SDCA e PDCA

Encontrei este esquema nos slides de uma multinacional. O clássico PDCA.

Olhei para aquela caixa "Improvements" no lugar do "Act" e pensei logo o quanto prefiro antes o CAPD:

• PDCA vs CAPD

Check - Avaliar o desempenho
Act - Decidir o que melhorar
Plan - Planear o que experimentar
Do - Realizar a experiência

Mas melhor ainda a proposta de Shoji Shiba, relacionar o SDCA com o PDCA:

Standard - Ter um padrão de operação
Do - Actuar de acordo com o standard
Check - Avaliar o desempenho
Act - Decidir o que melhorar
Plan - Planear o que experimentar
Do - Realizar a experiência
Check - Avaliar o desempenho
Act - Actualizar o standard


Faz muito mais sentido.

• Não-conformidades, acções correctivas e preventivas (Dezembro de 2007)
• Exemplo de acção preventiva (parte IX) (Maio de 2009)

Ainda acerca do EFQM

Por que não começamos pelo elo mais fraco, por que não começamos pela verificação das deficiências que têm de ser ultrapassadas, somos tentados pelos grandes projectos... bons porque sim.

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Por isso é que falhamos quando praticamos o empurrar em vez do puxar...

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Por isso é que falhamos quando apostamos no PDCA em vez de no CAPD... está tudo aqui.

Que resultados para a inovação (parte III)

Há dias reflectia neste espaço sobre a “Intuição vs Procedimentação” onde, com base nas palavras de Gary Klein:
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“Many organizations attempt to take refuge in procedures. This happens when supervisors play it safe and reduce the task to procedures even if those procedures don’t really capture all of the nuances and tricks of the trade. Turning a job into a set of procedures makes it easier for new workers to carry out their responsibilities, and it also supports accountability by letting managers more easily verify if the procedures were followed.
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Unfortunately, this practice can make it even harder to build up intuitions if the procedures eliminate the need for judgment calls. Clearly, we need procedures to help us react quickly to emergencies, or to orient new workers. Once a set of procedures is in place, however, supervisors may not bother teaching the skills workers need to understand or modify the procedures.This is how the expertise that makes a company great gets lost. There is a strong tendency in our culture to proceduralize almost everything, to reduce all types of work to a series of steps. But you cannot reduce intuition to a procedure.
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Organizations may try to reduce decisions and judgments to procedures by defining metrics (i.e., measurable objectives). Metrics are often seen as a way to replace intuitions. They can be useful as a corrective to relying too heavily on impressions, but if managers try to make decisions based on numbers alone they run the risk of eroding their intuitions.”
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Aquela última frase “but if managers try to make decisions based on numbers alone they run the risk of eroding their intuitions“ está em linha com o artigo de Julho-Agosto da Harvard Business Review “Restoring Competitiveness” de Gary Pisano e Willy Shih.
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“Recognize the limits of financial tools.
Most companies are wedded to highly analytical methods for evaluating investment opportunities. Still, it remains enormously hard to assess long-term R&D programs with quantitative techniques—even sophisticated ones like real-options valuation and Monte Carlo simulations. Usually, the data, or even reasonable estimates, are simply not available. Nonetheless, all too often these tools become the ultimate arbiter of what gets funded and what does not. So short-term projects with more predictable outcomes beat out the long-term investments needed to replenish technical and operating capabilities. Managers would serve their companies more wisely by recognizing that informed judgment is a better guide to making such decisions than an analytical model loaded with arbitrary assumptions. There is no way to take the guesswork out of the process.”
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Pois bem, através do blogue de Don Sull onde se pode ler isto:
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“Rely exclusively on process to execute. Many managers equate execution with standardized processes. They re-engineer key procedures and employ process disciplines, including six sigma, or total quality management to ensure continuous improvement. These approaches work well for activities–such as processing transactions or manufacturing cars–that can be laid out in advance and repeated thousands or millions of times per year with minimal variation. Process tools work less well for activities that consume much of the typical knowledge workers time, including coordinatinating work across a matrix or generating innovative solutions to unique problems.”
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Descobri este artigo “TQM, ISO 9000, Six Sigma: Do Process Management Programs Discourage Innovation?” onde se pode ler:
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“Yet Wharton management professor Mary J. Benner says now may be the time to reassess the corporate utility of process management programs and apply them with more discrimination. In research done with Harvard Business School professor Michael Tushman, she has found that process management can drag organizations down and dampen innovation. "In the appropriate setting, process management activities can help companies improve efficiency, but the risk is that you misapply these programs, in particular in areas where people are supposed to be innovative," notes Benner. "Brand new technologies to produce products that don't exist are difficult to measure. This kind of innovation may be crowded out when you focus too much on processes you can measure."”
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Antes de continuar a leitura recomendo um postal que escrevi em Junho de 2007 “Não culpem a caneta quando a culpa é de quem escreve!“ de onde retiro o seguinte trecho:
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“Como procuro demonstrar aqui, num mercado muito competitivo, é muito difícil conciliar na mesma organização, duas posturas mentais distintas. Não se pode impunemente, à segunda, terça e quarta apostar na eficiência, para depois, à quinta, sexta e sábado apostar na "boutique" das pequenas séries, no "atelier" das novidades. O 6 Sigma é uma ferramenta talhada para apoiar os negócios na redução dos custos, eficiência, não é uma ferramenta dedicada à eficácia, à criação do UAUUUUU, associado à inovação, à diferenciação.”
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Neste postal Como descobri que não é suficiente optimizar os processos-chave. (3/3) refiro algo a que costumo chamar a atenção nas acções de formação, os processos que constituem uma organização podem ser divididos em duas categorias: os processos contexto e os processos nucleares.
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Aos processos contexto podemos e devemos aplicar os métodos de melhoria da eficiência.
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Aos processos nucleares, fundamentais para a execução e diferenciação estratégica, devemos preocupar-nos acima de tudo com a eficácia. As preocupações com a eficiência nestes processos corta as pernas ao potencial de explosão estratégica.
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"Benner & Tushman (2003) warn agains explicit focus on incremental innovation which is achieved by process management orientation which results in innovation that is closesly related to existing technological or market competencies. Organizations that must meet current customer requirements and new customer demands must deal simultaneously with the inconsistent demands of exploitation and exploration. Authors suggest that appropriate answer is an ambidextrous organization which allows for both exploratory and exploitative activities to be spurred by loose and tight organizational arrangements. Benner & Tushman (2003) suggest that within processes, the tasks, culture, individuals, and organizational arrangements are consistent, but across subunits tasks and cultures are inconsistent and loosely coupled. Tight exploitation units in technologically stable settings, will benefit by reducing variability and maximizing efficiency and control by introducing process management techniques. On the other hand, n turbulent environments, for new customer segments and for radical innovation, process management activities are less conducive to organizational effectiveness. Exploratory units will succeed by experimentation, which is encouraged by introducing variety and loose control."

Que resultados para a inovação (parte II)

Em tempos (Novembro de 2006) escrevi "Que resultados para a INOVAÇÃO?"

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Acerca do, então, projecto de norma prNP 4457 sobre a "Gestão da Investigação Desenvolvimento e Inovação - Requisitos do Sistema de Gestão da Investigação Desenvolvimento e Inovação, onde aproveitava para criticar a falta de concentração em objectivos, a demasiada importância dada ao PDCA em detrimento do CAPD.

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Pois bem, aconselho a leitura de "“TQM, ISO 9000, Six Sigma: Do Process Management Programs Discourage Innovation?”" onde se pode ler:

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"Benner and Tushman examined the photography and paint industries from 1980 to 1999, choosing these two industries for differences in their competitive arenas. "Photography was undergoing major change. It was a turbulent environment and there was a potential need for innovation," says Benner, referring to the move from chemical-based film to digital technology. "Paint was focused on cost reductions. It was trying to reduce solvents in paint as opposed to developing wacky new stuff."

The authors looked at the number of ISO 9000 quality program certifications obtained by the paint and photography firms, the numbers of patents issued to the firms and "the extent to which a firm's patenting efforts built on knowledge it had used in previous patents." In photography, increased ISO certifications were associated with "a significant decline in the number of patents that were based entirely on knowledge new to the firm." In paint, the effect was not as strong but echoed the photography industry's disappointing experience. The results suggest, the authors write, "that in both the paint and photography industries, as process management activities increase, exploitation increases at the expense of exploratory innovations." (a propósito de exploitation e exploration não esquecer James March).

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Espero amanhã voltar ao resto do artigo com a recordação de outro postal escrito em Junho de 2007 "Não culpem a caneta quando a culpa é de quem escreve!"

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Small Wins

Karl Weick, neste artigo de 1984, “Small Wins”, chama a importância para as pequenas vitórias.
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Algo que comecei a aprender com Robert Schaffer no seu livro “The Breakthrough Strategy” e que consolidei com o uso do acrónimo SMARTa para apoiar a redacção de objectivos.
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Specific
Measurable
Attainable
Responsibility
Time-framed
aligned
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Os projectos têm de ser atingíveis, têm de ser manejáveis, para isso, têm de ter uma dimensão adequada.
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O mesmo Robert Schaffer, e Harvey A. Thomson, escreveram um fabuloso artigo para a revista Harvard Business Review (Janeiro-Fevereiro de 1992), “Successful Change Programs Begin with Results”. Segundo os autores, a maior parte dos esforços de melhoria têm resultados neglicenciáveis , porque se concentram nas actividades a realizar e não nos resultados a atingir, e porque não existe nenhuma relação entre acção e consequências. Ao dedicarem-se a pequenos projectos, os gestores podem não só ver os resultados mais rapidamente como também determinar mais rapidamente o que está a resultar ou não.
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Muita gente prefere dedicar-se a grandes, a grandiosos e ambiciosos projectos. Projectos que se tornam, por isso, muito grandes, demasiado grandes e muito provavelmente monumentos à treta (parte I e parte II). (talvez uma consequência do empurrar em vez do puxar, do PDCA em vez do CAPD associado ao CASD)
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Boyd ao explicar como funcionou o conceito de blitzkrieg chamou a atenção para o conceito de schwerpunkt (parte I e parte II):
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“Schwerpunkt represents a unifying concept that provides a way to rapidly shape focus and direction of effort as well as harmonize support activities with combat operations, thereby permit a true decentralization of tactical command within centralized strategic guidance—without losing cohesion of overall effort.

or put another way

Schwerpunkt represents a unifying medium that provides a directed way to tie initiative of many subordinate actions with superior intent as a basis to diminish friction and compress time in order to generate a favorable mismatch in time/ability to shape and adapt to unfolding circumstances."
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Horst Rittel escreveu:
“· Simple problems (problems which are already defined) are easy to solve, because defining a problem inherently defines a solution.
· The definition of a problem is subjective; it comes from a point of view. Thus, when defining problems, all stake-holders, experts, and designers are equally knowledgeable (or unknowledgeable).
· Some problems cannot be solved, because stake-holders cannot agree on the definition. These problems are called wicked, but sometimes they can be tamed.”
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Assim, tudo se encaminha para o mesmo propósito, apostar em pequenos projectos, projectos que podem ser resolvidos rapidamente, projectos que podem fornecer resultados palpáveis rapidamente, projectos que podem ser mais facilmente geridos.
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Karl Weick chama a atenção para a as pequenas vitórias associadas a pequenos projectos:
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“To recast larger problems into smaller, less arousing problems, people can identify a series of controllable opportunities of modest size that produce visible results and that can be gathered into synoptic solutions.”
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“The following analysis of small wins assumes that arousal varies among people concerned with social problems, but tends to be relatively high, which affects the quality of performance directed at these problems.”
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“Sometimes problem solving suffers from too little arousal. When people think too much or feel too powerless, issues become depersonalized. This lowers arousal, leading to inactivity or apathetic performance.
The prospect of a small win has an immediacy, tangibility, and controllability that could reverse these effects.”
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“A small win is a concrete, complete, implemented outcome of moderate importance. By itself, one small win may seem unimportant. A series of wins at small but significant tasks, however, reveals a pattern that may attract allies, deter opponents, and lower resistance to subsequent proposals. Small wins are controllable opportunities that produce visible results.”
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“Once a small win has been accomplished, forces are set in motion that favor another small win. When a solution is put in place, the next solvable problem often becomes more visible. This occurs because new allies bring new solutions with them and old opponents change their habits. Additional resources also flow toward winners, which means that slightly larger wins can be attempted.
It is important to realize that the next solvable problem seldom coincides with the next "logical" step as judged by a detached observer. Small wins do not combine in a neat, linear, serial form, with each step being a demonstrable step closer to some predetermined goal. More common is the circumstance where small wins are scattered and cohere only in the sense that they move in the same general direction or all move away from some deplorable condition.”
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“A series of small wins can be gathered into a retrospective summary that imputes a consistent line of development, but this post hoc construction should not be mistaken for orderly implementation. Small wins have a fragmentary character driven by opportunism and dynamically changing situations. Small wins stir up settings, which means that each subsequent attempt at another win occurs in a different context. Careful plotting of a series of wins to achieve a major change is impossible because conditions do not remain constant.”
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“Small wins provide information that facilitates learning and adaptation. Small wins are like miniature experiments that test implicit theories about resistance and opportunity and uncover both resources and barriers that were invisible before the situation was stirred up.”

PDCA vs CAPD

• The organisation has a purpose.
• That purpose should be defined in the context of what matters to customers.
• The performance of the organisation will be governed by what happens at the points of transaction with customers.
• The starting-place for change is to understand what is happening predictably at the point(s) of transaction.
• Current capability - how well the organisation responds - is governed by the organisation's core processes.
• Measures of process performance should be established before the process is studied.

This last point is, in our experience, of critical importance. If you have not measured a process before studying it, how can you know whether it is worth improving, and how can you judge any improvement?

Trecho extraído de "The Vanguard Guide to YOUR ORGANISATION AS A SYSTEM"

Primeiro: Uma lógica, um continuum da finalidade da organização até aos resultados medidos.
Segundo: Começar pela medição, em vez de começar pelo planeamento. Optar pelo CAPD, em vez do PDCA.

Em vez de começar com planos, em vez de começar por grandes planos, prefiro que as organizações comecem pelo fim.

Que resultados temos e que resultados queremos, ou precisamos de ter. Perante a análise, a verificação, do "gap" entre os resultados actuais e os resultados futuros desejados, toma-se a decisão de agir (A), depois inicia-se a planificação (P) de acções instrumentais, porque só fazem sentido para atingir as metas.

Com o PDCA, o planeamento transforma-se muitas vezes num fim em si mesmo. Fanfarra, discursos, incineração de dinheiro e... pouco mais.

"Government likes to begin things—to declare grand new programs and causes and national objectives. But good beginnings are not the measure of success. What matters in the end is completion. Performance. Results. Not just making promises, but making good on promises."
George Bush