"Specifying too much detail actually shakes confidence and creates uncertainty "

Uma delícia estes textos de von Molkte, escritos em 1869 e tão actuais.

“In 1869, von Moltke issued a document called Guidance for Large Unit Commanders. It was to become seminal, laying out principles of higher command which remained unchanged for 70 years, by which time the Prussian Army had become the German Army. Some passages are echoed in the doctrine publications of US and NATO forces to the present day. It contains von Moltke’s solution to the specific problem he identified in the Memoire, and directly addressed the general problem posed by the greatly increased scale of modern warfare: how to direct an organization too large for a single commander to control in person. As such, it is probably the first document of modern times to define the role of the senior executive in a large corporation.
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What is of interest here is the approach to command and control. The emphasis is on the former rather than the latter
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With darkness all around you, you have to develop a feeling for what is right, often based on little more than guesswork, and issue orders in the knowledge that their execution will be hindered by all manner of random accidents and unpredictable obstacles. In this fog of uncertainty, the one thing that must be certain is your own decision… the surest way of achieving your goal is through the single-minded pursuit of simple actions
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There are numerous situations in which an officer must act on his own judgment. For an officer to wait for orders at times when none can be given would be quite absurd. But as a rule, it is when he acts in line with the will of his superior that he can most effectively play his part in the whole scheme of things.
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not commanding more than is strictly necessary, nor planning beyond the circumstances you can foresee. In war, circumstances change very rapidly, and it is rare indeed for directions which cover a long period of time in a lot of detail to be fully carried out.
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Specifying too much detail actually shakes confidence and creates uncertainty if things do not turn out as anticipated. Going into too much detail makes a senior commander a hostage to fortune, because in a rapidly changing environment,
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In any case, a leader who believes that he can make a positive difference through continual personal interventions is usually deluding himself. He thereby takes over things other people are supposed to be doing, effectively dispensing with their efforts, and multiplies his own tasks to such an extent that he can no longer carry them all out.
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The demands made on a senior commander are severe enough as it is. It is far more important that the person at the top retains a clear picture of the overall situation than whether some particular thing is done this way or that.
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The higher the level of command, the shorter and more general the orders should be. The next level down should add whatever further specification it feels to be necessary, and the details of execution are left to verbal instructions or perhaps a word of command. This ensures that everyone retains freedom of movement and decision within the bounds of their authority."

Excerto de: Bungay, Stephen. “The Art of Action: Leadership that Closes the Gaps between Plans, Actions and Results”.

"a willingness to show independence of mind and challenge authority"

O meu parceiro das conversas oxigenadoras começou por me dizer, logo no primeiro almoço, que desafiava as pessoas da sua equipa a desobedecer a ordens, a descobrirem que há uma forma alternativa de fazer melhor.

Entretanto, os prussianos aprenderam:

“Prince Friedrich Karl of Prussia, the nephew of the future Kaiser Wilhelm I, and a practicing soldier. In a series of essays published in the 1850s and 1860s, he reinforced the growing idea that what made the Prussian officer corps distinctive, and gave it an edge, was a willingness to show independence of mind and challenge authority. In an essay dating from 1860 entitled “The Origins and Development of the Spirit of the Prussian Officer,” he tells the story of a staff officer dutifully carrying out an order without question, only to be pulled up short by a high-ranking general with the words: “The King made you a staff officer because you should know when not to obey.” In contrast to other European officer corps, Prince Friedrich Karl comments, the Prussians do not allow themselves to be hemmed in with rules and regulations, but give rein to the imagination and exploit every opportunity opened up by unexpected success. Such behavior would not be possible if senior commanders were to demand full control over every unit.”

Excerto de: Bungay, Stephen. “The Art of Action: Leadership that Closes the Gaps between Plans, Actions and Results”. iBooks.

Tudo a conjugar-se para asneira da grossa (parte II)

Parte I.

