So it begins

Primeiro, o que é a Chegg? 

A Chegg é uma empresa americana de tecnologia educacional que oferece aluguer de livros físicos e digitais, tutoria online, ajuda com trabalhos de casa e outros serviços para estudantes. Começou como uma empresa de aluguer de livros, mas evoluiu para uma plataforma de aprendizagem mais abrangente, oferecendo diversos serviços para apoiar os estudantes nas suas necessidades educativas. O modelo de subscrição da Chegg disponibiliza soluções para exercícios, respostas detalhadas de manuais, tutoria e preparação para exames.

Entretanto, encontrei este artigo no WSJ, "How ChatGPT Brought Down an Online Education Giant":

"While many companies are figuring out how artificial intelligence will change the way they do business, Chegg is trying to avoid becoming its first major victim.

The online-education company was for many years the go-to source for students who wanted help with their homework, or a potential tool for plagiarism. The shift to virtual learning during the pandemic sent subscriptions and its stock price to record highs.

Then came ChatGPT. Suddenly students had a free alternative to the answers Chegg spent years developing with thousands of contractors in India. Instead of "Chegging" the solution, they began canceling their subscriptions and plugging questions into chatbots. Since ChatGPT's launch,

Chegg has lost more than half a million subscribers who pay up to $19.95 a month for prewritten answers to textbook questions and on-demand help from experts. Its stock is down 99% from early 2021, erasing some $14.5 billion of market value. Bond traders have doubts the company will continue bringing in enough cash to pay its debts."

O ChatGPT oferece respostas instantâneas, personalizadas e de baixo custo ou gratuitas para as dúvidas académicas dos estudantes. Ao contrário do modelo de subscrição da Chegg, os estudantes podem usar o ChatGPT sem custos, eliminando as barreiras financeiras e reduzindo a atractividade de pagar por uma subscrição da Chegg.

Modelos de inteligência artificial como o ChatGPT estão disponíveis a qualquer hora e podem ajudar com uma variedade de questões académicas, desde apoio na redacção de ensaios até à resolução passo a passo de problemas de matemática e ciências. Este nível de versatilidade está, muitas vezes, além do alcance das soluções mais específicas da Chegg.

Um exemplo interessante das disrupções a caminho por causa da inteligência artificial.

O que me vem logo à cabeça é a frase da coluna ao lado:

"When something is commoditized, an adjacent market becomes valuable"

Qual o mercado adjacente? O que precisa? Que preços podem ser praticados?  

Fugir da comoditização

No DN do passado dia 8 li "Crescimento das marcas "brancas" retirou dois mil milhões às de fabricante"

O texto destaca que, em cinco anos, as marcas próprias da distribuição passaram de uma quota de 32% para mais de 45% do mercado. Esse crescimento significativo mostra como os consumidores têm optado cada vez mais por produtos de marca branca, em parte devido ao preço mais baixo.

Esse crescimento das marcas brancas resultou numa perda de cerca de dois mil milhões de euros para as marcas de fabricantes, refletindo o impacte directo que as escolhas dos consumidores têm na rentabilidade das marcas tradicionais.

O artigo aponta que, com a inflação a subir, os consumidores começaram a mudar as suas escolhas, favorecendo produtos mais económicos, como as marcas brancas.

Os fabricantes tentam estratégias para reconquistar a preferência dos consumidores, mas enfrentam dificuldades significativas devido ao poder de mercado e à competitividade das marcas brancas.

E as PMEs como devem actuar?

• Devem destacar a qualidade, exclusividade e benefícios adicionais dos seus produtos em vez de competir apenas pelo preço. Investir em produtos que proporcionem experiências superiores ou que se diferenciem de marcas brancas pode ajudar a justificar um preço mais alto e criar lealdade à marca.
• Têm de inovar e diferenciar os produtos para que os consumidores vejam valor em escolher a marca, mesmo que o preço seja mais elevado. O texto indica que as marcas brancas ganharam terreno, em parte, devido a uma busca por alternativas mais baratas; assim, oferecer algo que estas marcas não consigam replicar facilmente pode ser uma vantagem. Por exemplo, ainda ontem naveguei por uma prateleira com umas dez opções de diferentes marcas de maionese. Desisti, estava interessado numa com azeite e não no que me era oferecido com óleo de girassol ou óleo de colza.
• Devem investir em estratégias de branding que reforcem a imagem da marca como uma opção premium ou com características únicas e desviar a atenção da comparação de preços e criar uma percepção de valor superior.

Evitar a competição pelo preço mais baixo e criar um nicho próprio que se baseia em qualidade e características únicas, afastando-se da dependência do mercado dominado pelas marcas brancas é fundamental.

