"há anos em que décadas acontecem" (parte III)

Parte I e parte II.

Vivemos tempos em que padrões gerados ao longo de décadas parece estarem a ser rebentados no espaço de alguns meses.

Recomendo a leitura deste texto "Assumptions we need to question now":

"1. BRICS would be exciting sources of global growth

...

While the end of the BRICS dominance has been clear for a while (Goldman Sachs shut down its BRICS fund in 2015), any lingering faith in the idea is gone for good.

2. Energy costs would remain fairly stable

Back in 2020 (who would think we’d have a reason to look fondly at 2020???) pundits were predicting fairly stable, even somewhat lower, energy costs.

...

3. Inflation? That’s so 1970’s

...

Under inflation, cash is king and every mistake gets magnified. 

...

4. Cyber-attacks affect other people

...

5. “I’m not influenced by Russian-originated disinformation”

...

6. Infrastructure will be there and connectivity will be ongoing

It is one of the big negatives of the digital revolution – once you’ve created digital systems, which are marvels in many ways – you are increasingly dependent on them. Digital systems also lead to complexity with the consequence that they behave in far more unpredictable ways. So what is your plan B if some vital piece of infrastructure (water, energy, transport) gets disrupted or hijacked? How will you communicate when the cell towers are down? What will you do when the power goes out for an extended period?

7. Highly optimized supply chains will behave as planned

...

As well, how any little glitch anywhere along the complex sets of interactions that bring goods to our doorsteps can throw the whole system into disarray. The problem was already bad before the invasion; it isn’t about to get a whole lot better with disruptions of airspace and communication. ...

8. Politics are politics and commerce is commerce

... 

9. Countries that trade together don’t go to war

This is an assumption that’s been with us for an enormously long time and has been used to justify the creation of commercial connections, often following conflicts. ...

10. Liberal democracy is the norm"

A crença na concorrência imperfeita

"the majority of large companies do not successfully maintain their current revenue streams, let alone grow them over time
...
I found that in the period from 2000 to 2009, over half of the firms in the sample [publicly traded firms with market capitalizations of greater than US 1 Billion as of 2009]  shrunk their revenue by 10% or more in at least one of those years, clear evidence of eroding competitive advantage.
...
In that same study, there is also striking evidence of the rise of global competition.  In the 2004 sample, roughly 20% of the firms came from emerging markets.  Just five years later, fully 38% of the sample was from emerging markets,
...
the lifespan of companies in the Standard and Poors 500 (an index chosen to represent the total economy) has been steadily shrinking for decades"

O destino dos Golias.
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É deles que me lembro ao ler a previsão de Rifkin acerca do fim do capitalismo.
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O que falta aos Golias e a Rifkin? A crença na concorrência imperfeita
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Trechos retirado de  "Research: Most Large Companies Can’t Maintain Their Revenue Streams"

E volto ao contexto e ao nuclear

Volto ao capítulo IV do livro "The End of Competitive Advantage", leio:

"Run Nonnegotiable Legacy Assets for EfficiencyJust as you need to reconfigure existing structures to go after new opportunities, so too you need to deal with the assets tied up with those existing structures. In many cases, they are still important to your organization, but they are no longer growth opportunities. The watchword here is to extract as many resources as you can from running these activities, because they no longer represent opportunity.
...
The eroding differentiation of legacy assets can sneak up on you if you aren’t strategically alert. In past work, I’ve commented on the fact that what was once exciting and sexy about a product, service, or other offering that companies provide eventually becomes a commoditized nonnegotiable attribute. That means that customers expect something similar from all providers. The dilemma is that these things are often highly expensive table stakes. Not offering them to customers enrages them, but offering them, even offering them exceptionally well, does nothing for you competitively.
...
Because you have to do them but they don’t add to margin or gain you market share, the mantra for delivering them has to be to focus on cost savings. The slide from exciting to nonnegotiable means you need to change how you run the assets that deliver expensive nonnegotiable attributes.
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There are a number of ways in which nondifferentiating activities can be made more economical. One is to centralize them under a shared-services model to end duplication of things being done in many places. Another is to create absolutely standardized processes rather than continue to support dozens of idiosyncratically designed ways of working. Remember, the activity or thing in question is not delivering a competitive advantage, so it really can’t justify being highly customized—it’s common in the industry. Simplification—such as eliminating handovers, automating portions, or making some of a process user generated—is a further source of cost savings. And of course outsourcing makes sense as well, particularly if the activity is not part of your competitive secret sauce."

