Onde começa a inovação?

Recentemente recebi via e-mail da Strategyzer um artigo intitulado "Does innovation always start with customer needs?" de Tendayi Viki e com o seguinte começo:

"This is the age old push versus pull question. Should innovation be driven by advances in technology (e.g. AI) or by market insights (e.g. aging population)? A lot of innovation models tend to describe innovation as a linear process that starts with understanding customer needs. 

In the early days of my career, I was quite rigid in my thinking about this question. I used to get into endless debates with innovation teams as I tried to push them towards focusing on customer needs first.  

But over time, I learned that innovation is not a paint by numbers process. Inspiration does not come in a neat linear package. Sometimes, technological advancements that are not driven by a clear customer need can spur innovation. My experience has taught me that innovation can start anywhere."

Como Alexander Osterwalder, fundador da Strategyzer, é suíço lembrei-me logo de Feyrabend e o seu "anything goes", o que me levou a este postal de 2015 "Para reflexão, sobre a criação de mercados". 

Como explico nesse postal, para uma PME sem capital e em dificuldades o ponto de partida é o da effectuation, Começar de onde se está, começar com o que se tem à mão. Não perder a ligação à terra, como o mitológico Anteu.

Tendayi Viki escreve:

"If you have identified the problem, find the solution.

If you have a solution in mind, identify your customer's problem."

"If you have identified the problem, find the solution" - Eu PME, posso não ter capital para desenvolver a solução que nunca experimentei, posso estar a subestimar a complexidade da coisa. No entanto, estou a focar-me na inovação que interessa, estou a criar valor e diferenciação, posso atrair investidores(?).

"If you have a solution in mind, identify your customer's problem," - Eu PME fico desalinhado do mercado actual que conheço (pode passar por mudar de clientes, de mercados, de modelo de negócio), posso mesmo assim não conseguir taxas de adopção interessantes. No entanto, estou a diversificar e expandir o mercado, a aproveitar activos existentes e a tornar a empresa mais resiliente.

"Deixar de ser uma Arca de Noé"

E volto à leitura de "The World of Work to 2030" para encontrar uma série de textos que parecem tirados deste blogue. Textos acerca de como competir em Mongo:

"You just won't see it coming 

Buyers, whether businesses or consumers, will become even more swamped by choice than they are today. This means you will have to fight harder to rise above the noise of the competition. [Moi ici: Uma paisagem cada vez mais enrugada, cada vez mais picos]

...

Focus and Size

The forces playing out mean that companies everywhere will face continual, relentless, competitive threats. This poses an obvious question: How to respond?

To succeed in the future, companies will be forced to think consciously about what they are and how they do it. With competition becoming incessant and global, companies will need to decide what they do, what market they will focus on and where they will specialize. Most importantly, at the same time, they will consciously decide what they are not, which markets they are not focusing on and where they will not specialize.

This merely echoes what Harvard Business School professor Michael Porter said when defining strategy: 'the essence of strategy, is choosing what not to do.'

...

Just say 'no' 

The challenge in business (and to a similar extent in our personal lives) is that we seek to do too much ourselves. When a customer calls us asking for help, or wanting a different product or a different service, we dislike saying no. The same thing happens in our personal lives where we seek to do everything - all the tasks that life presents us with, from gardening to decorating - and to be expert in them all. No business can be expert in everything. It is exceptionally easy to say 'yes' to a customer. But as we progress further away from what we are good at, from what we are known for and from where our expertise lies, the thinner the ice on which we are skating and the greater the risk in something going wrong.

...

To be successful, companies will not be able to be all things to all customers. They can't spread themselves too thin being, in effect, wide and shallow. If they do, competition will swarm around them, nibbling away and they will suffer the death of a thousand cuts. Rather, to succeed and protect themselves, businesses will define their purpose more narrowly, more specifically, and will then seek to achieve depth, seeking dominance of that narrow space. Going forward, successful businesses will no longer be generalists: average will no longer be enough, depth and specialism will be critical.

...

Being a generalist is not sustainable. Focus and depth of specialism, combined with scale in that specialism, is needed in order to be successful."

Como não recuar a 2006 e a "Deixar de ser uma Arca de Noé". 

Como não reflectir nesta incoerência recente e sinto que algo não bate certo. 

Como não ligar ao ainda fresco Os últimos moicanos.

A clear goal

Ao longo dos anos, uma das constantes na minha relação com as empresas é a dificuldade destas em serem claras quanto ao seu propósito. Por isso, a relevância deste texto:

"The simplest way to run a business is to have no also.

We maximize profit, period.