Comoditização de uma experiência

Ontem li "How Starbucks Devalued Its Own Brand":

"Starbucks is in trouble again. In its last quarterly-earnings report, it announced disappointing results, including a 4% drop in same-store sales (11% in China, its second-biggest market). After that announcement, its stock plunged. (It is still well below its 12-month high.) And its founder and three-time CEO Howard Schultz once again fired off a missive on LinkedIn pleading with Starbucks' current leaders to rediscover and embrace the company's core purpose, its reason for existence.

Schultz's open letter, which followed another he issued in February, largely echoes the growing sentiments of many long-time customers: Going to Starbucks isn't what it used to be, and the brand itself isn't what it used to mean. The fundamental problem: Starbucks has been commoditizing itself."

Empresa tem sucesso inicial com uma proposta de valor única. Depois, a doença anglo-saxónica entra em jogo e começa a espiral que a atrai para a eficiência pura e dura e a magia inicial desaparece. Não esquecer o velho banco e a lição dos nabateus.

Como é que a Starbucks se comoditizou:

• Ao dar prioridade à eficiência operacional e ao aumento do volume de vendas, a Starbucks começou a parecer-se mais com um serviço genérico de café do que com um lugar único e acolhedor. Esta mudança resultou na perda da essência de ser o "third place" (um local além da casa e do trabalho onde as pessoas se podiam reunir e relaxar) que Howard Schultz havia idealizado.
• A automatização e a padronização dos processos reduziram o elemento humano e a personalização que diferenciavam a Starbucks dos outros estabelecimentos.
• Ao tentar atender tanto os clientes que buscavam conveniência rápida quanto aqueles que queriam uma experiência mais profunda e envolvente, a Starbucks acabou comprometendo a qualidade da experiência para ambos os grupos. 

Reduziram a qualidade da experiência em loja:

• As cadeiras confortáveis foram substituídas por cadeiras de madeira dura, incentivando os clientes a saírem rapidamente.
• Tornou-se difícil para os clientes encontrarem tomadas para carregar os seus dispositivos, reduzindo o tempo que passavam nas lojas. 
• Pedidos impressos substituíram a escrita manual nos copos, removendo o toque pessoal e as mensagens amigáveis que os baristas costumavam escrever.

Aumentou o foco na conveniência e no volume:

• O programa de fidelidade passou a focar mais o valor monetário das compras do que a experiência proporcionada.
• A introdução de drive-throughs e pedidos móveis aumentou as vendas, mas diminuiu a experiência no local, causando uma divisão da atenção dos baristas e criando um ambiente mais impessoal.

Mudança na atmosfera:

• O aroma característico de café fresco foi substituído por pacotes selados prontos para uso, diminuindo a experiência sensorial.
• Em certos locais, todas as cadeiras foram removidas para foco nos pedidos móveis, eliminando a possibilidade de socialização e relaxamento no local.

 Tensões internas e condições de trabalho:

• A Starbucks deixou de aparecer nas listas de melhores lugares para trabalhar, com funcionários vocalizando cada vez mais insatisfações sobre as suas condições de trabalho e a ênfase excessiva em métricas de vendas em detrimento da qualidade da interacção com os clientes.

Como dar a volta à situação?

"Recapturing the authenticity of the brand means doing away with the assembly-line feel of today's Starbucks, letting employees once again be key actors in the experience. The liveliness that comes with baristas shouting orders and the human connections they make are precisely what gave these places a neighborhood coffee shop feel — even if that meant an occasional odd misspelling on your cup or an unwarranted extra pump of syrup. Such "mistakes" made the Starbucks experience authentically human. Re-enriching jobs that have become routinized and empowering employees to stage meaningful experiences might also go a long way in improving their sentiment toward the company."

Nunca esquecer

Encontrei esta "Lei" formulada for Clayton Christensen:

“When the modularity and commoditization cause attractive profits to disappear at one stage in the value chain, the opportunity to earn attractive profits with proprietary products will emerge at an adjacent stage.”

Daí as previsões para a fase seguinte, no calçado e nos outros sectores. BTW, se lerem o artigo do Público de hoje sobre sobrequalificação dos trabalhadores, pensem nisto.

Cutting corners

"Chain restaurants rarely use fresh herbs. They’re uneven, unreliable and expensive, and most diners have been conditioned to want food that’s more processed and bland.

The same is true for most of what we buy and sell. It’s becoming ever more predictable, pre-processed and cost-reduced.

The pressure tends to go in one direction–turn your work into a commodity, smooth over the edges and fit in all the way. That seems hard to argue with, particularly if you want to be popular and profitable."