 E não consigo deixar de recordar as minhas reflexões sobre os processos de contexto e processos críticos:

• "Dealing with Darwin"
• "Como descobri que não é suficiente optimizar os processos-chave." (parte I, parte II e parte III)
• "Processos contexto e Processos nucleares"

Por motivos mesquinhos

O capítulo IV de "The End of Competitive Advantage" de Rita McGrath, intitulado "Using Resource Allocation to Promote Deftness" foi o que mais me impressionou.

"If you want to shape the way an organization behaves, an extraordinarily robust conclusion from academic research is that the resource allocation process is key. Firms built to thrive under transient-advantage conditions handle resources differently from firms designed for exploitation. In an exploitation-oriented firm, reliable performance, scale, and replication of processes from one place to another make a lot of sense because you can operate more efficiently and gain the benefits of scale. Resources, therefore, are directed to support these goals, and changing these resource flows is painful and difficult. A transient-advantage-oriented firm, on the other hand, allocates resources to promote what I call deftness - the ability to reconfigure and change processes with a certain amount of ease, quickly."

A parte que impressiona começa aqui:

"In a typical firm, resources are controlled by powerful existing businesses, and the powerful people are those who dominated the last-generation competitive advantage. That means that new opportunities are often force-fit into an existing structure, if they survive at all.
...
In a typical firm, every effort is made to squeeze as much operating margin out of existing assets as possible. In a transient advantage firm, people realize that the competitive life of an asset may be different from its accounting life, and move to retire those that are no longer competitive before they desperately have to.
...
a core implication of transient advantage is that what is good for a particular business may not be good for the organization as a whole. In a traditional company, people who had lots of assets and staff reporting to them were the important people in the company.
This idea was reinforced by systems such as the Hay Group’s point allocation, in which more pay and power were assumed to go to those managers with bigger operations. Indeed, just recently I was chatting with the head of talent development for a major publishing firm, who believes that this way of rating people is their single biggest obstacle to becoming a more nimble competitor. The bigger-is better mind-set is deadly in an environment in which advantages come and go. If people feel their authority, power base, and other rewards will be diminished if they move assets or people out of an existing advantage, they will fight tooth and nail to preserve the status quo."

Uma empresa pode perder o futuro por motivos mesquinhos, pela ostentação de status.
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E isto, de certo modo, também está relacionado com o que vejo em algumas PMEs. Empresas com uma certa dimensão e, por causa da evolução do mercado, têm uma rentabilidade medíocre por causa da sua constituição generalista. Encolher uma empresa, sobretudo num meio onde não somos anónimos como numa pequena ou média cidade, é visto como algo embaraçante ou mesmo vergonhoso. Assim, em vez de encolher a empresa e especializarem-se, continuam a manter uma estrutura desenhada para outros tempos.

Um lamento interessante

"Texts on strategy and innovation are full of great ideas of new things that leaders should do. But, lamented a senior executive I was with recently, “There aren’t any textbooks on what to stop doing!” In a world of temporary advantage, stopping things - exiting declining advantages - is every bit as critical as starting things. Activities need to stop because they can no longer demonstrate good growth potential, or perhaps competitors have made them a commodity, or perhaps they simply have few growth prospects."

Ora aí está um lamento interessante.

Trecho retirado do capítulo III "Healthy Disengagement" do livro "The End of Competitive Advantage" de Rita McGrath.

Não temos emenda... apetece baixar os braços e desistir deste país.

"Introdução de contexto: encerramento de 2.700 empresas e despedimento de 23 mil trabalhadores, no ano passado, uma subida de 1,9% de vendas este semestre face ao período homólogo, sendo que 2012 foi o pior ano dos últimos 27 anos para o sector automóvel. E a produção nas fábricas portuguesas a regredir 13,1% até Junho.
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Todos estes dados levam a que PS, PSD, PP e PCP, após a petição da associação do sector em Abril, venham agora propor um conjunto de dez medidas ao Governo para ajudar a reanimar esta actividade económica"

Como podemos ter futuro com estes trambolhos nos partidos, habituados a viver do dinheiro dos contribuintes como se não houvesse amanhã? Como querem evitar um 2º resgate? Gostava de ver um modelo, com os fluxos do dinheiro bem descritos, que me mostrasse a rentabilidade do dinheiro dos contribuintes que vai ser torrado em mais uma brincadeira de "quem faz xixi até mais longe".
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É nestas alturas que apetece baixar os braços e desistir deste país.
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Rita Mcgrath em "The End of Competitive Advantage" dedica o capitulo VI ao tema "The Leadership and Mind-Set of Companies Facing Transient Advantages", enquanto o lia pensei tantas vezes nos políticos deste país, ainda embalados, ainda embebidos na cultura que nos trouxe até aqui. E nós, que os elegemos e toleramos, merecemos tudo o que nos vai acontecer.

