"it’s much better to derail something at the beginning than at the end"

 

"Think slow, act fast: That’s the secret of success.

...

But "Think slow, act fast" is not how big projects are typically done. "Think fast, act slow" is. The track record of big projects unequivocally shows that."

Li isto em Fevereiro de 2023.

Agora, encontro a versão de Rory Sunderland:

"And my job, I think, is basically to continually provide the hint—to raise the uncomfortable questions. And actually, that means being a bit of a pain in the ass. Because to someone with an unbelievably linear mindset, it feels like you’re derailing things, throwing a spanner in the works.

But if I can judge the moment well, it’s much better to derail something at the beginning than at the end. One of the worst things you can do on any creative project is to start work straight away. There’s a kind of messy preliminary phase where it’s absolutely right to mess around with the brief—not least to ask whether the objective of the brief is even the right one in the first place."

As PME vivem com recursos limitados — dinheiro, pessoas, tempo. O risco de se lançar logo numa solução (o “act fast, think fast”) é enorme: pode significar investir em algo que afinal não resolve o problema certo. O “think slow” protege a PME contra erros caros. É o tempo de discutir o objectivo, de desafiar o brief, de perguntar “o que é que estamos realmente a tentar resolver?”.

As PME têm uma vantagem que muitas empresas grandes não têm: agilidade. Uma vez tomada a decisão, conseguem implementar rapidamente, ajustar processos, testar no mercado e corrigir em movimento. É aí que entra o “act fast”: depois da reflexão cuidadosa, a execução é veloz e decidida.

"think slow" não é o mesmo que engonhar. Também recordo muitas situações em que a um engonhar se seguiu um act slow.

Está na moda. Mas será que muda? (parte II)

Parte I.

Na revista The Economist do passado dia 12 de Maio encontrei um artigo do obrigatório Bent Flyvbjerg intitulado "Why so many IT projects go so horribly wrong".

Muitos projectos de TI correm tão mal porque combinam complexidade elevada, fraca visibilidade e governação deficiente. Ao contrário dos projectos de infra-estruturas, o software é intangível — é mais difícil de inspeccionar, acompanhar ou estabilizar. Essa abstracção abre caminho ao alargamento descontrolado do âmbito (“scope creep”), onde gestores e intervenientes vão acrescentando novas funcionalidades ao longo do tempo.

Além disso, os projectos de TI ainda não assentam em padrões profissionais maduros: muitos responsáveis de projecto não têm formação formal, e quem decide frequentemente não domina a tecnologia. Estes projectos implicam mudanças profundas na forma de trabalhar das organizações, o que desencadeia resistências internas e conflitos políticos.

O planeamento apressado, a excessiva personalização e a indefinição de responsabilidades agravam ainda mais o risco. Como mostra o estudo de Flyvbjerg, quando um projecto de TI corre mal, tende a correr muito mal — com derrapagens massivas e impacto sistémico.

Qual a implicação disto para os projectos de inteligência artificial (IA)? 

A principal implicação para os projectos de IA é que estes estão expostos aos mesmos riscos estruturais dos projectos de TI tradicionais — mas em grau ainda mais elevado.

Porquê? 

Porque a IA é uma tecnologia ainda mais nova e menos compreendida. Muitos dos decisores não têm literacia técnica suficiente para avaliar o que é viável, o que é seguro ou o que faz sentido implementar. Isso favorece decisões precipitadas e expectativas desajustadas. 

Porque os projectos de IA são, por natureza, ainda mais abstractos. Não há um "produto final" claramente visível ou testável até fases tardias. Isto dificulta o controlo, favorece alterações constantes e torna o risco de "falhar em silêncio" mais provável.

Porque a IA altera profundamente a forma como as pessoas trabalham. Ao contrário de um novo software de gestão ou uma nova máquina de produção, a IA mexe com a autonomia, os processos de decisão e até com a identidade profissional das equipas. Isso aumenta o risco de resistência interna, conflitos e sabotagem passiva.

Porque existe um entusiasmo exagerado e pressão para "implementar depressa". As chefias, muitas vezes pouco informadas, querem "usar IA" sem perceber o que implica ou para que serve. Esta pressa compromete o tempo necessário de planeamento, testes e ajustamentos que são essenciais em tecnologias com efeitos imprevisíveis.

