O conteúdo não é estúpido!

"O mercado chinês representa cerca de três milhões de euros por ano. É um mercado no qual nós, se quiséssemos, conseguiríamos crescer [...] Não queremos estar completamente concentrados neste mercado. Vendemos aquilo que queremos para o mercado chinês"

Querer, querer, querer, (se, não, sim).

Uma estratégia deliberada genuína tem um twist associado a sacrifícios.

Recordando Roger Martin:

"You only know that you've made a real strategic choice if you can say the opposite of what that choice is, and it's not stupid."

 Aplicando o teste:

"O mercado chinês representa cerca de três milhões de euros por ano. É um mercado no qual nós, queremos crescer [...] Queremos estar completamente concentrados neste mercado. Vendemos aquilo que queremos para o mercado chinês"

 O conteúdo não é estúpido!

Quando li o artigo, "Empresa de mármores de Santarém vende 30% para a China", ao ler o trecho inicial deste blogue pensei logo em comprar mármore de confiança a outros produtores e aproveitar o conhecimento do mercado chinês para vender. Essa pode ser a decisão racional de alguém, a decisão racional de outros pode ser diferente, e assim, por diante. É disto que falamos quando falamos de idiossincrasia.

Debaixo da superfície calma e pacata

À superfície vemos uma coisa, e tomamos decisões e construímos narrativas e visões do mundo com base nesse agregado fácil de contemplar para quem tem pressa ou preguiça de pensar.

No entanto, quando se mergulha e se vai à análise granular, quando se desdobra o agregado, percebemos que há uma turbulência subjacente permanente.

Recordei-me do índice de turbulência a propósito de um texto do Banco de Portugal sobre o sector do calçado. O texto é de Julho de 2018, ainda que trate de dados até 2016, "Análise setorial da indústria do calçado 2012-2016", e o que me chamou a atenção foi este gráfico:

Com a evolução da taxa de mortalidade e de natalidade no calçado.

Quando olhamos para as Monografias Estatísticas da APICCAPS sobre o sector e olhamos para a evolução do número de empresas:

Normalmente escápanos a percepção de que apesar do número total não ter tido grande evolução nos últimos anos, por trás dessa estabilidade há turbulência.

A curiosidade levou-me a olhar para alguns números dos Boletins de Conjuntura (Trimestrais) da APICCAPS (desde o 1º trimestre de 2015 até ao 2º trimestre de 2018). Eis alguns dados apresentados de duas formas:

Interessante notar que ao mesmo tempo em que cresce o número dos que afirmam que a utilização da capacidade diminui, aumentam os preços no estrangeiro.
Interessante notar que o número de empresas que contratam e despedem aumentou.
Interessante notar que o número de empresas que refere crescimento ou diminuição da carteira de encomendas do estrangeiro parece ter aumentado.

Cuidado com os que vêem os sectores como blocos homogéneos e não percebem o como a idiossincrasia desempenha um papel fundamental.

Nestes tempos de hoje estão a criar-se as causas que gerarão os efeitos de 2020:

• Fed Will Likely Raise Rates After Strong Jobs Report
• The IMF is having a ‘Groundhog Day’ moment with its economic forecasts

Good morning from Germany, where growth prospects are worsening. Deutsche Bank has cut Q3 growth forecasts to ZERO, sees now only 1.6% for 2018, has trimmed 2019 growth forecast to 1.3% from 1.7%. Despite signs that Q3 WLTP effect is subsiding recovery looks set to be slow. pic.twitter.com/HATtyoCv5u

— Holger Zschaepitz (@Schuldensuehner) November 4, 2018

O papel dos individuos

Ontem ao final da tarde encontrei este tweet:

Adam nails this one. As @stanford’s Jim March says, leadership requires plumbing and poetry. I would add that organizations would be in deep shit without skilled plumbers. https://t.co/5aEeArBvXk

— Bob Sutton (@work_matters) September 22, 2018

Isto depois de uma caminhada onde comecei a ler esta tese de doutoramento "Micro-foundations of value- based pricing and selling" de Mario Kienzler, onde sublinhei:

"it is not enough to enable customer value creation, firms also have to take value capture seriously. Value capture is defined as the processes that allow firms to claim some of the value created in exchange relationships. For supplier firms, value capture means making a profit from enabling customer value creation.
...
value-based selling has on average a positive relation with performance at the level of the salesperson and value-based pricing with performance at the level of the product and the firm.
...
since “organizations are systems of coordinated action among individuals and groups whose preferences, information, interests, or knowledge differ”, it is germane to recognize how these differences influence firm performance.
Indeed, evidence suggests that individuals have a sizable impact on firm performance.
...
If one accepts that organizational activities, routines, capabilities and processes tell only part of the story, then the individuals within organizations become an important unit of analysis."

