"em vez de enveredar pela race-to-the-bottom"

Isto, "O futuro do jornalismo", é, sem tirar nem pôr, o mesmo tema de "Make better tacos".

Na dúvida, em vez de enveredar pela race-to-the-bottom, procurar uma forma de fazer diferente ou melhor. Como não recordar as três regras de Raynor.

"aposta noutro mindset"

Primeiro, este trecho de Trout em "Differentiate or Die: Survival in Our Era of Killer Competition":

"Now let’s look at that 0 percent differentiation degree in the Banking sector. How can that be? All these big name banks spend millions on advertising telling us how wonderful they are to do business with. Well, class, the answer is obvious. Mergermania has taken a terrible toll. And after all these mergers, who knows who is who these days much less for what they stand. As the psychologists advise, without a line to the past, how can you be sure of a line to the future. The Banking category is a mess and deserves their 0 percent."

O que ouvimos e lê-mos em Portugal sobre os bancos?
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Corrida para fechar agências!
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Corrida para passar a oferecer os serviços via internet!
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O que se passa nos Estados Unidos, que vão à frente na tendência do eficientismo?

"Banks just can’t figure out what to do with their branches.
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The efforts are proving tricky given that banks want customers to come to branches for moneymaking financial products such as loans or credit cards, but also have to serve the millions of Americans who still regularly make deposits and withdraw cash at the teller line.
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Bank of America Corp. soon will begin converting about 9,000 tellers to “relationship bankers” who can direct customers to high-tech ATMs or show them how to deposit a check via smartphone.
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Despite banks cutting costs sharply in recent years, as many as one-third of those branches remain unprofitable, says consulting firm Simon-Kucher & Partners.
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“Nobody buys a home equity line of credit on impulse,” ... In some cases, the changes risk turning off customers.
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Some firms are simply shuttering branches. Fifth Third Bancorp last month announced that it will close or sell 100 branches, or 8% of its offices. Like many of its peers, the Cincinnati-based bank also is expanding its use of employees who can handle a variety of functions."

Entretanto no Twitter, encontrei estes tweets de Esko Kilpi, bem em linha com a mensagem deste blogue (ler de baixo para cima):

Recordar "The Three Rules" de Raynor e Ahmed:

• Better before cheaper;
• Revenue before cost;
• There are no other rules

O que é que os bancos andam a fazer há anos?
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A fugir da interacção e a fugir daquelas 3 regras.

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Para terminar, este trecho retirado de "Home and Away" na revista "Health Club Management":

Quem não aposta no "cheaper" e no "cost", aposta na interacção, aposta na co-criação, aposta noutro mindset... eu diria, "Every visit customers have to make are an opportunity for interaction and co-creation"
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Nunca esquecer, Golias pode apostar e ganhar com a automação porque está no seu ADN; contudo, David não tem qualquer vantagem em seguir esse caminho, tem muito mais a perder do que os euros que poupa.

Trechos 2 retirados de "Is This a Coffee Shop or a Bank?"

Para reflexão

"Our ongoing research into the drivers of superior performance has led us to conclude that exceptional profitability is a function of a corporation’s commitment to following three rules:

1. Better before cheaper: Don’t compete on price, compete on value.
2. Revenue before cost: Drive profitability with higher revenue, not lower cost.
3. There are no other rules: Change anything and everything to stay aligned with the first two rules.

These rules are rules because their validity does not seem to depend on circumstances. Regardless of industry, time period, or competitive context, the companies that follow these rules seem systematically more likely to realize superior long-term profitability.
...
But wait … there’s a catch. However confident we are that the rules define what makes exceptional companies truly exceptional, we cannot assume that following the rules is what allows a company to become exceptional in the first place. Those companies that are not exceptional (by construction that is most companies), yet aspire to exceptional performance, must embark on a journey to this difficult-to-find destination.
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Our research suggests that ultimately, most companies that become and remain exceptional owe their results in material measure to following the rules.
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The rules apply as guidance for sustaining exceptional performance. When to begin applying them along the way to exceptional performance depends on where you start your journey. The worse your performance is in relative terms, the more significantly one should, all else equal, focus on cost reduction. As this is done effectively, and performance begins to improve, additional performance improvements turn increasingly on improving gross margin or asset turnover.
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These findings have an intuitive appeal. Companies that find themselves in money-losing positions, unless suffering the consequences of fundamental strategic errors, are rarely at the cutting edge of operational efficiency. Consequently, when seeking simply to get back to profitability, cost reductions yield the most significant financial improvements.
This result is not what Rule No. 2—revenue before cost—prescribes. But then, a company that seeks merely to get out of the red is not aspiring to exceptional performance, at least not yet, so it is perhaps not too surprising that the rules driving exceptional performance do not apply.
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As companies move into the middle of the distribution, however, they will typically have captured the benefits of the more readily implemented improvements. Further increasing profitability will thenceforth rely more heavily on gross margin improvements. Our case study research shows that achieving these improvements, in turn, relies on achieving price premiums through competitive differentiation."