Continua.

Cheira a 2007...

Duas notas deste artigo, "ANA critica contas e projeções da Comissão Independente em relação ao novo aeroporto de Lisboa":

"A ANA considera ainda que a CTI foi "otimista" em relação à projeção de tráfego, tendo previsto 66 a 108 milhões de passageiros em 2050, quando "entidades internacionais altamente credenciadas", preveem entre 40 a 52 milhões de passageiros em 2050.

Adicionalmente, também considera "otimistas" os cronogramas de construção e contesta o entendimento da CTI de que a opção Montijo levaria seis anos a ser construída."

Entretanto no Twitter descobri outra:

A linha de alta velocidade Madrid - Barcelona tem 6M de passageiros. Num país com quatro vezes mais população que o nosso. Cada vez mais me convenço que não temos grande talento para estes estudos. pic.twitter.com/Qvb4GDdQan

— Moita de Deus (@Deus_outro) January 30, 2024

Como não recordar leituras já feitas... 

• em 2012 (como o tempo voa) O problema não é étnico... talvez genético, citação de "Thinking, Fast and Slow" de Daniel Kahneman:

"A 2005 study examined rail projects undertaken worldwide between 1969 and 1998. In more than 90% of the cases, the number of passengers projected to use the system was overestimated. Even though these passenger shortfalls were widely publicized, forecasts did not improve over those thirty years; on average, planners overestimated how many people would use the new rail projects by 106%, and the average cost overrun was 45%. As more evidence accumulated, the experts did not become more reliant on it"

• em 2023 li "How Big Things Get Done" de Bent Flyvbjerg e Dan Gardner. Os autores escrevem sobre a "Planning fallacy" e sobre a "The commitment fallacy":

"Research documents that the planning fallacy is pervasive, but we need only look at ourselves and the people around us to know that. You expect to get downtown on a Saturday night within twenty minutes, but it takes forty minutes instead and now you're latejust like last time and the time before that. You think you'll have your toddler asleep after fifteen minutes of bedtime stories, but it takes half an hour —as usual. You're sure you will submit your term paper a few days early this time, but you end up pulling an all-nighter and make the deadline with a minute to spare —as always.

These aren't intentional miscalculations. Much of the voluminous research on the subject involves people who are not trying to win a contract, get financing for a project, or ...

For us to be so consistently wrong, we must consistently ignore experience. And we do, for various reasons. When we think of the future, the past may simply not come to mind and we may not think to dig it up because it's the present and future we are interested in. If it does surface, we may think "This time is different" and dismiss it (an option that's always available because, in a sense, every moment in life is unique).

...

Purposes and goals are not carefully considered. Alternatives are not explored. Difficulties and risks are not investigated. Solutions are not found. Instead, shallow analysis is followed by quick lock-in to a decision that sweeps aside all the other forms the project could take. "Lock-in," as scholars refer to it, is the notion that although there may be alternatives, most people and organizations behave as if they have no choice but to push on, even past the point where they put themselves at more cost or risk than they would have accepted at the start. This is followed by action. And usually, sometime after that, by trouble; for instance, in the guise of the "break-fix cycle" mentioned in chapter 1.

I call such premature lock-in the "commitment fallacy." It is a behavioral bias on a par with the other biases identified by behavioral science. 

...

One is what I call "strategic misrepresentation," the tendency to deliberately and systematically distort or misstate information for strategic purposes. If you want to win a contract or get a project approved, superficial planning is handy because it glosses over major challenges, which keeps the estimated cost and time down, which wins contracts and gets projects approved. But as certain as the law of gravity, challenges ignored during planning will eventually boomerang back as delays and cost overruns during delivery. By then the project will be too far along to turn back. Getting to that point of no return is the real goal of strategic misrepresentation. It is politics, resulting in failure by design.

...

But as projects get bigger and decisions more consequential, the influence of money and power grows. Powerful individuals and organizations make the decisions, the number of stakeholders increases, they lobby for their specific interests, and the name of the game is politics. And the balance shifts from psychology to strategic misrepresentation."

