Falta a parte dolorosa da transição

 Um artigo interessante na revista The Economist, "Britain | The low-wage economy - Britain's failed experiment in boosting low-wage sectors":

"Choking off immigration to make low-wage sectors more productive was never going to work

The BREXITEER plan to end free movement from the European Union was not only about satisfying popular hostility to immigration. Leavers also talked of fixing Britain's perennial productivity problems. Boris Johnson, as prime minister in 2021, described a future that was "high wage, high skill, high productivity", and would be realised only if Britain kicked its addiction to cheap foreign labour.

...

Businesses show little sign of investing more or raising wages to attract more domestic workers, says Jonathan Portes, a professor of economics at King's College London.

...

A lack of commitment was not the only reason the Brexiteers' experiment failed. The thinking behind it was also faulty. The real productivity problem starts at home. A significant factor is the poor quality of British managers, according to John Van Reenen and Nick Bloom, two economists who have conducted international surveys. Other research suggests that this is especially true in low-wage sectors."

Portanto a ideia de Boris Johnson era:

• 1.A produtividade é baixa porque o acesso a mão de obra barata não impele as empresas a aumentarem a sua produtividade. 2.Então, se cortarmos o acesso a mão de obra barata as empresas vão ter de aumentar a sua produtividade para poderem pagar salários mais altos. 3.Assim, os britânicos poderiam aspirar a "high wage, high skill, high productivity".

De acordo com a minha experiência, na frase acima:

• O período 1 é verdadeiro. É o que vêmos em Portugal, fábricas e turismo a quererem importar mão de obra barata para poder manter as coisas como estão - recordo as bofetadas na cara em - Uma bofetada que recebo como um aviso, Bofetadas e locus de controlo - produtividade é que não., e Mais bofetadas e a turbulência em curso. Este é o quadrante do empobrecimento na figura abaixo, o quadrante em que as empresas são competitivas sem ser produtivas.

• O período 2 é verdadeiro. Mas é insuficiente. Pagar melhores salários implica cobrar preços mais elevados aos clientes e os clientes não estão para aí virados se não houver uma vantagem competitiva por parte das empresas. É o quadrante da baixa produtividade e baixa competitividade. O aumento do preço é feito sem contrapartidas para os clientes, e esse aumento não é desviado para melhorar a competitividade da empresa via produtividade, mas para pagar os custos mais altos. Nunca esquecer o caso do Uganda. É tão fácil e comum os políticos (e não só) confundirem mais competitividade com mais produtividade. O problema é o quadrante do empobrecimento.
• O período 3 é falso, é rotundamente falso porque falta a parte dolorosa da transição. Falta criar as condições para os flying geese (A mudança bottom-up!, The "flying geese" model, ou deixem as empresas morrer!!!). É preciso deixar as empresas morrer (e como isto é dificil politicamente, os desempregados são eleitores). No entanto, o que se faz é apoiar essas empresas para que dêem o salto de produtividade ... a sério?! Quantas usam o apoio, (sem maldade, simplesmente porque é a única coisa que sabem fazer), para manter os preços baixos e aguentar mais um ano, como Spender ilustrou com as fundições inglesas.

        O Japão não ficou rico a produzir vestuário de forma muito, 

        muito eficiente. Taiwan não ficou rica a produzir rádios 

        de bolso de forma muito, muito eficiente.

O tema dos flying geese ilustra bem a quase irrelevância desta frase tão comum em Inglaterra e em Portugal: "The real productivity problem starts at home. A significant factor is the poor quality of British managers". Acham que os melhores gestores do mundo iriam conseguir pôr o sector do vestuário com um nível produtividade capaz de ombrear com a média europeia? Só no Batalha e no Largo do Rato (e na sede nacional do PSD, et al também).

"high wage, high skill, high productivity" tem de ser resultado de outro perfil de economia... olhar outra vez para o esquema dos flying geese. BTW, nem pensem que conseguem aumentar a produtividade para o nível médio europeu com o mesmo perfil de sectores económicos mas em grande.

Recomendo recordar a noite em que, na minha leitura, morreu a chama de primeiro-ministro de Cavaco Silva em Também estava escrito nas estrelas.

Diferentes forças em jogo

Na primeira página do WSJ do passado dia 12 de Abril pode ler-se:

"The idea came to Johnny Taylor Jr. early last year, after one of his employees made a case that her technology position could be done anywhere. She wanted to leave Virginia, where she held job at the Society for Human Resource Management, a professional association based in Alexandria. She asked to work remotely in North Carolina.

"Then a lightbulb went off," said Mr. Taylor, the association's chief executive.

Instead of having the employee work in another state, he outsourced her job to India, where his organization is saving around 40% in labor costs, he said.

Welcome to the next wave of remote work. During the pandemic millions of people in the U.S. worked from home and many decamped to cities such as Boise, Austin and Phoenix. Companies learned that employees could be productive from afar because of remote-working tech like Zoom and Dropbox.

Those moves were usually at the behest of workers who wanted a change of environment, sought more living space or somewhere cheaper. Companies agreed to these arrangements largely to retain employees in a competitive labor market.

Now companies are responding to lingering labor shortages and rising wages by sending jobs overseas, according to labor consultants.

...

The exodus of office jobs overseas is still a trickle. But it is accelerating and some economists see it as the beginning of a new era. About 10% to 20% of U.S. service support jobs such as software developers, human-resources professionals and payroll administrators could move overseas in the next decade, according to Nicholas Bloom, an economist at Stanford University."

Entretanto, ontem  durante a minha caminhada matinal li:

• Só 4% das empresas com alta maturidade em people analytics. Falta talento qualificado e compreensão sobre potencial dos dados
• Taxa de desemprego na OCDE em mínimo histórico dos últimos 22 anos
• Playing With Fire - ChatGPT (muito interessante)
• The Great Stapler Crisis: The End Of Tech Company Perks? (muito interessante)

Entretanto, nos últimos dias publicámos aqui:

• Qual será o resultado deste choque?
• Por que se pedem paletes de mão de obra estrangeira barata? (Parte II)

Diferentes forças em jogo e a provocar mudanças ao nível do mercado do trabalho, das empresas e dos trabalhadores. Como é que isto vai influenciar o futuro da sua empresa? 