Cutting corners by default ou através de troca de gato por lebre é um sinal de alarme que vejo em algumas organizações.

Gente que troca gato por lebre faz-me lembrar gente que anda a minar os caminhos que supostamente já foram desminados. Os incautos inocentes ...

Trecho retirado de "Fresh herbs"

The Rules of the Passion Economy (parte VIII)

Parte I, parte II, parte III, parte IV, parte V, parte VI e parte VII.

"RULE #8: NEVER BE IN THE COMMODITY BUSINESS, EVEN IF YOU SELL WHAT OTHER PEOPLE CONSIDER A COMMODITY.
...
A commodity is an undifferentiated product that is easily copied and replicated by others. Commodities are widgets. Generic soap is a commodity; so is the dry cleaner on your way to work and the barber down the block. Commodity businesses are price takers, meaning they get paid whatever the market price happens to be. The only way for them to be truly successful is with volume and an ability to produce more cheaply than anybody else. That’s why commodity businesses tend to be dominated by huge, global corporations that use automation and outsourcing to cut their costs to the bone.
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Passion businesses never sell commodities. By definition, a passion business differentiates itself from others so that it can charge a unique price that represents its unique value.
...
Commodification is like gravity, always pulling at everyone, always trying to get each product and service and worker to fall to a common level."

Nem de propósito:

O Pingo Doce tem um anúncio de TV a garantir que apoia a produção nacional com borrego a 3,99.
Todos gostamos de promoções, mas - e este é um tema pré-Covid a que esta crise podia pôr termo - só é possível haver borrego a 3,99 com a miséria dos produtores e/ou produção aditivada pic.twitter.com/3M8XHRzE5A

— João M Fernandes (@jmmfernandes) April 10, 2020

Cuidado com a pedofilia empresarial. O negócio do preço não é para quem quer, é para quem pode. https://t.co/hXdCFTocMs

— Carlos P da Cruz (@ccz1) April 12, 2020

Recordar: Pregarás o Evangelho do Valor e sobretuso Privilegiar os inputs sobre os outputs (parte IX) a propósito dos adjectivos em vez dos substantivos.

Quantas empresas? (parte VII)

Parte I, parte II, parte III, parte IV, parte V e parte VI.

Na parte V usei esta figura:

Para ilustrar:

"Onde está a próxima etapa da cadeia com possibilidade de gerar diferenciação?
Será no desenho e diferenciação do que se faz?
Será no consumo e na forma como se chega a ele?"

Entretanto, ontem ao ler "Las certificaciones Gots se disparan un 35% en 2019":

"El número de compañías certificadas por la Global Organic Textiles Standard (Gots) se ha elevado un 5% en 2019
...
En España, el número de empresas que han conseguido este sello durante 2019 ha ascendido un 71%.
...
Los países con más certificaciones son India, con 2.411, Bangladesh, con 1.194, y Turquía, con 858."

Recordei-me da informação de que a certificação ambiental tem crescido muito entre as empresas de calçado. E fiz logo a ponte para a figura lá de cima e para o extremo do desenho.

E é suficiente? Convém recordar o canvas de Osterwalder:

Não basta coleccionar atributos. Há todo um mundo de ajuste e alterações a fazer no modelo de negócio. Por exemplo, quais as alterações na proposta de valor? Que diferentes prateleiras usar? Que diferentes actividades-chave?

Quantas empresas? (parte VII)

Parte I, parte II, parte III, parte IV, parte V e parte VI.

Voltemos à evolução do número de empresas de calçado em Portugal:

A azul os dados da APICCAPS publicados nas sucessivas monografias estatísticas anuais.
A vermelho curvas de tendência.

Consideremos a evolução de uma empresa em particular:

Inicialmente a empresa por tentativa e erro procura uma alternativa que lhe permita sobreviver, e quiçá, ter sucesso. 
FASE II - Muitas empresas não conseguem encontrar/criar o truque, o modelo de negócio e ou fecham ou prolongam a agonia como zombies. Subitamente uma empresa, depois outra e outra começam a ter melhores resultados e parecem ter chegado a um modelo que parece funcionar. 
FASE III - Por spillover o novo modelo é progressivamente adoptado pelas empresas existentes e o sucesso atrai novos empreendedores. Fase de exploração em que se faz render o modelo ao máximo.
FASE IV - Inevitavelmente, porque o contexto externo e interno muda, quer a nível de concorrentes, quer a nível do resto do ecossistema do negócio (clientes-distribuição, retalhistas, consumidores), o modelo começa a falhar e progressivamente começam a encerrar empresas incapazes de se sustentarem.

