Mongo decorre desta evolução natural

 Imagem retirada de "The Countries With The Most Craft Breweries"

"there are two separate types of firms operating: generalists and specialists.
...
Generalists are able to attract resources or consumers from the wide range of competitive dimension whereas specialists attract only a limited range. Although competing firms operate in the same market, there can be significant differences between consumers within this market. Consider the example of the market for beer: beer drinkers are distributed amongst age and social status, with a majority of consumers being of a middle social status and are middle aged. Generalists can (and do) target this mass market. Specialists may however target a particular part of the market, for example providing products that are attractive to older or younger consumers or provide specific products that appeal to lower or higher status consumers. These differences matter, in that ‘niches’ emerge where there exists an opportunity for a specialist to enter the market and gain market share from the incumbent firms.
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In early competition, generalists enter the market and tend to compete at the center of the market, without necessarily competing head-to-head.
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In further competition, the market may not be able to support two generalists, and one may be selected, forming a niche where the customers of the second firm are no longer served. This periphery of the market becomes unserved and exposed meaning that specialists are able to enter the market in these locations. These niches are often ‘legitimated’ by the entry of more specialists, and movement barriers may persist based on the difficulty for consumers to return to a generalist product.
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Finally, these niches take away customers from the incumbents, meaning that the generalist firm has fewer customers. Since the distribution of customers moves towards the niche supplier, these niche locations become ‘legitimated’.
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Therefore, as concentration of the industry increases it may mean superficially that it is an unattractive industry, and that the generalist firm is not satisfying the needs of peripheral customers. Rather than considering this as an unattractive industry, this can be an ideal breeding ground for specialist firms willing to offer a product closer to the needs of these peripheral customers."

Mongo decorre desta evolução natural.
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Trechos retirados de "The Dynamics of Strategy - Mastering Strategic Landscapes of the Firm" de Duncan Robertson e Adrián Caldart.

Outra previsão deste blogue

"The MIT professor credits some of the Chinese slowdown to the steady march of "near-shoring" (or reshoring) which is building products near the client
...
 "15% of U.S. companies responded that they were "definitively" planning" to move production back to the USA." The Professor identified a more recent survey showing a doubling of Reshoring with "32% already completed the process of Reshoring or was close to finishing so they could "meet end-market demand." Even more reassuring is the fact that "48% said near-shoring activities are likely within the next one to three years."
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The professor believes that "the world is in the middle of a transformation, with companies moving from a global manufacturing strategy, whose focus is on low-cost countries, to a more regional strategy, where China is for China, the United States (or Mexico and Latin America) is for the Americas.""

Recordar Maio de 2006 e "O regresso dos clientes" e conjugar com "Recuperação de pólo industrial em Famalicão gera 500 postos de trabalho até 2017" onde se pode ler ler:

"Grande parte do investimento está a ser canalizada para a unidade de acabamento e tricotagem onde estão a ser montados os primeiros 68 de um total de 192 teares."

Isto é um sinal de quê?
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Trecho retirado de "Four Teutonic Shifts Boost USA Manufacturing & Cause China's Stumble"

Polarização balanceada

Recupero a figura que se segue, do artigo "The Vanishing Middle Market" que referi em "Porque não podemos ser uma Arca de Noé! (II)"

E chamo a atenção para o Grupo 1: onde se verifica a polarização mercado (crescimento simultâneo do premium e do low-cost, com o desaparecimento do meio-termo). No Grupo 1 está a cerveja na Europa e na Alemanha.
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Por um lado assistimos à explosão da cerveja artesanal. Os números são impressivos. Ver: "THE YEAR IN BEER: 2014 CRAFT BEER IN REVIEW FROM THE BREWERS ASSOCIATION" (Gostei sobretudo desta demonstração de Mongo:

"Craft beer appreciators are becoming as diverse as craft beer itself."

Por outro lado, assistimos a esta consolidação das consolidações:

• "Cervejas: SABMiller estará disponível para uma oferta potencial da AB InBev";
• "Dona da Budweiser quer rival e controlar metade dos lucros da indústria cervejeira"

