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A apresentar mensagens correspondentes à consulta win with us ordenadas por data. Ordenar por relevância Mostrar todas as mensagens

quinta-feira, novembro 15, 2018

"You don’t win by focusing on your competition"

"Most of us work in mature industries that are overcrowded, where we are perceived as commodities (even when we are not), and where competition is ferocious. We work in industries where growth requires capturing market share from our competitors, and in many cases requires that we take their clients from them while they attempt to take our clients from us. How else do you grow by 12 percent in an industry that is growing by 2.7 percent annually?...
Your company goes out into the market to win new clients. You believe that what you sell—and how you sell it—is better than what your competitors sell. Your intention is to better serve those companies and customers that are not getting what they really want or need.
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You don’t win by focusing on your competition. What makes you a dangerous competitor is how you play the game. Let’s start by eliminating the things that your competitors routinely do in an attempt to cause you problems and take your business, the things that make them weak competitors.
Some of your competitors compete on price alone, offering a poorer service than you do at a lower price point, while falsely promising the same results you can offer. They will win the most price-sensitive customers in the market, many of whom will live with their shortcomings for much longer than you might imagine. While these competitors usually win clients who perceive only the lowest price as value, they will occasionally win good clients, clients who will stick with them until you find a way to displace them. Know that you cannot do anything about a competitor with an irrational pricing structure. It doesn’t change your pricing model or strategy, so your only response should be to compete in a way that allows you to win with a higher price."

Trechos retirados de “Eat Their Lunch” de Anthony Iannarino.

quarta-feira, julho 25, 2018

Falhar espectacularmente bem o cumprimento das metas!

OKRs push us far beyond our comfort zones. They lead us to achievements on the border between abilities and dreams. They unearth fresh capacity, hatch more creative solutions, revolutionize business models. For companies seeking to live long and prosper, stretching to new heights is compulsory. As Bill Campbell liked to say: If companies “don’t continue to innovate, they’re going to die—and I didn’t say iterate , I said innovate .” Conservative goal setting stymies innovation. And innovation is like oxygen: You cannot win without it
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[T]he harder the goal the higher the level of performance. . . . Although subjects with very hard goals reached their goals far less often than subjects with very easy goals, the former consistently performed at a higher level than the latter.” The studies found that “stretched” workers were not only more productive, but more motivated and engaged: “ Setting specific challenging goals is also a means of enhancing task interest and of helping people to discover the pleasurable aspects of an activity.”
Conheço algumas empresas portuguesas assim. Quando se compara o desempenho deste ano com a meta, parece que o ano foi mau. No entanto, quando se compara o desempenho do ano com o desempenho do ano anterior constatamos que o ano foi muito positivo. Claro que tem de ser uma cultura de empresa que não cobra por não se atingirem metas exigentes.

Excerto de: Doerr, John. “Measure What Matters: How Google, Bono, and the Gates Foundation Rock the World with OKRs”.

sábado, julho 21, 2018

Comunicar com clareza!

When you’re the CEO or the founder of a company . . . you’ve got to say ‘This is what we’re doing,’ and then you have to model it. Because if you don’t model it, no one’s going to do it."
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For sound decision making, esprit de corps, and superior performance, top-line goals must be clearly understood throughout the organization. Yet by their own admission, two of three companies fail to communicate these goals consistently.
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Leaders must get across the why as well as the what. Their people need more than milestones for motivation.
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In other words: Key results are the levers you pull, the marks you hit to achieve the goal. If an objective is well framed, three to five KRs will usually be adequate to reach it. Too many can dilute focus and obscure progress. Besides, each key result should be a challenge in its own right. If you’re certain you’re going to nail it, you’re probably not pushing hard enough.
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Keep in mind, though, that it’s the shorter-term goals that drive the actual work. They keep annual plans honest—and executed.
Clear-cut time frames intensify our focus and commitment; nothing moves us forward like a deadline. To win in the global marketplace, organizations need to be more nimble than ever before. In my experience, a quarterly OKR cadence is best suited to keep pace with today’s fast-changing markets. A three-month horizon curbs procrastination and leads to real performance gains.”

Excerto de: Doerr, John. “Measure What Matters: How Google, Bono, and the Gates Foundation Rock the World with OKRs”.

sábado, julho 14, 2018

"reality denial is more about identity than information"

Relacionar "Afinal não há dinheiro"  com "How to Talk to Someone Who Refuses to Accept Reality, According to Behavioral Science":
"Facts don't win arguments.
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When faced with threatening information, people often stick their heads in the sand.
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The problem is almost certainly one of emotions, not knowledge.
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And because reality denial is more about identity than information, throwing facts at the problem usually backfires. "Research on a phenomenon called the backfire effect shows we tend to dig in our heels when we are presented with facts that cause us to feel bad about our identity, self-worth, worldview or group belonging,""





segunda-feira, junho 25, 2018

"Giants invariably descend into suckiness" (parte XV)

