Conhece os seus clientes estratégicos (parte II)

Parte I.

"The way in which strategic customers are distinguished from others differs from one organization to another. In practice we quite often find pyramids with customer tiers or ‘A/B/C’ rankings. Also the definition of strategic customers varies and criteria are company specific.
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A Strategic Customer is: a customer whose current and potential value to us is high and to whom our (potential) value is significant as well. It is a customer who makes us change and who is willing and committed to change with us.
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Once we have distinguished true strategic customers from the other customers, we have a solid basis to differentiate sales approaches and resource allocation accordingly. With our strategic customers we can drive change and transform the business
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Strategic value reflects the extent to which a particular customer is helping (and sometimes forcing) us to move into our chosen strategic direction. ... Does the direction in which the customer is moving suit our strategic direction (strategic fit)? Is this a customer who ‘makes us change’? Strategic customers are typically customers who make us change. In a close cooperation between suppliers and customers joint value innovation takes place, in many cases transforming the seller and buyer business."

Gostei desta definição de cliente estratégico.

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Trechos retirados de "Transformational Sales Making a Difference with Strategic Customers"

Acerca da importância do foco (parte III)

Parte I e parte II.

"THE STRATEGIC PURPOSE OF SACRIFICEHmm, Sacrifice. Isn’t this just clear prioritization by any other name? The difference between Sacrifice and prioritization is that the latter allows secondary and tertiary targets. Sacrifice means not doing these secondary and tertiary things at all.
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Sacrifice’s value, therefore, is not simply one of concentration of marketing forces externally; it also has an internal value similar to hardpruning a plant: all the energy, all the dynamism in the company becomes devoted to the primary goal.
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1. Sacrifice concentrates the internal and external expressions ofidentity by eliminating activities that might dilute it.
2. Sacrifice allows the creation of strong points of difference by changing the organization’s mind-set from pursuing weak universal appeal to a more intense, narrower appeal (and thereby avoiding becoming the ‘‘mush in the middle’’).
3. Sacrifice generates critical mass for the communication of that identity and those differences by stripping away other secondary marketing activity. This is central to maximizing the Challenger’s consumer presence, given its more limited marketing resources.
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While the Brand Leader perceives its currency to be mass appeal and can afford the dilution of preference that creates because it is compensated for by the convenience of its ubiquity and distribution, Challengers need more extreme actions and gestures - they need to create a greater proportion of ‘‘committed’’ and ‘‘enthusiastic’’ users through real differentiation.
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Challenger currency is therefore not means but extremes: top-box preference scores or nothing.
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For any brand, positioning is Sacrifice; for a Challenger, it is the path to growth. What it chooses not to do defines who and what it really is."

Trechos retirados de "Eating the Big Fish" de Adam Morgan.

Acerca da importância do foco (parte II)

Parte I.
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Entretanto em "Eating the Big Fish" de Adam Morgan encontro todo um capítulo dedicado à importância da renúncia para as PME, segundo uma vertente diferente:

"In the world of clutter and information saturation that consumers are faced with, the greatest danger facing a brand is not rejection, but indifference.
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the solution to indifference for a Challenger lies in both a strong identity and, through this, a strong relationship with its consumer base. Inevitably, this means that success for the Challenger brand comes from considering very carefully what it is going to Sacrifice in order to create this relationship and identity. Indeed, the ability to sacrifice and concentrate one’s focus, voice, and actions more narrowly is one of the few advantages a Challenger has. Having to fight a war on two fronts weakens the ability to do either really well and Brand Leaders have to fight on many fronts at once.
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Challengers recognize, ... that in order to break through, their only currency with the consumer is going to be strong preference. If they achieve simply weak preference or parity preference, all the other attributes the market leader has on its side will swing the vote in its favor: ubiquity, social acceptability, salience, convenience. And to create that strong preference, we as Challengers accept that we will need to do things that reach out and bind certain groups of people very strongly to us. And we will also accept that, in order to create those stronger relationships, these same actions or behaviors may (and probably will) leave other groups cold.
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The Sacrifices a Challenger makes do not lie in incidentals to the business, such as minor line extensions, a research budget, or the assistant public relations manager. They are instead fundamentals: distribution, messages, audiences, even issues like promotional pricing, or our deliberate lack of it (T-box, unlike the rest of the ready-to-wear category, never offers seasonal discounts). The overriding objective is to have significant impact of the right kind on your core audience, to achieve critical mass for your voice.
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Although ubiquity in distribution is good for establishment brands like Coca-Cola and AT&T, it is dangerous for Challenger brands looking to create a stronger affinity with a more focused target, be they self-styled fashion rebels, surfing wannabes, or weekend mountain bikers.
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there is no escape: Strong brands are necessarily simple and single-minded in their communication, even if it means sacrificing what might seem to be important secondary messages.
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As a Challenger, we have to use our more limited resources (people, time, passion, energy, money) against the few things that will really make a difference, and this means being very clear on both who we are and what we are going to Sacrifice to promote that identity. Focus on the products, experiences, and marketing that will genuinely break through."

