deixem as empresas evoluir ou morrer, ponto!!!

Vou recuar só até 2018 e escolher alguns postais sobre o tema comum "deixem as empresas morrer":

• Por alguma razão Cortez queimou os barcos... 
• The "flying geese" model, ou deixem as empresas morrer!!!
• Não se pode querer sol na eira e chuva no nabal!
• "perder o terrível complexo de salvar empresas que não têm salvação"
• Deixem as empresas morrer!
• Gabiche? 

Em "O intervencionismo ingénuo (parte II)" escrevi:

"Se uma sociedade valoriza e premeia o risco económico do empreendedor da economia real gera-se toda uma dinâmica de crescimento, mortalidade e retorno. Se uma sociedade tem medo do risco económico e das suas consequências, começa a pôr em causa o motor ao não permitir que os melhores projectos ganhem os louros e o retorno adequado (recordar Spender e as fundições inglesas nos anos 80 "Apesar das boas intenções") [Moi ici: LER, por favor!!!]
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Se o negócio do leite corre mal para uma parte dos produtores lá aparece um apoio ou um subsídio do governo de turno.
Se o negócio do porco corre mal para uma parte dos produtores ...
Se o negócio do têxtil corre mal para uma parte dos fabricantes ...
Se o negócio da construção corre mal para uma parte dos construtores ...


O texto citado de Spender é muito bom, os apoios podem ajudar a comprar máquinas mas não mudam a mente dos gestores. [Moi ici: Meditem nisto e no texto abaixo] Logo, é dinheiro perdido enquanto se empata a economia com zombies que vão estragar o mercado recorrendo a fórmulas antigas e competindo pelo preço sem racionalidade económica.
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"Vive e deixa morrer" devia ser um lema a seguir por muitos governos."

Ontem, li "Why The Key Management Problem Is Often At The Top": 

"That is precisely the point. It’s actually a key to solving the management puzzle. The relatively weaker performance of the other firms is often the result of what is going on at the top of the firm. [Moi ici: Recordar o clássico aqui no blogue "Há mais variedade de produtividade intrasectoriamente do que intersectorialmente]

That in turn is good news for relatively poorly performing firms: they may be able to improve their performance without massive changes throughout the whole firm. What they need is to fix what's happening at the top.

At the same time, this also explains why the management problems of the weaker performers are so intractable: the top managers have difficulty in solving the problem because it is they who are often the problem. They are reluctant to look at their own behavior in the mirror. It is thus the role of management analysts to hold up the mirror for them and help them begin to discuss the undiscussable."

Este racional, que partilho, é o mesmo que me leva a discordar deste texto:

"Pero el problema de España es que tiene una gran parte de la fuerza laboral poco cualificada e incapaz de aportar valor añadido a la empresa por encima de un determinado nivel de retribución." 

Essa mesma força de trabalho pouco qualificada, emigra para a Alemanha ou França e dá saltos no valor acrescentado. O problema é a incapacidade das decisões da gestão de topo acompanhar o ritmo de subida dos custos de contexto.

Qual a solução? Nacionalizar as empresas? Roubar as empresas? Prender os empresários? Não, os empresários já dão o melhor que sabem e podem. A melhor solução é... deixem as empresas evoluir ou morrer, ponto!!! Claro que o ritmo do aumento dos custos de contexto pode ser tal que poucos conseguem evoluir a tempo, e a taxa de reposição de novos projectos não ser suficiente para renovar a economia. No problema! As pessoas emigram.

 

Two types of cronyism

 Na sequência de "Promotor da concorrência imperfeita, dos monopólios informais e das rendas excessivas" Erik Reinert traz um tema importante que me deixa arrepios:

"rent-seeking is the basic driving force of capitalism. [Moi ici: De acordo desde que seja através daquilo a que chamo monopólios informais] The question is whether this rent spreads through society in general - in the form of higher profits, higher wages and higher taxable income - or not. The theoretical goal of `perfect competition' is a situation that does not create wealth for the producers. To this rent-seeking argument is now added the related argument that industrial policy creates `cronyism', that money is being made through favouritism shown to friends and associates.