Promover a imperfeição dos mercados

"Companies in the top one-fifth of profitability earn, in aggregate, about 70 times more economic profit (accounting profit less cost of capital) than those in the middle three-fifths combined, according to McKinsey’s database of 3,000 large, publicly listed, nonfinancial U.S. firms.[Moi ici: A importância da idiossincrasia no desempenho das empresas]
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Moreover, the economic profit of companies that were in the top fifth in 1997 (at the start of the dataset) grew by close to 50% over the subsequent 15 years, so that the gap between the most and least profitable firms in the sample increased over time.[Moi ici: O que aqui não é dito, e acho grave, é que a maioria dos que estavam no topo em 1997 já não fazem parte desse topo 15 anos depois]
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Sound familiar? Even in the corporate world, the rich are getting richer.[Moi ici: Reler última nota]
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[Moi ici: Segue-se algo em linha com a minha proposta da concorrência imperfeita] this phenomenon of rising competitive intensity does not, evidently, apply to all firms. An increasing number of U.S. companies have enjoyed supernormal rates of return. In 1960, only a tiny proportion of major American firms earned an ROIC of 50% or more. The proportion rose slowly and relatively steadily, reaching 5% by the mid-1990s. It then leapt suddenly to 14% by the 2005–2007 period.
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So although you might expect that in a hypercompetitive environment, ambitious companies would constantly wrest market share from the leading firms, the reality is quite the opposite.
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It appears that some firms have recently become rather insulated from competition and that the performance of these corporate “haves” is diverging from that of the large majority of “have-nots.”
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So when billionaire Peter Thiel writes that “there is an enormous difference between perfect competition and monopoly, and most businesses are much closer to one extreme than we commonly realize,” he is onto something."

É preciso olhar para a paisagem competitiva e perceber que se está a enrugar

Os inteligentes não continuam a competir pelo velho e único BIG HIT, perceberam que há muitos picos isolados.

Trechos retirados de "Even for Companies, the U.S. Is Split Between Haves and Have-Nots"

"Listen very carefully, I shall say this only once."

Ontem, ao final do dia li um relatório da IHRSA, sobre o fitness na Europa e nos EUA, em breve terei de escrever sobre ele.
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Hoje, li "Près de 10 % des élevages sont « au bord du dépôt de bilan », selon Stéphane Le Foll", outro texto que merece uma reflexão futura.
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E, enquanto inspeccionava o estado das amoras silvestres da zona onde caminho, a minha mente fez uma viagem ao passado, recuando quase 10 anos. Foi no último trimestre de 2005 que recebi esta revista:

O número 4 de 2005 da revista The McKinsey Quarterly.
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Nas primeiras páginas encontrei um curto artigo que, tal como o de Marn e Rosiello na HBR, mexeu com o meu mindset e ainda hoje o alimenta.

O artigo é este "The vanishing middle market" de Trond Riiber Knudsen, Andreas Randel, e Jørgen Rugholm (escrevi sobre ele no blogue em 2006).
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A ideia do artigo, escrito antes da Grande Recessão iniciada em 2007, a ideia da polarização dos mercados, ajuda a perceber, a interpretar os sinais sobre o futuro do fitness, ou as alternativas para sair da espiral compressora que persegue os produtores de carne e leite.
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O artigo incluía umas figuras que todos os empresários deviam conhecer:
"Executives recognize that premium and no-frills offerings are squeezing middle-of-the-road products and services in many industries. Our study of 25 industries and product categories in Europe, North America, and on the global level shows the extent of this phenomenon, known as market polarization. We found that, from 1999 to 2004, the growth rate of revenues for midtier products and services trailed the market average by nearly 6 percent a year.
...

Que fatias do mercado cresciam?
Que fatia do mercado decrescia?
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Onde estão os Davids?
Onde estão os Golias?
Golias e David competem entre si, ou pertencem a campeonatos diferentes?
Que vantagens competitivas tem quem está no mercado do meio-termo?
Onde está o low-cost puro?
Onde estão os nichos e boutiques?
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Este exemplo retirado do mercado da refrigeração na Europa é bem elucidativo:

Que fatias crescem em unidades vendidas?
Que fatias crescem em vendas?
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O que é que o século XX sempre protagonizou? O que é que da mentalidade do século XX se impregnou como senso comum nas mentes dos empresários, académicos, políticos e paineleiros?
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Trabalhar, produzir, servir a norma, servir o mercado de massas:

O que está a acontecer ao mercado de massas no século XXI?
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Está a encolher e a transferir-se para o low-cost.
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Isto gera uma espiral de eficientismo desenfreado que premeia uns poucos e esmaga a maioria dos produtores, prisioneiros mentais do século XX e do mundo onde nasceram e cresceram.
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Qual o mercado que cresce?
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O dos nichos, o das boutiques, o da especialização:

Analisemos então, o casos dos produtores de carne e de leite.
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Continua.

Ter uma estratégia clara = escolhas claras = ideias claras = desejar sucesso à concorrência (parte VI)

Parte I, parte II, parte III, parte IV e parte V.

E volto às entrevistas incluídas no relatório "European Health & Fitness Market - Report 2015" da Deloitte, desta feita com John Treharne, CEO do Gymn Group.

