Acerca do crescimento canceroso

Ao arrepio do mainstream, na linha de "Teoria versus estatística (realidade)":

"It's conventional wisdom in business that bigger is better, and that being able to scale is an essential element of a company's success. ...

For some time, scale and scaling - meaning that a business grows to ever-greater size — have been the holy grail of the startup and corporate world. Implicitly many believe that if something doesn't scale, then it's a failure. Bigger means better, and not-bigger means failure.

...

Can we say why getting bigger does not always equal success? Others have done so, including famed economist E.F. Schumacher in his book, Small Is Beautiful. There is a flaw at the heart of the concept of scaling, though it can be hard to articulate in the face of "bigger is better." Looking back to the roots of "scale" can help us pinpoint what conventional wisdom might be missing."

Alternativas à escala tradicional:

• Scaling a Model, Not a Company
• Scalling Impact, Rather than a Company
• Scaling Humanity, Instead of Scaling Companies

"If we could broaden the lens of what we consider success and scale, we might be able to create more space for a healthier, happier economy. [Moi ici: Recordar o recente "Fugir da "rat race""] Sometimes we think that because something happens on its own — Adam Smith's famous invisible hand — that makes it good. But cancer gets bigger on its own. [Moi ici: Interessante como uso a mesma linguagem aqui no blogue - crescimento canceroso] There are places where scale makes sense, but places where it does not. Perhaps one day we could celebrate a company like Huit Denim changing the conversation or an organization like Blue Hill at Stone Barns scaling a model that creates healthier farms and more delicious food as an equal, maybe even bigger, success than a tech company."

Trechos retirados de "It's time to reimagine scale"

"shifts toward particular logics can be reversed" (parte IV)

Parte I, parte II e parte III.

"The beer item collectors association BAV also published a bimonthly magazine that frequently reported on historic Dutch breweries. A number of writers also began addressing the history of Dutch beer brewing. As a result, there was growing awareness of the history of Dutch brewing, and a growing amount was recollected and curated, increasing the availability and accessibility of the remnants of the craft logic.
Thus during the first stage of logic reemergence, institutional change took off once ties between the previously dormant and dispersed custodians of the decomposed logic were regenerated. This involved restorative activities as dormant actors were reawakened, ties between them were reestablished, and the remnants of the decomposed logic were again made available and accessible. It also involved transformative activities as the dormant custodians of craft became organized in new ways, new recruits became absorbed in these networks, and foreign entities also came to be regarded as representations of a craft-brewing logic that had decomposed in the Netherlands.
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PINT’s membership grew from 30 in 1981 to over 1,000 by 1994, and its bimonthly magazine attracted an increasingly wide readership in the Dutch beer-brewing field. But since PINT became organized around multiple local chapters that kept close ties with local pubs, hobby brewing associations, and eventually nascent craft breweries, which were not necessarily members of the association, the texts it produced were indicative of a developing national discourse and captured the regenerated vocabulary of practice surrounding craft brewing that began to emerge from reestablished networks. PINT not only provided a platform for alternative voices in the beer industry but also deliberately disseminated texts about what was ‘‘wrong’’ with the beer industry and what remedies were needed according to emerging ideas that were constitutive of this discourse.
A recurring component of these texts was the use of frames in which prototypical examples of modern brewing, industrial brewing corporations such as Heineken, were depicted as a foil to provide a favorable contrast for craft brewers."

Impressionante como uma revolução pode ser gerada por um movimento de base, que vai agrupando de forma ad-hoc indivíduos e grupos gerando um todo coerente.

Continua.

Trechos retirados de "What Is Dead May Never Die: Institutional Regeneration through Logic Reemergence in Dutch Beer Brewing", Administrative Science Quarterly 1–44 (2018) de Jochem J. Kroezen e Pursey P. M. A. R. Heugens.

"shifts toward particular logics can be reversed" (parte III)

Parte I e parte II.

O interessante é como este renascimento

começou a partir de um movimento de base, sem grandes recursos, sem patrocínios, sem intervenções governamentais.