Sim, faz sentido. Empresas à beira de um precipício, têm de reconhecer que a receita actual não funciona e que, se calhar, o mais correcto é encolher até uma dimensão sustentável, para a partir daí fazer nova tentativa de crescimento. Como, por exemplo, aconteceu com a Apple, após o regresso de Steve Jobs.
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Contudo, muitas empresas, optam por aumentar a capacidade de produção, para produzir mais, baixar os custos unitários e assim baixar preços para ser mais competitivas... quase sempre o resultado é, à beira de um precipício, deram o salto em frente.

Trechos retirados de "The journey to exceptional performance" de Rob Del Vicario, Michael E. Raynor, e Mumtaz Ahmed.

A doença americana

A doença americana... a falta de paciência estratégica para apostar na subida sustentável dos preços à custa de maior valor potencial percepcionado pelos clientes.
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Imagem retirada de "Should Your Company Focus on Price or Quality?"

Hei! Eu só sou um anónimo engenheiro da província

Sim, eu só sou um anónimo da província.
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Posso torcer o nariz ao que dizem ser o conteúdo do Plano Estratégico da PT, aqui e aqui, mas quem sou eu?
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Interessante recuperar este texto de 2005, "Zeitgeist Leadership":

"A leader’s long-term success isn’t derived from sheer force of personality or breadth and depth of skill. Without an ability to read and adapt to changing business conditions, personality and skill are but temporal strengths. An understanding of the zeitgeist and its implications has played a critical but unheralded role in some of the greatest business victories of all time."

E conjugá-lo com este outro de Novembro de 2014, "How the three rules drive telecom firms' performance":

"The history of the telecom industry ... is important because it created a set of deeply ingrained institutional beliefs and behaviors that were not appropriate in the context of new competitive realities. As a result, companies struggled, and some made poor decisions about how to approach new business realities.
...
Research conducted across industries, described in "The Three Rules: How Exceptional Companies Think", [Moi ici: Livro comentado aqui no blogue] shows that the most successful enterprises are those that continually search for and find ways to create new value - that is, value that is not price-driven - and in the process, pursue growth. Examining the study’s most consistently successful businesses, the researchers distilled three rules that drive long-term superior performance . The three rules are:
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1) Better before cheaper: Don’t compete on price; compete on value.
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2) Revenue before cost: Drive profitability with higher volume and price, not lower cost.
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3) There are no other rules: Do whatever you have to in order to remain aligned with the first two rules."

E, então, o plano estratégico da PT concentra-se na redução de custos? OK, está percebido!

A primeira regra, a ser violada

Sabem como sou um promotor do esforço das empresas, para conseguirem aumentar os seus preços, através de uma melhoria da proposta de valor dirigida aos seus clientes-alvo.
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BTW, quase o oposto do aqui relatado "Peugeot compromete-se a aumentar produção e evita fechos de fábricas em França até 2016":

"A empresa diz estar preparada para aumentar a produção em 7,5% para um milhão de veículos por ano,
...
Na Europa a queda dos registos de novos carros foi de 13% nos primeiros oito meses deste ano,"

Tentar aumentar as vendas através da redução dos custos/preços?!
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Recordando "The Three Rules" a primeira regra propõe: Better before cheaper...

"Dig a Hole to Fill a Hole"

Raynor e Mumtaz em "The Three Rules" para titular um texto sobre a evolução da Maytag escolheram:

"Dig a Hole to Fill a Hole"

Faz-me lembrar o mais défice, para reduzir o défice.
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É impressionante como empresas grandes, cometem erros crassos tão facilmente.

O conselho!

Mais um excelente trecho retirado de "The Three Rules":

"The prevalence of revenue-driven profitability among exceptional companies is perhaps most significant for what it says about how best to use ROA as a guide to strategie action.
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As we explored briefly in chapter 1, since ROA is a ratio, there is no mathematieal difference when ROA is inereased by adjusting any of its constituent elements. Raise price or volume, reduce costs or assets ... the arithmetic cannot tell the difference. (Moi ici: Advinhem qual a interpretação dos teóricos da tríade, desconhecedores da relações amorosas e crentes monoteístas no Excel)
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But in practice there seems to he a very real difference. Miracle Workers are not wastrels, but they do not rely ou cost leadership to drive their performance. Both in our population of exceptional companies and in our sample, Miracle Worker status is a consequence of gross margin advantage driven hy higher price or volume—and as often as not enabled by higher costs and frequently assets. ln other words, exceptional profitability demands, beyond a point, making trade-offs, accepting higher costs as the price of being truly exceptional. Driving profitability from merely good to truly great by reducing either costs or assets is not something we see, as an entirely empirical matter, to be the most likely route to Miracle Worker performance."

Um conselho sempre presente neste blogue.
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Li este trecho a caminhar para casa, depois de deixar o carro na revisão e, pensei nas "guerras" que às vezes é preciso ter nas empresas, para conseguir passar esta mensagem... a competição pelo custo está tão entranhada... e eu não tenho o tempo de antena da tríade, sempre a martelarem a mensagem da competição pelo custo... e como sublinhei há dias, com base em Gary Klein, uma mentira muitas vezes repetida passa a ser a verdade oficial, mesmo perante evidências que sustentam o contrário... é um combate desigual.

Acerca da captura de valor (parte II)

Mais um pouco de poesia retirada de "The Three Rules" e em linha com o esforço missionário deste blogue:

"increases in both price and volume increase revenue, which increases income, and hence ROA. However price and volume can be negatively correlated, making it difficult to increase both simultaneously.
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On the other hand, although higher cost (which reduces ROA) can be a consequence of inefficiency, it can also be a function of using higher-quality materials or more skilled labor, each of which can contribute to non-price value, thus justifying a higher price (which increases ROA). Consequently, price and cost can move in the same direction. Volume and assets also often move together yet exert contradictory pressures on ROA: higher volume can increase asset turnover, which increases ROA but only if the higher volume does not require disproportionately more assets.
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The key to superior profitability, then, is not how well a company manages any one variable in the ROA equation, but how it manages the interdependencies among them in light of often unavoidable trade-offs. We call this a company's profitability formula. We discovered that exceptional companies, by an overwhelming margin, have a common profitability formula, which we have summarized in our second rule, revenue before cost. This means that when exceptional companies face a trade-off between increasing profitability by increasing revenue or by decreasing cost, they systematically choose increasing revenue even if that means incurring higher cost. We have never seen an exceptional company spend with abandon. Rather, we have concluded that sustained profitability advantages are rarely driven by disproportionately lower cost or asset bases when compared with the competition, and instead are very often driven by disproportionately higher revenues.
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Profitability advantages driven by higher revenue, even when they incur higher cost, prove to be more vluable than advantages driven by lower cost.
...
costly non-price differentiation that earns higher revenue through higher price rather than volume increases that drive asset efficiency. In short, revenue before cost, and when it comes to revenue, price before volume"

Como não recordar "Volume is vanity, Profit is sanity".
Como não recordar anos e anos de pregação em vão contra o mainstream entranhado que só pensa nos custos.
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O triste é que a mensagem do mainstream tem este efeito:

"Not only is the first story likely to be wrong, it clogs our minds. It gets us thinking in the wrong direction, and it makes shifting over to the truth more difficult. When we get contradictory evidence, we fixate on the first story and preserve our mistaken impressions."

Trecho retirado de  "Streetlights and Shadows Searching for the Keys to Adaptive Decision Making" de Gary Klein.

Agora, leiam "Medinfar já tem 10% das vendas no estrangeiro":

"Ternos de produzir melhor, mais barato, mais rápido, para poder continuar no mercado.
O crescimento virá, quase exclusivamente, dos mercados externos?
Diria antes de clientes terceiros. Para além da produção que tentos para a Medinfar, produzimos para mais 45 clientes. Estamos mais competitivos, estamos a conseguir ganhar clientes. Aliás, neste momento pensamos crescer a dois dígitos a nível de produção para terceiros, o que é um óptimo sinal."

O aumento do volume compensará os activos? A fábrica vai produzir 12 milhões tendo capacidade para 40 milhões... como estarão as margens?

Acerca da captura de valor

Mais um trecho de "The Three Rules", desta vez o começo do quarto capítulo, sobre a segunda regra, "Revenue Before Cost":

"How best to create value for customers is a question that can be usefully seen as a choice between competitive positions defined by an emphasis on price value (that is, low price) or non-price value. Perhaps somewhat unusually, seeing the question in these high-contrast terms is not a dangerous oversimplification. It is instead an accurate distillation of an underlying structure that is too often hidden beneath unnecessary complexity. Sometimes the world is nuanced and complex and colored with shades of gray. But sometimes there are clear choices to be made, and we simply do not want to face up to them. Better befere cheaper is an unambiguous answer to a straightforward but too often ignored question. Creating value for customers is a necessary condition for exceptional performance, but it is not sufficient. The value you create is only the "size of the pie." Whether or not a given company is an exceptional performer is also a function of the "size of their slice," or how value is divided between customers and the corporation.' In other words, exceptional companies must not only create value, but also capture it in the form of profits."

Como não recordar o esquema que aprendi com Larreche:

 Como não recordar a importância de aumentar o producer-surplus!
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Como não recordar a premente urgência de deixar de deixar dinheiro em cima da mesa.
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Continua.

I told you so

"when your customers are yelling for price cuts, you can drop prices and then squeeze your company elsewhere to try to preserve profitability, or you can see through their complaints on price to the more difficult truth that maybe you have gotten lazy or lost focus or that the competition has upped its game and you no longer provide the superior value you once did. Addressing that problem means taking on the challenge of increasing and perhaps even changing the value you provide; it could mean changing any or all of your technologies, processes, markets, or customers. Both courses of action - cutting price or increasing value - can be difficult to pursue successfully, and each of them can make equally good sense.
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It is in just these circumstances that better before cheaper proves its worth. Faced with a choice between two difficult, similarly plausible, but mutually exclusive solutions to what can be an existential challenge, the best you can do is play the odds. Our research suggests strongly that the most profitable course of action is to devote your resources to tackling the hard problem of creating anew the non-price value your customers will pay for, not the hard problem of how to remain profitable at lower prices. "

Apetece dizer "I told you so!"
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Apostar no numerador, apostar na eficácia, apostar na subida na escala de valor... apostar no Evangelho do Valor!!!
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Trechos retirados de "The Three Rules" de Michael Raynor e Mumtaz Ahmed

Acerca do posicionamento

Um imagem interessante retirada de "The Three Rules":

"Competitive position is the height of the climb. Execution is what allows you to turn potential energy into kinetic energy by riding down the other side. Both the height of the climb and the efficiency of the ride down are indispensable to the overall experience. A big climb with no descent is essentially worthless, and a train that stutters down the other side is arguably not much better. The smoothest car in the world cannot make up for a puny drop. Similarly, you cannot compensate for a poor position with great execution while poor execution can compromise even the most promising position. In short, position determines how fast you can go; execution determines how fast you actually go.
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Industry is the frame of reference for the potential and kinetic energy. As an industry's structure changes - new technologies, new regulations, new entrants, and so on - exceptional companies understand that all performance (or motion, in the roller-coaster metaphor) is relative, and so they adapt in ways that preserve their ability to store potential and release kinetic energy.
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Average companies, and exceptional companies that lose their way, seem to forget that the key is relative position within an industry and instead begin matching their behavior to industry-level forces. If an industry is consolidating, they go on an acquisitions binge; if an industry is suffering a downturn, they begin cutting cost and price; if an industry is expanding, they invest and grow. That all seems reasonable, but it amounts to moving in the same direction and with the same velocity as the frame of reference itself - in other words, it amounts to standing still. Exceptional performance is built on being different, and making choices dominated by industry-level considerations makes you average."

O que tem feito a sua empresa para se diferenciar?
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O que tem feito a sua empresa para melhorar o seu posicionamento?
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Tem estado demasiado concentrado nos cortes, na execução e descurado o posicionamento?
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Com cada vez mais picos na paisagem competitiva enrugada:

 Não escolher um posicionamento é... asneira forte.

Um começo praticamente perfeito

E finalmente comecei a leitura de "The Three Rules - How Exceptional Companies Think" de Michael Raynor e Mumtaz Ahmed.
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O primeiro capítulo, "More Than a Fortune Cookie" cumpriu as expectativas na íntegra, o reforço integral da mensagem deste blogue ao longo dos anos.

"How much of each of price and non-price value a company provides relative to its competitors defines its position in competitive space; how a company creates value for its customers.
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Miracle Workers (Moi ici: Designação que os autores deram às empresas com desempenho excepcional) overwhelmingly had non-price positions... and Average Joes (Moi ici: Designação que os autores deram às empresas com desempenho mediano) typically competed on price.
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More compelling still - and a big part of why we feel a non-price position is a material cause of exceptional performance - we found that when exceptional companies abandoned a non-price position, their performance subsequently suffered.
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There are two dimensions of value along which any company can differentiate itself: price value and non-price value. Our research reveals that exceptional companies typically focus on non-price value, even if that means they have to charge higher prices. It did not have to turn out this way: price-based competition is a legitimate strategy. We have found, however, that competing with better rather than cheaper is systematically associated with superior, long-term performance. (Moi ici: Este parágrafo é, simplesmente, música celestial para este blogue... e recordo "guerras" que perdi, em várias empresas, pela minha incapacidade de defender a via do valor através do não-preço, sobretudo no início desta caminhada. O volume é um atractor poderoso, é uma sereia com um canto quase irresistível)
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Better before cheaper is a useful rule because it applies not just to questions of diversification or focus, but to many critical decisions our Miracle Workers faced. The differences in behavior that best explained the differences in performance were consistent with a bias for increasing non-price value, even if it was sometimes at the expense of being price competitive.
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Of course, no company can afford to ignore its relative price position. That is why the rule is "better before cheaper": being price competitive is far from irrelevant, but when it comes to position in a market, exceptional performance is caused most often by greater non-price value rather than by lower price.
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It turns out that just as there is a pattern in how exceptional companies create value (better before cheaper), there is a pattern in how they capture value.
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Our reserach reveals that exceptional companies are systematically  more likely to drive their ROA advantage through higher relative revenue than by lower relative cost or lower relative assets. Going down one more level, a revenue advantage can be driven by higher unit price or higher unit volume, and exceptional companies tend to rely more on price. (Moi ici: Recordar a série "Sobre a paranóia da eficiência e do eficientismo", "Aumentar o "producer surplus", o caminho menos percorrido (parte IV)" e "Não tente ser o melhor")
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A company's competitive position defines how it creates value. A company's profitability formula defines how it captures value. Profitability increases when revenue increases, cost decreases, or assets go down. We find that exceptional companies achieve superior profitability with revenue increases, even if that means higher cost or a higher asset base.
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When you find yourself having to allocate scarce resources—usually people, time or money—among competing priorities (which you surely will), think about which initiatives contribute most to enhancing the non-price elements of your position, or to earning relatively higher prices or greater volume, and give those the nod."

Um começo praticamente perfeito para a causa deste blogue.

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E a sua empresa, como está a investir no não-preço? O que está a fazer para ser mais valiosa do que mais barata? O que está a fazer para aumentar o producer surplus?

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Lá em cima os autores falam do indicador ROA (return on assets), aqui no blogue também uso um outro ROA, o return-of-attention, quando o mainstream só fala na eficiência e na redução de custos, é preciso muita perseverança, muito anti-short-termismo, muita personalidade para seguir o caminho menos percorrido e apostar no valor associado ao não-preço.

Três regras que as empresas deviam seguir

Um texto que me dá muito gosto referir aqui, "Three Rules for Making a Company Truly Great":

"we undertook a statistical study of thousands of companies, and eventually identified several hundred among them that have done well enough for a long enough period of time to qualify as truly exceptional. Then we discovered something startling: The many and diverse choices that made certain companies great were consistent with just three seemingly elementary rules:

1. Better before cheaper - in other words, compete on differentiators other than price.
2. Revenue before cost - that is, prioritize increasing revenue over reducing costs.
3. There are no other rules - so change anything you must to follow Rules 1 and 2.

The rules don’t dictate specific behaviors; nor are they even general strategies. They’re foundational concepts on which companies have built greatness over many years."

Em linha com o que procuramos fomentar e motivar, aqui e nas empresas:

"1. Better Before Cheaper Every company faces a choice: It can compete mainly by offering superior nonprice benefits such as a great brand, an exciting style, or excellent functionality, durability, or convenience; or it can meet some minimal acceptable standard along these dimensions and try to attract customers with lower prices."

Nem de propósito, ainda ontem voltei a usar esta figura:

Qual é a pergunta a que a sua empresa se dirige? Ao desempenho ou ao barato?

"We don’t mean to suggest that a company can afford to ignore its relative price position, any more than one that competes through low prices can afford to ignore product or service quality. We mean only that in most cases, outstanding performance is caused by greater value and not by lower price. Companies seeking sustained, exceptional profitability should pursue strategies that are consistent with this rule and avoid those that aren’t."

Em linha com as lições do Evangelho do Valor, da superioridade do numerador face ao denominador de Marn e Rosiello e da originação do valor de Larreche:

"2. Revenue Before Cost Companies must not only create value but also capture it in the form of profits. By an overwhelming margin, exceptional companies garner superior profits by achieving higher revenue than their rivals, through either higher prices or greater volume. Very rarely is cost leadership a driver of superior profitability.
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There’s nothing startling about the notion that higher prices can lead to higher profits, but we were impressed by the range of contexts in which companies have built businesses on this idea.
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Just as you can lower prices while adhering to better before cheaper, you can drive out inefficiencies and lower your costs while following the revenue-before-cost rule. But don’t try to achieve a profitability advantage through cost leadership."

  E, por fim:

"3. There Are No Other RulesThis rule underscores the uncomfortable (or liberating) truth that in the pursuit of exceptional profitability, everything but the first two rules should be on the table. When considering all the other determinants of company performance—operational excellence, talent development, leadership style, corporate culture, reward systems, you name it—we saw wide variation among companies of all performance types. There’s no doubt that these and other factors matter to corporate performance—how could they not?—but we couldn’t find consistent patterns of how they mattered."

Esta é a minha experiência:

"The first step in making use of the rules is to get a clear picture of your company’s competitive position and profitability formula. Our experience shows that many senior leaders lack that clarity, (Moi ici: Ás vezes é doloroso, está-se de fora, tem-se uma visão distanciada e consegue-se ver o que o gerente não consegue... o mundo mudou e a empresa continua a ser gerida e conduzida com o pensamento obsoleto que fez dela um sucesso num outro tempo... nem se consegue arranjar uma brecha para lançar a semente de um pensamento diferente... confia-se em mais uma artimanha, em mais um sacrifício, em mais um torcer das regras ou fechar dos olhos e não se sai disto) primarily because companies tend to put too much emphasis on comparing their present selves with their past selves and too often declare victory if they’ve improved. What they forget is that you compete only with your current rivals. Benchmarking may help, but in many instances it devolves into a comparison of single dimensions—Is our product more durable?
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Here’s how to put the rules into operation: The next time you find yourself having to allocate scarce resources among competing priorities, think about which initiatives will contribute most to enhancing the nonprice elements of your position and which will allow you to charge higher prices (Moi ici: Como aprendi há pouco tempo a verbalizar; preferir o lucro por unidade de produto em vez do lucro por referência de produto) or to sell in greater volume. Then give those the nod.
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If your operational-effectiveness program is mostly about cutting costs, whereas your innovation efforts are mostly about separating you from the pack, go with innovation. But if pushing the envelope on operations is about delivering levels of customer service way above your competition’s, whereas innovation seems geared to doing the same for less, then your operations folks deserve the additional care and feeding."

Do paradoxo da estratégia à psicologia, passando pelo preço do dinheiro e o horror a perder

Ainda na passada sexta-feira de manhã, a conversa, na viagem de carro da Figueira da Foz para Coimbra, veio parar a isto, ao paradoxo da estratégia.

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A conversa começara por causa de um sinal que vimos na autoestrada, aquele que se coloca a 1300 metros a avisar que vai haver um corte de faixa. Um sinal daqueles custa cerca de 700 euros. 

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Fará sentido, para uma empresa que faz uma obra por ano numa auto-estrada, adquirir um sinal? Não fará sentido haver no mercado empresas que aluguem sinais como quem aluga gruas?

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Perguntava-me a jovem:

- Então, se o futuro for no sentido que diz, empresas mais pequenas e especializadas. Elas podem ganhar mais dinheiro enquanto tudo correr bem mas, se o mercado mudar, têm menos hipóteses de escapar?

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Claro que concordei com o seu raciocínio. E tentei descrever esta figura e o seu significado:

Mais foco, mais pureza estratégica, maior rentabilidade e mais risco, logo mais mortalidade.

Menos foco, menos pureza estratégia, menor rentabilidade e menos risco, logo menos mortalidade.

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Este trecho veio-me recordar a conversa da passada sexta-feira:

"As I was reading this book I kept wondering why organizations were so reluctant to employ a strategy. All of this thinking reminded me of another book I had read a few years back on strategy called The Strategy Paradox. What is the paradox?

The most profitable strategies are “extreme” strategies that commit companies to positions of either product differentiation or cost leadership. These extreme positions expose firms to a greater likelihood of bankruptcy by increasing the strategic risk they face. Consequently, the strategies likeliest to succeed are also likeliest to fail. That is the strategy paradox.
At first I thought organizations avoided good strategy simply because it was complicated and involved hard choices. The more I thought about it, however, the more I settled on the fact that people avoid good strategies because they don’t want to be wrong."

E isto leva-me a fazer a ligação com o capítulo 28 do livro de Daniel Kahneman "Thinking, Fas and Slow", um capítulo chamado "Bad Events":

"The concept of loss aversion is certainly the most significant contribution of psychology to behavioral economics. This is odd, because the idea that people evaluate many outcomes as gains and losses, and that losses loom larger than gains, surprises no one. ... The brains of humans and other animals contain a mechanism that is designed to give priority to bad news. ... The brain responds quickly even to purely symbolic threats. Emotionally loaded words quickly attract attention, and bad words (war, crime) attract attention faster than do happy words (peace, love). ... The self is more motivated to avoid bad self-definitions than to pursue good ones. Bad impressions and bad stereotypes are quicker to form and more resistant to disconfirmation than good ones."

E agora estas estatísticas retiradas do golfe:

"Pope and Schweitzer reasoned from loss aversion that players would try a little harder when putting for par (to avoid a bogey) than when putting for a birdie. They analyzed more than 2.5 million putts in exquisite detail to test that prediction. They were right. Whether the putt was easy or hard, at every distance from the hole, the players were more successful when putting for par than for a birdie. The difference in their rate of success when going for par (to avoid a bogey) or for a birdie was 3.6%. This difference is not trivial. ... These fierce competitors certainly do not make a conscious decision to slack off on birdie putts, but their intense aversion to a bogey apparently contributes to extra concentration on the task at hand."

 Como o preço do dinheiro está cada vez mais elevado, são precisas rentabilidades cada vez mais elevadas para remunerar o capital, logo, um desafio interessante em cima da mesa... o paradoxo da estratégia, o preço do dinheiro e o horror às perdas que permeiam a nossa psicologia.

Estratégias puras e híbridas - opções!

Retomando o tema do ano passado (sim eu sei aranha e duck...)
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"Thornhill and White (2007) found that firms with a one-sided focus on either cost leadership or differentiation outperformed firms with mixed strategies in terms of short-term operating margin. They also found that despite pure strategies’observable performance benefits, the vast majority of firms occupy strategic space’s middle ground. The explanation was found in a follow-up study (Thornhill et al., 2007): Although pure players are more profitable, they also have higher risks and higher exit rates. The authors conclude that a middle position may be a rational choice that reflects firms’ preference for growth and survival rather than short-term profit maximization."
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Este trecho retirado de "Organizational Ambidexterity: Antecedents, Outcomes, and Moderators" de Sebastian Raisch e Julian Birkinshaw no Journal of Management em Março de 2008.
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O que é preferível para uma sociedade:

• Empresas mais rentáveis que seguem estratégias puras e que têm uma duração média de vida mais curta?
• Ou, empresas menos rentáveis que seguem estratégias híbridas e que têm uma duração média de vida mais longa?
  

Claro que a primeira opção implica uma sociedade mais móvel em que o fecho e o arranque de empresas é muito mais frequente e fácil.

O paradoxo da estratégia (parte VI: muitas e pequenas apostas antes da aposta em grande)

Continuado daqui.
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Ghemawat referiu, como ilustrámos nos episódios anteriores, que todos os planos estratégicos envolvem compromissos. Compromissos que têm de ser feitos perante um futuro cheio de incerteza.
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Seguem-se trechos retirados de “The Origin of Wealth – Evolution, Complexity, and the Radical Remaking of Economics” de Eric Beinhocker.
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“Truly strategic choices are difficult or costly to reverse once made.”… “The level of commitment distinguishes strategic from tactical decisions.”
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“Building a position of sustainable competitive advantage requires commitment, because by definition a position that does not require commitment is easy to imitate.” … “without irreversibility, there is no wealth creation, and it is irreversibility that makes wealth creation risky.”
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E num registo muito semelhante ao de Raynor, Beinhocker refere:
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“The standard approach to strategy thus hinges on two fundamental assumptions: first, that one can make confident predictions about what strategies will be successful in the future, and second, that one can make strategic commitments that will result in sustainable competitive advantage.”
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“We thus have a problem. On the one hand, strategic planning requires us to make predictions about the future to make strategic commitments. On the other hand, we have a near-infinite number of possible future states, and which brand we take may depend on a series of impossible-to-predict frozen accidents. At the same time, the punctuated nature of change tricks our pattern-recognizing minds into thinking that the world is more stable than it really is.”
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“All competitive advantage is temporary. Some advantages last longer than others, but all sources of advantage have a finite shelf life.”
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“The key to doing better is to “bring evolution inside” and get the wheels of differentiation, selection, and amplification spinning within a company’s four walls. Rather than thinking of strategy as a single plan built on predictions of the future, we should think of strategy as a portfolio of experiments, a population of competing Business Plans that evolves over time.”
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Beinhocker propõe que o planeamento estratégico não se concentre em prever o futuro, tarefa vedada aos humanos, mas se transforme num exercício de aprendizagem para preparar as mentes das pessoas para um futuro intrinsecamente incerto. O propósito não é o de descobrir “A Resposta” única mas criar mentes preparadas.
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“Typical strategic planning processes focus on chopping down the branches of the strategic decision tree, eliminating options, and making choices and commitments. In contrast, an evolutionary approach to strategy emphasizes creating choices, keeping options open, and making the tree of possibilities as bushy as possible at any point in time. Options have value. An evolving portfolio of strategic experiments gives the management team more choices, which means better odds that some of the choices will be right” … “The objective is to be able to make lots of small bets, and only make big bets as a part of amplifying successful experiments when uncertainties are much lower.”
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Algo na linha da ideia de Tom Peters de que quem faz mais pequenas experiências, sujeitas a pequenos erros, aprende mais depressa e tem mais hipóteses de tropeçar no sucesso antes dos mais conservadores.
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Trata-se de mais uma possível abordagem, mais fácil para grandes empresas.
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Assim que uma hipótese estratégica, que uma experiência, se revela errada, é preciso o distanciamento para lhe cortar o financiamento rapidamente, para que este seja canalizado para as hipóteses bem sucedidas. E isto é demasiado perigoso para quem está próximo da acção, há muito esforço e empenho investido.
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Assim, continuo a achar que estas abordagens para vencer o paradoxo estratégico são mais fáceis de aplicar a grandes empresas mas pouco úteis para PME's pouco capitalizadas e com poucos recursos humanos com capacidade para viver experiências fora do corpo.
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Sou tentado a preferir desenhar potenciais cenários para, depois, equacionar uma estratégia mais robusta.
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Sou tentado a preferir conhecer melhor o perfil dos clientes-alvo do que confiar em segmentações genéricas baseadas em critérios demográficos ou financeiros.

O paradoxo da estratégia (parte V: compromissos vs incerteza)