Trecho retirado de "Partidos querem que o Governo crie linhas de crédito para o sector automóvel"

Da próxima vez que pensar que os empresários portugueses são os piores do mundo

Enquanto leio "The End of Competitive Advantage" de Rita McGrath (e o capítulo 4 está a ser bem elucidativo sobre como muitas vezes a mudança numa empresa não se faz simplesmente pelos motivos mais mesquinhos) encontro estes números:

"Consider the pharmaceutical industry, the focus of a recent global survey my colleagues and I conducted. We asked nearly 200 life sciences executives about long-term trends that posed fundamental threats to their businesses and how management was dealing with them. Despite the fact that all were able to foresee developments unfolding over the coming decade with the power to irreparably damage their companies, 76 percent of the European respondents and 81 percent of the American ones said their companies had made no significant changes to strategy to counter those threats. (Executives representing Asia-Pacific life sciences companies were more sanguine, with 56 percent indicating their firms had prepared for an industry shock).
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In the face of knowable threats, is your own company making more than a futile effort to cry Stop?"

Da próxima vez que pensar que os empresários portugueses são os piores do mundo, lembre-se destes números.
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Trechos retirados de "Four Suggestions as You Face Your Industry's Steamroller"

Arenas em vez de indústrias

Comecei a leitura de "The End of Competitive Advantage" de Rita McGrath de onde retirei estes trechos logo no início:

"One of the biggest changes we need to make in our assumptions is that within-industry competition is the most significant competitive threats. Companies define their most important competitors as other companies within the same industry, meaning those firms offering products that are a close substitute for one another.
...
It isn't that industries have stopped being relevant; it's just that using industry as a level of analysis is often not fine-grained enough to determine what is really going on at the level at which decisions need to be made. A new level of analysis that reflects the connection between market segments, offer, and geographic locations at a granular level is needed. I call this an arena. Arenas are characterized by particular connections between customers and solutions, not by the conventional description of offerings that are near substitutes for one another.
...
The driver of categorization will in all likelihood be the outcomes that particular customers seek ("jobs to be done") and the alternative ways those outcomes might be met. (Moi ici: A unidade de análise são os clientes-alvo, não a indústria onde se opera) This is vital, because the most substantial threats to a given advantage are likely to arise from a peripheral or nonobvious location.
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This further raises the issue that a firm may not have a single approach that holds for all the arenas in which it participates. Instead the approach may be adapted to the particular arena and competitors it is facing.
...
The arena concept also suggests that conventional ideas about what creates a long-lived advantages will change. Product features, new technologies, and the "better mousetrap" sorts of sources of advantage are proving to be less durable than we once thought. Instead, companies are learning to leverage more ephemeral things such as deep customer relationships and the ability to design irreplaceable experiences across multiple arenas.(Moi ici: Cá está, o poder das relações, não a tecnologia!!! Recordar "O futuro também passa por aqui")
...
The imagery of arena-based strategy is more that of orchestration than of plotting a compelling victory, and implementation on the ground by those actually confronting conditions within a specific arena becomes increasingly important." (Moi ici: "Orquestrar um enredo")

O lucro, tal como o emprego, não é um objectivo, é uma consequência!