Parte I, parte IIparte IIIparte IVparte Vparte VIparte VIIparte VIIIparte IXparte Xparte XI, parte XII, parte XIII e parte XIV.
By the end of the twentieth century P&G had scaled up to a behemoth, offering more than three hundred brands and raking in yearly revenue of $37 billion. P&G was one of the world’s corporate superpowers.
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In 2016 analyst firm CB Insights published a graphic showing all the ways unscaled companies were attacking P&G. [Moi ici: Por que não gostamos de ser tratados como plancton] It looks like a swarm of bees taking down a bear. In that rendering P&G no longer appears to be a monolithic scaled-up company that has built up powerful defenses against upstarts; instead, it is depicted as a series of individual products, each vulnerable to small, unscaled, agile, AI-driven, product-focused, entrepreneurial companies.
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CBI called the overall phenomenon the “unbundling of P&G.” It is as clear an indication as any of what big corporations face in an era that favors economies of unscale over economies of scale. Small unscaled companies can challenge every piece of a big company, often with products or services more perfectly targeted to a certain kind of buyer—products that can win against mass-appeal offerings. If unscaled competitors can lure away enough customers, economies of scale will work against the incumbents as fewer units move through expensive, large-scale factories and distribution systems—a cost burden not borne by unscaled companies.
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Over the past hundred years, as the era of scale unfolded, small companies of course continued to exist, and many prospered even as they stayed small. Small business was the US economy’s underlying strength throughout the scaling age. In 2010, according to the US Census, the nation had about 30 million small businesses and only 18,500 companies that employed more than five hundred people.
However, in an era when economies of scale usually prevailed, when a scaled-up company competed directly against a small business, the small business usually lost. Just think of all the small-town Main Street retailers Walmart bulldozed over the past twenty-five years.
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We will see the big-beats-small dynamic reverse as we unscale. Over the next ten to twenty years companies that relied on scale as a competitive advantage will increasingly find themselves defanged. They will be at a disadvantage against focused unscaled businesses. Large corporations won’t disappear, just as small business didn’t disappear in the last era. But the big companies that don’t change their model will see their businesses erode, and some of today’s giants will fall. [Moi ici: Nada podem fazer contra a suckiness, têm de a abandonar]”

Excerto de: Taneja, Hemant, Maney, Kevin. “Unscaled”.

segunda-feira, janeiro 22, 2018

Tríade, Taylor, Mongo e a Al Qaeda

Em "Team of Teams: The Power of Small Groups in a Fragmented World" de Stanley McChrystal e Chris Fussell encontro um paralelismo que faço há muitos anos e que traduzo em linguagem colorida como em "os encalhados da tríade".

O mundo que formatou a tríade (políticos, académicos e comentadores) foi o mundo de Metropolis, o mundo de Magnitogorsk, o mundo da eficiência, um mundo criado pelo taylorismo:
"Taylor created a clockwork factory, systematically eliminating variation, studying all labor until he understood it inside and out, honing it to peak efficiency, and ensuring that those precise procedures were followed at scale. Because he could study and predict, he could control. He dubbed his doctrine "scientific management."
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Taylor became the world's first management guru. At a paper mill in Wisconsin, he was told that the art of pulping and drying could not be reduced to a science. He instituted his system and material costs dropped from $75 to $35 per ton, while labor costs dropped from $30 a ton to $8. At a ball bearing factory, he experimented with everything from lighting levels to rest break durations, and oversaw an increase in quantity and quality of production while reducing the number of employees from 120 to 35; at a pig iron plant, he raised worker output from 12.5 to 47 tons of steel per day, and decreased the number of workers from 600 to 140.
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Taylor’s ideas spread from company to company, from industry to industry, and from blue collars to white (there was one best way to insert paper into a typewriter, to sit at a desk, to clip pages together). They seeped into the halls of government. His philosophy of replacing the intuition of the person doing the job with reductionist efficiencies designed by a separate group of people marked a new means of organizing human endeavors. It was the behavioral soul mate for the technical advances of industrial engineering.
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Taylor’s success represented the legitimization of “management” as a discipline. Previously, managerial roles were rewards for years of service in the form of higher pay and less strenuous labor. The manager’s main function was to keep things in working order and maintain morale. Under Taylor’s formulation, managers were both research scientists and architects of efficiency.
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This drew a hard-and-fast line between thought and action: managers did the thinking and planning, while workers executed. No longer were laborers expected to understand how or why things worked—in fact, managers saw teaching them that or paying a premium for their expertise as a form of waste.
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Military planners had relied on many of Taylor’s strategies—the segregation of planning and execution, standardization, and an emphasis on efficiency— for centuries before Taylor was born. But Taylor’s ideas inspired many military leaders to find fresh ways to create a more efficient fighting force.
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by the late 1920s, it could seem that all of modern society had come under the sway of a single commanding idea: that waste was wrong and efficiency the highest good, and that eliminating one and achieving the other was best left to the experts.”"
Este é o molde que ao chocar com Mongo deixa de funcionar. Assim como o percebi algures entre 2006 - 2008, McChrystal começou a intui-lo em 2004 ao chocar com a Al Qaeda do Iraque. (Ao longe intuí o mesmo ao aconselhar às PMEs que seguissem o exemplo da Al Qaeda: 2010, 2009, 20082007 e 2006)
"This new world required a fundamental rewriting of the rules of the game. In order to win, we would have to set aside many of the lessons that millennia of military procedure and a century of optimized efficiencies had taught us.
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In 2004, as we planned clockwork raids designed to make the most of every drop of fuel, we were manning a managerial Maginot Line: our extraordinarily efficient procedures and plans were well crafted and necessary, but not sufficient.
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Over the past century, the kind of organizational measures that ensure the success
of combat parachute assaults have proliferated throughout the military, industry, and business. In today’s environment, however, these solutions are the equivalent of the provincial apprenticeship models that Taylor stumbled upon in 1874. In Iraq, the inexplicable, networked success of our underresourced enemy indicated that they had cracked this nut before we had. Managerially, AQI was flanking us."