At least you’re being honest about it.

If you say, “and we also care about the environment,” or “we also care about our people and treat them like family,” or even, “we’re here to serve our customers…” now you’re doing one of two things:

Either you’re asserting that doing those things is the way to maximize your profit…

Or you’re committing to not maximizing your profit, as your purpose is more human and connected than something that simple.

If it’s the latter, if you’ve decided that making just enough profit to maximize your real goal is the purpose of the organization, what an extraordinary opportunity. Organizations of humans with a clear measured goal and just enough profit to get there can make a huge impact.

But it’s worth being honest about whether you’re running that full-page ad with a koala in it because you’re here to help the koala or simply because you see it as a stepping stone to making more money."

Trechos retirados de "And we also"

Lições de Hidden Champions (parte II)

Foco, foco, foco... 

"How Hidden Champions Define Their Markets

There are numerous ways to define a market or a business. The oldest version is based on the product: "We operate in the market for dishwashers." This product-oriented definition was heavily criticized by Theodore Levitt in the groundbreaking article Marketing Myopia in 1960. Levitt's criticism of the American railroad companies has become famous. According to Levitt, their definition of their market as "railroads" and not *passenger transport" meant that they overlooked the emerging competition from airlines.

...

The market definition demanded by Levitt is based on customer needs or application.[Moi ici: Recordo logo Think “outcome before output”] "We make clean dishes our business" would be a needs-oriented definition for a dishwasher manufacturer. In addition, markets can be determined by reference to customer or target groups. Staying with our example, this would be: "We supply hotels and restaurants with dishwashing systems.' For example, the CEO of Brother, Seichi Hirata, made the following precise market definition according to target group, "Our main target group is the segment of small offices, home offices and small and midsize companies. We know this business very well and focus on it.

"Our competitors cover all segments. We don't." [Moi ici: É preciso ter muita coragem para não seguir atrás dos concorrentes] Brother achieved market leadership with its office machines in this segment as a result of the narrow market definition.

...

With their market definitions the hidden champions of the twenty-first century generally show a very modern understanding of the market. Customer needs and target groups clearly top the list. 

...

The hidden champions have grown beyond the narrow boundaries of their regions of origin. They view the world as their market, not their country or region. [Moi ici: Recordar "Nichos, co-criação e intimidade à escala" com a lição alemão e o fim da geografia]

...

If we asked a hidden champion selected at random to state the key to its success, the most likely answer would be "We specialize in ...""

"Hidden Champions of the Twenty-First Century Success Strategies of Unknown World Market Leaders" de Hermann Simon 

Mais pureza estratégica, mais rentabilidade

Algo que divulgamos aqui quase desde o primeiro dia deste blogue e sumarizado num texto de 2008 com esta figura:

Mais pureza estratégica, mais rentabilidade.

"Firms have effectively used low-cost or focus strategies to improve their performance. Our study demonstrates that although firms pursuing either strategy individually can benefit, pursuing these two generic strategies of low-cost and focus simultaneously actually hurts firms’ profitability. In essence, we show that when firms pursuing a low-cost strategy already possess a cost efficiency advantage over their rivals for the full customer base, firms have nothing to gain by simultaneously limiting rivalry—through focusing on a smaller customer segment—and thus giving away revenue to rivals. Our insights regarding the combination of different generic strategies caution managers to not be misled by the performance gains of either low-cost and focus strategies individually, but to realize that these two in tandem actually may harm profitability.

...

In his seminal work that examined the nuances of the understudied combination of these two generic strategies—low-cost and focus—Makadok (2010) showed analytically how these mechanisms work to reduce firm profit. Consistent with prior work, we find that having either a high cost efficiency advantage (i.e. an effective low-cost strategy) or reducing rivalry through a high level of horizontal differentiation (i.e., an effective focus strategy) is more likely to increase a firm’s profit. In addition, our empirical analysis shows that combining these two strategies has a negative relationship with firm profit, supporting Makadok’s (2010) analytic models.  These findings emphasize the importance of looking beyond the most often discussed combination of firms pursuing simultaneously a low-cost (Generic Strategy 1) and a differentiation strategy (Generic Strategy 2), and that it is also ill-advised to simultaneously pursue a low-cost (Generic Strategy 1) and a focus strategy (Generic Strategy 3).

...

In conclusion, our empirical study strengthens the Strategy outlook that firms do best when pursuing one generic strategy. Indeed, our study complements the existing insight regarding the negative outcomes of pursuing both a low-cost strategy (Generic Strategy 1) and a differentiation strategy (Generic Strategy 2) by explicating the logical arguments and providing empirical support for the negative outcome of pursuing both a low-cost strategy (Generic Strategy 1) and a focus strategy (Generic Strategy 3)."