Entretanto, Carga fiscal dispara para 36,4% do PIB e bate novo recorde em 2022.

O fim da globalização (parte IV)

Recently leaked China's population data confirm my estimates: births began to decline in 1991, with no peak in 2004 or 2011; Population is now less than 1.28 billion, not the official 1.41 billion; Population began to shrink in 2018, not 2031 as officially predicted. pic.twitter.com/xCge7cTRFS

— 易富贤YI Fuxian《大国空巢》 (@fuxianyi) July 9, 2022

Parte I, parte II  e parte III.

"The average grocery store today has about forty thousand individual items, up from about two hundred at the dawn of the twentieth century.

...

Take this concept of utter availability, apply it to absolutely everything, and you now have a glimmer of the absolute connectivity that underpins the modern, globalized economy. The ingredients of today’s industrial and consumer goods are only available because they can be moved from—literally—halfway around the world at low costs and high speeds and in perfect security. Phones, fertilizers, oil, cherries, propylene, single-malt whiskey . . . you name it, it is in motion. All. The. Time. Transportation is the ultimate enabler.

...

The East India Company traded about 50 tons of tea a year at the start of the nineteenth century and 15,000 toward the end of it. Today that same 15,000 tons is loaded or unloaded somewhere in the world every forty-five seconds or so.

...

In the age of globalization, everyone could get in on global access, manufacturing, and mass consumption. No longer was value-added work sequestered to the Imperial Centers. Manufacturing elsewhere required fuel and raw materials. Expanding industrial bases and infrastructure elsewhere required the same. Expanding middle classes elsewhere demanded even more.

...

In a world "safe" for all, the world's "successful" geographies could no longer lord over and/or exploit the rest. A somewhat unintended side effect of this was to demote geography from its fairly deterministic role in gauging the success or failure of a country, to something that became little more than background noise. Those geographies once left behind could now bloom in safety.

...

The ability to diversify supply systems over any distance means it is economically advantageous to break up manufacturing into dozens, even thousands of individual steps. Workers building this or that tiny piece of widget become very good at it, but they are clueless as to the rest of the process. The workforce that purifies silicon dioxide does not and cannot create silicon wafers, does not and cannot build motherboards, and does not and cannot code.

This combination of reach and specialization takes us to a very clear, and foreboding, conclusion: no longer do the goods consumed in a place by a people reflect the goods produced in a place by a people. The geographies of consumption and production are unmoored."

Segundo o autor de "The End of the World is Just the Beginning", Peter Zeihan, a globalização está a descarrilar pelo descalabro demográfico nos países produtores e consumidores, e pelo fim da Ordem Americana. Há muito que escrevo sobre a desglobalização, mas por causa de Mongo. A demografia é uma variável que raramente é considerada como refiro na parte III. 

Porque falham as transformações

"The Four Most Common Failure Modes for Transformative Innovations in Large Organizations

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Too late.  Leaders recognize the need for new growth but don’t commit to it until their competitors have already seized the opportunity.

Too few resources.  Leaders appropriately organize and adopt long-term growth initiatives but fail to allocate sufficient dollars, the right people, and enough of their own mindshare to sustain them.

Impatience for growth.  Many transformative ventures are slow to bloom. Perhaps an early business experiment fails or has slower than expected results. Instead of redesigning the experiment to learn more, senior leadership pulls the plug. Or maybe it experiences some early-stage success and senior leadership demands that it be scaled up before all of its premises have been thoroughly tested, causing the venture to make a fatal stumble.

Competition from the core.  A challenge with growth in the core may cause resources to be diverted away from a promising new venture. Or, in a misguided attempt to restore organizational efficiencies, leadership might “cram” a successful new venture back into the core prematurely, causing it to lose the unique attributes that were responsible for its success."

Eu acrescentaria um quinto factor: a falta de foco, a falta de instinto de matador. Até se indentifica a necessidade de mudança, mas não se muda, mas não se tem fogo no rabo.

Trecho retirado de “Lead from the Future” de Josh Suskewicz.

Desigualdade, heterogeneidade e produtividade

Um artigo interessante sobre o aumento da desigualdade entre assalariados nos Estados Unidos. As conclusões estarão em linha com outros estudos feitos para o Reino Unido, Alemanha, Suécia e Brasil.

"In this article, we study the contribution of firms and the role of worker composition between firms in the rise in earnings inequality in the United States using a longitudinal data set covering workers and firms for the entire U.S. labor market from 1978 to 2013. Our data set has several key advantages for studying firms and inequality: it is the only U.S. data set covering 100% of workers and firms for the entire period of the rise in inequality,...Our first main result is that the rise in the dispersion between firms in firm average annual earnings accounts for the majority of the increase in total earnings inequality.
…First, the rise in earnings inequality between workers over the past three decades is strongly associated with their employers. Two-thirds of the increase in the variance of log earnings from 1981 to 2013 can be accounted for by a rise in the dispersion of average earnings between firms and one-third by a rise in the differences in earnings between workers within firms..Second, examining the sources of the increase in between firm inequality, we find that it has been driven about equally by increased employee sorting (i.e., high-wage workers are increasingly found at high-wage firms) and segregation (i.e., highly paid employees are increasingly clustering in high-wage firms with other high-paid workers, while low-paid employees are clustering in other firms).…Third, the distribution of firm fixed effects themselves accounts for essentially none of the rise in inequality. Instead, about two-thirds of the rise in inequality is accounted for by rising variance in individual fixed effects, potentially due to rising returns to skill.…Fourth, the rise in within-firm inequality is concentrated in large firms with 1,000+ employees (and even more so in mega firms). This is driven by a fall in the earnings premium in large firms for median- and lower-paid employees and by rising earnings for the top 10% of employees."

Nunca esquecer o quanto os políticos, académicos e paineleiros (a minha famosa tríade) desconhecem esta realidade da heterogeneidade crescente entre empresas, mesmo dentro do mesmo sector. Recordar: "A distribuição de produtividades está a aumentar"

"Firming up inequality" de Jae Song, David Price, Fatih Guvenen, Nicholas Bloom e Till von Wachter, publicado por The Quarterly Journal of Economics - Vol. 134 2019 issue 1

Teorias e periferias

Ontem ao ler "How to Survive a Recession and Thrive Afterward" fixei-me neste trecho:

"In a 2017 study, Raffaella Sadun (of Harvard Business School), Philippe Aghion (of Collège de France), Nicholas Bloom and Brian Lucking (of Stanford), and John Van Reenen (of MIT) examined how organizational structure affects a company’s ability to navigate downturns. On the one hand, “the need to make tough decisions may favor centralized firms,” the researchers write, because they have a better picture of the organization as a whole and their incentives are typically more closely aligned with company performance. On the other hand, decentralized firms may be better positioned to weather macro shocks “because the value of local information increases.”"

