A mudança bottom-up!

Flying geese!

Descobri esta expressão há poucos anos, mas foi com Reinert que percebi o seu significado profundo e as suas implicações para a produtividade agregada dos países.

Em tempos de inflação elevada toda a gente quer ver o seu salário aumentado. Qual o problema disso? O nosso tradicional progresso de caracol no aumento da produtividade que gera a famosa guerra do gato e do rato. O pouco que se aumenta em produtividade é comido pelo magro aumento dos salários e "rouba" o capital para pagar os custos do futuro (segundo Schumpeter).

 

Por exemplo, hoje no JN aparece um artigo sobre a guerra entre as vacarias e a indústria de lacticínios, "Indústria desce preço do leite e coloca vacarias em risco":

"A dona dos queijos Limiano e Terra Nostra já anunciou uma descida de 7,8 cêntimos no preço do leite pago à produção. A Penlac vai baixar cinco. Os produtores acusam a indústria de estar "aproveitar-se" das ajudas anunciadas pelo Governo para "esmagar a produção" , garantem que vai voltar a haver fecho de vacarias e falta de leite nos supermercados. Exigem a intervenção do Executivo de António Costa.

"As indústrias pretendem aproveitar-se das ajudas anunciadas para voltar a espremer a margem dos produtores. Qualquer descida no preço do leite levará ao abate de animais, abandono da produção e à falta de leite nas prateleiras", afirma, em comunicado, a Aprolep -Associação dos Produtores de Leite de Portugal."

Agora vou ironizar: Malditas vacarias que esquecem o seu papel social (apesar dos impostos, taxas e taxinhas ainda têm de ser Misericórdias) 

Por alguma razão associo os flying geese ao meu tradicional grito aqui no blogue "The "flying geese" model, ou deixem as empresas morrer!!!"

Se uma vacaria não consegue ser competitiva ou muda de vida ou tem de fechar. As pessoas não estão dispostas a pagar mais ou, simplesmente não podem pagar mais. Os recursos aplicados numa vacaria que fecha vão para outra aposta mais produtiva.

Voltemos à produtividade agregada de um país. Como aumenta? Volto sempre a Maliranta. Na imagem dos flying geese:

O Japão deixou de produzir vestuário porque as empresas produtoras de vestuário deixaram de poder gerar rendimento suficiente que pagasse salários competitivos aos seus trabalhares. Por isso, esses trabalhadores migraram, primeiro para a metalomecânica, depois para a electrónica e assim sucessivamente. 

Há dias no Eco li um artigo que ilustra a mudança que o país precisa de ver acontecer, "De estofador a programador. Eles (re)programaram as suas carreiras para a indústria tecnológica":

"Em comum têm a decisão de reconverter as suas carreiras. Hoje em dia, são os quatro programadores em empresas de diferentes setores. Ganharam em salário e qualidade de vida. São mais valorizados e respeitados profissionalmente do que nunca, dizem."

A mudança bottom-up! Uns mudam de carreira, outros mudam de país. A maioria definha a proteger o passado. 

Acerca de KPIs

Terça pediram-me uma opinião:

1."Se esse KPI está sempre no verde não interessa para nada, porque não é challenging" Eu fiquei de pé atrás quando ouvi isto. E se por acaso for um KPI relevante? O que opinas? 2. Aliás, o critério último da relevância de um KPI não é o dever estar relacionado com a satisfação do cliente?

Por que seguimos um indicador de desempenho?

• Recordo daqui: "Once again, the reason why a measurement is important to a business or government agency is because of the existence of risk. Without risk, information would literally have no value to decision making.""

Por que é um indicador pode não ser challenging?

• Recordo daqui: "Usar indicadores da treta; Usar metas da treta"
• Um indicador pode ser bom, mas ter um desafio de desempenho tão baixo que acaba por estar sempre no verde. Vem-me logo à cabeça uma empresa que em 2022 teve 8 reclamações, em 2021 teve 9 ou 10 reclamações, e que para 2023 propunha uma meta de não mais de 12 reclamações. O responsável da qualidade queria tudo verde.
• Como saber se um indicador é bom? Se é um indicador estratégico - Está alinhado com a estratégia?  Recordar o mapa da estratégia. Se é um indicador operacional - Serve para medir a eficácia, ou a eficiência, ou a quantidade? 