"A key development was the emergence of five independent beer pubs that were not contractually tied to any industrial brewer and that began to import modest amounts of traditional foreign craft beer, predominantly Belgian ale, as an alternative to Dutch industrial lager. These locales, where individuals with ‘‘strange tastes’’ could meet (to quote a representative of one of these pubs), were Cafe ́ De Beyerd in Breda, Gollem in Amsterdam, Jan Primus in Utrecht, ‘t Pumpke in Nijmegen, and Locus Publicus in Rotterdam and Delft. The idea to import foreign beers emerged when the founders of these pubs came in contact with traditional beer styles that were still being brewed in Belgium, Germany, and the United Kingdom.
...The owners of pioneering beer pubs started with very modest means and ambitions and were surprised by the impact of their actions. Their initial success was followed by an emerging network of importers that began to specialize in foreign traditional craft beer.
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The attention given to traditional alternatives reawakened actors with marginalized or dissolved roles, who were dissatisfied with the state of the Dutch beer-brewing industry. The exposure to foreign traditional craft beer led to these actors’ growing perception that something had been lost in the Netherlands with the shift toward industrial brewing. The pioneering beer pubs gave these actors a chance to meet and (re)connect. One of these, Gollem in Amsterdam, began to organize an annual beer festival in 1978 for alternative Dutch beer. Initially, this was a very small-scale affair, but the festival grew from 65 to over 300 visitors within two years and would eventually attract more than 10,000 visitors...The pubs and their festivals thus provided an important space for marginalized actors, like enthusiast consumers, brewmasters, and pub owners, to connect and discuss the state of Dutch beer brewing. Importantly, these groups contained both individuals with access to institutional remnants and individuals who were entirely new to beer brewing.
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A group of Dutch beer enthusiasts who frequented the pioneering pubs also regularly traveled to London to visit pubs there. They noticed that the diversity of beers and brewing practices was higher in the UK and that there was a consumer association—the Campaign for Real Ale or CAMRA—promoting the revitalization of traditional craft brewing. This group would go on to establish the Dutch beer consumer association PINT.
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The establishment of PINT initiated the emergence of an ecosystem of new collective organizations that all contributed to a nostalgia-infused movement for change in the industry.
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In 1983, Nico van Dijk co-established a foundation for beer item collectors (BAV), which fueled greater awareness of traditional Dutch craft brewing. In 1984, the first modern brewers’ guilds—De Roerstok and Twents Bierbrouwersgilde—were established to encourage hobby brewing, inspiring a new generation of brewery entrepreneurs. The Bier Keurmeesters Gilde (BKG) that trains judges for the independent examination of the quality of amateur beers during competitions and tastings was established in 1986. And in 1987, an association for specialty beer pubs (ABT) was established, which acted as a catalyst for the distribution of craft beer. Collectively, these initiatives amplified the initial effect of the pioneering pubs. They revitalized marginalized actor groups by reawakening traditional members, providing them with spaces to reconnect and reflect, and attracting new recruits."

Continua.

Trechos retirados de "What Is Dead May Never Die: Institutional Regeneration through Logic Reemergence in Dutch Beer Brewing", Administrative Science Quarterly 1–44 (2018) de Jochem J. Kroezen e Pursey P. M. A. R. Heugens.

"shifts toward particular logics can be reversed" (parte II)

Parte I.

Voltemos à tabela 1:

O que vemos ali dentro da área sublinhada é um retrato fiel do paradigma económico do século XX.

Não admira a evolução do número de sobreviventes:

No modelo económico do século XX, o modelo gerado pela Revolução Industrial e que atingiu o seu apogeu no século XX, só existe um pico na paisagem competitiva. No final só pode existir um vencedor.

Mas em Mongo, o modelo económico deixa de ser único e abrem-se muitos outros picos:

Cada pico representa uma hipótese de procurar o sucesso. E ter sucesso num pico pouco tem a ver com ter sucesso num outro pico. Daí a minha exortação, concentrem-se nos clientes-alvo e não na concorrência.

Recomendo uma comparação das duas colunas, na figura acima, entre "Traditional Craft Brewing" e "Modern Industrial Brewing" - dois modelos tão diferentes!!!

O que é que aconteceu para que o renascimento típico de Mongo ocorresse a partir dos anos 70 do século passado?