Trechos retirados de "Competing Both Ways: How Combining Porter’s Low-Cost and Focus Strategies Hurts Firm Performance" 

Que diferença

Esta manhã fixei este trecho:

“Contrary to many of our misconceptions about command-and-control leaders, he points out, in a dangerous situation leaders don’t need to create more emotion; instead, they need to be able to temper people’s feelings in order to create focus.”

Ontem, no final de uma auditoria de dois dias, durante a reunião final, elogiava o que tinha encontrado. Elogiava sobretudo o esforço que uma empresa fez para mudar de vida. Há 7 ou 8 anos, quando os conheci, estavam a tentar sobreviver às consequências da crise de 2008-2011, dependiam de um cliente em assustadora medida, e um cliente num negócio de preço, com margens esmagadas.

Acolheram a mensagem deste blogue e hoje em dia transpiram saúde, o negócio do preço representa menos de um quarto do total (tem a vantagem de ser um pinga-pinga assegurado), e cresceram e abriram negócios em áreas com margens interessantes.

Comentava que ao contrário de outras empresas do mesmo sector, algumas bem maiores e mais reputadas, eu estava perante uma empresa com um pensamento para além do amanhã, já a pensar em novas áreas onde quer entrar nos próximos anos. Na altura, lembrei-me do cortisol, esse químico segregado pelo nosso corpo para nos ajudar em momentos de perigo, lembrei-me dos animais que até abortam naturalmente para que toda a energia e atenção se foque na fuga ao perigo.

Muitas empresas do mesmo sector nunca quiseram ou souberam diminuir a dependência do cliente do preço. Vivem apertadas, pressionadas, descapitalizadas, o cortisol já lhes invadiu o cérebro e concentra-as no aqui e agora.

Trecho retirado de “Seeing Around Corners” de Rita McGrath.

"Begin there, with obsessive focus"

“There’s a dangerous prank that relies on thief-detector dye. This dye, sold as a powder, is quite bright and a tiny bit goes a long way. Once the powder touches the moisture on your skin, it blooms into a bright purple and won’t easily wash off.
Drop a teaspoon of it into a swimming pool, and all the water in the pool will become permanently bright purple. But if you drop it in the ocean, no one will notice.
.
When you seek to share your best work—your best story, your shot at change—it helps if it’s likely to spread. It helps if it’s permanent. But even if it’s extraordinary, it’s not going to make a difference if you drop it in the ocean.
That doesn’t mean you give up hope.
.
It means you walk away from the ocean and look for a large swimming pool.That’s enough to make a difference. Begin there, with obsessive focus. Once it works, find another swimming pool. Even better, let your best customers spread the idea.”

Excerto de: Seth Godin. “This Is Marketing”.

"Measuring what matters"

Voltar a Agosto de 2008 e a uma das frases mais importantes dos meus últimos 10 anos:

"the most important orders are the ones to which a company says 'no'."

Dizer não, implica ter um critério de escolha.

“It is our choices . . . that show what we truly are, far more than our abilities” (J. K. Rowling)

“Measuring what matters begins with the question: What is most important for the next three (or six, or twelve) months? Successful organizations focus on the handful of initiatives that can make a real difference, deferring less urgent ones. Their leaders commit to those choices in word and deed. By standing firmly behind a few top-line OKRs, they give their teams a compass and a baseline for assessment. (Wrong decisions can be corrected once results begin to roll in. Nondecisions—or hastily abandoned ones—teach us nothing.) What are our main priorities for the coming period? Where should people concentrate their efforts? An effective goal-setting system starts with disciplined thinking at the top, with leaders who invest the time and energy to choose what counts.”

 Na empresa desta reunião só pretendem sistematizar um conjunto de indicadores. Identificámos os clientes-alvo e o que procuram e valorizam. Daí seleccionámos um grupo de indicadores.


Fica a faltar ser puxado pelo futuro, fica a faltar deixar a postura do gestor para abraçar a do líder que já viu o futuro e quer puxar a empresa para lá. Uma coisa são indicadores para termos uma noção fundamentada se estamos a cumprir ou não os níveis de desempenho considerados normais. Outra coisa é mudar o status-quo.

Excertos de: Doerr, John. “Measure What Matters: How Google, Bono, and the Gates Foundation Rock the World with OKRs”. iBooks.