Max Planck dizia que a ciência avança funeral atrás de funeral, ou seja, à medida que os defensores das velhas ideias morrem e deixam as suas cátedras e outros locais de influência.
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Nassim Taleb em "Antifragile" chama a atenção para onde estão as fronteiras do conhecimento:

"The error of naive rationalism leads to overestimating the role and necessity of the second type, academic knowledge, in human affairs—and degrading the uncodifiable, more complex, intuitive, or experience-based type.
...
the Baconian linear model, after the philosopher of science Francis Bacon; I am adapting its representation by the scientist Terence Kealey (who, crucially, as a biochemist, is a practicing scientist, not a historian of science) as follows:
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Academia → Applied Science and Technology → Practice
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While this model may be valid in some very narrow (but highly advertised instances), such as building the atomic bomb, the exact reverse seems to be true in most of the domains I’ve examined.
...
So we are blind to the possibility of the alternative process, or the role of such a process, a loop:
Random Tinkering (antifragile) → Heuristics (technology) → Practice and Apprenticeship → Random Tinkering (antifragile) → Heuristics (technology) → Practice and Apprenticeship …
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In parallel to the above loop,
Practice → Academic Theories → Academic Theories → Academic Theories → Academic Theories …
(with of course some exceptions, some accidental leaks, though these are indeed rare and overhyped and grossly generalized)."

Primeiro vêm a prática, só depois as teorias académicas.
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Por isso, tantas vezes me interroguei aqui sobre o porquê da cegueira da tríade (não confundir com a troika)
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O mundo muda, quem está no terreno, os pragmáticos, os práticos, têm de arranjar novas formas de lidar com a nova realidade com que deparam. Muitas tentativas iniciais falham até que uma ou mais novas abordagens resultam e começam a generalizar-se entre a comunidade de práticos. Entretanto, os teóricos continuam a pensar e a enformar novas gerações a pensarem sobre como lidar com o mundo antigo que já desapareceu.
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Assim, não é de admirar esta previsão:

"So here’s my wager on how long it will take for what even Jack Welch sees as ‘the world’s dumbest idea’, i.e. maximizing shareholder value, to become the minority view:
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“Major thought leaders: end 2014.
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All major businesses and business schools: 2020.”"

Depois, esta sequência é muito rica:

"In fact, shareholder value is part of a web of obsolete management ideas that no longer fit the 21st Century. As I noted in an article last week, other once-sacred and self-evident truths are also falling by the wayside:

• The search for the holy grail of strategy—sustainable competitive advantage—is recognized by Professor Rita McGrath of Columbia Business School as futile: competitive advantage is at best temporary. (Moi ici: Claro que muitos dirão que isto é perigosa propaganda neoliberal)

• The “essence of strategy” seen as “coping with competition”, as argued by legendary guru Professor Michael Porter, is now obsolete: the essence of strategy is about adding value to customers.

• It transpires that the raison d’être of a firm is not only, as Nobel Prize winner Ronald Coase argued, because it can reduce transaction costs, but also because it can add value for customers.

• The uni-directional value chain—the very core of 20th Century management thinking (Moi ici: Aqui a tríade está tão atrasada... ainda pensa na produção sem pensar na relação com os clientes, sem pensar no ecossistema da procura) developed by Professor Porter—is being replaced by the concept of multi-directional networks, in which interactions with customers play a key role.

• The extraordinarily generous compensation afforded to senior executives is recognized in an HBR article by Professor Mihir Desai, the Mizuho Financial Group Professor of Finance at Harvard Business School to be a giant “financial incentives bubble”, accompanied by an unjustified sense of entitlement.

• The short-term gains of large-scale off-shoring of manufacturing are recognized to have caused massive loss of competitive capacity: new heuristics for outsourcing have emerged.

• Supposed distinctions between leaders and managers, as argued by leadership guru Professor John Kotter, are dissolving: managers are leaders and leaders must be able and willing to get their hands dirty and manage.

• As a result of a failure of many firms to recognize and respond to these changes, a study by Harvard Business School has concluded that the US has lost much of its capacity to compete.

• Whereas the traditional management pursued an ethos of efficiency and control, a new paradigm is being pursued by many firms that thrives on the ethos of imagination, exploration, experiment, discovery, collaboration and self-organization. (Moi ici: Mongo, Mongo, Mongo!!! Benvindos ao Estranhistão!!! Benvindos à terra da diversidade e das tribos!!! Outra falha clamorosa da tríade)

• Whereas traditional management often treated both employees and customers as inanimate “things” to be manipulated, the new management paradigm respects employees and customers as independent, thinking, feeling human beings. (Moi ici: O poder da interacção, da co-produção, do co-design. da co-criação, ...)

• The new management embraces the increased complexity inherent in the shift as an opportunity to be exploited, rather than a problem to be avoided." (Moi ici: Abraçar a mudança)

Trechos de "When Will 'The World's Dumbest Idea' Die?"
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O lucro, tal como o emprego, não é um objectivo, é uma consequência!