Fiz logo a ponte para algo que li em "Seeing around corners" de Rita McGrath:

"Evidence of an emerging inflection point doesn’t present itself neatly on the conference table in the corporate boardroom. It is the people who are directly in contact with the phenomenon who usually notice changes early.
...
If snow melts from the edges, it behooves you to have mechanisms in place to see what is going on there.
...
A very common reason that leaders miss potentially important inflection points is that they are isolated from the people who could tell them what is really going on.
...
Snow melts from the edges. The changes that are going to fundamentally influence the future of your business are brewing on the periphery. To avoid being taken by surprise by an inflection point, you need to be exposed to what is happening at the edges.
The upheavals created by major strategic inflection points usually take quite some time to unfold. They are also not “complete” when you first see them. But if you are paying attention, you can begin to see the implications of their trajectory early on, when it is still possible to influence them."

E pensei nas empresas daqueles sectores que estão com evoluções negativas:

Já têm alguma teoria sobre o que se está a passar?

Quem está na periferia onde a neve derrete primeiro?

Um mar de heterogeneidade (Parte II)

Parte I.

Resolvi ir à procura do paper na origem do artigo citado na Parte I. Assim, cheguei a "What Drives Differences in Management Practices?" de Nicholas Bloom, Erik Brynjolfsson, Lucia Foster, Ron Jarmin, Megha Patnaik, Itay Saporta-Eksten, e John Van Reenen, publicado por American Economic Review 2019, 109(5): 1648–1683, e valeu a pena:

"There are compelling theoretical reasons to expect that management matters for performance. ... management practices are a key reason for persistent performance differences across firms due to relational contracts. ... “engagement traps” can lead to heterogeneity in the adoption of practices even when firms are ex ante identical.
...
The relationship between management practices and performance also holds over time within plants (plants that adopted more of these practices saw improvements in their performance) and across establishments within firms at a point in time (establishments within the same firm with more structured management practices achieve better performance outcomes).
.
The magnitude of the productivity-management relationship is large. Increasing structured management from the tenth to ninetieth percentile can account for about 22 percent of the comparable 90–10 spread in productivity. This is about the same as R&D, more than human capital, and almost twice as much as Information and Communication Technologies (ICT). ... variation in management practices is likely a key factor accounting for the much-discussed heterogeneity in firm productivity. Technology, human capital, and management are interrelated but distinct: when we examine them jointly, we find they account for about 44 percent of productivity dispersion.
...
First, there is enormous inter-plant variation in management practices. Although 18 percent of establishments adopt three-quarters or more of a package of basic structured management practices regarding monitoring, targets, and incentives, 27 percent of establishments adopt less than one-half of  such practices. Second, about 40 percent of the variation in management practices is across plants within the same firm. That is, in multi-plant firms, there is considerable variation in practices across units. ... Third, these variations in management practices are increasing in firm size. That is, larger firms have substantially more variation in management practices. This appears to be largely explained by the greater spread of larger firms across different geographies and industries.
...
To investigate learning spillovers,
...
Comparing the counties that “won” the large, typically multinational plant versus the county that narrowly “lost,” we find a significant positive impact on the management practices of incumbent plants in the county. Importantly, the positive spillovers only arise if the plant is in an industry where there are frequent flows in managerial labor from the MDP’s industry, [Moi ici: MDP = Million Dolar Plant] suggesting that the movement of managers is a mechanism through which learning occurs. We also show positive impacts on jobs and productivity."

Um mar de heterogeneidade (Parte I)

"Why are some companies more productive than others? And why do certain divisions within those companies perform better than others do? Research has shown that top performers tend to invest more in research and development, adopt better technology, and employ a more educated workforce. [Moi ici: Poderíamos resumir, depois do que temos lido de Felin e Zenger que "Top performers haver better theories"]
...
Nicholas A. Bloom [Moi ici: Um velho conhecido deste blogue] ... found that management practices accounted for about one-fifth of the variation in productivity among plants. Management style had the same effect as R&D spending — and twice the impact of technology spending — in explaining productivity differences.
.
“There’s an overwhelmingly strong relationship between structured management and performance,” Bloom says.
...
The researchers found that plants where managers carefully monitored the manufacturing process, production targets, and employee performance, and used that data to inform decisions, were more successful. Plants where leaders infrequently reviewed performance indicators and targets, and promoted employees based on tenure or connections rather than achievement, fared worse. These links remained strong after controlling for workers’ education level, the age of the plant and firm, and a wide range of other factors. Plants with more structured management performed better than other sites within the same firm, and plants that adopted more of these strategies saw their performance improve over time.
...
One takeaway of the study was just how differently plants are managed, even within the same state or industry. In fact, 40% of the total difference in productivity was among plants within the same firm. [Moi ici: Algo sobre o qual escrevemos aqui há milhares de anos] That means that the attributes of a CEO, corporate governance, and company ownership can’t easily explain a large share of the differences in management practices.
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“It’s astounding,” Bloom says. “Some managers monitor huge amounts of data, and others seem to operate entirely by gut instinct.” [Moi ici: Uma classificação que quem anda no terreno nunca faria, é o pão nosso de cada dia]
...
“You would think all firms would be well-managed and doing the right thing, but they’re not,” Bloom says. “I guess firms are like people — we all have our faults.” [Moi ici: Come on Bloom, esperava que já estivesses mais calejado nestas cenas]"

Trechos retirados de "How Much Does Management Matter to Productivity?"

Desigualdade e empresas

Há anos que escrevo e defendo esta tese "Corporations in the Age of Inequality".

Basta pesquisar o marcador "distribuição de produtividades" e a frase "há maior variabilidade dentro de um mesmo sector de actividade do que entre sectores de actividade"

Na economia do século XX havia basicamente uma estratégia a seguir, a do preço, a do crescimento da quota de mercado, a do aumento da eficiência, a da localização no denominador da equação da produtividade.