"empresas pequenas cheias de ganas de experimentar" (parte II)

O texto da parte I fez-me recuar a "O que é isto senão Mongo?" e ao texto "In Technology, Small Fish (Almost Always) Eat Big Fish":

"When you start looking at the world through this lens — that when small meets large, small almost always wins — you see it everywhere, across all tech sectors. It's so prevalent, in fact, that I consider it an industry law, in this case, “Leslie’s Law.” More examples to follow, but first, let’s take a closer look at how this plays out..When a sleek, small player enters the market, it does so by creating a low-friction, high-fit product that is sold at a low price to a large market. These new products are sold to a portion of the market that cannot access the larger products due to the cost of entry (in dollars and complexity) and the cost of ownership. The larger company may not even notice that the new company has entered the market because there are no mano-a-mano customer confrontations..This leaves the smaller company free to expand upward into the market. Its leading-edge customers whose needs are expanding, and its own interest in expanding its market upward, spurs it on to increase the features and functionality of its products. From the perspective of the large incumbent companies, this upward migration is imperceptible. They aren't worried, so they don't pay attention to it. But it’s happening..Inevitably, by the time the threat becomes compelling, it’s too late. The small company has taken root, developing the advantages of a lower-cost structure with a simpler, lower-friction product. A new ecosystem has already sprung up around its core offerings. It’s here to stay, and its inroads into the incumbent’s territory can’t be stopped."

Enquanto a empresa da parte I "ataca" o mercado entrando por cima, aytavés da inovação, apelando ao gosto pelo risco dos underserved visionários de Geoffrey Moore, o texto desta parte II refere-se aos que entram por baixo, servindo os overserved, o exemplo clássico de disrupção de Christensen.

Sentido de urgência (parte I)

O meu avatar nas redes sociais é este

A mensagem inicial era a da burning platform. Parte do meu trabalho, quando facilito projectos de transformação estratégica em empresas, é a de instilar um sentido de urgência. Urgência de mudar. Recordar:

• "Criar uma "burning platform""
• "A "sense of urgency", a "burning platform""
• "Várias leituras... (parte II)"

Por isso, mergulhei com interesse no artigo "We need to intensify our sense of urgency" publicado pela HBR de maio de 2016:

"I had underestimated the benefit of focus, because you can’t put it in a cash flow model. It’s a remarkable accelerant.[Moi ici: Recordar a atenção que sempre demos ao foco neste espaço. Foco é terrível, obriga a fazer renúncias... pois, pobre ou com saúde]
...
So we set out on a turnaround journey, which I predicted would take five years. I said, “What are the core values of this company? Let’s identify what it does really well and do more of that as the anchor for the turnaround. [Moi ici: Mesmo uma multinacional, quando está à rasca, faz o que propomos às PME, começar pelo ADN, começar por onde podem fazer a diferença, começar pelo que pode ser um ponto forte. Mais, até esta multinacional seguiu o que recomendo às PME que façam e não seguiu a treta dos livros] Then let’s make a to-do list of the things to be fixed.” So we went back to our core founding principles, and the company responded.
...
But I didn’t spend a lot of time worrying about how we got here. I was just determined to turn the ship around. The first step was to decide whether to spin off the PC business. The second was to get our cost structure in line with the revenue trajectory, because in 2012 revenues declined by more than 5%. When you have declining revenues, you have to manage your cost structure very aggressively in order to expand margins and save for investment in what’s needed to fix the company. [Moi ici: Grego clássico, ou aramaico pré-cristão para político ou funcionário público. Bê-á.bá para qualquer empresário com dois dedos de testa] Next we had to reignite the innovation engine.
...
“Authentic leadership” is a term that’s used a lot. What does it mean to you?
You have to be exactly who you are, because ultimately people will see through you if you’re not leading in an authentic way. For me, it’s about very simple, straightforward communication. Our industry tends to do a lot of technospeak, to make things more complicated than they need to be. With a company this size, you have to speak clearly and lay out the objectives so that your teams can explain what’s happening to customers and partners and one another."[Moi ici: Como não pensar na situação política actual e na treta fragilista]

Temos a hipótese de escolher

"Focus is a choice.
.
The runner who is concentrating on how much his left toe hurts will be left in the dust by the runner who is focusing on winning.
.
Even if the winner's toe hurts just as much.
.
Hurt, of course, is a matter of perception. Most of what we think about is.
.
We have a choice about where to aim the lens of our attention."

