Nichos, co-criação e intimidade à escala

"Dalton, Ohio is an unlikely place to find fresh insight into how to thrive in a chaotic 21st-century economy.[Moi ici: Pensem no século XXI, na internet, em toda a parfernália tecnológica e, depois, pensem numa empresa de gente Amish que cumpre os preceitos Amish, que não pode ter electricidade da rede ligada ao negócio, que não pode usar a internet, ... como prosperam?]
...
A company like Pioneer could not have been nearly as successful in a previous era. It is, in its own way, thoroughly modern and embodies what I call the “passion economy”
...
The tools of modern commerce—easy access to sophisticated shipping and logistics, the ability to reach and connect with customers all over the globe—are now available even to the most technologically unsophisticated businessperson. This allows something new: intimacy at scale, in which companies can create highly specialized products that reach customers thinly spread around the world.[Moi ici: Quando leio estas coisas lembro-me sempre da lição alemã que aprendi em 2010 - ""pursue niche strategies that combine product specialization with geographic diversification", "they concentrate their often limited resources on niche market segments that they can dominate worldwide.", e de Conrado Adolfo e o fim da geografia, apesar de Ghemawat]
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The Pioneer business model would be hard to pitch to a group of investors. The core addressable market is fewer than 25,000 farmers, with decidedly below-average purchasing power. That market cannot be reached through digital ads, TV or radio. The products themselves are big and bulky and need to be shipped from rural Ohio to remote customers across North America. [Moi ici: Sabe quem são os seus clientes? Sabe o que procuram e valorizam? Sabe quais são as suas ansiedades e sonhos? Sabe quais são os seus medos e dores? Sabe o que é sucesso para eles?]
...
Amish farmers are increasingly shifting from bulk commodity grains to higher-value produce, which means they need entirely different kinds of gear. [Moi ici: Interessante esta nota acerca da fuga à comoditização por parte de uma comunidade que não pode usar tecnologia moderna e tudo o que apoia o eficientismo da quantidade] Many Amish are moving north, leaving their historic districts in Pennsylvania, Ohio and Indiana for relatively cheap farmland in the deindustrializing Rust Belt and the prairie out west. This means they are farming colder, rockier ground and need plows that are stronger and more pliable.
...
In today’s economy, the narrowness and complexity of Pioneer’s market is actually a strength. While 25,000 farmers aren’t enough to attract the full attention of the big players like John Deere, Kubota and Caterpillar, they are more than enough to support Pioneer and several other Amish farm equipment makers, all of which are growing healthily.
...
Companies like Pioneer will not replace large firms, which are getting bigger and more dominant in the American economy.
...
But companies like Pioneer offer an alternative path. By focusing obsessively and passionately on an audience that they know uniquely well, and by embracing the tools that will help them serve that audience while rejecting those that won’t, such small businesses are able to thrive in the 21st-century economy."

Quando em "Acerca da rapidez (parte II)" rematamos no final "Talvez os nichos sejam o futuro, talvez a co-criação seja o futuro." estamos a sugerir o mesmo caminho referido no último trecho sublinhado. Focar um nicho e servir esse nicho como ninguém"

Trechos retirados de "An Amish Lesson for Small Business Success"

De onde vêm as grandes estratégias (parte III)

Parte I e parte II.

"Great strategies should be both impactful and innovative. But where do such strategic innovations come from?"

Interessante como a mesma pergunta é colocada por mais três autores, depois de olharmos para a proposta de Gavetti.

"The question of where great strategies comes from has many answers, and there are theories and anecdotal “origin stories” to support each of them. But there is a fundamental tension between answers that emphasize favorable outcomes under conditions of uncertainty and those that assert intentionality (see Figure 1).

First, there is a basket of different kinds of components that grows with time as new components are added to it. Second, there is a prespecified set of valid and invalid combinations of these components, with the valid combinations representing viable products. We assume that the firm knows which combinations of the components already in its basket, as well as combinations from the existing basket with any single new component under consideration for adoption, constitute viable products. But, crucially, we assume no knowledge of the “recipe book” beyond this—that is, we do not know whether or not combinations containing multiple components outside of our basket are viable.
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The firm’s goal is to maximize the number of products that it can make—its product space—as it adds more components to its basket. The model does not consider the different values associated with specific products, which will depend on the market environment and may change over time. Instead, it simply seeks to maximize the number of viable products that it can make,
...
we introduce two simple variables: the complexity of products and the usefulness of components.
...
To make a product of complexity c, we must possess all c of its distinct components. So making a complex product is harder than making a simple one, because there are more ways that we might be missing a needed component.
...
Components that tend to show up in complex products do not seem useful early on, because we are likely to be missing other components that those products require.[Moi ici: Aqui as coisas começam a aquecer. Como não recordar que os macacos não voam, de Ricardo Hausmann]
...
Our research shows that the most important components—materials, skills, and routines—when an organization is less developed tend to be different from when it is more developed. The relative usefulness of components changes over time [Moi ici: Como não recordar os que acreditam que basta importar/copiar o que se faz noutros países. Como não recordar a rejeição do Relatório Porter]
...
A key insight from the analysis is that there are different frames of reference for prioritizing a set of components. The most useful components in one frame, or innovation stage, need not be the same as in another. No single frame is inherently more valid than any other; the frame we prioritize depends on our current stage and how far into the future we wish to and are able to look.
...
Internally, the optimal strategy depends on resource constraints and, more broadly, the objectives of the firm, which are related to its governance. Resource-constrained firms tend to favor an impatient strategy and immediately reap the value of new components, whereas wealthier firms likely favor a farsighted strat-egy and, after a stagnant period assembling needed components, expect to achieve greater growth as the value of those components kicks in.[Moi ici: Como não relacionar isto com "Carlos Costa: “Empresas portuguesas estão entre as mais alavancadas da Europa”]"
...
Third, our analysis stresses the importance of trade-offs, but with a clearly dynamic twist. ... The distinction between impatient and farsighted strategies more closely resembles the distinction in evolutionary biology between r-selection (more offspring) and K-selection (better offspring). The r-selection approach, similar to our impatient strategy, invests little in nurturing individual progeny, focusing instead on fast, immediate growth.
Fourth, our analysis fits with recent academic and practical work on strategy dynamics emphasizing the importance of both irreversibility and uncertainty for dynamic thinking about strategy to really be required. ... without irreversibility of any sort, choices could be reversed costlessly and therefore be made myopically, without penalty.
...
what matter are the components that are available at a point in time rather than the order in which they were acquired.
...
Our main insight is that the most important objects, skills, and routines are not static but depend on how far along the innovation process a firm has progressed."