Há medida que a economia do século XXI avança, uma economia onde há muito mais estratégias alternativas que não a do preço tout court, e recordo a imagem:

Diferentes abordagens estratégicas geram diferentes distribuições de produtividades e permitem diferentes rentabilidades. Assim, as diferenças entre empresas do mesmo sector começam a aumentar.

"Whereas many economists focus on inequality between individuals, Bloom’s view is filtered through his early work as a consultant at McKinsey, where he became interested in the impact of good management on the economy. “Economists have long dismissed the importance of management practices and were often skeptical of the value of management research,” says Bloom.
...
Bloom was amazed by the variation in management practices he saw among clients — and by how convinced each client was that theirs was the best way.
...
Bloom shares his research on the role firms and management play in the rise of income inequality. He highlights how competitive forces and corporate decision making have contributed to divergent outcomes for individuals and suggests that inequality can’t be fully understood without thinking about companies.
...
Companies can contribute to rising income inequality in two ways. As we’ve just discussed, pay gaps can increase within companies — between how much executives and administrative assistants are paid, for example. But studies now show that gaps between companies are the real drivers of income inequality.
...
We found that the average wages at the firms employing individuals at the top of the income distribution have increased rapidly, while those at the firms employing people in the lower income percentiles have increased far less.
...
In other words, the increasing inequality we’ve seen for individuals is mirrored by increasing inequality between firms. But the wage gap is not increasing as much inside firms, our research shows. This may tend to make inequality less visible, because people do not see it rising in their own workplace."

Produtividade e gestão

"We turn to a long-standing question in economics, stretching back to at least Walker (1887), of how much of the variation in national and firm performance can be accounted for by di erences in management practices?
...
Overall, on average 30% of the cross country gap in TFP appears to be management related. This fraction varies a lot between countries. In general we account for a smaller fraction of the TFP gap between the U.S. and low income countries like Zambia (6.2%), Ghana (9.7%), and Tanzania (12%), which is likely to be because these countries have much greater problems than just management quality. We account for a larger fraction of the TFP gap between the U.S. and richer countries like Sweden (43.9%), Italy (48.9%) and France (52.3%). Figure A4 graphically illustrates this, showing that more developed countries have a higher share of their TFP gap accounted for by di erences in management.
...
Economists, business people and many policymakers have long believed that management practices are an important element in productivity."

Trechos retirados de "Management as a Technology?" de Nicholas Bloom; Raffaella Sadun e John Van Reenen. HBS Working Paper 16-133

Curiosidade do dia

Ontem em "Gestores portugueses estão entre os menos competentes" o JdN publicou a seguinte figura:

Segundo o jornal a fonte é "The New Empirical Economics of Management", de Nicholas Bloom, Renata Lemos, Raffaella Sadun, Daniela Scur e John Van Reenen, publicado em Abril de 2014.
.
Só que a figura da fonte é diferente:

Olha, até estamos à frente da Irlanda e da Espanha... aposto que o JdN preferiu ir buscar a figura do gráfico da versão de 2012, porque lhe dava jeito para a narrativa do "bota abaixo":

Mongo e a dispersão da produtividade

"Bloom et al. (2012) find rising volatility of plant-level TFP shocks in the U.S. manufacturing sector after 1990. Decker et al. (2014b) find that the intra-industry dispersion of plant-level total factor productivity rose, not fell, in the past quarter century."

"We undertake two types of exercises. First, we examine the evolution of the within-industry dispersion in (log) TFP. This is a proxy for the intensity of idiosyncratic shocks impacting establishments. Figure 17 shows the evolution of the within-industry 90-10 gap in productivity and the standard deviation of (log) TFP. Consistent with the literature  there is large dispersion in TFP across plants in the same industry.
...
Moreover, the evidence suggests that this dispersion is, if anything, rising over time. One concern might be that this measured dispersion is capturing permanent differences across plants.

Primeiro trecho retirado de "Labor Marlket Fluidity and Economic Performance"
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Segundo trecho retirado de "The Secular Decline in Business Dynamism in the U.S."

"Let a thousand business models bloom"

Este texto "Our Obsession With Scalability Must End" deixou-me sem palavras.

.
Encontrar um texto escrito por alguém num outro continente, a 30 de Outubro de 2014, e tão sintonizado e alinhado com o que aqui escrevemos há muitos anos. Quando escrevemos sobre Mongo, sobre o Estranhistão, sobre o eficientismo, sobre o denominador versus o numerador, sobre a interacção para co-criar valor, sobre a polarização dos mercados, sobre o não querermos, como clientes, ser tratados como miudagem, ser tratados como plankton.
.
Isto é música celestial para PME, pena que a mensagem não chegue com a celeridade necessária aos empresários:

"Our obsession with scalability is getting in the way of unleashing the potential of the 21st century. [Moi ici: Escala versus interacção, volume versus à medida, vómito versus personalização] We are so fixated with scalability we have taken our eye off of delivering value at every scale including the most important scale of one. [Moi ici: O cliente deixa de ser uma pessoa, uma empresa concreta e, passa a ser um substantivo colectivo, como a miudagem, como o plankton] The Industrial Era did that to us. Reaching the mass market takes precedence over delivering value to each customer.
...
The Industrial Era brought us the reign of the predominant business model. Every industry quickly became dominated by one business model that defined the rules, roles, and practices for all competitors and stakeholders. We became a nation of share takers clamoring to replicate industry best practices to gain or protect every precious market share point. Companies moved up or down industry leadership rankings based on their ability to compete for market share. Business schools minted CEOs who became share-taking clones of one another. It was all about scale. Bigger was always better.
...
Institutional leaders are even more obsessed with scalability than entrepreneurs. They fixate on protecting their current scale and assess all new customer value creating ideas through the lens of their current business model.  ...  This is why CEO’s are so hungry for merger and acquisition opportunities. It’s all about scale, not changing the customer value equation.  New business models force institutional leaders to rethink scalability.
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We live in an era that screams for less share taking and more market making. Market makers don’t accept the idea that a predominant business model has to dictate the industry landscape.  [Moi ici: E falamos aqui sobre ecossistemas e market scripting, desenhar mercados como um pintor pinta quadros] They create a new market with a different playbook. ... Today’s consumers refuse to accept that there is only one predominant business model in every industry and that they have to take or leave its offerings.  Consumers now demand personalized experiences, products, and services.
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Consumers are bringing the era of the predominant business model to an end. Business models don’t last as long as they used to. Predominant business models are crumbling all around us.
...
It’s time end our obsession with scalability. There are too many consumer, student, patient, and citizen needs left unmet by predominant business models in every industry. There are too many new business model concepts stuck on white boards and in consulting decks.  We are still allowing predominant business models to slow down and block the emergence of new business models that can better meet our needs.  It’s time to move from the era of the predominant business model to the era of business model proliferation. Let a thousand business models bloom." [Moi ici: Recordar]

Este texto resume bem as ideias deste blogue e da mensagem de esperança que elas encerram.