Curiosidade do dia

Tão difícil seguir esta disciplina "Exit an Unprofitable Line of Business" no mundo dos direitos adquiridos.
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A velha postura da "formiga no meio do piquenique de gigantes"... sem dramas, poupar o dinheiro, a atenção e a energia emocional para outras aventuras e regresso a 2007 e à descoberta de Geoffrey Moore em "Managing inertia"

Perigosa propaganda neoliberal que quer promover a precariedade

Em 2010:

"Passo a passo, os nossos empreendedores, os nossos empresários hão-de descobrir essa nova economia, mais assente na diferenciação, na oportunidade, na flexibilidade, no efémero, do que hoje."

Natal de 2012:

"Tudo é efémero, tudo é breve"

Ontem:

"O uso crescente de estruturas efémeras"

No futuro, "Competitive Advantage's End":

"the need for continuous reconfiguration. Isn’t it difficult to be always in a state of reconfiguration?.
There’s expense, and there’s difficulty. The companies that are good at this don’t let themselves get overinvested in an old advantage. One of the reasons that moving from an old advantage to a new advantage is expensive is that you build up assets and systems and structures. When you have to reconfigure them, it’s expensive. Instead, if you went in with the idea that you’d have to take it apart in five or ten years, then you’re less likely to have gone overboard in creating a capital-intensive structure. In an ideal world, what you’re doing is continually upgrading your assets, so they don’t hold you back when it’s time to change."  

Desde sempre e para sempre:

"Uma estratégia nunca é eterna" 

"Stressors are information" e os "stimulus junckies"

Começo com uma proposta que não me soa nada bem "Seguro quer Estado a entrar no capital de empresas "sem gastar um cêntimo"".
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Num mundo cada vez mais complexo, volátil, caótico, em que em vez da dimensão e das regras escritas na pedra, triunfam a rapidez, a flexibilidade, a idiossincrasia, os defensores dos Senhores dos Perdões não percebem o papel dos "stressors":

"Just as spending a month in bed leads to muscle atrophy, complex systems are weakened or even killed when deprived of stressors.
...
The economic class doesn't realize an economy lives by stressors rather than by top-down control."

 Rita Gunther McGrath em "Competitive Advantage Is Dead. Here's What To Do About It" avança com a sua hipótese sobre o que se está a passar com o espaço competitivo:

"The longstanding premise of corporate strategy has been to help companies identify their “sustainable competitive advantage” in the marketplace, and then exploit it over time.
...
business is now evolving too rapidly for anything to be sustainable. The real secret to success may be knowing when it’s time to quit or adapt. (Moi ici: Com o capital do Estado a amortecer a dor e a eliminar os stressors... ia ser bonito)
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“If you accept the idea that advantages are temporary, a lot of corporate structures don’t make sense,” (Moi ici: Mongo, empresas mais pequenas, mais ágeis, mais flexíveis)
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The next wave of strategy should instead encourage companies to “build up an advantage, exploit it – and then get out of it. (Moi ici: A entrada do Estado, numa tentativa de estancar a hemorragia e defender o passado... e voltamos a Setembro de 2007 - "... faltou sempre o dinheiro que o "Portugal profundo" preferiu gastar na "ajuda" a "empresas em situação económica difícil"...) But it’s tempting to stick with it longer than you should.”

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Indeed, executive success is often measured by how many people you manage or how much budget you control – a powerful disincentive to call it quits when a market shift is underway. (Moi ici: "Claro que esta escolha é dolorosa e evitada. Muitos gerentes, talvez a maioria, confunde volume com grandeza, confunde volume com lucro, e isso não é bom." (aqui, aqui e aqui))

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It’s no longer enough to cultivate deep expertise in your business, she says. Instead, “the capacity you want to create is networks and the ability to move quickly and learn to be dynamic.” (Moi ici: E a melhor forma de conseguir isso é meter capital do Estado na gestão das empresas? Come on!) She admits it won’t be easy; many executives are good “idea people,” and some are terrific at executing those ideas. “But very few of us are going to be good at saying, ‘it’s over,’” she says.
...
The mentality you need to cultivate is the ability to “get into and out of spaces” while understanding that every innovation or advantage is likely to be overtaken within a short time period – maybe a year or two."

 Enfim, “stimulus junkies”...