Trechos retirados de "Searching for Great Strategies" de Thomas Fink, Pankaj Ghemawat e Martin Reeves, publicado por Strategy Science Vol. 2, No. 4, December 2017, pp. 272–281

Acerca da globalização

"According to Mr. Ghemawat, a globalization strategy should be based on three interrelated options: adaptation, aggregation, and arbitrage.
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Adaptation means responding to differences among countries by tailoring products and services to suit local tastes and needs. However, each such local variation adds costs and complexity, thus reducing the benefits of aggregation and economies of scale. Smart adaptation requires limiting the amount of local variations as well as finding the most efficient ways of introducing such variations. [Moi ici: Conversa para entreter Golias... presos entre a espada e a parede. Por um lado a eficiência, o querer aproveitar a vantagem da escala, por outro a incapacidade de servir todas as tribos] Platforms offer a good way forward, offering the aggregation benefits of a common platform foundation, while each country or region can develop its own ecosystem of platform partners, whose product and services are adapted to local requirements.
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Aggregation is used to deliver economics of scale and scope by expanding operations across national borders. Aggregation drives efficiencies and productivity and is one of the most common justification for having a global R&D, manufacturing and logistics strategy. “Those advantages normally have to be pretty large in order to overcome the home court advantage of local competitors… Companies that have operations in markets where they’re only marginally successful, on the other hand, may need to retrench.”
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Arbitrage leverages economic differences between national and regional markets, such as labor costs and tax incentives. Arbitrage opportunities have somewhat narrowed in recent years, given the rising prosperity of several emerging markets.
...
Companies should consider regional strategies, as a reasonable compromise between a one-size-fits-all global strategy that ignores local differences, and an inefficient and costly highly localized strategy. Such strategies would allow them to take advantage of similarities between neighboring countries in the same region.  “An analysis of 29 distance variables shows that in almost all cases countries from the same region average higher similarity scores than countries from different regions – and often by very wide margins.” Another pragmatic variant is to localize the customer-facing, front end parts of the strategy, while centralizing the back-end platforms that support R&D, production and other operational functions.[Moi ici: Golias a avançarem para plataformas de produção por grandes regiões económicas]
.
The article points out that “the backlash against globalization is also, in part, a backlash against big business.
...
What went wrong? Part of the problem is that global firms have generally responded to this challenging economic environment by focusing primarily on reducing their overall operational costs. Despite dramatic advances in technology, companies have mostly ignored the opportunities to pursue growth through innovative new products and markets."

Trechos retirados de "The True State of Globalization: Not Dead, Not Completely OK"

Ver também "Globalization in the Age of Trump"

Irreversibilidade - uma faca de dois gumes

A ler "A Formal Theory of Strategy" de Eric Van den Steen e publicado por Management Science e a pensar nas crises económicas, nas recessões, na inevitabilidade de desemprego e tempo de resposta quando o choque é estrutural:

"the role of commitment, reliability, and irreversibility—characteristics that mat-ter both for their practical relevance and because they are among the few that have been explicitly argued as making a decision strategic. The paper carefully defines these characteristics and then shows that it is reliability—whether the actual decision will be “as announced in the strategy”—that determines whether a decision is strategic: alignment on unreliable announcements often ends in misalignment, thus reducing the ex ante incentives to align on such decision and hence its effectiveness as a guide. The need for reliability, on its turn, implies that the ability to commit may make a decision more strategic, but only when it is otherwise insufficiently reliable. Irreversibility, finally, does not necessarily make a decision more strategic, but it always increases the value of strategy and makes decisions with which the irreversible decision interacts more strategic."

E volto a 2008 e aos almoços que não são grátis:

Quanto mais pura é uma estratégia, maior a sua irreversibilidade ou seja menos flexibilidade há para outras alternativas estratégicas em simultâneo, e maior a rentabilidade quando as escolhas são as correctas, estão alinhadas e são implementadas. No entanto, quando o mundo muda, e o mundo muda cada vez mais depressa, as escolhas deixam de ser as correctas ou as menos más e a irreversibilidade actua como uma barreira à mudança em busca de um novo conjunto de escolhas, o que se traduz numa mortalidade empresarial superior.

Decisões de localização (parte II)

Parte I.

Na leitura final de "From Global to Local" de Finbarr Livesey encontrei uma série de trechos sobre decisões de localização com os quais concordo embora com algumas dúvidas:

[Moi ici: Primeiro algo sobre Mongo] "While new production technologies are not going to give us Star Trek like 'replicator' any time soon, they are enabling smaller factories to be  economically viable. They do this by lowering what is referred  to as minimum economic scale, the lowest volume of production for which the investment in the factory is financially viable. [Moi ici: Isto é Mongo a 100%. A democratização da produção]
.
The simple view of production was that bigger is better: you offset large capital costs by having a factory that produces in high volume with extreme efficiency. The case for ever increasing sizes of factory hits barriers of coordination if the factories become too large and the level required to be efficient or cost competitive has fallen as additive manufacturing and other techniques have developed and improved their performance. [Moi ici: BTW, a seu tempo os políticos descobrirão isto mas só depois de provocar muito sofrimento com as escolas-cidade, os hospitais-cidade, os tribunais-cidade, as esquadras-cidade, ...] A key implication of techniques like additive manufacturing is that they remove the need for specialised components such as moulds or forms to be made specific to the product working its way down the assembly line. [Moi ici: Pesquisar a palavra japonesa "seru"] As well as saving cost and time by not having to make these specialised pieces, it also means that a factory can more easily make a variety of products. Rather than thinking of the investment in a factory being tied to one product, the costs can be offset against the income generated from a series of products, hence a lower minimum economic scale for each product. With lower scale, the likelihood of having a greater number of smaller factories instead of a small number of extremely large factories goes up. And as that happens the factories are going to be geographically dispersed, lowering the number of trade movements necessary to get a product to customers in different countries.
...
[Moi ici: Agora sobre decisões de localização] The second level of change is a strengthening of the regionalisation of trade. The temptation is to work at the extremes — everything is global or everything is local. This misses the subtleties that are needed in industrial organisation and the diversity that exists in manufacturing. Regionalisation will be driven by the balance of forces between the scale required to have efficiencies and the desire to reduce time to customer and the costs of being in different countries simultaneously.[Moi ici: Sinto que há muito de verdade neste último trecho. Unidades produtivas muito eficientes a trabalhar para todo o mundo produzindo artigos fáceis de transportar e pouco dependentes da vontade do cliente na sua versão final. Unidades produtivas ágeis e mais pequenas, talvez a trabalhar para mercados até 3/4 dias de camião, mais próximas do lugar de consumo, permitindo produções com séries curtas, reposições rápidas, alterações de design e iterações rápidas. Unidades produtivas junto do consumo para permitir customização, interacção, co-criação ]
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It is worth noting that even though the declining importance of distance for trade has been accepted as a stylised fact for many years. distance has always moderated trade. [Moi ici: Ghemawat tem um livro com uns gráficos espectaculares que ilustram esta realidade] The further away from one another two countries are, the smaller the level of trade we would expect to see between them. A recent review of over one hundred academic papers on the effect of distance on trade indicates that the average effect means that to per cent increase in distance lowers bilateral trade by about 9 per cent? Distance continues to matter even with absolute transport costs falling and increasing digital interconnection around the world. [Moi ici: Depois disto tudo tenho dúvidas num aspecto. Se a digitalização e a conectividade reduzem as fronteiras, como conciliar tudo isto com a técnica alemã de procurar clientes-alvo independentemente da geografia? Acredito que a diferenciação que trabalha para nichos e que não se baseia na interacção mas antes na vantagem tecnológica ou de design crescerá baseada na conectividade digital sem olhar à geografia]
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With smaller factories being economically viable and tooling costs falling due to increased use of techniques like additive manufacturing, companies can produce for the different regions of the world independently rather than attempting to have a global product. [Moi ici: Teremos pois, é fácil de prever para os próximos anos, a criação de unidades produtivas de multinacionais para servirem continentes e não o mundo]
...
In a regionalised scenario a company may not have its supply chain and final assembly all in the country in which it will be selling its products. They can organise themselves and their suppliers across the region. However, in some cases that won't be the best way to be organised, for example if time is really an issue. If there cannot be a lag of, say, a week to get goods from Mexico to the east coast of the USA, then the company will need to have at least final assembly in the country of purchase, if not more of the supply chain feeding that assembly process for your product.
...
At the third level within regions we are likely to see agglomeration or clustering effects. These clusters arise as there are positive effects for companies to be close to other companies im similar sectors.
...
As we move into a world where products have shorter journeys to get to us, where factories are smaller and there are more of them, and where is great uncertainty about what work we will be doing, the other elements of globalization will also continue to evolve. Nothing in the trends we have described will by themselves reduce or block digital globalization."

E isso seria tornar impossível a tarefa de matematizar a economia

"But what many economists generally gloss over is a notion that I will argue is highly complementary to market failures: management failures. For policy-making purposes economists assume that all businesses act rationally in the pursuit of profits. The possibility that that might not be the case is generally ignored, or even when mentioned, quickly finessed.
...
Partly because profit maximization is a bedrock assumption and partly because maximization is a basic mathematical tool, economists have trouble dealing with firms that are not maximizing profits.
...
Economists disagree about the actual incidence of these market failures and the cost-effectiveness of governmental efforts to tackle them, but they broadly agree that the only factors that prejudice performance are external to businesses." [Moi ici: Isso seria admitir que as empresas são todas diferentes umas das outras e, isso seria tornar impossível a tarefa de matematizar a economia]

Trechos retirados de "What Economists Know That Managers Don’t (and Vice Versa)"

Os limites da globalização

Ainda tenho o recorte, algures, de uma entrevista a um director de uma fábrica de processamento de tomate, onde ele focava o dilema entre produzir pasta de tomate e molhos de tomate, grandes séries versus pequenas séries). O senhor chamava a atenção para a impossibilidade de produzir molhos de tomate em larga escala para o mundo globalizado porque cada país, às vezes cada região dentro de um país, tem um gosto diferente.
.
Anos depois, ao ler Ghemawat, tomei consciência de como aquele sintoma, da entrevista referida acima, se encaixava em algo mais geral e profundo:

"differences between countries are larger than generally acknowledged. As a result, strategies that presume complete global integration tend to place far too much emphasis on international standardization and scalar expansion.
...
“The real state of the world is semiglobalized.
The world will remain semiglobalized for decades to come.
A semiglobalized perspective helps companies resist a variety of delusions derived from visions of the globalization apocalypse: growth fever, the norm of enormity, statelessness, ubiquity, and one-size-fits-all.
.
Semiglobalization is what offers room for cross-border strategy to have content distinct from single –country strategy.”

Ontem, ouvi falar da internacionalização da Abyss & Habidecor, hoje, ao pesquisar sobre a empresa encontrei este estudo "ADAPTAÇÃO CULTURAL DO PRODUTO: O CASO ABYSS & HABIDECOR":

"O processo de globalização não está a levar à homogeneização do comportamento do consumidor entre países. Pelo contrário, o comportamento do consumidor está a tornar-se mais heterogéneo devido às diferenças culturais. As estratégias de venda para um país não podem ser estendidas a outros países sem adaptação, adaptação do produto e/ou publicidade. Este fenómeno torna cada vez mais importante compreender os valores das diferentes culturas e o seu impacto no comportamento do consumidor.
...
Os resultados mostram que, neste caso, os consumidores de diferentes países têm necessidades e gostos diferentes, pois compram diferentes modelos, cores e medidas de tapetes e toalhas. Deste modo, pode afirmar-se que, de facto, não parece que a globalização esteja a levar à homogeneização do comportamento do consumidor."