Por isto, fico doente quando vejo empresários com o locus de controlo no exterior. Concentram-se mais na política dos apoios e subsídios, das protecções e benesses do que em ganhar clientes.
.
Recuar a 2007 e a "Isto é mesmo um desafio digno de Hercules"

Trecho retirado de "Depth of field"

Salami slicers

Salami slicers!
.
Não, não os da figura, antes uma metáfora.
.
Ontem, aprendi mais uma metáfora, a dos salami slicers.
.
Lembram-se da série sobre o tecto de vidro? Recordar "Tecto de vidro? Uma hipótese de explicação (parte XVIII)" acerca das empresa que param de crescer, que estagnam, que têm rentabilidades de caca porque não se focam, porque querem servir tudo a todos. No mesmo sentido também esta outra série "Assim, talvez ter inimigos entre os clientes ou ex-clientes seja bom sinal (parte II)".
.
Já perdi a conta às dicussões com empresários que acham que a sua empresa tem de ser uma espécie de one-stop-shop.
.
- Ó Carlos Cruz, temos de ter tudo, não podemos deixar que os clientes tenham de ir à concorrência buscar algo que não temos no portefolio!
.
Quem são os salami slicers?

"The idea of a multipurpose or ‘generalist’ club that provides a broad range of services under one roof being slowly ‘salami-sliced’ by nimble and highly focused substitutes should be front of mind for those responsible for navigating a club’s future.
...
What is a salami-slicer?
A highly specialised fitness offering which excels in one thing that attracts away a significant minority of members from a ‘generalist’ club that provides a broad range of services under one roof.
...
The new reality is that consumers do not just ‘like’ these salami-slicers, they ‘love’ them, which means the bar for all other providers is rising."

Um conselho importante:

"What advice do you have for independent club operators who feel their business being salami-sliced and threatened by an increasing number of competitors?- CR Get brutally self-aware of your business. [Moi ici: Esta capacidade de olhar friamente para o que se está a passar no negócio, de não estar com paninhos quentes e águas mornas. Esqueça a treta socialista do feel-good, como consultor, não lhe trago pancadinhas nas costas, vou mais por Mateus 10, 34-36] To do that, seek feedback from current, previous and potential members and analyse usage, financial, competitive and business data to understand the strengths, weaknesses and opportunities for your business. Once you have that information, put together a candid, smart, creative and savvy team to devise strategy and tactics for your business to thrive. Moderate that room with a whiteboard, no hierarchy and little regard for the status quo."

Trechos retirados de "Health club industry mid-market report – investigating how brands are repositioning in an era of rising competition" (Researched and written by Ray Algar, Managing Director, Oxygen Consulting, UK. December 2015) 

Curiosidade do dia

"Our life's journey is about making choices and focusing on what is important.
...
When you do take the time to focus, he adds, something profound happens."

Trechos retirados de "A 3-Minute Reminder About The Little Things We Take For Granted"

Acerca da importância do foco (parte III)

Parte I e parte II.

"THE STRATEGIC PURPOSE OF SACRIFICEHmm, Sacrifice. Isn’t this just clear prioritization by any other name? The difference between Sacrifice and prioritization is that the latter allows secondary and tertiary targets. Sacrifice means not doing these secondary and tertiary things at all.
.
Sacrifice’s value, therefore, is not simply one of concentration of marketing forces externally; it also has an internal value similar to hardpruning a plant: all the energy, all the dynamism in the company becomes devoted to the primary goal.
...
1. Sacrifice concentrates the internal and external expressions ofidentity by eliminating activities that might dilute it.
2. Sacrifice allows the creation of strong points of difference by changing the organization’s mind-set from pursuing weak universal appeal to a more intense, narrower appeal (and thereby avoiding becoming the ‘‘mush in the middle’’).
3. Sacrifice generates critical mass for the communication of that identity and those differences by stripping away other secondary marketing activity. This is central to maximizing the Challenger’s consumer presence, given its more limited marketing resources.
.
While the Brand Leader perceives its currency to be mass appeal and can afford the dilution of preference that creates because it is compensated for by the convenience of its ubiquity and distribution, Challengers need more extreme actions and gestures - they need to create a greater proportion of ‘‘committed’’ and ‘‘enthusiastic’’ users through real differentiation.
.
Challenger currency is therefore not means but extremes: top-box preference scores or nothing.
...
For any brand, positioning is Sacrifice; for a Challenger, it is the path to growth. What it chooses not to do defines who and what it really is."

Trechos retirados de "Eating the Big Fish" de Adam Morgan.

