Nunca esquecer

Encontrei esta "Lei" formulada for Clayton Christensen:

“When the modularity and commoditization cause attractive profits to disappear at one stage in the value chain, the opportunity to earn attractive profits with proprietary products will emerge at an adjacent stage.”

Daí as previsões para a fase seguinte, no calçado e nos outros sectores. BTW, se lerem o artigo do Público de hoje sobre sobrequalificação dos trabalhadores, pensem nisto.

Quantas empresas (parte X)

Parte I, parte II, parte III, parte IV, parte V, parte VI, parte VII, parte VIII e parte IX.

Este é percurso a seguir por uma empresa virtual de calçado em busca do próximo modelo para funcionamento na Fase IV.

É preciso descobrir o(s) novo(s) mercado(s), seleccionar aqueles que parecem ser os primeiros clientes, validar essas hipóteses, para só então começar a fazer crescer o negócio.

É preciso aprender a perceber os problemas, as expectativas e necessidades dos hipotéticos novos clientes, é preciso desenvolver um modelo de abordagem comercial, um modelo de venda que possa ser replicado, é preciso criar e gerir a procura para, por fim, transitar um modo de descoberta e aprendizagem, um modo de tentativa e erro, para um modo de empresa, um modo de execução eficiente.

Descoberta do cliente

Descobrir quem são os clientes, qual o nicho a servir, qual o produto procurado e qual o problema que esses clientes procuram resolver. A tal startup, ainda que virtual, referida na Parte IX, não é uma réplica em escala reduzida de uma empresa. Uma start-up é uma experiência. Os empreendedores têm uma ideia que nunca foi testada no mercado. Essa ideia tem clientes? Quais? Onde estão? Essa ideia materializa-se em que tipo de produto ou serviço?

Qualquer start-up, numa fase inicial, está em modo "search", pesquisando sucessivas hipóteses de clientes e produto. Nesta fase o "fail often, fail well, fail fast" é fundamental: testar hipóteses sobre a combinação clientes-produto e descartar rapidamente as que não funcionam, o que no mundo das startups é conhecido como "pivoting". Nesta etapa, o empresário tornado empreendedor, não tem ninguém por quem copie sobre o que fazer para ter sucesso. Tem de criar o seu futuro, tem de testar alternativas de futuro. Saras Sarasvathy e a sua Teoria da Efectivação pode ser útil. Segundo a Teoria da Efectivação o empreendedor é como um piloto na cabine de um avião, o futuro é algo que se pode influenciar como base nas decisões que se tomam, ou seja, o empreendedor pode criar as suas próprias oportunidades:

Os quatro princípios da efetivação são:

• Um pássaro na mão: O empreendedor precisa criar soluções com os recursos que tem disponíveis aqui e agora.
• O princípio da limonada: Erros e surpresas são inevitáveis e podem ser usados para procurar novas oportunidades.
• A colcha criativa: Entrar em novas parcerias pode trazer ao projecto novos fundos e novas direcções.
• Perda comportável: O empreendedor deve investir apenas o quanto estiver disposto a perder.

Assim, o melhor que o empreendedor pode fazer é começar por si, pela sua empresa da Fase III.

Olhar para nichos de clientes com os quais tem uma relação especial, com os quais continua a ganhar bom dinheiro, e gerar perguntas, e gerar hipóteses: Que experiência foi adquirida ao longo do tempo?

É olhar para nichos de clientes actuais, e gerar hipóteses: por que é que este tipo de clientes me continua a comprar? Quais são as vantagens que a minha empresa actual tem? 

Qual é mesmo o negócio em que está metido ao trabalhar para esse tipo de clientes de nicho? É muito provável que a resposta certa não seja a primeira que lhe vem à cabeça. Um cliente de nicho não compra sapatos, compra uma paixão, compra a solução de um problema, compra o diálogo e a capacidade de comunicar, experimentar, compra a cumplicidade de alguém que o percebe. Os sapatos são como que contratados para fazer um trabalho na sua vida. Qual é mesmo esse trabalho?

O empreendedor deve perguntar: Quem conhecemos? Conhecemos alguns potenciais clientes de nichos? Conhecemos alguém que conheça potenciais clientes de nichos? Conhecemos alguém que conheça intervenientes no modelo de negócio dos clientes de nichos?

O empreendedor deve começar com o que tem, arriscar o que pode pagar, estar aberto a surpresas positivas e procurar relacionar-se com outros.

A ideia é seleccionar um nicho com potencial, desenvolver uma proposta de produto, uma amostras ou protótipos, e sair da empresa e ir para a rua, e ir para o mercado à procura da validação do cliente.

Continua.

Quantas empresas? (parte V)

Parte I, parte II, parte III e parte IV.

O desafio que as empresas de calçado estão a sentir de novo é o desafio da comoditização.

A globalização, fazendo da China a fábrica do mundo criou este modelo:

Preços baixos, mas uma janela de 150 ou mais dias desde o desenho até à montra:

"By relocating most production for North America and Europe to Southeast Asia and putting retailers on 150-day order windows, the shoe industry has created a marvel of low cost at the factory gate in combination with an extraordinary array of styles"

O que o calçado português aprendeu foi a tirar partido da proximidade entre produção e consumo e

 permitir reduzir o tempo do desenho à montra, o que permitiu mais flexibilidade e acelerar o bailado entre oferta e procura.

O que recentemente a Turquia, o Norte de África e a Roménia conseguiram foi criar novos centros de produção de confiança próximos do consumo e mais baratos.

Aqui, fui ao meu exemplar de "The Innovator's Solution" e mergulhei no capítulo "How to avoid commoditization" e reli:

"It turns out that there is hope. One of the most exciting insights from our research about commoditization is that whenever it is at work some-where in a value chain, a reciprocal process of de-commoditization is at work somewhere else in the value chain. And whereas commoditization destroys a company's ability to capture profits by undermining differentiability, decommoditization affords opportunities to create and capture potentially enormous wealth. The reciprocity of these processes means that the locus of the ability to differentiate shifts continuously in a value chain as new waves of disruption wash over an industry. As this happens, companies that position themselves at a spot in the value chain where performance is not yet good enough will capture the profit.
…Making highly differentiable products with strong cost advantages is a license to print money, and lots of it. We must emphasize that the reason many companies don't reach this nirvana or remain there for long is that it is the not-good-enough circumstance that enables managers to offer products with proprietary architectures that can be made with strong cost advantages versus competitors. When that circumstance changes—when the dominant, profitable companies overshoot what their mainstream customers can use—then this game can no longer be played, and the tables begin to turn. Customers will not pay still-higher prices for products they already deem too good. Before long, modularity rules, and commoditization sets in. When the relevant dimensions of your product's performance are determined not by you but by the subsystems that you procure from your suppliers, it becomes difficult to earn anything more than subsistence returns in a product category that used to make a lot of money. When your world becomes modular, you'll need to look elsewhere in the value chain to make any serious money.
…Note that it is overshooting—the more-than-good-enough circum-stance — that connects disruption and the phenomenon of commoditization. Disruption and commoditization can be seen as two sides of the same coin. A company that finds itself in a more-than-good-enough circumstance simply can't win: Either disruption will steal its markets, or commoditization will steal its profits. Most incumbents eventually end up the victim of both, because, although the pace of commoditization varies by industry, it is inevitable, and nimble new entrants rarely miss an opportunity to exploit a disruptive foothold. There can still be prosperity around the corner, however. The attractive profits of the future are often to be earned elsewhere in the value chain, in different stages or layers of added value. That's because the process of commoditization initiates a reciprocal process of de-commoditization. Ironically, this de-commoditization — with the attendant ability to earn lots of money — occurs in places in the value chain where attractive profits were hard to attain in the past:
…Firms that are being commoditized often ignore the reciprocal process of de-commoditization that occurs simultaneously with commoditization, either a layer down in subsystems or next door in adjacent processes. They miss the opportunity to move where the money will be in the future and get squeezed — or even killed — as different firms catch the growth made possible by de-commoditization. In fact, powerful but perverse investor pressure to increase returns on assets (ROA) creates strong incentives for assemblers to skate away from where the money will be. …Executives who seek to avoid commoditization often rely on the strength of their brands to sustain their profitability — but brands become commoditized and de-commoditized, too. Brands are most valuable when they are created at the stages of the value-added chain where things aren't yet good enough. When customers aren't yet certain whether a product's performance will be satisfactory, a well-crafted brand can step in and close some of the gap between what customers need and what they fear they might get if they buy the product from a supplier of unknown reputation. The role of a good brand in closing this gap is apparent in the price premium that branded products are able to command in some situations. For similar logic, however, the ability of brands to command premium prices tends to atrophy when the performance of a class of products from multiple suppliers is manifestly more than adequate. When overshooting occurs, the ability to command attractive profitability through a valuable brand often migrates to those points in the value-added chain where things have flipped into a not-yet-good-enough situation. These often will be the performance-defining subsystems within the product, or at the retail interface when it is the speed, simplicity, and convenience of getting exactly what you want that is not good enough. These shifts define the opportunities in branding."

Onde está a próxima etapa da cadeia com possibilidade de gerar diferenciação?
Será no desenho e diferenciação do que se faz?
Será no consumo e na forma como se chega a ele?

“this product is not for you”

"If a consumer doesn’t see his job in your product, it’s already game over. Even worse—if a consumer hires your product for reasons other than its intended Job to Be Done, you risk alienating that consumer forever. As we’ll discuss more later, it’s actually important to signal “this product is not for you” or they’ll come back and say it’s a crummy product."

Quem tem coragem de assumir isto? Quem sabe quais são as encomendas mais importantes?

Trecho retirado de "Competing Against Luck".

"É o que te chateia, é o que te cria desconforto no trabalho"

Na semana passada em conversa com empresário sobre as actividades de melhoria que patrocina na sua empresa, apontei esta frase sobre como define melhoria na sua comunicação com os operários:

"O que é melhoria? É o que te chateia, é o que te cria desconforto no trabalho"

Logo na altura sorri ao ouvir a frase porque a associei logo a isto:

"I think I have as many jobs of not wanting to do something as ones that I want positively to do. I call them “negative jobs.” In my experience, negative jobs are often the best innovation opportunities."

Trecho retirado de "Competing Against Luck"

"empresas pequenas cheias de ganas de experimentar" (parte II)

O texto da parte I fez-me recuar a "O que é isto senão Mongo?" e ao texto "In Technology, Small Fish (Almost Always) Eat Big Fish":

"When you start looking at the world through this lens — that when small meets large, small almost always wins — you see it everywhere, across all tech sectors. It's so prevalent, in fact, that I consider it an industry law, in this case, “Leslie’s Law.” More examples to follow, but first, let’s take a closer look at how this plays out..When a sleek, small player enters the market, it does so by creating a low-friction, high-fit product that is sold at a low price to a large market. These new products are sold to a portion of the market that cannot access the larger products due to the cost of entry (in dollars and complexity) and the cost of ownership. The larger company may not even notice that the new company has entered the market because there are no mano-a-mano customer confrontations..This leaves the smaller company free to expand upward into the market. Its leading-edge customers whose needs are expanding, and its own interest in expanding its market upward, spurs it on to increase the features and functionality of its products. From the perspective of the large incumbent companies, this upward migration is imperceptible. They aren't worried, so they don't pay attention to it. But it’s happening..Inevitably, by the time the threat becomes compelling, it’s too late. The small company has taken root, developing the advantages of a lower-cost structure with a simpler, lower-friction product. A new ecosystem has already sprung up around its core offerings. It’s here to stay, and its inroads into the incumbent’s territory can’t be stopped."

Enquanto a empresa da parte I "ataca" o mercado entrando por cima, aytavés da inovação, apelando ao gosto pelo risco dos underserved visionários de Geoffrey Moore, o texto desta parte II refere-se aos que entram por baixo, servindo os overserved, o exemplo clássico de disrupção de Christensen.

A sua empresa, consegue ser clara?

Na linha de "Sobre a paranóia da eficiência e do eficientismo" e de "Aumentar o "producer surplus", o caminho menos percorrido (parte IV)" este texto "Any Value Proposition Hinges on the Answer to One Question":

"the key issue is always: what is the center-of-gravity in our approach? Do we ultimately compete on the basis of our cost structure or another basis that increases our target customer’s willingness-to-pay? In other words, will we sell it for more or make it for less — and allocate sales resources accordingly?
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Sell it for more. Here, your product or service provides better performance on attributes that are important to target customers and for which they are willing to pay a premium.
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Make it for less. Here, your cost structure allows you to sell and make money at prices that competitors cannot. Realities in many industries typically allow only a few firms to compete successfully in this manner. Once they do, moreover, their scale advantages make it difficult for others to duplicate.
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You must be clear with your people about where your business falls along this spectrum.
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If you’re not clear about this, your sales efforts will run into problems. Externally, there will always be someone out there who can beat you on cost and price, or someone else who tailors its operations and sales efforts to the performance and buying criteria of a segment better than you can. Depending upon your value proposition, sales will face different buyers and selling tasks and require different support processes to deliver value.
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Strategy requires choice, clear communication, and coherent performance management practices, not just stirring metaphors, with the people who deal with customers. A moment of truth is the customer value proposition. Clarity about that will help your salespeople (and everyone else) focus more efficiently, qualify customers more effectively, and allow your firm to allocate resources more profitably."

Um dos grandes problemas passa por isto "Subtrair é tão difícil". É difícil deixar alguma possibilidade de fora, quer-se ir a todas.

"finance will eat strategy for breakfast any day"

"Finance is taught independently in most business schools. Strategy is taught independently, too—as if strategy could be conceived and implemented without finance. The reality is that finance will eat strategy for breakfast any day—financial logic will overwhelm strategic imperatives—unless we can develop approaches and models that allow each discipline to bring its best attributes to cooperative investment decision making. As long as we continue this siloed approach to the MBA curriculum and experience, our leading business schools run the risk of falling farther and farther behind the needs of sectors our graduates aspire to lead."

Trecho retirado de "The Capitalist’s Dilemma"

Acerca da falta de crédito

Assim que li este título "Falta de crédito é obstáculo à recuperação económica" fiz logo a ponte para "The Capitalist's Dilemma".
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Quanto daquela falta de crédito tem um paralelismo com a experiência americana?

"One phenomenon we’ve observed is that, despite historically low interest rates, corporations are sitting on massive amounts of cash and failing to invest in innovations that might foster growth. That got us thinking: What is causing that behavior? Are great opportunities in short supply, or are executives failing to recognize them? And how is this behavior pattern linked to overall economic sluggishness? What is holding growth back?"

 Como é que os projectos onde o crédito pode ser aplicado são avaliados?

"Our success metrics determine what we can and cannot invest in. We have allowed a minority to dictate those metrics to the majority. Over and over, the higher value placed on return on net assets, internal rate of return, and earnings per share over other metrics has led to innovations that squeeze costs and noncash assets. As a result, investing to create growth and jobs is a third-best option, behind efficiency innovations (first) and doing nothing (second)."

E no caso português, ainda é mais grave, dado que as PMEs não podem competir pela eficiência.

Proximidade (parte III)

A evolução descrita na parte II tem um lado muito positivo; a subida na escala de valor.
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A subida na escala de valor traduz-se na venda do produto a um preço unitário cada vez maior. Como o preço não pode ser imposto, a sua subida é a contrapartida para um aumento da percepção de valor potencial por parte dos clientes e consumidores.
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A mesma lógica por detrás deste discurso "CEO da McLaren explica porque é que só constrói carros desportivos".
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BTW, a lógica seguida pela Lamborghini parece ser a contrária, ao decidir avançar para a produção de um SUV. Ou seja, diluição da marca.

Recordar:

• "Aumentar o "producer surplus", o caminho menos percorrido (parte V)"
• "Aumentar o "producer surplus", o caminho menos percorrido (parte IV)"

Por amor de Deus, segmente!!!

Outro texto de Rags Srinivasan e outro ditado usado frequentemente neste blogue:

"Volume is Vanity, Profit is Sanity"

Uma lição que recordo de Hermann Simon em "Manage for Profit, not for Market Share".
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Quando pensamos em valor e não em quota de mercado, deixamos de pensar em algo que vale cada vez menos e se tem de vender em cada vez maior quantidade, para podermos pensar contra a corrente. Recordar Christensen em "Sobre a paranóia da eficiência e do eficientismo".

"How many gurus and bloggers write – the single most important task for a business is to gain market share?
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Making 10% gross margin on $640 motorcycle and making 40% gross margin on $20,000 premium motorcycle means businesses have to sell hundreds of millions of cheaper unit just to get the same profit selling premium units to 100,000 customers.Think about the cost of capital, distribution network, service network and all the other fixed costs needed to server hundred million customers.
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A business’ strategy is to decide which segment they want to serve and what customer job they want to position their product for. Because segmentation and positioning determines price and hence profit.
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The goal of business is not gain 100% market share but make profit in the most efficient and least capital intensive way. You do not have to serve every segment and every customer job."

Trecho retirado de "Those Who Know Segment and the Rest Chase Market Share"

Abraçar a mudança em vez de tentar incorporá-la

Mais um artigo interessante de Clayton Christensen, "Online education as an agent of transformation".

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Começo por sublinhar a história do barco a vapor, já lá vão cerca de 200 anos mas as forças são as mesmas que continuam a actuar hoje:

"WHEN the first commercially successful steamship traveled the Hudson River in 1807, it didn’t appear to be much of a competitive threat to transoceanic sailing ships. It was more expensive, less reliable and couldn’t travel very far. Sailors (Moi ici: Os incumbentes instalados) dismissed the idea that steam technology could ever measure up — the vast reach of the Atlantic Ocean surely demanded sails. And so steam power gained its foothold as a “disruptive innovation” in inland waterways, where the ability to move against the wind, or when there was no wind at all, was important. (Moi ici: Podemos alterar o texto a negro para o ajustar a muitos outros exemplos e manter os sublinhados a vermelho)
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In 1819, the technology vastly improved, the S.S. Savannah made the first Atlantic crossing powered by steam and sail (in truth, only 80 of the 633-hour voyage was by steam). Sailing ship companies didn’t completely ignore the advancement. They built hybrid ships, adding steam engines to their sailing vessels, but never entered the pure steamship market. Ultimately, they paid the price for this decision. By the early 1900s, with steam able to power a ship across the ocean on its own, and do so faster than the wind, customers migrated to steamships. Every single transoceanic sailing-ship company went out of business.
Traditional colleges are currently on their hybrid voyage across the ocean.
Like steam, online education is a disruptive innovation — one that introduces more convenient and affordable products or services that over time transform sectors. Yet many bricks-and-mortar colleges are making the same mistake as the once-dominant tall ships: they offer online courses but are not changing the existing model.
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The lessons from any number of industries teach us that those that truly innovate — fundamentally transforming the model, instead of just incorporating the technology into established methods of operation ­ — will have the final say."

Talvez a melhor forma de actuar não seja tentar incorporar a mudança na empresa incumbente... talvez seja mais fácil criar uma empresa paralela, dar-lhe o capital de semente e atirá-la aos lobos para que se desenrodilhe e aprenda a criar um novo modelo de negócio adequado à nova realidade que aí virá. Se o não fizer e se houver suficiente liberdade económica, a sua empresa de hoje acabará como esta "Blockbuster fechará lojas e centros de distribuição nos EUA em janeiro".
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BTW, Christensen escreve sobre esse mundo conservador que são as universidades... pois, estão a ver o filme.

A mensagem há-de passar,

A mensagem há-de passar, embora não à velocidade desejada...

"Investing in efficiency innovations can lead to a cycle of increased profits and re-investing in more efficiency. But that cycle vastly decreases investment in the kinds of research-and-development toward longer-term, potentially disruptive innovations--therefore decreasing overall economic growth and job creation. Here, Christensen says, is where America faces a capitalist dilemma. "Because of the way we measure things, it doesn't make sense to do what makes sense," he said.
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"My sense is over the last 20 years the American economy has generated about one-third the number of empowering innovations as was historically the case," he said. What's the potential toll of all this lost innovation on the future of the country? Christensen hypothesized: "If you want to know what the future of America looks like, just look at Japan. You can feel the same thing happen in the United States, and I worry a lot about that.""

Recordar "Sobre a paranóia da eficiência e do eficientismo"

Trecho retirado de "Clay Christensen: The Wrong Kind of Innovation BY Christine Lagorio-Chafkin"

Aumentar o "producer surplus", o caminho menos percorrido (parte V)

A propósito deste texto "Do Things That Don't Scale" lembrei-me logo de Christensen e de Don Peppers.
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Quem pensa em ter sucesso "doing things that scale" pensa em crescimento do volume, pensa em ganhar escala, pensar em drequência de produção, pensa em eficiência.
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Daí Christensen, como sublinhei em "Sobre a paranóia da eficiência e do eficientismo". E, sobretudo, daí Don Peppers em "Aumentar o "producer surplus", o caminho menos percorrido (parte IV)":

"Quando se compete pelo preço e se elege a redução de custos como o vector fundamental para o negócio, procura-se quantidade, volume, market share para maximizar o retorno do agregado daquele SKU. Quando se sobe na escala de valor e se trabalha do cliente para trás, para a oferta, para o produto, aposta-se no aumento do valor percepcionado pelo cliente, por cada cliente. Assim, aposta-se na maximização do valor criado com cada unidade de SKU e não pelo seu agregado. O negócio não é quantidade, não é market share!"

Ou, melhor ainda, e ainda com Don Peppers num texto que descobri muito recentemente e sublinhei em "Isto é tão bom" (Não consigo destacar nada em particular, é tudo tão bom!!!)
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Em vez de escalar, concentrar a atenção em cada cliente, como se não houvesse mais nenhum no mundo. O texto é sobre as startups mas startups são o ADN primordial de futuras empresas:

"The question to ask about an early stage startup is not "is this company taking over the world?" but "how big could this company get if the founders did the right things?" And the right things often seem both laborious and inconsequential at the time.
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And I know Brian Chesky and Joe Gebbia didn't feel like they were en route to the big time as they were taking "professional" photos of their first hosts' apartments. They were just trying to survive. But in retrospect that too was the optimal path to dominating a big market.
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Another reason founders don't focus enough on individual customers is that they worry it won't scale. But when founders of larval startups worry about this, I point out that in their current state they have nothing to lose. Maybe if they go out of their way to make existing users super happy, they'll one day have too many to do so much for. That would be a great problem to have. See if you can make it happen. And incidentally, when it does, you'll find that delighting customers scales better than you expected. Partly because you can usually find ways to make anything scale more than you would have predicted, and partly because delighting customers will by then have permeated your culture.
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What founders have a hard time grasping (and Steve himself might have had a hard time grasping) is what insanely great morphs into as you roll the time slider back to the first couple months of a startup's life. It's not the product that should be insanely great, but the experience of being your user. The product is just one component of that. For a big company it's necessarily the dominant one. But you can and should give users an insanely great experience with an early, incomplete, buggy product, if you make up the difference with attentiveness.
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Sometimes the right unscalable trick is to focus on a deliberately narrow market. It's like keeping a fire contained at first to get it really hot before adding more logs.
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Like paying excessive attention to early customers, fabricating things yourself turns out to be valuable for hardware startups. You can tweak the design faster when you're the factory, and you learn things you'd never have known otherwise. Eric Migicovsky of Pebble said one of things he learned was "how valuable it was to source good screws." Who knew?
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The need to do something unscalably laborious to get started is so nearly universal that it might be a good idea to stop thinking of startup ideas as scalars. Instead we should try thinking of them as pairs of what you're going to build, plus the unscalable thing(s) you're going to do initially to get the company going."

Parte I, parte II e parte III e parte IV. 

O espírito de Mongo

Ontem, começámos o dia com o desafio da Bimbo. Hoje, via André Cruz, começamos com o espírito quase oposto, o espírito de Mongo.
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Bem vindos ao Estranhistão!!!

"A Tété, empresa agro-alimentar que actua no sector da produção e comercialização de produtos lácteos, acaba de lançar manteiga de vaca, cabra e ovelha.
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Recorrendo a processos artesanais, a empresa apresenta uma manteiga que incorpora sabores e qualidades de um produto tradicional, em que notas de flor de sal se conjugam com o sabor cremoso da manteiga.
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A empresa está actualmente a atravessar uma fase de crescimento. Fechou o primeiro trimestre com um aumento de vendas na ordem dos 10%."

Trabalhar para quem está fora da caixa, fugir do redemoinho anorexizador da competição pelo preço e pela quantidade, fugir dos oceanos tingidos de vermelho e, como David, seguir o caminho menos percorrido, o caminho da imperfeição dos mercados.
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É voltar aquele texto de Christensen em Novembro passado sobre o tipo de inovação e a criação de emprego.
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Trechos retirados de "Manteigas tradicionais dão trabalho a 100 pessoas".

Sem papas na língua

Gosto de gente assim, gente sem papas na língua, gente capaz de dizer o contrário do que diz a corrente dominante.
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Lembro-me de ler "The Innovator’s Dilemma" sem saber da fama que o livro tinha e achar que o livro era muito, muito bom.
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Primeiro acerca do 'big data':

"In your lecture you suggested that firms are too beholden to data. How does that view fit with the age of big data?
It is truly scary to me. By definition, big data cannot yield complicated descriptions of causality. Especially in healthcare. Almost all of our diseases occur in the intersections of systems in the body. For example, there is a drug that is marketed by Elan BioNeurology called TYSABRI. It was developed for MS [multiple sclerosis]. It turns out that of the people who have MS a proportion respond magnificently to TYSABRI. And others don't. So what do you conclude from this? Is it just a mediocre drug? No. It is that there is one disease but it manifests itself in different ways. How does big data figure out what is the core of what is going on?" (Moi ici: Recordar "Curiosidade do dia"; "Big Data" e "A libertação")

Depois, acerca das universidades:

"So I'd be very surprised if in ten years we don't see hundreds of universities in bankruptcy
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Is this something you lament?It makes me sad because these institutions have a lot of meaning for a lot of people. But on the other side, we should celebrate. People will be so much better served. Because learning becomes a process that means they can learn for their lifetime and get skills for new jobs and it will be customised to their needs. It is hard to argue when you think about the customer."

Depois, acerca da investigação nas universidades:
"We are awash in content that needs to be taught, yet the vast majority of colleges give a large portion of their faculties’ salaries to fund research.
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The problem is the research that most of them generate isn't useful to anyone except other academics. In business there are five ‘A’ journals in which you have to publish to get promoted to tenure. In one of those five the average article is read by 12 people. If only one in every five research universities stopped doing research, society wouldn't be impaired in the least.
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Given your research on innovation, I am surprised to hear you say that. Surely innovation can come from unlikely places, including esoteric research?
I don't think you are right. Almost always great new ideas don't emerge from within a single person or function, but at the intersection of functions or people that have never met before. And most universities are organised so you don't have those intersections. They are siloed. Universities think people come up with great ideas by closing the door. The academic tenure process, where you have to publish to journals which are very narrow, stands in the way of great research."
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Trechos retirados de "Clayton Christensen: Still disruptive"

Faz todo o sentido este pensamento

Ainda no Domingo ironizei, nesta "Curiosidade do dia", que os quase 23% de jovens norte-americanos com menos de 25 anos que estão desempregados são vítimas da moeda forte do seu país, o euro.
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Como os Estados Unidos não têm o euro como moeda e, apesar disso, também exibem elevados níveis de desemprego jovem, independentemente dos dólares atrás de dólares que continuam a ser atirados para estimular a sua economia, talvez a origem do fenómeno não seja a moeda mas algo comum a ambos os blocos económicos.
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Em Novembro passado escrevi aqui "Sobre a paranóia da eficiência e do eficientismo" com base num artigo de Clayton Christensen publicado num jornal.
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Hoje, descubro uma interessante reflexão provocada pelo mesmo artigo e que relaciona aquilo que o mainstream valoriza, na monitorização do desempenho, com os níveis de desemprego. Para mim, faz todo o sentido esta via de pensamento "The Present Jobless Innovation Era We Face" (muito bom mesmo!!!).
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Um exemplo, entre tantos outros aqui, "As employers push efficiency, the daily grind wears down workers":

"“If you're a highly skilled employee with highly marketable talents, they're going to pay dearly for you. But if you're a relatively fungible person, with nothing that separates you from anybody else, the risks and costs have been shifted to you at a dramatic rate,” said Rita Gunther McGrath, a management professor at Columbia University's business school."

E a pressão começa sobre as empresas: se elas produzem algo de distintivo com vantagem, OK, podem jogar no campeonato da eficácia; caso contrário, estão no campeonato da eficiência e são pressionadas e pressionadas e pressionadas... e têm de aliviar a pressão passando-a para alguém, ou automatizam ou ...
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Só a aposta na subida na escala de valor, no numerador da equação da produtividade, permite aspirar a um mundo com empregos.

Disrupção

Muito sumo!

19:33 - Quando um negócio morre, abre-se uma janela de oportunidade para negócios adjacentes (Newsweek e Fortune de um lado e Forbes do outro)
20:34 - Jobs-to-be-done (causalidade versus correlação)
51:10 - Quando se tenta ser tudo para todos... não se consegue a focalização suficiente para ser capaz de fazer a diferença
51:42 - Um exemplo - Estamos mergulhados em pilhas de informação, será que alguém me pode ajudar a perceber o que é realmente verdade? (Moi ici: Todos nós encontramos tantos exemplos nos media em que as notícias são "fabricadas", não são convenientemente investigadas, os jornalistas são enganados)
58:45 - Se alguém consegue ver como o seu negócio pode sofrer uma disrupção, é muito provável que outros no exterior também o consigam ver.
59:16 - Qualquer negócio novo dedicado a provocar a disrupção do negócio da empresa incumbente deve ser autónomo... (Moi ici: Quantos jornais o fizeram?) (You cannot change the task that people are doing every day for a different priority while the existing priority is still effective ... and the way you define goodness changes)

Por isso, ocorrem as falências e as re-estruturações (parte II)

Parte I.
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Sem o choque com a realidade poucos são os que pensam na necessidade de mudar. Em "Why we often can’t self-disrupt" podemos consultar uma longa lista de motivos que nos podem impedir de perceber a necessidade de mudar

Universidades e a disrupção

A disrupção não começa por baixo, começa sempre pelos clientes "overserved".



Excelente reflexão a combinar com a leitura de "CLAY CHRISTENSEN: GE And Perdue Farms Will Disrupt Harvard Business School"
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"Institutions of higher learning must move, as the historian Walter Russell Mead puts it, from a model of “time served” to a model of “stuff learned.” Because increasingly the world does not care what you know. Everything is on Google. The world only cares, and will only pay for, what you can do with what you know. And therefore it will not pay for a C+ in chemistry, just because your state college considers that a passing grade and was willing to give you a diploma that says so. We’re moving to a more competency-based world where there will be less interest in how you acquired the competency — in an online course, at a four-year-college or in a company-administered class — and more demand to prove that you mastered the competency.
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We demand that plumbers and kindergarten teachers be certified to do what they do, but there is no requirement that college professors know how to teach. (Moi ici: Eheheh Recordo logo uma minoria de professores que tive na Universidade e que não tinham jeitinho nenhum para aquilo) No more. The world of MOOCs is creating a competition that will force every professor to improve his or her pedagogy or face an online competitor.
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Bottom line: There is still huge value in the residential college experience and the teacher-student and student-student interactions it facilitates. But to thrive, universities will have to nurture even more of those unique experiences while blending in technology to improve education outcomes in measurable ways at lower costs. We still need more research on what works, but standing still is not an option."

Trechos retirados de "The Professor's Big Stage"