O critério último da relevância de um KPI não é o dever estar relacionado com a satisfação do cliente? Proponho que se desenhe o mapa da estratégia, depois escolher os indicadores nas quatro perspectivas. Na perspectiva clientes equacionar 3 resultados desejados: clientes ganhos; clientes satisfeitos e clientes leais.

"wait for the coming of the meteor"

Na passada terça-feira no JN li:

Na segunda-feira, numa conversa com o meu parceiro das conversas oxigenadoras, falámos do crescente número de famílias dependentes de apoios do estado. Falámos do interesse do sistema na manutenção da situação. Já imaginaram que o sucesso de um programa de apoio levaria ao fim do posto de trabalho dos trabalhadores do programa, porque o objectivo de apoio teria desaparecido? Quem aceita isso? Recordei a minha primeira leitura de Peter Drucker, mais de 900 páginas, onde ele propunha que muitos programas do estado fossem iniciados com data de encerramento.

Recordei o trecho que li numa das caminhadas durante os primeiros tempos de lockdown em Devo ser muito burro mesmo! (parte II) - "Toyota leaders swore they would never be reliant on banks again." Quando recordo a estória da Toyota vou sempre aterrar no racional deste postal de 2021, Quando o povo estiver maduro os diques e comportas serão abertos. 

Enquanto o povo não estiver maduro não vale a pena lutar e gastar energia. Ainda na segunda-feira disse o mesmo.

Entretanto, ontem li "We must become barbarians" onde sublinhei:

"The historian Malcom Yapp invented a wonderful term for this kind of dispersed culture of refusal: jellyfish tribes. In Scott’s words, jellyfish tribalism is “a process of defending cultural and economic autonomy by scattering” to “make the group invisible or unattractive as object of appropriation”.

...

This is why I find the notion of the jellyfish tribe so intriguing. Any attempt at building utopia will fail — but utopia should never be a goal. Some form of free survival is the goal; survival in order to uphold the values of a true human life. There is no easy or standardised way to emulate what Scott calls the “state-repelling characteristics” of the Zomians, but there is one question it might be useful for anyone who seeks to evade Leviathan to ask themselves: what kind of barbarian do I want to be?

...

What we see here, then, is two potential escape routes: one outside, one inside. Shatter zones do not have to literally be in the hills: they can be within our homes and even within our hearts. My heart soars whenever I hear of some remote monastery or surviving rooted community with no online access or even electricity, whose people know exactly where they stand: outside the state, the better to see God and experience creation. Such places are the work of the raw barbarians, and we need more of them.

...

if we coalesce as a jellyfish tribe, we can begin to dissociate ourselves from the state, while creating alternatives to it. Plenty of people are already doing this. They create cultures-within-cultures, parallel economies and ways of living. Like small furry mammals running unnoticed beneath the feet of the tyrannosaurs, we can thus build our own little worlds on the margins and wait for the coming of the meteor, which we can already see coming in the very un-sustainability of technological modernity. The mice don’t attack the dinosaurs, and neither do they wait for them to die out: they just avoid them as best they can, and get on with their work."

Sei que o tal sistema lá de cima não é sustentável, vai durar graças aos apoios dos trouxas frugais do Norte da Europa enquanto por cá se esbanja dinheiro:

Ao fim de semana , pela calada , para o esquema passar despercebido. Realmente este goveno destaca-se pela transparência. pic.twitter.com/FOI3xTDFPQ

— It's I,.. Leclerc ! (@it_leclerc) March 28, 2023

 

Mas não era óbvio para toda a gente que com o PS o PRR ia ser uma tourada? Qual é o espanto?https://t.co/GB9O5TAkpi

— Miguel Cardoso (@hipersurf) March 28, 2023

Só nos resta esperar pelo meteoro. 

"this feeling of being “ripped-off”"

"what airlines have forgotten over time is, that if you treat customers like rational customers then you will get rational customers and extremely price sensible customers in the end.  However, there is a good reason why economics is called a dismal science. So if you follow economists, you get a dismal industry.

...

The digital customer is a knowledgeable customer due to all the information he has. So if airlines treat him still like the stupid customer of the past when he had no access the information, customers will feel even more exploit by the airlines as profit maximizers. The bad joke is that the airlines short-term profit seeking behavior is exactly the reason why there is no profit in the airline industry.

