuous Improvement":

"Looking beyond Japan, iconic six sigma companies in the United States, such as Motorola and GE, have struggled in recent years to be innovation leaders. 3M, which invested heavily in continuous improvement, had to loosen its sigma methodology in order to increase the flow of innovation. As innovation thinker Vijay Govindarajan says, "The more you hardwire a company on total quality management, [the more] it is going to hurt breakthrough innovation. The mindset that is needed, the capabilities that are needed, the metrics that are needed, the whole culture that is needed for discontinuous innovation, are fundamentally different.""

E recordar o que o anónimo engenheiro de província escreveu lá em cima em "O perigo da cristalização"

A guerra em curso... ou como a inovação é como as mulheres nas empresas

Quando animo uma sessão sobre "Identificação de clientes-alvo e sua caracterização", para responder à pergunta "Afinal para quem vamos trabalhar?", costumo começar por simplificar a coisa e mostrar um mundo de clientes extremados no preço, no serviço e na inovação. Depois, mostro como cada um desses clientes-tipo tem de ser servido por um mosaico de actividades com prioridades e suportado por culturas todas diferentes.
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A figura 12 deste artigo ilustra a confusão de querer ir a todas e servir todo o tipo de clientes... claro, depois os resultados são espelhados por Byrnes e pelas curvas de Stobachoff.
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A escolha dos clientes-alvo determina a cultura, as prioridades, as políticas, as linhas de orientação, o mosaico solidário, sinérgico, de actividades encadeadas capazes de criar a vantagem do serviço e dificultarem a cópia por concorrentes.
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O pior que pode acontecer, é tentar aplicar o que está na moda numa cultura que serve um tipo de clientes-alvo com bons resultados, numa outra cultura que pretende servir outro tipo de clientes-alvo.
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Ao longo dos anos aqui no blogue referi como exemplo disto a tontice da 3M com o Lean Six Sigma:

• "Não culpem a caneta quando a culpa é de quem escreve" (Julho de 2007)
• "O que revela a leitura dos indicadores de um balanced scorecard" (Setembro de 2007)
• "Eficácia, eficiência, processos e proposta de valor" (Abril de 2010)

O problema não é português, é universal. 

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Jeffrey Phillips em "Innovation and Efficiency – Opposing Forces" expande a minha preocupação e clarifica melhor as consequências nefastas de tantos anos de experiência no corte de custos, no impacte negativo das conversas da tríade nos media. Quanto mais os académicos encalhados se enterrarem no pântano da eficiência, da normalização, do QCD, mais aumenta a energia que tem de se gastar para vencer a energia de activação para começar a competir no campeonato que interessa: o campeonato do valor, o campeonato da eficácia, o campeonato da inovação:
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"Efficiency is winning because, to continue the warfare analogy, all the troops have been trained in the cost cutting and efficiency models and methods. We have ninjas stalking through the business reinforcing Six Sigma and Lean concepts. The coin of the realm is paid out to reward efficiency gains far more frequently than innovation outcomes. Business models, processes and methods are much more attuned to efficiency. As these concepts are reinforced, they remind the rest of the troops to place emphasis on reducing risk, reducing variability, reducing costs. When an officer (read executive) argues for a new battle plan, based on innovation, the majority of the organization looks on in horror. No one is familiar with those tools and methods. They introduce risk and uncertainty, with a very indefinite outcome. And innovation doesn’t reinforce the strengths of the existing business model and strategies – in fact it may weaken or destroy the very fortress the firm has worked so hard to build. While I’ve written this in rather florid language, make no mistake, there’s a battle underway in every firm between efficiency and innovation, and efficiency is poised to win in most organizations."

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Agora, recuem, procurem uma janela para onde possam olhar o horizonte e respondam à pergunta:

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As medidas que o governo mais tem badalado nos últimos meses, relativamente à Economia, condicionam, despertam, ajudam, concentram, que tipo de abordagem, a da eficiência ou a da inovação (eficácia)?

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TSU, mais meia-hora, menos feriados... tudo relacionado com os custos de quem já está implantado... nada  relacionado com a eficácia/inovação!!!

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Os nossos amigos finlandeses (com Maliranta à cabeça) ensinaram-me a primeira citação na coluna da direita deste blogue:

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""It is widely believed that restructuring has boosted productivity by displacing low-skilled workers and creating jobs for the high skilled."Mas, e como isto é profundo:"In essence, creative destruction means that low productivity plants are displaced by high productivity plants." Por favor voltar a trás e reler esta última afirmação." 