"Value Truth over Good News"

Recordo de 2009, "Fake recoveries, os 3 amigos e a linguagem de carroceiro":

"BTW, acham que as empresas de Belmiro de Azevedo, por causa da sua linguagem realista e crua estão a viver um momento de descalabro moral, de desânimo, revoltadas com o discurso da tanga do seu líder? Acham mesmo?

Não estarão antes, cientes da realidade, a fazer das tripas coração, a pensar em alternativas, a tentar criar um amanhã melhor? Qual das duas linguagem promove mais facilmente o cerrar de fileiras?

Se Belmiro de Azevedo replicasse a linguagem do ministro nas suas empresas iria gerar o veneno mais corrosivo das organizações, IMHO, o cinismo."

Relaciono com trechos retirados de "Heuristics for Masterbuilders: Fast and Frugal Ways to Become a Better Project Leader" de Bent Flyvbjerg.

"Value Truth over Good News. This was proposed by a leader who had observed that in most organizations good news is encouraged over bad. As a result, no one wants to be the messenger of bad news. The problem with this approach, the leader said, is that on big, complex projects it is only a matter of time until something goes wrong and bad news appear. As leader, you want to hear about this as quickly as possible, so you can do something about it before it grows worse. To be an effective project leader you therefore cannot afford the good-news culture of most organizations. You need to do the opposite: Encourage your team to always immediately tell you the truth about the project, no matter how bad it is. You need to actively encourage bad news and create an organization in which they travel fast, with clear escalation mechanisms and directives for who does what when things go wrong, so you don't have to spend precious time on figuring this out after the fact, argued this leader. -- Again, there was deep resonance in the room. Another cohort member explained that she used a version of this heuristic: Encourage Bad News. And again, these are heuristics that will help you be a better leader if they resonate with your experience, and you can walk the talk."

Porquê?

"It's the Benefits, Stupid! A project leader pointed out that project teams and owners focus too little on the benefits of their projects and too much on costs and schedule. It's not that cost and schedule are not important, emphasized this leader. But the ultimate reason for doing projects is their benefits. Cost and schedule are means to an end -- the end being benefits - not ends in themselves. We must therefore keep our eyes on the benefits, or we lose sight of why we do what we do, the leader concluded. - Again, the cohort was sympathetic. And again, our research supports the heuristic. First, we have found that most projects don't even measure benefits, making their study difficult. Second, project managers who do measure and manage benefits perform better than managers who do not. Not only do these managers perform better in delivering benefits, but also in delivering on budget and on time. It appears that once project managers know how to get benefits right, they know how to get everything right. They have graduated to the level of the mature and effective project leader. Therefore, if you don't already focus on benefits in your projects, now is a good time to start. You will not truly master project management until you do."

Relacionar os sublinhados acima com o tema do último artigo de Cavaco Silva.

"Ask Why? This will focus you on what matters, namely the benefits the project will achieve, which are the ultimately purpose of the project. Nietzsche rightly observed that, "to forget one's purpose is the commonest form of stupidity" (Nietzsche 1994: para 206). Good leaders are not stupid. They stay on purpose by asking why? This also prevents you from jumping too quickly to solutions, a classic error in project management and, indeed, all management. Moreover, it prevents you from seeing the project as an end in itself, instead of as a means to an end, another common error. Even a company is just a means to an end, and if you begin to see it as an end in itself then, ironically, that is the beginning to the end. Steve Jobs was crystal clear about his answer to why?: "making wonderful things" or "great products," as he repeated, over and over, like a mantra (Schlender and Tetzeli 2015: 233). Finally, asking and answering why? helps you think from right to left, like Wolstenholme above. The answer to why? is your "right" -- your North Star -- which will guide you every step of the way through delivery. Your "left" is the actions to get you there, your means. In the end, there are only two types of projects. The ones that get things right from the start, by asking why?, and the ones that fix things later. There are no shortcuts. The later you leave the fix the more expensive and stressful it will be. Once you're in the din of delivery, it is easy to forget to ask why? Therefore, remind yourself. Good leaders never stop asking why?"

Trechos retirados de "Heuristics for Masterbuilders: Fast and Frugal Ways to Become a Better Project Leader" de Bent Flyvbjerg.