"The dominance of the large industrial brewers led to substantial diminishment and, ultimately, dissolution of the roles of field actors who used to carry traditional craft brewing. But this decomposed logic left behind institutional remnants that continued to be at least partially conserved [Moi ici: Isto faz-me lembrar uma empresa de calçado que conheço que tem uma fatia muito grande de trabalhadores reformados. Gente com mais de 65 anos e que continua a trabalhar. A quantidade de gente que domina a arte de cortar pele à mão é impressionante. Sobretudo nestes tempos de balancés e máquinas de corte.]
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While these remnants appear to be important resources for institutional change, regenerating them was rife with challenges due to their significant degree of decomposition. First, although there were individuals who could act as custodians of these institutional remnants, they were dispersed and had either become disembedded from the field or had completely switched to modern industrial brewing. Until 1980, there had been no collective efforts in the field to maintain or conserve elements of the craft-brewing logic. Craft-brewing remnants were therefore scattered around the field. Second, the remaining remnants provided only an incomplete set of representations of the traditional logic, which was insufficiently actionable.
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Traditional craft brewing had come to be associated with inferior quality as compared with modern industrial brewing, in part because of the political efforts of the modern industrial brewers. Compliance with increased ‘‘quality’’ regulations imposed in 1926, which had resulted in part from industrial brewers’ lobbying efforts, required substantial investments in ingredients and equipment, which many traditional breweries were unable to make [Moi ici: Tão típico! ASAEs et al são criações dos gigantes para afastar concorrência. Recuo a 2010 onde escrevi "Quanto mais maduro estiver um sector para consolidação, maior a torrente de legislação e regulamentação sobre ele. Antes de começar a comprar concorrentes, há que expulsar os mais fracos do mercado, ou criar-lhes dificuldades extra para que sintam uma oferta de aquisição como um alívio bem-vindo."]. These policies, which had institutionalized crisp industrial lager as the dominant and qualitatively superior product, combined with the natural stigma associated with failure initially disqualified remnants left behind by the traditional carriers of craft brewing as legitimate building blocks for later change efforts.
In spite of these challenges, however, the craft-brewing logic reemerged in the Netherlands through the establishment of 489 new breweries between 1980 and 2016. These new organizations collectively regenerated the institutional remnants of craft. This led to fundamental institutional change, as these organizations contributed to the restoration of the institutional orders of the community, family, professions, and religion in the field.
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The process of regenerative institutional change in Dutch beer brewing began during the early 1970s, when networks of actors with marginalized roles—such as brewmasters and members of traditional brewing families, who were the dormant custodians of craft brewing—were restored and transformed. These groups were reawakened when they were exposed to the surviving elements of traditional craft brewing in surrounding countries and began to mix with other marginal actors who were attracted to a budding hobby-brewing scene. Out of these interactions developed a growing sense that something of value had been left behind with the shift to modern industrial brewing. This fueled an interest in Dutch beer-brewing history and the mobilization of resources to promote nostalgia-infused change, ultimately leading to the rediscovery of what was left of the decomposed craft-brewing logic."

Continua.

Trechos retirados de "What Is Dead May Never Die: Institutional Regeneration through Logic Reemergence in Dutch Beer Brewing", Administrative Science Quarterly 1–44 (2018) de Jochem J. Kroezen e Pursey P. M. A. R. Heugens.

"shifts toward particular logics can be reversed" (parte I)

"Many organizational fields in which modernity has seemingly taken hold may experience a revival of traditional arrangements. Revival dynamics are visible in organizational fields as diverse as cattle farming, retail banking, radio broadcasting, and whisky distilling. Such cases pose a puzzle for institutional change theoreticians, who, ... have long depicted change as a process of modern institutional arrangements destroying and replacing traditional ones. Institutional change can thus paradoxically also occur through the reemergence of traditional arrangements that challenge modern ones.
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Regenerative institutional change thus refers to shifts that occur due to the reemergence of logics that had previously experienced decline and decomposition due to modernization. The development of the grass-fed livestock market in the U.S. as a result of the revival of traditional farming practices suggests a reemergence of particular logics that had previously dwindled in importance due to a shift toward industrial agriculture. The microradio movement in the U.S. spurred the reemergence of communal, religious, and educational radio stations by way of restoring low-power radio technology that had previously been abandoned as a result of increasing corporate concentration and federal regulation. And the reemergence of community banks in areas in the U.S. that were previously subject to acquisition activity by large national banks also suggests that shifts toward particular logics can be reversed.
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craft revival followed an extensive period of total domination by industrial brewing. 