Assim, concentração não só por causa do encaixe do mosaico estratégico (recordar Terry Hill) mas também para reforçar a mensagem de marketing, mas também para criar uma identidade forte.
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Continua.

Acerca da importância do foco (parte I)

Quando comecei a trabalhar estratégia com PME chamava a atenção para a importância do foco, da concentração nos clientes-alvo.
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Mostrava como a escolha de diferentes tipos de clientes-alvo implicava apostar em diferentes prioridades contraditórias entre si.

Depois, conheci Terry Hill e Skinner e a sua plant-within-plant:

Recordo de 2008:

"the most important orders are the ones to which a company says 'no'."

Recordo Jonathan Byrnes:

"in a typical company, 30 to 40% of revenues are actually unprofitable, while another fraction of revenues — often more like 20 to 30% — accounts for most of the organization’s profitability."

Recordo Kotler:

"Philip Kotler no livro “Marketing para o século XXI” chama a atenção para a relação 20/80/30.
Já ouviu falar dela?
De certeza que já ouvi falar na relação 20/80.
80% dos lucros de uma empresa são gerados pelos 20 clientes mais rentáveis.
E os 30? O que querem dizer?
Os 30 clientes menos rentáveis provocam um corte de metade dos lucros de uma empresa.
Pense bem no significado, no impacte, desta relação… "

Recordo as curvas de Stobachoff:

Recordo a polarização dos mercados e o "Stuck-in-the-middle".
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Tudo razões para defender que uma PME não pode ir a todas, tem de seleccionar os seus clientes-alvo e tem de se organizar para os servir. Servir bem um tipo de clientes implica não servir bem outro tipo de clientes.
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Entretanto, encontrei mais uma razão para a necessidade de focalizar.
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Continua.

Um exemplo de segmentação

O texto mais antigo que conheço sobre a curva de Stobachoff é um artigo de Kaj Storbacka sobre um banco na Finlândia.
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Um banco que ganhava dinheiro com metade dos clientes para perder muito com a outra metade. Trata-se de um fenómeno muito comum como aprendi com Skinner, Terry Hill, Kotler e Byrnes entre outros, um fenómeno que decorre das empresas não escolherem os seus clientes-alvo e terem a veleidade de ser tudo para todos e, terem a veleidade de serem uma espécie de Arca de Noé, e terem horror a rejeitarem clientes, a rejeitarem encomendas.
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Por isso, saliento este exemplo "Barclays recusa clientes menos abastados"

Para acabar com o deixar dinheiro em cima da mesa - parte IIa

E voltamos a Reed Holden e Mark Burton em "Pricing with Confidence" e ao problema de deixar dinheiro em cima da mesa.

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A segunda regra que os autores propõem é "Perceber o valor que se oferece ao cliente".
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Costumo escrever aqui no blogue que os empresários portugueses se subestimam em demasia e, por isso, deixam dinheiro em cima da mesa. Se calhar é outro erro que cometo ao generalizar... se calhar não são só os empresários portugueses.
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Os autores comparam a negociação entre um cliente e um comercial a um jogo de poker.

"“How do you win at poker?”
The best poker players win by being good at bluffing. Every price negotiation game has an element of bluffing. Both customers and suppliers do it, but the customer usually has an advantage because his bluff—walking away—is more credible. It’s a bluff that few sales professionals want to risk. Customers know this and use it to their advantage. Salespeople respond with lower prices because they are afraid of the consequences—a lost customer—if they don’t. In short, they lack the confidence that their pricing strategy is sound. They lose sight of the important value they offer to the customer. Salespeople forget that this is all just a poker game. They take the safe route and offer a discount. The customers gleefully sweep the money off the table. They do it because they know how to bluff."

A segunda regra que os autores propõem passa pelos comerciais perceberem qual a percepção de valor que emerge na vida do cliente ao integrar a oferta com os seus recursos. Dessa forma, a capacidade dos clientes fazerem bluff é eliminada.
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Como é que as empresas definem o valor que os seus clientes vão percepcionar?
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A maior parte, quando fala de valor fala de algo muito enevoado, pouco claro, em suma, um chavão. Sem perceber, sem definir claramente qual é o valor, é impossível fugir ao jogo do bluff comandado pelo cliente. Sem perceber qual é o valor, qualquer necessidade dos clientes transforma-se numa prioridade, quando tudo é prioritário... nada é prioritário e a confusão instala-se.

Holden e Burton escrevem para o mundo do B2B:

"Regardless of how customers talk about the subject, in a business-to-business context, dollars that fall to the customer’s bottom line when it uses your offering is the true measure of financial value. Businesses are profit-making entities. Their actions and who they purchase goods and services from are driven by a desire to improve profits. They accomplish this by purchasing from suppliers that excel at helping them meet their profit goals. The equation is simple: Decrease your customers’ total costs and/or increase their revenues and you increase their profits. ... If you lack the ability to connect what benefits your offering delivers to how it will improve profits for your customers, you are operating at a huge disadvantage. If you can’t articulate your value in dollars and cents, you won’t get paid for it."

Assim, a chave para fugir ao bluff do cliente passa por perceber como é que a oferta da sua empresa cria valor financeiro para o cliente. Infelizmente muitas conversa começam pela pergunta "O que acha do nosso preço?"

"The better questions center on their requirements, the benefits provided by your offerings, and how the two interrelate. The key is to understand your value to your customers and then use this to manage their willingness to pay. By showing that you understand your value and demonstrating that your prices are reasonable given that value, you change the discussion. It is no longer just about price but about value and price.
Some of our clients are tempted to ask their customers if they are satisfied with your prices. This question also is a mistake. The truth is you don’t want customers to be totally satisfied with your prices. If a customer is satisfied, your prices are likely too low. A better scenario is when customers acknowledge that your prices are fair or reasonable. If you sell high-value products with lots of service and support, you might want customers to acknowledge that, yes, your prices are high, but on the whole you are worth it."

Esta última frase faz-me lembrar as empresas com elevados "grau de satisfação dos clientes" durante anos a fio e que estão à beira da falência.
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Continua.

Para acabar com o deixar dinheiro em cima da mesa - parte Ib

Continuado da Parte I.

Ainda sobre a primeira regra, para acabar com o dinheiro deixado em cima da mesa das negociações, "Rule One: Replace the Discounting Habit with a Little Arrogance", retirada de "Pricing with confidence - 10 ways to stop leaving money on the table" de Reed Holden e Mark Burton, vamos encontrar um tema recorrente aqui no blogue:

"One of the problems that leads to discounting is salespeople and managers who look for every opportunity to sell something. They don’t stop and ask whether any particular customer or order is good or bad for the business. This is one of the root causes that leads to excessive discounting: selling to customers who don’t and will never value the things you do as a firm. To make matters worse, these may be the customers who switch vendors, complain about everything, and extract all sorts of extra services that they don’t pay for. Why do we continue to serve them? Because we are trained to satisfy the customers, whatever it takes. Whether it’s smart—in other words, profitable—to continue to serve individual customers rarely enters the conversation."

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"The correct response is to take a step back. Within the global view of possible markets, identify which customers and markets you cannot serve at a profit. If some customers are marginally profitable, but others are significantly more profitable, is your company better off serving the former, or are you better off focusing resources on the more profitable opportunities? It’s a matter of defensive strategy.
It’s simply better for you that unprofitable customers are served by your competitors. It’s one less burden for you and one more for them. It’s important to determine which doors you do or don’t want your salespeople knocking on. If you don’t identify these doors, salespeople will waste their time and sell to customers that don’t value your offerings."

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The reality is that serving a large percentage of customers represents a loss for the business. The challenge, of course, is for a company to distinguish between the customers it can serve at a profit and those it cannot."

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"Because they are desperate for business, most managers don’t want to fire customers. We don’t like to do it either. The goal, of course, is to convert unprofitable customers into profitable ones. Before making a unilateral decision, we recommend that you have a candid conversation with the customers. Tell them why the relationship is not sustainable in its present form and let them know you are prepared to end the relationship. Some percentage of those bottom customers (larger than you may think) will understand and offer to keep doing business with you on some new terms."

Tantas e tantas vezes voltamos ao tema, ele é decisivo: quem são os clientes-alvo? Que procuram e valorizam?
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Como é a curva de Stobachoff da sua empresa? Qual a  percentagem de clientes com os quais a sua empresa perde dinheiro? Não tem clientes que geram prejuízo? A sério? Kotler e Byrnes apontam para cerca de 40% a quantidade de empresas americanas com clientes que dão prejuízo.

Quem são os clientes mais rentáveis? (parte I)

No final de Dezembro, por causa da publicidade na revista HBR fiz uma compra por impulso e encomendei um livro.
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Mais de um mês depois o livro chegou-me a casa... e já não me lembrava de o ter encomendado e, mais importante, já não me lembrava do motivo porque o tinha escolhido, e isso intrigou-me.
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Assim, mal tive uma aberta foi para ele que foi a minha opção de leitura experimental.
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O livro chama-se "How companies win - Profiting from demand-driven business models no matter what business you're in" de Rick Kash e David Calhoun e tem sido uma agradável surpresa. Há já vários meses que não lia um livro tão útil assim.
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O livro é um hino à defesa que fazemos neste blogue e na nossa vida profissional do conceito de cliente-alvo.
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O livro na parte inicial, defende que os clientes não são todos iguais e que diferentes clientes querem e valorizam coisas diferentes. No entanto, chama a atenção para o facto das empresas dividirem os seus clientes em segmentos em função da idade, geografia, rendimentos e... mas isso tudo não passarem de elementos exteriores à compra, o que é que uma empresa pode fazer para aumentar a venda de produtos topo de gama numa dada zona?
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Os autores dividem a história económica mundial nestas 4 temporadas:

• market equilibrium (1947 - 1990) (equilíbrio entre a oferta e a procura);
• oversupply (1991 - 2007)
• demand contraction (2008 - 2009)
• demand-driven economy (2010 and beyond)

IMHO a "demand-driven economy" para as PMEs exportadoras portuguesas começou há muito mais tempo, com a adesão da China à OMC, com a queda do Muro de Berlim e a abertura da Europa de Leste, e com o fim do escudo como moeda fraca com a qual se podiam fazer manigâncias em conluio com os governos.
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"... whenever there's a growing ratio of supply to demand, there is a downward pressure on prices and profit. Organic growth, which has always been difficult to achieve, becomes ever more elusive.
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For the next several years, businesses will find themselves in a period of hypercompetition driven by flat demand and significant increases in lower-cost supply. The conclusion: companies that have a competitively advantaged understanding of profitable demand will be the winners." (Moi ici: olhar para o mercado, olhar para a procura e em vez de ver todos como potenciais clientes, ver diferentes tipos de procura, como num mapa militar olhar para o terreno e ver diferentes curvas de nível, ou seja, diferentes tipos de clientes)
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Durante décadas as empresas concentraram-se na sua cadeia de fornecimento, na escolha, na localização dos fornecedores de materiais, componentes e subcontratados, focaram a sua atenção na redução de custos e no aumento da eficiência.

No entanto, num mundo com excesso de oferta, o fundamental é a concentração na criação, no desenvolvimento e aprofundamento de uma outra cadeia, a cadeia da procura.

Ainda ontem reflectimos aqui sobre o preço e sobre a importância, o impacte, que um aumento de apenas 1% tem nos lucros de uma empresa.
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Num mundo com excesso de oferta é impossível subir o preço e não esperar uma quebra de volume de vendas.
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"Ultimately, pricing is about control. When you lose your power to set prices to your best advantage, you also lose the ability to shape the market. You lose the ability to maximize your profits. That means you are no longer in control of your destiny. And, as every business leader knows, that is a very vulnerable - and dangerous - place to be."
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O primeiro conselho dos autores começa com uma pergunta:
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"What do you know about the demand of your most profitable customers that your competitors don't know?
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It is the precise and strategic answer to this question that enables you to make and align differentiated supply so that it better satisfies the demand of your most profitable customers."
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Aqui convém fazer uma interrupção e recordar as palavras de Kotler em "Marketing para o século XXI":
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Philip Kotler no livro “Marketing para o século XXI” chama a atenção para a relação 20/80/30.
Já ouviu falar dela?
De certeza que já ouvi falar na relação 20/80.
80% dos lucros de uma empresa são gerados pelos 20 clientes mais rentáveis.
E os 30? O que querem dizer?
Os 30 clientes menos rentáveis provocam um corte de metade dos lucros de uma empresa.
Pense bem no significado, no impacte, desta relação…
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E como será na sua empresa?
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Uma empresa esfalfa-se a trabalhar para os 20 clientes mais rentáveis para, depois, desperdiçar metade do que lucrou a servir os 30 clientes menos rentáveis.
Além de Kotler, vários outros autores chamam a atenção para este fenómeno. Os clientes não são todos iguais, há clientes com os quais se perde dinheiro, mesmo quando pagam a tempo e horas.
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Jonathan Byrnes num livro recente "Islands of Profit in a Sea of Red Ink" (Já chegou e é o próximo na lista de prioridades de leitura) escreve:
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“numa empresa típica, 30 a 40% das vendas não são rentáveis, geram prejuízo, enquanto que outra parcela das vendas - por vezes mais de 20 a 30% - é responsável pela maior parte da rentabilidade da empresa.”
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A mesma história!
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E como será na sua empresa?
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Quer isto dizer que as empresas, ao tentarem servir todo o tipo de clientes, desperdiçam muitos recursos.
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Voltando ao "How Companies Win":
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"Real success comes from the combination of understanding demand and then (Moi ici: O que se segue é o fruto do mosaico sobre o qual escrevemos há algumas semanas) creating the right product, the right package, the right price, and the right communications and total messaging, so that your total proposition aligns with that demand.
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What do you know about the demand of your most profitable customers that your competitors don't know? Do you know the answer? If not, can you find that answer? If you can't, you can at least take heart in the fact that your predicament is shared by most companies - even some of world's largest corporations.
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This shouldn't be surprinsing. In a world focused for generations on supply, that wasn't a question most companies ever needed to ask of themselves. But today it is.
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Perhaps the best way to begin answering this question is to break it down into four focused questions:

• Who are my most profitable customers?
• What is their unsatisfied current, latent, and emerging demand?
• How do I differentiate my products and services so I better satisfy the demand of those most profitable customers?
• What is the action plan so I can align the people inside of my company to satisfy the demand for all our customers outside of my company?"

Estas quatro perguntas são as clássicas:

• Quem são os clientes-alvo?
• O que procuram e valorizam?
• Como nos vamos distinguir?
• Como nos vamos organizar num mosaico que produza naturalmente essa proposta?

"With entire pools of demand evaporating in the current economy, and others becoming commoditized and low-profit in the face of global oversupply, finding those highest-profit customer clusters, growing them, and then hanging on to them for dear life may decide your company's future."

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BTW, uma pergunta para reflexão ... e o que têm feito as mittelstand?

Continua.