Contexto e teoria das restrições

Esta semana, na preparação de um workshop para o desenho de um mapa da estratégia, olho para um exemplo de Strategic-Current Reality Tree como este:

Ou este:

E o que vejo é um objectivo que se quer atingir (Aumentar a rentabilidade) e um conjunto de factores internos e externos negativos que conspiram para dificultar o cumprimento desse objectivo. O que vejo é um conjunto de elementos do contexto da empresa que têm potencial para se transformarem em riscos e dificultar o cumprimento do objectivo:

Nunca tinha organizado mentalmente estes tópicos sob este prima das cláusulas 4.1, 4.2 e 6.1 da ISO 9001.

Risk and objectives

With ISO 9001:2015 came the risk based approach, and with ISO 9000:2015 came a definition of risk:

"Risk - effect of uncertainty

Note 1 to entry: An effect is a deviation from the expected"

It took me just over two years to realize the importance of Note 1 and formulate this approach:

"Therefore, in a strategic approach, the policy must be broken down into objectives for the management system (MS). These objectives cannot be established in a vacuum, but must consider the external context of the organization, its internal reality, and the expectations and values of relevant interested parties.

...

Assessing the external context, internal reality, and interested parties expectations and values allows for the identification of a set of risks that could hinder the company's ability to achieve its performance objectives, as well as a set of opportunities that could potentially benefit the company's ability to reach its performance targets. These risks and opportunities should be evaluated, and actions should be taken to minimize risks and capitalize on opportunities, based on priorities. These actions will be part of achieving the objectives of the desired future MS.

...

Thus, clauses 4.1 and 4.2 of ISO 9001:2015 refer to a moment prior to defining objectives aligned with the policy, influencing it. Meanwhile, clause 6.1 of ISO 9001:2015 refers to a moment after defining objectives, which may contradict or benefit their fulfillment."

This means that we should not determine risks and opportunities in the abstract, but rather by considering the objectives of the management system. Failing to do so runs the serious risk of generating long lists of risks and opportunities resulting from free brainstorming, but with little added value for organizations.

I had never looked for the definition of risk in ISO 31000 ... until some weeks ago.

According to ISO 31000, risk is defined as the effect of uncertainty on objectives. This implies that risk is the possibility of a positive or negative impact on an organization's objectives. Uncertainty refers to the state of having incomplete or imperfect information about something.

The relationship between risk and uncertainty is that uncertainty is the source of risk. In other words, risk cannot exist without uncertainty. For example, if you know with certainty that something will happen, then there is no risk. However, if you don't know with certainty what will happen, then there is a risk.

ISO 31000 defines risk as the effect of uncertainty on objectives. This definition is important because it emphasizes the fact that risk is not just about the probability of something happening. It is also about the impact that something happening will have on an organization's objectives.

Here are some examples of how uncertainty can lead to risk:

• A company that is planning to launch a new product is uncertain about how the product will be received by consumers. This uncertainty could lead to risk if the product is not well-received and the company loses money.
• A bank is uncertain about the future of the economy. This uncertainty could lead to risk if the economy takes a downturn and the bank loses money.
• A government is uncertain about the future of the political climate. This uncertainty could lead to risk if there is a coup or other political instability.

As you can see, uncertainty can lead to risk in many different ways. It is important for organizations to understand the different types of uncertainty that they face and to develop strategies for managing them.

Uncertainty is generated by the internal and external context.

How do you determine risks in your MS, do you take objectives into account?

Quando acaba o dinheiro barato (parte II)

 Quando acaba o dinheiro barato ...

"If current trends continue, more VC- or private equity-backed startups will fall into bankruptcy this year than at any point since 2010.

In the first half of 2023, 338 U.S. companies filed for bankruptcy protection, according to newly released S&P Global Market Intelligence data, including 54 companies with private equity or venture capital backing. At that rate, 108 VC-backed startups will fail by year's end, besting the 95 that failed during 2010.

Why is this happening? Highly leveraged companies are dealing with headwinds they didn't face just a year ago. Because of rate hikes by the Federal Reserve, they're paying higher interest rates on loans. And it's become increasingly difficult to secure new money from investors. As a result, some companies can't bring in enough revenue to keep the business moving toward profitability and eventually a lucrative exit for their backers."