"Could you briefly describe the concept of The Gym Group? What sets your company apart from the competitors?
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We were the first low-cost operator open 24/7 in the UK. Furthermore, there are three other key parts of our business. First of all, we do offer competitive prices in relation to our 24/7-concept. Then, we implemented a very high technology-driven business, which differentiates us very much from the rest of the UK health club market. Another key part is that we have a no contract environment, so that members can join for any period. [Moi ici: Outra proposta diferente, outra combinação de oferta - low-price; aberto 24/7; muita tecnologia; e sem a amarra de um contrato. Como se houvesse uma lista de atributos e cada um destes entrevistados escolheu um modelo de negócio baseado em diferentes atributos e diferentes combinações, para servir diferentes segmentos da procura]
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From your point of view, what are the major trends and developments in the fitness industry that influence your company now and also in the future? ...
Work-life balance now receives higher significance. Additionally, I think the UK market is becoming more competitive in the local sector similar to the top market, which is also growing very quickly.
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I think the market will concentrate on special facilities, which might be special PT facilities, special cycling facilities or others. They will satisfy customers' wants and needs as well as their particular wishes and interests. So my guess is that the market requires more micro clubs, which offer only one special product so that customers can access exactly what they want without distraction from other things. [Moi ici: A caminho de Mongo, o acelerar do bailado entre o aumento da heterogeneidade da procura, a alimentar e a ser alimentado por um aumento da heterogeneidade da oferta]
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Is there further growth potential in the fitness industry in general; if so, in what regions or segments?
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What is happening already is the premium end of the market continues to grow and we will see the local sector grow very rapidly as it has done elsewhere in Europe. These concentrations lead to the mid-market being squeezed so that they have to move further up to the premium end of the market or have to become lower segment rather than to stay in the mid-market or stuck in the middle. [Moi ici: O velho fenómeno da polarização dos mercados e do "stuck-in-the-middle"]
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In recent years, low-cost operators have significantly impacted the European health and fitness industry. How would you characterise their role in the UK market today and will this trend continue in the near future?
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My personal belief is that the UK health market will continue to grow, but I do think it will be sector specific. We observe that over 35% of our members who join each month have never visited a health dub, sports centre or gym before, which is driven by a number of things. Prices reflect one important factor, but also the concept of 24/7 operation. This enables us to attract people like doctors, nurses, bus drivers etc. We are available to them, whenever they want. This is the key behind 24/7 operation."

Continua.

"how prices are framed and the context of the purchase significantly influence our willingness to pay"

"When economists were treating preference, price, and value as stable and absolute, Kahneman, Tversky, and other psychologists argued that in the human mind, everything is relative and depends on context. And when we say everything we really mean everything, from judgments of physical attractiveness to judgments of  reference, price, and value. Almost all human judgments are made in relation to a reference point.
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“Our perception of, and reaction to, reality is subjective. How you feel about products, or even about your life, is at least as important, and probably much more  important, than the product or your life’s objective characteristics.”
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the brain didn’t evolve to perceive reality as it is. It evolved to make approximations that are reliable.
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Coherent arbitrariness tells us that absolute preferences are volatile, but relative preferences are stable. This creates an illusion of order that disguises the largely arbitrary nature of how we value things.
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If we accept coherent arbitrariness, we should dismiss (or at least discourage) the idea that market price is solely determined by a balance between demand and supply. [Moi ici: Ehehehe subversão para cima da tríade] Just like the valuation of the man’s wealth depends on his wife’s sister’s husband, his willingness to pay for a product depends on his perception of fairness, not a cold calculation of what the product should be worth based on its market price. The behavioral economist would argue that even though market price is not entirely arbitrary - no one could get away with selling a six-pack of beer for one thousand dollars - how prices are framed and the context of the purchase significantly influence our willingness to pay.
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The second interpretation is that high and low anchors make us feel like we’re deciding rationally, even though we’re probably just responding to social pressures and loss aversion—we don’t want to be perceived as cheap, but we don’t want to get ripped off, so we opt for the middle option.
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in the luxury trade where expensive items that don’t sell change what does. Thus, if a retailer wants to sell a pair of shoes that cost $100, they should put them next to a pair of shoes that cost $150. That way, the retailer will activate the trade-off contrast principle, which says that if item X is clearly better than item Y consumers will tend to buy X, even when X is only better relative to Y—and potentially worse than comparable items.[Moi ici: Recordar o exemplo das conservas da Comur]
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Neoclassical economic models predict that customers weigh all the options rationally. In reality, when we encounter too much choice - just like we would in a shoe store - we tend to opt for items that we can justify. We talk ourselves into X because it looks better than Y."

Deliciosos trechos retirados de "What Makes Us Tick?"

E quando o "é meter código nisso" vier subverter o seu modelo de negócio? Mete uma providência cautelar?

Na sequência de "Microgestão, jongleurs, bilhar e convite" onde escrevi:

"Imaginem um fabricante de palmilhas, muito certinho, muito eficiente, confiante no casulo da sua pacata rotina de conforto, sempre acreditando que no dia seguinte o queijo lá estará à sua espera.
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Agora, imaginem um novo player a entrar no mercado e a seguir a máxima deste blogue "é meter código nisso"..."