 As multinacionais, que têm arcaboiço para as fábricas de tamanho "cecil b. demile", gostariam de viver num mundo de bolas azuis, mas esse tempo, bom para os dinossauros, o Jurássico, teve o seu expoente no século XX, agora, o futuro é Mongo, aliás, os sintomas de Mongo estão em todo o lado.
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Os limites da globalização são uma boa notícia para as PMEs que têm uma identidade.

E Mongo continua

Parece que a realidade continua a brindar-nos com exemplos ou com previsões sobre a integração de Mongo no nosso dia-a-dia:

"What will global manufacturing look like five years from now?.
The future of manufacturing in one word is “connected.”
.
More Connected to Customers & Local Markets: As consumers demand more customization, markets will be micro-segmented and competition will intensify. Having the capabilities to manufacture and deliver the right product at the right time to the right place will become an even greater driver of competitive advantage. Additionally, labor rates in low-cost countries will go up, logistics costs will increase and energy costs will drop in some regions. All this will drive the regionalization of manufacturing near large centers of consumer demand (Moi ici: Chamem-me bruxo! Por que é que tanta gente com acesso aos media tradicionais no nosso país não falam desta oportunidade - proximidade; flexibilidade; customização; interacção) such as North America, Europe and Southeast Asia.
...
"What will global manufacturing look like five years from now?.
The migration of high volume, relatively simple, high labor content, low cost to produce and ship products, which do not need to be delivered instantaneously, will continue to chase low labor cost locations in the developing, and even underdeveloped, parts of the world. On the other hand, “one-off” or very low volume, more complex, more challenging to produce and much more expensive to ship products, will be produced closer to their ultimate end customer."

Intriga-me é encontrar tantas opiniões ainda tão enformadas no paradigma do século XX. Por exemplo, de uma pessoa que muito considero, é triste ler:

"Manufacturing facilities will come to resemble one another even more than they do now. Companies with multiple facilities will seek similarity across countries in order to be able to shift production quickly as demand shifts and to monitor them centrally to ensure that they meet the same standards." 

Quase exactamente o oposto do que penso que vai acontecer...
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Esta matriz:

 diz-me que em Mongo, porque vou ter produções mais pequenas e diferentes, porque vou assistir a uma explosão na variedade da oferta, vou ter unidades produtivas flexíveis. E recordo também Ghemawat e a conclusão acerca da importância da variabilidade inter-regional.

Trechos retirados daqui.

A propósito de Mongo e do Estranhistão

Tal como pensamos aqui no blogue, em vez de um futuro com um mundo plano, um futuro com o mundo cada vez mais localizado, regionalizado, diversificado, com mais variedade.
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Aquilo a que se chama globalização foi o último ato, o estertor do século XX. E o pico da globalização já passou: "Go Mongo: "We will find a place (To settle) Where there's so much space"", o século XXI voltará a ser um século de artesãos e de variedade:

"The real problem with The World Is Flat is not so much that it overstates—even considerably—the flatness of today’s world. The crucial conceptual error in Friedman’s thesis is that he assumes his 10 flatteners would automatically and rapidly lead to a more interconnected and, therefore, flat world. But the opposite has often been the case. The empirical evidence suggests that the global economy is increasingly being driven by urban clusters and, if anything, becoming more instead of less “curved.” (Moi ici: A caminho de Mongo, ou seja, o Estranhistão)
...
The danger of Friedman’s flat-world thesis is that it could cause executives to misinterpret the trends they observe in their own businesses and make potentially serious strategic errors. Instead of pursuing an aggressive localization strategy, for example, executives from multinational firms often decide to “wait it out” in emerging markets such as China and India. They hold the mistaken belief that demand-side and supply-side conditions will soon flatten and converge with those in developed markets. They may, for instance, believe that China’s retail environment will consolidate relatively quickly; as a result, they may fail to invest in localized distribution channels that are more appropriate for today’s market conditions. In reality, such consolidation is highly unlikely to occur within any reasonable planning horizon. And the impact of such wishful thinking is far from trivial. It could result in missed profit opportunities, and could also cause multinationals to fail to check the advance of competitors from these emerging markets until it is too late.
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The world is still far from flat today, and, in many industries, it’s likely to retain its curvature for quite some time to come. Executives should be wary of relying too much on Friedman’s superficially persuasive, but seriously flawed, evidence."

Trechos retirados de "The Flat World Debate Revisited"

Como é que Ghemawat interpretaria estes números?

Leio:

"As exportações portuguesas de bens para a China cresceram 183,3% no primeiro semestre deste ano, transformando aquele país no décimo maior cliente de Portugal, à frente do Brasil."

E recordo logo "World 3.0" de Pankaj Ghemawat...

" "gravity models to study bilateral interactions. Such models resemble Newton's law of gravitation in linking interactions between countries to the product of their sizes (usually their gross domestic products) divided by some composite measure of distance that incorporates some of the factors (Cultural distance, Administrative distance, Geographic distance, Economic distance). I tend to think of them as distance models
...
To start with geographic or physical distance, a useful stylized fact is that a 1 percent increase in the geographic distance between two locations leads to about a 1 percent decrease in trade between them."

Como é que Ghemawat interpretaria estes números?
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BTW, ontem, ao final da tarde estive numa PME de calçado que me começou a enumerar com orgulho, a lista de países para onde exporta... achei interessante as encomendas de reposição, sinal de que a encomenda inicial já foi vendida, do Japão e do Cazaquistão...
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Trecho inicial retirado daqui.

O mundo não é plano

Quando uma empresa tem mais de 175 anos de idade e, nesses anos todos teve menos CEOs do que a Igreja Católica teve papas, dá para perceber que se trata de uma empresa que vai estar cá na próxima década, com muita probabilidade, que se trata de uma empresa que pensa no depois de amanhã:

.

"Deere, the Moline (Ill.) company founded in 1837 by John Deere, a blacksmith who developed a polished-steel plow and figured out how to mass-produce it. After 175 years and eight more chief executive officers (the Roman Catholic Church has had 12 popes in the same span), Deere remains the world’s largest maker of farm equipment."

 ...

