"There are no pricing problems; only segmentation problems"

"What is the most important thing you can share about pricing?

• There are no pricing problems; only segmentation problems. [Moi ici: Qual é mesmo a segmentação que a sua empresa faz?]

• Think about your end-customer first.

• Value is in the perspective of the person with whom you are talking.

• The value changes in context as well.

...
How does a price war destroy value?

• War results in destruction and casualties and price war leads to value destruction. – Dropped Mobile Profits

• There is a misconception of success when you capture market share.

• The causation effect is lost in the minds of people during a price war.

• Market share at any cost is chasing the wrong target.

• Which comes first, market share or profit?

• Profit comes first as it creates value for the customer; value comes first."

Trechos retirados de "The Ethics of Price Discrimination with Rags Srinivasan"

E quantas PME segmentam o seu mercado?

"product positioning is telling (targeting) specific customers (segments) what job you want them to hire the product for. Remember, if you do not position your product they will do it themselves or if they don’t your competitors will do it for you.[Moi ici: O primeiro exemplo que me veio à cabeça foi o da Comur. O potencial de lucro perdido deve ser ... triste]
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So it decided to target a segment that has budget to pay (business customers) and telling them what specific job it wants them to hire an iPad Pro for.
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Marketing is nothing more than Segmentation,[Moi ici: E quantas PME segmentam o seu mercado? Quantas continuam a tratar tudo como granel? Quantos empresários continuam a praticar o marxianismo entranhado sem o saberem?] Targeting and Positioning."

Trechos retirados de "Product Positioning Comes to iPad Pro"

Volume e vaidade

Recordar:

Volume (quota de mercado) é vaidade
Lucro é sanidade

Mais um excelente texto de Rags:

"Apple never chased market share and was more than willing to let others fight for the low end of the market.
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Apple with just around 15% market share has 90% of profit share of the market.
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Market share is simply the wrong business metric to chase as I have written several times before. Businesses exist to create value for all stakeholders – customers, investors, partners and employees. Businesses must take actions that maximize this value pie so everyone’s share, however small the ratio is, is better than it would have been otherwise. The question of chasing market share does not come into play at all in this quest unless it is a side effect of increasing value pie.[Moi ici: Consequência ou obliquidade]
...
Price is not a goal, it is not something you optimize for. it is not something your product deserves. It is not an invariant that must be adhered to. Price is a lever you have under control to maximize your share of value created.  You do not fix a price point to maintain perception rather you ensure the price point is aligned with the segment you choose to target and its needs.
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Religiously fixing a price point is an assured way to destroy value for customers and investors.
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Customers come first. We win customers by creating net new value to customers that is far more than other alternatives. We maximize the value to customers we become the preferred product and hence maximize our share of this value pie. Price is a way for us to get our fair share of that value created. Price is not the end, it is the means."

Trechos retirados de "Apple’s Focus- Market Share? Profit? or Price?"

Muito mais do que valor financeiro (parte III)

Parte I e parte II.
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Por vezes, à noite, entretenho-me a ver no canal História um programa que julgo que se chama "O Preço da História", acerca do que aparece numa loja de penhores em Las Vegas.
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Frequentemente aparecem artigos invulgares que requerem que a loja chame um especialista para avaliar o seu preço de mercado. Recentemente, apareceu alguém com um blusão de aviador da força aérea americana da II Segunda Guerra Mundial. O especialista comprovou a sua autenticidade, avaliou o seu preço de mercado e, no fim rematou algo como:
- Assim, vale $X. Se arranjar a estória que está por trás dele, quem o usou, onde o usou e como chegou até à actualidade consegue que ele se valorize para $1,5X.
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No mesmo canal há um outro programa sobre "gente do ferro-velho", dois "arqueólogos" da modernidade percorrem a América rural em busca de itens que possam comprar para, depois, venderem na sua loja e a coleccionadores. Muitas vezes, apanham uma carcaça metálica semi-enterrada, e que quase já desistiu de lutar conta a corrosão e gritam que pertence a uma qualquer moto do início do século XX e que é um exemplo do que chamam de "Americana" e são capazes de pagar pequenas fortunas por causa da mística, por causa das estórias.