...
Modern industrial brewing. The Industrial Revolution, the invention of the corporation, and substantial improvements in the transportability of perishable goods ultimately enabled both the proliferation of modern industrial breweries and the emergence of a very different institutional logic around the turn of the twentieth century. [Moi ici: O Normalistão] Although there were many other examples, Heineken is the epitome of industrial brewing. It was established in 1864, when the son of a trader in cheese and butter acquired a struggling traditional brewery that had recently become a limited liability company. Heineken quickly developed into one of the largest breweries globally by focusing on mass production of industrial lager. The economic rationalization of beer brewing by Heineken and others led to a dramatic homogenization of products, such that by 1980 all of the beer produced in the Netherlands could be classified as industrial lager and traditional breweries had failed en masse. As an ideal type, modern industrial brewing involved a concern with profit, market power, and economies of scale; an automated and standardized brewing process; and a highly rational approach to the organization of production and sales, in which brewmasters became operations managers who were hierarchically subjected to financial and sales managers. Table 1 contrasts the ideal-typical logics of traditional craft and modern industrial brewing."

Trechos retirados de "What Is Dead May Never Die: Institutional Regeneration through Logic Reemergence in Dutch Beer Brewing", Administrative Science Quarterly 1–44 (2018) de Jochem J. Kroezen e Pursey P. M. A. R. Heugens.

Um lema para Mongo

Ainda na sequência deste postal.

"De Oliveira also believes that the Italian stranglehold on global style is waning, and that its one-trick-pony approach to interior design and retail won’t take it much further. Diversity, choice, quality but economies of scale and production are De Oliveira’s watchwords."

If our fixed costs reside in the downstream...

Em "Tilt - Shifting Your Strategy From Products to Customers" de Niraj Dawar, o autor começa por contar o impacte do barbeiro Richard Arkwright, um nome da lista que memorizei no 8º ano de escolaridade sobre os homens que começaram a Revolução Industrial em Inglaterra, ao criar o conceito de produção em escala, apostando nos volumes crescentes e nos custos unitários cada vez mais baixos:

"The money was used to set up wholesale and retail distribution routes to market and to persuade consumers to buy, [Moi ici: Cá está aquele pormenor, o mercado de massas não criou a produção em larga escala de grandes séries ou lotes. Foi o contrário, foi a produção em massa, com os seus produtos a baixo custo que levou os consumidores a fazerem o sacrifício de entrarem na massa] The marketing budget had made its first appearance. Money could be invested in building markets, not just factories. Still, for at least another century or so, the capital employed in building the factories would continue to dwarf the marketing budget, and for another 250 years, the strategic imperatives of the large-scale factory would continue to drive business decisions.
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Mass production rapidly ran riot through just about every industry. Entrepreneurs, businesspeople, and capitalists who seized this source of competitive advantage would quickly and decisively outperform firms with more traditional forms of competitive advantage. Those who missed it or were too slow to recognize it were either driven out of business or gobbled up by the fast-growing scale-seeking enterprises. Scale became the defining feature of success and the cornerstone of strategy. Scale-driven consolidation continues in many industries today. That is Arkwright's legacy. The primary strategic question that drives Arkwrightian business is, "How much more of this stuff can we sell?" [Moi ici: Isto é tão tríade...] The amortization of the fixed costs of manufacturing, the quest for new markets, and decisions related to competitive strategy all flowed from that one question."

Entretanto já no século XXI:

"if the main ongoing fixed costs are advertising, promotion, listing fees, market research, and customer relationship management, and our manufacturing costs are variable, the critical resource that needs to be optimized is no longer the factory; [Moi ici: Consigo ouvir uma série de pessoas a cair da cadeira] it is the customers.
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But customers are very different from factories as a locus for fixed costs. Factories are monolithic: a single entity that is good at producing one thing. Customers, on the other hand, are a collection of individuals, an aggregation of many different needs, preferences, and tastes. If our fixed costs reside in the downstream, then the question that should govern our strategy is no longer "How much of this stuff can we sell?" but rather "What else do our customers need? Our success depends not so much on economies of scale as on economies of scope.""