Acerca da importância do foco (parte II)

Parte I.
.
Entretanto em "Eating the Big Fish" de Adam Morgan encontro todo um capítulo dedicado à importância da renúncia para as PME, segundo uma vertente diferente:

"In the world of clutter and information saturation that consumers are faced with, the greatest danger facing a brand is not rejection, but indifference.
...
the solution to indifference for a Challenger lies in both a strong identity and, through this, a strong relationship with its consumer base. Inevitably, this means that success for the Challenger brand comes from considering very carefully what it is going to Sacrifice in order to create this relationship and identity. Indeed, the ability to sacrifice and concentrate one’s focus, voice, and actions more narrowly is one of the few advantages a Challenger has. Having to fight a war on two fronts weakens the ability to do either really well and Brand Leaders have to fight on many fronts at once.
...
Challengers recognize, ... that in order to break through, their only currency with the consumer is going to be strong preference. If they achieve simply weak preference or parity preference, all the other attributes the market leader has on its side will swing the vote in its favor: ubiquity, social acceptability, salience, convenience. And to create that strong preference, we as Challengers accept that we will need to do things that reach out and bind certain groups of people very strongly to us. And we will also accept that, in order to create those stronger relationships, these same actions or behaviors may (and probably will) leave other groups cold.
...
The Sacrifices a Challenger makes do not lie in incidentals to the business, such as minor line extensions, a research budget, or the assistant public relations manager. They are instead fundamentals: distribution, messages, audiences, even issues like promotional pricing, or our deliberate lack of it (T-box, unlike the rest of the ready-to-wear category, never offers seasonal discounts). The overriding objective is to have significant impact of the right kind on your core audience, to achieve critical mass for your voice.
...
Although ubiquity in distribution is good for establishment brands like Coca-Cola and AT&T, it is dangerous for Challenger brands looking to create a stronger affinity with a more focused target, be they self-styled fashion rebels, surfing wannabes, or weekend mountain bikers.
...
there is no escape: Strong brands are necessarily simple and single-minded in their communication, even if it means sacrificing what might seem to be important secondary messages.
...
As a Challenger, we have to use our more limited resources (people, time, passion, energy, money) against the few things that will really make a difference, and this means being very clear on both who we are and what we are going to Sacrifice to promote that identity. Focus on the products, experiences, and marketing that will genuinely break through."

Assim, concentração não só por causa do encaixe do mosaico estratégico (recordar Terry Hill) mas também para reforçar a mensagem de marketing, mas também para criar uma identidade forte.
.
Continua.

Acerca da importância do foco (parte I)

Quando comecei a trabalhar estratégia com PME chamava a atenção para a importância do foco, da concentração nos clientes-alvo.
.
Mostrava como a escolha de diferentes tipos de clientes-alvo implicava apostar em diferentes prioridades contraditórias entre si.

Depois, conheci Terry Hill e Skinner e a sua plant-within-plant:

Recordo de 2008:

"the most important orders are the ones to which a company says 'no'."

Recordo Jonathan Byrnes:

"in a typical company, 30 to 40% of revenues are actually unprofitable, while another fraction of revenues — often more like 20 to 30% — accounts for most of the organization’s profitability."

Recordo Kotler:

"Philip Kotler no livro “Marketing para o século XXI” chama a atenção para a relação 20/80/30.
Já ouviu falar dela?
De certeza que já ouvi falar na relação 20/80.
80% dos lucros de uma empresa são gerados pelos 20 clientes mais rentáveis.
E os 30? O que querem dizer?
Os 30 clientes menos rentáveis provocam um corte de metade dos lucros de uma empresa.
Pense bem no significado, no impacte, desta relação… "

Recordo as curvas de Stobachoff:

Recordo a polarização dos mercados e o "Stuck-in-the-middle".
.
Tudo razões para defender que uma PME não pode ir a todas, tem de seleccionar os seus clientes-alvo e tem de se organizar para os servir. Servir bem um tipo de clientes implica não servir bem outro tipo de clientes.
.
Entretanto, encontrei mais uma razão para a necessidade de focalizar.
.
Continua.

O que é isto senão Mongo?

Via @armando_moreira cheguei a este artigo "Salesforce cofounder explains where big old tech companies like Microsoft often go wrong" cim uma mensagem tão querida deste blogue:

"Salesforce is expected to surpass $6 billion in revenue this year, making it the fastest enterprise software company to ever do so. Now it’s worth over $45 billion..It took almost 16 years for Salesforce to get to this point, but its cofounder Parker Harris believes there’s one key reason to its massive growth in a relatively short period of time: focus..Unlike some of its bigger rivals like Oracle and SAP, who are virtually in every area of enterprise software, Salesforce has kept its business focused on the customer relationship management (CRM) space, largely comprised of sales, marketing, and service automation....“Many people have said we just need to add more products. Look at Oracle, look at SAP. Add ERP and inventory or compensation. Add all this stuff,” Harris told IDG. “What we realized is we’re the customer company. We’re the front office solution and our customers would be really upset if we just added a whole bunch of stuff and lost focus.”"