“A gap in knowledge prompts the collection of more data. ... Seeking to improve its information-gathering and processing capability, the company became more complex, adding committees and overlays, some permanent, some ad hoc. ... So it pumped more data through its existing systems. No one took a decision to do so. It was just the natural result of how the organization as a system was programmed. ... the data flow paralyzed decision making, because no matter how much there was, there was always more to obtain. Meetings were about analyzing problems rather than resolving them.
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A gap in alignment is often indicated by top-level frustration and lower-level confusion. ... Top-level managers felt increasing pressure to specify exactly what they wanted people to do. They began to stress actions rather than outcomes, in the one case by spelling things out “in painful detail” and in the other through SOPs and central processes.
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A gap in effects is typically responded to by an increase in control. The favorite control mechanism is metrics. As time goes on, the emphasis is switched from outputs to inputs, so that in the end everybody’s actions are detailed, analyzed, and controlled by a few people who look to everyone else as if they are seeking to become omniscient about the world outside and omnipotent in the world inside. Controls have a cost. Overhead builds up around the controllers, and the reporting burden increases for the controlled.
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These natural reactions do not simply fail to solve the problem, they make it worse. Because the cause-and-effect cycles are systemic and reciprocal, all three reactions interact with and exacerbate each other."

Quantas empresas caem nesta armadilha?

Lembram-se dos relatos dos bombeiros em Monchique, parados enquanto populares combatiam fogos a poucos metros? Parados porque não tinham autorização superior para agir!

Há muitos anos ouvi falar em Blitzkrieg, como "Guerra Relâmpago", e sempre pensei que tinha a ver com surpresa e velocidade. Só há cerca de 10 anos aprendi com Boyd o que estava por trás da Blitzkrieg. A origem da Blitzkrieg assenta lá atrás no tempo, quando os exércitos de Napoleão limparam o sebo ao exército prusfsiano, uma eficaz máquina de combate da guerra anterior.

Uma catástrofe militar tem o poder de acabar com direitos adquiridos e colocar como objectivo número um a sobrevivência da comunidade. Isso, liberta as pessoas para colocar tudo em causa, até a impossibilidade de militares do povo poderem subir na hierarquia militar até ao topo por não serem de boas famílias.

Excerto de: Bungay, Stephen. “The Art of Action: Leadership that Closes the Gaps between Plans, Actions and Results”.

Tudo a conjugar-se para asneira da grossa

“Clausewitz describes the effects of friction in terms of two gaps. One gap, caused by our trying to act on an unpredictable external environment of which we are always somewhat ignorant, is between “desired outcomes and actual outcomes (as in the example of the simple journey of the overoptimistic traveler). Another gap, caused by internal friction, is the gap between the plans and the actions of an organization. It comes from the problem of information access, transfer, and processing in which many independent agents are involved (as in his example of a battalion being made up of many individuals, any one of whom could make the plan go awry).

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The problem of strategy implementation is often reduced to one issue: the gap between plans and actions. How do we get an organization actually to carry out what has been agreed? However, because of the nature of the environment, even if the organization executes the plan, there is no guarantee that the actual outcomes will match the desired ones; that is, the ones the plan was intended to achieve. The two gaps interact to exacerbate each other. In both cases there is uncertainty between inputs and outputs. The problem of achieving an organization’s goals is not merely one of getting it to act, but of getting it to act in such a way that what is actually achieved is what was wanted in the first place. We have to link the internal and external aspects of friction and overcome them both at the same time. There is a third gap, the one between the two, which we must also overcome
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So these two gaps collapse together, leaving three in all: the gaps between plans, actions, and the outcomes they achieve.

In the case of all three elements – plans, actions, and outcomes – there is a difference between the actual and the ideal. The ultimate evidence for this is that the actual outcomes differ from the desired ones. That means that the actions actually taken were different from those we should have taken. This in turn may have been because we planned the wrong actions (as in the case of the traveler) or because although we planned the right actions, people did not actually do what we intended (as in the case of the confused battalion). Or it may have been because of both. The causes of those shortfalls are different in each case.
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And even if we make good plans based on the best information available at the time and people do exactly what we plan, the effects of our actions may not be the ones we wanted because the environment is nonlinear and hence is fundamentally unpredictable. As time passes the situation will change, chance events will occur, other agents such as customers or competitors will take actions of their own, and we will find that what we do is only one factor among several which create a new situation. Even if the situation is stable, some of the effects of our actions will be unintended. Reality will change...
So in making strategy happen, far from simply addressing the narrowly defined implementation gap between plans and action, we have to overcome three. Those responsible for giving direction face the specific problem of creating robust plans, and those responsible for taking action face the specific problem of achieving results in markets that can react unpredictably.
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These real uncertainties produce general psychological uncertainty. We do not like uncertainty. It makes us feel uncomfortable, so we try to eliminate it.
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[Moi ici: Isto gera uma tendência para mais informação, mais detalhe, mais controlo, mais procedimentos, mais...] show a consistent drive toward more detail in information, instructions, and control, on the part of both individuals and the organization as a whole. This response is not only a natural reaction for us as individuals, it is what the processes and structures of most organizations are set up to facilitate."