...

Airlines have trained their customer to look for the best price and not for value, and now the customers look via comparison engines for the best price and not value.

Airlines have conditioned their customers in the past on price, now that backfires, since customers have to be retrained about value. And as we all know, unlearning is impossible. Airlines have trained customers for a long time on price to be the sole criteria so value strategies will have serious problems to even reach the customers.

...

the difference for the same flight from the same airline can be up to 50%. How can I trust the corporate site, if they want to rip me off? It is not the 50 CHF that annoys me but this feeling of being “ripped-off”."

Trechos retirados de "The strange business model of airlines" 

"It's the Benefits, Stupid!"

"It's the Benefits, Stupid! A project leader pointed out that project teams and owners focus too little on the benefits of their projects and too much on costs and schedule. It's not that cost and schedule are not important, emphasized this leader. But the ultimate reason for doing projects is their benefits. Cost and schedule are means to an end - - the end being benefits - not ends in themselves. We must therefore keep our eyes on the benefits, or we lose sight of why we do what we do, the leader concluded. - Again, the cohort was sympathetic. And again, our research supports the heuristic. First, we have found that most projects don't even measure benefits, making their study difficult. Second, project managers who do measure and manage benefits perform better than managers who do not. Not only do these managers perform better in delivering benefits, but also in delivering on budget and on time. It appears that once project managers know how to get benefits right, they know how to get everything right. They have graduated to the level of the mature and effective project leader. Therefore, if you don't already focus on benefits in your projects, now is a good time to start. You will not truly master project management until you do."

Trecho retirado de "Heuristics for Masterbuilders: Fast and Frugal Ways to Become a Better Project Leader" 

"the real impacts happen when they act like small ones"

Há anos fixei um tweet de Tom Peters neste postal Too Big To Care que voltei a referir neste outro postal Too big to care.

Ontem, recordei-me dele ao ler Seth Godin em "Is it possible to care at scale?":

"Caring at scale can’t be done by the CEO or a VP. But what these folks can do is create a culture that cares. They can hire people who are predisposed to care. They can pay attention to the people who care and measure things that matter instead of chasing the short term.

Large organizations have significant structural advantages. But the real impacts happen when they act like small ones."

Por que se pedem paletes de mão de obra estrangeira barata?

Volta e meia oiço, ou leio, líderes associativos a pedirem paletes de mão de obra estrangeira barata para resolverem o seu problema.

Qual o impacte da política de imigração de Trump nos salários dos americanos mais pobres?

Qual o impacte de um mercado laboral apertado nos salários dos trabalhadores?

"Given that inadequate employment plays such a powerful role in theories of poverty, it is surprising how little research has been done on whether, or to what extent, tight labor markets reverse these trajectories. Only recently have scholars turned their attention to the impact of tight labor markets on inequality, offering insight into how very tight labor markets have the potential to substantially close the Black-white wage, income, and unemployment gaps. If persistent unemployment or low earnings are indeed the root of most poverty problems, then truly tight labor markets that last long enough to reach those at the bottom of the economic ladder should change the equation in two ways. First, low unemployment should catalyze competition among employers to attract workers, driving them to improve job quality—including raising wages for workers on the bottom rungs. Second, low unemployment should draw jobless workers off the sidelines, transforming applicants with little formal education or employment experience into viable job candidates.

These benefits should flow into the other domains tied to poverty. As hiring managers are forced to look further afield for workers, the stigma attached to having a criminal record, especially a nonviolent one, should be less of a barrier. In theory, when men can claim steady salaries, young women have more choices in the partnership “market.” Tight labor markets provide women with more options as well, including raising children on their own in more economically secure households. As unemployment declines, neighborhood peace should be easier to secure since economic security begets residential stability, which increases social capital and peaceful streets.

...

we explore the gains that can accrue for people living in poverty when labor is scarce and jobs are going begging.

...

Poor workers are instead marked—by race, criminal records, or past unemployment—in ways that are often stigmatized by employers. Our research shows that these qualitative distinctions mean that these workers are categorically excluded from work opportunities until the labor market becomes especially tight, around 4 percent unemployment, at which point opportunities open up."