No entanto:

"Like a phantom limb or a deceased patriarch, the long-dismantled, shuttered, and offshored factories continue to haunt strategic discourse long after they are gone. Companies continue to be obsessed with volume (and volume measures such as market share), with the development and protection of new products (rather than markets and customers), and with the utilization of production capacity rather than the customer base. Managers continuously and misguidedly try to gain competitive advantage in the upstream playing fields that were leveled years ago."

A erosão do poder da escala ou, o susto para alguns

Mais um texto que vem ao encontro da narrativa deste blogue, "Bigger is Not Necessarily Better in Our Information-Rich Digital Economy":

"The mass production of standardized products is a defining hallmark of the 20th century industrial economy, bringing high productivity and low costs to a wide variety of products, - from household appliances to cars.
...
“Chains took advantage of that data deficit.
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Not surprisingly, things are now changing in our information-rich digital economy.  “Information technology is eroding the power of large-scale mass production.  We’re instead moving toward a world of massive numbers of small producers offering unique stuff - and of consumers who reject mass-produced stuff.  The Internet, software, 3D printing, social networks, cloud computing and other technologies are making this economically feasible - in fact, desirable.”
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“A series of breakthrough technologies and new business models are destroying the old rule that bigger is better,” he wrote.  “By exploiting the vast (but cheap) audience afforded by the Internet, and taking advantage of a host of modular services, small becomes the new big.  The global business environment is decomposing into smaller yet more profitable markets, so businesses can no longer rely on scaling up to compete, but must instead embrace a new economies of unscale.”
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While a few leading edge companies are able to keep up, the vast majority of traditional firms are lagging behind.  They are not able to embrace these disruptive technologies and innovations at anywhere the same speeds.  These companies are working harder than ever, trying to achieve greater efficiencies and predictability.  They keep trying to fit new technologies and practices into outdated business models.  They are holding on to strategies that worked well in the relatively stable business environments of the industrial economy, but fall short in our fast changing digital economy, where new products, business models and competitors keep emerging from all corners of the worlds.
Everyone talks about the need to become more flexible and agile, but many companies have trouble doing so.  The Deloitte study cites a number of strategy and financial barriers uncovered in their research.  But in the end, they suspect that “a more fundamental force may be at work: the historical value accorded to efficiency and controllability by businesses accustomed to a less changeable, less transparent world. . . Simply put, there is a growing mismatch between the old frameworks and practices that many companies use and the structures and capabilities required to be successful in a rapidly changing environment.  Legacy corporate practices are holding businesses back from fully participating in new opportunities.”
“These new economies of unscale will be good for job growth, because they open up thousands of new market niches for exploitation,” writes Taneja.  “By buying specialized services, in customized form and at modest cost, companies can create unique products, find buyers from across the world, and secure profits."

Será que a tríade fica assustada com isto?

A história do século XX

Descobri este livro, "The coming prosperity: how entrepreneurs are transforming the global economy" de Philip Auerswald, ontem. A leitura do primeiro capítulo foi um imenso deja vu:

"The story of the twentieth century is invariably told as a political and military narrative: first, the war to end all wars that did not; then, the democracies’ world war to defeat fascism; and finally, the successful struggle to defeat Soviet communism. Far less well appreciated, but arguably more relevant to the present, is the economic subtext of this same history: the rise and partial fall of large-scale, centralized production.
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At the start of the twentieth century, the economic landscape was transformed by the emergence of an entirely new form of business entity, larger and more complex than any that had existed previously. The major impetus behind this growth was what economists call economies of scale and scope: the ability to reduce costs per unit by (1) increasing the quantity of output and/or (2) integrating within a single business entity the different stages of production, from the acquisition of raw materials to the assembly of a finished product."

Até Magnitogorsk aparece:

"The harnessing of the power of scale and scope was a global phenomenon. It found its most dramatic expression not in Standard Oil, Ford Motor Company, or Thyssen Steel, but rather in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Absolute political control allowed the Soviets to undertake an unprecedented experiment: placing the entire productive apparatus of a nation under the control of what was, at least in theory, a single administrative authority. If, as appeared to be the case in the 1930s, economic power was rooted in the ability to harness economies of scale and scope, then the decentralized market economies of the West seemed to have ample reason to worry. No one would be able to match the Soviets."