"It's the Benefits, Stupid!"

"It's the Benefits, Stupid! A project leader pointed out that project teams and owners focus too little on the benefits of their projects and too much on costs and schedule. It's not that cost and schedule are not important, emphasized this leader. But the ultimate reason for doing projects is their benefits. Cost and schedule are means to an end - - the end being benefits - not ends in themselves. We must therefore keep our eyes on the benefits, or we lose sight of why we do what we do, the leader concluded. - Again, the cohort was sympathetic. And again, our research supports the heuristic. First, we have found that most projects don't even measure benefits, making their study difficult. Second, project managers who do measure and manage benefits perform better than managers who do not. Not only do these managers perform better in delivering benefits, but also in delivering on budget and on time. It appears that once project managers know how to get benefits right, they know how to get everything right. They have graduated to the level of the mature and effective project leader. Therefore, if you don't already focus on benefits in your projects, now is a good time to start. You will not truly master project management until you do."

Trecho retirado de "Heuristics for Masterbuilders: Fast and Frugal Ways to Become a Better Project Leader" 

Quem não os conhecer que os compre

"This article presents results from the first statistically significant study of traffic forecasts in transportation infrastructure projects. The sample used is the largest of its kind, covering 210 projects in 14 nations worth U.S.$9 billion. The study shows with very high statistical significance that forecasters generally do a poor job of estimating the demand for transportation infrastructure projects. For 9 out of 10 rail projects, passenger forecasts are overestimated; the average overestimation is 106%. For half of all road projects, the difference between actual and forecasted traffic is more than +20%. The result is substantial financial risks, which are typically ignored or downplayed by planners and decision-makers to the detriment of social and economic welfare. Our data also show that forecasts have not become more accurate over the 30-year period studied, despite claims to the contrary by forecasters. The causes of inaccuracy in forecasts are different for rail and road projects, with political causes playing a larger role for rail than for road."

Trecho retirado de "How (In)accurate Are Demand Forecasts in Public Works Projects? - The Case of Transportation" de Bent Flyvbjerg, Mette K. Skamris Holm, e Soren L. Buhl, publicado no Journal of the American Planning Association, Vol. 71, No. 2, Spring 2005. 

"awarding contracts to domestic companies is a good way to make influential friends and win public support" (parte II)

O ministro João Galamba. 

Este blogue percebe-o tão bem. Ontem ao fm da tarde li, ""Teremos uma fábrica de comboios em Portugal", garante João Galamba".

Como não recordar o recente postal "awarding contracts to domestic companies is a good way to make influential friends and win public support"

Um organismo unido, focado e determinado

Na segunda-feira de manhã cedo ouvi o zunzum sobre o que se passou com o navio de patrulha Mondego.

Ontem de manhã, durante a minha caminhada matinal continuei a leitura de "How Big Things Get Done" de Bent Flyvbjerg. Comecei e acabei a leitura do capítulo 8 - “A SINGLE, DETERMINED ORGANISM”.

O capítulo fala sobre a importância de ter uma equipa coesa na implementação de um projecto e sobre como criar essa coesão. O livro usa o exemplo da construção do Terminal 5 (T5) de Heathrow sob a responsabilidade da British Airports Authority (BAA).

Os subtítulos apresentados no caso são:

• A DEADLINE SET IN STONE
• HOW TO BUILD A TEAM
• MAKING HISTORY
• 4:00 A. M.

Em Making History pode ler-se:

"Identity was the first step. Purpose was the second. It had to matter that you worked for T5. To that end, the worksite was plastered with posters and other promotions comparing T5 with great projects of the past: the partially completed Eiffel Tower in Paris; Grand Central Terminal under construction in New York; the massive Thames Barrier flood controls in London. Each appeared on posters with the caption "We're making history, too."

...

I grew up in construction and know from firsthand experience that construction workers are sharp as knives at understanding what's happening on their worksites. Moreover, they have a well-founded skepticism of management. They know corporate propaganda when they see it, and they distrust it. "Most guys turn up with cynicism on any site we go to," Richard Harper said. They are usually right to be cynical "because it's all bollocks what the people [management] are saying." Promises aren't kept. Work conditions are poor. Workers aren't listened to. When reality doesn't match the words, corporate PR about teamwork and making history is worse than useless on the shop floor.