Tudo a conjugar-se para asneira da grossa, para microgestão, para big data...

Excerto de: Bungay, Stephen. “The Art of Action: Leadership that Closes the Gaps between Plans, Actions and Results”

Não são parafusos, são pessoas

Um tema que os professores Guedes Miranda e Vitorino me deram a conhecer quando andava no 10º e 11º anos de escolaridade: o indeterminismo. A incapacidade de ter à priori toda a informação, mas mesmo que a tivéssemos teríamos de viver com o facto da mesma acção não gerar os mesmos efeitos ao longo do tempo. Einstein, da velha guarda, dizia que Deus não joga aos dados.

“War is an environment, he argued, in which getting simple things to happen is very difficult and getting difficult things to happen is impossible.
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The gap is described as the difference between what we know and what we can do, as the gulf between planning and execution
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It is important here to understand the nature of Clausewitz’s disagreement with von Bülow, and others of the school of scientific generalship. They too recognized that chance and uncertainty played a role in war. The difference was that they believed these factors could be eliminated by a more scientific approach to planning. Certainty of outcomes could be achieved by anyone who could gather and correctly process data about topological and geographical distances, march tables, supply needs, and the geometrical relationship between armies and their bases. They believed that in many cases this would render fighting unnecessary.
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Clausewitz disagreed on two counts. First, he believed that friction was as inherent to war as it is to mechanical engineering and could therefore never be eliminated but only mitigated. Secondly, he believed that studying march tables and the like was not a fruitful means of mitigation. In fact, he came to think that friction had to be worked with. It actually provided opportunities, and could be used by a general just as much as it could be used by an engineer. The first thing was to recognize its existence. The second thing was to understand its nature. That was and remains more difficult.
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The very business of getting an organization made up of individuals, no matter how disciplined, to pursue a collective goal produces friction just as surely as applying the brakes of a car. Because of the role of chance, actual outcomes are inherently unpredictable.
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There is a gap between the actions we planned and the actions actually taken.
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no one should develop a strategy without taking into account the effects of organizational friction. Yet we continue to be surprised and frustrated when it manifests itself. We tend to think everything has gone wrong when in fact everything has gone normally. The existence of friction is why armies need officers and businesses need managers. Anticipating and dealing with it form the core of managerial work. Recognizing that is liberating in itself.
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Not only is an army not a “well-oiled machine,” the machine generates resistance of its own, because the parts it is made of are human. Although Clausewitz’s metaphors are all taken from mechanics rather than biology, he clearly sees where the metaphor itself begins to break down. He is reaching toward the idea of the organization as an organism. While the scientific school sought to eliminate human factors to make the organization as machine-like as possible, Clausewitz sought to exploit them.”

Clausewitz não via o factor humano como um defeito.


Excerto de: Bungay, Stephen. “The Art of Action: Leadership that Closes the Gaps between Plans, Actions and Results”

"No battle plan ever survives contact with the enemy"

Bom senso, simplicidade - coisas que normalmente estão em défice:

“1 Decide What Really Matters .
You cannot create perfect plans, so do not attempt to do so. Do not plan beyond the circumstances you can foresee. Instead, use the knowledge which is accessible to you to work out the outcomes you really want the organization to achieve. Formulate your strategy as an intent rather than a plan.
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2 Get the Message Across.
Having worked out what matters most now, pass the message on to others and give them responsibility for carrying out their part in the plan. Keep it simple. Don’t tell people what to do and how to do it. Instead, be as clear as you can about your intentions. Say what you want people to achieve and, above all, tell them why. Then ask them to tell you what they are going to do as a result.
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3 Give People Space and Support.
Do not try to predict the effects your actions will have, because you can’t. Instead, encourage people to adapt their actions to realize the overall intention as they observe what is actually happening. Give them boundaries which are broad enough to take decisions for themselves and act on them.”