Encontrei um artigo sobre o tema e com uma perspectiva muito interessante, "Break your product into new markets by raising the price". O autor começa por recordar o famoso livro "O Dilema do Inovador" e, a lição de como fazer frente a eventuais disruptores na base do mercado. Depois, a coisa torna-se muito mais atraente:

"today, more and more companies are learning the hard way that a competitor that caters to the high-end of the market could upend them. Disruption is coming from all sides, not just the bottom. The challenge is to innovate toward the middle, but you can start from anywhere.
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Honeywell experienced this firsthand when Nest’s Learning Thermostat arrived on the scene in 2011. The massive conglomerate had done exactly what Christensen advised: they catered to the low-end of the market by selling $30 thermostats. But what they didn’t anticipate was that a beautifully designed, high-end model - priced eight times higher than their product - would beat them at their own game. [Moi ici: O mesmo fenómeno que aconteceu com o mercado dos aspiradores, "98 anos eliminados em 18 meses ao dobro do preço"] ...
starting at the top provides an advantage that low-end disruption lacks: it allows you to imbue your brand with aspiration."

A quantos e quantos produtores poderá acontecer este choque contra a parede de uma nova realidade?
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A quantos poderá acontecer surgir um concorrente novo, completamente out-of-the-blue, com um produto com um design superior e com código imbuído? Código que permitirá toda uma nova constelação de parcerias.
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Será que vão praticar o desporto nacional das providências cautelares?
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Não esqueça o nosso convite:

Inscrição.

E, no fim, ganha a Alemanha

Ontem, no JdN, no artigo "Desvalorização do euro pode substituir queda dos salários?", podia ler-se:

"Alemanha é quem mais ganha?
O BCE estima que uma depreciação de 10% do euro, faz aumentar 0,4% o PIB da Zona Euro e 0,6% a inflação. Embora se antecipem ganhos para Portugal a partir deste movimento, há quem aponte que os principais beneficiários serão os grandes países, com a Alemanha à cabeça."

A Alemanha será a mais beneficiada mas não por ser grande.
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Dolan e Simon em "Power Pricing" justificam de forma clara porque é que a Alemanha ganha mais com a desvalorização do euro, por causa da assimetria das gamas de preço:

"Many markets have a structure in which brands or products are aligned on a "value-map" of perceived product value vs. price as shown in Figure 4.4. This particular map shows three market tiers: economy, middle market, and premium.[Moi ici: Consideremos, por exemplo, o sector da maquinaria onde marcas alemãs e portuguesas concorrem. Normalmente, a marca alemã é mais cara, e compete no tier-premium. A marca portuguesa, mais barata, compete no tier-middle market]"

Normalmente, as marcas do tier-economy não competem directamente com as do tier-middle ou com as do tier premium. Normalmente, a competição ocorre dentro de cada tier.

"The appropriate number of tiers to utilize is situation specific. A two-tier (branded vs. nonbranded) separation is sometimes useful. ... Regardless of the number of tiers, the essential point is the same: one's chosen position on the "value-map" effectively implies a strategy and defines a relevant competitive set. ...

• competition within a price-tier is typically more vigorous than across tiers. 

• there is an asymmetry in competition across tiers. Price cuts by higher quality tiers are more powerful in pulling customers up from lower tiers, than lower tier price cuts are in pulling customers down from upper tiers; i.e., customers "trade up" more readily than they "trade down." 

Pictorially, we show this in Figure 4-5 for a two-tier market, which for simplicity we show as having two premium brands P1 and P2 and two economy brands E1 and E2. 

...

Figure 4-5 shows a "fence" separating the premium and economy tiers. The "fence" denotes the fact that a price cut by any brand typically impacts its same-tier competitors more strongly. ... A price cut by premium tier brand P1 draws to it economy tier buyers - who are able to slip through the spacing in the "picket fence" portion at the upper left end of the fence. That is, P1, has some clout in being able to induce customers from the economy tier to "trade up" to it. However, if E2 cuts price, the premium brand buyers conceptually crash into the solid portion of the fence on the lower right, without trading down to the economy segment. E2's price cut can increase its sales volume - by drawing El customers or increasing the category consumption rate - but it will not draw many customers away from the premium brands."

Assim, facilmente se percebe porque é que a Alemanha ganha mais, porque tem mais marcas premium.

A polarização dos mercados já vem de longe

Na senda de “The vanishing middle market” (Maio de 2006) e do fenómeno da polarização dos mercados, "How a Two-Tier Economy Is Reshaping the U.S. Marketplace":
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E, já agora, "Rushing to Cater to America’s Rich"

Acerca de Mongo (parte II)

Na sequência de "Acerca de Mongo" mais um interessante sobre o futuro do trabalho em Mongo em "The future of work":