Foco, foco, foco!
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Em vez de querer ser tudo para todos, em vez de uma oferta alargada, just-in-case"; foco, foco, foco!!!
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Interessante como o tema está presente numa série de outros artigos publicados recentemente.
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Por exemplo, "In Technology, Small Fish (Almost Always) Eat Big Fish" (este artigo merece outro postal futuro, sobre outra vertente) pode ler-se:

"Eventually, and inevitably, these “small” entrants eat their way up the food chain into the market, capturing a larger and larger share, until the behemoths of the sector are forced to retreat back into a narrowing market niche.
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One sterling example is in the CRM (customer relationship management) space. For as long as anyone could remember, the market was owned by Siebel. It was big, offering an incredibly complex solution that had to be installed for customers on their servers, licensed in bulk, with tons of training and customer service attached. Sounds unwieldy, but it was the norm, and everyone needed it.
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Then along came a company called Salesforce.com, offering just one capability of the many Siebel already provided. Only they offered it differently — instead of having to buy hundreds of licenses, customer companies could pay per employee using Salesforce.com, and use it in their web browsers hassle free. They became the automatic choice for the many young companies that couldn’t afford to do anything but start small with SaaS.
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Even so, the larger incumbents like Siebel comforted themselves that enterprise customers would never entrust their precious data and prospect lists to an offsite cloudbased system. Today, Salesforce.com completely dominates the CRM market and has an enormous ecosystem around it. Siebel, having had their lunch eaten right in front of them, became acquisition bait for Oracle.
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Salesforce.com’s ascent highlights the momentum of all cloud solutions, led by small, specialized companies purveying simple, easy-to-understand benefits for consumers and enterprises alike. Think Dropbox and Box, respectively. They are now what people think of when they hear the term “cloud,” not the large, vertically integrated storage solutions of yesteryear.
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[Moi ici: Recordando o exemplo de ontem sobre as peúgas, sobre a decomoditização] Your rallying objective should be to build something truly great for the low end of the marketplace, solving an important problem with a simple, low-friction product in a segment of the market that's underserved by the incumbents. Once you've achieved excellent market traction in this arena, you can nibble your way upward until you're competitive with the heavyweights of your industry."

Ainda um outro artigo sobre o poder do foco "The Increasing Fragmentation of SaaS":

"According to ChiefMarTec, in 2015 there are 1875 marketing technology companies, up from 947 last year. If the number of marketing software companies is any indication, there is a huge expansion in the number of SaaS companies in almost every segment including sales tools, engineering productivity, finance, and human resources.
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This fragmentation trend has been happening for quite some time. In the old model of software procurement, companies would call one of the large software monoliths (Oracle, SAP, IBM, etc) and negotiate an enterprisewide license for a software suite to serve the majority of their departments. These suite offerings promised simplified negotiation and procurement, a single integrated platform with free data interchange across departments, and one point of support. But, this promise was never fulfilled. For example, according to a recent study by Panorama Consulting Solutions, the average
ERP implementation requires 16 months to deploy and 20% of them are considered failures.
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The alternative, which is the fragmented market of today, enables teams to purchase best-of-breed point solutions, try them, and quickly cycle through all the different offerings until they find the best one for their needs. This change in purchasing behavior is happening broadly across SaaS.
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These department specific software stacks serve their customers much better than a single suite ever could, because each team in each company can select precisely the products that offer the features that meet their specific needs. and if requirements should change, it’s as simple as canceling a subscription, and starting with another product."

O que é isto senão Mongo? Diversidade, focalização, especialização, decomoditização...
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BTW, em sectores completamente diferentes, recordar:

• "Hits" versus nichos;
• "Ter uma estratégia clara = escolhas claras = ideias claras = desejar sucesso à concorrência (parte V)"

A lição da biologia:

Especialização, diferenciação, nichos...

Qual a empresa com mais foco?

Leio "Audi vai investir 24 mil milhões até 2019 para ultrapassar BMW" e pressinto logo que estamos em mais um daqueles momentos em que uma empresa grande, secundada por consultores de topo, resolve dar o passo em frente para a asneira.
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Primeiro, a preocupação com a concorrência.
Segundo, a preocupação com a quota de mercado.
Terceiro, a ideia de ser tudo para todos:

"O objectivo da Audi é alargar o número de modelos dos actuais 50 para 60 até 2020."