Interessante, sempre pensei isto e sempre considerei os pedidos de paletes de mão de obra estrangeira barata uma forma de manter os salários baixos. Uma forma de reduzir o imperativo desubir na escala de valor, para que a produtividade acrescida permita pagar os salários crescentes.

Trechos retirados de "Moving the Needle" de Katherine S. Newman.

Rumo ao fundo da tabela

Extraordinário, Roménia agora tem poder de compra superior a Portugal e "Portugal é o sétimo país com menor PIB per capita da UE. Foi ultrapassado pela Estónia e Letónia"

Recordar:

• A previsão mais fácil de todas. Socialismo = Sildávia!
• Para reflexão
• É sempre possível piorar!
• A caminho da Sildávia ao vivo e a cores, mais um pacotão

Sabem por que é que acabaram as PPPs? Para impedir comparações como estas entre portas, para não mostrar o estado do SNS.

Quem não os conhecer que os compre

"This article presents results from the first statistically significant study of traffic forecasts in transportation infrastructure projects. The sample used is the largest of its kind, covering 210 projects in 14 nations worth U.S.$9 billion. The study shows with very high statistical significance that forecasters generally do a poor job of estimating the demand for transportation infrastructure projects. For 9 out of 10 rail projects, passenger forecasts are overestimated; the average overestimation is 106%. For half of all road projects, the difference between actual and forecasted traffic is more than +20%. The result is substantial financial risks, which are typically ignored or downplayed by planners and decision-makers to the detriment of social and economic welfare. Our data also show that forecasts have not become more accurate over the 30-year period studied, despite claims to the contrary by forecasters. The causes of inaccuracy in forecasts are different for rail and road projects, with political causes playing a larger role for rail than for road."

Trecho retirado de "How (In)accurate Are Demand Forecasts in Public Works Projects? - The Case of Transportation" de Bent Flyvbjerg, Mette K. Skamris Holm, e Soren L. Buhl, publicado no Journal of the American Planning Association, Vol. 71, No. 2, Spring 2005. 

Iterar mais rapidamente

No início da década de 90 trabalhei com uma empresa japonesa do ramo automóvel no projecto CDW27, que mais tarde seria o Ford Mondeo. O japonês com quem trabalhava gabava-se do cliente Toyota ser muito mais dinâmico que a Ford. Julgo que ele dizia que enquanto a Ford demorava 5 anos a pôr um carro no mercado a Toyota demorava 3 anos, ou então era 7 anos versus 5 anos. Não interessam os números exactos, o que interessa é chamar à reflexão o pensamento de Boyd sobre a vantagem de quem consegue iterar mais depressa, o que tiver o ciclo OODA mais curto:

"The key is the combination — rigor in each step; and getting through more cycles of the OODA Loop faster than the enemy."

Nestes tempos de contexto a mudar a um ritmo alucinante, interrogo-me sobre a vantagem das empresas com um rolling budget versus a que têm um orçamento anual e uma disciplina férrea na sua execução. 

"awarding contracts to domestic companies is a good way to make influential friends and win public support" (parte II)

O ministro João Galamba. 

Este blogue percebe-o tão bem. Ontem ao fm da tarde li, ""Teremos uma fábrica de comboios em Portugal", garante João Galamba".

Como não recordar o recente postal "awarding contracts to domestic companies is a good way to make influential friends and win public support"

"isn’t a license to not worry about costs"

Uma, mais uma, excelente reflexão de Roger Martin, que por sua vez nos põe a pensar. Desta vez é "Cost-Effective Differentiation - Why it Really Matters for your Strategy" da qual sublinho a parte final:

"Real differentiators have the margin room to be aggressive with pricing when needed and, in addition, have the earnings from their high margins to invest in the next differentiation. And low-cost players can grab share by pricing below the level that any other player is game to match. Consequently, ineffective high-value players have difficulty growing. Customers who happen to really value their particular offering remain loyal customers at the price they need to charge. But as with all companies, ineffective high-value players face a downward-sloping demand curve in which higher prices mean lower demand.

Simply, the ability to grow any business is hampered by needing to charge a high enough price to earn a return on costs. If those costs are higher than they need to be, but you add value to a set of customers, you will have a decent business. But it won’t be a great business.