Selecção e subsídios

Com Maliranta em 2007 aprendi aquela frase com que se inicia a coluna das citações:

"It is widely believed that restructuring has boosted productivity by displacing low-skilled workers and creating jobs for the high skilled."
Mas, e como isto é profundo:
"In essence, creative destruction means that low productivity plants are displaced by high productivity plants." Por favor voltar a trás e reler esta última afirmação.
E o grande finale:
"As creative destruction is shown to be an important element of economic growth, there is definitely a case for public policy to support this process, or at least avoid disturbing it without good reason. Competition in product markets is important. Subsidies, on the other hand, may insulate low productivity plants and firms from healthy market selection, and curb incentives for improving their productivity performance. Business failures, plant shutdowns and layoffs are the unavoidable byproducts of economic development."

Com Taleb em 2018 voltei ao tema:

"Systems don’t learn because people learn individually –that’s the myth of modernity. Systems learn at the collective level by the mechanism of selection: by eliminating those elements that reduce the fitness of the whole, provided these have skin in the game." 

E agora volto a encontrar mais tijolos para a estrutura em "Why Leaders Get Stuck at Average":

"We don’t automatically improve as time passes.  The longer we do something the more likely we are to do it like we’ve always done it.
...
Leading doesn’t make you a better leader. Just like playing golf doesn’t make you a better golfer.
.
The only way to improve performance – in any field – is purposeful practice. (Researchers and authors often use the expression ‘deliberate practice’.)"

E em "A basic theory of inheritance: How bad practice prevails":

"All organizations have “best practices”: habits that they have picked up in the past or mimicked from others. Managers often believe that these must be the best ways of doing things, because otherwise market forces would have eliminated them. The theory in the paper explains why this belief may be wrong. Some enduring practices may be harmful without managers realizing it because it is not necessarily the most optimal practices that survive (just like harmful viruses persist in nature)."

Effectual Logic

Muitas vezes dou comigo a regressar a este postal de Outubro de 2015, "Do concreto para o abstracto e não o contrário". Pensar estratégia para PME deve ser diferente de pensar estratégia para empresas grandes. As PME têm de partir do que têm e não se podem permitir entrar em ilusões de rico, ""analisamos os meios que temos e imaginamos futuros possíveis" (parte II)".

"Causation is when actions are made based on predetermined goals and focuses on the selection between available means to achieve those goals. It begins with the identification and exploitation of opportunity in the existing market, followed by a series of tasks that include extensive market study and detailed competitive analyses to develop a business plan. In order to implement the plan, resource acquisition and interaction with different stakeholders by developing partnerships takes place.
.
In contrast, effectuation focuses on choosing between possible objectives that can be created with the set of available resources (who I am, what I know, whom I know). Who I am includes these characteristics; for example traits, preferences, skills, abilities, passions, assets; what I know consists of prior knowledge including; education, training and expertise, knowledge from life, and informal learning. Lastly, who I know includes the social and professional networks. [Moi ici: Tudo isto tem a ver com a importância da idiossincrasia] Those goals are constructed and evaluated within affordable losses rather than expected returns. Effectuators then seek to co-create those goals through negotiating with various stakeholders who are willing to make actual commitments. These commitments add new resources to the pool of means to achieve new goals (markets, products, and firms). Effectual logic is focused on co-creating the future by the use of intangible resources, utilising co-creation of value and relationships. Effectual and causal logics are different in terms of having two different processes at their foundations.
...
when an individual uses causal logic they begin with a given goal, decision-making is based on expected returns, execute competitive advantage and conduct comprehensive market study, exploit pre-existing knowledge and try to predict the future. Whereas individuals uses effectual logic begin with a given set of means, decision making based on affordable loss, emphasize strategic alliances and exploit contingencies, and seek to control and embrace unpredictable future.
...
“Bricolage” is “making do by applying combinations of resources at hand to new problems and opportunities”
...
Effectuation is characterized by flexibility, experimentation and affordable loses. Those characteristics allow service innovation to take place. In causal approach, outsiders are perceived as competitors or threats, while in effectual approach, customers, suppliers, workers even competitors are perceived as potential partners who can help in crystalizing the service by adding new means or goals. [Moi ici: Os meus queridos ecossistemas] Bricoleurs involve customers, suppliers and other parties to solve a problem or launch/improve service innovation. Collaboration expands the pool of available resource and helps to broaden ones expertise."