terça-feira, outubro 24, 2017

Privilegiar os inputs sobre os outputs (parte VII)

Parte I, parte II, parte IIIparte IV, parte V e parte VI.
"Customers in B2B markets are becoming increasingly sophisticated about purchasing. Recognizing that most products and services they buy are not strategic to their businesses, they begin by simply seeking suppliers that will meet their basic specifications at a competitive price. Then, after they’ve winnowed down the contenders, they often ask the finalists to offer “something more.”
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Many suppliers misunderstand this request. They’ll respond with the well-worn tactic of stressing features their offerings have but competitors’ lack, and when that doesn’t work, they propose price concessions. But it turns out that customers are looking for neither of those things.
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During a three-year research project, we discovered that when purchasing managers ask for something more, they are actually looking for what we call the justifier: an element of an offering that would make a noteworthy difference to their company’s business. A justifier’s value to the customer is self-evident and provides a clear-cut reason for selecting one supplier over others, effectively breaking the tie among the final contenders.[Moi ici: O artigo está cheio de bons exemplos, em vários sectores, destes "justifiers"]
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The justifier, or tiebreaker, helps the purchasing manager demonstrate to senior leadership that he or she is making a contribution to the business. [Moi ici: Outra vez um exemplo de deixar de pensar nos outputs para concentrar a atenção nos inputs. Basta pensar no que vem a seguir] That is no small thing. People responsible for nonstrategic purchases have difficult, often thankless, jobs. They’re under pressure to complete these transactions as quickly and efficiently as possible. Whenever anything goes wrong with what they’ve bought, they get blamed. But their diligence and understanding of the business typically get little recognition.
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Tiebreaking sellers coach their salespeople to explore this topic with customers and engage them in a conversation about their concerns.
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With value selling, suppliers build a case to prove that their offerings provide greater worth to customers than competitors’ do. But when purchases aren’t strategic, that approach is ineffective, and suppliers need something extra whose value is self-evident to win the sale.
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The top yearly goals of a customer’s senior management can be a great source of ideas for justifiers. By visiting a customer’s website or perusing its annual report, a supplier can learn about initiatives aimed at improving safety in specific areas, reducing waste, and the like. Yet purchasing managers told us that salespeople rarely conduct such rudimentary background research or put in the time to learn about their customers’ objectives.
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we discovered demonstrate that with enough determination, even a supplier of a nonstrategic offering can persuade its customers’ purchasing managers and leadership that it is something special."


Trechos retirados de "Tiebreaker Selling"

segunda-feira, julho 17, 2017

"you need to enter their personal story"

"Your customers care a whole lot more about themselves than they care about your products or your messages.  That’s why your marketing and sales communications shouldn’t focus on your products.  They should focus on your customers.
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Every person you come in contact with greets you with a rich personal narrative going on in their mind, not a blank slate. If you want to get their attention and have them value the encounter, you need to enter their personal story, not force them into your story."
Como não recordar:
"Come and win with us" vs "Let us win with you"
Trechos retirados de "It’s not about Michael Jordan. It’s about you."