Ajustando as duas figuras temos, para uma empresa-tipo:

Richard D'Aveni no velhinho livro "Hyper-competition: Managing the Dynamics of Strategic Advantage" escreve, a propósito da segunda figura acima (a figura é uma adaptação da que D'Aveni usa):

"The pursuit of a sustainable advantage has long been the focus of strategy. But advantages last only until competitors have duplicated or outmaneuvered them.
...
Once the advantage is copied or overcome, it is no longer an advantage. It is now a cost of doing business. Ultimately the innovator will only be able to exploit its advantage for a limited period of time before its competitors launch a counterattack [Moi ici: Não gosto desta liguagem de "contra ataque". Os concorrentes não nos atacam. Os concorrentes precisam dos mesmos recursos financeiros que nós. Esses recursos financeiros estão nos bolsos dos potenciais clientes. Os concorrentes não nos atacam. Os concorrentes arranjam uma alternativa que serve melhor os potenciais clientes, proporcionando-lhes mais valor]. With the launch of this counterattack, the original advantage begins to erode (see Figure 1-1}, and a new initiative is needed."

Há muito que uso aqui no blogue este gif para ilustrar que as estratégias nunca são eternas:

No final da FASE III a vantagem competitiva está perdida e volta-se à estaca zero, procurar uma nova vantagem competitiva. O interessante é que ao longo das décadas, parece que a duração da fase de exploração parece que se vai encurtando.

Às vezes oiço empresários, meio a sério, meio a brincar, a defender que é preciso importar bangladeshis ou chineses. Isso era o que se fazia antigamente quando os concorrentes que se tinham tornado mais competitivos tinham melhorado a sua competitividade nuns "pós" percentuais, estes concorrentes estão muito melhor habilitados para este campeonato. Por isso, tentar extender o tempo da exploração é perder tempo e gastar recursos que deviam ser colocados ao serviço da procura do próximo modelo de negócio bem-sucedido.

D'Aveni usa uma linguagem colorida:

"So what is the harm of trying to sustain an advantage for as long as possible? In an environment in which advantages are rapidly eroded, sustaining advantages can be a distraction from developing new ones. It is like shoveling sand against the tide rather than moving on to higher ground.
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Trying to sustain an existing advantage is a harvest strategy rather than a growth strategy. It is designed to milk what assets you have now rather than to seek new assets to build on. Even in high-growth markets old advantages based on old assets may not be the ones that will be the source of future success. A strategy of sustaining the advantage created by your existing assets creates a danger of complacency and gives competitors time to catch up and become strong.
...
Attempting to sustain an old advantage can eat up resources that should be used to generate the next move, thereby inviting attack by savvy competitors who realize that complacency has set in. Sustaining advantage is effectively a defensive strategy designed to protect what a firm has. In hypercompetition the better defense is often a strong offense."

Continua

Quantas empresas? (parte VI)

Parte I, parte II, parte III, parte IV e parte V.

Na parte V recordamos Clayton Christensen e a continua transição entre comoditização e de-comoditização. Na passada segunda-feira o Wall Street Journal trazia o artigo "Specialty Grocers Lose Natural Edge":

"Gourmet grocers are losing their edge as natural foods become mainstream. Supermarket chains and discounters are selling more fresh, natural and organic foods at lower prices, drawing shoppers who used to seek out those products at specialty grocers.... As a result, specialty grocers are having a hard time convincing customers to pay a premium to shop in their stores. And without the revenue and reach of bigger chains, they have also been hesitant to match price cuts or to invest in new services like delivery....“Differentiation can be ephemeral. Retail is an open book of copycats,”...“What was special 10 years ago isn’t special anymore,”...New Seasons Market, based in Portland, Ore., is trying to stand out from the competition with hyperlocal products, Chief Operating Officer Mark Law said. The chain of more than 20 stores in the Pacific Northwest works with local chefs to prepare oven-ready meals and buys dairy products from nearby farmers. Samestore sales growth rate nearly doubled last year.
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“Organic has been commoditized,” Mr. Law, a former Whole Foods executive, said. “You can’t differentiate with your product mix alone.”
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Other specialty grocers also are emphasizing services to stand out. But offering better services can push up costs, executives said.
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“You not only have your cost of goods but you’re trying to provide a higher level of customer service to differentiate yourself,”

Este tema já apareceu aqui: "As estratégias nunca são eternas ponto"

Outro artigo recente "Fairway Is So Crowded! How Can It Be in Bankruptcy?"

Quantas empresas? (parte V)

Parte I, parte II, parte III e parte IV.

O desafio que as empresas de calçado estão a sentir de novo é o desafio da comoditização.