Recordar von Molkte:

"no plan of operations extends with any certainty beyond the first contact with the main hostile force
...
No battle plan ever survives contact with the enemy."

Excerto de: Bungay, Stephen. “The Art of Action: Leadership that Closes the Gaps between Plans, Actions and Results”.

"Unfortunately, these reactions do not solve the problem"

"“We can measure the results until the outcomes we want are achieved. We can make plans, take actions, and achieve outcomes in a linear sequence with some reliability. If we are assiduous enough, pay attention to detail, and exercise rigorous control, the sequence will be seamless.

In an unpredictable environment, this approach quickly falters. [Moi ici: Imaginem ter um Estado-Maior numa sala, longe das operações no terreno, a dar ordens aos bombeiros sobre quando devem actuar e como. E comparar com o blitkrieg] The longer and more rigorously we persist with it, the more quickly and completely things will break down. The environment we are in creates gaps between plans, actions, and outcomes:

•  The gap between plans and outcomes concerns knowledge: It is the difference between what we would like to know and what we actually know. It means that we cannot create perfect plans.
•  The gap between plans and actions concerns alignment: It is the difference between what we would like people to do “and what they actually do. It means that even if we encourage them to switch off their brains, we cannot know enough about them to program them perfectly.
•  The gap between actions and outcomes concerns effects: It is the difference between what we hope our actions will achieve and what they actually achieve. We can never fully predict how the environment will react to what we do. It means that we cannot know in advance exactly what outcomes the actions of our organization are going to create.

Although it is not common to talk about these three gaps, it is common enough to confront them. It is also common enough to react in ways that make intuitive sense. Faced with a lack of knowledge, it seems logical to seek more detailed information. Faced with a problem of alignment, it feels natural to issue more detailed instructions. And faced with disappointment in the effects being achieved, it is quite understandable to impose more detailed controls. Unfortunately, these reactions do not solve the problem. In fact, they make it worse.”

Excerto de: Bungay, Stephen. “The Art of Action: Leadership that Closes the Gaps between Plans, Actions and Results”. iBooks. 

"The problem is getting the right things done"

Acabei de ler até à última página  “The Art of Action: Leadership that Closes the Gaps between Plans, Actions and Results”de Stephen Bungay. 

Valeu a pena!

O livro começa com uma introdução sobre o blitzkrieg, tema que já abordei aqui há anos (2010 e 2009) e que os relatos do recente incêndio de Monchique avivaram.

O livro começa com o discurso estratégico de um CEO. Depois, alguém coloca a pergunta:

"“what do you want me to do?”
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she had had the courage to ask the risky question that everyone wanted answered.
The reply was measured, but evinced frustration of its own. As I said, the CEO observed, we do not have all the answers. But surely you don’t expect me to tell all of you what to do? This is not a command-and-control organization. You are big boys and girls. I am not running this company, we all are. We have a strategy, we have long-term objectives, we all have budgets. We are running a business and we have a direction. It is for each of us to decide what we have to do in our own area and to get on with it.
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Answering that simple question “What do you want me to do?” is quite a problem.
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GETTING THINGS DONE
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Generating activity is not a problem; in fact it is easy. The fact that it is easy makes the real problem harder to solve. The problem is getting the right things done – the things that matter, the things that will have an impact, the things a company is trying to achieve to ensure success. A high volume of activity often disguises a lack of effective action. We can mistake quantity for quality and then add to it, which merely makes things worse.”

"autonomy at work is the key to employee satisfaction"

"A recent survey conducted by The Harvard Business Review reveals that autonomy at work (not micromanagement) is the key to employee satisfaction and organizational achievement.
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It describes this concept as "rebelling," or giving employees the freedom to "deviate from organizational norms, others' actions, or common expectations, to the benefit of the organization."
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Autonomy for your employees depends on clearly defining your company vision while grounding every project in logical outcomes. Issues arise when people get caught up in their output (how much work they're producing) without a defined outcome (what it is they need to produce).
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"Am I working on the right thing?" is a hard question to answer without understanding what the outcome should be.
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When you hire the right people and share the outcomes you wish to achieve and why, you can trust them to figure out the how. 

Fiz logo o paralelismo com o Blitzkrieg: Agilidade e estratégia

Trechos retirados de "This Harvard Survey Reveals What Most People Miss About Leadership"

Curiosidade do dia

"4 German words we should all use"
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Verschlimmbesserung - precisamente o que a Via Negativa tenta evitar!
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Auftragstaktik - ler o que já aqui se escreveu sobre ela e Schwerpunkt  (marcadores)

Liberdade no terreno

Recordar o exemplo do desempenho da Wal-Mart em Nova Orleães no pós-Katrina em "Lições de 2012":

"Os funcionários superiores da Wal-Mart concentraram-se em estabelecer metas, avaliando o progresso e mantendo as linhas de comunicação com os empregados nas linhas da frente e com agências oficiais quando podiam. Por outras palavras, para lidar com esta situação complexa não emitiram instruções. As condições eram demasiado imprevisíveis e estavam sempre a mudar. O trabalho deles era assegurar que as pessoas falavam umas com as outras."

E comparar com a mensagem de David Marquet em "Turn the Ship Around":

"Specifying to the crew that the true objective was to put the fire out as quickly as possible was a mechanism primarly for competence. Specifying goals, not methods is a mechanism for competence"  

E comparar com o sucesso da Blitzkrieg:

"Tell team members what needs to be accomplished, get their agreement to accomplish it, then hold them strictly accountable for doing it - but don't prescribe how. Requires very high levels of mutual trust." 

E recordar "Schwerpunkt":

"Schwerpunkt represents a unifying medium that provides a directed way to tie initiative of many subordinate actions with superior intent as a basis to diminish friction and compress time in order to generate a favorable mismatch in time/ability to shape and adapt to unfolding circumstances."

Em tempos de incerteza...

"the only way to set strategy effectively during uncertain times was to bring together, much more frequently, the members of the top team, who were uniquely positioned to surface critical issues early, debate their implications, and make timely decisions."

E a sua empresa? Com que frequência analisa criticamente os temas associados à estratégia? A frequência actual é diferente da frequência de há três anos?
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Imagina que uma empresa com um sistema de gestão da qualidade alinhado com a estratégia para o negócio, se entretém e contenta com uma revisão anual do sistema?
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Quantos minutos dedica à estratégia nas suas revisões do sistema?
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Mais, Quantos minutos dedica por mês a discutir temas relacionados com a estratégia?
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Em tempos de incerteza a maioria acredita em mais controlo, acredito que não, acredito em mais firmeza estratégica e, muito mais, fluidez táctica.

Trecho retirado de "Managing The Strategy Journey"

Commander's Intent versus Conformidade com os procedimentos

Continua a minha reflexão sobre a função dos procedimentos documentados e sobre o grau de pormenor a neles incluir, através da discussão mental desencadeada pela leitura do livro "Complexity and Management - Fad or radical challenge to systems thinking?" de Ralph D. Stacey, Douglas Griffin e Patricia Shaw.

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Esta leitura em curso, encaixa-se perfeitamente com o sentido deste texto retirado do livro "Made to Stick" de Chip Heath & Dan Heath:

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""The trite expression we always use is No plan survives contact with the enemy," says Colonel Tom Kolditz, the head of the behavioral sciences division at West Point.
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Many armies fail because they put all their emphasis into creating a plan that becomes useless ten minutes into the battle."
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Colonel Kolditz says, "Over time we've come to understand more and more about what makes people successful in complex operations." He believes that plans are useful, in the sense that they are proof that planning has taken place. The planning process forces people to think through the right issues. But as for the plans themselves, Kolditz says, "They just don't work on the battlefield." So, in the 1980s the Army adapted its planning process, inventing a concept called Commander's Intent (CI).
CI is a crisp, plain-talk statement that appears at the top of every order, specifying the plan's goal, the desired end-state of an operation.
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The CI never specifies so much detail that it risks being rendered obsolete by unpredictable events. 'You can lose the ability to execute the original plan, but you never lose the responsibility of executing the intent," says Kolditz.
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Commander's Intent manages to align the behavior of soldiers at all levels without requiring play-by-play instructions from their leaders. When people know the desired destination, they're free to improvise, as needed, in arriving there.
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I could spend a lot of time enumerating every specific task, but as soon as people know what the intent is they begin generating their own solutions."
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Estamos a falar da actuação de um exército, paradigma do respeito pela hierarquia, em que falhar é, muitas vezes, morrer.

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A mim, pessoalmente, isto deixa-me a pensar...

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BTW, este conceito de "Commander's Intent" fez-me recordar Boyd e o que aprendi sobre o blitzkrieg.

• "Schwerpunkt"
• "Schwerpunkt (II)"
• "Auftragstaktik" ("Auftragstaktik encourages commanders to exhibit initiative, flexibility and improvisation while in command. In what may be seen as surprising Auftragstaktik empowers commanders to disobey orders and revise their effect as long as the intent of the commander is maintained.")
• "Parte I - os alicerces da guerra relâmpago (Blitzkrieg)"

Julgo que Seth Godin escreveu qualquer coisa como "Os líderes têm seguidores, os gestores têm empregados". Tom Peters volta e meia escreve no twitter "Os líderes não criam seguidores, geram novos líderes"

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(1)"The German army leaders “consciously traded assurance of control for assurance of self-induced action.”
These leaders developed a military cultural norm that supported and expected decisive action by subordinates in the face of uncertainty or ambiguity.

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Fundamental to the success of Aftragstaktik in the German doctrine was trust. Silva writes: “Trust between superior and subordinate is the cornerstone of mission-oriented command. The superior trusts his subordinate to exercise his judgment and creativity, to act as the situation dictates to reach the maximum goal articulated in his mission; the subordinate trusts that whatever action he takes in good faith to contribute to the good of the whole will be supported by his superior.”"

...

Os líderes geram seguidores, partilham a intenção, comungam do propósito e, geram novos líderes, pois sabem que é impossível ao Grande Planeador tudo prever.

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Isto exige confiança, exige conhecimento, exige competência, exige motivação, exige responsabilidade.

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Quando facilito a descrição e documentação de um processo gosto de reflectir sobre a finalidade: Qual a finalidade do processo?

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A finalidade é o mais importante, é a razão de ser do processo. Costumo dizer que de nada serve sermos honestos e cumprirmos o procedimento se a finalidade não puder ser cumprida, seremos como os músicos do Titanic.

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(2)"“The commander’s intent describes the desired endstate. It is a concise statement of the purpose
of the operation and must be understood two levels below the level of the issuing commander. It must clearly state the purpose of the mission. It is the single unifying focus for all subordinate elements. It is not a summary of the concept of the operation.
Its purpose is to focus subordinates on what has to be accomplished in order to achieve success, even when the plan and concept no longer apply, and to discipline their efforts toward that end."

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Trechos (1) e (2) retirados de "Communicating Intent and Imparting Presence".

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Do texto "Evolution of Commander’s Intent in the US Military" retiro ainda "The decision-making process requires making assumptions, establishing estimates, developing possible solutions, analyzing and comparing possible solutions, and selecting the best situational solution." e agora imaginar uma realidade em constante mutação plena de incerteza, ambiguidade e de assimetria na informação recolhida e processada.

Auftragstaktik

Outro palavrão que aprendi com Boyd:

"Tell team members what needs to be accomplished, get their agreement to accomplish it, then hold them strictly accountable for doing it - but don't prescribe how. Requires very high levels of mutual trust."

Com um mapa da estratégia, com indicadores de um balanced scorecard, com metas exigentes na mão. Cada equipa recebe uma ficha de missão e tem de desenhar uma iniciativa estratégica que ajude a convergir para os resultados desejados.

Como diz a Wikipedia:

"Auftragstaktik encourages commanders to exhibit initiative, flexibility and improvisation while in command. In what may be seen as surprising Auftragstaktik empowers commanders to disobey orders and revise their effect as long as the intent of the commander is maintained."

"Analysis by the US Army of the 1939 German campaign in Poland found that "The emphasis which the Germans placed on the development of leadership and initiative in commanders during years of preparatory training brought its rewards in the Polish campaign. With confidence that these principles had been properly inculcated, all commanders, from the highest to the lowest echelons, felt free to carry out their missions or meet changes in situations with a minimum of interference by higher commanders." They recognized that "initiative, flexibility and mobility" were the essential aspects of German tactics."