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O governo fez alguma coisa para facilitar a vida à entrada no mercado de novos players anónimos? Se não, como é que eles, de cabeça limpa, sem a contaminação da eficiência, podem aumentar a nossa produtividade com a inovação? Nunca esquecer Marn e Rosiello, eles foram o farol que me orientou para a viagem que me deu a conhecer o planeta Mongo!!!

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A inovação tem de ser como as mulheres nas empresas... tem de ser muito, muito, muito competente para passar à frente de um homem com muito menos competência.

Não culpem a caneta quando a culpa é de quem escreve (parte III)

Parte I e parte II.
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O "cargo cult" dá nisto!!!
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"The Six Sigma Blues"
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O 6 sigma é fantástico para aumentar a eficiência numa empresa. Recomendo-o! Já vi o seu efeito em empresas que precisavam de se tornar muito mais eficientes.
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Agora... a maioria das empresas antes de ser mais eficiente precisa de ser mais eficaz.
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Não interessa ser eficiente se a empresa não seduz clientes com o que produz.
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Acham que a Ferrari é uma empresa eficiente?
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Mas a culpa nunca é da ferramenta, é sempre do cérebro humano que a usa!

"I would suggest that pharma CEOs look to Hollywood for inspiration"

Ainda hoje, durante uma reflexão com empresários, recordei esta experiência "O perigo da cristalização" ao tentar dar a minha opinião sobre onde os sistemas da qualidade podem falhar por terem encalhado no tempo.
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Já por várias vezes tenho chamado a atenção para o facto de que não existem boas-práticas à priori. Aquilo que são boas-práticas para uma indústria que vive do preço mais baixo pode ser um crime aplicar numa indústria que vive da inovação. Por exemplo:

• "Não existem boas-práticas!!!"
• "Não culpem a caneta quando a culpa é de quem escreve!"
• "Lanchesterianos e a surpresa da flexibilidade talibã"

Pois bem, acabo de ler um artigo que me encheu as medidas "What Is Really Killing Pharma":
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"I have come to believe (and I admit that this is only a theory) that as more and more of pharma’s budget was funneled into advertising and direct marketing to both the general public and to doctors themselves, the path to the top in pharma ceased to be via the lab bench and instead was by way of Madison Avenue (Moi ici: Da Wikipedia "he term "Madison Avenue" is often used metonymically for advertising, and Madison Avenue became identified with the advertising industry after the explosive growth in this area in the 1920s").
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Like today’s pharma CEOs, he knew a lot about selling but not much about what he was selling.
One consequence of this shift from science to business in the pharma industry has been less and less appreciation for the realities—as opposed to the hype and hope—of drug discovery. This is reflected both in the quixotic choices made by pharma as to what to pursue and in the stunningly bad management of the core talent in drug discovery.
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Because your modern big pharma CEO knows next to nothing about science, I have to assume they think they are adding value by imposing management schemes they do know about. Let’s consider one such disaster of a fad: lean thinking and six sigma.
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The problem, though, is the process being modeled here—drug discovery—doesn’t lend itself to this method. As any senior medicinal chemist or molecular modeler would be happy to explain to management, an embarrassingly large fraction of drug discovery involves serendipity—while you’re looking for one thing, you find another. And serendipity is, of course, the complete antithesis of a Taguchi robust process where variance, i.e. a standard deviation, can be well defined- we work in the domain of the unexpected, the domain of the “Black Swan”. Now that the method has been applied and failed, it seems ridiculous to have ever thought it might have succeeded. But not only was it applied with great vigor, it often came to be seen as a much more secure employment path than the vagaries of drug discovery. Not a little talent was wasted on these meaningless exercises and not a few careers lost to management bullshit.
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Here’s a positive suggestion: instead of using biotech as a model, I would suggest that pharma CEOs look to Hollywood for inspiration. The film industry long ago recognized that what is important is talent. No one can predict what will be a blockbuster (drug or movie), but Hollywood has at least recognized that movie-making is a talent-based industry. Perhaps today’s pharma chiefs need to see themselves as latter-day studio heads—I’m sure they’d love that!—and come to the same conclusions. Define the vision, get and keep the right people, stop making it harder for talented people to do their jobs, give them the time and resources to be creative. Then maybe, just maybe, they would start curing pharma."
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Que grande artigo!!!
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Pôe o dedo na ferida!!!
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E em linha com o postal que está a gestação na minha mente sobre os intangíveis e a criação de valor, e a dificuldade da velha academia encaixar isto na cabeça.