Trechos retirados de "Causation and Effectuation in the context of Service Innovation in small, independent firms - Integration and management of resources and capabilities"

Shift happens (parte II)

Interessante esta evolução:

"Em 2016, a faturação da fileira têxtil e vestuário subiu 6,6%,face a 2015, um desempenho que supera as restantes industrias transformadoras e é o valor mais elevado desde 2012. O crescimento foi transversal a todos os segmentos de negócio.
...
A análise regista que naquele período foram mais as empresas que encerraram do que as que foram criadas. Por isso, o universo têxtil encolheu 1,2% no biénio 2015/16. Por cada 10 empresas que cessaram atividade, foram criadas oito, revela o estudo do BdP.
...
Em 2016, a rentabilidade da fileira têxtil atingiu os 10%, o valor mais alto desde 2012 e superior à média nacional (8%).
.
No resultado de exploração (EBITDA), o setor também está acima da concorrência: a subida de 10% compara bem com os 2% da indústria transformadora e 7% de média nacional.
...
O crédito concedido pelo sistema bancário às empresas têxteis caiu 2,5% de 2015 para 2016. Mas, registou uma subida de 1,1% em 2017.
.
No final de 2017, estava em incumprimento 11,6% do crédito concedido, em linha com a média da indústria.
.
O passivo do tecido têxtil subiu, em 2016, 4%, com a dívida remunerada a representar 47% do total do passivo."

Um texto que devia ser lido pelos crentes no monolitismo sectorial económico, incapazes de perceber a importância das idiossincrasias.

Trechos retirados de "Têxtil representa 2% das empresas e 5% do emprego"

Não é fácil escapar das armadilhas

"Managers often unknowingly adopt bad practices when they try to benchmark their organizations against the other companies in their industries.
...
For instance, some years ago, whenever GE did something new, many firms were inclined to immediately imitate it. Like a lot of people, the managers at these organizations assumed that GE's leaders knew it all: "Surely, when they do it, it must be a good thing, because they're such a successful firm."
.
Indeed, research has confirmed that organizations tend to imitate the actions of other companies that stand out as successful, even when it is clear that the newly developed practice is not the cause of the company's success.
.
The press does it, too. Journalists habitually write about top-performing companies and interview their CEOs, rather than the average Joes. We, admittedly, do it in business schools: we teach cases about the best, blue-chip companies, ignoring the less-sexy average types."[Moi ici: A propósito disto recordar "Cuidado com o título"]

Agora pensem nos artigos da revista Exame, pensem nas posições que a CIP defende, pensem nas decisões das associações de sector chefiadas pelos líderes das empresas grandes.

Freek Vermeulen dá como título à secção de onde retirei estes trechos "Benchmarking is BS"... pois é.



Trechos retirados de "Breaking Bad Habits" de Freek Vermeulen

Cooperativas, partes interessadas, valor e a sua partilha

Se a maior riqueza que há num ecossistema é a sua biodiversidade, porque encerra em si a robustez para lidar com o desconhecido, também numa economia a heterogeneidade e idiossincrasia é algo positivo pelas mesmas razões.

Recentemente visitei empresa muito bem sucedida e que, imaginem:

• desistiu de crescer em quantidade, só aposta em crescer por aumento de preços, por subida na escala de valor;
• rejeita clientes;
• rejeita crescer mais do que um certo valor por cliente;
• rejeita convites de clientes para investir em novas fábricas em mercados onde esses clientes estão a implantar-se ou a expandir-se.

A gerência consegue explicar o racional por trás de cada uma dessas decisões. Outra gerência composta por outras pessoas poderia tomar outras decisões. Não há resposta certa, não há resposta única.

Sabendo e crendo na frase "Não há resposta certa, não há resposta única.", apesar de tudo, fico com pena disto "Aumenta procura direta de azeitona em Murça devido a quebras a nível internacional":

"A azeitona sai daqui a granel e não colocamos nós as nossas marcas no mercado internacional”, salientou. O responsável considerou ainda que, com esta venda direta, “não há mais-valia para o azeite de Trás-os-Montes”."

Quem segue este blogue sabe o quanto valorizo a aposta:

• na autenticidade;
• na fuga ao granel comoditizado;
• na aposta numa marca;
• na subida na escala de valor;

No entanto, também sei que cada produtor é que sabe da sua vida.

O que levanta outra questão:

"esta situação pode “condicionar a vida das próprias cooperativas”." 

Até que ponto as cooperativas estão a fazer o seu trabalho? Até que ponto as cooperativas estão a tratar os produtores como partes interessadas livres que devem ser cativadas e seduzidas para um projecto de longo prazo? Até que ponto as cooperativas estão a recompensar convenientemente os produtores? Até que ponto as cooperativas têm elas próprias uma gestão suficientemente ágil? Para eventualmente melhorar preços a pagar aos produtores e negociar melhores condições com a procura? Para aproveitar oportunidades e colocar em novas prateleiras o seu azeite numa altura de escassez? Para subir preços em tempos de escassez?

Imaginem uma cooperativa com um sistema de gestão certificado pela ISO 9001 a marcar uma revisão do sistema extraordinária para actualizar a análise do contexto e das partes interessadas e tomar decisões à priori, a comandar os acontecimentos em vez de, com as calças na mão, ir a reboque dos acontecimentos.

BTW, estão a ver aquelas simulações sobre a vida das estratégias? Uma estratégia tem sucesso e a maioria das empresas está a tentar ter sucesso seguindo-a. Depois, algo muda no contexto, e uma empresa-pioneira testa uma nova abordagem e tem algum sucesso, à medida que essa abordagem vai se aperfeiçoando, o sucesso vai aumentando, o próprio contexto co-evolui e o spill-over começa a contaminar outras empresas que começam a seguir a mesma estratégia. Então, a densidade de uso da estratégia anterior começa a baixar e a da nova estratégia começa a subir. Depois, algures no tempo, uma nova alteração de contexto e uma nova experiência a nível de estratégia. Experiência que pode passar por recuperar uma estratégia anterior, uma estratégia entretanto abandonada.

Voltar a uma estratégia entretanto abandonada pode ser um retrocesso, pode ser um erro, pode ser muita coisa, mas voltamos ao princípio e à idiossincrasia.

Heterogeneidade da procura e idiossincrasia da oferta

A propósito da minha paixão pela heterogeneidade da procura e pela idiossincrasia das empresas:

"Demand heterogeneity...
The degree of heterogeneity in consumer preferences is characterized by the extent to which customers differ in their preference orderings and budget constraints, which in turn determines the extent to which more than one offer can succeed in a given market.
...
we may observe some heterogeneity among these consumers with regards to budget constraints and performance requirements. This explains why some customers prefer high-end to low-end products derived from the old technology. The rise of a new dominant technology does not change these relationships—consumers in the home market still prefer the old technology to the previous alternatives, and still have the same heterogeneity in budget and performance requirements.
...
Revealing latent heterogeneity
.
Although the new technology does not itself change consumers’ preferences, its very emergence can act to reveal previously hidden differences in consumers’ preferences.
...
heterogeneity is revealed by differences in observed choices. Choices, in turn, are bounded by choice sets. When a new technology offers a new attribute bundle, it presents consumers with new couplings and de-couplings of attributes. This expands the choice set in which consumer preferences can be observed and the dimensions along which heterogeneity can be parsed, which, in turn, can be used to identify new niches within the existing market.
...
Retrenching in a revealed niche
.
Losing the mainstream of the market need not be a signal of the impending loss of the entirety of the market.
...
While it is possible that all consumers in the market uniformly prefer the new technology to the old, there are several drivers of variance that may lead parts of the market to continue to prefer the old technology to the new. This variance can be rooted in budget constraints, such that some consumers may prefer the new technology on a pure performance basis, but nonetheless choose the old technology on a price/performance basis
...
By revealing latent heterogeneity in the market, the introduction of the new technology exposes new lines of segmentation—niche opportunities within a market that previously had been regarded as homogenous. Within these niches, the old technology can maintain a sustainable advantage over the new technology. Exploiting this heterogeneity, however, entails redefining the size and composition of the market, and retrenching into the revealed niche.
It also entails a complete inversion of strategic imperatives: for racing firms, the key question is: “What new attributes and performance does the new technology address, and how can I make up for it to maintain relevance in the market?” For retrenching firms, the key question is: “What old attributes and performance did the new technology reveal by not addressing them, and how can I exploit this to create a sustainable niche?”"

Trechos retirados de "Old technology responses to new technology threats: demand heterogeneity and technology retreats" de Ron Adner e Daniel Snow, publicado em 2010 por Industrial and Corporate Change, Volume 19, Number 5, pp. 1655–1675

o vector tempo não é irrelevante (parte III)

Na parte II sublinhámos:

"the conviction that the coarse structure of the economy can exhibit no regularities that are not results of the fine structure, and that those aggregates or mean values, which alone can be grasped statistically, give us no information about what takes place in the fine structure."