domingo, julho 02, 2017

Apostar nas forças

Excelente reflexão, útil para empresas que sentem que têm de mudar de vida:
"In their efforts to compete, business strategists often forget a basic principle: Build from your strengths. [Moi ici: Começar pela análise do ADN] The most successful companies have a clear, well-articulated view of what's important to them and their customers. They understand that the way to win consistently is through what they do rather than what they sell.
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These companies also understand that “what they do” is unique to them; they have their own capabilities and practices that no other company could quite duplicate, even if it tried. In that sense, building from your strengths is the most reliable way we have found to differentiate your company.
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when you understand what you’re great at, and design your capabilities and strategy accordingly, you can define how you want to compete, and shape your own future rather than waiting for others to do it for you.
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1. Accept Your Weaknesses
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All of us — individuals, teams, and organizations — have weaknesses. These are not skill gaps; those can be corrected with learning. Weaknesses are inherent deficiencies of talent or capability that do not change even after aggressive efforts to improve them. Pride and our ingrained work ethic may cause us to deny our weaknesses, but acceptance is the first step toward designing for strength.
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2. Recognize Your Specific Strengths
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Weaknesses tend to be universal and broad. ... But strengths are often extraordinarily specific.
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3. Solve the Right Problem
A moment of magic accompanies the willingness to quit. It involves gaining a better perspective. Prior to this moment, it is almost impossible to be objective about your challenges. Too many emotions and pressures intrude. But now, you can evaluate your options more dispassionately, and — in the language of design thinking — learn to ask better questions. The problem you are trying to solve may not be the right one to address.
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In my case, fixing my weaknesses was the wrong problem to solve. I have since come to think that the same is true for many other people and organizations seeking breakthrough performance. Instead of solving for “how do I fix my weaknesses?”  [Moi ici: Isto é o que critico quando escrevo aqui sobre o Return-of-Attention das organizações patronais. Gastam demasiado tempo a combater a última guerra quando o mundo entretanto mudou, em vez de procurar uma nova guerra onde tenham vantagens únicasI asked myself, “how can I design for my unique strengths?
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4. Double Down on Your Strengths"
Trechos retirados de "Design for Your Strengths"

quinta-feira, janeiro 12, 2017

Quando o mundo muda e o locus de controlo

Quando o mundo muda as empresas... as organizações com o locus de controlo no exterior viram-se para o papá-Estado a pedir apoios, a pedir protecção, a pedir arranjinhos, a pedir ... crony capitalism.

Quando o mundo muda as organizações com o locus de controlo no interior fazem perguntas, tomam decisões, avançam e testam:
"Anyone in retail needs to ask themselves a set of important questions that weren’t relevant post–World War II because in that era they were obvious questions. Stepping outside and reconsidering the dynamics of the retail world, these questions include:
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Price strategy. Do you want to compete on price? If the answer is yes, then it’s going to be increasingly difficult to retail in physical stores. There’s an extra step in the supply chain, and the economics simply don’t make sense. In a market of near-perfect pricing knowledge, price-sensitive buyers gravitate to the cheapest price unless the warehouse and the store are one and the same. ... They are more a bulk warehouse pick-up system than a traditional retailer. In general, online will win the price battle because price leadership is about low-cost infrastructure, and extra links in the retail chain do not make for low cost.
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Product range strategy. Do you want to have a large or lean product range? Clearly, online will win the large-range battle. It doesn’t have the physical constraints of shelves and the cost of big stores. Online needs fewer places for the actual goods. In this world bricks-and-mortar retail can’t win a product-range battle, it can only win a uniqueness and customised one. It’s only a matter of time before widely distributed product brand owners start competing with retailers.
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Location strategy: What’s our physical location about? For online players it’s an easy decision: find a location that facilitates effective delivery. For stores it’s much more than that. If the store is merely about acquiring the product, then in a connected world it has no reason to exist. A physical store needs to be a place of entertainment, education, co-creation and socialisation — a maison and experience that satisfies the five senses. Stores need to be events, not re-sellers.[Moi ici: Dedicado a leitora de Aveiro]
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Attention strategy: Will people use their feet or their fingers to find us? If it’s fingers (online), we have two simple choices: have an über niche audience that loves what we do because it’s unique, or have a kicking SEO (Search Engine Optimisation) strategy that’s first-page worthy. Both of these realities show a clear strategy: survival in retail is about being the cheapest or the nicest. Anything in between can’t compete or will get lost in a world of infinite supply."
Imaginem o tempo perdido com o papá-Estado, que aproveita para dar o seu abraço pedófilo com a impostagem normanda como contrapartida para o suposto apoio, tempo que não pode ser dedicado a reflexão e acção interna.

Trechos retirados de "The Great Fragmentation : why the future of business is small" de Steve Sammartino

terça-feira, janeiro 10, 2017

Acerca das exportações (parte I)

O valor mensal das exportações no passado mês de Novembro foi o segundo mais alto de sempre, só ultrapassado pelo recorde de Julho de 2015.

Um excelente desempenho das PME. Quando excluímos as exportações de combustíveis e lubrificantes constatamos que Novembro de 2016 foi recorde absoluto de exportações:
Claro que a maioria dos comentadores e políticos, da oposição e da situação, não sublinham estes recordes para não prejudicar a sua narrativa do país-coitadinho, vítima do euro, que lhes dá munições para o seu capital de queixa e reivindicação perante Bruxelas.