The workers brought their usual cynicism to T5, Harper said. "But with that site, within, if not fortyeight hours, a week maximum, everybody had bought into the philosophy of T5. Because they could see T5 was implementing what they said they would do." It started with the on-site facilities. "It was just something mind-boggling," Harper told me, sounding amazed even now. "The guys had never seen this. The toilets, the showers, the canteens were the best I've ever seen on any site I've worked on in the world They were fantastic."

...

Harper said. "If guys had wet gloves, they only had to take them back to the store and they got a fresh pair of gloves. If they had a scratch on the glasses and couldn't see properly, they'd take the glasses back, and they were changed. Guys weren't used to this. This was totally new to them. On other jobs, they told you, 'If you're not happy with the glasses or whatever, buy your own.' " These may sound like small things to outsiders, but as Harper pointed out, for workers they are "massive, just massive. You set a man to work in the morning and you've put the things there that he wants, then you get a good day's work. You start them off in a bad way, and you know the next eight to ten hours, it's going to be very difficult." Multiply that by thousands of workers and thousands of days, and you do indeed get something massive.

T5's managers not only listened to workers, they consulted them, asking some to sit down with designers to explore how designs and workflows could be improved."

Cheguei ao fim do capítulo, desliguei o tablet e voltei ao Mondego ...

"Os militares denunciam "a entrada de água em dois momentos diferentes, falta de manutenção do único dos dois motores que equipam a embarcação, um dos três geradores de energia inoperacionais e diversas fugas de óleo", entre outros problemas."

E pensei, que excelente forma de criar um “A SINGLE, DETERMINED ORGANISM”. 

BTW, nunca esqueço:

Espirais

"Perhaps most important, management started celebrating progress against inchstones and milestones. The spiral of negativity was replaced by an updraft of accomplishment that everyone could feel. The whole turnaround process took ninety very intense days and nights."

Ter um plano detalhado, querer cumpri-lo a sério.

Trecho retirado de  "How Big Things Get Done" de Bent Flyvbjerg. 

black swan management"

Bent Flyvbjerg no livro "How Big Things Get Done" refere que por vezes os projectos saem furados não por causa da execução, mas por causa das previsões irrealistas com que foram baseados:

“When delivery fails, efforts to figure out why tend to focus exclusively on delivery. That’s understandable, but it’s a mistake, because the root cause of why delivery fails often lies outside delivery, in forecasting, years before delivery was even begun.”

Uma das formas de evitar estas previsões irrealistas passa por usar informação de projectos anteriores (o título do capítulo é "SO YOU THINK YOUR PROJECT IS UNIQUE?" e o subtítulo é "Think again. Understanding that your project is "one of those" is key to getting your forecasts right and managing your risks.""

Muitos projectos seguem uma distribuição normal.

"But even with a project as simple as a kitchen renovation, the number of possible surprises, each unlikely, is long. Many small probabilities added together equal a large probability that at least some of those nasty surprises will actually come to pass. Your forecast did not account for that."

No entanto, os projectos grandes podem seguir um outro tipo de distribuição:

"There is, however, a big, fat-tailed caveat on all this. Imagine you have a graph with the costs of one thousand kitchen renovations that takes the shape of a classic bell curve—with most projects clustered around the mean in the middle, very few projects on the far right or far left, and even the most extreme data points not far removed from the mean.

...

But as noted in chapter 1, my analysis revealed that only a minority of the many project types in my database are “normally” distributed. The rest—from the Olympic Games to IT projects to nuclear power plants and big dams—have more extreme outcomes in the tails of their distributions. With these fat-tailed distributions, the mean is not representative of the distribution and therefore is not a good estimator for forecasts. For the most fat-tailed distributions, there isn’t even a stable mean that you can expect outcomes to cluster around because an even more extreme outcome can (and will) come along and push the mean further out, into the tail toward infinity. So instead of good old regression to the mean, you get what I call “regression to the tail.” In that situation, relying on the mean and assuming that your result will be close to it is a dangerous mistake.

...