Sou um acompanhante e promotor da idiossincrasia das empresas como grande factor competitivo. Por isso, apreciei muito estes trechos:

"Competitive  advantages  and  superior  resource positions are the outcome of an idiosyncratic and path-dependent process. In the extant literature scholars have argued that this path is both enabled and  constrained by firms’ knowledge and capabilities. Our arguments suggest that superior market positions and superior resource complementarities may also act as self-reinforcing mechanisms that shape a firm’s evolutionary path and may amplify differences in competitive positions (at least in the absence of discontinuous environmental change).
...
ultimately, it is managers that must make decisions about acquiring or building resources. Managerial judgment concerning the value creation potential of a resource and the factors that enable and constrain it are key factors in determining what resources a firm acquires or builds and, thus, what path toward a distinct competitive position it takes
...
Arriving at a position of competitive advantage often requires the orchestration of complex resource acquisition, development, and disposal strategies consistently over an extended period of time. We can depict managers as using the mechanisms of superior market position, superior resource complementarities, and superior network position strategically to turn initial asymmetries to their advantage through a set of resource orchestration decisions that evolve and unfold over time. Managers can shape their firm’s resource base in a way that allows for competitive improvement at a later stage—for example, through anticipating future market positions or future complementarities and through acquiring at an early stage some of the resources that are needed for building a market position later..These resources will not be as valuable unless the firm successfully acquires or builds other complementary resources in the future. Such a strategy may be particularly beneficial when resources take time to develop..Our arguments suggest that, under uncertainty, resource value is subjective and at least partly depends on the identity and characteristics of managers. Given their unique knowledge and experience, managers differ in terms of how much value they attribute to a resource and, subsequently, how much value they are able to create with a resource.…our results highlight the role of value creation in strategic management theory, as opposed to value capture, which depicts strategy as a zero-sum game, where the gain of one is the loss of the other. Value capture implies a focus on bargaining and pricing but neglects demand-side opportunities and taking into account or even influencing what customers are willing to pay. Considering value creation opens up new perspectives on demand-side opportunities that firms are able to exploit—for example, through diversification. Recently, both in the marketing literature and the strategy literature scholars have suggested that attention to how customers perceive value, how value is created from using products, and how firms are able to boost customers’ willingness to pay are key contributors to firm performance. Strategies aimed at increasing value creation by taking into account demand-side factors, as well as aimed at shaping such factors, are central to strategic management (and not only to marketing) but are very much an understudied topic..Furthermore, the demand side entails an opportunity space that allows firms to establish, enhance, or retain the value of their resources. Understanding the environment, particularly customer preferences, allows firms to acquire or build those resources or extract those services from resources that generate the most value for customers."

Trechos retirados de "What Makes a Resource Valuable? Identifying the Drivers of Firm-Idiosyncratic Resource Value" de Jens Schmidt e Thomas Keil, publicado por  Academy of Management Review, 2013, Vol. 38, No. 2, 206–228

Do abstract retiro:

"We further emphasize how the role of demand-side factors, [Moi ici: Heterogeneidade da procura] as well as the understanding and active shaping of such factors by managers, is a source of heterogeneity in firms’ resource endowments. [Moi ici: Heterogeneidade de recursos] Thus, our results show how two  understudied  areas  in  strategic  management—the  role  of  managers  in  resource  management and the role of the demand side as an opportunity space — can  be  fruitfully  combined  to  gain new insights into how firms achieve positions of competitive  advantage."

"driver of productivity differences" (parte II)

Parte I.

Há tempos ao pesquisar algo aqui no blogue cheguei a este postal "estado, estado, estado,...".

A matéria desse postal é reduzida a quase nada quando se pega num país, quando se escolhe um mesmo sector da economia, CAE, e se aprecia o panorama de variabilidade no desempenho das empresas, apesar do Estado, das leis, dos trabalhadores, serem os mesmos.

Aqui no blogue gosto de chamar a atenção para a importância da idiossincrasia no desempenho das empresas:

• "traced to factors under management control"
• "muitas vezes escandalizo-me com a forma como os economistas tratam a economia real"
• Estratégia não é matemática nem física newtoniana (parte II)
• Acerca da idiossincrasia nas empresas
• A importância da estratégia, para o bem ou para o mal (parte II)

Por isso, recomendo a leitura de "Good Managers, Not Machines, Drive Productivity Growth":

"When people discuss what drives long-run productivity, they usually focus on technical change. But productivity is about more than robots, new drugs and self-driving vehicles.
...
a huge number of statistical analyses and case studies of the impact of new technologies on firm performance have shown that there is a massive variation in its impact. What’s much more important than the amount spent on fancy tech is the way managerial practices are used in the firms that implement the changes.
...
look at the management scores across countries. They are highly correlated with GDP per capita. In fact, almost a third of the cross-country gaps in productivity are explained by management practices.
...
the economic environment is not destiny. Organizations can heal themselves. Firms need to be honest with themselves – many simply do not realize that there is much room for improvement. They need to benchmark themselves rigorously and seek out ways to change, even if this involves external advice."

 Qual é a mensagem do mainstream dos governos, dos políticos, dos media, das associações patronais?

Coitadinhos dos empresários, têm de ser ajudados, têm de ser apoiados, ... olha aqui está o Vosso Salvador: o governo de turno!

A propósito daquele "They need to benchmark themselves rigorously" recordar "Satisficing"

"traced to factors under management control"

"In 87 percent of the cases [of stalled growth], the cause could be traced to factors under management control, like management complacency, failure to maintain product innovation, premature abandonment of a viable core business, or a failed major acquisition. In only 13 percent of the cases was management believed to be the unfortunate victim of external factors outside of its control, like major regulatory reform or geopolitical asset seizure."

Trecho retirado de "If You're in a Dogfight, Become a Cat!: Strategies for Long-Term Growth"

Biologia e economia

"One particularly memorable set of meetings we had involved a CEO who represented the third generation of his family to run a major public company which his grandfather started. When we met with him he was nearly always focused on macroeconomic issues like Federal Reserve interest rate policy and forecasts about the economy. Talking about these macro issues seemed to make him feel better. He never seemed to know much about his actual business. Over the years that business has declined to a point where all that is left today is the brand. It is a tragic story that negatively impacted not only him and his family, but tens of thousands of people. Of course, startup founders can fail for essentially the same reason at this CEO when they spend too much time on macro, attending industry conferences and shows and posing for photo shoots.
.
The CEO I am referring to attended one of the most well-known business schools in the world where he was taught that the systems his company had to deal with could be explained by concepts borrowed from physics like “equilibrium.” This was both unfortunate and fatal since the reality is that a capitalist economy is an evolutionary system and the best metaphor for how it works is biology rather than physics. Charlie Munger agrees: “I find it quite useful to think of a free-market economy – or partly free market economy – as sort of the equivalent of an ecosystem.” Unfortunately for people like this CEO there is no formula that will tell someone like him what to do. People who claim to have such a formulas are never right more than once in a row. The good news is that there are processes which can be followed that will greatly increase the probability of success. One process that killed the huge business was customer development. The pace at which new products were developed at his company was so ponderous and expensive that they were unable to react with sufficient speed when customer demand changed."

Como não recordar o que já escrevemos aqui acerca da relação entre a biologia e a economia e os ecossistemas.

• Biologia e economia - cuidado com as "leis universais" (2016)
• Biologia e economia
• Outra vez os ecossistemas
• Não confundir com perigosa propaganda neoliberal, é só a biologia a funcionar
• Biologia e economia
• Tanto a aprender com a biologia...
• Mongo is everywhere I look
• Diversidade e complexidade
• Economia e biologia, o mesmo desafio evolutivo (2008)

Como não recordar o que aqui critico na academia que ainda está no século XX a pensar o Normalistão quando já estamos no Estranhistão. Ah! Mt 11, 25

Como não recordar a superioridade da micro-economia face à macroeconomia quando trabalhamos num mundo repleto de tribos e pleno de idiossincrasias.

• Acerca da tríade
• Não há boleias da macroeconomia ...
• A microeconomia é mais importante que a macroeconomia

Trecho inicial retirado de "Why has the level of business competition levels been turned up to 11? Or: Why is the lean customer development process important?"

O contexto é um fluido em permanente mutação

Um excelente texto, "Here's Why You Should Think Twice About Listening to Business Gurus", para nos chamar a atenção para a inexistência de regras gerais:

"Simple rules always get more complicated when you try to apply them to the real world.
...
Simple rules rarely apply to a messy world."

A idiossincrasia é a regra nas empresas do mundo real e, o mundo real, o contexto, é um fluido em permanente mutação. O que é verdade hoje amanhã é mentira.

Por isso, aprendi que ao trabalhar com uma PME devemos partir do concreto para o abstracto e não ao contrário.

Palavras sensatas

Palavras sensatas de alguém que me habituei a respeitar:

"The other paradigm views policies as solutions to specific problems. Because each society [Moi ici: Substituir por empresa] has a unique set of characteristics, constraints and goals, policies are necessarily idiosyncratic: the path is made by walking. This does not mean that one should disregard what can be learned from others; but imitation without adaptation is a recipe for ineffectiveness, if not worse. It can easily imply importing solutions to non-existent problems, while letting real problems fester.
...
took the risk of imagining some key strategic, export-oriented investments, and then focused on creating the conditions to make them happen.
...
Authentic leadership requires a commitment to real goals. But, to achieve them, there are no prêt-à-porter solutions. Tailoring policies to specific problems, without disregarding the lessons from the past or from elsewhere, involves risks, and any responsible leader will necessarily feel the anxiety this creates."

Trechos retirados "Authentic Leadership"

BTW, Nuno podemos aprender algo com o Panamá?

Idiossincrasias e variabilidade

Este artigo "The One Type of Leader Who Can Turn Around a Failing School" sobre o tipo de lideranças nas escolas inglesas é muito interessante e, só por isso merece ser lido. Perceber como diferentes tipos de personalidade da liderança geram diferentes prioridades e diferentes consequências.
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Depois, fazer o paralelismo para as empresas e perceber a distribuição de produtividades e rentabilidades intrasectorial como uma função da idiossincrasia da sua liderança.
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BTW, de sublinhar a descrição acerca dos líderes Filósofos:

"Philosophers are passionate about teaching and love debating the merits of alternative approaches.
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They spend as much of their time as possible with other teachers debating and discussing alternative teaching methods. They’re somewhat elitist (although they’d never admit it) and believe teachers are far more important than the people who support them or the students they teach.
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Teachers are very excited when the Philosopher first arrives, as she or he tells them how important their work is and how much value they add to society. They start going on trips to observe other teachers and invite teachers to their school, to share ideas and approaches. But fundamentally, nothing changes. Students carry on misbehaving, parents are still not engaged, and performance – both financial and examination results – stays the same. When asked why performance hasn’t improved, the Philosopher says, “These things take time. Teaching is an art and it can’t be transformed overnight.”
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In the two to three years the Philosopher leads the school, teachers become increasingly frustrated as they’re still having to manage poor behavior and fill out forms. There are no significant improvements during the Philosopher’s tenure and performance — both examination results and financial — coasts or declines after they leave.
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The Philosophers were the most publicly recognized leaders in our study,
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Philosophers would be seen as ineffectual debaters (not inspirational leaders) who talk a good game, but have no impact."

Faz-me lembrar muitos políticos cheios de teorias da treta e que não gostam de sujar as mãos na realidade e que estão sempre em guerra com a Aritmética

Produtividade e gestão

"We turn to a long-standing question in economics, stretching back to at least Walker (1887), of how much of the variation in national and firm performance can be accounted for by di erences in management practices?
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Overall, on average 30% of the cross country gap in TFP appears to be management related. This fraction varies a lot between countries. In general we account for a smaller fraction of the TFP gap between the U.S. and low income countries like Zambia (6.2%), Ghana (9.7%), and Tanzania (12%), which is likely to be because these countries have much greater problems than just management quality. We account for a larger fraction of the TFP gap between the U.S. and richer countries like Sweden (43.9%), Italy (48.9%) and France (52.3%). Figure A4 graphically illustrates this, showing that more developed countries have a higher share of their TFP gap accounted for by di erences in management.
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Economists, business people and many policymakers have long believed that management practices are an important element in productivity."

Trechos retirados de "Management as a Technology?" de Nicholas Bloom; Raffaella Sadun e John Van Reenen. HBS Working Paper 16-133

"muitas vezes escandalizo-me com a forma como os economistas tratam a economia real"

Como não sou economista, muitas vezes escandalizo-me com a forma como os economistas tratam a economia real. Habituado a lidar com empresas de muitos tamanhos, de muitos sectores, cada uma comandada por diferentes tipos de pessoas, com diferentes modelos mentais, custa-me perceber, uma vez atrás da outra, como os economistas simplificam e tratam a realidade empresarial como um bloco homogéneo. É o velho tema do Sr. dos Perdões e da sua imagem:

Recordar daqui: Recordar o marcador "distribuição de produtividades" e a explicação para o facto de, num mesmo país, haver mais variabilidade no rendimento intra-sectorial do que no rendimento inter-sectorial.
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Ontem, foi tempo de perceber melhor porque é que os economistas pensam assim. O interessante é que pensam mesmo que as empresas são essa massa homogénea e que a única coisa que conta são as variáveis macro. Tanta tolice!!!
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Ontem, foi dia de iniciar a leitura de um extenso artigo "The Microfoundations Movement in Strategy and Organization Theory", publicado por The Academy of Management Annals, 2015 Vol. 9, No. 1, 575–632, e assinado por Teppo Felin, Nicolai Foss e Robert Ployhart.

