Heterogeneidade e produtividade

"In his Nobel lecture, James Heckman named 'the evidence on the pervasiveness of heterogeneity and diversity in economic life' the most important empirical discovery from econometric analyses using micro data. Everybody who has ever worked with plant- or enterprise-level data will agree - there is no such thing as a representative firm, not even in four-digit industries where growing and shrinking, entering and exiting firms can be found in each period. Productivity differentials are a case in point as regards firm heterogeneity within industries. 'Of the basic findings related to productivity and productivity growth uncovered by recent research using micro-data, perhaps most significant is the degree of heterogeneity across establishments and firms in productivity in nearly all industries examined'." [Moi ici: Como não recordar o Lugar do Senhor dos Perdões ou Voltar ao Lugar do Senhor dos Perdões]

Seguem-se agora uns trechos que explicam o mindset das polítcas bem intencionadas:

"The empirical facts uncovered in microeconometric studies motivated formal models for the dynamics of industries with heterogeneous firms

...

In these models, productivity differentials play a central role in the entry, growth and exit of firms. In equilibrium, growing and shrinking, exiting and entering firms that have different productivities are found in an industry.

...

[Moi ici: Os políticos gostam de estabilidade, receiam a incerteza. Vêem com maus olhos o encerramento de empresas] H1. Firms that exit in year t were less productive in t-1 than firms that continue to produce in t.

Given that firms with a low productivity have a higher probability of exit at a point in time, exiting firms will be concentrated among the least productive units. [Moi ici: Por isso, os políticos pensam que as empresas com baixa produtividade têm de ser subsidiadas, têm de ser apoiadas, para que não encerrem. A desculpa é a de que os apoios ajudarão as empresas a aumentarem a sua produtividade] 'Less productive' means that the productivity distribution of exits is stochastically dominated by the productivity distribution of the continuing firms.

H2. Firms that enter the market in year t are less productive than incumbent firms in year t.

This follows from the selection process described above that leads to an improvement of the productivity distribution of incumbents over time because in each period the less productive firms have the highest probability to fall below the critical level and, therefore, to exit. Here, 'less productive' means that the productivity distribution of entries is stochastically dominated by the productivity distribution of incumbents.

H3. Surviving firms from an entry cohort were more productive than nonsurviving firms from this cohort in the start year."

Não me custa nada a crer no poder estatístico de H1, H2 e H3 no texto acima numa economia de mercado. Isto ajuda a explicar o aumento da produtividade agregada num dado sector económico. No entanto, não ajuda a explicar o mais importante. 

"Thus, the concept of “industry profitability” may have no meaning”

Há muitos anos que aqui no blogue escrevo sobre o "Lugar do Senhor dos Perdões". Senhor dos Perdões por causa de um dos postais onde abordei o tema sobre como a academia vê os sectores económicos, blocos homogéneos, quando a realidade que eu vejo é a de uma extrema variabilidade de desempenho e postura, traduzida na famosa frase "há mais variabilidade dentro de um sector económico do que entre sectores económicos".

Recordemos alguns postais sobre o tema:

• Shift happens! - Novembro de 2014
• O triunfo da heterogeneidade - Agosto de 2012
• Qual o retorno da atenção? - Julho de 2012
• A minha tese corroborada - Abril de 2011
• É perigoso pôr catequistas à frente de uma economia! (parte II) - Março de 2011

Mais um trecho retirado de "The Crux - How Leaders Become Strategists" de Richard P. Rumelt:

“Michael Porter’s “Five Forces” industry-analysis framework. This framework is based on the economic theory of “industrial organization,” or IO, which attempts to explain why some industries generate more profits than others.

Each of the five forces—the strength of competition, the ease of new entrants appearing, the bargaining power of suppliers, the bargaining power of customers, and the threat of substitute products—is a threat to an industry’s profitability.

When employing the framework, you look in fair detail at each of these forces. Just looking at these facts about an industry can often help insight. But remember that the underlying model is about industry performance, not individual company performance. If the profit rates of firms within an industry are spread out over a wide spectrum, with some high and others low, then the five-forces framework is inappropriate. It is not that the model is wrong. It is a model of an industry of roughly similar firms. If your company is in an industry where almost all competitors are similar and are struggling with low profits and, especially, price cutting, then the five-forces framework is the right tool of analysis.

One issue with the framework is that most real industries contain firms with markedly different profit rates. Thus, the concept of “industry profitability” may have no meaning.”

Agora, lembrem-se das "amélias" sempre a pedir orientação ao governo de turno para o seu sector. 

Acerca da concorrência imperfeita

Roger Martin em "Is Strategy a Zero-Sum Game?", publicado no final de Dezembro passado, toca vários temas clássicos deste blogue.

"The first critique I get is that my insistence on pursuing a winning strategy is just too aggressive. The thought is that if the organization I am encouraging to win manages to figure out how to win, then someone else will lose in a zero-sum game in which society is no better off. [Moi ici: Gente que não conhece as toutinegras de MacArthur ou as paramécias de Gause, gente que continua no século XX e ainda pensa numa paisagem competitiva com um único pico] 

...

[Moi ici: Agora até o tema da concorrência perfeita ele mete ao barulho] Economists love ‘perfect competition.’ [Moi ici: A malta da tríade, lembram-se? Ainda ontem escrevi sobre eles] This is when numerous competitors compete in a given space — what I would call a particular Where-to-Play (WTP) ... Without competition, a monopoly provider would set price at B (the volume at which marginal revenue and marginal cost are equal) and the market would clear at a lower volume. Hence fewer customers would benefit from the offering, and all would pay a higher price than under vigorous competition. Thus, the absence of vigorous competition in this WTP results in a deadweight cost to society.

Thus, economists don’t like winning either! They dream of having competition in a given space look like this, in which (for example) six competitors duke it out in almost identical WTPs, approximating perfect competition. Nobody wins — they just play.

...

[Moi ici: Entra a concorrência imperfeita] My Dream is industries that evolve like the following:[Moi ici: Como não recordar o Senhor dos Perdões]

Customers are heterogeneous and when I think about a company’s WTP, I think of it as a circle with the customer who thinks the company’s offering is absolutely perfect, and hence puts the highest value on it, at the center of the company’s WTP circle.

...

In My Dream, rather than compete head-to-head with the same WTPs and same/similar HTWs, the six competitors spread out and reduce their overlap. Each competitor wins in a somewhat different WTP. Many more customers get an offering that is perfect for them. Competition happens — but it the boundary territories at the intersections of the individual WTPs, rather than across each competitor’s entire WTP. That ensures that while the competition won’t be as intense as in the Economist’s Dream, it will still be meaningful.[Moi ici: É isto que as toutinegras de MacArthur ilustram]

If each company pursues a winning strategy in its carefully defined WTP, each can prosper and achieve a level of profitability that enables it to innovate and move the market forward on behalf of its customers. [Moi ici: O meu clássico "Viver e deixar viver"]

...

Playing to win isn’t zero-sum or obsolete. It is the most positive sum thing that you can do. Winning sets up a competitive dynamic that makes customers, employees, communities, and investors better off over time and opens up possibilities for rather than works against productive partnerships."

Dispersão de produtividades e salários

E volto uma vez mais a este figura neste postal "O presente envenenado"

A propósito deste relatório "The firm-level link between productivity dispersion and wage inequality: A symptom of low job mobility?".

Algo relacionado com outro velho tema deste blogue, a loucura do Senhor dos Perdões, (a crença de que um sector de actividade é homogéneo, quando existe mais variabilidade dentro de um sector do que entre sectores económicos).

Alguns sublinhados do relatório:

"Differences in average wages across firms which account for around one-half of overall wage inequality are mainly explained by differences in firm wage premia (the part of wages that depends exclusively on characteristics of firms) rather than workforce composition. Using a new cross-country dataset of linked employer-employee data, this paper investigates the role of cross-firm dispersion in productivity in explaining dispersion in firm wage premia, as well as the factors shaping the link between productivity wages at the firm level. The results suggest that around 15% of cross-firm differences in productivity are passed on to differences in firm wage premia. The degree of pass-through is systematically larger in countries and industries with more limited job mobility, where low-productivity firms can afford to pay lower wage premia relative to high-productivity ones without a substantial fraction of workers quitting their jobs. Stronger product market competition raises pass-through while more centralised bargaining and higher minimum wages constrain firm-level wage setting at any given level of productivity dispersion. From a policy perspective, the results suggest that the key priority should be to promote job mobility, which would reduce wage differences between firms while easing the efficient reallocation of workers across them."

"In many OECD countries, there are large and increasing productivity differences between firms, even within narrowly defined industries. At the same time, in these countries, differences in average wages between firms have also increased, explaining more than half of the overall increases in wage inequality. To some extent, such increases in between-firm wage differences reflect the sorting of workers with higher education and more experience into firms paying higher wages. But differences in wages between firms are large even for workers with similar characteristics, suggesting the existence of firm wage premia.

2.2. Wage premia dispersion between firms mainly reflects within-industry differences

Wage premia differentials between industries are small relative to differentials between firms within the same industry. On average across countries, around 75% of dispersion in firm wage premia IS explained by wage differences between firms within the same industry (Figure 3)."

Assimetria e dizer uma coisa e fazer outra

 

Como exilado do mundo da Engenharia para o mundo da Gestão, não passo de um autodidacta. Por isso, muitas vezes ao longo dos anos, dei conta aqui no blogue do meu desconserto entre o que lia e ouvia nos media e não só, e a realidade que encontrava no meu trabalho.

Recordo, a título de exemplo:

•       De Outubro de 2015 – “Do concreto para o abstracto e não o contrário”
•       De Junho de 2010 – “Lugar do Senhor dos Perdões (parte III)” 
•       De Março de 2008 – “Para reflectir”
•       Ou ainda a grande série, 25 episódios, de Fevereiro e Março de 2016, “Aprenda a duvidar dos media (parte XXV)”

Ainda ontem, ao ler “Research in Cognition and Strategy: Reflections on Two Decades of Progress and a Look to the Future” de Sarah Kaplan e publicado em Journal of Management Studies 48:3 May 2011 sublinhei as seguintes passagens:

“The cognitive perspective suggested that the environment is not purely exogenous and therefore organizational response to the environment is mediated by the interpretations made of that environment by managers. Cognitive researchers pointed out that this is particularly true because of the uncertainties and complexities of the environment that decision-makers faced. … cognitive frames are the means by which managers could make sense of the environment, and such sensemaking shapes strategic choice and action.

…

to address a challenge in the strategic management literature posed by asymmetries within industries. [Moi ici: Outro tema recorrente aqui no blogue, existe mais variabilidade dentro de um sector de actividade do que entre sectores de actividade] There was an emerging critique of the tendency (escalated by the publication of Michael Porter’s 1980 book on competitive strategy and industry analysis) to focus strategic analysis at the industry level. Thomas and others suggested that such a high-level grouping omitted asymmetries within industries that could explain outcomes”

O artigo de Sarah Kaplan parte dos 20 anos da publicação do artigo "Competitive Groups as Cognitive Communities: The Case of Scottish Knitwear Manufacturers" publicado no Journal of Management Studies em Julho de 1989”, e que citei recentemente.

 

O artigo de 1989 refere 17 empresas escolhidas numa zona da Escócia onde se produziam peças de lã clássicas e de elevada qualidade. Sorri ao ler o artigo pois via retratada uma hipótese competitiva que me é muito querida. Estes fabricantes escoceses de malhas definiram seu negócio como a produção de pulôveres de cashmere e casacos de lã de alta qualidade. Elegeram como consumidores-alvo a nata dos consumidores endinheirados e, criaram um modelo de negócio onde lidavam com agentes e lojas focadas nesse tipo de cliente.

 

Entretanto, em Maio de 2011, no mesmo volume onde Sarah Kaplan publicou o seu artigo, os autores do artigo de 1989 publicaram uma revisitação ao seu artigo de 1989. Nele pode-se ler:

“The question, of course, was whether this focused strategy and definition of the market was a source of competitive advantage or disadvantage. Strategy and organizational theories could no doubt support either conclusion, and our own observations in Hawick provided good grist for considering both possibilities. The Hawick producers were financially successful during the 1980s, and, indeed, we had chosen to study them because of their success. However, a third outcome from our research was the nascent empirical intuition that most of these firms were on borrowed time, and that some had already entered the downward spiral of self-reinforcing decline that Baden-Fuller and Stopford (1992) argued is a central dynamic of a ‘mature’ business. We worked hard in writing the 1989 paper to be as neutral as possible in telling the Hawick story, and thus did not take a stand on the liabilities or advantages of the sector's strong business identity. But, it was pretty clear to us back then that the ‘Hawick Mind’, as we called it, had become more of a liability than a source of spirited innovation in the industry.

The cues were all around us. Hawick Managing Directors spoke proudly about their firms' skill in providing retail customers with flexible small lot production runs. But, when we spoke with these very same customers, they said just the opposite, and remarked that they often had to bargain hard to get their preferred garments delivered on time. And, the production flexibility that managers said existed in the industry was betrayed by the large work-in-process inventories that we observed in many Hawick factories.

…

Unfortunately, our quiet intuition in 1989 has largely been borne out in subsequent industry developments during the past twenty years. The Gross Value Added of output from the Scottish textile sector decreased by half from 1995 to 2005 (Scottish Executive, 2005), with clothing output declining even more. The Borders knitwear industry, in particular, has significantly shed employment in its ongoing efforts to rationalize production and align with a lower revenue base. Between 1981 and 1998, industry employment declined by over 40 per cent, and has dropped even more in the past decade (Scottish Parliament, 2000). Dawson International, the confident leader of the industry in 1989, has divested many of its operating companies and dismantled the vertically integrated production system that was the hallmark of the company's corporate strategy. Iconic Hawick firms such as Pringles, Peter Scott, and Ballantyne have been sold to Asian and Italian rivals, merged with other brands, or taken into administration. Many smaller producers have permanently closed their doors as well. And, as jobs and tax revenue have disappeared, the community of Hawick has struggled to adapt to the changing economics of the region. A 2004 article in The Scotsman referred to the town as a ‘third world economy’ because of the loss of high paying jobs and the displacement of skilled workers (Chisholm, 2004). To be fair, some firms in Hawick are still doing well, and a recent report on local cashmere production suggests that the worst of the decline may be over and that there is still a viable export business for ‘. . . a flexible, innovative and dynamic cashmere industry which is focused on high quality, niche markets’ (Scottish Enterprise, 2007, p. 37). Then again, the report's recommended actions – i.e. ‘effective brand development’, ‘design creativity and flair’, ‘high quality’, and ‘not competing on price’ (p. 38) – were exactly the same goals of the industry twenty years ago.

This last point, we believe, reinforces our fourth, and perhaps most important, observation coming out of the Scottish study: the cognitive and material aspects of the knitwear industry (indeed, all industries) are thickly interwoven. It seems to us that it is this intermingling that makes strategic imagination, innovation, and new ways of acting so difficult, and the downward spiral of mature businesses so problematic.”

 

E isto faz-me seguir duas linhas de pensamento:

• O paradoxo de Ícaro, recentemente referido no blogue
• E, sobretudo uma linha desencadeada por:

“The cues were all around us. Hawick Managing Directors spoke proudly about their firms' skill in providing retail customers with flexible small lot production runs. But, when we spoke with these very same customers, they said just the opposite, and remarked that they often had to bargain hard to get their preferred garments delivered on time. And, the production flexibility that managers said existed in the industry was betrayed by the large work-in-process inventories that we observed in many Hawick factories”

 

Esta é uma linha de pensamento triste... a realidade não existe, a realidade é o que seleccionamos, vêmos e pensamos dela, nada mais. Quantas vezes um empresário adopta uma estratégia e, de boa-fé ilude-se porque só tem acesso ao feedback que reforça o seu pensamento. Por outro lado, quantas vezes um empresário adopta uma estratégia facialmente, mas por trás toma decisões deliberadas que a minam, porque se acha mais esperto que os outros, porque acha que pode vender gato por lebre. Há dias estava a pensar num empresário que está a seguir este caminho e pensei nos anfíbios que andam por terra, mas quando sentem perigo fogem para a água a toda a velocidade. Aqui a água é a recordação de um tempo anterior onde se sentia à vontade e tinha bons resultados. O que é interessante, é a falta de coragem para assumir abertamente as escolhas feitas. Parece que aguarda, estilo governo com a TAP quando começou a pandemia, que a evolução dos acontecimentos torne inevitável as escolhas que já fez, mas não tem coragem de verbalizar.

"the Age of Diverse Markets" (parte VII)

 Parte I, parte II, parte II, parte IV, parte V e parte VI.

"Cost reduction provides another landmark example of the power of transaction-based profit analytics. In virtually all supply chain projects, the objective is to reduce costs. The analytical process is to identify the costs that are above average and reduce them to at least average levels. What could be wrong with this?

The answer is that neither simply reducing higher-than-average costs nor reducing costs across the board will maximize profitability. The reason is that the Profit Peak customers are often more costly to serve—and rightly so because the extra customer service costs are a great investment."

Como não regressar ao Senhor dos Perdões e ao discurso monolítico sobre um todo homogéneo:

"Most strategic analyses are based on an assessment of a company as a whole. This is an artifact of the Age of Mass Markets. So-called strengths-weaknesses- opportunities-threats (SWOT) analysis, and even Michael Porter’s powerful Five Forces framework, illustrate this approach. Profit contour analysis significantly enriches these analytical models because it shows the composition of a company’s component segments and activities, allowing managers to see their underlying patterns of profitability, which have historically been hidden by aggregate, average metrics.

Companies are not monolithic. For example, profit contour analysis indicates how much a company would be helped by better positioning (for example, which segments are helped, which would suffer profit erosion in the absence of repositioning, and which are well positioned already). It also indicates how difficult, costly, or time-consuming the transition will be (for example, what proportion of the products or vendors have to be changed). This is especially important in addressing the specific problems and opportunities that the currents of change pose.

...

In analyzing possible strategic groups in both your current and transformed industry, it is very instructive to focus on the value-to-cost relationship of your major profit segments: Profit Peaks, Profit Drains, and Profit Deserts."

Trechos retirados de “Choose Your Customer: How to Compete Against the Digital Giants and Thrive” de Jonathan S. Byrnes.

There will be surprises!

"At the individual level Austrians have taken sharp exception to the manner in which neoclassical theory has portrayed the individual decision as a mechanical exercise in constrained maximization.
.
Such a portrayal robs human choice of its essentially open-ended character, in which imagination and boldness must inevitably play central roles. For neoclassical theory the only way human choice can be rendered analytically tractable, is for it to be modeled as if it were not made in open-ended fashion, as if there was no scope for qualities such as imagination and boldness. Even though standard neoclassical theory certainly deals extensively with decision making under (Knightian) risk, this is entirely consistent with absence of scope for the qualities of imagination and boldness, because such decision making is seen as being made in the context of known probability functions. In the neoclassical world, decision makers know what they are ignorant about. One is never surprised. For Austrians, however, to abstract from these qualities of imagination, boldness, and surprise is to denature human choice entirely."

Como anónimo engenheiro da província, apaixonado pelo mundo do turnaround, sobrevivência e sucesso das empresas, sempre me espantei com o "basicismo" da abordagem económica do mainstream ao mundo da concorrência. Recordo, por exemplo, "muitas vezes escandalizo-me com a forma como os economistas tratam a economia real" o que me leva logo a um clássico deste país: o Senhor dos Perdões. Recordo, por exemplo. Recordar também um clássico de 2010, "Realidade e teoria".

Trecho retirado de "Entrepreneurial Discovery and the Competitive Market Process: An Austrian Approach" de Israel Kirzner, publicado por Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XXXV (March 1997), pp. 60-85

Cuidado com as médias

A propósito deste título "“Na Europa, cada mil milhões de euros de exportações apoiam 14 mil empregos”"

Este é o pensamento que critiquei no Senhor dos Perdões, ver a economia como um monólito, como uma realidade homogénea.

Como é que é possível lançar um número como este e esperar que tenha algum significado?

O perfil de exportações português é diferente do alemão e diferente do romeno, por exemplo. Por exemplo, em 2016 a rubrica "Viagens e turismo" representou mais de mil milhões de crescimento das exportações. Quantos empregos foram criados? Muito mais do que 14 mil.

Recordar esta lição.

Let be careful out there

"A separate but equally indicative failing is to incessantly cite Apple and Steve Jobs to any and all clients as a paragon of excellence and instruction for brand building. If you find yourself sitting through a ninety-minute sermon on the power of Apple’s branding and its relevance for your portable toilet business it may be time to press the escape button."

Recordar "Cuidado com o título" e "Pensamento contrário"

"First, any mention of millennials means you are dealing with a marketing moron and should lead to immediate cessation of all discussions. I’m serious about the “moron” tag. Anyone dumb enough to think that the 14 million British millennials qualify as a segment needs their head examined. They fail every possible test of segmentation and anyone who refers to them in any context other than to point out that they are a total load of clichéd bollocks should not be trusted."

Recordar "Voltar ao Lugar do Senhor dos Perdões"

Trechos retirados de "Mark Ritson: The seven unmistakable signs of a shit brand consultant"

Resultados da concorrência imperfeita

Um tema que me é muito querido, "Corporate Inequality Is the Defining Fact of Business Today".
.
Em Maio de 2010 comecei a usar o marcador "distribuição de produtividades" com "Clientes-alvo e Valor (parte II)" depois de no dia anterior ter escrito "A realidade e a teoria".
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Em Junho de 2010 comecei a usar o marcador "idiossincrasias" com "Lugar do Senhor dos Perdões (parte II)"
.
Assim, na linha de "Desigualdade e estratégia" é quase estranho perceber que para muito economista teórico isto é uma barbaridade:

"Perhaps the most overlooked aspect of economic inequality has been the role that firms play in it.
.
The best-performing companies seem to be pulling away from the rest, according to a growing body of research, and that fact explains a large part of the growth in inequality between individuals. The result, at least in developed nations, is a highly unequal corporate landscape, where some firms are incredibly productive and the amount of money a person makes is tied to the company they work for, not just the job that they do." [Moi ici: E por trás disso estão empresas que praticam a concorrência imperfeita e que à custa disso conseguem aumentar e manter por mais tempo margens interessantes - a minha tese]

O interessante, como relata o artigo é não haver uma explicação cabal e pacífica, reconhecida pelo meio académico.

O mundo da micro economia: uma beleza e surpresa que não passa pela mente da tríade

Ao longo dos anos aqui no blogue uso o rótulo de "tríade" para identificar o conjunto de académicos, políticos e comentadores que, estando nós no século XXI, estando nós a entranhar-nos em Mongo, estando a economia a evoluir para uma explosão de propostas de valor, canais e, sobretudo, uma explosão do lado da procura em termos de tribos, cada vez mais tribos e mais segmentadas e mais intransigentes no seu gosto e mais informadas, continuam a ver o mundo e a propor soluções que resultaram no século XX da produção e do consumo de massas.
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Recomendo a leitura desta excelente metáfora "Ye gods: an efficient orchestra!"
.
Torna viva e materializa de forma fácil a treta que é a conversa da tríade:

"If this student had instead chosen a factory, nobody would be laughing, perhaps least of all the people in that factory."

Como já aqui escrevi muitas vezes e afirmei em muitas salas de reunião, o que salvou as PME exportadoras foi o não ligarem à tríade. Imaginem que um empresário do calçado em 2005, (quando o sector atingiu o ponto mais baixo e Daniel Bessa passava a certidão de óbito e André Macedo enterrava o caixão), ouvia as previsões de Ferreira do Amaral, ou as bocas dos gurus desta série e as levasse a sério... teria desistido certamente.
.
Daí ter favoritado:

"I am looking for a lot of men who have an infinite capacity to not know what can't be done.” — Henry Ford pic.twitter.com/FJJOVhPtng

— Alex Osterwalder (@AlexOsterwalder) April 20, 2016

Por isso, a tríade não percebe este desempenho, aliás, aposto que nem o conhecem:

Uma empresa que compete no mercado pelo custo mais baixo compete de forma diferente e dirige-se a clientes diferentes dos de uma empresa que compete pela rapidez e flexibilidade, dos de uma empresa que compete pela autenticidade, dos de uma empresa que compete pela inovação, dos de uma empresa que compete pela marca, dos de uma empresa que compete pela ...
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Claro, a tríade acha que é tudo igual, recordar "Voltar ao Lugar do Senhor dos Perdões".
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BTW, foi por este tema que estranhei a escolha de alguém com a cultura SONAE (custo) para a Viriato.

Acerca da heterogeneidade

"This situation raises the crucial question of why firms pursuing unsuccessful strategies do not change to more successful strategies, including possibly imitating the winners. Another way of stating this question is in terms of firm heterogeneity: why do firm differences persist once strategic and organizational recipes for success become known?
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The first point to recognize is that heterogeneity does not always persist. In some industries, imitation is relatively easy and firms simply follow the leaders. In others, selection processes are so severe and rapid that unsuccessful firms are eliminated before their managers can figure out what is going on. This appears to be the case especially in industries driven by strong economies of scale, such as beer brewing, where thousands of firms have gone under in a relatively short period, reducing heterogeneity enormously. In many instances, however, firm heterogeneity persists for long periods."

Um tema que sempre me fez espécie, tanta gente que olha para um sector económico como um todo homogéneo. Recordar o Senhor dos Perdões.
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Trecho retirado de "A Sociological View On Why Firms Differ" de Glenn R. Carroll e publicado no
Strategic Management Journal, Volume 14, Issue 4 (May, 1993), 237-249.

Voltar ao Lugar do Senhor dos Perdões

O Miguel Pires, num comentário, chamou-me a atenção para "Bad Assumptions".
Ao ler:

"Bad Assumption 1: Markets are monolithic

If you look at a market monolithically [Moi ici: Como não recordar "Lugar do Senhor dos Perdões (parte III)" e "Quando os macro-economistas falam sobre o desempenho, sobre a produtividade de um sector de actividade, como o calçado, como o têxtil, como o mobiliário, falam de um bloco homogéneo, coerente, maciço... como se todas as empresas, imersas no mesmo ambiente competitivo, tivessem o mesmo comportamento"], simple math dictates that the average will be most heavily influenced by the majority. And, income distributions being what they are, the majority of customers in any market will have less money, and likely be inclined to prioritize price. Ergo, monolithic market analysis necessarily concludes that customers prioritize price.

Markets, though, are not monolithic. They are wildly disparate, able to be endlessly segmented not just by income, but by a whole host of demographic and psychographic factors. In every market there is a segment of people who have the means to buy nice things, and there is a segment that values a superior experience."

E os paralelismos continuam:

"Bad Assumption 2: Consumers only care about speeds, feeds, and priceThe old hoary chestnut that “Apple only wins because its advertising tricks people into paying too much” was raised in my Twitter feed last night, and while the holders of such an opinion are implicitly saying others are stupid, my take runs in the opposite direction: it’s not that people are irrational, it’s that human rationality is about more than what can be reduced to a number. Delight is a real thing, as is annoyance; not feeling stupid is worth so much more than theoretical capability. Knowing there is someone you can ask for help is just as important as never needing help in the first place."

E estas análises, baseadas nas "bad assumptions", são mainstream na Europa mas muito mais mainstream num país sem paciência estratégica como os EUA.


BTW, interessante este ponto:

"Apple lost more money to currency fluctuations than Google makes in a quarter"

Shift happens!

No Público pode ler-se:

"Estado deve desenvolver uma acção empenhada na detecção e divulgação de mercados potencialmente interessantes e de vantagens comparativas dos recursos portugueses em relação a previsíveis concorrentes."

Lembrei-me logo do Lugar do Senhor dos Perdões.
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Em "O regresso ao Lugar do Senhor dos Perdões":

"The takeaway is to stop thinking about whether the industry you are in is "good" or "bad" — recognizing that as the wrong question — and to focus instead on what you can do to win where you are." 

Em "Lugar do Senhor dos Perdões (parte II)":

"A filosofia por trás do caso do Lugar do Senhor dos Perdões está relacionada com a proposta de António Vitorino no Prós e Contras de ontem: o Estado é que sabe quais os sectores de futuro em que se deve apostar." 

Em "Lugar do Senhor dos Perdões (parte III)":

"The magnitude of within-sector heterogeneity implies that idiosyncratic factors dominate the determination of which plants create and destroy jobs, and which plants achieve rapid productivity growth or suffer productivity declines."

Lembrei-me logo de um vídeo que vi no sábado passado, em que Gary Hamel ao minuto 25 afirma que a melhor alternativa para os líderes é experimentarem, testarem (o nosso, fuçarem) e aprenderem com os erros, para melhorarem a abordagem seguinte:

"Organizations loose their relevance when there is more experimentation outside than inside"

E, por fim, lembrei-me logo do que comecei a ler em "Business Strategy - Managing Uncertainty, Opportunity, and Enterprise" de  J.-C. Spender:

"Strategy’s meanings are always “situated” reflections of the knowledge absences the strategist chooses to grapple with in the pursuit of profit. “What are we going to do now?” is the key question, and time matters. In our capitalist system these choices are incredibly varied, and strategic work is a corollary of this freedom of choice.
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So this chapter moves towards a notion of strategic work as the practice of managerial judgment, choice, and persuasion rather than observation, computation, and instruction...
Any definition that ignores the particularities and difficulties of the context in which the goal is pursued is useless “one-handed clapping.” Because particulars are crucial to the nature of strategic work, no general definition can work. Second, not every distinction helps. Sometimes market segmentation will matter, sometimes not. Likewise technological evolution will sometimes matter and sometimes not. Strategic work begins with finding the specific distinctions that are appropriate to help us wrap our arms around the particular collision of intention, context, and difficulty that is the firm.
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Merely being in a context does not mean you need a strategy; you may have no intention of changing your situation. Intention is not simply about reaching for a goal, it is also about purposively or intendedly moving away from your current position and towards another particular situation. Thus intention and strategy are bound up with the specific changes we want to make in specific situations. The essence of the managers’ strategic work lies in the difficulties that stand in the way of satisfying their desire to make these changes. Paradoxically we have to know who we are—strategically speaking—before we can delineate the context of our goal seeking. Socrates was absolutely right on this—know thyself! Strategy is as much about choosing who we are as about choosing a goal or the context in which to pursue it. Again, strategy lies at the intersection of the actor’s chosen identity, her/his intention, and the difficulties s/he faces in a specific context."

Quem define o que é um mercado potencialmente interessante? Quem define quais são as vantagens comparativas dos recursos portugueses?
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Vamos escolher um burocrata para tomar essas decisões?
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Não! Que horror"
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Vamos escolher um académico? Recordar Daniel Bessa e o calçado.
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Vamos escolher um jornalista? Recordar André Macedo e o calçado e o têxtil.
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Vamos escolher um empresário? Recordar Paulo Vaz da ATP e o têxtil.
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Vamos escolher um governante? Recordar Pinho e a Qimonda.
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Vamos escolher um político? Recordar ...
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Todos falharam as previsões! São burros? Não! A realidade é que está em permanente dança e o que é verdade hoje amanhã é mentira. A única coisa que interessa em economia é o trecho de poesia que li em Setembro de 2004 na revista HBR:

"Life is the most resilient thing on the planet. I has survived meteor showers, seismic upheavals, and radical climate shifts. And yet it does not plan, it does not forecast, and, except when manifested in human beings, it possesses no foresight. So what is the essential thing that life teaches us about resilience?
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Just this: Variety matters. Genetic variety, within and across species, is nature's insurance policy against the unexpected. A high degree of biological diversity ensures that no matter what particular future unfolds, there will be at least some organisms that are well-suited to the new circumstances."

Como se diz em inglês, "Shift happens!" e só a diversidade de opiniões e apostas cria a antifragilidade do todo e, mesmo as escolhas que parecem absurdas para uns, podem ser a solução para outros.
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E volto ao texto do Público:

"Contudo, produzir e vender para o exterior em quantidades significativas, exige um forte empurrão por parte do poder político, particularmente do Ministério da Agricultura." 

Luxleaks em versão portuguesa?
E basta produzir? E conhecer os canais de distribuição? Seremos competitivos, nestas quantidades significativas, com as entregas aéreas diárias do Quénia? E o que fazer depois do final da Primavera até ao Inverno seguinte? Por que é que quem já está no terreno e com sucesso, não segue essa via?

Não será mais fácil optar pela via negativa?

Parece que cada vez mais pessoas despertam para o papel da gestão, da idiossincrasia, na distribuição de produtividades e no desempenho intra-sectorial. Desta vez temos "Choque de gestão":

"Este estudo sugere-nos que os problemas estruturais que enfrentamos atualmente na economia portuguesa (e também na brasileira) são acompanhados por um défice na qualidade da gestão. A crise atual não é apenas política. Empresários, gestores e académicos fazem parte da realidade que as ruas denunciam. É preciso humildade para reconhecermos esta realidade sem desculpas; é preciso determinação para fazermos as mudanças que são necessárias; é preciso criatividade para inovarmos nas práticas de gestão (podemos sempre copiar os americanos, mas este é o momento em que o mundo está ávido por novos modelos). É preciso um choque de gestão!"

Apetece perguntar, será que pretende intervir nas empresas? Será que pretende uma intervenção top (Estado) - down (empresas)?
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Não será mais fácil deixar a concorrência intervir e decidir? Não será mais fácil optar pela via negativa e deixar os clientes premiar quem entendam? Não será mais fácil e barato acabar com os casos-tipo Senhor dos Perdões?

Curiosidade do dia

O anjinho, je, pensava que era erro ou má gestão, "Lugar do Senhor dos Perdões (parte I)". Afinal, estava tudo "bem" encaminhado:

"ainda beneficiou de um último "balão de oxigénio" em Setembro de 2009, quando o IAPMEI injectou na empresa mais 750 mil euros, num total de quase dois milhões de euros, elevando a sua posição accionista para cerca de 40%. Mas o dinheiro acabou por ser integralmente utilizado na amortização de passivo bancário."

Trecho retirado de "Cheyenne "back on track" mete Angola no bolso da frente"

O regresso ao Lugar do Senhor dos Perdões

Uma mensagem importante que deve ser sempre sublinhada, sobretudo pelos intervencionistas ingénuos:

"The takeaway is to stop thinking about whether the industry you are in is "good" or "bad" — recognizing that as the wrong question — and to focus instead on what you can do to win where you are.
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Indeed, our study shows that the biggest variations in TSR [Total Shareholder Return] are not between industries but within them. Yes, at 21%, the median annual return of tobacco, the best-performing industry between 2002 and 2012, was seven times higher than computers and peripherals, the worst-performing industry. The difference in the averages between those two industries was 18 percentage points — no small potatoes.
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But the TSR variations of companies within these industries were far greater: 44 percentage points in tobacco and 69 percentage points in computers and peripherals."

Trecho retirado de "Don't Blame Your Company's Poor Performance on Its Industry"

Recordar "Lugar do Senhor dos Perdões (parte III)" e o marcador ali abaixo.

O crescimento da desigualdade

Quando se fala no aumento da desigualdade social eu penso logo nisto "‘Gazelles’ widen company growth gap" como a verdadeira causa:

"The divide between midsized UK companies that are merely surviving and the better-performing “gazelles” is widening, according to a new report.
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Figures compiled by Experian, the credit checking agency, noted that although the overall number of medium-sized companies – defined as those with turnover of £2.5m-£100m – has been broadly flat at 24,955 over the past 12 months, the number of businesses within that group which have achieved high levels of growth has increased by 10 per cent to 4,353."

É a velha história que os macroeconomistas não incluem nos seus modelos, qualquer sector de actividade económica está carregado de heterogeneidade, de variabilidade, de diversidade de abordagens, de diversidade de visões, de diversidade de interpretações do que é problema e do que é solução. E é essa diversidade que torna as sociedades e as economias resilientes.
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Recordar a série "Lugar do Senhor dos Perdões", com especial relevo para as partes II e III.

Blocos heterogéneos vs blocos homogéneos

Muitas vezes oiço elementos da tríade falarem dos sectores económicos como blocos homogéneos:

• Lugar do Senhor dos Perdões (parte III);
• O jogo do gato e do rato (parte III);

Essa não é a nossa versão. 

A nossa experiência, o nosso contacto com as empresas, aponta para uma outra versão, cada sector económico é uma realidade altamente heterogénea. 

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Entretanto, descubro este artigo de 2009 "Analyzing Firm Performance Heterogeneity: The relative Effect of Business Definition" e percebo, embora ache tão estranho, como é que a tríade tem um modelo mental de acordo com a versão do bloco homogéneo.

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Se as publicações científicas ainda andam a discutir a hipótese heterogénea... claro que os membros da tríade foram formatados e enformados, durante a sua formação, no modelo da homogeneidade:

"The results indicate that firm effects explain most of the variance in four performance variables but that the impact of business definition on performance could be underestimated. It turns out, according to our findings, that business membership (and thus differences in business definition) explains about 8 percent of the variance in performance between firms within the examined industry.
Consequently, managers should carefully monitor and examine the business domain they are in as it directly related with the firm’s level of performance.
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Our analysis of the business definition-performance link indicates that business definition choices do have performance implications but that the relative impact of industry, firm and business domain effects on performance has received scant empirical study and is still unclear.
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This study is, however, the first study to further analyze the performance heterogeneity within an industry by considering the effect of business membership and thus the effect of business domain choices. Indeed, there may be more than one business domain within an industry: different product offerings (the supply side) can be combined with different market segments (the demand side) with a different geographical reach.
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One of the major discussions in strategy concerns the determinants of firm performance. Academics from various backgrounds have focused on explaining firm performance and on identifying the sources of inter-firm performance differences. Researchers in the industrial-organization tradition, for example, have argued that industry structure is a central determinant of firm performance and contend that the structural features of an industry effect the competitive position of all business units in that specific industry. However, the inability of the industrial-organization tradition to provide a rigorous explanation for intra-industry heterogeneity in performance has stimulated strategy researchers to focus on the firm itself. As a result, firms were no longer viewed as identical “black boxes” in a given market structure but as dynamic collections of specific capabilities influenced by differing organizational structures and specific strategic decisions.
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One of these vital strategic decisions, assumed to impact organizational performance, is the (implicit or explicit) selected business definition. Especially in the case of small and medium sized enterprises (SME’s) an adequate business definition seems to be of vital importance as the traditional explanation for their success is that SME’s choose their battles carefully.
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The study results indicate that the examined industry consists of two distinct business domains whereby business domain membership explains about 8% of the variance in performance. The findings should urge managers to carefully (re)consider where (in terms of businesses) they are competing within the industry. Managers should pay (more) attention on business definition dimensions as business definition choices have operational consequences that affect the performance bottom-line."