If you face a fat-tailed distribution, shift your mindset from forecasting a single outcome (“The project will cost X”) to forecasting risk (“The project is X percent likely to cost more than Y”), using the full range of the distribution.

...

Contingencies might have to be 300, 400, or 500 percent over the average cost—or 700 percent, as we saw for the Montreal Olympics. That’s prohibitive. Providing such contingencies would not be budgeting; it would be blowing up the budget. So what can you do about the tail? Cut it off. You can do that with risk mitigation. I call it "black swan management".

...

Some tails are simple to cut. Tsunamis are fat-tailed, but if you build well inland or erect a high enough seawall, you eliminate the threat. Earthquakes are also fat-tailed, but build to an earthquake-proof standard, as we did with the schools in Nepal, and you are covered. Other tails require a combination of measures; for a pandemic, for instance, a blend of masks, tests, vaccines, quarantines, and lockdowns to prevent infections from running wild. That’s black swan management.

...

The critical next step is to stop thinking of black swans the way most people do. They are not bolt-from-the-blue freak accidents that are impossible to understand or prevent. They can be studied. And mitigated."

Um exemplo da mitigação apresentado é: construção de uma linha ferroviária em Inglaterra. Qual o motivo mais comum para paragem de uma obra? Achados arqueológicos! Mitigação: Contratar arqueólogos para estarem de prevenção para intervirem e reduzirem tempo de paragem.

"awarding contracts to domestic companies is a good way to make influential friends and win public support"

• "Portugal tem todas as capacidades para fabricar comboios"
• "Seis candidatos a fornecer comboios à CP. E há grupos portugueses interessados"

"O ministro das Infraestruturas, Pedro Nuno Santos, defendeu que o concurso deve ter “repercussão na indústria e no povo português”.

“Queremos produção e fabrico em Portugal. Quem quiser cumprir as regras do caderno de encargos, será bem-vindo. E quem quiser produzir aqui, terá condições para criar não só para Portugal como para outras zonas do mundo”, disse o ministro em dezembro na cerimónia de lançamento do concurso.

Pedro Nuno Santos disse ainda que “este concurso é um impulsionador para que Portugal venha a fazer parte do clube dos fabricantes de comboios na Europa."

Lembrei-me destas cenas e de muitas outras em que se apela aos "campeões nacionais":

• Campeões nacionais versus campeões escondidos

por causa destes trechos de "How Big Things Get Done" de Bent Flyvbjerg:

"MARGINALIZING EXPERIENCE

...

Politicians everywhere know that awarding contracts to domestic companies is a good way to make influential friends and win public support with promises of jobs, even if the domestic company will not perform as well as its foreign competitor because it is less experienced. When this happens -and it happens routinely -those responsible put other interests ahead of achieving the project's goal. At a minimum, such an approach is economically dubious, and sometimes it is ethically dodgy, too, or downright dangerous. And elected officials are far from alone in doing this. Big projects involve big money and big self-interest. And since "who gets what" is the core of politics, there is politics in every big project, whether public or private.

...

A Canadian example is arguably even more egregious. When the Canadian government decided it wanted to buy two icebreakers, it didn't buy them from manufacturers in other countries that were more experienced with building icebreakers, deciding instead to give the contracts to Canadian companies. That's national politics. But rather than give the contracts to one company so that it could build one ship, learn from the experience, and deliver the second ship more efficiently, it gave one contract to one company and the other to another company. Splitting the contract "will not lead to these natural learning improvements," noted a report by the parliamentary budget officer, Yves Giroux - a report that found that the estimated cost of the icebreakers had soared from $2.6 billion (Canadian) to $7.25 billion. So why do it? One company is in a politically important region in Quebec, the other in a politically important region in British Columbia. Splitting the contracts meant twice the political payoff -at the cost of experience and billions of dollars."

Um PRR, uma ideia de aeroporto e um grupo de políticos entram num bar

"The construction of the Sydney Opera House was an outright fiasco. Setbacks piled up. Costs exploded. Scheduled to take five years to build, it took fourteen.

The final bill was 1,400 percent over the estimate, one of the largest cost overruns for a building in history.

...