"Microfoundations are not a theory, per se, but rather a movement and way of thinking that has spread across a broad array of macro theories.
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Macro explanations, on the one hand, emphasize the role that history, culture, and structure play in explaining economic outcomes, whereas micro explanations, on the other hand, focus on individual actions and interactions.
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The subsequent trajectory of strategic management and organization theory was heavily focused on macro factors, at the expense of the micro.
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The emphasis in this literature, then, has squarely been on homogeneity, rather than an effort to understand organizational heterogeneity, let alone the role of individuals.
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Thus, not only have individuals played a lesser role in macro management, but also the notion of organization as a social actor has been missing from macro organizational scholarship.
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The emphasis on collective factors, at the expense of individuals, is perhaps best encapsulated in the published transcript of a 1999 Academy of Management symposium where a number of prominent macro strategy and organizational scholars seemingly agreed that individual-level considerations simply are not relevant for macro scholarship: “if we truly focused on routines, competencies, practices and so on, we would not follow people anymore in our research. Instead we would follow how competencies spread, replicate, and insinuate themselves into organizations”
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The assumptions in these literatures are that individuals are homogeneous and thus effectively that they are randomly distributed into organizations. [Moi ici: Esta gente não se enxerga? Isto é ainda mais grave que considerar a realidade como estando povoada por econs]
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This literature places an emphasis on macro factors such as firm-level knowledge and competencies, social capital, networks, and other collective constructs. While including the collective and macro concepts in explanation is not problematic per se, it is of concern when it has come at the exclusion of individual-level considerations that in fact might be driving—or highly consequential for explaining—collective outcomes."

Resultados da concorrência imperfeita

Um tema que me é muito querido, "Corporate Inequality Is the Defining Fact of Business Today".
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Em Maio de 2010 comecei a usar o marcador "distribuição de produtividades" com "Clientes-alvo e Valor (parte II)" depois de no dia anterior ter escrito "A realidade e a teoria".
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Em Junho de 2010 comecei a usar o marcador "idiossincrasias" com "Lugar do Senhor dos Perdões (parte II)"
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Assim, na linha de "Desigualdade e estratégia" é quase estranho perceber que para muito economista teórico isto é uma barbaridade:

"Perhaps the most overlooked aspect of economic inequality has been the role that firms play in it.
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The best-performing companies seem to be pulling away from the rest, according to a growing body of research, and that fact explains a large part of the growth in inequality between individuals. The result, at least in developed nations, is a highly unequal corporate landscape, where some firms are incredibly productive and the amount of money a person makes is tied to the company they work for, not just the job that they do." [Moi ici: E por trás disso estão empresas que praticam a concorrência imperfeita e que à custa disso conseguem aumentar e manter por mais tempo margens interessantes - a minha tese]

O interessante, como relata o artigo é não haver uma explicação cabal e pacífica, reconhecida pelo meio académico.

Estratégia não é matemática nem física newtoniana (parte II)

Parte I.

Se uma estratégia não é matemática nem física newtoniana, se uma estratégia é contextual, transitória, pessoal e subjectiva, duas pessoas perante os mesmos factos podem tomar decisões bem diferentes.
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Por isso, diferentes empresas a operarem no mesmo país com as mesmas leis têm desempenhos tão diferentes. Por isso, a variabilidade dentro de um sector de actividade é sempre maior que a que existe entre sectores de actividade.
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Estratégia é uma escolha pessoal, muitas vezes solitária, que o líder de uma empresa assume, para o bem ou para o mal.
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Assim, ao ler títulos destes "“Falta uma estratégia, uma visão de futuro para Portugal”" só me apetece dizer:

+ 1 socialista com uma visão holística para o país https://t.co/ZN9RL8BFDt obrigado dispenso. deixe-me ficar com a minha liberdade de errar

— Carlos P da Cruz (@ccz1) April 18, 2016

Por favor, deixem-me ser humano, deixem-me errar, deixem-me fazer as minhas escolhas, deixem-me ser responsável ou irresponsável e arcar com as consequências.
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Portugal não é um ser não é uma pessoa, Portugal não é uma criação top-down, por muito que custe às elites. Portugal é um substantivo colectivo que é tanto mais feliz e tanto mais antifrágil quanto mais bottom-up conseguir ser, quanto mais estratégias diferentes albergar, quanto mais diversidade permitir.