A globalização, fazendo da China a fábrica do mundo criou este modelo:

Preços baixos, mas uma janela de 150 ou mais dias desde o desenho até à montra:

"By relocating most production for North America and Europe to Southeast Asia and putting retailers on 150-day order windows, the shoe industry has created a marvel of low cost at the factory gate in combination with an extraordinary array of styles"

O que o calçado português aprendeu foi a tirar partido da proximidade entre produção e consumo e

 permitir reduzir o tempo do desenho à montra, o que permitiu mais flexibilidade e acelerar o bailado entre oferta e procura.

O que recentemente a Turquia, o Norte de África e a Roménia conseguiram foi criar novos centros de produção de confiança próximos do consumo e mais baratos.

Aqui, fui ao meu exemplar de "The Innovator's Solution" e mergulhei no capítulo "How to avoid commoditization" e reli:

"It turns out that there is hope. One of the most exciting insights from our research about commoditization is that whenever it is at work some-where in a value chain, a reciprocal process of de-commoditization is at work somewhere else in the value chain. And whereas commoditization destroys a company's ability to capture profits by undermining differentiability, decommoditization affords opportunities to create and capture potentially enormous wealth. The reciprocity of these processes means that the locus of the ability to differentiate shifts continuously in a value chain as new waves of disruption wash over an industry. As this happens, companies that position themselves at a spot in the value chain where performance is not yet good enough will capture the profit.
…Making highly differentiable products with strong cost advantages is a license to print money, and lots of it. We must emphasize that the reason many companies don't reach this nirvana or remain there for long is that it is the not-good-enough circumstance that enables managers to offer products with proprietary architectures that can be made with strong cost advantages versus competitors. When that circumstance changes—when the dominant, profitable companies overshoot what their mainstream customers can use—then this game can no longer be played, and the tables begin to turn. Customers will not pay still-higher prices for products they already deem too good. Before long, modularity rules, and commoditization sets in. When the relevant dimensions of your product's performance are determined not by you but by the subsystems that you procure from your suppliers, it becomes difficult to earn anything more than subsistence returns in a product category that used to make a lot of money. When your world becomes modular, you'll need to look elsewhere in the value chain to make any serious money.
…Note that it is overshooting—the more-than-good-enough circum-stance — that connects disruption and the phenomenon of commoditization. Disruption and commoditization can be seen as two sides of the same coin. A company that finds itself in a more-than-good-enough circumstance simply can't win: Either disruption will steal its markets, or commoditization will steal its profits. Most incumbents eventually end up the victim of both, because, although the pace of commoditization varies by industry, it is inevitable, and nimble new entrants rarely miss an opportunity to exploit a disruptive foothold. There can still be prosperity around the corner, however. The attractive profits of the future are often to be earned elsewhere in the value chain, in different stages or layers of added value. That's because the process of commoditization initiates a reciprocal process of de-commoditization. Ironically, this de-commoditization — with the attendant ability to earn lots of money — occurs in places in the value chain where attractive profits were hard to attain in the past:
…Firms that are being commoditized often ignore the reciprocal process of de-commoditization that occurs simultaneously with commoditization, either a layer down in subsystems or next door in adjacent processes. They miss the opportunity to move where the money will be in the future and get squeezed — or even killed — as different firms catch the growth made possible by de-commoditization. In fact, powerful but perverse investor pressure to increase returns on assets (ROA) creates strong incentives for assemblers to skate away from where the money will be. …Executives who seek to avoid commoditization often rely on the strength of their brands to sustain their profitability — but brands become commoditized and de-commoditized, too. Brands are most valuable when they are created at the stages of the value-added chain where things aren't yet good enough. When customers aren't yet certain whether a product's performance will be satisfactory, a well-crafted brand can step in and close some of the gap between what customers need and what they fear they might get if they buy the product from a supplier of unknown reputation. The role of a good brand in closing this gap is apparent in the price premium that branded products are able to command in some situations. For similar logic, however, the ability of brands to command premium prices tends to atrophy when the performance of a class of products from multiple suppliers is manifestly more than adequate. When overshooting occurs, the ability to command attractive profitability through a valuable brand often migrates to those points in the value-added chain where things have flipped into a not-yet-good-enough situation. These often will be the performance-defining subsystems within the product, or at the retail interface when it is the speed, simplicity, and convenience of getting exactly what you want that is not good enough. These shifts define the opportunities in branding."

Onde está a próxima etapa da cadeia com possibilidade de gerar diferenciação?
Será no desenho e diferenciação do que se faz?
Será no consumo e na forma como se chega a ele?

