A chegar a um novo normal

"Empresários dizem que procura é o maior travão ao investimento"

"A esmagadora maioria dos investidores inquiridos pelo Instituto Nacional de Estatística (INE) diz que o principal fator limitativo ao investimento é a "deterioração das perspetivas de vendas". A "dificuldade em obter crédito" surge apenas em terceiro lugar como travão ao investimento."

As coisas começam a compor-se e a chegar à nova normalidade.

"They were beginning to feel the pinch of customer scarcity.
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Customers are scarcer than capital.

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If you have a good business idea (that is, one with a high return on investment), you can almost always find the capital required to fund it. You could raise the capital from your shareholders, or get a loan from a bank, or borrow the money from your Uncle Dave, and pay it all back later with interest. Capital is virtually unlimited, because it has a price, and as we "use it up" the price simply increases.
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But there is no secondary market for customers. No bank is going to lend you some customers to create value, then let you pay them back later with interest. This means you need to create whatever value you can, from whatever customers and prospective customers are available to you. Every time you give up a chance to create more value with a particular customer, it is a permanent, irretrievable loss to your business. You can't simply make it up with another customer."

Trecho de retirado de "Customers Are Your Scarcest Resource"
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Recordar a queda no crédito a privados, "Curiosidade do dia" e "Consumo interno, importações e dúvida - ajudem-me por favor!"

Liberdade no terreno

Recordar o exemplo do desempenho da Wal-Mart em Nova Orleães no pós-Katrina em "Lições de 2012":

"Os funcionários superiores da Wal-Mart concentraram-se em estabelecer metas, avaliando o progresso e mantendo as linhas de comunicação com os empregados nas linhas da frente e com agências oficiais quando podiam. Por outras palavras, para lidar com esta situação complexa não emitiram instruções. As condições eram demasiado imprevisíveis e estavam sempre a mudar. O trabalho deles era assegurar que as pessoas falavam umas com as outras."

E comparar com a mensagem de David Marquet em "Turn the Ship Around":

"Specifying to the crew that the true objective was to put the fire out as quickly as possible was a mechanism primarly for competence. Specifying goals, not methods is a mechanism for competence"  

E comparar com o sucesso da Blitzkrieg:

"Tell team members what needs to be accomplished, get their agreement to accomplish it, then hold them strictly accountable for doing it - but don't prescribe how. Requires very high levels of mutual trust." 

E recordar "Schwerpunkt":

"Schwerpunkt represents a unifying medium that provides a directed way to tie initiative of many subordinate actions with superior intent as a basis to diminish friction and compress time in order to generate a favorable mismatch in time/ability to shape and adapt to unfolding circumstances."

Qual é a proposta de valor da sua empresa?

"A value proposition should be defined and regularly reviewed at every level where you also develop a strategy. Remembering to do so will make you a better strategist.
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At the customer level, great sales reps know how to pitch a company’s solution in a way that describes how a specific customer’s situation will benefit from that solution. When companies merely respond to questions in an RFP, and fail to present a strong value proposition, they end up competing on price alone.
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At the offering and category level the value proposition sets in motion the entire marketing communications and sales strategy, including branding."

Trecho retirado de "The role of Value Propositions in Business Model Strategy"

A receita deste blogue (parte II)

Parte I.
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Como é que começou a mudança da Marlin Steel?

"The job that rescued Marlin Steel was small--20 baskets, a $500 order. (Moi ici: Mais uma mensagem a reter - atenção ao fora de comum), Greenblatt was handling sales in 2003, so he took the call himself. "It was an engineer from Boeing," he says. "He didn't think I was in the bagel-basket business. He just needed custom wire baskets." The Boeing engineer, who had seen a Marlin ad in the Thomas Register, a pre-Internet manufacturing directory, wanted baskets to hold airplane parts and move them around the factory. He wanted them fast. And he wanted them made in a way Marlin wasn't used to--with astonishing precision. For bagel stores, says Greenblatt, "if the bagel didn't fall out between the wires, the quality was perfect." The Boeing engineer needed the basket's size to be within a sixty-fourth of an inch of his specifications. "I told him, 'I'll have to charge you $24 a basket,'" says Greenblatt. "He said, 'Yeah, yeah, whatever. No problem. When are you going to ship them?'"" (Moi ici: Pequenas séries, com exigências específicas, idealmente a precisar de interacções que gerem co-desenho ou co-produção e entregas rápidas)