(Moi ici: O mundo não é plano, uma forma de ter futuro é abraçar essa ideia, é fugir da produção em massa e pensar na interacção e na customização.) "“You can’t go with a German tractor and conquer the world or a U.S. tractor and conquer the world,” says Markwart von Pentz, who manages Deere’s sales outside the U.S. “You have to design to the requirements of the market.” European farmers tend to want more speed and turning ability, while rice growers in India prefer compact vehicles that won’t sink in paddies."

...

(Moi ici: Um produto/serviço não serve para tudo e para todos. Há que segmentar os clientes.) "“If you want somebody to get from home to office, you don’t buy a Harley-Davidson, you buy a little scooter,’’"
...
"“We’re normally not the first to market,” he says. “We’re normally followers, but we do it better.”"  (Moi ici: Como aprendi com Steve Blank, os pioneiros é que apanham com as setas todas dos índios, e muitos não sobrevivem.)
...
Yet few 8Rs [linha de tractores] are identical, because the company offers a vast array of options. Imagine sitting down at a Chrysler dealership and choosing among - instead of two or three option packages - six different front axles, five transmissions, 13 rear hitches, and 54 configurations of front wheels and tires. Not to mention a menu of radio, mirror, cold-weather start, and fender packages. A farmer or dealer shopping for an 8R can flip through 358 option codes for the base tractor and an additional 114 codes for attachments.

...

From March 2011 to March 2012, Deere says, customers ordered more than 7,800 different configurations of the 8R. On average, each configuration was built only 1.5 times. More than half the 8Rs were built just once, for a single customer. Thus, the global tractor: One size does not fit all, from Kansas to Kazakhstan. (Moi ici: Conheço um fabricante de máquinas que vai ficar menos desconfortável quando vir isto.) 

...

Five years ago the Horitas’ fleet was dominated by Case tractors. Like other Brazilians, the Horitas balked at buying Deere because its prices were higher. “Nobody wants to pay more,” says Paulo Herrmann, Deere’s director of ag sales for Latin America. But “there’s a difference between price and value.” Walter Horita says, “If you have a machine that can harvest more hectares a day, you are reducing cost.” (Moi ici: A nossa velha guerra, foco no valor, subir na escala de valor) 

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Customização, interacção, valor.
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Trechos retirados daqui.

Qual o retorno da atenção?

A propósito de "Fórum para a Competitividade diz faltar “quase tudo nas reformas estruturais”, sim, eu sei, o Estado que temos é como um tumor, um parasita burro que está a minar, cada vez mais, a sustentabilidade desta comunidade. Contudo, pergunto: por que é que ao longo dos anos só vejo referido nos media o Fórum para a Competitividade por causa destas coisas?
.
Se consultarmos os estatutos do Fórum, no artigo 1º encontramos:

"2. Constitui objecto global do FORUM a promoção do aumento da competitividade de Portugal, através
do estímulo ao desenvolvimento da produtividade nas empresas e...
...
3. Para prossecução dos seus fins, o FORUM poderá:
a) Promover acções de apoio às empresas e associações empresariais, visando a melhoria da
gestão empresarial e estimulando a competitividade entre as mesmas;
b) Realizar colóquios, seminários e conferências em áreas de interesse para o
desenvolvimento empresarial;
c) Recolher, tratar e divulgar a informação com interesse para a actividade empresarial,
nomeadamente no que respeita aos meios financeiros de apoio ao desenvolvimento;
d) Promover acções de formação e informação de gestores empresariais, designadamente na
área das novas tecnologias;
e) Cooperar ou filiar-se em organismos nacionais e internacionais;
f) Criar um secretariado permanente de apoio aos gestores empresariais;
g) Desenvolver todos os esforços no sentido de motivar comparticipações financeiras para o
desenvolvimento da sua actividade empresarial;
h)Promover a racional aplicação e rentabilização dos meios, materiais ou de “know-how”,
postos a sua disposição pelos associados ou por terceiros."

Por que nunca vejo o Fórum mencionado por causa das acções listadas em 3?
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Talvez seja interessante recordar "Creating Competitive Advantage" de Pankaj Ghemawat e Jan Rivkin:
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"Some companies generate far greater profits than others.
...
large differences in economic performance are commonplace. Understanding their roots is crucial for strategists."
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Existem diferenças na rentabilidade entre os vários sectores económicos:

Mas muito mais interessante é a parte que se segue:
"industry averages can mask large differences in economic profit within industries.
...
Indeed, recent research indicates that intra-industry differences in profitability like those shown in Figures ...

 may be larger than differences across industries such as those in [na primeira figura] Industry-level effects appear to account for 10-20% of the variation in business profitability while stable within-industry effects account for 30-45%."
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Por que será?
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Costumo escrever que o recurso mais escasso que os gestores têm é o tempo... o tempo gasto com uma coisa não pode ser gasto noutra... qual o retorno da atenção?
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E a sua empresa?
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Dentro do seu sector de actividade económica, onde é que ela se encaixa? No grupo com rentabilidades superiores ou no grupo com rentabilidades inferiores? Não está a precisar de um pouco de estratégia? Não sofre da doença de querer servir todo o tipo de clientes? Não sofre da doença da falta de alinhamento e da falta de mosaico?

Cuide do seu queijo

"Most companies I know have been running pretty hard lately. And, like the White Rabbit in Alice in Wonderland, many feel that the faster they go, the behinder they get."

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O famoso Red Queen effect que mata as empresas através da anorexia.

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Quem está entre a manada tem de correr mais sob pena de não ter ração para viver mais um dia, como todos correm mais ou menos juntos, quanto mais um corre mais os outros correm também... até ao esgotamento, quando já não há músculo e é só osso. Nessa altura ficam apenas aqueles que desde o princípio estavam destinados a vencer, não pela sorte mas pela análise fria dos números, como Cornuallis.

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Cornuallis tinha um exército mais experiente, mais disciplinado, mais bem armado e mais numeroso. Ganhou enquanto os revolucionários lutaram seguindo as mesmas regras... começou a perder e perdeu a guerra da independência quando os revolucionários mudaram as regras do jogo.

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"Especially after the last few years, when chasing business has sometimes been frantic, this is a good moment to stand back and ask yourself some hard questions. One of them might be: What's most important now: growth or consolidation?"

...

Um das mensagens que continuo a considerar válida, ano após ano, é: impaciente com os lucros e paciente com a quota de mercado, com o volume. É uma vacina contra a comoditização e uma forma de apostar constantemente na subida na escala de valor potencial.

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Talvez 2012, com o choque que o meio abiótico vai proporcionar às empresas, seja um bom ano para reflectir sobre quem tirou o meu queijo:

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"1. Poor strategic focus.
When you take any business you can find, it's easy to discover that your positioning is now way off course–or non-existent." (Moi ici: Em que é que são bons? Em que é que se podem especializar e fazer a diferença? O que é que os apaixona?)

...

"2. Bad customers.
Not all customers are equal. Some are demanding and that helps you become better at your job. But others are demanding just for the sake of it. They Drain your time, attention, and patience, and, in essence, they take far more than they will ever pay for. Pure pursuit of revenue says that you have to keep pleasing them. A more analytic approach would highlight the degree to which some customers are unprofitable and therefore need to be fired."  (Moi ici: Quem são os clientes-alvo? Talvez a pergunta mais vezes colocada neste blogue e nas empresas com que contacto. As empresas deviam ser "obrigadas" a fazer as suas curvas de Stobachoff para terem umas surpresas e descobrirem formas simples de aumentarem o lucro)

...

"3. Expensive footprint.
It's tempting to take business wherever you can find it. But a very broad geographical spread can cost you a fortune in time and travel. While it may look as though that customer on the other coast takes just a day's work, in reality getting there takes one day and getting back takes another. Does the income justify that expense?"  (Moi ici: Ghemawat em "World 3.0" visualiza como isto é importante. As relações comerciais são sobretudo com os "vizinhos", a importância da proximidade. Mais perto mais flexibilidade, mais relação e menos probabilidade do preço ser o order winner)

...

"4. Valuable time.
Many businesses fall into what I call the revenue/time trap. They are so busy chasing cash that they don't have the time to sit down and invest the time and resources required to develop new products or new markets. Impulsive and energetic, they work hard but never attain momentum." (Moi ici: Aquilo a que chamo drenagem do presente, motivo pelo qual falo não de uma empresa mas de 4 em simultâneo e como isso requer jongleurs nas empresas)

The Better You Understand Economics, the More You Realize that Money Isn’t All that Matters

O título deste postal foi roubado a Don Boudreaux no "Cafe Hayek".
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E foi roubado porque é uma grande verdade que muitos desconhecem:
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"The Better You Understand Economics, the More You Realize that Money Isn’t All that Matters"
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O dinheiro, o preço, não é tudo.
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E os empresários do futuro são os empresários que trabalham para aumentar os preços do seu serviço-produto.
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Como?
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Concentrando-se no que está para lá do dinheiro trocado na transacção... concentrando-se na experiência que os clientes vão viver.
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Os sinais estão por todo o lado, por exemplo em "Manufacturing’s Wake-Up Call":
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"debate over the future of U.S. manufacturing is intensifying. Optimists point to the relatively cheap dollar and the shrinking wage gap between China and the U.S. as reasons the manufacturing sector could come back to life, boosting U.S. competitiveness and reviving the fortunes of the American middle class.
...
Instead, for the foreseeable future, manufacturing will largely be regional. (Moi ici: Há anos que o marcador "proximidade" marca presença neste blogue... recordar também Ghemawatt e a semi-globalização)
...
But for many manufacturers, economics and market dynamics increasingly suggest that they locate factories close to their major markets, including the United States. This type of region-oriented footprint is a clear way to provide adequate scale and volume, minimize transportation and logistics costs, increase market responsiveness and innovation, and customize products for the unique preferences of different regions and cultures. If factory labor costs and currency rates were the sole enablers of manufacturing success, then the West could not compete with emerging nations or offshoring. More and more, though, these factors play a smaller part in manufacturing decisions. (Moi ici: Claro que os políticos e os académicos, longe da realidade, não percebem esta mudança estrutural) Four other considerations, all more complex, drive manufacturers’ choices about where to place and expand factories:

1. The skill level and quality of factory employees, especially for high-tech facilities. 
2. The presence of high-impact clusters, in which many companies can learn from one another and innovate more readily. 
3. Access to nearby countries with emerging consumer markets and lower-cost labor (for the U.S., this means building a future with Mexico). 
4. A reasonably competitive regulatory and tax environment (for the U.S., this means simplifying and streamlining the current tax and regulatory structure).

...

With unit labor costs playing a smaller part in manufacturing decisions, (Moi ici: Entretidos com a TSU, com o ataque ao euro, com a impressão de bentos, não percebem como é que isto pode acontecer...) other factors — including talent availability, market accessibility, innovation, regulations, intellectual property protections, barriers to entry and exit, and scale of operations — increasingly drive decisions about where to place and expand factories. Based on the relative economics for each segment, we charted which U.S. industries can compete as exporters, which can be dominant in the regional North American market, which can survive but are threatened by foreign competitors, and which are already mostly overseas but can still manufacture in the U.S. to serve niche markets. (Moi ici: A divisão é interessante e permite pensamento estratégico... ver as figuras)
...
designing production systems that align employees’ activities with the company’s overall strategy (Moi ici: A mensagem deste blogue, do nosso trabalho, dos nossos livros... concentrar uma organização no que é essencial, alinhar recursos, vontades, motivações, ideias) and that empower employees to improve manufacturing processes can unlock the productivity and innovation potential of the well-educated U.S. workforce."