"There is a shift from “commoditization” to “personalization”

"Experience has emerged as the new basis for exchange. Schmitt (1999, p. 53) opined that “companies have moved away from traditional “features-and-benefits” marketing towards creating experiences for their customers”.
...
This approach is based on the foundation that a consumer lives by consuming experiences offered by products, services, events or a series of multisensory interactions between customers and organizations at every touchpoint in pre-purchase, purchase and post-purchase situations.
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There is a shift from “commoditization” to “personalization” – personalized co-created consumption experiences. The customer value is derived during the entire consumption process as “internal and subjective responses” through co-creation experiences. The organizations act as resource integrators to facilitate experience creation by providing experience environment.
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Interaction is central to experience creation. ... consumer responses (approach or avoidance) are determined by interaction between stimulus (organizational or environmental) and organism (consumers – emotional state of pleasure, arousal and dominance). Holbrook and Hirschman brought experiential perspective and described consumption experience as “a phenomenon directed towards the pursuit of fantasies, feelings, and fun”. They further commented that “the consumer behaviour is the fascinating and endlessly complex result of a multifaceted interaction between organism and environment”. Addressing the dimensions of customer value, Holbrook explained that “Value is an interactive relativistic preference experience”. ...  “All experiences are ‘consumption experiences’ and that these consumption experiences constitute most of what we do during our waking and even our non-waking lives”
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“The traditional system is become obsolete [...] In the emergent economy, competition will centre on personalized co-creation experiences resulting in value that is truly unique to each individual”. They emphasized on customer value derived from purposeful and meaningful personalized interaction between customer and organization. ... “The customer is always a co-creator of value. Value creation is interactional” and “Value is always uniquely and phenomenologically determined by the beneficiary. Value is idiosyncratic, experiential, contextual and meaning laden”. ... “Commercial experiences need to be considered as a product offering to avoid commoditization and price competition”.

Trechos retirados de "Customer experience – a review and research agenda", Journal of Service Theory and Practice, Vol. 27 Issue: 3, pp.642-662, de Rajnish Jain, Jayesh Aagja, Shilpa Bagdare, (2017)

Countering commoditization begins with ... (parte III)

Parte I e parte II.

O quadrante "Core" é o ponto de partida para muitos dos desafios em que acompanho as PMEs. 

"Core This quadrant, low on both value-adding dimensions, is a starting point where the offer lacks sufficient differentiation to avoid becoming a commodity. Customers do not perceive compelling differences between the firm and its rivals in their value propositions. What is offered is not sufficiently adapted to the specific requirements of individual customers or their segments, nor does it have an added ‘bundled’ value besides the core product. Under this scenario the firm is obliged to look beyond its core for the missing differentiation that comes with added value."

As hipóteses são:

"Targeted Extension This quadrant represents a strategy that aims to add value by extending its core offer to more closely meet the special and possibly unique needs of the market segments or even the individual accounts it serves.
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System Development Firms choosing to compete in this quadrant develop a package of products and services that offer the synergistic benefits of a ‘system’.
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Solutions Innovation What happens when the firm’s offer consists of a full set of bundled products and services that are specifically targeted at certain customer segments or individual accounts?"

A figura que se segue ilustra com o exemplo da SKF:

 Interessante como o quadrante das Total solutions = Solutions Innovation é um exemplo perfeito da máxima "Privilegiar os inputs sobre os outputs". Não vendem rolamentos, vendem os resultados que os clientes procuram. Os rolamentos foram um instrumento inicial para o arranque da conversa.

Countering commoditization begins with ...

"Figure 3.1 shows a typical scenario of how the combined effects of commod- itization and buyer concentration, common in many industrial sectors, can over time lead to margin erosion. It begins with a steady decline in the differentiation of the core offer. In other words, the firm’s customer-value proposition begins to lose its uniqueness and, with it, most or all of its differentiating power. Customers view all competing products alike and dismiss any vendor claims to the contrary. When combined with buyer concentration, i.e. when a growing share of sales is generated from a declining number of large customers, the consequences of commoditization can be dramatic: a loss of control on prices (when the seller is no longer a price setter but a price taker), in addition to losses in supplier identity, customer loyalty and brand equity. The scenario’s negative impact on margins and profitability is all too predictable.
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Countering commoditization begins with a re-examining of the core business and its customer-value proposition. When all customers appear to look alike and the firm’s value offer has a one-size-fits-all quality to it (both features of many commoditized markets), it is time to ask a couple of fundamental questions: beyond the lowest price, what do the customers really value and how could the commoditized offer, product or service, be redefined to better reflect the often unarticulated needs of its customers?"