Em Pre-suasion, encontrei uma história deliciosa e ao mesmo tempo preocupante:
"often try to convey to various audiences is that, in contests of persuasion, counterarguments are typically more powerful than arguments. This superiority emerges especially when a counterclaim does more than refute a rival’s claim by showing it to be mistaken or misdirected in the particular instance, but does so instead by showing the rival communicator to be an untrustworthy source of information, generally. Issuing a counterargument demonstrating that an opponent’s argument is not to be believed because its maker is misinformed on the topic will usually succeed on that singular issue. But a counterargument that undermines an opponent’s argument by showing him or her to be dishonest in the matter will normally win that battle plus future battles with the opponent."
Depois disto vamos à história:
"perhaps the most effective marketing decision ever made by the tobacco companies lies buried and almost unknown in the industry’s history: after a three-year slide of 10 percent in tobacco consumption in the United States during the late 1960s, Big Tobacco did something that had the extraordinary effect of ending the decline and boosting consumption while slashing advertising expenditures by a third. What was it?
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On July 22, 1969, during US congressional hearings, representatives of the major American tobacco companies strongly advocated a proposal to ban all of their own ads from television and radio, even though industry studies showed that the broadcast media provided the most effective routes to new sales.
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[Moi ici: Cá vai a solução para o mistério] In 1967, the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) had ruled that its “fairness doctrine” applied to the issue of tobacco advertising. The fairness doctrine required that equal advertising time be granted on radio and television—solely on radio and television—to all sides of important and controversial topics. If one side purchased broadcast time on these media, the opposing side must be given free time to counterargue.
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That decision had an immediate impact on the landscape of broadcast advertising. For the first time, anti-tobacco forces such as the American Cancer Society could afford to air counterarguments to the tobacco company messages. They did so via counter-ads that disputed the truthfulness of the images displayed in tobacco company commercials. If a tobacco ad featured healthy, attractive, independent characters, the opposing ads would counterargue that, in fact, tobacco use led to diseased health, damaged attractiveness, and slavish dependence.
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During the three years that they ran, those anti-tobacco spots slashed tobacco consumption in the United States by nearly 10 percent. At first the tobacco companies responded predictably, increasing their advertising budgets to try to meet the challenge. But, by the rules of the fairness doctrine, for each tobacco ad, equal time had to be provided for a counter-ad that would take another bite out of industry profits. When the logic of the situation hit them, the tobacco companies worked politically to ban their own ads, but solely on the air where the fairness doctrine applied—thereby ensuring that the anti-tobacco forces would no longer get free airtime to make their counterargument."
Imaginem o que seria um anónimo como eu confrontar Ferreira do Amaral com números que desmascaram a sua narrativa da falta de competitividade portuguesa com o euro.

sexta-feira, outubro 28, 2016

Estratégia sempre antes dos objectivos

"Like most goals, especially those that come before strategy, ours was an arbitrary one, and it diverted our attention from some fundamental choices.
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having goals come ahead of strategy is putting the cart before the horse. When this happens, companies often fall into trouble.
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Beware leaders who tell you their company will be the best this or the largest that before they tell you their strategy for winning. When big, hairy audacious goals drive strategy, they can waste time and money. [Moi ici: Como não recordar os políticos que começam por dizer que o objectivo é aumentar o emprego] The goals companies adopt don’t have to prevent them from coming up with great strategies. But they often do, because the brightness of big goals has a way of blinding their owners to the realities of great strategy.
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Another lesson is that maintaining sharp thinking about your value proposition is easier said than done.
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Great strategies require an objective, self-aware, and up-to-date sense of the capabilities that give you the right to win. Most of us are smart enough to recognize when our capabilities have lost their edge. But it’s all too easy for our emotions to get in the way. Companies are often forced into this realization after making a costly mistake.
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The fundamentals of strategy seem so obvious: Pick, choose, or design a winning value proposition for the right target market that requires the distinctive capabilities you really have — rather than those you used to have or wish you had."
Trechos retirados de "The Strategy Lessons of a Long Hike"

sexta-feira, setembro 09, 2016

Mambo jambo de consultor ou faz algum sentido?

Ontem, a seguir ao almoço, a caminho de uma reunião numa empresa de calçado, passo por um antigo cliente. Uma fábrica de sucesso que terá crescido a sua facturação 7 ou 8 vezes desde que começámos a trabalhar juntos.
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A quinta-feira deles é a sexta-feira de quase todas as PME portuguesas. Sem falsa modéstia foi uma das ideias que ajudei a introduzir na empresa. Carregar os camiões para exportação à quinta-feira é uma vantagem, por exemplo, a pressão sobre toda a cadeia de fornecimento começa mais cedo e não há "concorrência". As empresas com as calças na mão para fechar as expedições à sexta só vão atacar à ... sexta-feira. Também, a sexta-feira, já é tempo de planear a próxima semana. Mas adiante, o tema não é esse. Num dos cais de embarque estava um camião com uma lona fazendo publicidade da empresa. Além das cores, do logo, havia uma frase:
"Come and win with us"

Voltei a concentrar a atenção na estrada mas a frase não me saía da cabeça...
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Quando cheguei à empresa, disseram-me que o empresário ainda ia demorar um quarto de hora. Sentei-me à mesa da sala de reuniões, abri a minha agenda, escrevi aquela frase, acrescentei um VS e uma nova frase:
"Let us win with you"
Agora que recordo isto, julgo que é o resultado da combinação da leitura de:
"So two years ago, they launched a new brand aptly called NoBull. "Our mentality is that our shoes are not going to make you fitter, jump higher, or run faster," Wilson explains. "The only thing that will make you fitter is you working hard every day.""
Trecho retirado de "Does The Sportswear Industry Ignore Serious Athletes? These Entrepreneurs Think So", artigo citado na parte I da série "Ilustração da narrativa de Mongo"