Seeking to be a differentiator isn’t a license to not worry about costs. It is all one singular value equation. The determinant of your competitiveness is the margin between the value you create and the costs you incur. And in that metric: a buck is a buck is a buck."

Recordo trading up versus trading down.

Uma regra de polegar

A propósito dos projectos públicos, um exemplo de uma boa prática que deve servir de alerta para as notícias que acompanham o anúncio de obras públicas:

"Subways would seem to be an even harder case for modularization, but when Madrid Metro carried out one of the world's largest subway expansions between 1995 and 2003, it leaned on modularity in two ways. First, the seventy-six stations required for the expansion were treated like Lego, with all sharing the same simple, clean, functional design. Costs plunged, and speed of delivery soared. To amplify those effects, Madrid Metro shunned new technologies. Only proven technologies - those with a high degree of "frozen experience" - were used."

Trecho retirado de "How Big Things Get Done" de Bent Flyvbjerg. 

Alteração de contexto

Hoje no JdN sublinhei:

"Há regras que são simples como: para haver retorno tem que haver risco e, quem promete o contrário, dizendo que não está a correr risco, está a enganar alguém e, no fim, alguém vai pagar a conta."

Recordei logo este esquema de 2008:

Entretanto, também hoje no Twitter fixei:

Isto num país endividado com empresas endividadas é um grande modificador do contexto (já não é o tempo desta política?).

Quantas empresas estão a rever a sua estratégia para equacionar esta alteração de contexto?

Evitar o blame game

Ouvi uma conversa em que o auditor interno corporativo dizia que não auditava as auditorias internas das unidades de negócio, para impedir que as unidades de negócio entrassem num esforço de esconder a realidade, com medo das auditorias corporativas.

Dias depois, recordei algo que li em "Caixa Negra" de Matthew Syed algures em 2018:

"if pilots anticipate being blamed unfairly, they will not make the reports on their own mistakes and near misses, thus suppressing the precious information that has driven aviation's remarkable safety record. This is why blame should never be apportioned for reasons of corporate or political expediency, but only ever after a proper investigation by experts with a ground-level understanding of the complexity in which professionals operate.

The jury did their best to make up their minds on the facts, but it is not easy while sitting in a staid courtroom to make a judgment about split-second decisions made in the cockpit of a 200-ton jumbo jet flying through thick fog at nearly 200 mph.

But if the Oscar November incident shows anything, it is just how easy it is to engage in the blame game. A tragedy very nearly happened, therefore someone had to be punished. Aviation is generally an industry with an empowering attitude toward error, and is rightly considered a leader when it comes to having a just culture. It rarely engages in blame and uses mistakes to drive learning.

...

But what the Oscar November incident reveals is that even a pioneering industry like aviation is not completely immune from the blame tendency. And perhaps it exposes, more than anything, just how far we need to travel to eradicate the blame instinct once and for all."

Uma estória sobre um banco

Ontem, durante as compras da manhã emergiu na minha mente, já não me recordo porquê, a palavra temperança.

Sempre que penso nessa palavra recordo uma estória que li em 2013:

"Sonny, we’ve been in business for 85 years. What makes you think we won’t be in business another 85?"

Usar a maximização, quando se trata de negócios, é demasiado perigoso, demasiado arriscado.

A estória de 2013 é sobre um banco...

Zombies, produtividade e subsídios

Em "How not to grow the economy" li uma espécie de resumo do que tenho escrito por aqui ao longo dos anos:

"But there is a deeper problem with Labour's and the Tories' approach to the productivity slump. While both parties have bought into the new economic consensus - that is, the belief that low business investment is at the root of lacklustre growth - they also share the belief that businesses need more state financial support. In today's circumstances, though, this would act to entrench the low-growth quagmire.

...

But there is a big problem here: state financial aid to business is self-defeating. [Moi ici: A lição de Spender] It hinders the innovation it is meant to promote. State handouts encourage corporate dependency and reduce the pressure on businesses to become more productive and commercially competitive. They often blunt the incentive for producers to experiment with and develop even better technologies. Businesses often end up concentrating on meeting various government criteria and conditions, rather than focussing on what might be best commercially.  [Moi ici: Recordo A economia das carpetes e biombos e O nefasto poder aditivo dos subsídios] 

...