Recordar:

• O século XX começou há 100 anos 
• Ora o século XXI não será o século de Metropolis mas o século de Mongo
• Adeus segunda metade do século XX, adeus Metropolis, adeus Magnitograd
• Magnitograd versus Mongo

Cuidado com as noções tradicionais de influência e poder

"A small group of passionate people can influence others that are slightly more reticent, still others take notice and also join in. That’s how disruption happens.
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Disruption never makes sense to us [Moi ici: Os incumbentes instalados], because it always starts with them.
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The truth is that it’s not the influentials [Moi ici: Como não lembrar logo os 70 reformados de luxo] we have to worry about, but when ordinary folks start joining in.
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The 20th century was driven by the scale economy.  The path to success was paved by minimizing costs and maximizing control over the value chain.  The bigger you were, the more you were able to able to negotiate with customers and suppliers, acquire technology and talent and leverage capital and marketing might.
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Yet today, we are competing in a semantic economy in which everything is connected.  Anyone with an idea and a broadband connection can gain access to technology, marketing, finance and talent that rival the world’s biggest firms and, indeed, even large nations."

Cuidado com as noções tradicionais de influência e poder, em Mongo as regras do jogo são outras.

Trechos retirados de "Strategy Is No Longer A Game Of Chess"

Sintomas de mudanças em curso

"A crise está a ajudar as mercearias de bairro"

"As pequenas mercearias e supermercados de bairro, detidos por empresários em nome individual, estão a conquistar pontos num sector de grande concorrência, dominado por gigantes como o Continente (grupo Sonae, o mesmo do PÚBLICO), Pingo Doce, Jumbo (Auchan) ou Lidl: entre Janeiro e Junho deste ano, aumentaram para 15,4% a quota no mercado alimentar, ou seja, mais 0,3 pontos percentuais em comparação com o mesmo período de 2012."

Espero que estes números não incluam as mercearias que fazem parte dos programas de franchising do Continente e da Jerónimo Martins.
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Se não incluírem, são números interessantes. Será uma mensagem de que até na distribuição há nichos, há segmentos que não valorizam acima de tudo o preço mais baixo.
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Por exemplo, há tempos li sobre uma cadeia de lojas no Reino Unido ou nos Estados Unidos, que era líder de vendas para as pessoas com menos dinheiro, apesar de não terem os preços unitários mais baixos. No entanto, um cliente nas suas lojas podia comprar 1 iogurte ou 1 rolo de papel higiénico e não era obrigado a comprar 8 unidades de iogurte ou 42 de papel higiénico por atacado.
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Pessoalmente, sempre que posso, opto por fugir dos gigantes. Imagens do último Sábado:

Aumentar o "producer surplus", o caminho menos percorrido (parte V)

A propósito deste texto "Do Things That Don't Scale" lembrei-me logo de Christensen e de Don Peppers.
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Quem pensa em ter sucesso "doing things that scale" pensa em crescimento do volume, pensa em ganhar escala, pensar em drequência de produção, pensa em eficiência.
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Daí Christensen, como sublinhei em "Sobre a paranóia da eficiência e do eficientismo". E, sobretudo, daí Don Peppers em "Aumentar o "producer surplus", o caminho menos percorrido (parte IV)":

"Quando se compete pelo preço e se elege a redução de custos como o vector fundamental para o negócio, procura-se quantidade, volume, market share para maximizar o retorno do agregado daquele SKU. Quando se sobe na escala de valor e se trabalha do cliente para trás, para a oferta, para o produto, aposta-se no aumento do valor percepcionado pelo cliente, por cada cliente. Assim, aposta-se na maximização do valor criado com cada unidade de SKU e não pelo seu agregado. O negócio não é quantidade, não é market share!"