Com a leitura de "Customer-dominant logic: foundations and implications", citado em "Um ponto de vista diferente":
"In the CDL perspective, firms should be concerned with how they can become involved in customers’ lives instead of figuring out how to involve customers in the firms’ business: “There is a need to contrast the established provider-oriented view of involving the customer in service co-creation with a more radical customer-oriented view of involving the service provider in the customer’s life”."
Que acham disto? Mambo jambo de consultor ou faz algum sentido?
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Em vez da mensagem, "nós somos vencedores, venham também vencer connosco", a alternativa "deixem-nos ajudar a sermos vencedores convosco"

segunda-feira, abril 04, 2016

O papel da arte!

Sábado, ao ouvir o deputado Pedro Duarte a pedir mais uma revolução no Ensino, desta feita para apostar e quatro vectores: ciência; engenharia; tecnologia e economia, escrevi no Twitter:
É preciso não conhecer a biografia de Jobs, ou os textos de Hilary Austen, ou o futuro de Mongo para esquecer o papel da arte.
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Sem arte como é que a Bang & Olufsen teria o sucesso que teve?
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Sem arte como haveria concorrência imperfeita?
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Esquecer a arte é continuar a pensar que o valor resulta de um cálculo e não de um sentimento. Por tudo isto, recomendo a leitura deste texto "Hedi Slimane: The Steve Jobs of Fashion":
"Like many industries, Big Fashion companies keep acquiring tiny, money-losing, buzz-worthy brands… that never quite go mainstream. They die silently and perhaps mercifully. But the real question is: why is this a pattern, when it’s both predictable and pointless? Because the fashion industry is making stuff for critics. Like many industries, from tech to media to sports, it’s trying to please them, win them over, even pander to them. But the critics aren’t the people who are buying the stuff. Result: shapeless, gigantic, genderless clothes that critics love… but that are driving the business of fashion to stagnation. They’re out of touch with what people actually want, love, hunger for.
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He also, importantly, made clothes people actually wanted to wear, and that looked better up-close in stores than they did on the runway. The fashion world was shocked.
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But collection by collection, he built a devoted cult of fans precisely because he was ahead of even the critics. The self-referential game of pleasing critics might feel good — but it doesn’t necessarily build a business.
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To do that, you have to make products people truly desire. It’s a dirty word in boardrooms, desire. We’re more comfortable with calculative, rational expressions of wants. We can put them in spreadsheets and crunch and process those. There’s just one tiny problem. So can consumers. You don’t pay royally for stuff that you’re running a calculation in the back of your mind about. You pay royally for stuff that enchants, hypnotizes, and entrances you. Stuff you love. Stuff that we love — whether that “stuff” is people or clothes or phones, to be crude — suspends the rational bits of us. It intoxicates us and leaves us giddy. We say to ourselves, “Of course it’s too expensive… but I don’t care. I have to have it.” [Moi ici: Excelente!!! Isto é Mongo! Isto é a concorrência imperfeita! Isto é arte!]
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At the core of this financial success is real artistry.
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Clusters like Brooklyn and Detroit are putting artistry and craft back into products from chocolate to coffee to furniture today. But the harsh truth is that Big Corporations see artisanship as marketing. They try to brand it, tricking people into thinking there’s artistry in things – Tesco’s “fictional farms” marketing ploy is a recent example — not really practicing itor investing in it. They should take a lesson from Slimane and actually do it.[Moi ici: A importância da autenticidade]
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That’s how you get out of the trap of simply riding trends and cashing in on them: ignoring critics, breaking rules, making things people truly desire, and making them with real artistry. It takes a rare combination of personal genius and organizational risk – which is perhaps why we don’t see that many Slimanes out there. Still, we can always hope for more."

sábado, fevereiro 20, 2016

Volume e vaidade

Recordar:
Volume (quota de mercado) é vaidade
Lucro é sanidade
Mais um excelente texto de Rags:
"Apple never chased market share and was more than willing to let others fight for the low end of the market.
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Apple with just around 15% market share has 90% of profit share of the market.
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Market share is simply the wrong business metric to chase as I have written several times before. Businesses exist to create value for all stakeholders – customers, investors, partners and employees. Businesses must take actions that maximize this value pie so everyone’s share, however small the ratio is, is better than it would have been otherwise. The question of chasing market share does not come into play at all in this quest unless it is a side effect of increasing value pie.[Moi ici: Consequência ou obliquidade]
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Price is not a goal, it is not something you optimize for. it is not something your product deserves. It is not an invariant that must be adhered to. Price is a lever you have under control to maximize your share of value created.  You do not fix a price point to maintain perception rather you ensure the price point is aligned with the segment you choose to target and its needs.
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Religiously fixing a price point is an assured way to destroy value for customers and investors.
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Customers come first. We win customers by creating net new value to customers that is far more than other alternatives. We maximize the value to customers we become the preferred product and hence maximize our share of this value pie. Price is a way for us to get our fair share of that value created. Price is not the end, it is the means."
Trechos retirados de "Apple’s Focus- Market Share? Profit? or Price?"