Trecho retirado de "Venture-backed startups are failing at record rates" 

Quando acaba o dinheiro barato

Muitas vezes ao longo dos anos tenho referido aqui no blog esta figura que criei em 2008:

Por exemplo:

• em 2022 -  We're not in Kansas anymore
• em 2017 - Antecipar a próxima jogada

Quando o preço do dinheiro desce, a rentabilidade necessária para um projecto sobreviver baixa, e vice versa. Vivemos mais de uma década de dinheiro barato... quais as implicações para os negócios habituados a baixo rentabilidade?

O NYT de ontem chama a atenção para o tema em "Corporate Debt Was Cheap, But Economy May Pay Price":

"Companies loaded up on cheap debt during an era of superlow borrowing costs to help finance their operations. The Fed has since lifted interest rates to a range of 5.25 to 5.5 percent from near zero, where they were as recently as March 2022.

The fear is that as debt comes due and businesses still in need of cash are forced to renew their financing at much higher interest rates, bankruptcies and defaults could accelerate. That risk is especially pronounced if the Fed keeps borrowing costs higher for longer - a possibility that investors have slowly come to expect.

...

The bankruptcies that have happened this year haven't seriously dented the economy so far. But analysts have warned they are symptomatic of the excesses that developed during a decade of historically low interest rates. And financial stress is unpredictable, so it poses a wild-card risk for the Fed as it tries to tame inflation. It hopes to do that without causing a recession.

...

As higher rates last, “more and more corporations will need to refinance into a higher-rate environment,”

...

But in a sign of the uncertainty over the severity of debt distress on the horizon, the Moody’s forecast also suggested that in a “severely pessimistic” scenario defaults on risky debt could jump to 13.7 percent in a year, higher than the 13.4 peak reached during the 2008 financial crisis."

Não há risco?

O JdN do passado dia 5 de Julho traz uma entrevista de várias páginas ao presidente da AEP, fiz alguns sublinhados:

"Entre o balanço do primeiro semestre e a perspetiva para o segundo "há questões constantes, nomeadamente a dificuldade de contratação de mão de obra a inflação e as taxas de juro, agora agravadas com a redução da procura interna cexterna que já se começa a fazer sentir", diz Luis Miguel Ribeiro, presidente da AEP ao Negócios.

...

O aumento dos custos de financiamento terá um efeito "significativo" ou "muito significativo" em dois terços das empresas, mais gravoso do que os 60% que garantem ter sofrido consequências da subida das taxas de juro.

...

Aevolução da procura interna um dos fatores com mais crescimento nas preocupações para a evolução da atividade, com 58% dos gestores a atribuirem-lhe um peso "significativo" ou "muito significativo"

...

Os inquiridos enunciam também o peso dos impostos como um dos fatores que vai ter impacto negativo na atividade até ao final do ano."

Até aqui o discurso do costume, o foco nas dificuldades, o foco nos problemas. Depois, apanho esta pérola:

"Que o Banco de Fomento permita, de uma vez por todas, que as empresas acedam a financiamento em melhores condições, à semelhança de muitos países da Europa com os quais competimos."

Como conciliar o comboio de queixas e dificuldades da primeira parte com o desejo de facilidades na sugunda parte? À luz da primeira parte não há risco acrescido em emprestar dinheiro às empresas? 

"Unpredictable demand"

"This week, the $350 bn company [Moi ici: Walmart] issued its second profit warning in just over two months, telling investors that surging inflation, particularly in the prices of food and fuel, was affecting its customers' ability to afford other goods.

...

Consumers are not only worrying that they have less money to spend after filling their fridges and cars, retailers say: more of their discretionary spending is going on experiences they missed out on earlier in the coronavirus pandemic, such as travel and eating out, rather than on clothes, furniture or appliances.

Unpredictable demand, particularly among the most cash-strapped consumers, is only part of the challenge, however. Several companies, fearing a repeat of the supply chain delays that burnt them last holiday season, have been stocking up early this year.

Mattel, the maker of Barbie dolls and Hot Wheels cars, reported last week that its inventories were up 43 per cent year on year, for example, while rival Hasbro also had unusually high inventory levels as it stocked up for toymakers' peak season.

'Importers don't trust supply chains anymore," explained Zvi Schreiber, chief executive of logistics booking service Freightos. 'Retailers are not taking any risk. If they can afford the inventory, they're stocking up ready now for the on » shopping season."

...

But the current combination of historically high inflation and historically low unemployment is one that even retailers of Walmart's vintage have no playbook for, said Stephanie Cegielski, vice-president of research for the shopping centre group ICSC.