Ou, melhor ainda, e ainda com Don Peppers num texto que descobri muito recentemente e sublinhei em "Isto é tão bom" (Não consigo destacar nada em particular, é tudo tão bom!!!)
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Em vez de escalar, concentrar a atenção em cada cliente, como se não houvesse mais nenhum no mundo. O texto é sobre as startups mas startups são o ADN primordial de futuras empresas:

"The question to ask about an early stage startup is not "is this company taking over the world?" but "how big could this company get if the founders did the right things?" And the right things often seem both laborious and inconsequential at the time.
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And I know Brian Chesky and Joe Gebbia didn't feel like they were en route to the big time as they were taking "professional" photos of their first hosts' apartments. They were just trying to survive. But in retrospect that too was the optimal path to dominating a big market.
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Another reason founders don't focus enough on individual customers is that they worry it won't scale. But when founders of larval startups worry about this, I point out that in their current state they have nothing to lose. Maybe if they go out of their way to make existing users super happy, they'll one day have too many to do so much for. That would be a great problem to have. See if you can make it happen. And incidentally, when it does, you'll find that delighting customers scales better than you expected. Partly because you can usually find ways to make anything scale more than you would have predicted, and partly because delighting customers will by then have permeated your culture.
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What founders have a hard time grasping (and Steve himself might have had a hard time grasping) is what insanely great morphs into as you roll the time slider back to the first couple months of a startup's life. It's not the product that should be insanely great, but the experience of being your user. The product is just one component of that. For a big company it's necessarily the dominant one. But you can and should give users an insanely great experience with an early, incomplete, buggy product, if you make up the difference with attentiveness.
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Sometimes the right unscalable trick is to focus on a deliberately narrow market. It's like keeping a fire contained at first to get it really hot before adding more logs.
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Like paying excessive attention to early customers, fabricating things yourself turns out to be valuable for hardware startups. You can tweak the design faster when you're the factory, and you learn things you'd never have known otherwise. Eric Migicovsky of Pebble said one of things he learned was "how valuable it was to source good screws." Who knew?
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The need to do something unscalably laborious to get started is so nearly universal that it might be a good idea to stop thinking of startup ideas as scalars. Instead we should try thinking of them as pairs of what you're going to build, plus the unscalable thing(s) you're going to do initially to get the company going."

Parte I, parte II e parte III e parte IV. 

Uma beleza!!!

Segue-se mais um sintoma do progresso de Mongo, o sucesso dos pequenos sobre a vantagem da escala e do volume:

"Over the last several years, small consumer packaged goods (CPG) companies in the U.S. have steadily gained market share at the expense of larger competitors. This has been true across a broad range of CPG companies and categories. What’s more, upstarts often price their products at a premium. Booz & Company recently completed an analysis of the top 25 food and beverage categories and found that small players (those with sales of less than US$1 billion) are outperforming the competition in 18 of the top 25 categories, including the largest ones.
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Several broad forces, most of them peculiar to our times, are combining to create advantageous conditions for small companies. For starters, consumers are demanding broader selection. “Selectionists,” who comprise 30 percent of the consumer market, seek greater variety and new tastes—and sometimes care deeply about other factors such as the origins of the food and how far it has been shipped. Selectionists have a stronger interest in local, boutique foods and beverages. Some traditional supermarkets are catering to this trend as a way to differentiate themselves from Walmart and other big price clubs. It’s difficult for traditional supermarkets to compete on price, but they can compete by offering a wider assortment of products, which, in turn, creates further opportunities for niche manufacturers.
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Several other important factors in the rise of small CPG players are linked to technology. The fragmentation of media and the generally lower cost of digital platforms give small players new outlets to reach customers in more targeted, cost-efficient ways. But what should concern large players the most is how technology is eroding their scale-driven advantages. Small players are increasingly able to outsource invoicing, HR systems, and logistics, as well as other back-office SG&A functions.
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Retail consolidation is further chipping away at scale advantage. The preference among bigger retailers is to work with a broad range of manufacturers—both large and small—to keep large CPG companies from gaining too much leverage.
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From 2009 to 2012, small food and beverage manufacturers grew revenue about three times faster than the rate of the overall category. In the packaged food category specifically, small players experienced a three-year compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 6.2 percent, and gained 1.7 percent of market share. Meanwhile, large players increased sales by just 1.6 percent CAGR and saw market share decline 0.7 percent. In the beverage category, the results were similar. Small companies saw a three-year CAGR of 4.4 percent, compared to just 0.1 percent among large companies. Small companies saw their market share rise 0.8 percent while large companies’ market share dropped 2.5 percent. This outperformance occurred even in some of the largest, most consolidated categories, such as bakery, dairy, snacks, and ready meals (see Exhibit 1).
along with market share gains, small players enjoyed price premiums in many categories. A survey of in-store pricing found that Godiva chocolate cost 138 percent more than the Hershey’s product of comparable size and flavor, Cape Cod potato chips cost 24 percent more than Lay’s, and Amy’s Kitchen soups cost 58 percent more than Campbell’s. Small players also showed pricing strength over private-label manufacturers. From 2011 to 2012, the price premium for small players over private labels jumped 5 percent for butter, olive oil, and packaged/industrial bread.
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Small players don’t have a single or consistent approach across all categories to account for their success. They are using a variety of strategies that incorporate brand positioning, pricing, market entry, innovation, route to market, and in-store marketing and merchandising. Within these categories, each carves out distinct positions depending on the product and competitive environment. The overall effect is a patchwork of bespoke strategies. That means one needs to look harder for the lessons—but they are there."