Not all state-investment measures come with such onerous conditions. But state subsidies are never a free lunch. They are usually prescriptive and they often intrude on normal commercial practices. Whatever their intentions, state incentives often distort business-investment activities.

The contemporary problem for growth has not been too little but too much state support. Sustaining the business status quo with an abundance of subsidies doesn't just distort corporate focus and decision-making. It also helps sustain a zombie economy, by keeping inefficient and even unprofitable businesses afloat. [Moi ici: Recordar Para que servem os apoios e subsídios? e A morte lenta]

...

Zombie firms are those that, without extra support, such as cheap and easy debt facilities or state financial relief, would normally close down due to poor performance. Since the 1980s, this zombification trend has congested the wider economy. It blocks the creative-destructive process by which economies have moved ahead in the past, with lower-productivity, less-efficient businesses giving way to expanding, higher-productivity businesses.

Today, business investment is being held back by a surfeit of the old. Peter Drucker, one of the most influential 20th-century business thinkers, argued that the first step in innovation is to get rid of yesterday. 'If leaders are unable to slough off yesterday', he said, 'they simply will not be able to create tomorrow. [Moi ici: Recordar deixem as empresas evoluir ou morrer, ponto!!!] Drucker argued that dying products, services or processes - even if still profitable today shackle people and resources. This applies not just for individual businesses, but also for the economy in general. An excess of low-productivity firms gums up the whole economy, disincentivising even the healthiest businesses from investing in new advancements.

...

Instead of letting the old go, a profusion of state policies now sustains what already exists. These policies - monetary, fiscal and regulatory - tend to favour larger, incumbent companies at the expense of smaller, younger firms. And it is those smaller, younger firms that would usually be the ones innovating and driving productivity higher. [Moi ici: Recordar Maliranta em Deixar a produtividade aumentar]

...

But perhaps the biggest obstacle is the state's mummification of an already moribund economy. Fortunately, this is probably the easiest one for a government to overcome. It can turn off the corporate-welfare mechanisms that preserve and stultify. And it can start doing so right now."

Some Countries Do 'Ave 'Em

Na quarta-feira ao final do dia li "A economia, as políticas e os negócios" de onde sublinhei:

"Quem quer investir num país assim?

Bom dia, o Governo tem um discurso cada vez mais agressivo contra as empresas, especialmente as maiores e que têm lucros. É trágico. 

...

À medida que as condições económicas e sociais apertam, ou quando o Governo está sob pressão mediática por um qualquer caso, ao fim de sete anos de governação, já se pode identificar um padrão. Em Portugal, é preferível ter uma empresa pequena, e com prejuízos [Moi ici: Subsidize it]. As grandes empresas, com lucros, estão permanentemente em risco, mesmo quando esses lucros são 'vistosos' em termos absolutos mas limitados quando avaliados em função do capital investido (verdadeiramente, o critério que é relevante). 

...

António Costa até pode beneficiar no curto prazo deste discurso contra as empresas, contra os bancos, contra as companhias de energia, de telecomunicações ou da distribuição. Num momento em que os portugueses perdem rendimento disponível, e quando o desemprego começa a dar sinais de agravamento, são um alvo fácil. É a tal habilidade política que todos lhe reconhecem. Mas é ao mesmo tempo a nossa perdição. Quem quer investir num país assim?"

 Agora comparemos com Inglaterra em "How not to grow the economy":

"Despite the many legitimate criticisms of the short-lived Liz Truss administration, it did leave one exceptional legacy. It put the question of economic growth, and the importance of raising productivity, back on the mainstream political agenda.

...

It took an extraordinary triple whammy - the pandemic lockdowns, the postlockdown disruptions to global supply chains, and the war in Ukraine - to finally force the British political class, in the shape of the Truss administration, to acknowledge the dire state of the economy. It put the need for growth back on the agenda."

Este último artigo merece um comentário mais longo. 

Um organismo unido, focado e determinado

Na segunda-feira de manhã cedo ouvi o zunzum sobre o que se passou com o navio de patrulha Mondego.

Ontem de manhã, durante a minha caminhada matinal continuei a leitura de "How Big Things Get Done" de Bent Flyvbjerg. Comecei e acabei a leitura do capítulo 8 - “A SINGLE, DETERMINED ORGANISM”.