Receita para disrupcionar mercados

Rita Gunther McGrath dá uma excelente lição sobre como disrupcionar um sector em "Recipe for Disruption Leans on Lazy Incumbents"
Leio isto:

"the would-be disruptor first needs to select a target, and there's no better target than a lazy incumbent. Better yet, an entire niche or setting in which multiple incumbents have enjoyed a privileged position for a long time. Stability in a sector is often synonymous with lack of change.
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Managers in these niches don't have to take many many risks to move forward in their careers, so guess what? They don't. Powerful people enjoying long, stable careers, lots of perks and very few challenges to their authority are just what the disruptor ordered. Brownie points if the leaders in your target segment take a "I don't want any surprises, and don't bring me bad news" approach to hearing from their direct-reports. Ideally, the incumbents count on sizable revenue flows."

E começo logo a pensar no massacre que foi a "invasão dos produtos chineses" e da "produção na China", para as nossas empresas do sector transaccionável, durante a primeira metade do século XXI, com a entrada da China na OMC. As nossas empresas viviam dos baixos preços, dos baixos salários, tinham-se habituado, com cerca de 25 anos de boleias clandestinas proporcionadas pela desvalorização do escudo, a não precisarem de mudar nada, o Estado mudava por elas. O Estado proporcionava-lhes uma vantagem competitiva externa; a taxa de câmbio.
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A chegada do factor China foi "mortal"!!!
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Recordar sempre esta tabela:

(Muitas empresas definharam, colapsaram e morreram. Demorámos cerca de 6/7 anos a dar a volta, a perceber como dar a volta.)
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De seguida vêm as várias formas de abordar os clientes do incumbente:

"Next, think about the customer need you'll be addressing. It might be the same need that the incumbent provides, or it could conceivably be a way of making what the incumbent provides unnecessary. Or doing the same thing, but at a fraction of the price. Can you think of a customer need that is not being met, is being met badly or expensively, or is being met in such a way that infuriates customers? Might they reward you for making their experience better?"

Reflexões acerca da estratégia num mundo em vertigem de rapidez

"Why is strategy so much important?
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Rita McGrath: Strategy is fundamentally about making choices.  Choices, of course, about what to do but equally importantly about what not to do.  I think of strategy as a central, integrated concept of how we’re going to achieve our objectives.  In a business sense, it’s what customers we seek to serve, what we’re going to do for them that is better than other options they have, and how we differentiate our offerings.
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How the world is more complex than it used to be? And why?
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Rita McGrath: As I say in the article, it’s because things are more connected and interdependent than they have historically been.  That means that you can have interactions that are unpredictable, so that you can’t predict the outcome by knowing the initial conditions.  The net and advanced communications technologies have made many more connections than used to be possible.
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Why do you think entrepreneurial mindset can help us to succeed in unpredictable world?
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Rita McGrath: Because in a world of temporary advantage, you need to innovate to create a pipeline of new advantages even as old ones fades away.  That requires thinking like an entrepreneur at all times.
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What should be the strategy of startup companies those who are getting all giant companies like Google, Apple, Facebook and Amazon as competitors?
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Rita McGrath: Find a customer niche that really wants what only you can provide and service them with well designed offerings that create a complete experience.
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Why so many good companies fail at growth?
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Rita McGrath: Because they are trapped in old ways of thinking.  Many try to exploit old businesses, even though that isn’t where their future lies."

Trecho retirado de "Rita McGrath : Strategy in Volatile and Uncertain Environments"

O céu é o limite

Há dias escrevi sobre a dificuldade em reduzir os riscos não-monetários e dei o exemplo pessoal  da instalação de vidros duplos.
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Hoje descubro a Angie's List!!!
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"Angie's List vs. Groupon"
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"members review "high cost of failure" segments — plumbers, roofers, contractors, and doctors. Membership creates value by providing subscribers with a greater sense of confidence when springing for a high-risk purchase."

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Fantástico, o céu é o limite... e vêm-me com a conversa de investimentos cainesianos da treta na economia do século XX.