Trechos retirados de "3 Countering Commoditization: Value-added Strategies and Aligning with Customers" de Kamran Kashani

"markets are being pulled in two different directions"

“The concept of levels of value describes the way markets are being pulled in two different directions. Where no real value creation is necessary, where what is being purchased is a true commodity, prices are being reduced to the lowest point possible. Companies are competing by being super transactional, removing the friction of buying and lowering costs. This is the strategy of Level 1 and Level 2 value providers. It is important to note that when a company makes this decision, it is a strategic decision. Super transactional does not simply mean discounting or making pricing concessions. This is how these companies consistently compete.
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The opposite strategy is super relational. This is high trust, high value, high caring. This approach is the very opposite of super transactional, placing greater value on providing results, being proactive, developing customer intimacy, and having deep knowledge and expertise.
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When decisions are complex, with many factors at play and many possible paths forward, relationships of value matter a great deal. This is the strategy of Levels 3 and 4, and because most B2B sales organizations have been creating Level 3, selling the tangible return on investment and solving their client’s existing problems to the point of its being a commodity, success in creating opportunities and acquiring and retaining clients requires Level 4. Level 4 is disruptive in that it allows you to compel change.
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If you behave like you are super transactional, intentionally or unintentionally, you will be treated like a commodity. You will be an attractive alternative only to prospects who care mostly about price, even if they do so to their detriment. This is to be a vendor or supplier (two words that you should be horrified to ever hear your client utter when referring to you), not a trusted adviser (words that produce the sweetest  “sound to your ears).
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Alternatively, if you are super relational, you will attract companies and people who want better results. You will be interesting to people who are growth oriented and people who want to address their systemic challenges and threats and move their companies forward. Being super relational is what makes you a trusted adviser.”

Qual é a direcção da sua empresa?
Que indicadores segue?
Acha que a gestão requerida por uma direcção é a mesma que a requerida na outra direcção?
Acha que a cultura requerida por uma direcção é a mesma que a requerida na outra direcção?

Já pensou a sério nisto? Não?! Talvez seja isto o que lhe está a acontecer: "If you behave like you are super transactional, intentionally or unintentionally, you will be treated like a commodity."

Excerto de: Anthony Iannarino. “Eat Their Lunch”.

A magia da interacção

 Ao longo dos anos tenho aqui sublinhado o papel da interacção nos ecossistemas da procura, para fugir à comoditização, para subir na escala de valor.

"The Joint Sphere: Value Co-creation Opportunities.
In the joint sphere, the customer’s value creation is different. In this part of the value process, the two actors meet and interact with each other.
...
What may happen in such direct interactions, if the actors allow it, is that the provider’s and the customer’s processes—the firm’s service-providing process and the customer’s consumption and value-creating process—merge into one interactive, collaborative and dialogical process. The two processes become one, and a platform of co-creation emerges. Such direct interactions can be both face-to-face interactions and interactions with smart technologies. If both actors are willing to do it and know how to do it, the service provider may engage with the customer’s value-creating process and co-create value with him or her at this stage of the value process. If they do not want to or do not know how to do it, no value co-creation takes place, in spite of the existence of a platform of co-creation. In that case, the provider’s role is restricted to continue facilitating the customer’s value creation.
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Thus, in the joint sphere, the role of the firm may be that of a value co-creator, where the firm’s goal is to, when needed and appropriate, actively influence the customer’s value-creating process and, thus, his or her value fulfilment. On the other hand, the customer’s role is to be the value creator and perhaps also a value co-creator with the provider. The customer’s goal is the same as in the customer sphere: to use and integrate resources with the aim to become better off. In the joint sphere, the actors may switch roles, and the provider becomes the customer and the customer becomes the service provider of, for example, actionable information and feedback. Viewed from below, from a managerial micro-perspective, co-creation only takes place in direct interactions, provided that a platform of co-creation is formed. In all other situations, the firm can only facilitate the customer’s value creation.
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From a managerial point of view, co-creation can have both positive and negative consequences.[Moi ici: Quando o tema não é abordado de forma preparada, planeada, é provável que por vezes quem interage não tenha consciência das prioridades e das consequências dos seus actos e comportamentos]
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From the micro-vantage point, one also observes that the firm can do much more than only offer value propositions. If the actors’ processes indeed merge in the joint sphere into an interactive, collaborative and dialogical process and a platform of co-creation comes into existence, the firm has the opportunity to influence the customer’s value process and how this process develops, and in the end, the customer’s value fulfilment. Because this also may have an impact on the customer’s preferences and future purchasing decisions, it also has fundamental implications for marketing. In the service marketing literature, this part of the marketing process is called interactive marketing, and the service employees involved in it are termed part-time marketers."

Trechos retirados de "On Value and Value Creation in Service: A Management Perspective" de Christian Grönroos publicado por Jornal of Creating Value.