The key force behind the opera house project was Joe Cahill, the premier of the state of New South Wales. Cahill had held office for many years and was ill with cancer. Like so many politicians before and since, his thoughts turned to his legacy. And like other politicians before and since, he decided that the public policies he had ushered in were not enough, that his legacy must take the tangible form of a grand building. But Cahill's Australian Labor Party colleagues did not share his dream. New South Wales faced a severe shortage of housing and schools, and pouring public money into an expensive opera house struck them as folly.

Facing a classic political dilemma, Cahill chose a classic political strategy: He lowballed the cost, helped in part by an estimate prepared for the contest judges that simply filled the large blanks in the plan with optimistic assumptions and concluded that Utzon's design was the cheapest of the leading contenders.

And Cahill rushed the process. He decreed that construction would start in February 1959, whatever the state of planning. Not coincidentally, an election was due in March 1959. He even instructed his officials to start building and "make such progress that no one who succeeds me can stop this. It was the "start digging a hole" strategy discussed in chapter 2. And it worked for Cahill. By October 1959, he was dead, but the opera house was alive and under construction -although no one knew precisely what they were building because the final design had not been decided and drawn."

Trechos retirados de "How Big Things Get Done" de Bent Flyvbjerg.

"Just do it!"

 Na segunda-feira publiquei aqui no blogue, "a hypothesis waiting to be tested":

"There's a failure to understand that you can run an organization thinking like a scientist. By that I mean, just recognizing that every opinion you hold at work is a hypothesis waiting to be tested. And every decision you make is an experiment waiting to be run.

So many leaders just implement decisions. It's like life is an A/B test, but they just ran with the A, and didn't even realize that there was a possible B, C, D and E. Too many leaders feel like their decisions are permanent."

 Entretanto, li mais uns trechos retirados de "How Big Things Get Done" de Bent Flyvbjerg e que julgo que encaixam bem com os sublinhados acima:

"A preference for doing over talking -sometimes distilled into the phrase "bias for action" - is an idea as common in business as it is necessary. Wasted time can be dangerous. "Speed matters in business," notes one of Amazon's famous leadership principles,

...

however, that Bezos carefully limited the bias for action to decisions that are "reversible." Don't spend lots of time ruminating on those sorts of decisions, he advises. Try something. If it doesn't work, reverse it, and try something else. That's perfectly reasonable.

...

When this bias for action is generalized into the culture of an organization, the reversibility caveat is usually lost. What's left is a slogan - "Just do it!"

...

we found that managers feel more productive executing tasks than planning them," ... "Especially when under time pressure, they perceive planning to be wasted effort." To put that in more general behavioral terms, people in power, which includes executives deciding about big projects, prefer to go with the quick flow of availability bias, as opposed to the slow effort of planning."

A janela da desgraça (parte II)

Parte I.

"To understand the right way to get a project done quickly, it's useful to think of a project as being divided into two phases. This is a simplification, but it works: first, planning; second, delivery. The terminology varies by industry-in movies, it's "development and production"; in architecture, "design and construction" - but the basic idea is the same everywhere: Think first, then do.

A project begins with a vision that is, at best, a vague image of the glorious thing the project will become. Planning is pushing the vision to the point where it is sufficiently researched, analyzed, tested, and detailed that we can be confident we have a reliable road map of the way forward.

Most planning is done with computers, paper, and physical models, meaning that planning is relatively cheap and safe. Barring other time pressures, it's fine for planning to be slow. Delivery is another matter. Delivery is when serious money is spent and the project becomes vulnerable as a consequence.

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Planning is a safe harbor. Delivery is venturing across the storm-tossed seas.

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Put enormous care and effort into planning to ensure that delivery is smooth and swift. Think slow, act fast: That’s the secret of success.

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But "Think slow, act fast" is not how big projects are typically done. "Think fast, act slow" is. The track record of big projects unequivocally shows that."

Isto faz sentido. Contudo, penso logo no perigo da volubilidade de alterações ao âmbito do projecto. Talvez seguir melhor o conselho de Frank Gehri, começar pelo "Why" e nem chegar a abraçar o projecto se o cliente não aceitar as regras do jogo logo à partida.

Trechos retirados de "How Big Things Get Done" de Bent Flyvbjerg

A janela da desgraça

Acerca da duração dos projectos - THE WINDOW OF DOOM.