Trechos retirados de "Good Things Come in Small Packages"

Equívocos

"o estudo divulgado esta manhã na Fundação AEP, no Porto, revela que os empresários reconhecem também debilidades na sua própria actuação. “Desde logo, chamam a atenção para a reduzida dimensão das empresas, com o consequente impacto em termos de economia de escala e de massa crítica para enfrentar, com sucesso, o mercado internacional” (Moi ici: Acreditar que uma PME pode competir, com sucesso, no mercado internacional com base na escala e no volume é continuar a acreditar que só se pode competir com Golias de igual para igual. Pena que os exemplos das estratégias alternativas não sejam mais conhecidos. Pena que o modelo triunfante do século XX continue tão forte nas mentes que ainda não perceberam as potencialidades de competir no século XXI), lê-se no sumário executivo, reforçando que “os próprios empresários afirmam a necessidade de uma maior cooperação entre as empresas (que pode traduzir-se em parcerias, fusões ou alianças estratégicas) que leve a uma efectiva conjugação de esforços e de recursos”.
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A falta de profissionalismo na gestão é outro “mea culpa” realizado pelos líderes empresariais que participaram neste estudo, no qual reconhecem a necessidade de melhorar a sua capacidade de gestão e defendem que deve ser implementada uma “atitude profissionalizada” na gestão das PME. (Moi ici: Podiam começar pela sua própria empresa. A velha mensagem de Ghandi, sejam a mudança que querem ver no mundo) Uma gestão rigorosa e responsável, assente em equipas e estruturas de trabalhadores com “forte espírito de resistência” e “valências” que lhes permitam enfrentar o futuro, sustenta o mesmo documento.
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Trechos retirados de "Um quarto das empresas assume “risco de insolvência ou perda de reputação”"
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BTW, lembram-se disto?

"Se me venderem a redução da TSU para facilitar a vida às empresas que vivem do mercado interno concordo, o grosso do emprego está aqui e estas empresas vão viver tempos terríveis, o aumento futuro do desemprego virá sobretudo daqui, e tudo o que for feito para lhes aliviar o nó na corda que vai asfixiando o pescoço das empresas será bem vindo."

Chamam-me bruxo!

Vêm brincar para o nosso recreio!!!

"Yet 3D printing is just one of many production technologies and trends which are transforming the way companies will be able to make things in the future. The old rules of manufacturing, such as “you must seek economies of scale” and “you must reduce unit-labour costs”, are being cast aside. New machines can print every item differently. More flexible robots are getting cheaper and better at doing all the boring and dirty stuff."

Pouco a pouco, os media tradicionais vêm "brincar" para o nosso recreio!
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Venham, há espaço para todos e o HAL vai ficar feliz!
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Trecho retirado "The new maker rules"

Profit is Sanity, Volume is Vanity

"We're not saying companies shouldn't pay attention to their competitors; they might be doing reasonable things that you may also want to do," Armstrong says. "What we're saying is that the objective should not be to try to beat your competitor. The objective should be profitability. In view of all the damage that occurs by focusing on market share, companies would be better off not measuring it."

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The 'Myth of Market Share': Can Focusing Too Much on the Competition Harm Profitability?" aqui.