"Using the now ubiquitous platform of the smartphone to deliver labour and services in a variety of new ways will challenge many of the fundamental assumptions of 20th-century capitalism, from the nature of the firm to the structure of careers.
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The idea that having a good job means being an employee of a particular company is a legacy of a period that stretched from about 1880 to 1980. The huge companies created by the Industrial Revolution brought armies of workers together, often under a single roof. In its early stages this was a step down for many independent artisans who could no longer compete with machine-made goods; it was a step up for day-labourers who had survived by selling their labour to gang masters.
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Thus more and more of the routine parts of knowledge work can be parcelled out to individuals, just as they were previously parcelled out to companies. This could be bad news for the business models of professional-service companies which use juniors to do fairly routine work—thus providing the firm with income and the juniors with training—while the partners do the more sophisticated stuff. As on-demand solutions and automation prove applicable to more and more routine work, that model becomes hard to sustain.
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The on-demand economy is unlikely to be a happy experience for people who value stability more than flexibility: middle-aged professionals with children to educate and mortgages to pay. On the other hand it is likely to benefit people who value flexibility more than security: students who want to supplement their incomes; bohemians who can afford to dip in and out of the labour market; young mothers who want to combine bringing up children with part-time jobs; the semi-retired, whether voluntarily so or not."

E é pena que não compreendam que a sua paixão é uma vantagem competitiva

Mongo por todo o lado:

"When Randy Komisar walks around his house, he sees the future of retail quite clearly. ... about two-thirds of the objects in his house are commodity products: paper towels, socks, toothpaste, and a whole pile of other things that can be bought at Wal-Mart Stores (WMT) or on Amazon.com (AMZN). The remaining third of his stuff is more distinctive and harder to procure: high-end cowboy boots, custom-made bicycles, New Belgium beer. That slim, specialized slice of commerce is arguably the best place to cultivate a retail company these days.

Turning out a noncommodity product is the only antidote to the economies of scale powering the modern retail behemoths. [Moi ici: Não nos cansamos de o escrever e defender e, por isso, apreciamos Mongo]
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there’s room in the market for a whole new wave of specialized, hyperfocused retailers.
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1. Amazon Can’t Be Stopped … The supply chains of the retail giants, at this point, are too massive and technologically advanced to beat. Unless a product is distinctive in some way,
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2. … but Amazon Can Be Survived. There are plenty of things that giant retailers don’t do well, particularly connecting with consumers and selling small-batch stuff.
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3. Technology Makes It Possible for Small Retail to Thrive.
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4. The “Mushy Middle” Is a Wasteland. The future will get increasingly bleak for companies that don’t have the scale of Amazon or the unique wares and agility of e-commerce startups. [Moi ici: A polarização dos mercados continua, o middle-market continua a esvair-se. Esta frase provocatória exprime bem o que muitas vezes sinto "Look past the logos and you’ll find they are merely managers of vast real estate and marketing operations.". E é pena que os apaixonados empresários de muitas PME não compreendam que a sua paixão é uma vantagem competitiva]
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5. Turning Commodities Back Into Specialized Products. The true opportunities for retail entrepreneurs—the so-called white space—lie in improving products people have long considered commodities.
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6. All You Need Is Other People’s Love. Make a product people love. Provide customer service they love. And keep costs low, so prices will be equally lovable."

Agora, tentem encontrar pontes entre estas marcas, estas boutiques, estas lojas, independentes e a série "E quem puder dar esse acompanhamento superior"

Trechos retirados de "A Retail Playbook for How the Small Can Survive the Age of Amazon"

A fórmula para um mundo perfeito

"Then the economists, many on the left but some on the right, in quick succession 1880 to the present - at the same time that trade-tested betterment was driving real wages up and up and up - commenced worrying about, to name a few of the grounds for pessimisms they discerned concerning ”capitalism”: greed, alienation, racial impurity, workers’ lack of bargaining strength, women working, workers’ bad taste in consumption, immigration of lesser breeds, monopoly, unemployment, business cycles, increasing returns, externalities, under-consumption, monopolistic competition, separation of ownership from control, lack of planning, post-War stagnation, investment spillovers, unbalanced growth, dual labor markets, capital insufficiency, peasant irrationality, capital-market imperfections, public choice, missing markets, informational asymmetry, third-world exploitation, advertising, regulatory capture, free riding, low-level traps, middle-level traps, path dependency, lack of competitiveness, consumerism, consumption externalities, irrationality, hyperbolic discounting, too big to fail, environmental degradation, underpaying of care, overpayment of CEOs, slower growth, and more.
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One can line up the later items in the list, and some of the earlier ones revived à la Piketty or Krugman, with particular Nobel Memorial Prizes in Economic Science. I will not name here the men (all men, in sharp contrast to the method of Elinor Ostrom, Nobel 2009), but can reveal their formula: first, discover or rediscover a necessary condition for perfect competition or a perfect world (in Piketty’s case, for example, a more perfect equality of income). Then assert without evidence (here Piketty does a great deal better than the usual practice) but with suitable mathematical ornamentation (thus Jean Tirole, Nobel 2014) that the condition might be imperfectly realized or the world might not develop in a perfect way. Then conclude with a flourish (here however Piketty falls in with the usual low scientific standard) that “capitalism” is doomed unless experts intervene with a sweet use of the monopoly of violence in government to implement anti-trust against malefactors of great wealth or subsidies to diminishing-returns industries or foreign aid to perfectly honest governments or money for obviously infant industries or the nudging of sadly childlike consumers or, Piketty says, a tax on inequality-causing capital worldwide.
A feature of this odd history of fault-finding and the proposed statist corrections, is that seldom does the economic thinker feel it necessary to offer evidence that his (mostly “his”) proposed state intervention will work as it is supposed to, and almost never does he feel it necessary to offer evidence that the imperfectly attained necessary condition for perfection before intervention is large enough to have reduced much the performance of the economy in aggregate.
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The economists didn’t say how to attain the knowledge to do it, or how much their non-quantitative advice would actually help an imperfect government to get closer to the perfect society."