O advento de Mongo, relato de uma conspiração

Ontem à noite o meu computador parecia estar a ser vítima de uma conspiração pró-Mongo.
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De rajada, via Twitter, tive acesso a três artigos. Ponto comum entre todos eles: Mongo, o advento de Mongo.
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Ponto prévio, li "O mundo é Plano" de Thomas Friedman e gostei. Depois, rapidamente, com a minha experiência profissional no terreno, e com a ajuda de Ghemawatt, percebi que Friedman estava errado. O mundo não é plano! E as empresas podem fazer com que ele fique cada vez mais enrugado... a famosa fittness landscape de Kauffman, de Ghemawatt e de tantos outros... os mundos simulados de Lindgren.
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Verifico agora, para meu conforto, que Friedman também já descobriu que podemos enrugar o mundo, que podemos criar Mongo!
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“the Age of Average is over.” (Moi ici: Essa foi a Idade do Preço como o Order-Winner. O tempo em que a escala era a única via para competir)
...
“You should aim to be an artisan… (Moi ici: O artesão não faz duas coisas iguais! É exactamente o oposto da escala... é tão interessante como os mundos de Lindgren simulam a nossa realidade) everything thing you do, you should be proud of, willing to put your initials on it.”
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Depois, sigo a pista para este texto. O autor escreve sobre a carreira de cada um, eu acrescento que é aplicável à vida das empresas (PMEs) que já existem e que não têm futuro como estão:
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"The Career Craftsman believes this process of career crafting always begins with the mastery of something rare and valuable. The traits that define great work (autonomy, creativity, impact, recognition) are rare and valuable themselves, and you need something to offer in return. Put another way: no one owes you a fulfilling job; you have to earn it.
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The Career Craftsman believes that mastery is just the first step in crafting work you love. Once you have the leverage of a rare and valuable skill, you need to apply this leverage strategically to make your working life increasingly fulfulling. It is then — and only then — that you should expect a feeling of passion for your work to truly take hold." (Moi ici: Deixa de ser-se "an order taker" e passa-se a ter a matéria-prima, o conhecimento, os circuitos neuronais de "an experience maker")
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Por fim, Roger Martin em "You Can't Analyze Your Way to Growth" vai no mesmo caminho, descasca no mundo da escala, no mundo dos muggles que só sabem fazer contas e que se esquecem que o valor é um sentimento não um resultado numa folha de cálculo:
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"The biggest enemy of top-line growth is analysis and its best friend is appreciation.
...
The fundamental reason is that analysis of data is all about the past. Data analysis crunches the past and extrapolates it into the future. And the past does not include opportunities that exist but have not yet happened. So, analysis conspicuously excludes ways to serve customers that have not been tried or imagined or ways to turn non-customers into customers.
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Thus the more we rely on data analysis, the more it will tell a dour story on top-line growth — and not give particularly useful insights.(Moi ici: Será por isto que as PMEs fazem milagres? As discussões que já ouvi entre economistas (directores financeiros) e gerentes. Os economistas não gostam de gastar dinheiro em feiras, por exemplo)
...
If instead, the core tool is not analysis but rather appreciation —deep appreciation of the consumer's life — what makes it hard or easy; what makes her (in this category) happy or sad — there is the opportunity to imagine possibilities that do not exist. (Moi ici: Começar pela experiência de vida dos clientes-alvo)
...
"Organizationally and behaviorally, analysis and appreciation are two very different things. Analysis is distant, done in office towers far from the consumer. It requires lots of quantitative proficiency but very little experience in the business in question. It depends on data-mining: finding data sources to crunch, often from data suppliers to the industry. Appreciation is intimate, done in close proximity to the consumer. It requires qualitative proficiency and deeper experience in the business. (Moi ici: Falta aos macro-economistas encartados das academias e dos que fizeram a sua vida em negócios rentistas) It requires the manufacture of unique data, rather than the use of data that already exists.
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In my experience, most organizations have more of the former capabilities and behaviors than of the latter and hence most struggle with top-line growth. The biggest issue isn't the absence of top-line growth opportunities but rather the lack of belief that they exist. And that is driven by the dominance of analysis over appreciation."
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Claro que existem excelentes excepções entre os economistas! E tenho o gosto de conhecer alguns.

Uma oportunidade

Quando oiço os políticos falarem sobre a flexibilidade laboral abano a cabeça e penso sempre que se esquecem do nosso maior potencial trunfo acerca da flexibilidade: a nossa localização.
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A proximidade é muito importante (basta ler "World 3.0 de Pankaj Ghemawat “a 1 percent increase in the geographic distance between two locations leads to about a 1 percent decrease in trade between them,”) pode dar uma ajuda importante, mas a batota também é fundamental.
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O que está a acontecer com os mercados das nossas exportações? Travagem às 4 rodas! (França estagnou no último trimestre, a Itália cresceu 0,2%, a Espanha cresceu 0,2% e a Alemanha cresceu 0,1%, sim, quase estagnou - estão a ver o futuro das exportações de pópós montados em Portugal? Nós também não!). O que vai acontecer com o nosso mercado interno? Aqui vai um cheirinho: "Economia portuguesa recua 0,9% no segundo trimestre" (Ainda este governo não tinha começado com as políticas socialistas de saque fiscal que ainda vão no adro)
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"Sales forecasts based on historical patterns in time series have become less accurate and hence less useful in the past year in many industries. ... forecasting is integral to setting price, maximising revenue and managing operations.
...
forecast accuracy is very important and the underlying issues of changing consumer attitudes, and the implications for customer segmentation and forecasting of buying behaviour, are not just relevant to Revenue Management. They are also fundamental to sales, marketing, brand management, customer loyalty, product design and beyond.
...
In a recent blog on forecasting of consumer default on loans, the Chief Financial Architect of SAS advised that ‘ … the historical data you collected before the recession can no longer be applied to forecast consumer behaviour during the recession or after’. At the opposite extreme, companies can simply continue to tune the current systems, hope that market stability will return soon and consumer behaviour will revert to type. In reality, the best option is likely to be somewhere between these extremes, implementing a system that takes appropriate account of historical data, identifying which data are useful and which are now defunct. In particular, a revenue manager wishes to identify what aspects of buying behaviour and current models remain stable and what has changed and become volatile.
...
Forecasts are never going to be completely accurate and there is an argument for moving the focus away from being smarter with existing data towards making the business less dependent on sales forecasts. For example, taking a close look at increasing flexibility in the supply chain or operations, or re-examining the strategy for setting prices."
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A proximidade é fundamental para aumentar a flexibilidade da cadeia de fornecimento...
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O que é que uma PME portuguesa pode fazer para se tornar mais sedutora e substituir as importações asiáticas? O que pode fazer para reduzir o tempo para apresentar amostras? Para reduzir o tempo para fazer reposições? Para fazer 3 ou 4 colecções por época?
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Era bom que se queimassem pestanas a procurar soluções e alternativas e se desconfiasse mais das ajudas do Estado.
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Trechos retirados de "Consumer behaviour and sales forecast accuracy: What's going on and how should revenue managers respond?" de Christine S M Currie e Ian T Rowleya, e publicado por ournal of Revenue and Pricing Management (2010) 9, 374–376.
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Há quem esteja atento:
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"Marcas regressam a Portugal"
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"A mais valia da proximidade"
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BTW, a propósito de "“Aumentar Exportações. Exportar Valor. Ganhar Mundo” é o tema do XIII Fórum da Indústria Têxtil" duas notas:
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NOTA 1: As empresas não exportam valor, as empresas apenas podem apresentar propostas de valor. O valor emerge da experienciação que o cliente sente durante o uso. Cada experiência é única, logo, não as empresas não criam valor, os clientes é que criam uma "distribuição de valor experienciado" porque cada um tem uma experiência diferente à qual atribui um valor diferente.
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NOTA 2: "O Fórum da Indústria Têxtil conta ainda com a intervenção do orador convidado António Nogueira Leite sobre o tema “Crise e Recuperação Económica. Opções para Portugal" Qual é a economia em que se move Nogueira Leite? As receitas que se aplicam às empresas que Nogueira Leite conhece, a experiência de vida que Nogueira Leite tem, têm alguma relação com o universo competitivo em que se movem as empresas têxteis portuguesas? Não tinham ninguém mais adequado para fazer a intervenção?
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NOTA 3: Nada me move contra Nogueira Leite pessoa.