Influência da legislação e das instituições portuguesas na dimensão típica das PMEs

Com frequência, encontro nos media o discurso sobre necessidade das PMEs portuguesas crescerem, para serem mais produtivas.
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Entretanto, em "The New Empirical Economics of Management" de Nicholas Bloom, Renata Lemos, Raffaella Sadun, Daniela Scur e John Van Reenen, reencontro este facto:

"using data on the population of manufacturing firms for France (following Gibrat) and the US we plot the firm size distribution in Figure 3. 

The power law implies that in log-log space there is a negative linear relationship between firm size and density, which is what we observe for the US data, except for the far right tail. France looks similar except for a break at 50 employees, which is an important regulatory threshold for labor laws. Garicano, Lelarge and Van Reenen (2013) discuss how the presence of many regulatory “taxes” that begin when the firm reaches 50 employees implies a broken power law exactly as described by the data."

Qual será a influência da legislação e das instituições portuguesas na dimensão típica das PMEs portuguesas?

Acerca das barreiras

Recente, deste Abril passado, a versão de 2014 de "The New Empirical Economics of Management" de Nicholas Bloom, Renata Lemos, Raffaella Sadun, Daniela Scur e John Van Reenen.
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Algumas ideias:

"management does indeed appear to be important in accounting for the large differences in cross-country Total Factor Productivity (TFP) as well as within-country differences. [Moi ici: Por isso, é importante não erguer barreiras à entrada ou à saída. Por isso, é importante não proteger os incumbentes. Os clientes, com o seu bolso, que escolham livremente quem tem direito a viver]
...
Competitive intensity is one important and robust factor in raising management quality,  [Moi ici: Como não pensar no lastro mental de centenas de anos de influência da CoroaEstado para minimizar a concorrência, para manter o status-quo e impedir a destruição criativa. A elite não pode ser prejudicada e correr o risco de perder] as is ownership and governance (e.g. family firms appear to have weak management on average).
...
Much of aggregate productivity growth is from the reallocation of output away from less productive firms towards more productive firms.  [Moi ici: Por isso, é importante não erguer barreiras à entrada ou à saída. Por isso, é importante não proteger os incumbentes] This reallocation can take place on the extensive margin as less productive firms exit and more productive firms enter. ... But reallocation can also take place on the intensive margin as market shares get reallocated among incumbents away from the least efficient and towards the more efficient firms.
...
analyzed data from US manufacturing plants and argued that over a five year period about half of a typical industry’s TFP growth was due to the reallocation of output between plants rather than ongoing incumbent within plant productivity growth."  [Moi ici: Por isso, é importante não erguer barreiras à entrada ou à saída. Por isso, é importante não proteger os incumbentes]

Continua.

We will be weird

Regressando ao primeiro postal em que usei a designação "Estranhistão", recupero esta figura do livro "We are all weird" de Seth Godin:

Tudo por causa deste trecho:

"The most-downloaded e-books in the three months were Inferno and titles by self-published authors using Kindle Direct Publishing, including No-One Ever Has Sex On a Tuesday by Tracy Bloom and The Magpies by Mark Edwards."

O que resta da massa compra o Dan Brown, mas o que a massa compra é igualado pelo que as tribos compram.
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Este trecho, também é um sintoma do que se passa:

"As lojas de discos independentes (Moi ici: Não são comandadas centralmente por uns gestores que só lêem folhas de excel e não têm grunhos ignorantes a aturar clientes nas lojas, têm à frente do balcão gente que fala com os clientes e que tem acesso a quem decide a vida da loja. Lojas independentes cheira sempre a David e a estratégias de guerrilha) no Reino Unido registaram um aumento homólogo de 44% nas vendas nos primeiros seis meses do ano, apoiadas sobretudo na venda de álbuns em vinil. (Moi ici: Tribos, tribos, tribos)
De acordo com uma análise da associação de retalhistas do Reino Unido, hoje noticiada pela revista britânica Uncut, a queda de 1,5% no global das lojas contrasta com um aumento expressivo de vendas nas lojas independentes. (Moi ici: Um contraste significativo!!! Este é o sintoma que devia ser o alvo das atenções. É o excêntrico que está a crescer não o mainstream!!!)
...
Em 2012, as vendas de vinil em todos os géneros subiram 15% no Reino Unido, o maior avanço desde 2004, revela a associação de retalhistas." (Moi ici: Parece um fenómeno em ascensão)

Mas claro, eu só sou um anónimo engenheiro da província (parte VI)

Parte I, parte II, parte III, parte IV e parte V.
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A propósito de "O défice da gestão portuguesa" publicado no JdN da passada quinta-feira fiquei a matutar em alguns pontos.
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Depois de ler o artigo, e como sou um apreciador do trabalho de Bloom, um valioso aliado na minha pregação de que a produtividade das empresas poderá melhorar com melhores práticas de gestão, em vez de confiar em benesses concedidas pelos governos, resolvi ir à fonte referida, "The Radical Beauty of Three Simple Management Practices", e fiquei a pensar no que se segue.
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Na semana passada, numa conversa numa empresa, para recolha de elementos, para a elaboração de uma proposta sobre a implementação de um sistema de gestão baseado no balanced scorecard (BSC), colocaram a pergunta sacramental:

"- E quanto tempo será necessário?"