Valor é muito mais do que simplesmente o arranjo de átomos de uma certa maneira:

"All of the products and services around us are examples, and it is the information embedded in these products and services that gives them their value.For example, Hidalgo notes that a Bugatti Veyron sports car sells for $2.5m. He then conducts a thought experiment, asking the value if one drove it into a wall — presumably less. Yet all of the atoms in the car would still be there (assuming one kept the broken bits). What has changed is the order or arrangement of the atoms in the car. That order reflects the information embedded in the product, which in turn reflects the knowledge and know-how of its designers and manufacturers. One can think of “knowledge” as information that is useful to humans — when it is embedded in a product, it enables that product to do useful things."[Moi ici: A informação que refiro nesta série é outra, é a que permite sensoriar experiências e mudar pessoas]

Trevho retirado de "‘Why Information Grows: The Evolution of Order, from Atoms to Economies’, by César Hidalgo"
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Muito mais do que valor financeiro (parte II)

Parte I.
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O tema desenvolvido na parte I, relativamente ao valor na relação B2C insere-se no tema deste postal "No Dearth of Pricing Experiments". Nele, Rags segue uma linha muito semelhante à por nós seguida há uns meses em "Consequências da radioclubização ou os muggles à solta":

"Their assumption, which seem to be taken almost axiomatically is,
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“Customers want to know the costs of products they buy”.
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So they show their detailed costs breakdown, their overheads and margins. Have we seen this before? Yes, in the extreme form of cost based pricing I illustrated a few years ago,
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The simplest counter argument that negates their premise is that customers do not buy product to offset our costs. They have a need to fill or a job to be done. They hire the right product that will get the job done under constraints. Our costs are just that, our costs. Not a concern for our customers.
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Pricing is about getting your fair share of value you create for your customers. As a online retailer Everlane seems unclear what unique value it creates for its customers. So it is hoping customers will gladly pay to offset its costs and cover its margin.
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Wrong and futile!"

Setters vs Takers

Imagem retirada de "5 Differences Between Price Setters and Price Takers"

O excesso de procura afasta clientes? (parte II)

Neste postal acerca do Evangelho do Valor faço referência a um dos gráficos da minha vida:

Em "The Power of Pricing" encontro:

"For most companies, managing pricing is the most effective, lowest-risk lever for driving top-line growth and enhancing profitability. Multiple studies have shown that a 1 percent increase in pricing can have a much greater impact on the bottom line than bringing variable costs down by 1 percent or by increasing sales by 1 percent. That said, however, recent Nielsen research across categories has shown wide discrepancies in how successful companies are in their abilities to realize pricing power, making it clear that when it comes to this capability, there are winners and losers both across and within categories. It also highlights an opportunity for those that have not optimized their approach to pricing.
...
Overcome the commodity perspective. One of the biggest barriers to achieving pricing power is believing that you’re stuck in a commodity category or that you only have a commodity offer. ...  Bottled water is a great example: if companies can differentiate water, they can differentiate anything.
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Price to benefit distinct consumer clusters rather than to the entire market. No two customers—and no two customer needs—are exactly alike. Each customer has a different level of interest in your category, is seeking a different set of benefits and has a certain level of price sensitivity.
...
Once you understand the consumer segments in the market, examine the value equation for each. The value equation is simply the total benefits gained from the offer divided by the price paid to get them, expressed as “value = benefits/price.”
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Ultimately, pricing power is the tangible outcome of an effective strategy—one that differentiates businesses from their competitors and creates something that makes paying more for worth consumers’ while. In contrast, undifferentiated commodities will lack pricing power because they simply accept the level of pricing the market will bear."

Por fim, encontro este interessante postal de Rags Srinivasan "What does slowing iPad sales really mean in 10 pictures", depois de o ler comparem com "O excesso de procura afasta clientes?"
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BTW, malta da tríade que só sabe baixar o preço quando a procura baixa, convém olhar com cuidado para o texto de Rags.

Sobre os escombros da Torre de Babel...