Vivemos no Mundo 3.0, não num Mundo 2.0, portanto, cuidado com as receitas

Para os políticos e académicos da macro-economia, os muggles, a solução para aumentar as exportações passa pela redução dos preços.
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Quem acompanha este blogue sabe que essa ideia é simplista e errada. É a ideia de quem ainda está no Mundo 2.0
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Mas podem pensar que são  manias minhas...
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OK! Leiam então a proposta de Pankaj Ghemawat em "World 3.0"
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Aconselho a leitura dos capítulos 13 e 14:
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"business leaders (Moi ici: Os CEOs das multinacionais com um grande poder financeiro e talhadas para as economias de escala, que competem pelos custos e pela uniformização da oferta) tend to be among the most ardent supporters of World 2.0 because of the seemingly limitless opportunities for profit that it promises. But when World 2.0's exaggerations run up against the reality of semiglobalization, the results disappoint.
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Companies that fail to respect the law of distance suffer performance penalities, and inflict collateral damage on society at large. Companies with a greater appreciation for differences can performa better both from a private and a public perspective.
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My fundamental prescription for business is, therefore, to think different. Not just differently - but tnhink different, in the sense of becoming more sensitive to and genuinely welcoming of local differences. For most companies, thinking different entails nothing less than a fundamental restructuring of a firm's global strategy. Corporate approaches to dealing with globalization often presume that the world will continue to become much more integrated and that companies just need to keep up with rising levels of globalization. But that kind of World 2.0 leads to blunders rooted in underappreciation of differences and, at the extreme, even in a lack of respect for individual countries' sovereignty. Shifting to a World 3.0 mind-set can help managers avoid such costly mistakes"

I rest my case!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

A narrativa defendida neste blogue simplesmente:
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RULES!!!!
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Interessante artigo da McKinsey "Understanding your ‘globalization penalty’- Strong multinationals seem less healthy than successful companies that stick closer to home. How can that be?" de Julho de 2011, da autoria de Martin Dewhurst, Jonathan Harris, e Suzanne Heywood.
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"The rapid growth of emerging markets is providing fresh impetus for companies to become ever more global in scope. Deep experience in other international markets means that many companies know globalization’s potential benefits—which include accessing new markets and talent pools and capturing economies of scale—as well as a number of risks: creeping complexity, culture clashes, and vigorous responses from local competitors, to name just a few. (Moi ici: Por isso, aqui e aqui, só a título de exemplo, defendemos que as nossas PMEs exportadoras não podem crescer muito, o seu número é que tem de crescer)
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Less obvious is a challenge identified by our latest research: global reach seems to threaten the underlying health of far-flung organizations, even highly successful ones. In particular, we have found that high-performing global companies consistently score lower than more locally focused ones on several critical dimensions of organizational health—direction setting, coordination and control, innovation, and external orientation—that we have been studying at hundreds of companies over the past decade."
...
"To understand what lies beneath these findings, we interviewed executives at 50 global companies. Those interviews, while hardly dispositive, suggested a relationship between organizational health and a familiar challenge: balancing local adaption against global scale, scope, and coordination.
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Almost everyone we interviewed seemed to struggle with this tension, which often plays out in heated internal debates. Which organizational elements should be standardized? To what extent does managing high-potential emerging markets on a country-by-country basis make sense? When is it better, in those markets, to leverage scale and synergies across business units in managing governments, regulators, partners, and talent?" (Moi ici: Mania de achar que a escala é tudo... leiam Ghemawatt, o mundo não é plano!!! (aqui, aqui e sobretudo aqui onde discordo dele))
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Quem acredita que os maiores ficam cada vez maiores, que os poderosos ficam cada vez mais poderosos, que existem estratégias eternamente válidas... tudo é contingente, tudo é situacional. E isso é simplesmente belo.

O mundo a mudar outra vez

"Take supply chain decisions. The trend toward significant offshoring will most likely continue (Moi ici: Pessoalmente acredito que já está em retrocesso). But many companies are becoming concerned that widely dispersed, low-cost supply chains make them vulnerable to protectionist governments, rising transportation costs, and quality problems. Some are taking steps to make their supply chains shorter, simpler, and stronger, in effect reducing internal distance within their production networks to better manage their exposure."
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Tantas oportunidades a serem agarradas no mundo do B2B pelas nossas PMEs, fazendo uso da proximidade e flexibilidade.

Trecho retirado de "The Cosmopolitan Corporation" de Pankaj Ghemawat e publicado no número de Maio da HBR.

O mundo não é plano!

"Things such as culture, language, and the industry you're in all matter a great deal. Managers sometimes focus very heavily on geographic distance and may not give much weight to cultural dimensions."
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Como isto é verdade e como isto é importante para Mongo!!!
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"Creating a Smart Export Strategy"