O truque de equacionar o servir os clientes que não valorizam tanto o preço:

"What got Greenblatt's attention in that phone call wasn't the need for speed or even the quality standards. It was that Boeing was completely unconcerned about price. "I'm trying to sell a basket for $12, the bagel shops are saying, 'I'm not paying more than $6.' I'm ready to jump off a bridge, and here's a guy who just shrugs at the outrageous sum of $24. I was like, Wow. He's price insensitive."
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That epiphany marked Marlin's rebirth. The company would keep bending heavy-gauge wire to make baskets, but instead of going to Bruegger's to hold bagels, the baskets would go to the factories of Toyota and Caterpillar, Merck and GE to hold everything from microchips to turbine blades."

E a revolução ao nível do pessoal:

"But for Greenblatt, the most important element of the moat is what Marlin didn't have before Boeing called: engineering and design. No one at Marlin designs baskets on slips of notepaper today. Five of 28 employees are degreed mechanical engineers. "We give people slick, elegant designs that make it worthwhile to use us rather than a commodity-part supplier from China," says Greenblatt. More to the point, says designer Alur, "people come to us with a problem and we try to solve it." Marlin has taken something utterly pedestrian and turned it into a tool of innovation--for its customers."

Faz lembrar o que os "patrões" do calçado andam a fazer:

"Sob o lema "A indústria mais sexy da Europa", os sapatos made in Portugal acompanharam a recuperação das exportações com a qualificação dos seus recursos humanos: a percentagem de trabalhadores qualificados subiu de 28% para 48% e o valor acrescentado bruto por trabalhador cresceu 34% em 10 anos.""

Por fim, outro conselho que costumo dar, "prefiram os clientes mais exigentes":

"The final line of defense for Marlin lies in the customers it targets: Greenblatt wants the toughest ones, the kind who make his competitors roll their eyes. "What I realized is that the customers who are a pain in the neck are really the great customers," he says. "Some people might say, 'Those guys [at Marlin] are crazy expensive.' But we find the people who appreciate that. I've never sold anything to Walmart." (Moi ici: Os grandes que vendem para a grande distribuição nem percebem o orgulho com que Grrenblatt diz isto)
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What those customers realize is that baskets aren't interchangeable commodities."

Está cá tudo...

BTW, recordar:

"O exemplo da Vipp chama a atenção para o facto de se poder criar uma marca de topo em qualquer sector de actividade, não é preciso ser uma Apple."

A espiral recessiva aperta

"Indicador da OCDE antecipa melhoria da economia com subida homóloga pelo sétimo mês"

"Em Maio, o indicador registou uma leitura de 101,31 pontos, situando-se pelo quarto mês seguido acima dos 100 pontos, que corresponde média de longo prazo. O valor registado em Maio traduz uma subida face ao mês anterior de 0,35%, sendo que desde o início de 2012 o indicador apresenta evoluções mensais positivas.
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Já em termos homólogos a subida registada em Maio (3,75%) foi a sétima consecutiva e a maior deste período, apontando para uma recuperação mais forte da actividade económica em Portugal no final deste ano."

Cuidado com os resultados que os instrumentos nos dão...

Cuidado com os resultados que os instrumentos nos dão...
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Uma das primeiras lições que aprendi no mundo das empresas e que não me contaram na escola.
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Recordar "Relógios e nuvens, entre eles: o mundo em que vivemos"
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A propósito de "I may follow the crowd, but not because it's a crowd"

A receita deste blogue (parte I)

Um artigo paradigmático.
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Um artigo que devia ser copiado e distribuído por muita gente.
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Um artigo que encerra em si tantas mensagens...
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Vamos a ele, "The Road To Resilience: How Unscientific Innovation Saved Marlin Steel"
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Em 1998, Drew Greenblatt comprou uma uma empresa anónima a Marlin Steel, fabricante de cestos metálicos. Os cestos eram usados pelas lojas alimentares nas suas prateleiras.
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Greenblatt não percebia nada do negócio (1) mas achava que ia poder viver com um rendimento regular, modesto mas regular, retirado do funcionamento da empresa.