With reference to the two types of economic activities - Malthusian and Schumpeterian ... we also need to separate the two types of cronyism. Consider these examples:

2005: A Filipino sugar producer uses his political influence to get import protection for his products.

2000: Major Daley in Chicago (ignoring the advice of University of Chicago economists) provides subsidies to already wealthy high-tech investors through an incubator.

1950s and 1960s: Swedish industrialist Marcus Wallenberg uses his close contacts with Labour Party Minister of Finance Gunnar Strang, to win political support to carry out his plans for Swedish companies, Volvo and Electrolux.

1877: Steel producers in the United States use their political clout to impose 100 per cent duty on steel rails.17

1485: Woolworkers use their connections to King Henry VII to influence the state to give them subsidies and to impose an export duty on raw wool to increase raw material prices for their competitors on the Continent, slowly strangulating the wool industry elsewhere, for example in Florence.

The above examples all involve crony capitalism and rent-seeking behaviour which mainstream economic theory tends to abhor. However, a crucial difference separates the first example from the rest. The Filipino crony differs from the other cronies in that he gets subsidies for a raw material with diminishing returns that competes in a world market-facing perfect competition. In other words, he is a Malthusian crony, leading his country down the path of diminishing returns (in spite of technological change which counteracts this) in an activity where technical change fails to raise real wages. The others are Schumpeterian cronies, producing under what Schumpeter called historical increasing returns (a combination of both increasing returns and fast technological change). If we couple this with new trade theory, we see that the tilted playing fields of Schumpeterian cronyism produce vastly different results from those of the Filipino crony."

Trecho retirado de "How Rich Countries Got Rich and Why Poor Countries Stay Poor" de Erik S. Reinert.

The Walking Dead e o activismo político

Governos, empresas grandes e "crony capitalism" 

"There’s an important risk in what I call the “bailout of everything,” or the conscious decision from governments and central banks to provide any needed support to all sectors and companies with access to debt.

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Most of these stimulus packages and liquidity measures are aimed at supporting current government spending and providing liquidity to companies with assets, access to debt, and in traditional sectors. It’s not a surprise, then, that at the same time as we see the largest fiscal and monetary support plan since World War II, we are already witnessing two dangerous collateral effects: the rise of zombie companies and the collapse of small businesses and start-ups.

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Additionally, according to Deutsche Bank and the Bank of International Settlements, the number of zombie companies in the eurozone and the United States, large companies that cannot cover their interest expense costs with operating profits, has rocketed to new all-time highs.

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“Europe’s productivity problem is partly due to the rise of zombie firms that crowd out growth opportunities for others.” This problem is only increasing in the current crisis.

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The rise in bond defaults is a consequence of previous high leverage in a weakening operating income environment. This should not be a concern if creative destruction works to improve the economy, as inefficient companies are taken over by efficient ones and new investors restructure challenged businesses to make them competitive. The big problem is that massive liquidity and low rates are perpetuating overcapacity and keeping an extraordinary amount of zombie firms alive.

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Maintaining and increasing zombie firms destroys any positive effect from restructuring and innovation. Additionally, to maintain cash flows and stay alive, companies are cutting investment in innovation, technology, and research. Meanwhile, small businesses that do not have access to debt or own hard assets are dissolving every day.

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In most developed economies, where 80 percent of employment comes from small businesses, the “bailout of everything” is becoming a massive transfer of wealth from the new economy to the old economy, preventing a stronger and more productive recovery.