Trecho retirado de "Measured, Unmeasured, Mismeasured, and Unjustified Pessimism: A Review Essay of Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twentieth Century" de Deirdre Nansen McCloskey.

Promoção da batota de criar ou descobrir, e alavancar a imperfeição no mercado

Há anos que promovemos descaradamente a batota de criar ou descobrir, e alavancar a imperfeição no mercado.
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Assim, é sempre interessante descobrir gente que usa a mesma linguagem que nós:

"For a company to beat the market by capturing and retaining an economic surplus there must be an imperfection that stops or at least slows the working of the market. An imperfection controlled by a company is a competitive advantage. The best companies are emulated by those in the middle of the pack, and the worst exit or undergo significant reform. Good strategies emphasize difference—versus your direct competitors, versus potential substitutes, and versus potential entrants.
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Know your competitive advantage, and you’ve answered the question of why you make money (and vice versa).
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The need to beat the market begs the question of which market. Research shows that the unit of analysis used in determining strategy (essentially, the degree to which a market is segmented) significantly influences resource allocation and thus the likelihood of success: dividing the same businesses in different ways leads to strikingly different capital allocations.
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Defining and understanding segments correctly is one of the most practical things a company can do to improve its strategy."

Trechos retirados de "Have you tested your strategy lately?"

"value creation processes and value outcomes" (parte II)

Parte I.
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Um alerta para as diferentes formas de abordar os "value outcomes":

"Value outcomesThe value outcome logics concern how an actor determines the value outcome. Three of the four categories of value outcome determination logics, that is, value as means–ends, value as benefits/sacrifices, and value as experience outcomes, are consistent with the previously conducted reviews on customer value literature. The fourth category, value outcome as phenomenological, was identified from the S-D logic literature.
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Value as means–ends. The first approach, value in accordance with mean–end theories inspects product evaluations as chains from the object characteristics to use consequences. According to this view, value can be appreciated at different levels of abstraction, with product attributes at the lowest, attribute performances at the middle, and goals and purposes at the highest level.
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Value as benefits/sacrifices. This research stream views value as a cognitive judgment of utility made by a customer based on inputs (benefits) and outputs (sacrifices). In its simplest form, it is a ratio between service quality (benefit) and costs (sacrifice) or even an assessment of a product being a good buy. The benefits may include several quality dimensions but also relationships, time-to-market, know-how, and social benefits. Sacrifices range from monetary to non-monetary.
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Value as experience outcomes. Value as experience outcomes aims to supplement and enrich the view of customers as logical decision makers by seeing humans as emotional sensation-seekers
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value as an ‘interactive, relativistic preference experience’, meaning that value is an experience based on interaction between a subject and an object as well as relative. The relativism refers to three aspects of value: value is comparative (varying between objects for a certain person), personal assessment (what is valuable for one person need not be that to another), and situational, that is, context specific. Thus, the value of an object is dependent on the context in which the judgment occurs.
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S-D Logic‘value is always co-created with and determined by the customer (value-in-use)’.
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value is created when the customer’s ‘wellbeing has somehow been improved’ and exemplify this with a customer feeling relieved because the service has fulfilled its value proposition and has been integrated in the customer’s life. Overall, the emphasis is on value-in-use and it seems close to value as experiential."

"Think Differently About Scale"

Outra nota retirada de "The Disappearing Middle Is a Real Market Threat — Here’s What Firms Can Do" que muito nos apraz é esta:

"Think Differently About Scale.
Historically, we have thought about the benefits of scale as being cost or supply based — with more scale comes the ability to offer the same set of benefits at lower cost. But this is no longer the case. Indeed, in category after category, technology and the globalization of production has made smaller offerings more economically viable. An offering that is tailored to appeal to a small segment of people — who are willing to pay a lot for it — is far more likely to be successful in today’s global, digitally-connected business environment. [Moi ici: I rest my case. O que é isto senão a base para Mongo, para o Estranhistão onde "we are all weird"]
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As a result, aiming for the “middle of the market” is no longer necessary to drive business success. For large companies, the advantage of scale will no longer come from applying it just to the supply side of the business, but also the demand side. With scale comes the ability to generate superior consumer understanding, something most companies spend relatively little to understand."