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BTW, não esquecer "Finding Opportunities in Business Model Innovation"

Sistema anquilosado

Rita MccGrath escreveu recentemente este postal "The World Is More Complex than It Used to Be" que começa assim:
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"It's not you — the world has become more complex.
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Consider 1980. There was no such thing as a personal computer. The Internet and broadband connections to it were more than a decade away. You used film to take pictures, got them developed in a photo shop, and mailed copies to relatives if you wanted to share them. Roughly half of the 4.4 billion people on Earth were either so poor that they were cut off from the rest of humanity, or lived in regimes so repressive that no outside communication was possible. AT&T was the only telephone operator in the United States; telephony was just one of many high-impact industries that were highly regulated and protected from competition."
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 E termina assim:
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"In a complex system, leaders have to rewrite their playbooks and re-jigger their organizations quickly.
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Complex systems are unforgiving places for companies, and people, who move slowly."
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Fez-me logo recordar as imagens de "A Terceira Vaga"...
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Quanto mais o tempo passa mais o sistema fica anquilosado, obsoleto, pôdre...

Experimentar, testar, aprender e evoluir.

O trecho que ontem recortei do livro "Competing for the Future" ficou a ressoar na minha mente com uma preocupação... concentração não significa saber tudo à partida, não quer dizer que se tem tudo estabelecido desde o início.

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Então, no capítulo seguinte encontro algo que ajuda a esclarecer, que ajuda a evitar a mensagem que não queria que fosse apreendida:

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"being first carries a risk of failure disproportionate to the rewards of leadership only when the pioneering firm permits its financial commitment to race ahead of its understanding of the precise nature of the emerging opportunity. The objective is to learn as quickly and as inexpensively as possible about the precise nature of customer demand, the suitability of the new product or service concept, and the need for adjustments in market strategy."

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Boyd ensinou-me os fundamentos da blitzkrieg... schwerpunkt:

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"Schwerpunkt represents a unifying concept that provides a way to rapidly shape focus and direction of effort as well as harmonize support activities with combat operations, thereby permit a true decentralization of tactical command within centralized strategic guidance—without losing cohesion of overall effort.

or put another way

Schwerpunkt represents a unifying medium that provides a directed way to tie initiative of many subordinate actions with superior intent as a basis to diminish friction and compress time in order to generate a favorable mismatch in time/ability to shape and adapt to unfolding circumstances."

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Entretanto, a minha leitura do número especial da revista Long Range Planning dedicado aos modelos de negócio levou-me a um artigo de Rita McGrath, "Business Models: A Discovery Driven Approach":

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"The concept of ‘the business model’ is appealing because it suggests a change to the way that strategies are conceived, created and executed against. In highly uncertain, complex and fast-moving environments, strategies are as much about insight, rapid experimentation and evolutionary learning as they are about the traditional skills of planning and rock-ribbed execution. Modeling, therefore, is a useful approach to figuring out a strategy, as it suggests experimentation, prototyping and a job that is never quite finished.
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business models often cannot be fully anticipated in advance. Rather, they must be learned over time, which emphasizes the centrality of experimentation in the discovery and development of new business models
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Conventionally, the Holy Grail in strategy has been the creation of a ‘sustainable’ competitive advantage. In more and more categories, however, we see firms competing to achieve what we might think of as a ‘temporary’ advantage, which they exploit until competition has caught up or markets have changed, at which point, the hunt is on for a new advantage. The business model construct encourages conversations which might help us discern possible early warnings of model weakness and prompt the search for new ones
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Finally, as business models themselves evolve and mature, adopting the notion suggests a developing understanding that strategy itself is quite frequently discovery driven rather than planning oriented.
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When an existing business model has been copied, made irrelevant by environmental events or is otherwise no longer germane to customers, new business models have the opportunity to flourish. It is difficult, however, to plan analytically for which new models will supplant old ones, since so many of the variables relevant to their success are unknown at the outset. This brings us to the next issue - the centrality of experimentation in discovering new models.
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Most business models are conceived within the boundaries of a particular set of constraints. As new technologies and other shifts relax constraints or impose different ones, the opportunities for new models (and the threats to existing ones) increase. Typically, new models emerge when a constraint is lifted, and old ones often come under pressure when one emerges."

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Este último sublinhado faz-me recordar aquela citação, a vida na Natureza não pensa, tem tem vontade teleológica, a vida na Natureza evolui fugindo, ou contornando as restrições.

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Nós, humanos, pensamos, temos vontade teleológica... mas temos ferramentas incompletas e imperfeitas para perceber o mundo na sua totalidade. Nós estamos no mundo mas não vemos o mundo, vemos a nossa interpretação, o nosso modelo do mundo.