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The “Bailout of Everything” (as long as it’s large) creates significant risks. Low productivity and indebted sectors survive, creating a perverse incentive that benefits malinvestment and poor capital allocation. Additionally, as these sectors already had overcapacity and structural problems, their bailout does not lead to higher job creation or stronger investment. Furthermore, high-productivity sectors will likely suffer the tax burden that rises after these governments’ rescue plans, diminishing the employment potential and the likelihood of rising real wages as productivity growth stalls."

Trechos retirados de "The Risk of the ‘Bailout of Everything’"

"perder o terrível complexo de salvar empresas que não têm salvação"

"se Portugal precisa de novas empresas, também precisa de fechar as que não são produtivas. E são muitas…
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Pegando nas críticas à baixa produtividade, e às responsabilidades que o ministro atribuiu aos bancos nesse domínio, Siza Vieira devia ter lembrado que Portugal tem de perder o terrível complexo de salvar empresas que não têm salvação. Nomeadamente aquelas que por cada dificuldade que enfrentam, pedem a ajuda do Estado. Seja pela concessão de subsídios, seja pelas facilidades no pagamento de impostos e/ou de contribuições para a Segurança Social, seja pela pressão para manter postos de trabalho que não fazem sentido (a propósito, sabe quantos postos de trabalho desnecessários a Altice mantém?).
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os recursos que os governos (de direita e de esquerda) dedicam a salvar empresas inviáveis são recursos que fazem falta para deixar florescer as empresas novas, com modelos de negócio inovadores."

Como não recordar o nosso:

• Deixem morrer as empresas (Janeiro de 2020, Dezembro de 2018)
• Gabiche? (Dezembro de 2018)
• No país dos zombies, porque não se morre... (Abril de 2018)

Trechos retirados de "Precisamos de novas empresas? Sim, mas..."

Activismo e cronyismo

“A market economy is never static. Products that are cutting-edge today will soon become commodified and easy to make. Industries that are on the technological frontier will become mainstream and, later, relics of the past. What is a good job today will inevitably become a bad job in the future. This dynamic was first recognized by Karl Marx, who thought that it was evidence of the inherent instability of the capitalist system. Eighty years later, however, the Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter pointed out that instead of being a flaw, this process of “creative destruction” is capitalism’s greatest strength and its engine of growth.
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The Princeton economist Alan Blinder recently noted that in the 1950s, companies making television sets were at the heart of America’s high-tech sector and generating tens of thousands of high-paying jobs. After a while TV sets became just another easy-to-make commodity, and today no TV set is made in America. The computer manufacturing industry picked up where the TV industry left off, and for a while it was responsible for 400,000 high-paying jobs. We saw earlier that most of these jobs have now moved elsewhere. But this is not a sign of failure. Indeed, it is a sign of success. To remain prosperous, a society needs to keep climbing the innovation ladder. As Schumpeter argued, it is the dynamic that has been ensuring our prosperity since the beginning of the industrial revolution.
The crucial question for America’s future is therefore whether our innovation clusters can adapt and reinvent themselves to maintain their edge. Clusters, unlike diamonds, are not forever. At some point the industry that supports them matures, stops bringing prosperity, and turns into a liability. The forces of attraction provide an important advantage, but once-mighty clusters have collapsed in spectacular ways.”

Recordo Nassim Taleb: "Stressors are information", são sinais para calibrarmos a quantidade relativa de exploration versus exploitation. Perante os stressors há os que os agarram e, como os ratos do livro "Quem mexeu no meu queijo", interagem com a nova realidade. E há os que, como o Pigarro do mesmo livro, resistem à mudança e solicitam o apoio e a protecção dos governos, gerando toda uma série de doenças por causa do veneno do activismo.

Como não recordar logo o exemplo do leite ou do vinho na Madeira? Entretanto, na semana passada vi várias reportagens em que uns coitadinhos pediam apoios porque o aquecimento global lhes queimou uvas e fruta. Admitamos que efectivamente há um aquecimento global em curso, antropogénico ou não. Então, o melhor é estes coitadinhos mudarem de culturas ASAP.