Respondi:

"- 3 a 4 meses para desenhar o mapa da estratégia, definir indicadores e construir as iniciativas estratégicas e o sistema de monitorização. Depois, a fase de comunicação e acompanhamento pode, ou não, ser incluída no projecto."

E, imediatamente comecei a pensar nos casos que lia há dez anos sobre a implementação de BSC, e sobre os anos que duravam... e, pensei na dimensão média dessas empresas dos casos estudados e na dimensão do seu mercado doméstico e fiz o confronto com a realidade das PMEs portuguesas.
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Há défice de gestão nas empresas portuguesas? Claro que há, basta pesquisar Bloom e Reenen neste blogue, basta recordar o gráfico daqui e o marcador "Distribuição de produtividades". No entanto, cuidado com a importação das práticas americanas para as empresas portuguesas.
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No artigo de Bloom e Reenen, citado pelo JdN pode-se ler:

"As part of our research, we partnered with the World Bank to offer manufacturers in Tarapur, India, (Moi ici: Um país com escassez de oferta face à procura e com produção nacional protegida da entrada de concorrentes) the opportunity to participate in an experiment. Fourteen plants got free, high-quality advice from consultants, who taught them about three management fundamentals: setting targets, establishing incentives, and monitoring performance. The consultants showed the companies how to support long-term goals with tough but achievable short-term performance benchmarks, how to reward high performers with promotions and bonuses while retraining or moving underperformers, and how to collect and analyze performance data to identify opportunities for improvement.
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The interventions transformed the plants. On average, the manufacturers cut defects by more than 50%, reduced inventory by 20%, and raised output by 10%. (Moi ici: Estes resultados são bons mas, para muitas empresas portuguesas, as que competem no sector dos bens transaccionáveis, seriam insuficientes para contrabalançar o efeito China. Estes resultados têm tudo a ver com olhar para dentro e tornar-se mais eficiente, têm tudo a ver com fazer bem as coisas, mesmo quando essas coisas deixaram de ser as coisas certas) They also became far easier for their CEOs to manage, which allowed for the addition of new facilities and the expansion of product lines."

Há défice de gestão nas empresas portuguesas? Claro que há!!! Agora, cuidado com o pensamento homogeneizador que parte do princípio que as práticas americanas e alemãs são transplantáveis para Portugal tout court. As práticas que são necessárias para gerir corporações ou empresas multi-site que operam ao nível de continentes e têm dezenas de milhares de trabalhadores não são as mesmas que as requeridas para gerir empresas com dezenas ou centenas de trabalhadores, operam em um ou dois sites e vêem o resto da Europa como mercado de exportações.
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BTW, esta parte final é deliciosa:

"como refere Ricardo Reis, "Portugal é pobre por ser pouco produtivo, a raiz deste problema está na má gestão das empresas portuguesas. Uma solução é melhorar a qualidade dos nossos gestores. (…) Uma maior qualidade de ensino produzirá também melhores gestores. Mas, para isso, é preciso também que estes melhores gestores possam competir, em termos justos, com os maus gestores instalados"."

Como é que os maus gestores instalados são protegidos?

• Recordar esta curiosidade do dia 
• Recordar este desabafo de Daniel Bessa "... faltou sempre o dinheiro que o "Portugal profundo" preferiu gastar na "ajuda" a "empresas em situação económica difícil"..."
• Recordar a diferença entre o calçado e o têxtil  e a anedota da argumentação da revista Visão: "Se há uma guerra entre os sectores, o calçado terá tido o tempo a favor. Ao contrário dos têxteis, obrigados a enfrentar a liberalização do mercado apenas em 2005, os sapatos começaram a competir com os grandes asiáticos mais cedo, uma vez que não beneficiaram de um período de transição, com quotas de exportação para a Europa." (Moi ici: Anedota porque põe em causa os programas de transição e as ajudas, de resto estou de acordo com ela)

Mas claro, eu só sou um anónimo engenheiro da província.

O presidente da Galp é que sabe... e os bentos-lovers também

Arquivo de fontes para uso futuro:
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"How competition improves management and productivity":
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"But what determines productivity, or the amount of output that can be produced from a given set of inputs?
...

In the 1990s, Stephen Nickell led a team of CEP researchers to address the productivity question head on. ... The first finding was a descriptive fact that has stood the test of time: there are huge differences in productivity between firms even in narrowly defined industries that last for many years. Yet the existence of persistently less efficient firms encountered in Nickell’s research was hard to square with the standard economic model of perfect competition, which assumed that such inefficiency could not persist.
...

increases in competition provided a large and persistent boost to firm productivity. Competition could be increased in a number of ways: more openness to trade, lower barriers to entry and greater consumer choice.
...

In the 2000s, Nicholas Bloom and I built on the insight that firms’ internal organisation was the key to  productivity by launching a major effort to measure management and organisation within firms (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007).
...

It turns out that the original intuition of the 1990s work was right: management really does matter in explaining productivity differences. And furthermore, a key factor in boosting management quality in both the private and public sectors is competitive intensity. This worked not only within firms, as Nickell emphasised, but also between firms. In other words, competition raise average productivity in a nation through a Darwinian selection effect where the low productivity firms are driven out of the market and the high productivity firms expand.
...

Protecting inefficient firms from going under is a major reason for lower European productivity. The direction of policy is to make space for the more efficient firms to grow and prosper."
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À atenção do presidente da Galp (meu Deus...) "A range of recent econometric studies suggest that (i) competition increases management quality and (ii) improved management quality boosts productivity." e "Management Practices Across Firms and Countries":
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"On average, we find that in manufacturing American, Japanese, and German firms are the best managed. Firms in developing countries, such as Brazil, China and India tend to be poorly managed. American retail firms and hospitals are also well managed by international standards, although American schools are worse managed than those in several other developed countries. We also find substantial variation in management practices across organizations in every country and every sector, mirroring the heterogeneity in the spread of performance in these sectors. One factor linked to this variation is ownership. Government, family, and founder owned firms are usually poorly managed, while multinational, dispersed shareholder and private-equity owned firms are typically well managed. Stronger product market competition and higher worker skills are associated with better management practices. Less regulated labor markets are associated with improvements in incentive management practices such as performance based promotion.
...