Quantos modelos tem a BMW?
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Qual a empresa com mais foco?

Um desafio... o desafio

O desafio por excelência é o da concentração no que é essencial (o subtítulo do livro).
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Focar a atenção para o que interessa é tão difícil...
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"The second lesson is the actual wisdom of his thinking concerning technology, which touches on the line of thinking which says it's not the thing that's important, it's the *experience* of the thing.
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Garr sobre Steve Jobs "Steve Jobs & the art of focus"

The “plant within a plant” (PWP)

Nestes tempos de incerteza em que o middle-market traiçoeiro está a aumentar as suas fronteiras, as fronteiras de retornos financeiros medíocres, julgo que faz todo o sentido regressar aos clássicos e procurar paralelismos entre o que se vive hoje e o que se viveu no passado.
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Assim, recomendo vivamente a leitura do artigo de Wickham Skinner "The Focused Factory" publicado originalmente na revista Harvard Business Review em Maio de 1974.
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O artigo pode ser acedido aqui.
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Um trecho sobre como caminhar para a fábrica focada e dedicada:
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“In my experience, manufacturing managers are generally astounded at the internal inconsistencies and compromises they discover once they put the concept of focused manufacturing to work in analyzing their own plants.
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Then, when they begin to discern what the company strategy and market situation are implicitly demanding and to compare these implicit demands with what they have been trying to achieve, many submerged conflicts surface.
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Finally, when they ask themselves what a certain element of the structure or of the manufacturing policy was designed to maximize, the built-in cross-purposes become apparent.
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At the risk of seeming to take a cookbook approach to an inevitably complex set of issues, let me offer a recipe for the focused factory based on an actual but disguised example of an industrial manufacturing company which attempted to adapt its operations to this concept.
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Consider this four-step approach of, say, the WXY Company, a producer of mechanical equipment:
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1. Develop an explicit, brief statement of corporate objectives and strategy. The statement should cover the next three to five years, and it should have the substantial involvement of top management, including marketing, finance, and control executives.
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In its statement, the top management of the WXY Company agreed to the following:
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“Our corporate objective is directed toward increasing market share during the next five years via a strategy of (1) tailoring our product to individual customer needs, (2) offering advanced and special product features at a modest price increment, and (3) gaining competitive advantage via rapid product development and service orientation to customers of all sizes.” (esta abordagem de certa forma faz a empres voltar aos seus tempos de arranque em que tinha poucos clientes e poucos produtos e, por isso, era extremamente enfocada no essencial, a empresa não tinha recursos para desperdiçar em floreados)
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2. Translate the objectives-and-strategy statement into “what this means to manufacturing.” What must the factory do especially well in order to carry out and support this corporate strategy? What is going to be the most difficult task it will face? If the manufacturing function is not sharp and capable, where is the company most likely to fail? It may fail in any one of the elements of the production structure, but it will probably do so in a combination of some of them.
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3. Make a careful examination of each element of the production system. How is it now set up, organized, focused, and manned? What is it now especially good at? How must it be changed to implement the key manufacturing task?
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4. Reorganize the elements of structure to produce a congruent focus. This reorganization focuses on the ability to do those limited things well which are of utmost importance to the accomplishment of the manufacturing task.
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The reader may perceive a disturbing implication of the focused plant concept—namely, that it seems to call for major investments in new plants, new equipment, and new tooling, in order to break down the present complexity.
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For example, if the company is currently involved in five different products, technologies, markets, or volumes, does it need five plants, five sets of equipment, five processes, five technologies, and five organizational structures? The answer is probably yes. But the practical solution need not involve selling the big multipurpose facility and decentralizing into five small facilities.
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In fact, the few companies that have adopted the focused plant concept have approached the solution quite differently. There is no need to build five plants, which would involve unnecessary investment and overhead expenses.
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The more practical approach is the “plant within a plant” (PWP) notion in which the existing facility is divided both organizationally and physically into, in this case, five PWPs. Each PWP has its own facilities in which it can concentrate on its particular manufacturing task, using its own work-force management approaches, production control, organization structure, and so forth. Quality and volume levels are not mixed; worker training and incentives have a clear focus; and engineering of processes, equipment, and materials handling are specialized as needed.
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Each PWP gains experience readily by focusing and concentrating every element of its work on those limited essential objectives which constitute its manufacturing task. Since a manufacturing task is an offspring of a corporate strategy and marketing program, it is susceptible to either gradual or sweeping change. The PWP approach makes it easier to perform realignment of essential operations and system elements over time as the task changes.”