Outro exemplo da economia deficiente. Nos EUA, "Harvard Business School professor: Half of American colleges will be bankrupt in 10 to 15 years". Por cá, tudo será feito para atrasar a mudança, torrando dinheiro impostado/roubado aos contribuintes para manter o status-quo.


BTW: Os romanos tinham vinhas nos Alpes, sinal de que o clima era mais quente que o dos últimos séculos. Imaginem os produtores de vinho suíço a receberem apoios desde há 2000 anos. Que renda!

Excerto de: Enrico Moretti. “The New Geography of Jobs”

Quando o mundo muda e o locus de controlo

Quando o mundo muda as empresas... as organizações com o locus de controlo no exterior viram-se para o papá-Estado a pedir apoios, a pedir protecção, a pedir arranjinhos, a pedir ... crony capitalism.

Quando o mundo muda as organizações com o locus de controlo no interior fazem perguntas, tomam decisões, avançam e testam:

"Anyone in retail needs to ask themselves a set of important questions that weren’t relevant post–World War II because in that era they were obvious questions. Stepping outside and reconsidering the dynamics of the retail world, these questions include:
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Price strategy. Do you want to compete on price? If the answer is yes, then it’s going to be increasingly difficult to retail in physical stores. There’s an extra step in the supply chain, and the economics simply don’t make sense. In a market of near-perfect pricing knowledge, price-sensitive buyers gravitate to the cheapest price unless the warehouse and the store are one and the same. ... They are more a bulk warehouse pick-up system than a traditional retailer. In general, online will win the price battle because price leadership is about low-cost infrastructure, and extra links in the retail chain do not make for low cost.
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Product range strategy. Do you want to have a large or lean product range? Clearly, online will win the large-range battle. It doesn’t have the physical constraints of shelves and the cost of big stores. Online needs fewer places for the actual goods. In this world bricks-and-mortar retail can’t win a product-range battle, it can only win a uniqueness and customised one. It’s only a matter of time before widely distributed product brand owners start competing with retailers.
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Location strategy: What’s our physical location about? For online players it’s an easy decision: find a location that facilitates effective delivery. For stores it’s much more than that. If the store is merely about acquiring the product, then in a connected world it has no reason to exist. A physical store needs to be a place of entertainment, education, co-creation and socialisation — a maison and experience that satisfies the five senses. Stores need to be events, not re-sellers.[Moi ici: Dedicado a leitora de Aveiro]
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Attention strategy: Will people use their feet or their fingers to find us? If it’s fingers (online), we have two simple choices: have an über niche audience that loves what we do because it’s unique, or have a kicking SEO (Search Engine Optimisation) strategy that’s first-page worthy. Both of these realities show a clear strategy: survival in retail is about being the cheapest or the nicest. Anything in between can’t compete or will get lost in a world of infinite supply."

Imaginem o tempo perdido com o papá-Estado, que aproveita para dar o seu abraço pedófilo com a impostagem normanda como contrapartida para o suposto apoio, tempo que não pode ser dedicado a reflexão e acção interna.

Trechos retirados de "The Great Fragmentation : why the future of business is small" de Steve Sammartino

Crony capitalism

Em "Edge Strategy" encontrei uma história interessante:

"The story begins in 1947 at Frank Urich's convenience store in Los Angeles.
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A born entrepreneur, Urich opened the world s rst self-service gas station. This was long before automation, so he still required some attendants, typically gliding from pump to pump on roller skates collecting cash and resetting the meters for the next customer. But the reduction in labor costs was signicant and meant that Urich could offer his customers a better deal.
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Yet, for all this, the gas stations that offered full service continued to dominate the business. It helped that these were mostly owned by deep-pocketed oil companies that spent a fortune lobbying state regulators to prohibit their self-service rivals. Two years after Urich s pioneering move, New Jersey was persuaded to prohibit self-service gas stations. They are still banned there."