sexta-feira, outubro 23, 2015

A vantagem da co-criação

"Competition - "I win if you lose."
Cooperation - "I will agree to go along with you here, if you agree to go along with me here - which might involve some compromise on both our parts - a chipping-off sometimes."
Collaboration - "We work together in a way that includes what is important to both of us and our visions without having to compromise."
Cocreation - "We work together in a way that includes what is important to both of us without having to compromise AND what we emerge is new, unexpected and greater than the sum of our visions."
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The boundaries between these modes, of course, are permeable with overlaps. The key is that co-creation can contain collaboration, cooperation, and even competition under its umbrella, but competition generally does not contain co-creation. By consciously choosing to expand to a co-creative framework, our playing field opens up and we are at choice when to compete, cooperate, collaborate, or co-create - instead of doing only one of the modes on autopilot.
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Every time we expand our habitual paradigm or mental playing field, new choices, options and possibilities open up. New interpersonal dynamics are possible."
Trecho retirado de "The Fertile Unknown"

quinta-feira, setembro 10, 2015

Curiosidade do dia

"The aging trend is ratcheting up this pressure. The median age of the US worker was 34.6 years in 1980, but in 2013, it was 42.4 years. In advanced economies, one-third of workers could retire in the next two decades, taking valuable skills and experience with them. In Germany, Japan, and South Korea, nearly half of today’s workforce will be over the age of 55 in another ten years (Exhibit 30)."

Imagem e trecho retirado de "Playing to Win: The New Global Competition for Corporate Profits" de Richard Dobbs, Tim Koller, e Sree Ramaswamy.

quinta-feira, fevereiro 12, 2015

De volta à velha Atenas, a minha previsão


Nem de propósito. Ontem à noite, já depois de ter escrito "Cuidado com as previsões", encontrei "Learning to Become Athenians":
"After two or three centuries during which manufacturing consolidated into larger and larger enterprises, technology is now restoring opportunities for the lone craftsman making things at home—with extraordinary consequences for careers and lifestyles.
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In classical Athens, with no industrial machinery and much of the work done by slaves whose maintenance costs were identical and whose capital costs reflected their skills, it was not possible to get an advantage in costs or in capital utilization. To compete successfully, you had to differentiate your product to make it worth more than your competitors’.
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The nature of a society in which most households participate, at least occasionally, in making goods is radically different from the world we are used to.
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The industrial revolution changed the economics of manufacturing by creating new forms of advantage based upon operating costs and capital investment. Starting in the eighteenth century, the lower costs offered by mechanization, mass production, and shared information drove production into fewer and larger units, and the amateur craftsman in the family workshop was squeezed almost out of existence.
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The nature of a society in which most households participate, at least occasionally, in making goods is radically different from the world we are used to. For citizens in ancient Athens, casual manufacturing was a vital income-earning component in a portfolio of activity. The industrial revolution changed the economics of manufacturing by creating new forms of advantage based upon operating costs and capital investment. Now, though, the information revolution is reversing the consolidating effect of the industrial revolution.
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After two or three centuries during which manufacturing consolidated into larger and larger enterprises, technology is now restoring opportunities for the lone craftsman making things at home—with extraordinary consequences for careers and lifestyles. The powerful trends toward making things oneself and choosing freelance careers over full-time employment recreate some of the economic and social dynamics of Athens between 500 and 300 B.C.—and pose important challenges to businesses and society. If we understand the forces behind the changes in industry structure since those times, we will have a better sense of how and why the dynamics of that structure are reversing and what that might mean for our daily lives.
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To build a large business, you have to win more volume than others in a competitive marketplace; this means having an advantage your competitors cannot match. For a competitive advantage to be of value, it must be manifested in one of the elements of return on capital: revenues, costs, or capital employed. In classical Athens, with no industrial machinery and much of the work done by slaves whose maintenance costs were identical and whose capital costs reflected their skills, it was not possible to get an advantage in costs or in capital utilization. To compete successfully, you had to differentiate your product to make it worth more than your competitors’.
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For a huge range of other products, which made up most of consumption—such as everyday clothes, basic ceramics, simple metalwork, and carpentry—there was no basis for differentiation. Almost all Athenian citizen households would have family members or slaves who made clothes. Some might make a surplus to sell; other households would have to buy some clothing. Many would have made simple wooden, ceramic, or metal objects for their own use and sometimes to exchange with neighbors or sell in the marketplace.
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The nature of a society in which most households participate, at least occasionally, in making goods is radically different from the world we are used to. ... By reducing their expenditures and bringing in some income through making simple household products, Athenian citizens managed to enjoy a rich and varied life. They had time to go to the theater and games, and some evidently had time to philosophize.
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The implications for the individual, for society, and for manufacturing companies are significant. For the individual, the restoration of competitive equality between the home craftsperson and the large factory creates real opportunities for the freelance lifestyle that many young people aspire to. As Forbes reported last year, 60 percent of Millennials in the U.S. stay fewer than three years in a job and 45 percent would prefer more flexibility to more pay.  In a recent survey, 87 percent of UK graduates with first- or second-class degrees saw freelancing as highly attractive, and 85 percent believe freelancing will become the norm.
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Some manufacturing businesses will face a completely new challenge, one in which the stock weapons of increasing efficiency and reducing costs will be of little use. Few makers will recognize the opportunity cost of their time in a very businesslike way, given the psychic rewards they find in exercising their craft. Now that the other components of cost (procurement of raw materials, training and product development expenses, marketing investment, and energy) are available at rates not much different from those achieved by large enterprises, would-be makers will not be deterred by price cuts from established players."
Parece que o BCG andou a ler este blogue!!!
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Está aqui tudo!!!
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Amostra:

Conseguem imaginar as implicações desta mudança? Na educação, na cobrança de impostos, no retalho, nos transportes, nas comunidades, na humanização do mercado, no cálculo e interpretação das estatísticas, na circulação do dinheiro, ...

sexta-feira, janeiro 16, 2015

O trabalho que se devia iniciar hoje (parte II)

"9 Ways to Stand Out Among Lower Cost Competitors (Without Lowering Prices)":
"“When prices can’t be lowered, focus on the ways you’re ahead of your competitors in terms of quality. Clients care about price, but they care more about the quality of what they’re getting for their money. Customer service is also a key point.
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“As our market becomes more competitive, we increased prices to help us tell the story of how we are different. When our prices were lower, it was harder to tell a compelling story.
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“Competition is the ugly truth of business and sometimes it can get nasty. If a competitor is undercutting your price, then you need to react by further positioning your offerings as more valuable than others in the market. It is all about keeping your company on its own path. Racing to the bottom against someone setting the pace can easily end up with your business crashing and burning.”
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“If you focus on price alone, you’ll never win the war. Focus on the value your product will bring your customers and why your product is what they need to become more profitable."
Muita gente que lê textos com este tipo de mensagem torce o nariz e reage como em 1992 reagi ao ler o artigo de Marn e Rosiello na HBR.
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Seguir estes conselhos sem ter iniciado um prévio trabalho de diferenciação não é muito saudável.
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Quando é que a sua empresa vai iniciar o seu trabalho para a grande viagem da diferenciação?

sexta-feira, dezembro 26, 2014

Pois...

"Estudantes preferem um emprego por conta de outrem do que abrir a sua própria empresa".
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A economia do futuro, e a economia do futuro já anda por cá, ainda que distribuída de forma muito anormal, é que pode precisar de cada vez menos funcionários.
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As máquinas substituirão os funcionários, como varreram os portageiros do mapa.
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Este trecho retirado de "The Second Machine Age: Work, Progress, and Prosperity in a Time of Brilliant Technologies":
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"To Switch the Skills, Switch the Schools
Education researcher Sugata Mitra, who has showed how much poor children in the developing world can learn on their own when provided with nothing more than some appropriate technology, has a provocative explanation for the emphasis on rote learning. In his speech at the 2013 TED conference, where his work was recognized with the one-million-dollar TED prize, he gave an account of when and why these skills came to be valued.
I tried to look at where did the kind of learning we do in schools, where did it come from? . . . It came from . . . the last and the biggest of the empires on this planet, [the British Empire].
What they did was amazing. They created a global computer made up of people. It’s still with us today. It’s called the bureaucratic administrative machine. In order to have that machine running, you need lots and lots of people.
They made another machine to produce those people: the school. The schools would produce the people who would then become parts of the bureaucratic administrative machine. . . . They must know three things: They must have good handwriting, because the data is handwritten; they must be able to read; and they must be able to do multiplication, division, addition and subtraction in their head. They must be so identical that you could pick one up from New Zealand and ship them to Canada and he wo uld be instantly functional.
Of course, we like this explanation because it describes things as computers and machines. But more fundamentally, we like it because it points out that the three Rs were once the skills that workers needed to contribute to the most advanced economy of the time. As Mitra points out, the educational system of Victorian England was designed quite well for its time and place. But that time and place are no longer ours. As Mitra continued:
The Victorians were great engineers. They engineered a system that was so robust that it’s still with us to day, continuously producing identical people for a machine that no longer exists. . . . [Today] the clerks are the computers. They’re there in thousands in every office. And you have people who guide those computers to do their clerical jobs. Those people don’t need to be able to write beautifully by hand. They don’t need to be able to multiply numbers in their heads. They do need to be able to read. In fact, they need to be able to read discerningly.
Recordar: