Volume is vanity, Profit is sanity

"Market leadership is even more precarious. The percentage of companies falling out of the top three rankings in their industry increased from 2% in 1960 to 14% in 2008. What’s more, market leadership is proving to be an increasingly dubious prize: The once strong correlation between profitability and industry share is now almost nonexistent in some sectors. According to our calculation, the probability that the market share leader is also the profitability leader declined from 34% in 1950 to just 7% in 2007. And it has become virtually impossible for some executives even to clearly identify in what industry and with which companies they’re competing."

Como não recordar o clássico "Manage For Profit, Not For Market Share: A Guide to Greater Profits In Highly Contested Markets"

Trecho retirado de "Adaptability: The New Competitive Advantage"

"The market share mindset is the antithesis of a value mindset"

"One of the most important tests of your organization's maturity level and business orientation is how you use the word "commodity." If this is a common way for you to describe your products—internally and especially externally—you shouldn't be surprised if customers treat you as a commodity, meaning they argue that you have no differentiation. They have no desire at all to pay a premium. A commodity mindset shows that you don't have the right business orientation for VBP. ...Given maturity and a business orientation, there is also a difference between going through the motions and making the required changes and improvements. The volume-versus-value mindset is decisive. It is often the acid test for a transformation and for whether an organization is serious about it. ...You can spend all the money you want and create the culture you want, but if your organization is not willing to let go of market share, it will not change. Pretty brutal, but true. The market share mindset is the antithesis of a value mindset. It is the Jack Welch "be number r or number 2" mentality that still determines the way so many Gen Xers and Gen Yers run their businesses. I find it almost surreal in some companies that make market share into one of their most important and most reported KPIs."

Trechos retirados de Stephan M. Liozu em "Dollarizing Differentiation Value: A Practical Guide for the Quantification and the Capture of Customer Value"

"turning away from the apparent safety of the herd" (parte II)

Há dias li e apreciei este caso "How Should an Understated Luxury Brand Compete Against Bling?" com um interessante dilema estratégico.

Um responsável por uma marca de luxo de relógios suiços preocupado com a falta de "bling" (falta de espalhafato, falta de kitch, falta de animação para ser conhecida no mercado chinês)

Ontem encontrei este texto sobre relógios de luxo produzidos no leste da Alemanha, "How Eastern Germany’s Watchmaking Capital Is Beating Switzerland":

"the town of 7,000 is home to the greatest concentration of world-class watchmakers outside of Switzerland - with a business that’s growing even as Swiss producers retrench.
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Glashuette produced more than 32,000 watches last year, with a total value of at least 500 million euros, according to analyst estimates. These aren’t Swatches: The town’s 10 watchmakers tend toward the high end, and the priciest local producer, A. Lange & Soehne, has built a reputation that rivals those of giants such as Patek Philippe and Audemars Piguet. Some of its watches top 1.9 million euros ($2.1 million), and its average price is roughly 50,000 euros.
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“Our customers like that not everyone knows what they have around their wrist," says Wilhelm Schmid, chief executive officer of A. Lange & Soehne. "We’re a very well-kept secret, almost like stealth wealth.”
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The German industry, though far smaller than Switzerland’s, is less dependent on sales to China, where the watch business has been hammered by an anti-corruption drive." 

Interessante como isto anda tudo relacionado. Voltando a "aumentar preços unitários ou reduzir custos unitários" ou lucro vs quota de mercado. Quando se opta por quota de mercado entra-se numa espiral perigosa, um atractor para o comportamento de manada. E quando se tropeça... parece que não se consegue voltar atrás com o abastardamento. Não é impunemente que se fazem estas asneiras.

O velho ditado

Há um velho ditado que aprendi com uma boutique de vinhos australiana em 2006:

"e que tal uma “boutique small winery”. Um gestor da "boutique" diz mesmo que é um negócio “high end fashion retailing”, em vez de inundar o mercado com produtos banais, e desesperar numa guerra de preços, atacar nichos específicos. É um prazer ver uma actividade ligada ao sector primário transpirar pensamento estratégico, demonstrar capacidade de distanciamento e de se situar no mercado."

Ou seja:

"Volume is vanity, profit is sanity" 

Ao longo dos anos tenho chamado a atenção para a curva de Stobachoff que tanto atrai os nórdicos a este blogue. Aprendi com Byrne aquela frase:

"in a typical company, 30 to 40% of revenues are actually unprofitable, while another fraction of revenues — often more like 20 to 30% — accounts for most of the organization’s profitability."

E ainda a relação 20/80/30 de Kotler:

"80% dos lucros de uma empresa são gerados pelos 20 clientes mais rentáveis.
E os 30? O que querem dizer?
Os 30 clientes menos rentáveis provocam um corte de metade dos lucros de uma empresa."

Assim, como não sorrir com este artigo "HTC only wants to make high-end phones, should be worrying for Sony":

"Sony doesn’t often get credit for for their strategic vision as they more often than not skate to where the puck is, with a delay, rather than to where the puck is going to be. With smartphones this was no different but with their mobile division in disarray, the company did something many pundits thought to be suicide – they exited the entry market and instead focused on high-end devices like the Xperia Z5, Xperia X, and now Xperia XZ. The results? A division that was once reporting over a billion dollars in losses is now recording profits.
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Now mind you there is a lot Sony could be doing to better the situation for themselves but their initial vision was correct – to put aside the volume driven mentality that drove the PC business and many Android makers into the ground and instead focus on profitability."

"There are no pricing problems; only segmentation problems"

"What is the most important thing you can share about pricing?

• There are no pricing problems; only segmentation problems. [Moi ici: Qual é mesmo a segmentação que a sua empresa faz?]

• Think about your end-customer first.

• Value is in the perspective of the person with whom you are talking.

• The value changes in context as well.

...
How does a price war destroy value?

• War results in destruction and casualties and price war leads to value destruction. – Dropped Mobile Profits

• There is a misconception of success when you capture market share.

• The causation effect is lost in the minds of people during a price war.

• Market share at any cost is chasing the wrong target.

• Which comes first, market share or profit?

• Profit comes first as it creates value for the customer; value comes first."

Trechos retirados de "The Ethics of Price Discrimination with Rags Srinivasan"

O volume é um indicador que afaga o ego

Recordar o Barclays ou o "Bigger isn't better. It's merely bigger." tudo de ontem antes de começar a ler "Coach, Kors & Kate: The Handbag Wars". Alguns excertos:

"Racing to the Bottom of the BagThe accessible luxury brands of Michael Kors, Kate Spade and Coach all mentioned in their investor calls the promotional activity in the department store channel in the second quarter of 2016. Each is attempting to mitigate exposure to this brand-eroding behavior with solutions.
...
“this industry has evolved over the past few years to accelerated promotional activity. And we know that. That’s the absolute wrong thing to do for a business over the long term. And so we have put in fairly significant plans, declines in certain areas of the business, one of them obviously being wholesale.”
...
Double-Digit Product Shipments Accompanied by Revenue Declines
Regarding the June quarter, Idol said, “The amount of promotional activity from many of the people who carry our line was at its all-time high, and we have to compete to be able to move our inventories during that period. When you do that, it just lowers your average order value, and you just can’t keep up with [it], even though our transactions, our conversion was up double-digit.”"

O volume é um indicador que afaga o ego e destrói valor.

Volume é vaidade, lucro é sanidade

"O britânico Barclays está a preparar-se para dizer a sete mil clientes para realizarem mais transacções com o banco ou procurarem outra instituição, de acordo com a Bloomberg. O objectivo desta medida é impulsionar as receitas.
...
O banco britânico lançou um novo sistema informático, o Flight Deck, que classifica cada cliente da sua unidade de "trading" de acordo com o retorno que gera para a instituição. Assim, o Barclays pode dar prioridade à relação com os clientes que são mais lucrativos e descartar aqueles que não dão grandes contributos para o retorno do banco, segundo a mesma fonte.
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A instituição financeira britânica eliminou, desde 2014, 17 mil clientes devido às regras mais duras no que diz respeito ao retorno de capital. Com este novo sistema agora implantado, mais sete mil clientes do Barclays podem ter de procurar uma nova instituição financeira, escreve a Bloomberg."