Quando a comoditização bate à porta

A comoditização pode bater à porta.

Não creio que as PME possam ter sucesso no campeonato da comoditização. No entanto, acho este artigo, "What to do when a specialty-chemical business gets commoditized", muito interessante. A linguagem utilizada, a clareza.

O futuro é interacção e co-criação

"marketing has changed. Some say it’s about lead generation, creating demand, building relationships and engagement. I like that last word, engagement. Here’s a thought. Marketing appears to be about putting something out there, an advertisement, email campaign, promotion, etc., that will hopefully pull in business. Engagement is about interacting and attraction.
Both are part of the customer experience (CX). So, which customer experience would you rather create? One that is pushy and promotional or one that is about interacting and relationship building?"

Ontem recebi um telefonema. Olhei para o écran e vi que era um número de Lisboa.
- Quem será?

Atendi e era uma gravação a dizer que a minha opinião era tão importante mas tão importante que tinham criado uma aberração automática para a obter. Claro que desliguei de imediato o telefone.

If you give them peanuts you'll get monkeys.

O futuro é interacção e co-criação. Um futuro baseado em relações comoditizadas não é para quem quer é para quem pode.

Trecho retirado de "The Customer Experience Is Your Best Marketing"

"efficiency always leads to commoditization. Not sometimes. All the time."

"No doubt, when they think about how they can provide a better service, they come up with all kinds of great ideas, but none of them are experiences. Better service is efficiency, and efficiency always leads to commoditization. Not sometimes. All the time.
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Experience has nothing to do with the offering.
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Imagine if Canada Post had been able to see the writing on the wall, and instead of trying to only get better at providing better services, like drive-through windows, they instead converted most of their postal offices into coffee shops.
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What was stopping Canada Post from becoming something more like Starbucks? I mean, aside from imagination?"

Concordo em absoluto com a mensagem sublinhada. E ainda acrescento uma citação da coluna de citações que vai ao encontro da mensagem:

"When something is commoditized, an adjacent market becomes valuable" 

Trecho retirado de "Postcards from the Edge (of Oblivion)"

Valor num mercado comoditizado

"Managing value in a commoditizing market
...
How can we do VBP when the entire market is spiraling in price wars and commoditization? That is an excellent question! I often remind them that lots of companies disappear every year because of acquisition, price wars, or bankruptcy. My standard answer is `What choice do you have? How long can you reduce you price without going out of business?" Price cuts are quantitative. The qualitative side of that coin is the perception that your market is commoditizing. If that is the case, you can't give up. You have to be creative and start fighting back. You have to invest in innovation to start changing the conversation from price to value. Use bundling, versioning, or other tactics to find or create pockets of differentiation. One opportunity that may be harder to capitalize on is to begin charging for some services that have been free, either historically or as a response to the economic crisis of 2008-9. At that time, many companies gave away services as a way to maintain volume. When markets recover and companies look to improve or re-establish their pricing power, services such as JIT delivery or technical training are candidates for prices, because they create measurable value. Debundling is also a possibility, as airlines have done with so many services. But you still need to keep the context in mind. You can add surcharges, and you can differentiate performance levels, but it may be difficult to reintroduce a fee on something that has been free for many years.
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VBP is far more than jut doing EVEs! It is the basis for your go-to-market strategy, and it touches on the pillars of marketing strategy: segmentation, differentiation, communication."

Trechos e imagem retirados de Stephan M. Liozu em "Dollarizing Differentiation Value: A Practical Guide for the Quantification and the Capture of Customer Value"

"The market share mindset is the antithesis of a value mindset"

"One of the most important tests of your organization's maturity level and business orientation is how you use the word "commodity." If this is a common way for you to describe your products—internally and especially externally—you shouldn't be surprised if customers treat you as a commodity, meaning they argue that you have no differentiation. They have no desire at all to pay a premium. A commodity mindset shows that you don't have the right business orientation for VBP. ...Given maturity and a business orientation, there is also a difference between going through the motions and making the required changes and improvements. The volume-versus-value mindset is decisive. It is often the acid test for a transformation and for whether an organization is serious about it. ...You can spend all the money you want and create the culture you want, but if your organization is not willing to let go of market share, it will not change. Pretty brutal, but true. The market share mindset is the antithesis of a value mindset. It is the Jack Welch "be number r or number 2" mentality that still determines the way so many Gen Xers and Gen Yers run their businesses. I find it almost surreal in some companies that make market share into one of their most important and most reported KPIs."

Trechos retirados de Stephan M. Liozu em "Dollarizing Differentiation Value: A Practical Guide for the Quantification and the Capture of Customer Value"