A Grande Recessão não o gerou, apenas o acentuou

Via Twitter, fui encaminhado para este texto "The Disappearing Middle Is a Real Market Threat — Here’s What Firms Can Do" onde leio logo à cabeça:

"The Great Recession forced consumers to drastically rethink their purchase behaviors and, even though many have regained their financial footing in the five years since the downturn officially ended, those buying patterns have remained. As a result, more and more products are moving toward the “value” or “premium” ends of the spectrum, leaving a middle market that is struggling to remain relevant."

 Não creio que esta tendência tenha sido criada pela Grande Recessão. Terá, quando muito, acelerado uma tendência que vinha de trás.
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Nunca me esqueço de um brilhante artigo na The McKinsey Quarterly de Novembro de 2005, “The vanishing middle market”. Muito antes do choque da Grande Recessão.
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Recordar também "Polarização do mercado ou como David e Golias podem co-existir"

um sintoma de que doença(s)?

Durante mais uma caminhada, tive oportunidade de ler este relatório da consultora Roland Berger "Escaping the commodity trap – How to regain a competitive edge in commodity markets". Um tema e um desafio que tratamos, há vários anos, quer neste blogue quer no dia-a-dia profissional.

"A "commodity trap" describes a situation where even complex products and services are downgraded to "commodities", with limited differentiation and where competition is primarily price-based – this is due to a combination of developments experienced by customers, competitors and in products/technologies
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The commodity trap is a phenomenon found in all industries – over 60% of the study participants have been affected, 54% have yet to take sufficient action to escape (and among affected companies even 65%). At many companies, there is a significant gap between recognizing the commodity trap and reacting accordingly [Moi ici: Quem são os clientes de uma consultora como a Roland Berger? Qual será a tipologia das empresas que fazem parte do universo questionado?].
In most industries, commoditization already started some 5 years ago – almost all industries report their low-end market segments as being affected, [Moi ici: Algo perfeitamente expectável, já o que se segue começou por me chocar...] more than half of the participants also see their middle segments being hit and about 20% face commoditization even in their premium segments." [Moi ici: O que significa isto? Isto é um sintoma de que doença(s)? Como não fazer a ponte para esta interrogação do Paulo Peres "Marcas serão mais vulneráveis no futuro?" ou para aquela que parece ser a ideia-base do livro que tenho na lista para ler "Absolute Value: What Really Influences Customers in the Age of (Nearly) Perfect Information" de Itamar Simonsen and e Emanual Rosen. Faz algum sentido uma oferta premium estar comoditizada? Não é um sintoma de um profundo distanciamento entre clientes e marcas?]

No final a consultora apresenta 5 factores-chave para o sucesso no combate à armadilha da comoditização:

"1 Core competencies – Leverage core competencies to develop new know-how or business opportunities
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2 Thinking outside the box – Look beyond the current business model for ways out of the commodity trap
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3 Change management – Be aware that successful implementation, especially for business model innovations, requires comprehensive change management actions
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4 Value chain & market segments – Analyze all directions along the value chain and potential market segments in order to find the "white spot" for your future business
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5 Sustainability – Think of long-term, sustainable ways to escape a commodity trap – short-term actions usually only postpone the problem"

 Porque acredito no Estranhistão, porque acredito que cada vez mais "We are all weird" [and proud of it], porque acredito no mundo de tribos apaixonadas, fico surpreendido pela pouca ênfase colocada na cada vez maior importância da escolha dos clientes-alvo, na cada vez maior importância da interacção.
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Caricaturando, posso pensar que os clientes-tipo da consultora ou são Golias ou aspiram a ser Golias, por isso, dão muita ênfase ao que podem controlar e crescer é o fim e não uma consequência. Por isso, estão cada vez mais afastados dos clientes e pensam que o logotipo da marca aguenta tudo... não aguenta, porque num mundo onde a assimetria de informação a favor da empresa está cada vez mais ameaçada, o valor durante o uso é cada vez mais fácil de percepcionar antes da compra.

Polarização do mercado ou como David e Golias podem co-existir

Há muito que o fenómeno da polarização dos mercados me fascina. Por polarização entenda-se:

• tem sucesso quem vende o mais barato;
• tem sucesso quem vende caro;
• quem não se define e quer ir a todas as fatias de mercado e, por isso, oferece um produto médio... desaparece.