Quem lê estes trechos não pode deixar de sorrir e recordar marcadores que este blogue utiliza há quase uma década:

• Stobachoff - aquele "classifica cada cliente da sua unidade de "trading" de acordo com o retorno que gera para a instituição" tem tudo a ver com a curva de Stobachoff

• Clientes-alvo - um dos primeiros marcadores usados neste blogue. A importância de perceber para quem temos de trabalhar. Ao decidir deixar de trabalhar com 17 + 7 mil clientes não rentáveis a empresa percebe que não é o volume que interessa. Ao perceber que o mais importante é saber para quem não trabalhar (volto sempre a Hill e à magia de 2008), ao concentrar-se nos clientes-alvo há-de perceber que há um padrão nos JTBD e nos serviços prestados
• Volume is vanity profit is sanity - frase usada aqui no blogue pela primeira vez em Julho de 2006. Como não recordar a empresa de calçado que me ensinou a metáfora da Arca de Noé em 2006.

Agora pensem nos outros bancos. O que dirão desta decisão?

Trechos retirados de "Barclays vai pedir a sete mil clientes para intensificarem transacções ou saírem do banco"

"Growth without profit is perilous"

1. "Bad customers drive out good customers.
2. He who liveth by the discount, shall ye also perish by the discount.
3. All measurements are judgments in disguise.
4. Ideas are always and everywhere more important than their mere execution.
5. Prescription before diagnosis is malpractice (First Law of Medicine: Do No Harm).[Moi ici: Ao ler esta primeira lei da medicina lembrei-me logo dos catequistas/fragilistas que não praticam a via negativa]"

...
[Moi ici: Segue-se um trecho em completo alinhamento com a mensagem deste blogue e com o nosso trabalho]1. Growth without profit is perilous..
We start with profitability, rather than revenue, because we are not interested in growth merely for the sake of growth - the ideology of the cancer cell. As many companies around the world have learned - some the hard way, such as the airlines, retailers, and automobile manufacturers - market share is not the open sesame to more profitability. We are interested in finding the right customer, at the right price, consistent with our purpose and values, even if that means frequently turning away customers.
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Adopting this belief means you need to become much more selective about whom you do business with; even though that marginal business may be “profitable” by conventional accounting standards. Very often the most important costs—and benefits, for that matter - do not ever show up on a profit-and-loss statement. There is such a thing as good and bad profits. Accepting customers who are not a good fit for your firm - either because of their personality or their unwillingness to appreciate your value - has many deleterious effects, such as negatively affecting team member morale, and committing fixed capacity to customers for whom you simply cannot create value. Growth without profit is perilous."

Trechos retirados de "Episode #97 - VeraSage Laws Part II"

Acerca de medir o que interessa

O @pauloperes chamou-me a atenção para "Should You Use Market Share as a Metric?"

É claro que me lembrei do primeiro livro que li de Hermann Simon, "Manage for Profit, Not for Market Share: A Guide to Greater Profits in Highly Contested Markets"
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Voltando ao artigo:

"Managers commonly argue that market share is a useful intermediate measure — in effect, a leading indicator of future success. In some markets, market share probably does help increase future profits, but this is not always the case: General Motors Co. was the world’s biggest carmaker before filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy court protection in June 2009. Therefore, it is critical to understand the expected relationship between market share and profitability in your specific market.
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In some markets, bigger can be better; the most obvious examples are markets with economies of scale. Companies in such markets can reduce their cost per unit by selling more — thus increasing overall profits. If you think you are in such a market, you should confirm that the economies of scale you think exist actually do. Economies of scale do not automatically apply to all markets."

O tema deste artigo joga bem com este texto de Seth Godin "Numbers (and the magic of measuring the right thing)":

"When you measure the wrong thing, you get the wrong thing. Perhaps you can be precise in your measurement, but precision is not significance.
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On the other hand, when you are able to expose your work and your process to the right thing, to the metric that actually matters, good things happen.
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We need to spend more time figuring out what to keep track of, and less time actually obsessing over the numbers that we are already measuring."

E na sua empresa, o que é que se mede? Qual o racional por trás dessas escolhas? Que sinais internos são enviados por essas escolhas?

"a focus on profitability"

Às vezes, em projectos de reflexão estratégica, sinto uma forte concentração da equipa no crescimento da facturação.
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Chamo sempre a atenção para o topo do mapa da estratégia, a perspectiva financeira tem duas vertentes: facturar mais e mais produtividade. E que facturar mais em detrimento de uma menor produtividade é um tiro no pé. Assim, como não sublinhar este trecho:

"We find that a focus on profitability, rather than revenue growth or value creation, offers a surer path to enduring exceptional performance across all three measures.
...
our research shows that growth tends to be more volatile than profitability overall, this suggests that steady growth in absolute terms is unlikely to result in long-run exceptional growth"

Trecho retirado de "Exceptional performance a nonrenewable resource"

Lucro vs quota de mercado (parte III)

Parte I e parte II.
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Outro exemplo:

"Lindt & Spruengli AG on Tuesday reported an 11% increase in full-year profit as the Swiss chocolate maker overcame a “persistently challenging market environment” where a hot summer slackened demand for chocolate and a strong Swiss franc weighed....
The maker of Lindor chocolate balls had previously announced a 7.9% increase in annual sales to 3.65 billion francs for 2015."

Este trecho que se segue faz-me lembrar as preocupações da APICCAPS com o aumento do preço das matérias-primas:

"Lindt said it increased sales in all its major markets, despite describing 2015 as a tough year where higher raw material prices and the elevated level of the Swiss franc were negative factors."

Quando não se está no campeonato do preço mais baixo as regras são outras. A estória, a marca, a sedução são mais importantes

Trechos retirados de "Lindt & Spruengli Lifts Profit in Challenging Market"

Lucro vs quota de mercado (parte II)

Parte I.
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Recordando o mercado da refrigeração na Europa e a sua polarização:

Este exemplo fresco dos colchões nos Estados Unidos:

"Most mattresses bought in the U.S. cost under $1,000, but mattresses that cost more than $1,000 account for over half of the industry’s sales in dollars, according to Tempur Sealy." 

Trecho retirado de "Bed-in-a-Box Startups Challenge Traditional Mattress Makers"

Para fazer crescer a auto-estima

O @pauloperes chamou-me a atenção para este artigo "This Country Is Now the World's Most Popular Maker of Wine".
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Como não recordar o caso recente Mattel vs Lego e o desafio lucro ou quota de mercado.
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Nunca esquecer a lição de Hermann Simon e o ditado australiano de Julho de 2006:

"Volume is Vanity, Profit is Sanity"

O presidente-eleito ameaça que nos quer fazer crescer a auto-estima, imagino que com prelecções e catequese laica. Obrigado, não precisamos!
.
Basta publicitar os muitos bons exemplos do país, como é o caso do vinho. Recordar

• "Trocar a filosofia do volume pelo valor" (Outubro de 2014)
• ""Não nos interessa exportar mais volume, interessa-nos exportar mais valor"" (Junho de 2015) 

E emprenhar menos pelo ouvido o cântico das cassandras preguiçosas.
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BTW, o espanhol entrevistado no artigo da Fortune não está a ver bem o filme... subir preços num mercado concorrencial não é tão fácil como os governos a aumentarem impostos, com o auxílio implícito das várias organizações armadas a quem paga o soldo e controla hieraquicamente. Aumentar preços implica trabalhar na co-criação de valor junto dos clientes e abandonar um ADN entranhado. A vantagem portuguesa é que começamos mais tarde e o Mar del Plastico não é em Portugal:

• Portugal faz bem (Junho de 2015)
• A marca Portugal (Junho 2014)

ADENDA: Acabo de receber dois tweets:

@ccz1 https://t.co/lm2eqhnMNx

— JPS (@joaops) March 6, 2016

@ccz1 @pauloperes No JN hoje também vem um artigo sobre Vinho e valor https://t.co/ylAUsj4ZER

— highalpha (@veryhighalpha) March 6, 2016

Lucro vs quotade mercado

Impressionante!

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A Lego, depois de perder as patentes, depois de uma experiência de quase-morte, quando resolveu deixar de olhar para a eficiência, de olhar para o denominador ... descobriu que o valor não resulta de uma folha de cálculo mas é um sentimento.

"Denmark’s Lego A/S reported a 31% increase in full-year net profit on strong revenue growth,
...
The closely held toy maker said net profit came to 9.2 billion Danish kroner in 2015 ($1.34 billion), compared with 7.0 billion kroner in 2014. Revenue jumped 25% to 35.8 billion kroner, while operating profit grew 26% to 12.2 billion kroner.
...
Mattel's 2015 revenue fell 5% from the previous year, and the company posted a 26% decline in its net profit to $369.4 million."

Parece uma trajectória à la Apple.

Trechos retirados de "Lego Profit Rises 31% but Mattel Remains King of Toy Market"

Volume e vaidade

Recordar:

Volume (quota de mercado) é vaidade
Lucro é sanidade

Mais um excelente texto de Rags:

"Apple never chased market share and was more than willing to let others fight for the low end of the market.
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Apple with just around 15% market share has 90% of profit share of the market.
...
Market share is simply the wrong business metric to chase as I have written several times before. Businesses exist to create value for all stakeholders – customers, investors, partners and employees. Businesses must take actions that maximize this value pie so everyone’s share, however small the ratio is, is better than it would have been otherwise. The question of chasing market share does not come into play at all in this quest unless it is a side effect of increasing value pie.[Moi ici: Consequência ou obliquidade]
...
Price is not a goal, it is not something you optimize for. it is not something your product deserves. It is not an invariant that must be adhered to. Price is a lever you have under control to maximize your share of value created.  You do not fix a price point to maintain perception rather you ensure the price point is aligned with the segment you choose to target and its needs.
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Religiously fixing a price point is an assured way to destroy value for customers and investors.
...
Customers come first. We win customers by creating net new value to customers that is far more than other alternatives. We maximize the value to customers we become the preferred product and hence maximize our share of this value pie. Price is a way for us to get our fair share of that value created. Price is not the end, it is the means."

Trechos retirados de "Apple’s Focus- Market Share? Profit? or Price?"

Pricing man (parte II) - para reflexão

Mais um trecho retirado de "Confessions of the Pricing Man: How Price Affects Everything" de Hermann Simon.

"Countries show significant differences in how profitable their companies are. I have tracked data on this topic for many years, and attribute some of the results to cultural norms. Figure 5.1 compares the average profit margins for companies in 22 countries.

US companies are in the middle of the pack at 6.2 %. German companies have an average after-tax profit of 4.2 %, placing them in the lower half despite their improved performance in the recent past. Japanese companies have assumed their customary place near the bottom, with a meager 2.0 %. The average across all countries works out to 6.0 %.

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What causes these sharp differences? To a large degree it is a matter of having the wrong goals. While I wouldn’t say these numbers are completely self-fulfilling prophecies, they do reflect the priorities that companies set. Too many companies have given higher priority to goals other than profit.

...

There is nothing inherently wrong with having sales, volume, and market share targets. Most companies have them and work hard to strike the right balance. These three secondary goals, however, offer you no useful guidance for price setting. Price setting requires a thorough understanding of two things: how your customers perceive your value and the profit level you need to sustain or improve that value. If market share is your primary goal, why don’t you just give away your product for free? Or even pay customers to use it? Of course such a strategy makes no sense. The reality in almost all companies is that goal setting is not an “either-or” exercise. 

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Balance is paramount. The central problem is that most companies are not balanced. They still underemphasize profits relative to such goals as market share, revenue, volume, or growth. And they misunderstand the often dire consequences of that prioritization. This imbalance results in bizarre pricing strategies and ineffective marketing tactics."

Pricing man (parte I)

Nos próximos dias vou registar aqui alguns trechos retirados de "Confessions of the Pricing Man: How Price Affects Everything" de Hermann Simon.

"The pursuit of profit is both a driver of excellent pricing and an outcome of it; there is no way to separate the two topics. Profit is ultimately the only valid metric for guiding your company. The rationale is simple: profit is the only metric which takes both the revenue side and the cost side of a business into account. A company which wants to maximize its sales neglects the cost side. A company which wants to maximize its market share can distort its business in many ways. After all, the easiest way to maximize market share is to set one’s price at zero.
...
defending “profit” is not tantamount to defending greed and excess. It is a defense of corporate survival and growth. Let’s remember the comment by Peter Drucker, one of the most respected and widely followed management experts of our time: “Profit is a condition of survival. It is the cost of the future, the cost of staying in business.” [Moi ici: Lucro como o custo do futuro foi das primeiras frases de Peter Drucker que sublinhei. Julgo que ele citava textos de Schumpeter de 1909] Or as the esteemed German economist Erich Gutenberg once remarked, “no business has ever died from turning a profit.”
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Profit transcends other corporate goals because it ensures a company’s survival. Businesses cannot afford to treat profit as a “nice to have” or a “pleasant surprise” at the end of the year. Put another way: if the company you work for makes no profit - or takes actions which puts profits in grave danger - your own job is at risk. It is only a matter of time before the cuts come.
...
Because profit is an indispensable condition of survival, it follows that excellent pricing is a means of survival. Companies need to take prices into their calculations with the same intensity and rigor they apply to costs."

Acerca da produtividade e dos feriados (parte III)

Parte I e parte II.
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Voltemos à equação:

"Profitability = Intellectual Capital X Price X Effectiveness"

e ao resultado, o lucro em vez da facturação:

"We start with profitability, rather than revenue, because we are not interested in growth merely for the sake of growth. As many companies around the world have learned - some the hard way, such as the airlines, retailers, and automobile manufacturers - market share is not the open sesame to more profitability. We are interested in finding the right customer, at the right price, consistent with our vision and mission, even if that means frequently turning away customers. I have coined a corollary to Gresham’s law - bad money drives out good - from monetary economics, affectionately known as Baker’s Law: Bad customers drive out good customers.
.
Adopting this belief means you need to become much more selective about whom you do business with; even though that marginal business may be “profitable” by conventional accounting standards. Very often the most important costs - and benefits, for that matter - don’t ever show up on a profit and loss statement. Accepting customers who are not a good fit for your company - either because of their personality or the nature of the work involved - has many deleterious effects, such as negatively affecting team member morale and committing fixed capacity to customers who do not value your offerings. This is why the new equation focuses on profitability, not simply gross revenue. When it comes to customers, less is usually more."

Continua.

Trecho retirado de "Measure what matters to customers : using key predictive indicators" de Ronald J. Baker.

Acerca da produtividade e dos feriados

Por estes dias, é interessante - ou deverei antes escrever exasperante? - acompanhar o debate no Twitter entre a direita e a esquerda acerca do efeito da reposição dos feriados na produtividade.
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Como é que se consegue mais produção? Como se aumenta a produtividade?
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A resposta da direita e da esquerda está nesta frase:

"Toda a gente sabe que o aumento da produtividade se consegue com mais produção. E como é que se consegue mais produção? Trabalhando mais horas ou, trabalhando com mais afinco em cada hora..."[Cuidado, isto é sarcasmo. Não se iludam!]

A direita defende "Trabalhando mais horas".
A esquerda defende "trabalhando com mais afinco em cada hora". [O racional é: mais horas de descanso levam a mais produtividade nas horas em que se trabalha. Foi o que li num tweet].
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Não há dúvida que as empresas portuguesas têm um problema de produtividade. No entanto, assim como a redução dos feriados não mudou o panorama, também agora a sua reposição não o altera.
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Qual é a minha receita? Há muitos anos que defendo aqui uma abordagem bem diferente da veiculada pelo mainstream. Recentemente encontrei este resumo de Ronald Baker:

"When you think about the traditional theory of an enterprise, you would no doubt construct a model similar to this:

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Revenue = Capacity X Efficiency X Cost-Plus Price

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... this model dominates the thinking of business leaders to this day"

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A direita chama a atenção para a "Capacidade" e a esquerda para a "Eficiência".
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A equação resume bem a mentalidade do Normalistão que governou o pensamento económico do século XX.
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O que aqui defendemos há muitos anos pode ser resumido por:

"The old equation is no longer relevant to the drivers of success in the business of the future.

...

It is time to replace the old equation described in the previous chapter with this new model: 

Profitability = Intellectual Capital X Price X Effectiveness"

Comparar as parcelas:

• Lucro versus Volume de vendas
• Capital Intelectual versus Capacidade
• Preço versus Cost-plus Price
• Eficácia versus Eficiência

Continua.

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Relacionar com:

• Economistas desvalorizam impacto no PIB do regresso dos feriados
• Industriais alertam para custo do regresso dos feriados
• Mário Centeno diz que o modelo de baixos salários “está esgotado”

BTW se usam esta argumentação e fonte:

In defence of Europe’s long holidays https://t.co/DcAvYeF1ts sobre as vantagens para a produtividade de ter mais dias de descanso.

— Sérgio Lavos (@sergiolavos) January 5, 2016

Convinha ler tudo até ao fim, nomeadamente:

"But raising productivity is not a consequence of extending the time between when workers clock in and out, nor reducing the number of weeks a year they spend on the Côte d’Azur or the Costa Brava."

Trecho retirado de "Measure what matters to customers : using key predictive indicators" de Ronald J. Baker.

A prova do tempo... tudo por causa de um Pingo Doce

Este título "Suinicultores entram no Pingo Doce de Braga e detectam falhas na rotulagem" despertou-me a atenção.
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Há qualquer coisa por trás desta acção, o Pingo Doce compra o porco no mercado nacional... ou comprava.
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Então, a minha mente recua a 2011 e à Raporal e a este postal "Especulação à volta da carne de porco".
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Entretanto, uma pesquisa no Google leva-me até "When modern distribution owns the piggy bowl" e... lamento!
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Lamento que as minhas previsões de 2011 se tenham cumprido. Confesso que era fácil, diferenciação sem marca própria dificilmente leva a margens superiores, diferenciação sem paciência estratégica dificilmente leva a resultados positivos. A leitura levou-me a identificar uma terceira falha:

"In 2013 Raporal had overcome the period of transition, and was working together with the large distributors. “Pingo Doce was responsible for more than 50% of the sales” referred Sr. Mário Guarda, one of the board members of Raporal and responsible for the meat slaughtering and meat processing units.
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The result of this partnership was an immediate success; in 2011 the “Pig with more flavour” was awarded the national “The Portugal Winner” prize. In terms of annual performance until 2013, sales were largely made under the umbrella of this contract, which allowed Raporal to continue to grow despite the economic downturn and decreasing consumption of pork meat.
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By 2013, the contract was half way through, and the board of directors used this “free flow” time to evaluate the agreement and the future of “Pig with more flavour” upon the end of the contract.
At this point it had become clear that the initial aim of the differentiation, which rested in the ambition to improve the relationship with a client, was not achieved, as negotiations remained very tough. Moreover Raporal did not create enough brand awareness, with the differentiated product, although this was never its main objective. Nevertheless it did succeed in increasing its sales volume, and more importantly the growth of its business.
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In 2013 Raporal had overcome the period of transition, and was working together with the large distributors. “Pingo Doce was responsible for more than 50% of the sales”, while the percentage of sales through small sellers was becoming more and more irrelevant.
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While sales volumes kept increasing Raporal could not help but see its profit margins go down, mostly because of the tough negotiation with modern distribution agents. [Moi ici: Abaixo faço duas reflexões sobre este sublinhado] In the attempt to improve these relationships, Raporal decided to invest in the differentiation of its product which later was sold exclusively under Pingo Doce’s brand. Although sales figures were very promising, negotiations did not get any better.
With a challenging period ahead, Raporal’s management was forced to continue to develop strategies that would gradually decrease the dependency on this modern distributor although clearly understanding that the market conditions dictated the need to sell to these agents if the aim was to maintain large sales volume."

Reflexão 1: Não deixo de ser sentir um perfume de pedofilia empresarial por este caso. Não sabe o que é? Ver isto e isto.
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Reflexão 2: Aquele "While sales volumes kept increasing Raporal could not help but see its profit margins go down" fez-me logo recordar uma das frases que mais cito neste blogue:

Volume é Vaidade,
Lucro é Sanidade.

 2016 quase a chegar e ainda há tantas e tantas empresas a trabalhar para o market share como objectivo, quando devia ser uma consequência...
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Agora, imaginem que a Raporal tinha contactado há 5 anos este anónimo consultor da província... quanto dinheiro teria poupado? Quanto dinheiro teria ganho? Acham que este consultor iria mesmo propor-lhes "Ser ricos e com saúde" em simultâneo, ou iria trazer-lhes o incómodo de terem de se decidir e alinhar pelo que decidiram, ser rico e doentio ou pobre e com saúde? Acham que este consultor deixaria passar em claro o erro clamoroso de apostar na inovação sem desenvolver marca própria?
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Esta é a prova do tempo, o que previ e o que aconteceu. Há a outra prova do tempo, por exemplo aqui e aqui.
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A sua empresa está no lugar da Raporal em 2007?
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Será que podemos ajudar?