Por estes dias Rags Srinivasan anda especialmente recomendável. Mais uma interessante leitura em "All Things to All People Redux".
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Impossível não pensar nestas empresas cheias de dinheiro, cheias de consultores, cheias de gente formada nas melhores universidades e capazes de erros estratégicos de palmatória, mesmo ao nível de empresa-de-vão-de-escada. O exemplo de hoje impressionou-me sobremaneira:

"Remember Compaq? You may remember it as part of HP and the lengthy acquisition. Before things fell apart Compaq was a high flying PC maker that famously declared their vision as
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“Delivering all things to all customers”"

Depois, Rags vira-se para os dias de hoje e para a Amazon:

"Somehow the investors and analysts believe a single business can serve all customers and excel at it. Somehow they all believe all those disparate businesses will start paying off when the company turns on the profit switch.
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When a business plays in every possible field it has competition from every possible player out there. Fortunately for them the competition is coming only from bigger players they can keep their eyes on. And these players  do not have the same freedom with their investing community.
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Disruption comes not from bigger players but from many smaller players. Can they handle disruptions that erupt in every small corner? Will they start yielding smaller areas and suffer impact to their growth story or try to plough more to defend in every market?"

Acredito que a Amazon, ou melhor o seu modelo de negócio, terá futuro naquilo em que pode ser boa, uma excelente "vending machine" que conjuga preços baixos com o histórico das nossas preferências.
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Querer ir mais longe do que isso, é como construir uma Torre de Babel... sobre os seus escombros, futuros Golias concentrar-se-ão no negócio do preço e, inúmeros pequenos Davids construirão o Estranhistão com toda a sua diversidade.

só os clientes definem o que é valor.

Quem determina o que é valor?
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O cliente!
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Rags Srinivasan no seu excelente blogue relata um exemplo muito interessante "Where Staircase is the Value - Inversion of Elevator Story"

"Stairs, from being a hassle for some have become the differentiating feature in renting the apartment.
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Not only are stairs more than usually important in a walk-up, but, he said, “you hear renters say that they are looking for something with character — that character is an amenity. The staircase is a great place to find that, because it is the place where interactions with neighbors happen.”
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It sure adds more credence to the theory that it is customers who decide value and it is the job of marketer to understand that  and deliver them a product that delivers them that value. Of course the marketer gets to share that value in the form of better price realization."

Num postal anterior ele tinha defendido que os apartamentos com escadas, sem elevador, eram penalizados por isso...  só os clientes definem o que é valor.

"Delivering the Maximally Valued Product"

Grande postal de Rags Srinivasan, "Delivering the Maximally Valued Product":

"The question is not how much the xxx costs but

• what is the customer segment your business chose to target – does the ingredient choice fit that segment?
• what job you want customers to hire your product for?
• how will this ingredient change fit within the two?
• what is the revenue upside from increasing the segment size  or from higher prices customers would pay?
• what are the opportunity costs, what else you could be doing for the same costs?

You do not make a product decision based on what your components costs are but based on your customer and strategy. (Moi ici: Tanta, mas tanta gente que precisava de reflectir sobre isto) You do not pack value into a product because you can, you do it because it delivers the maximum value your customers are willing to pay for. (Moi ici: Por favor voltar atrás e reler duas ou três vezes)
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A Maximally Valued Product for a given customer segment is the product version that adds most value to the customers (Moi ici: Isto deve pôr à nora a malta da UTAO) while enabling marketer to extract their share of the value as price premium."

Recordo logo os empresários de calçado com marca própria e que trabalham para a nata do mercado

Outra vez, e não exclui ninguém?

Recordando "E não exclui ninguém?" e mais recentemente este "the ones to which a company says 'no'" esta reflexão "Choosing When Not To Version Your Product":

"Every version you add must fit with your overarching brand message and competitive strengths. Conversely, versions that weaken your brand message must be pruned even if they are profitable."

the ones to which a company says 'no'

Ter uma estratégia passa por fazer escolhas!
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Ter uma estratégia passa por se saber para quem se trabalha, saber quem são os clientes-alvo.
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Ter uma estratégia passa por se saber que encomendas recusar: saber quem não é cliente e o que não se vai fazer.
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E isto não é nada fácil.
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Recordo o que li em Agosto de 2008:

"the most important orders are the ones to which a company says 'no'."

Por isso, respeito as empresas que são capazes de o fazer:

"Realizing that regular gyms can be intimidating to overweight users, Downsize Fitness has tailored its fitness centers to bigger customers to make them feel more at ease while exercising.
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only those who are at least 50 pounds overweight can take part in the programs available at the centers" 

Como tão bem sumariza Rags Srinivasan em "Demarketing":

"Demarketing is not a tactic like reverse psychology, it is about making choices!
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Turn away the wrong customers so you won’t turn off the right customers."