"It was really just a metalworking shop: 18 employees, most at minimum wage, using hand tools to bend and weld metal, with $800,000 a year in sales. Marlin didn't own a fax machine, and most of the equipment was from the 1950s. Purchase orders arrived by mail. The pace was methodical and unhurried--each employee made 15 or 20 baskets a day. Still, says Greenblatt, make no mistake: "We were the King of the Bagel Baskets.""

Só que as coisas não correram como previsto:

"Within five years of buying Marlin, Greenblatt was getting killed. Chinese factories (2) suddenly started making bagel baskets. Marlin sold its baskets for $12 apiece and with 36 baskets to equip a typical bagel shop made $450 when a company added a location. Chinese factories were selling baskets for $6 each. Marlin's customers were switching to save $200 a store. And Marlin would never be able to match its Chinese competitors on price. "My steel was costing me $7 a basket," says Greenblatt. "We were going to go extinct." It would have been smarter for him to buy bagel baskets from China for $6 each and sell them for $6.50." (Moi ici: Este é o efeito China. Não foi o euro que deu a machadada na nossa economia de bens transaccionáveis, durante a primeira metade da década do século XXI, foi a China. O exemplo do preço do aço mostra que mesmo que os custos salariais se reduzissem à custa de uma forte desvalorização da moeda continuariam a ser irrelevantes para combater o efeito China)

Como é que a Marlin Steel deu a volta?

"Marlin saved itself by facing a truth that few threatened manufacturers can stomach: It was failing because it had gotten everything wrong. It had the wrong customers (3);(Moi ici: Por isso, fazemos tantas e tantas vezes a pergunta, quem são os clientes-alvo? Deque adianta um esforço eficientista tremendo se os clientes não são os adequados?) it had the wrong products(4); (Moi ici: Por isso, fazemos tantas e tantas vezes o convite às empresas para pensarem na diferenciação da sua oferta) it had the wrong prices(5). (Moi ici: Por isso, fazemos tantas e tantas vezes a pergunta, e o que é que a sua empresa está a fazer para aumentar os seus preços?) Greenblatt realized--just in time--that even wire baskets could be innovative. The simplicity of Marlin's technology is not what we typically associate with innovation--there's no algorithm, no microchip, no touch screen.(6) Instead, Marlin learned how its products could help its customers, providing the quiet innovation that can give a fellow U.S. factory a critical edge and help keep jobs in the United States.

Today, a decade later, Marlin Steel is outcompeting not just Chinese factories but German ones as well. Its sales are six times the 2003 level, and it has almost double the number of employees. The staffers have health insurance and 401(k) accounts (five employees are on pace to be 401(k) millionaires) and an average wage four times what it was a decade ago. The little Baltimore factory runs double shifts. Most remarkably, Marlin is still making wire baskets--just not bagel baskets. Or at least not very many."

Continua.

(mensagem 1: o risco da experiência é o de ficar prisioneiro de modelos mentais sem o saber)
(mensagem 2: o efeito China)
(mensagem 3: a importância de responder à pergunta: quem são os clientes-alvo?)
(mensagem 4: a importância de diferenciar a oferta)
(mensagem 5: trabalhar para aumentar os preços)
(mensagem 6: inovação não é apenas tecnologia de ponta, inovação é, também, olhar para o negócio de forma diferente)

Quem são os clientes-alvo da McDonald's?

Um artigo "Why the McWrap Is So Important to McDonald's" que permite equacionar os problemas do futuro da McDonald's:

"Richard Adams used to own several McDonald’s in San Diego and is now a consultant to franchisees. He’s also one of the most candid insiders. “It’s supposed to be an assembly-line business. They are giving people too much variety and selection,” he says. “Customers are already frustrated by how long they have to wait. Sales growth will stagnate because of the complexity.” He points out that some of the competition, such as Five Guys and Chipotle, keep their menus simple. McDonald’s has about 145 items on its menu, six of them different kinds of McWraps. As for the notion that McDonald’s should encourage some kind of foodie culture, Adams sighs. He’s heard it before. “McDonald’s management, once they get to a certain level—I think it’s when they get a limo—they no longer want to be hamburger guys. They want to be restaurateurs.”

Apetece perguntar: Qual é o negócio da McDonald's? Quem são os clientes-alvo da McDonald's? O que procuram e valorizam?
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Quanto mais itens, mais custos, menos rápido é o "fast-food".
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E depois este pormenor:

"Even if McWrap sales ultimately disappoint, the McWrap serves another stealth purpose. (Moi ici: Faz-me lembrar aquela frase irónica sobre os nossos políticos: "Há investimentos para ganhar dinheiro e há os investimentos "estratégicos"") Hennessy, the marketing professor, notes that customers may come into restaurants with healthy intentions but fall short of their aspirations. Many people encouraged McDonald’s to sell salads, yet in the past decade they have accounted for no more than 3 percent of sales. With salads and now the McWrap on the menu, customers may forgive themselves a little more for showing up at McDonald’s. And if they skip the wrap at the final moment and get a Big Mac and fries instead, she says, “They don’t blame the restaurant.”" (Moi ici: Quem são os clientes-alvo da McDonald's? Os que têm vergonha de ir a um McDonald's?)

Mais tarde ou mais cedo as consequências vão-se repercutir nas contas da McDonald's.

Mais um exemplo da espiral recessiva

"Concertos e festivais de verão: nunca se venderam tantos bilhetes"

Curiosidade do dia

"Fourth Generation war represents the largest paradigm shift in the conduct of war since 1648. It reverses what the Peace of Westphalia established, the state’s monopoly on war. All over the world, state militaries designed to fight other state armed forces much like themselves instead find themselves battling non-state entities: again, as before Westphalia, families, tribes, and clans; races and religions; sects and “causes,” i.e. ideologies, which are new since Westphalia but have their parallels in pre-Westphalian heresies; business enterprises including gangs, etc. All things old have been made new again. Unlike in most of the modern age, when state armed forces fight these non-state elements, the state forces almost always lose. The US Marine Corps, the best of the American armed services, is now 0-4 (Lebanon, Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan).
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As Martin van Creveld says, what changes in Fourth Generation war (his term is “non-trinitarian warfare,” referring to Clausewitz’s trinity of state, people, and army) is not how war is fought, but who fights and what they fight for. This is a larger change than changes in how war is fought.
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Not only is Fourth Generation war non-trinitarian, it escapes Clausewitz’s definition of war as politics carried on by other means. Many of the objectives for which Fourth Generation warriors fight are not political (some of course are). They range from having fun and grabbing women and loot through attaining eternal salvation. Much Fourth Generation war is supply-side war, generated by the presence of large number of young men with no jobs, no money, no access to women, and no future. What do such young men naturally do? Fight.
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Some commentators have mistakenly defined Fourth Generation war merely as insurgency. This reduces it to just another buzzword and obviously not a paradigm shift. Their error is not looking beyond how war is fought. Many Fourth Generation entities do employ the techniques of insurgency, but these techniques are not the origin of their strength. Their strength is mental and, above all, moral, not physical. It is a product of the causes they represent and as van Creveld has pointed out, of their very physical weakness. They represent David confronting Goliath. In the several thousand years the story of David and Goliath has been told, how many people have identified with Goliath? Over time, Fourth Generation war will affect how war is fought. It has already rendered most of the hi-tech, hyper-priced weapons in the arsenals of state armed forces irrelevant. Why do we need the F-22 Raptor? To shoot down Taliban flying carpets (Chet Richards adds, the fact that so far the F-22 has not bagged a single carpet shows we need a new radar and a new platform to carry it)."

Trecho retirado de "The view from Olympus"

Outro exemplo da espiral recessiva

"Consumo de combustíveis aumenta pela primeira vez em dois anos"

Assim, têm todo o interesse em contrariar Mongo

Ao ler este texto de Matt Ridley "The myth that choice overload is a cause of great misery" começo a especular...
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As empresas grandes, as empresas viciadas e habituadas ao volume, à escala, ao negócio do custo como o factor competitivo número 1, têm tudo a perder com o advento de Mongo.
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Assim, têm todo o interesse em contrariar Mongo, em contrariar o Estranhistão, em defender que escolher cansa, em defender que é tudo igual, que se escolhe entre genéricos.

E o lado intangível?

2 reparos a propósito de "Why Doesn't Everybody Buy Cheap, Generic Headache Medicine?"
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Primeiro:

"Why does anyone buy Bayer aspirin — or Tylenol, or Advil — when, almost always, there's a bottle of cheaper generic pills, with the same active ingredient, sitting right next to the brand-name pills?
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Matthew Gentzkow, an economist at the University of Chicago's Booth school, recently tried to answer this question. Along with a few colleagues, Gentzkow set out to test a hypothesis: Maybe people buy the brand-name pills because they just don't know that the generic version is basically the same thing."

Por que é que cada vez mais empresas farmacêuticas estão a recuar e  a deixar de comprar APIs (active pharmaceutical ingredient) na China?
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Aqui, o meu passado da química e da indústria química vem ao de cima, bem como o meu passado da qualidade e do seu combate à variabilidade.
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O API pode ser o mesmo... e as impurezas, são as mesmas?
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Quando a ICI (inglesa) e a Enimont (italiana) se juntaram para formar a EVC (European Vinyls Corporation) dividiram o mercado entre si. Por exemplo, em Portugal quem comprasse PVC à EVC tinha de comprar o produzido em Itália. A empresa onde eu trabalhava na altura, apesar da referência e da descrição do e-PVC ser a mesma, não conseguia ter os mesmos resultados com o e-PVC italiano que conseguia com o inglês, a reologia não era a mesma. Lembro-me do meu director técnico dizer "A água que entra no reactor é diferente!"
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Portanto, cuidado com as simplificações, o API pode ser o mesmo mas as impurezas, que existem sempre, são diferentes. E, depois, são essas impurezas diferentes que por vezes tramam os testes de estabilidade.
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Segundo:

"I asked several people who had a bottle of Bayer or Tylenol or Advil at home why they'd bought the brand name. One guy told me he didn't want his wife to think he was cheap. A woman told me Bayer reminded her of her grandmother. Another guy, a lawyer, said he just didn't want to spend the time to figure it out, and decided it was worth the extra couple bucks to buy the brand.
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In general, we often buy brands when we lack information — (Moi ici: Isto é o que os industriais do sector do bacalhau ainda não perceberam) when, like that lawyer, we decide it's easier to spend the extra money rather than try to figure out what's what.
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Jesse Shapiro, one of the co-authors of the headache paper, told me he buys Heinz ketchup rather than the generic brand. He likes Heinz. He thinks it's better than the generic, but he's not sure. "I couldn't promise that, if you blindfolded me, I could tell them apart," he says."

O texto só dá valor ao lado tangível. E o lado intangível? E aquilo que não se pode pôr numa folha de cálculo?

Seis meses perdidos

Em Fevereiro sugeri "Transformar Ameaças em Oportunidades".
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Contudo, parece que o sector ainda não percebeu isso "Industriais portugueses contra químicos no bacalhau".
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O português da frase final não é o melhor:

"Quanto o sal for trocado pelos químicos, o bacalhau vai mudar de cor –  ficar mais branco – e  ter outro sabor, mesmo que disfarçado pelas 1001 maneiras de o cozinhar. Mas sobretudo, vai ficar mais caro porque a cura leva mais tempo a fazer."

Presumo que a mensagem é: o bacalhau com polifosfatos será mais barato e que é isso que mete medo aos industriais do sector.
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Há males que vêm por bem, talvez seja o que falta para esta gente aprender o peso, a força, o valor das coisas intangíveis como uma marca. Criem a marca que identifica a cura tradicional! Criem a marca que grita "Não tem fosfatos!"

YES!!!

Froome já está de amarelo.

O lucro, tal como o emprego, não é um objectivo, é uma consequência!

Max Planck dizia que a ciência avança funeral atrás de funeral, ou seja, à medida que os defensores das velhas ideias morrem e deixam as suas cátedras e outros locais de influência.
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Nassim Taleb em "Antifragile" chama a atenção para onde estão as fronteiras do conhecimento:

"The error of naive rationalism leads to overestimating the role and necessity of the second type, academic knowledge, in human affairs—and degrading the uncodifiable, more complex, intuitive, or experience-based type.
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the Baconian linear model, after the philosopher of science Francis Bacon; I am adapting its representation by the scientist Terence Kealey (who, crucially, as a biochemist, is a practicing scientist, not a historian of science) as follows:
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Academia → Applied Science and Technology → Practice
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While this model may be valid in some very narrow (but highly advertised instances), such as building the atomic bomb, the exact reverse seems to be true in most of the domains I’ve examined.
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So we are blind to the possibility of the alternative process, or the role of such a process, a loop:
Random Tinkering (antifragile) → Heuristics (technology) → Practice and Apprenticeship → Random Tinkering (antifragile) → Heuristics (technology) → Practice and Apprenticeship …
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In parallel to the above loop,
Practice → Academic Theories → Academic Theories → Academic Theories → Academic Theories …
(with of course some exceptions, some accidental leaks, though these are indeed rare and overhyped and grossly generalized)."

Primeiro vêm a prática, só depois as teorias académicas.
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Por isso, tantas vezes me interroguei aqui sobre o porquê da cegueira da tríade (não confundir com a troika)
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O mundo muda, quem está no terreno, os pragmáticos, os práticos, têm de arranjar novas formas de lidar com a nova realidade com que deparam. Muitas tentativas iniciais falham até que uma ou mais novas abordagens resultam e começam a generalizar-se entre a comunidade de práticos. Entretanto, os teóricos continuam a pensar e a enformar novas gerações a pensarem sobre como lidar com o mundo antigo que já desapareceu.
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Assim, não é de admirar esta previsão:

"So here’s my wager on how long it will take for what even Jack Welch sees as ‘the world’s dumbest idea’, i.e. maximizing shareholder value, to become the minority view:
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“Major thought leaders: end 2014.
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All major businesses and business schools: 2020.”"

Depois, esta sequência é muito rica:

"In fact, shareholder value is part of a web of obsolete management ideas that no longer fit the 21st Century. As I noted in an article last week, other once-sacred and self-evident truths are also falling by the wayside:

• The search for the holy grail of strategy—sustainable competitive advantage—is recognized by Professor Rita McGrath of Columbia Business School as futile: competitive advantage is at best temporary. (Moi ici: Claro que muitos dirão que isto é perigosa propaganda neoliberal)

• The “essence of strategy” seen as “coping with competition”, as argued by legendary guru Professor Michael Porter, is now obsolete: the essence of strategy is about adding value to customers.

• It transpires that the raison d’être of a firm is not only, as Nobel Prize winner Ronald Coase argued, because it can reduce transaction costs, but also because it can add value for customers.

• The uni-directional value chain—the very core of 20th Century management thinking (Moi ici: Aqui a tríade está tão atrasada... ainda pensa na produção sem pensar na relação com os clientes, sem pensar no ecossistema da procura) developed by Professor Porter—is being replaced by the concept of multi-directional networks, in which interactions with customers play a key role.

• The extraordinarily generous compensation afforded to senior executives is recognized in an HBR article by Professor Mihir Desai, the Mizuho Financial Group Professor of Finance at Harvard Business School to be a giant “financial incentives bubble”, accompanied by an unjustified sense of entitlement.

• The short-term gains of large-scale off-shoring of manufacturing are recognized to have caused massive loss of competitive capacity: new heuristics for outsourcing have emerged.

• Supposed distinctions between leaders and managers, as argued by leadership guru Professor John Kotter, are dissolving: managers are leaders and leaders must be able and willing to get their hands dirty and manage.

• As a result of a failure of many firms to recognize and respond to these changes, a study by Harvard Business School has concluded that the US has lost much of its capacity to compete.

• Whereas the traditional management pursued an ethos of efficiency and control, a new paradigm is being pursued by many firms that thrives on the ethos of imagination, exploration, experiment, discovery, collaboration and self-organization. (Moi ici: Mongo, Mongo, Mongo!!! Benvindos ao Estranhistão!!! Benvindos à terra da diversidade e das tribos!!! Outra falha clamorosa da tríade)

• Whereas traditional management often treated both employees and customers as inanimate “things” to be manipulated, the new management paradigm respects employees and customers as independent, thinking, feeling human beings. (Moi ici: O poder da interacção, da co-produção, do co-design. da co-criação, ...)

• The new management embraces the increased complexity inherent in the shift as an opportunity to be exploited, rather than a problem to be avoided." (Moi ici: Abraçar a mudança)

Trechos de "When Will 'The World's Dumbest Idea' Die?"
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O lucro, tal como o emprego, não é um objectivo, é uma consequência!

Agora, só precisam de aprender a dar valor ao que têm

Fico fascinado com estes relatos de um Portugal que longe do caminho mais percorrido, longe dos holofotes, longe das promoções das operadoras de comunicações móveis e das cervejeiras, teima em resistir:

• "A  romaria das ovelhas"

E a verdade é que com a chegada da troika, com o consequente enfraquecimento da força da drenagem desertificadora do interior para as grandes cidades, com o progresso de Mongo e das suas tribos que procuram autenticidade, o pior já passou para o interior.

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Ouso especular que agora só precisam de ter orgulho e dizer bem da sua terra, ninguém quer ir viver para uma terra com má publicidade, gerada pelos seus próprios autarcas como força de pressão perante Lisboa. Agora, só precisam de aprender a dar valor ao que têm e a não tentar copiar os modelos do litoral.

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O futuro, não é a uniformização, o futuro é a diversidade e a adequação à realidade próxima.

Os verdadeiros alfaiates de máquinas, os originais!

Enquanto o país que passa nos media passou uma semana a destruir valor, o resto do país, o das pessoas anónimas, continua a trabalhar.
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Recordo aquele conselho deste blogue já com anos e anos: façam o by-pass ao Estado, façam o by-pass ao país.
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Como sintoma e sinal dessa realidade, ontem, recebi um e-mail que transpirava optimismo e uma pontinha de orgulho:

"Quero mostrar-lhe o visual do quadro de comando  da máquina que vai para o México.
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Uma coisa é certa,  quem olha para isso saberá a marca da máquina!"

A Maquinol é uma empresa pequena mas não é uma pequena empresa. Faz parte do grupo de empresas que conheço pessoalmente e que demonstram bem aquela máxima:

"A paixão numa empresa é inversamente proporcional à sua dimensão"

Pode ser uma empresa pequena mas não lhes faltam ideias para novos modelos de negócio e, para novidades nas suas máquinas.
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Uma empresa pequena; contudo, ainda na última feira onde estiveram presentes, na Alemanha, apresentaram uma solução que nenhuma multinacional se lembrou.
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Uma empresa pequena; contudo, ainda na tal última feira, às tantas tinham uma cliente da Malásia, com uma máquina com 14 anos, espontaneamente a explicar o funcionamento e as vantagens da máquina a dois potenciais clientes.

BTW, estes é que são os verdadeiros alfaiates de máquinas, os originais!

Curiosidade do dia

Igreja-matriz de Vila Nova de Foz Côa.
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Lembrei-me logo da Sagrada Família em Barcelona.

Segmentação com base no comportamento

"The idea that clusters of customers can be targeted based on certain similarities is nothing new. Typically, firms segment customers on the basis of demographics: age, gender, geographic location, and so forth. The problem with this is that demography is not destiny; people who share a demographic profile often don’t behave in the same way, don’t have the same needs, and won’t share the same perceptions of value.
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The upshot is that an entrepreneurial mindset calls for insight into the people in the target segment’s behavior rather than settling for the same old segments everyone else uses. Ideally, you not only discover a new segment, but can actually carve this segment out of conventional ones by resegmenting.
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Can you identify a significant subset of customers whose behavior and motivations are not well served by companies using conventional segmentation approaches? Finding them involves discovering two things: First, what is different about the needs of this subsegment that is reflected in behavioral differences, and second, how can you respond in such a way that your offering is more compelling than those of competitors?"

Trechos retirados de "The Entrepreneurial Mindset" de Rita McGrath e Ian MacMillan.