From a policy perspective, several factors seem important in influencing management quality. Product market competition has a critical influence in increasing aggregate management quality by thinning the ranks of the badly managed and incentivizing the survivors to improve. Indeed, much of the cross-country variation in management appears to be due to the presence or absence of this tail of bad performers. One reason for higher average management scores in the US is that better managed firms appear to be rewarded more quickly with greater market share and the worse managed forced to rapidly shrink and exit. This appears to have led American firms to rapidly copy management best practices from around the world,"
...

taxes and other distortive policies that favor family run firms appear to hinder better management, while general education and multinational presence seem valuable in improving management practices."
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E os que defendem a saída do euro para proteger as empresas nacionais mal geridas ou que fizeram opções erradas, ou que se dedicaram a apostas válidas até à pouco... incapazes de ver o sucesso de tantas e tantas PMEs que lançaram pés ao caminho.
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BTW, daqui retirei este gráfico:

Está tudo ligado: China; colapso do mercado do meio-termo com a polarização dos mercados, a inovação, o aumento da dispersão de produtividades, a subida na escala de valor, a espiral aberta virtuosa e a espiral fechada viciosa, a aposta na eficiência versus a aposta na eficácia, denominar versus numerador, custos versus valor, ... "Changes in Wage Inequality"

It's not the euro, stupid! (parte V)

Parte I, parte II, parte III e parte IV.
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Escrevemos, no primeiro postal de 2012:
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"As dificuldades criam, geram, proporcionam, escondem oportunidades.

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"In the middle of difficulty lies opportunity" (Einstein).
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As dificuldades podem ser a chispa que desencadeia a revolução que estava por detrás da rolha, o tsunami preso pelas comportas.
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As crises podem ter o condão de criar a oportunidade de libertar os factores aprisionados a velhas fórmulas, a velhos modelos.
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Claro, os incumbentes de espírito tentarão até à última defender o status-quo... os que não têm nada a perder arriscam e constroem o futuro."

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Bem na linha de "A Trapped Factors Model of Innovation" de Nicholas Bloom, Paul Romer e John Van Reenen, publicado em Outubro de 2010.

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"When will reducing trade barriers against low wage country cause innovation to increase in high wage regions like the US or EU?

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We develop a model where factors of production (such as skilled labor) are used to either produce or innovate. (Moi ici: Exploitation versus exploration) Because of sunk investments (like learning bydoing) they become “trapped” in producing old goods. In this model, trade liberalization with a low wage country reduces the profitability of the old good and so the opportunity cost of innovating falls. (Moi ici: Talvez a escassez de capital que vivemos, a par do colapso na procura interna, reduzam os custos da inovação, reduzam os custos de retirar recursos escassos (capital, gente talentosa, tempo, ...) de apostas que passaram o seu prazo de validade, para novas apostas) Interestingly, the “China shock” is more likely to induce innovation than liberalization with high wage countries, as richer countries will compete in both old and new goods."  (Moi ici: Gente perigosa... De acordo com o que sucedeu a Portugal com a entrada na CEE. Os produtos alemães não vinham competir com os produtos portugueses, os produtos portugueses é que foram competir pelo preço com os produtos alemães naquela questão 

"Para um dado nível de desempenho, quão barato o podem oferecer?")

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"we show, paradoxically, that increased trade with a low-wage trading partner, which drives down prices and forces firms to shut down some lines of production, can also increase the rate of innovation. Instead of increasing the return to innovation, this kind of trade effect reduces the opportunity cost of the resources used to innovate." (Moi ici: evolução dos euros produzidos por trabalhador na indústria do calçado e na do têxtil e vestuário)

"workers acquire human capital that is specific to a firm and the goods that it produces. This makes the human capital used by each firm a “trapped factor”. If a factor of production is trapped in a firm, a trade shock that reduces the value of this factor in specific lines of production can encourage the firm to reallocate this factor to other activities including innovation. Because the human capital is firm-specific, the shock reduces the opportunity cost of the human capital that it uses without having any effect on the cost of human capital to other firms.

...

The nature of the market failure is that skilled workers should specialize in innovation but they do not because the private incentive to innovate is below the social incentive. Their product specific skills cause them to be “trapped factors” from planner’s point of view.

...

we describe the predictions of this theory for innovation in a high wage country under two types of trade shock: a “China shock” (liberalization of goods with a low wage country) and an “OECD shock” (liberalization of trade with a high wage country). We show that the positive effect of liberalization holds only for the China shock."

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E das Conclusões:

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"In this paper we have considered a “trapped factor” model where some factors of production due to sunk costs are partially irrerversible and are therefore “trapped” in a firm (e.g. when there is firm-specific human capital from learning by doing). We show that in such a model that when a rich OECD country reduces trade barriers with a low wage country like China this can act to speed up the rate of innovation and therefore economic growth in the OECD country. This is because the trapped factor will be used (in part) to produce old goods and this sets the opportunity cost of innovation. A China shock reduces the profitability of producing these old low tech goods and therefore reduces the opportunity cost of innovation. Abstracting from market size effects, integration with a high wage OECD country does not have these pro-innovation effects.

...

First, opening up to trade with China appears to have generated faster technical change in firms in richer countries (like Europe and the US) not simply from reallocation but also through within firm innovation. Secondly, the effects of opening up to trade with countries like China appears to have stronger effects on innovation than trade integration with other rich countries."

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Por que é que esse choque em Portugal foi tão violento, levando à morte de tantas empresas?

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Porque a maioria das empresas portuguesas competia no mesmo campeonato da China, usando como vantagem competitiva os preços baixos, ou seja, muitas empresas estavam longe da fronteira do seu sector:

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"It is important to understand the factors that infl‡uence a country’s transition from the production of low-quality to high-quality products since the production of high-quality goods is often viewed as a pre-condition for export success and, ultimately, for economic development. In this paper, we provide the fi…rst evidence that countries ’import tariffs affect the rate at which they upgrade the quality of their products. We analyze the effect of import competition on quality upgrading using highly disaggregated export data to the U.S. from fi…fty-six countries in 10,000 products using a novel approach to measure quality. As predicted by recent distance to the frontier models, we fi…nd that lower tariffs are associated with quality upgrading for products close to the world quality frontier, whereas lower tariffs discourage quality upgrading for products distant from the frontier."
...
"we show that there is a signi…cant relationship between import tariffs and quality upgrading. The direction of the effect depends importantly on how far the product is from the world quality frontier. For products close to the frontier, low tariffs encourage quality upgrading whereas for products distant from the frontier, low tariffs have the opposite effect, discouraging quality upgrading. (Moi ici: O exemplo que nos vem do Brasil!)
...
Our findings support the theories by Aghion and Howitt (2005) and ABGHP (2009) that highlight two forces: one, the “escape-competition ”effect that induces a fi…rm close to the frontier to invest in quality upgrading in order to survive competition from potential new entrants; and two, the “appropriability” effect that discourages …firms distant from the frontier from investing in quality upgrading because they are too far away from the frontier to be able to compete with potential new entrants. Our results show that support for these theories is strongest in countries with good business climates, a fi…nding that is perhaps not surprising given that lower tariffs are unlikely to alter signi…cantly the competitive environments in countries that face many other restrictions on competition."
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Trechos retirados de "Import Competition and Quality Upgrading" de Mary Amitiy e Amit K. Khandelwalz, publicado na versão final em Novembro de 2011.
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Ah! E para os que acham que o problema é do euro... recomendo a figura 2 na página 24.

It's not the euro, stupid! (parte II)

Parte I.
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A partir deste "amigo" cheguei a este "amigo" que me levou a este "amigo" (abençoada Internet).
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Em "Trade Induced Technical Change? The Impact of Chinese Imports on Innovation, IT and Productivity" de Nicholas Bloom, Mirko Draca e John Van Reenen, publicado em Janeiro de 2011 descubro uma alma gémea. Já li o corpo do artigo duas vezes e ainda não encontrei nada com o qual não concordasse... tudo o que é apresentado vem suportar as teses que defendo há anos aqui no blogue.
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Convém recuar ao Portugal de 1996... salários baixos, dentro da fortaleza Europa...
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"A vigorous political debate is in progress over the impact of globalization on the economies of the developed world.
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One major benefit of Chinese trade had been lower prices for manufactured goods in the developed world. We argue in this paper that increased Chinese trade has also induced faster technical change from both innovation and the adoption of new technologies, contributing to productivity growth. (Moi ici: O mesmo efeito que a ausência de patentes impõe no mundo da moda) In particular we find that the absolute volume of innovation (not just patents per worker or productivity) increases within the firms and industries more affected by exogenous reductions in barriers to Chinese imports. (Moi ici: Uma outra forma de dizer: subir na escala de valor, fugir do campeonato do preço e entrar no do valor)
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A contribution of our paper is to confirm the importance of low wage country trade for technical change using a large sample of over half a million firms and exploiting China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) to identify the causal effect of trade.
...
The rise of China and other emerging economies such as India, Mexico and Brazil has also coincided with an increase in wage inequality and basic trade theory predicts such South-North integration could cause this. ... What may be happening is that trade is stimulating technical progress, which in turn is increasing the demand for skilled labor.
...
First, on the intensive margin, Chinese import competition increases innovation, TFP and management quality within surviving firms. Firms facing higher levels of Chinese import competition create more patents, spend more on R&D, raise their IT intensity, adopt more modern management practices, and increase their overall level of TFP. Second, Chinese import competition reduces employment and survival probabilities in low-tech firms - e.g. firms with lower levels of patents or TFP shrink and exit much more rapidly than high-tech firms in response to Chinese competition. Thus, our paper jointly examines the effects of trade on survival/selection and innovation. The combined impact of these within firm and between effects is to cause technological upgrading in those industries most affected by Chinese imports. An additional set of results shows that Chinese imports significantly reduce prices, profitability and the demand for unskilled workers as basic theory would suggest. (Moi ici: Tudo, tudo a suportar o que defendemos neste blogue há anos!!! Baixar salários? Aumentar o tempo de trabalho para fazer face aos chineses? Get a life!!! Quem o defendo só ilustra assim a sua ignorância dos números e não percebe o que se passa/passou)
...
Chinese imports reduce the relative profitability of making low-tech products but since firms cannot easily dispose of their “trapped” labor and capital, the shadow cost of innovating has fallen. Hence, by reducing the profitability of current low-tech products and freeing up inputs to innovate, Chinese trade reduces the opportunity cost of innovation. (Moi ici: É o salto para a frente, há empresas que são inovadoras por causa do seu ADN, está-lhes na massa do sangue. Há muitas mais que só inovam quando a necessidade aperta!!!)
...
First, import competition from low wage countries like China has a greater effect on innovation than imports from high wage countries. This occurs because Chinese imports have a disproportionate effect on the profitability of low-tech products, providing greater incentives to innovate new goods. Second, firms with more trapped factors (as measured by industry-specific human capital, for example) will respond more strongly to import threats.
...
for labour economics we find a role for trade with low wage countries in increasing skill demand (at least since the mid-1990s) through inducing technical change.
...
Our paper uses new patenting, IT, R&D, management and productivity data to establish that trade drives out low-tech firms (reallocation) and increases the incentives of incumbents to speed up technical change.
...
important role of trade on technical change. In particular, our finding that (i) the positive trade effect is on innovation (rather than just compositional effects on productivity via offshoring or product switching)
...
we find that about half of the increase in innovation following the fall in trade barriers against China comes from within firms (they expand the number of patented innovations, spend absolutely more on R&D and modernize their management practices) implies that changing composition is not the whole story.
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size is not an adequate proxy for productivity, finding that small plants actually do relatively better than larger plants following an increase in Chinese import.  (Moi ici: Em toda a linha!!! Até este tópico da dimensão das empresas e a vantagem das PMEs vem suportar as teses deste blogue!!!)
...
In their model, small firms survive by operating in product niches rather than the standardized products competing with China.  (Moi ici: Nichos, outro conselho recorrente deste blogue!!!)
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Chinese imports are associated with an increase in the wage-bill share of college educated workers, suggesting Chinese trade raises the demand for skills. ... This is consistent with the model that Chinese trade leads firms to switch from producing older low-tech goods to the design and manufacture of new goods, which is likely to increase the demand for skilled workers.
...
in the face of Chinese import competition European firms change their product mix."
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Só gostava de conhecer um estudo com números, com suporte em amostra estatisticamente significativa que comprove que o problema da nossa economia é a falta de competitividade do sector de bens transaccionáveis... ao menos um.