Seis Sigma e Inovação: Para mim não cola

Ontem de manhã, o administrador de uma empresa com a qual estou a desenvolver um projecto mandou-me esta newsletter chamando a minha atenção para o artigo "Seis Sigma e Inovação: serão ambos possíveis em simultâneo?"
A mim, o artigo não convenceu.
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Além disso tem algumas afirmações muito bonitas mas perigosas.
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Por exemplo: "Objectivo: atingir um melhoramento rápido e significativo para se tornar o “best-inclass” em tudo." 
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Em tudo? 
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Em tudo?
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E é possível "em tudo?"
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Se fosse possível melhorar tudo, onde estava a necessidade de uma estratégia?
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Por exemplo, Tony Hsieh no livro "Delivering Happiness: A Path to Profits, Passion, and Purpose" escreve:
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"The most efficient way to run a warehouse is to let the orders pile up, so that when a worker walks around picking up orders, the picking density is higher and the worker has less distance to walk. But we're not trying to maximize picking efficiency.
We're trying to maximize the customer experience, which in e-commerce involves getting orders out to customers as quickly as possible." 
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Eficácia à frente da eficiência!
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O que diria o Seis Sigma disto? 
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O Seis Sigma não é eficiência?
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Outro trecho: "Uma vez mais, não é errado ser consistente se os processos estão a oferecer um valor excepcional ao consumidor" 
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Sublinho "se os processos estão a oferecer", se estão a a produzir já algo, já não é inovador, já foi inovador. Agora, uns chineses acabados de chegar do campo à Foxconn podem fabricar i-pads de forma repetitiva até ao final dos tempos.
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Outro trecho: "se a Apple produz os seus produtos" cá está, fala do presente, do processo, da massificação, não fala do projecto, não fala do protótipo.
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Não, não conseguiram convencer-me de que o Seis Sigma e a Inovação possam ser usados em conjunto.

Modelos de negócio (parte VII)

Voltando à figura da parte VI:

E olhando para o estágio das tácticas, das consequências operacionais que decorrem das escolhas estratégicas feitas a montante, tenho de aproveitar para fazer a ponte para o artigo "An Essential Step for Corporate Strategy" de Tim Laseter na revista strategy+business issue 57.

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"“The success of a strategy depends on doing many things well — not just a few — and integrating among them.” (Moi ici: integração - palavra-chave - criar sinergias que se reforçam em loops dinâmicos auto-catalíticos)

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Effective overall strategy, by Porter’s own definition, reinforces the critical need for an operations strategy.

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Porter should have explained the critical need for an operations strategy in enabling the overall corporate strategy to succeed.

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Wickham Skinner (Moi ici: uma referência habitual neste blogue), attempted to make business practitioners aware that the manufacturing function warranted more executive attention in a 1969 Harvard Business Review article. Titled “Manufacturing — The Missing Link in Corporate Strategy,” the article anticipated Porter’s argument by more than 25 years, noting that “a production system inevitably involves trade-offs and compromises.” But rather than focusing on strategic positioning, Skinner highlighted a number of “decision areas” where the operations arena needed to resolve important trade-offs.

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To be sure, the operations strategy at most companies has been determined on an ad hoc basis by the accumulated effect of many small and large operational decisions. Rarely does a company formally design and document its operations strategy in a deliberate fashion. (Moi ici: tão verdade nas PMEs, daí que quando se concentram no que é essencial, dão um salto na sua competitividade)
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Structural decisions define the what, when, where, and how of investing in operations bricks and mortar.
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Porter properly dismissed the pursuit of operational effectiveness without a clear linkage to the company’s competitive differentiation, but he underestimated the importance of building these capabilities. (Moi ici: O perigo do benchmarking, o perigo de aplicar o que resulta bem na indústria automóvel numa empresa que compete pela inovação. Por exemplo, basta procurar 3M e 6 sigma.)
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In Porter’s defense, many operations executives also do not think about building unique capabilities, but instead mindlessly pursue “best practices.” In other words, they try to develop the capabilities that their fiercest competitors have already mastered. The concept of “best practices,” in fact, reinforces the flawed mind-set that triggered Porter’s attack on operational effectiveness. There are no universally superior methods that should be applied by all industry participants. Such a model yields competitive convergence and the often destructive model of pure cost-based competition. Instead, capabilities should be nurtured with a clear focus on the company’s desired, differentiated position in the marketplace." (Moi ici: Please, rewind a read again this last underlined text. Read again and again until your epiphanic moment.).

Que resultados para a inovação (parte III)

Há dias reflectia neste espaço sobre a “Intuição vs Procedimentação” onde, com base nas palavras de Gary Klein:
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“Many organizations attempt to take refuge in procedures. This happens when supervisors play it safe and reduce the task to procedures even if those procedures don’t really capture all of the nuances and tricks of the trade. Turning a job into a set of procedures makes it easier for new workers to carry out their responsibilities, and it also supports accountability by letting managers more easily verify if the procedures were followed.
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Unfortunately, this practice can make it even harder to build up intuitions if the procedures eliminate the need for judgment calls. Clearly, we need procedures to help us react quickly to emergencies, or to orient new workers. Once a set of procedures is in place, however, supervisors may not bother teaching the skills workers need to understand or modify the procedures.This is how the expertise that makes a company great gets lost. There is a strong tendency in our culture to proceduralize almost everything, to reduce all types of work to a series of steps. But you cannot reduce intuition to a procedure.
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Organizations may try to reduce decisions and judgments to procedures by defining metrics (i.e., measurable objectives). Metrics are often seen as a way to replace intuitions. They can be useful as a corrective to relying too heavily on impressions, but if managers try to make decisions based on numbers alone they run the risk of eroding their intuitions.”
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Aquela última frase “but if managers try to make decisions based on numbers alone they run the risk of eroding their intuitions“ está em linha com o artigo de Julho-Agosto da Harvard Business Review “Restoring Competitiveness” de Gary Pisano e Willy Shih.
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“Recognize the limits of financial tools.
Most companies are wedded to highly analytical methods for evaluating investment opportunities. Still, it remains enormously hard to assess long-term R&D programs with quantitative techniques—even sophisticated ones like real-options valuation and Monte Carlo simulations. Usually, the data, or even reasonable estimates, are simply not available. Nonetheless, all too often these tools become the ultimate arbiter of what gets funded and what does not. So short-term projects with more predictable outcomes beat out the long-term investments needed to replenish technical and operating capabilities. Managers would serve their companies more wisely by recognizing that informed judgment is a better guide to making such decisions than an analytical model loaded with arbitrary assumptions. There is no way to take the guesswork out of the process.”
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Pois bem, através do blogue de Don Sull onde se pode ler isto:
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“Rely exclusively on process to execute. Many managers equate execution with standardized processes. They re-engineer key procedures and employ process disciplines, including six sigma, or total quality management to ensure continuous improvement. These approaches work well for activities–such as processing transactions or manufacturing cars–that can be laid out in advance and repeated thousands or millions of times per year with minimal variation. Process tools work less well for activities that consume much of the typical knowledge workers time, including coordinatinating work across a matrix or generating innovative solutions to unique problems.”
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Descobri este artigo “TQM, ISO 9000, Six Sigma: Do Process Management Programs Discourage Innovation?” onde se pode ler:
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“Yet Wharton management professor Mary J. Benner says now may be the time to reassess the corporate utility of process management programs and apply them with more discrimination. In research done with Harvard Business School professor Michael Tushman, she has found that process management can drag organizations down and dampen innovation. "In the appropriate setting, process management activities can help companies improve efficiency, but the risk is that you misapply these programs, in particular in areas where people are supposed to be innovative," notes Benner. "Brand new technologies to produce products that don't exist are difficult to measure. This kind of innovation may be crowded out when you focus too much on processes you can measure."”
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Antes de continuar a leitura recomendo um postal que escrevi em Junho de 2007 “Não culpem a caneta quando a culpa é de quem escreve!“ de onde retiro o seguinte trecho:
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“Como procuro demonstrar aqui, num mercado muito competitivo, é muito difícil conciliar na mesma organização, duas posturas mentais distintas. Não se pode impunemente, à segunda, terça e quarta apostar na eficiência, para depois, à quinta, sexta e sábado apostar na "boutique" das pequenas séries, no "atelier" das novidades. O 6 Sigma é uma ferramenta talhada para apoiar os negócios na redução dos custos, eficiência, não é uma ferramenta dedicada à eficácia, à criação do UAUUUUU, associado à inovação, à diferenciação.”
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Neste postal Como descobri que não é suficiente optimizar os processos-chave. (3/3) refiro algo a que costumo chamar a atenção nas acções de formação, os processos que constituem uma organização podem ser divididos em duas categorias: os processos contexto e os processos nucleares.
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Aos processos contexto podemos e devemos aplicar os métodos de melhoria da eficiência.
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Aos processos nucleares, fundamentais para a execução e diferenciação estratégica, devemos preocupar-nos acima de tudo com a eficácia. As preocupações com a eficiência nestes processos corta as pernas ao potencial de explosão estratégica.
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"Benner & Tushman (2003) warn agains explicit focus on incremental innovation which is achieved by process management orientation which results in innovation that is closesly related to existing technological or market competencies. Organizations that must meet current customer requirements and new customer demands must deal simultaneously with the inconsistent demands of exploitation and exploration. Authors suggest that appropriate answer is an ambidextrous organization which allows for both exploratory and exploitative activities to be spurred by loose and tight organizational arrangements. Benner & Tushman (2003) suggest that within processes, the tasks, culture, individuals, and organizational arrangements are consistent, but across subunits tasks and cultures are inconsistent and loosely coupled. Tight exploitation units in technologically stable settings, will benefit by reducing variability and maximizing efficiency and control by introducing process management techniques. On the other hand, n turbulent environments, for new customer segments and for radical innovation, process management activities are less conducive to organizational effectiveness. Exploratory units will succeed by experimentation, which is encouraged by introducing variety and loose control."

Que resultados para a inovação (parte II)

Em tempos (Novembro de 2006) escrevi "Que resultados para a INOVAÇÃO?"

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Acerca do, então, projecto de norma prNP 4457 sobre a "Gestão da Investigação Desenvolvimento e Inovação - Requisitos do Sistema de Gestão da Investigação Desenvolvimento e Inovação, onde aproveitava para criticar a falta de concentração em objectivos, a demasiada importância dada ao PDCA em detrimento do CAPD.

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Pois bem, aconselho a leitura de "“TQM, ISO 9000, Six Sigma: Do Process Management Programs Discourage Innovation?”" onde se pode ler:

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"Benner and Tushman examined the photography and paint industries from 1980 to 1999, choosing these two industries for differences in their competitive arenas. "Photography was undergoing major change. It was a turbulent environment and there was a potential need for innovation," says Benner, referring to the move from chemical-based film to digital technology. "Paint was focused on cost reductions. It was trying to reduce solvents in paint as opposed to developing wacky new stuff."

The authors looked at the number of ISO 9000 quality program certifications obtained by the paint and photography firms, the numbers of patents issued to the firms and "the extent to which a firm's patenting efforts built on knowledge it had used in previous patents." In photography, increased ISO certifications were associated with "a significant decline in the number of patents that were based entirely on knowledge new to the firm." In paint, the effect was not as strong but echoed the photography industry's disappointing experience. The results suggest, the authors write, "that in both the paint and photography industries, as process management activities increase, exploitation increases at the expense of exploratory innovations." (a propósito de exploitation e exploration não esquecer James March).

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Espero amanhã voltar ao resto do artigo com a recordação de outro postal escrito em Junho de 2007 "Não culpem a caneta quando a culpa é de quem escreve!"

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Não culpem a caneta quando a culpa é de quem escreve! (parte II)

Há cerca de ano e meio escrevemos o postal Não culpem a caneta quando a culpa é de quem escreve! acerca do perigo de aplicar receitas válidas para uma proposta de valor destinadas a um certo tipo de clientes-alvo, a qualquer organização independentemente da sua proposta de valor.
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Não faz sentido querer aplicar o lean six sigma a um conjunto de processos relevantes para a liderança pela inovação, como o artigo da Business Week referido no postal faz suspeitar.
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Pois bem, a revista Harvard Business Review de Março de 2009 volta de certa forma ao tema com o artigo "When Should a Process Be Art, Not Science?" assinado por Joseph M. Hall e M. Eric Johnson.
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"The idea that some processes should be allowed to vary flies in the face of the century-old movement toward standardization. Process standardization is taught to MBAs, embedded in Six Sigma programs, and practiced by managers and consultants worldwide. Thousands of manufacturing companies have achieved tremendous improvements in quality and efficiency by copying the Toyota Production System, which combines rigorous work standardization with approaches such as just-in-time delivery of components and the use of visual controls to highlight deviations. Process standardization also has permeated nearly every service industry, generating impressive gains.
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With success, though, has come overuse. Process standardization has been pushed too far, with little regard for where it does and does not make sense. We aim to rescue artistic processes from the tide of scientific standardization by offering a three-step approach to identifying and successfully integrating them into any business.
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We argue that artistic and scientific approaches need not be at odds but must be carefully harmonized."
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Criar um vinho, ano após ano, passa por fazer sobressair o melhor de cada um desses anos.
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Receber e servir os hóspedes na recepção e um hotel, passa por criar experiências únicas para pessoas únicas.
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E como o mundo é pequeno:
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"Artists, of course, must learn the skills of their trade. They often have to undergo a formal apprenticeship or informal mentoring and a probationary period during which their freedom is curtailed. They might even have to pass a formal exam to be certified.
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But whether the artists are insurance claims adjusters, civil engineers, or software architects, their training entails more than just mastering new skills. It also involves developing an understanding of customer needs, the judgment required to act without perfect information, and the ability and willingness to learn from both good and bad outcomes.
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Companies can employ a variety of methods to instill their culture in new artists. One we’ve already mentioned: an apprenticeship with a master. Another is storytelling. Ritz-Carlton regularly shares stories of outstanding customer service to inspire its frontline employees."
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Por fim, o artigo termina com a caixa "Science as a Platform for Art"
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"The creation of many products and services involves both artistic and scientific processes. In such cases, the output of the scientific processes should provide a stable platform on which artists can then apply their craft."
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Pessoalmente, estou neste momento a trabalhar com uma empresa que quer fazer precisamente o contrário. Tem uma unidade de negócio que baseada na arte serve os visionários do lado de cá do 'chasm' e quer desenvolver outra unidade de negócio, em que os produtos da arte servem de plataforma para, após autópsia e reformulação, através da padronização dos processos e componentes, servir os pragmáticos do lado de lá do 'chasm'.

Não culpem a caneta quando a culpa é de quem escreve!

Este artigo da Business Week chama a atenção para o risco associado ao uso deslocado de uma ferramenta.

Como procuro demonstrar aqui, num mercado muito competitivo, é muito difícil conciliar na mesma organização, duas posturas mentais distintas. Não se pode impunemente, à segunda, terça e quarta apostar na eficiência, para depois, à quinta, sexta e sábado apostar na "boutique" das pequenas séries, no "atelier" das novidades. O 6 Sigma é uma ferramenta talhada para apoiar os negócios na redução dos custos, eficiência, não é uma ferramenta dedicada à eficácia, à criação do UAUUUUU, associado à inovação, à diferenciação.

"The tension that Buckley is trying to manage—between innovation and efficiency—is one that's bedeviling CEOs everywhere. There is no doubt that the application of lean and mean work processes at thousands of companies, ..., has been one of the most important business trends of past decades. But as once-bloated U.S. manufacturers have shaped up and become profitable global competitors, the onus shifts to growth and innovation, especially in today's idea-based, design-obsessed economy. While process excellence demands precision, consistency, and repetition, innovation calls for variation, failure, and serendipity."
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"There has been little formal research on whether the tension between Six Sigma and innovation is inevitable. But the most notable attempt yet, by Wharton School professor Mary Benner and Harvard Business School professor Michael L. Tushman, suggests that Six Sigma will lead to more incremental innovation at the expense of more blue-sky work. The two professors analyzed the types of patents granted to paint and photography companies over a 20-year period, before and after a quality improvement drive. Their work shows that, after the quality push, patents issued based primarily on prior work made up a dramatically larger share of the total, while those not based on prior work dwindled.

Defenders of Six Sigma at 3M claim that a more systematic new-product introduction process allows innovations to get to market faster. But Fry, the Post-it note inventor, disagrees. In fact, he places the blame for 3M's recent lack of innovative sizzle squarely on Six Sigma's application in 3M's research labs. Innovation, he says, is "a numbers game. You have to go through 5,000 to 6,000 raw ideas to find one successful business." Six Sigma would ask, why not eliminate all that waste and just come up with the right idea the first time? That way of thinking, says Fry, can have serious side effects. "