"Most big projects are not merely at risk of not delivering as promised. Nor are they only at risk of going seriously wrong. They are at risk of going disastrously wrong because their risk is fat-tailed. Against that background, it is interesting to note that the project management literature almost completely ignores systematic study of the fat-tailedness of project risk.

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smaller projects are susceptible to fat tails, too.

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major corporations on the hook for runaway projects may be able to keep things going by borrowing more and more money. Governments can also pile up debt. Or raise taxes. But most ordinary folks and small businesses cannot draw on a big stockpile of wealth, run up debt, or raise taxes. If they start a project that hurtles toward the fat tail of the distribution, they will simply be wiped out, giving them even more reason than a corporate executive or government official to take the danger seriously. And that starts by understanding what causes project failure.

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Projects that fail tend to drag on, while those that succeed zip along and finish. Why is that? Think of the duration of a project as an open window. The longer the duration, the more open the window. The more open the window, the more opportunity for something to crash through and cause trouble, including a big, bad black swan.

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From the dramatic to the mundane to the trivial, change can rattle or ruin a project—if it occurs during the window of time when the project is ongoing.  Solution? Close the window. Of course, a project can’t be completed instantly, so we can’t close the window entirely. But we can make the opening radically smaller by speeding up the project and bringing it to a conclusion faster. That is a main means of reducing risk on any project.

In sum, keep it short!"

Como reduzir a janela de oportunidade para a desgraça? 

Resposta rápida, simples, mas errada: Começar já, começar depressa. 

Continua. 

Trechos retirados de "How Big Things Get Done" de Bent Flyvbjerg

"issues are left unresolved that will resurface during delivery"

"what’s less well-known is that the Guggenheim Bilbao also set a management standard that very few large projects have attained: It was delivered on time, within just six years, and cost $3 million less than the $100 million budgeted.

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With such a clearly defined project, another architect may have treated this as a simple choice: either accept or pass. Gehry did neither. Instead, he did what he does with every potential client. He asked questions, starting with the most fundamental: “Why are you doing this project?” [Moi ici: Faz-me recordar as obras que são para a JMJ, ou para a requalificação da zona oriental, ou para ...]

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By starting projects with meaningful questioning, and by carefully listening to the answers, Gehry figures out what the clients really want rather than what they think they want. [Moi ici: Faz-me recordar o "When you get what you want, and not what you need"]

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When prospective clients come to Gehry’s firm, they are walked through the development of past projects so that they understand Gehry’s process. That’s crucial because the discussion to shape the project’s initial conception is not the end of their involvement. It’s the beginning. “Some people aren’t up for it,” notes Lloyd. “It takes a brave person to work with us.”

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Gehry’s process asks much of everyone involved. It also consumes a great deal of time.[Moi ici: Então!? Assim, como conciliar com ajustes directos e a mentalidade do desenrasca? Planear com tempo? Pensar antes de começar a fazer?] For project proponents eager to have something to show for their efforts—and get to the finish line—extended planning can be frustrating, even unnerving. For them, planning is pushing paper, something to get over with. Only digging and building are progress. If you want to get things done, they think, get going.

This sentiment is easy to understand. But it is wrong. When projects are launched without detailed and rigorous plans, issues are left unresolved that will resurface during delivery, causing delays, cost overruns, and breakdowns. A scramble for more time and more money follows, along with efforts to manage the inevitable bad press. With leaders distracted in this manner, the probability of further breakdowns—more scrambling, more delays, more cost overruns—grows. Eventually, a project that started at a sprint becomes a long slog through quicksand." [Moi ici: Este "issues are left unresolved that will resurface during delivery" tem-me acontecido algumas vezes ao longo da vida como consultor. Sou subcontratado por entidade com quem quero ficar bem, mas apanho empresa que não está preparada para o projecto, que quer fazer o projecto sem recursos. O que me salva a sanidade mental é ter ao mesmo tempo outro projecto que com recursos adequados se executa em 5 meses ao lado de dois com mais de 18 meses]

Trechos retirados de "How Frank Gehry Delivers On Time and On Budget" de Bent Flyvbjerg, Dan Gardner na Harvard Business Review (Janeiro 2023)