Been there, done that and... moved on

Este postal é para iniciados... e receio confundir os não-iniciados.
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Uma das primeiras questões a colocar, para iniciar uma reflexão estratégica numa empresa é:
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Quem são os clientes-alvo?
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As empresas que não respondem a esta pergunta, ou que não são consequentes com a resposta, tratam os clientes como uma média, a miudagem, um perigoso fantasma estatístico (ver marcadores).
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Não trabalhar para clientes-alvo significa um passaporte para o stuck-in-the-middle, significa incapacidade para actuar num mercado polarizado, ou seja, o fim da linha para essas empresas que são incapazes de se definirem e de escolherem os clientes preferidos.
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Até aqui tudo bem e estou de acordo com Peter Fader "Customer Centricity":
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"Too many people think that being customer centric means doing everything that your customers want, and that's not the case. Being friendly and offering good service are a part of customer centricity, but they are not the whole thing. Customer centricity means that you're going to be friendly, provide good service and develop new products and services for the special focal customers -- the ones who provide a lot of value for you -- but not necessarily for the other ones. You need to pick and choose. Some customers deserve the special treatment, and if others want to buy from you, that's great, but they are not going to be treated the same.
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You are not going to ignore customers. You are not going to fire customers. (Moi ici: Depende, basta recordar as curvas de Stobachoff e os números de Byrnes. Ver marcadores) You are not going to treat them badly, but you will treat some better than others. You are going to be really careful about whom you choose to treat that way and what that treatment means. Does it mean you give those special customers absolutely everything? Maybe not. But you're definitely going to give them more consideration than customers who frankly are not worth that much to you.

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A requirement behind customer centricity is the ability to understand customers at a fairly granular level  (Moi ici: O que chamo: olhar olhos nos olhos, olhar na menina dos olhos dos clientes-alvos) and to be able to identify the customers or the segments of customers who are valuable from the ones who aren't. If you can't sort out your customers -- if you can't look at them and know who is good and who is bad -- then you can't be customer centric. That's step one.
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Step two is having an operational ability as well as an organizational capability to be able to deliver different products and services to different kinds of customers. (Moi ici: Construir, adaptar, um mosaico de actividades auto-reforçadoras. Ver marcadores) That's tough to do.

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Nearly every company on the planet is product centric. You look at their organizational chart, and it's broken up by different kinds of products. You look at the incentives. You look at the language they use. You look at the performance metrics that they rely on. It's all based on different kinds of products. The whole business model is based on producing something or a set of somethings in really high volumes and at really low costs, and that's going to drop to the bottom line. (Moi ici: Recordar aqueles postais recentes: parte I e parte II sobre tudo ser serviço e a co-criação)
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That's more or less business as usual. I'm not suggesting that it's easy, and I'm not suggesting that it's going away tomorrow. But I am suggesting that there are alternatives. If you organize the company around different types of customers and have customer segment managers who are just as powerful as today's product managers are -- giving them the right incentives and the right resources and tools -- that can actually be a more profitable way for many companies to go to market.

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(Moi ici: Now, quite a finale!)

One of the things that surprised me in the book is you say that "the customer" doesn't exist. We've been talking about customers all afternoon. What does that mean? (Moi ici: Recordar os postais do Senhor dos Perdões sobre a tolice da homogeneidade dos mercados)

Fader: One of the things that drives me crazy is when I hear managers or entrepreneurs talking about "the customer," doing back-of-the-envelope calculations about what "the customer" will be worth or discussing how "the customer" will respond to this kind of product or that kind of offer.
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By talking about "the customer" or by talking about "the average customer," that doesn't do justice to the vast heterogeneity and the incredible differences across our customers in terms of their propensity to buy, to talk to each other and to respond to different kinds of offers.

(Moi ici: Agarrem-se às cadeiras, mais um promotor de Mongo) Again, step one of being customer centric is not only acknowledging the heterogeneity, but celebrating it; saying, "Wow, all this heterogeneity is a great thing because it lets us pick and choose different kinds of customers!" (Moi ici: That's the spirit. Mais do que reconhecer e aproveitar a heterogeneidade dos mercados, é celebrá-la, é fazer batota para a aumentar, é assim que se torna a concorrência imperfeita e se criam monopólios de facto) When we say "the customer," we are selling ourselves short. I think it's important to not use those words and to always have a plural there."

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Depois de tudo isto, não posso estar mais de acordo com Fader ... tal como estávamos de acordo com Newton, até que apareceu Einstein... depois de identificarmos os clientes-alvo... descobrimos que isso é, cada vez mais, insuficiente!!! And we moved on.

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Temos de equacionar a cadeia da procura... como aqui relatei em alguns exemplos, uma empresa pode criar um modelo de negócio em que quem paga, o cliente-alvo, não é o foco principal. 

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Para lá da customer-centricity, temos de adoptar a balanced centricity, o many-to-many... (aqui, aqui e aqui)