Daí os marcadores usados com alguma frequência aqui no blogue:

• polarização;
• middle market; e sobretudo
• stuck-in-the-middle (que é onde acaba quem trabalha para a média)

Dai postais como:

• A polarização dos mercados (2011)
• The vanishing middle market (2009) (o artigo da McKinsey citado tem umas imagens eloquentes)
• Quando se acorda atolado num pântano de indefinição... (2006)

Assim, foi com um sorriso de confirmação que vi as evidências do mesmo fenómeno a acontecer na agricultura americana, segundo o artigo "New Data Shows Fewer Farms, Richer Farmers":

"While the average size of farms increased slightly, to 434 acres from 418, the census shows a continuing hollowing out of midsized farms in America. The number of very small farms and very large ones remained constant." (Moi ici: Excelente figura a que se segue)

BTW, recordar de "Profiting from Proliferation" (página 10) este gráfico eloquente:

O caso Valbona (parte II)

Parte I..
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A descrição da Valbona remete-me logo para dois nomes Terry Hill e Wickam Skinner.
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As empresas existem para servir clientes. Na parte I, na descrição da situação da Valbona, percebe-se o dilema. Se desenharmos o ecossistema da procura

vamos chocar com o poder do dono da prateleira. Os produtos só chegam aos consumidores, aos utilizadores, através da prateleira.
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A única forma da Valbona chegar directamente aos consumidores é através do marketing. Só através de um marketing forte, associado a produtos genuinamente diferenciadores, é que os consumidores poderão "vergar" o poder do dono da prateleira. O dono da prateleira montou um negócio em torno da eficiência e quer o preço mais baixo. Contudo, sabe que o que realmente interessa é o retorno por m2 de prateleira e, esse retorno, tanto pode ser obtido pela rotação de muitas unidades a um preço baixo, como pela rotação de menos unidades a um preço mais alto (recordar os frangos Purdue e o Evangelho do Valor).
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O que acontece é que muitas "Valbonas" subestimam-se e desinvestem no marketing, para compensar os "impostos revolucionários" cobrados pela distribuição grande e, por isso, entram numa espiral de perda de valor intangível junto dos consumidores... mas já estou a derivar e a fugir do objectivo deste postal.
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Voltemos ao ecossistema da procura simplificado lá de cima. Se agora identificarmos o que é que cada interveniente procura e valoriza:

Simplificando podemos dizer que a distribuição grande quer:

• Qualidade no sentido de conformidade, de ausência de defeitos;
• Preço mais baixo;
• Prazo de entrega cumprido.

Que os consumidores se dividem em dois grandes grupos. Os que querem acima de tudo:

• Preço mais baixo;
• Conformidade; e
• Disponibilidade.

E os que querem acima de tudo:

• Inovação, mais qualidade no sentido de mais atributos;
• Novidade;
• Marca que dê confiança, que suporte os tópicos anteriores.

As "Valbonas" que pensam, ao tentar servir a distribuição grande e os dois tipos de consumidores, ao analisarem a sua estrutura produtiva deparam-se com o quadro que aprendi a construir com Terry Hill:

Para ser bom a servir uns, tenho de ser menos bom a servir os outros. Aquilo em que tenho de especializar para servir os "pretos" vai minar a minha capacidade de servir bem os "azuis" e, vice-versa.
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Claro que as "Valbonas" que não pensam chegam à situação espelhada pelas bolas vermelhas:

Não têm uma estrutura produtiva alinhada. Por exemplo, a máquina flexível que permite fazer trocas rápidas de série de produção. não consegue ter a cadência rápida de uma máquina dedicada a grandes séries. Como dar a volta a isto?
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Skinner é um velho conhecido, basta pesquisar nos marcadores a sua intervenção neste blogue, por exemplo aqui onde recordo o famoso pwp (plant within the plant):

"For example, if the company is currently involved in five different products, technologies, markets, or volumes, does it need five plants, five sets of equipment, five processes, five technologies, and five organizational structures? The answer is probably yes. But the practical solution need not involve selling the big multipurpose facility and decentralizing into five small facilities.
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In fact, the few companies that have adopted the focused plant concept have approached the solution quite differently. There is no need to build five plants, which would involve unnecessary investment and overhead expenses.
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The more practical approach is the “plant within a plant” (PWP) notion in which the existing facility is divided both organizationally and physically into, in this case, five PWPs. Each PWP has its own facilities in which it can concentrate on its particular manufacturing task, using its own work-force management approaches, production control, organization structure, and so forth. Quality and volume levels are not mixed; worker training and incentives have a clear focus; and engineering of processes, equipment, and materials handling are specialized as needed.
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Each PWP gains experience readily by focusing and concentrating every element of its work on those limited essential objectives which constitute its manufacturing task. Since a manufacturing task is an offspring of a corporate strategy and marketing program, it is susceptible to either gradual or sweeping change. The PWP approach makes it easier to perform realignment of essential operations and system elements over time as the task changes."

O risco das "Valbonas" que não pensam é o de quererem ir a todos os segmentos e canais, é o de quererem ser uma espécie de "Arca de Noé" e servir o mercado do meio-termo. Contudo esse mercado está a desaparecer por todo o lado... o mundo requer cada vez mais estratégias puras do que estratégias híbridas porque o dinheiro é cada vez mais caro.
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Querer servir o middle-market geralmente resulta em "stuck-in the midlle"
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Continua com o problema sob o ponto de vista do balanced scorecard.