"The struggle for everybody right now," she said, is that "we've never seen anything like this."

Mais material para pôr em causa as longas cadeias de fornecimento dos últimos 20 anos, são incompatíveis com elevados níveis de incerteza. Mais material para afectar a tal balança de forças.

Trechos retirados de "'We've never seen anything like this': US retailers compete to clear stock"

"how to shape the future"

 

 "The future is not about prediction but about shaping the future with agile experimentation on what works and what does not work

Regardless of how much you plan, you will not predict the future because neither customers nor companies can anticipate what is possible. The only way to push for radical innovation is to accept the uncertainty and thereby accepting that with more traditional planning we can not predict the future.

By saying so, I do not mean that we need no planning or management anymore. We even need it more than ever, but with a different aim. The aim should not be to predict the future but to plan a creative process how to shape the future."

Recordar o pensamento baseado no risco que a ISO 9001 propõe: o que pode correr mal? 

Recordar os rinocerontes cinzentos e os fragilistas:

A 2 de Janeiro de 2016 escrevi em "O não-fragilista prepara-se para os problemas":

"Os fragilistas partem do princípio que o pior não vai acontecer e, por isso, desenham planos que acabam por ser irrealistas ou pouco resilientes. Depois, quando as coisas acontecem, chega a hora de culpar os outros pelos problemas que não souberam prever, não quiseram prever, ou que ajudaram a criar."

Em Julho do mesmo ano em "O fragilismo" escrevi:

"O fragilismo espera sempre o melhor do futuro, não prevê sobressaltos. Acredita que os astros se vão alinhar em nosso favor, não vê necessidade de precaução, just in case."

Trecho retirado de "The missing part for business model innovation: The process" 

"Stop improvising"

 "Most organizations can cope with straightforward bad news, and so can most people. We absorb the shock, and move on. But what happens when we don’t know how bad the news actually is?

When it comes to crises, the news companies must deliver is often potential bad news. 

...

Communicating about uncertainty — what people call ‘risk communications’ in practice — has become one of the most important challenges faced by anyone who needs to convey or consume information.

...

The inherent challenge for risk communicators is people’s natural desire for certainty and closure.

...

To start to repair the trust deficit will require a significant retrofit of existing communications practices. Here are three places to start.

Stop improvising. Firms will never be able to reduce uncertainty to zero, but they can commit to engaging with customers around uncertainty in systematic, predictable ways.

...

Change the metric for success, and measure results. Avoiding negative press should not be the primary objective for firms that are faced with communicating uncertainty. In the short term, the primary goal should be to equip customers with the information they need to interpret uncertainty and act to manage their risk. In the long term, the goal should be to increase levels of ambient trust and to reduce risks where possible. Communicators need to demonstrate that what they are doing is working, by creating yardsticks that rigorously measure the effectiveness of communications against both these short and long term goals. ... Design for risk communications from the beginning. Consider what it would mean if every product were built from the start with the need to communicate uncertainty about how it will perform when released into the wild — that is, “risk communication by design.” 

...

People are naturally inclined to prefer certainty and closure, but in a world where both are in short supply, trust deficits aren’t an inevitable fact of nature. We’re optimistic that organizations can do better collectively by making disciplined use of the existing science."

Trechos retirados de "The Art of Communicating Risk" 

"Risk is failure of a projected narrative"

A ISO 9001 aborda a abordagem baseada no risco. 

“The Oxford Dictionary defines risk as ‘the possibility that something unpleasant or unwelcome will happen’,

…

Risk in its ordinary meaning concerns unfavourable events, not beneficial ones.

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Risk is asymmetric. We do not hear people say ‘there is a risk that I might win the lottery’ because winning the lottery is not something they would describe as a risk. They do not even say ‘there is a risk I might not win the lottery’ because they do not realistically expect to win the lottery. The everyday meaning of risk refers to an adverse event which jeopardises the realistic expectations of the individual household or institution. And so the meaning of risk is a product of the plans and expectations of that household or institution. Risk is necessarily particular. It does not mean the same thing to J. P. Morgan as it does to a paraglider or mountain climber, or to a household saving for retirement or the children’s education.

…

Very often, the risks that concern us are not risks to the status quo, but risks to our plans to change that status quo.

…

We believe the best way to understand attitudes to risk is through the concept of a reference narrative, a story which is an expression of our realistic expectations. For J. P. Morgan, the overarching reference narrative is one in which the bank continues profitable growth. A large corporation will have many strategies for achieving that overarching objective in particular areas of its business and there will be a reference narrative relating to each business unit. Some of these business unit reference narratives may be very risky, but the corporation may tolerate such risks provided they do not endanger the reference narrative of the organisation as a whole.

…

And since different people start with different reference narratives, the same risk may be assessed by different people in different ways. Risk may not be the same for those who work in an organisation as it is for the shareholders of that organisation.

…

Risk is failure of a projected narrative, derived from realistic expectations, to unfold as envisaged. The happy father anticipating his daughter’s wedding has in mind a reference narrative in which events go ahead as planned. He recognises a variety of risks – the prospective bridegroom has cold feet, a torrential downpour drenches the guests. There is an implied measure of risk in such assessment – an outcome can fall short of expectations by a narrow margin or a wide one. The scale of that risk may or may not be quantifiable, before or after the event. But this interpretation is very different to the view that has come to dominate quantitative finance and much of economics and decision theory: that risk can be equated to the volatility of outcomes.”

Trechos retirados de “Radical Uncertainty” de John Kay e Mervyn King 

Covid-19 - Direcção e iteração colaborativa

Quando comecei a trabalhar a ISO 14001, nos anos 90 do século passado, fiquei fascinado com a sua diferença face à ISO 9001.

Ao trabalhar com a ISO 9001 facilmente ficávamos prisioneiros da quantidade de procedimentos obrigatórios que tinhamos de criar. Por isso, os resultados no terreno demoravam a aparecer. Primeiro tinhamos de arquitectar e construir o sistema, traduzi-lo em procedimentos e só depois começar a implementação. A implementação, porque o consultor era tótó, ou porque a gestão de topo só estava interessada na bandeira, ou porque a empresa estava sobrecarregada de trabalho, mais parecia um calvário. O objectivo da implementação era chegar a algo que pudesse ser certificado e uma bandeira atribuída. Uma vez obtida a certificação, a empresa dizia-nos adeus, e raramente havia oportunidade mergulhar na melhoria do sistema.

Entretanto, na minha cabeça remoía um artigo de 1992 na HBR - "Successful Change Programs Begin with Results"

Ao trabalhar com a ISO 14001 descobria a possibilidade de desenhar um sistema de gestão virado para atingir resultados. Um sistema de gestão como um portfolio de projectos:

Acabei por publicar um livro onde explicava a metodologia. (BTW, um projecto interessante que nunca foi pago pela editora)

No ano passado descobri mais uma norma ambiental, confesso que não a conhecia, a ISO 14005:2019 - Environmental management systems — Guidelines for a flexible approach to phased implementation.

Esta norma apoia a implementação faseada de sistemas de gestão ambiental. O que é que isto quer dizer? Em vez de começar por montar um sistema de gestão ambiental completo, com todos os ésses e érres, começar por um desafio concreto, um desafio específico. Por exemplo, melhorar a eficiência energética, ou reduzir a produção de resíduos perigosos.

Por que escrevo sobre isto agora? Porque o meu parceiro das conversas oxigenadoras pôs-me a ler este livro, "The Lean Strategy" de Michael Ballé, Daniel Jones, Jacques Chaize, e Orest Fiume.

"Lean thinking starts with acting: solving immediate problems to better understand the deeper issues. It differs radically from the mainstream approach.
...
Lean thinking starts with find, in the real world, by identifying immediate problems right now, moves to face as we grasp which problems are easy to solve and which aren’t, what our deeper challenges are, then to frame these challenges in a way others will understand intuitively both (a) the problem we’re trying to solve and (b) the generic form of the solution we’re looking for, and then form the specific solutions through repeated try-and-see efforts with the people themselves until we, all together, build a new (often unforeseen) way of doing things
...
Effectively, the idea is that to learn anything, we first have to change something and then carefully check the results to evaluate the impact.
...
"Don’t look with your eyes. Look with your feet. Don’t think with you head. Think with your hands.”
...
The point is that running experiments and experiencing consequences is an ongoing process. It is more to accelerate the learning cycle—to learn and respond, then grasp with the current situation, then adjust again—than it is to establish large-scale goals and compare our progress to them on an occasional basis rather than as a constant state. Companies must use meaningful metrics to understand meaningful actions."

Entretanto, ontem ao folher um livro, "Managing Crises: Responses to Large-Scale Emergencies" de Arnold Howitt e Herman B. Leonard. Encontrei estes trechos:

"[Moi ici: As emergências podem ser de dois tipos, as de rotina e as de crise. As de rotina são aquelas para as quais as organizações se preparam e testam. São aquelas para as quais existem planos de resposta. Já a pandemia em curso é uma emergência de crise... não há plano, não houve preparação prévia] This is not a routine emergency. There are no scripts or templates—guides, check-lists, and norms that dictate the set of things that need to be done, their order, the way they are organized, and so on. An authority-driven command and control hierarchy is a good organizational form for producing the efficient execution of known and practiced routine actions.
...
This is a Crisis Emergency. This emergency has significant elements of novelty that organizations were not prepared for. The presence of significant novelty as the defining feature of crisis emergencies creates an array of distinctive challenges, requiring significantly different approaches, techniques, and processes by those engaged in them. Novelty comes in many forms and from many different sources.
...
During a crisis, leaders must relinquish the belief that a top-down response will engender stability. In routine emergencies, the typical company can rely on its command-and-control structure to manage operations well by carrying out a scripted response. But in crises characterized by uncertainty, leaders face problems that are unfamiliar and poorly understood. A small group of executives at an organization’s highest level cannot collect information or make decisions quickly enough to respond effectively. Leaders can better mobilize their organizations by setting clear priorities for the response and empowering others to discover and implement solutions that serve those priorities. To promote rapid problem solving and execution under high-stress, chaotic conditions, leaders can organize a network of teams." 

E ao chegar aqui ... recuo ao Natal de 2007 e a Boyd e à blitzkrieg (parte I e parte II):

"Give lower-level commanders wide freedom, within an overall mind-time-space scheme, to shape/direct their own activities so that they can exploit faster tempo/rhythm at tactical levels yet be in harmony with the larger pattern/slower rhythm associated with the more general aim and larger effort at the strategic level."

Como diz o meu parceiro das conversas oxigenadoras: uma pena as empresas não estarem a aproveitar esta crise para encontrarem uma plataforma de comunicação real com os seus trabalhadores... sim, o primeiro ciclo de Senge:

Risco do coronavírus e ficar à espera do papá-estado

Ontem ao almoço tive uma conversa interessante com o meu parceiro das conversas oxigenadoras.

A certa altura chamou-me a atenção para o socialismo em que estamos todos embrenhados, esperando que seja o governo a dizer-nos o que devemos fazer para nos preparamos para o coronavírus. Depois, à noite, sorri ao ler este tweet:

Mas o que é isto? Pais a não quererem assumir a responsabilidade de impedirem os filhos de irem em viagens de finalistas para zonas afectadas pelo coronavírus. Querem que seja o governo a dizer se devem ou não ir. Querem o governo a mandar nos filhos deles?

— Estrela Serrano (@estrelaserrano) February 27, 2020

De manhã tinha partilhado este documento da DGS no Linkedin -


Entretanto, ao final da tarde li "Lead Your Business Through the Coronavirus Crisis".

O meu colega das conversas oxigenadoras chamou a atenção para o que nenhum governo vai fazer pela sua empresa:

• como minimizar a possibilidade dos seus trabalhadores ficarem infectados? Acima de x infectados pode crer que lhe fecham a fábrica, ou escritório, ou loja.
• como minimizar o impacte do encerramento de fornecedores e de subcontratados?
• onde arranjar alternativas para as matérias-primas?
• e se França, ou Espanha, fecharem fronteiras, como é que as encomendas chegam aos clientes?

estão a recordar aquela pergunta acerca da frequência com que se devem rever os riscos no âmbito do sistema de gestão da qualidade? Creio que agora é altura para repensar que riscos podemos correr e como os minimizar.

Ontem no Financial Times em "Italy plant closure prompts car industry fears":

"A European auto supplier has had to close its main Italian plant because of the coronavirus quarantine, in the first concrete evidence of the impact the disease could have on Europe’s domestic industry and economy. Electronics manufacturer MTA said that if its 600 employees in the northern town of Codogno were not allowed to return to work within days, production lines at Fiat Chrysler (FCA) subsidiaries would be brought to a standstill.
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“All the other FCA plants in Europe and those of Renault, BMW and Peugeot will close too,” MTA said, marking the first forecast of a shutdown at a large German carmaker’sdomestic sites."

Já esta madrugada, enquanto tomava o chá da manhã li as sugestões de "Prepare Your Supply Chain for Coronavirus":

"Start with your people. The welfare of employees is paramount, and obviously people are a critical resource.
...
Maintain a healthy skepticism. Accurate information is a rare commodity in the early stages of emerging disasters, especially when governments are incentivized to keep the population and business community calm to avoid panic.
...
Run outage scenarios to assess the possibility of unforeseen impacts. Expect the unexpected, especially when core suppliers are in the front line of disruptions.
...
Create a comprehensive, emergency operations center. Most organizations today have some semblance of an emergency operations center (EOC), but in our studies we’ve observed that these EOCs tend to exist only at the corporate or business unit level.
...
Designing for response
...
Know all your suppliers. Map your upstream suppliers several tiers back. Companies that fail to do this are less able to respond or estimate likely impacts when a crisis erupts.
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Understand your critical vulnerabilities and take action to spread the risk. Many supply chains have dependencies that put firms at risk.
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Create business continuity plans. These plans should pinpoint contingencies in critical areas and include backup plans for transportation, communications, supply, and cash flow. Involve your suppliers and customers in developing these plans.
...
Don’t forget your people. A backup plan is needed for people too. The plan may include contingencies for more automation, remote-working arrangements, or other flexible human resourcing in response to personnel constraints."

Li agora no El Economista de ontem que o El Corte Inglés não ficou à espera do papá-estado e pôs de quarentena todos os seus compradores que estiveram no norte de Itália.

Interessante, nem sinal de um coronavírus...

A partir de "Business model risk and uncertainty factors: Toward building and maintaining profitable and sustainable business models" de Anne-Sophie Brillinger, Christian Els, Bjorn Schafer e Beate Bender, publicado por Business Horizons (2020) 63, 121-130.

Exemplos do que pode ser considerado ao determinar riscos relevantes para uma organização.

Acerca dos clientes:

Acerca da oferta (produto/serviço):

Acerca da viabilidade financeira:

Acerca do ambiente:

Interessante, nem sinal de um coronavírus...

Gente não fragilista

No Jornal de Negócios do passado dia 23 de Janeiro no artigo "Jesus salvou têxtil, ficou sem a Zara e ganhou Boss e Hilfiger" sublinhei:

"A Círculos & Contrastes, que acabou por falir, tinha um único cliente, a gigante espanhola Inditex, cuja confiança teve de ser reganhada pela nova Tamanho e Tantos. “Tivemos de começar tudo do zero com a Inditex, da qual continuamos completamente dependentes”, lembrou Jesus, que divide a meias o capital da empresa com o seu “sócio e amigo” José Teixeira.
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Entretanto, a líder mundial de venda de roupa a retalho começa a desviar massivamente encomendas para fornecedores mais baratos. “A Inditex, que começou a abandonar Portugal, podia sair a qualquer momento, pelo que começamos a fazer o desmame e a arranjar novas soluções”, recordou o co-CEO da empresa.”

Um bom exemplo. Uma equipa de gestão que não se iludiu com o presente e preparou o futuro. Algo que me fez recordar:

“For the unprepared organisation, periods of significant transition are typically marked by confusion (‘What’s happening?’), uncertainty (‘What should we do?’) and reprisals (‘Who’s to blame?’). Caught by surprise, managers tend to react with hasty, inadequate responses that merely demonstrate their misreading of the situation, or else they are struck by strategic inertia, frozen by their inability to fully comprehend what is happening.”

Só revelam que não são fragilistas, que não acreditam que os astros se vão alinhar para que tudo corra bem. Gente que avalia os riscos do contexto

1. Factor externo negativo - Desinvestimento da Inditex em Portugal
2. Factor interno negativo - Dependência importante da Inditex
3. Risco - Perca de um volume importante de vendas e a sobrevivência da empresa

e aje em conformidade.

Trecho retirado de “Rethinking Strategy” de Steve Tighe.

Vendas, custos e riscos

Um trecho interessante para os empresários pensarem:

"Clients pay for two things in the main, either increasing revenue or reducing costs. [Moi ici: Faz logo lembrar "The Three Rules", mas o ponto que quero sublinhar é o que vem a seguir] But they will also pay, in a very direct way, for trust and for the perception of reduced risk. One of the things that allows you to increase your rates over time is think of it that there is a tremendous fear in every client’s mind, when they get into a new technology project (or any kind of project really), that the project is just going to totally blow up and they will get no value out of it. So they discount the rate that they are paying to you, the maximum rate they think they can afford to pay you, by the chance of the project totally blowing up."[Moi ici: Faz logo lembrar a frase "no one was ever fired for buying ibm"]

A ideia do risco tem duas vertentes:

• Ajuda os que estão estabelecidos e têm uma reputação no mercado
• Prejudica os novos que querem entrar num mercado: os estudos todos dizem que o produto é melhor, mas ... são estudos, não a vida real. E se corre mal? Recordar:

Recomendo a audição ou a leitura da fonte do trecho lá de cima "Ramit Sethi and Patrick McKenzie On Why Your Customers Would Be Happier If You Charged More" (muito me ri ao ouvir o podcast enquanto conduzia debaixo de chuva à noite). Por exemplo:

"“How do I download the Googles to my printer?”
Ramit:  What? That’s a reasonable ‑‑ [laughs] to your printer?
.
Patrick:  Yeah.
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Ramit:  [laughs] You had me until you said printer. OK, that is ridiculous.
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Patrick:  My users occupy a place of love in my heart. So I say this from a position of love, and not to make fun of anyone, but rather to tell you that real people really think like this: I’ve had to convince people that there are not two physically distinct Internets entitled “the blue Googles” and the “the green Googles.”  This means they can use their login on my website regardless of whether they’re on the blue Googles or the green Googles.  Believe it or not, any site that you can reach from the blue Googles is available on the green Googles as well.
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(Wondering how someone would come to this misconception?  A particular customer used the Internet using IE opening to MSN at school and IE opening to Google at home.  They did not realize that Microsoft and Google were not the same company.  They interpreted this as “the blue Googles” and the “green Googles”, because the Googles is the Internet to them.  When they typed stuff into the two different boxes on the two different Googles, different results came out.  Their natural inclination for, “Why does this strange, devil box work in different ways?” was, “Oh, they must be two different devil boxes.”)"

 À parte as piadas o artigo deixa várias provocações relacionadas com a parte do título "Your Customers Would Be Happier If You Charged More"

Tail risks can screw you (parte II)

Parte I.

O D. Pedro IV comentou:

"Disclaimer: não conheço o caso em concreto. Mas há um padrão que se tem.vindo a repetir....
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- "Mas porque é que não têm lojas? Porque é que não vendem on-line? Olhe que o mercado está a mudar muito e não podem ficar de fora."
À resposta:
- "porque somos fabricantes e queremos foco completo e especialização nisso"
As pessoas olham com verdadeira desilusão. Senti isso várias vezes. O mundo está cheio de Ícaros, ou se preferirmos de exemplos do princípio de Peter que nos impele sempre a avançar até que saímos da nossa área de experiência e core business.
Exagerando: a necessidade (quase obrigação) de sair da zona de conforto está overrated!"

Por que usei a foto na parte I?

Demasiada gente fica seduzida com o glamour, com o lado solar, e não sabe, ou desvaloriza o sofrimento, o risco, ou o lado lunar.

O comentário avança duas linhas de pensamento. A primeira é acerca da essência da estratégia, a segunda acerca do nível de risco.

1. A essência da estratégia
A essência da estratégia é ser capaz de dizer não. Recordo sempre a lição de Agosto de 2008:

"the most important orders are the ones to which a company says 'no'"

O que não vamos fazer? Quem não vamos servir?
Sem escolher dizer não a certas coisas, não se pode ser excelente a outras, fica-se stuck-in-the-middle.

No texto "Quando falta mão de obra (parte II)" citei:

"Of course, economies of scale can sometimes be required for success in certain markets and for some products, but often they aren’t required and it is ego, not a strong business strategy, that is forcing growth where growth isn’t necessary."

Entre crescer pelo volume ou crescer pelo preço unitário (ou seja, pelo valor acrescentado) não deveria ser um dilema para uma PME. No entanto, quase sempre a pressão pelo crescimento leva a dizer sim a mais coisas do que deviam ser aprovadas. E uma organização começa a dispersar-se, começa a espalhar os recursos escassos por fatias de pão cada vez maiores.

2. Até onde arriscar?
Em princípio parece não haver uma resposta única a esta pergunta. Cada um arrisca até onde a sua paixão pelo risco o leva. No entanto, em Antifrágil Nassim Taleb dá uma pista infalível. Seguir o exemplo dos estóicos:

"combines an aggressive stance toward upside opportunities with a healthy paranoia about large negative outcomes"

Nunca arriscar a casa. Só arriscar até ao limite em que se tudo for perdido, a vida pode continuar. Ou seja:

"Dans une stratégie qui entraîne la ruine; les bénéfices ne compensent jamais les risques de ruine"

Deixa-me arriscar, tenho aqui uma possibilidade fantástica de ganhar uma boa maquia, só tenho de jogar uma vez na roleta russa...

“failing to plan for problems is planning to fail”

Excelente texto, "The Myth of “Failing to Plan is Planning to Fail”", bom para suportar a introdução e a justificação para a abordagem baseada no risco incluída na ISO 9001:2015:

"Making plans is important, but our gut reaction is to plan for the best-case outcomes, ignoring the high likelihood that things will go wrong.
A much better phrase is “failing to plan for problems is planning to fail.” To address the very high likelihood that problems will crop up, you need to plan for contingencies.
...
What explains cost overruns? They largely stem from the planning fallacy, our intuitive belief that everything will go according to plan, whether in IT projects or in other areas of business and life. The planning fallacy is one of many dangerous judgment errors – what scholars in cognitive neuroscience and behavioral economics call cognitive biases – that we make due to how our brains are wired.
...
Four Research-Based Techniques to Avoid the Planning Fallacy
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1. Anticipate what problems might come up and address them in advance through prospective hindsight where you envision yourself in the future looking back at potential challenges in the present."

"you do not fight complexity with complexity"

"“Modern finance is complex, perhaps too complex. Regulation of modern finance is complex, almost certainly too complex. That configuration spells trouble. As you do not fight fire with fire, you do not fight complexity with complexity. Because complexity generates uncertainty, not risk, it requires a regulatory response grounded in simplicity, not complexity”
...
Heuristic strategies are simple rules of thumb that solve complex uncertain situations precisely because of their simplicity, not despite it. More calculation, time, and information are not always better. Less can be more.
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A good heuristic can be better than a complex strategy when used in the proper environment. Less can be more. The recognition heuristic is ecologically rational when a correlation exists between recognizing an option and the criteria for judgment.
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One main point in the business world is that entrepreneurs can generate profit in the markets, à la Knight, precisely because they intelligently deal with immeasurable, irreducible uncertainty.
...
In most business situations knowledge is much less than perfect and uncertainty prevails over risk. Heuristic strategies that are successfully used in business decision-making exploit the structure of information in the environment, rely on simplicity to overcome the complexity of situation, and are indispensable when faced with irreducible uncertainty. One central observation is that less can be more. That is, less information, calculation or time, can be beneficial under particular circumstances to achieving a given task."

Trechos retirados de "Risk, uncertainty, and heuristics" de Shabnam Mousavi e Gerd Gigerenzer, publicado por Journal of Business Research 67 (2014) 1671–1678

Análise de risco à la FMI

Será que isto pode ser útil para quem quiser investir um pouco mais na abordagem baseada no risco?

Risco - o que a incerteza pode gerar se não mexermos.

Oportunidade - o que podemos ambicionar se mexermos?


Imagem retirada de "Italy : 2017 Article IV Consultation-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for Italy"

Incerteza

Três notícias relacionadas:

• OPEP enfrenta primeira deserção do acordo
• The 'Tesla of scooters' is about to rapidly expand in Berlin
• Porsche pode dizer adeus aos diesel. Já em 2020

Esta semana numa empresa ouvi a previsão, com alguma certeza, de que o preço do petróleo vai aumentar nos próximos anos por causa da China. No entanto, vejo alguma incerteza nessa previsão.

Decisions Under Uncertainty

"There are decisions where:

1. Outcomes are known. This is the easiest way to make decisions. If I hold out my hand and drop a ball, it will fall to the ground.
2. Outcomes are unknown, but probabilities are known. This is risk. Think of this as going to Vegas and gambling. Before you set foot at the table, all of the outcomes are known as are the probabilities of each. No outcome surprises an objective third party.
3. Outcomes are unknown and probabilities are unknown. This is uncertainty.
We often think we’re making decisions in #2 but we’re really in #3."

Trechos retirados de "Decisions Under Uncertainty"