O capítulo fala sobre a importância de ter uma equipa coesa na implementação de um projecto e sobre como criar essa coesão. O livro usa o exemplo da construção do Terminal 5 (T5) de Heathrow sob a responsabilidade da British Airports Authority (BAA).

Os subtítulos apresentados no caso são:

• A DEADLINE SET IN STONE
• HOW TO BUILD A TEAM
• MAKING HISTORY
• 4:00 A. M.

Em Making History pode ler-se:

"Identity was the first step. Purpose was the second. It had to matter that you worked for T5. To that end, the worksite was plastered with posters and other promotions comparing T5 with great projects of the past: the partially completed Eiffel Tower in Paris; Grand Central Terminal under construction in New York; the massive Thames Barrier flood controls in London. Each appeared on posters with the caption "We're making history, too."

...

I grew up in construction and know from firsthand experience that construction workers are sharp as knives at understanding what's happening on their worksites. Moreover, they have a well-founded skepticism of management. They know corporate propaganda when they see it, and they distrust it. "Most guys turn up with cynicism on any site we go to," Richard Harper said. They are usually right to be cynical "because it's all bollocks what the people [management] are saying." Promises aren't kept. Work conditions are poor. Workers aren't listened to. When reality doesn't match the words, corporate PR about teamwork and making history is worse than useless on the shop floor.

The workers brought their usual cynicism to T5, Harper said. "But with that site, within, if not fortyeight hours, a week maximum, everybody had bought into the philosophy of T5. Because they could see T5 was implementing what they said they would do." It started with the on-site facilities. "It was just something mind-boggling," Harper told me, sounding amazed even now. "The guys had never seen this. The toilets, the showers, the canteens were the best I've ever seen on any site I've worked on in the world They were fantastic."

...

Harper said. "If guys had wet gloves, they only had to take them back to the store and they got a fresh pair of gloves. If they had a scratch on the glasses and couldn't see properly, they'd take the glasses back, and they were changed. Guys weren't used to this. This was totally new to them. On other jobs, they told you, 'If you're not happy with the glasses or whatever, buy your own.' " These may sound like small things to outsiders, but as Harper pointed out, for workers they are "massive, just massive. You set a man to work in the morning and you've put the things there that he wants, then you get a good day's work. You start them off in a bad way, and you know the next eight to ten hours, it's going to be very difficult." Multiply that by thousands of workers and thousands of days, and you do indeed get something massive.

T5's managers not only listened to workers, they consulted them, asking some to sit down with designers to explore how designs and workflows could be improved."

Cheguei ao fim do capítulo, desliguei o tablet e voltei ao Mondego ...

"Os militares denunciam "a entrada de água em dois momentos diferentes, falta de manutenção do único dos dois motores que equipam a embarcação, um dos três geradores de energia inoperacionais e diversas fugas de óleo", entre outros problemas."

E pensei, que excelente forma de criar um “A SINGLE, DETERMINED ORGANISM”. 

BTW, nunca esqueço:

Foi você que falou em certificação dos clientes?

Nestes tempos em que se fala tanto de qualidade, de satisfação dos clientes, de certificação, de clientes mistério, de ... 

"Americans are encountering more problems with companies' products and services than ever before, and a higher proportion of them are actively seeking "revenge" for their troubles, a new study has found.

Some 74% of the 1,000 consumers surveyed said they had experienced a product or service problem in the past year. That is up from 66% in 2020, when the study last was conducted, and 56% in 2017. Only 32% told researchers they had experienced a problem in 1976, when a similar version of the study was first conducted.

The percentage of consumers who have taken action to settle a score against a company through measures such as pestering or public shaming in person or online, has tripled to 9% from 3% in 2020, according to the study. That reversed a downward trend with regards to revenge-seeking behavior: The average percentage of customers seeking revenge between 2003 and 2017 was 17%."(1)

"Effective support for years has been looked upon as a consumer right, however, and some customer experience executives say stratifying it into tiers runs the risk of eroding trust among those who can't or don't want to pay." (2)

(1) - As Customer Problems Hit a Record High, More People Seek 'Revenge 

(2) - Want Better Customer Service? Join the (Membership) Club