Continuado daqui.
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Continuando com as ideias de Ghemawat no livro “Commitment – The Dynamic of Strategy”:
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“Commitment is mostly concentrated in a few choices” (estratégia é escolher, não se pode ir a todas)
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“choices that individually embody significant commitment are crucial in the sense that they have the most potential to influence the organization’s future opportunities” (não estamos a falar de escolhas obtidas por consenso ou por brainstorming, estamos a falar de uma concatenação de escolhas que constituem um encadeamento lógico num mapa da estratégia e resultam num caminho para o futuro)
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“commitment choices can be counted on to have a disproportionately large impact on future performance. This extra impact demands extra attention, in the form of in-depth analysis.”
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“strategic choices demand cost-benefit analysis”
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“strategic choices should always be analyzed in terms of their implications for competitive positions in individual product markets”
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O dilema dos gestores resulta da necessidade de assumir compromissos perante um futuro sempre incerto, daí resulta o paradoxo da estratégia, ou como refere Michael Raynor no livro "The Strategy Paradox":
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“A successful strategy allows an organization to create and capture value. To create value, a firm must connect with customers. For a firm to capture value, its strategy must be resistant to imitation by competitors. Satisfying customers in ways competitors cannot copy requires significant commitment to a particular strategy, that is, strategic commitments, to unique assets or to particular capabilities.
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Commitments are a powerful determinant of success because they make a strategy difficult to imitate. To reduce strategic risk, many firms invest only in what has been shown to work. Since these latecomers wait while some firms – the lucky ones – make what happen to be the right commitments, lucky firms enjoy a period of relatively little competition: it takes time to replicate capabilities so painstakingly created.”
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“The downside of commitment is that if you make what happen to be the wrong commitments, it can take a long time to undo them and make new ones.”
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“The strategy paradox, then, arises from the collision of commitment and uncertainty. The most successful strategies are those based on commitments made today that are best aligned with tomorrow’s circumstances. But no one knows what those circumstances will be, because the future is unpredictable. Should one have guessed wrong and committed to the wrong capabilities, it will be impossible to adapt – after all, a commitment that can be changed was not much of a commitment.”
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“The strategy paradox is a consequence of the conflict between a commitment and strategy uncertainty. The answer to the paradox lies in separating the management of each, charging some with the responsibility of delivering on the commitments the organization has already made, and others with the task of mitigating risk and providing exposure to promising opportunities”
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A receita de Raynor para a solução do paradoxo pode funcionar em corporações, agora para as PME's... tenho dúvidas sobre a sua aplicabilidade.
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A série concluiu-se amanhã com uma outra alternativa de solução.

O paradoxo da estratégia (parte I: Compromissos)

Há dias, neste postal “Não há almoços grátis: Há que optar” desenhei este esquema como uma interpretação da mensagem do artigo "No Free Lunch: How Strategic Position Relates to Profitability and Failure" de Stewart Thornhill, Roderick White e Michael Raynor.
Depois, neste postal “Estratégias puras ou híbridas (parte I)” e neste outro “Estratégias puras ou híbridas (parte II)” fiz referência ao artigo “Strategic Purity: A Multi-Industry Evaluation of Pure vs. Hybrid Business Strategies”, publicado no Strategic Management Journal (2007, pp. 553-561) da autoria de Stewart Thornhil e Roderick White.
Thornhill e White focam sobretudo a ligação 1, a relação entre pureza estratégica e rentabilidade: as empresas que seguem estratégias puras têm uma rentabilidade superior à das empresas híbridas que seguem estratégias de meio-termo.Michael Raynor no seu livro “The Strategy Paradox” chama a atenção para as restantes ligações e põe em cima da mesa um dilema para os gestores de topo. É certo que a pureza estratégica traz rentabilidades superiores”, contudo, os gestores nunca conhecem o futuro com precisão e certeza, o futuro está cheio de incertezas e decidir é arriscar. Assim, têm de assumir compromissos, sobre onde investir e sobre onde actuar com base em informação insuficiente.
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Os compromissos estratégicos, para proporcionarem mais rentabilidade, estão associados a mais risco, porque não conhecendo o futuro sem a incerteza associada, é mais arriscado apostar numa estratégia pura do que numa estratégia híbrida, porque a empresa perde flexibilidade e se a aposta for mal sucedida… é mais difícil dar o golpe de rins e sobreviver.
Assim, segundo Raynor, a aposta em estratégias puras é mais arriscada porque:

• Uns ganham, e ganham muito;
• Outros perdem, e perdem muito, não conseguindo mesmo sobreviver.

Já com estratégias híbridas nunca se ganhará muito, mas também nunca se perderá muito.
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Raynor tem uma proposta para deslindar este paradoxo, mas esse não é para já o meu objectivo. O meu objectivo, neste postal, passa antes por recuar e alicerçar melhor a justificação para a ligação 2.
Apostar numa estratégia significa, implica assumir um conjunto de compromissos, daí nada melhor do que consultar uma das fontes sobre o tema, o livro “Commitment – The Dynamic of Strategy” de Pankaj Ghemawat.
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Formular uma estratégia traduz-se na realização de um conjunto de escolhas. Essas escolhas por que persistentes no tempo e por que condicionam o comportamento posterior de uma organização, representam compromissos que se materializam em padrões de comportamento.
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Formular uma estratégia passa por seleccionar um conjunto de factores (sticky factors segundo Porter) com as seguintes características: duráveis; específicos – ou seja, não são adequados a todas as estratégias -; e de transacção difícil.
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Assim, diferentes estratégias puras implicam a escolha de diferentes factores, o que se traduz em diferentes padrões de comportamento (que se auto-excluem).
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Algo como:
Continua.
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Adaptar-se a mudanças que ocorrem lentamente (parte III)

Continuado daqui.
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"Over the course of centuries, the Greenland Norse had built an intricate social and economic structure that proved more successful and durable... Their reliance on agriculture over hunting, their top-down political system, the central role of the Church, and trade with Europe had all served them well for generations. As a result, when conditions began to sour, the Greenland Norse responded by innovating within the constraints of their existing systems and structures." (é impossível ler este trecho final e não associar logo a este texto de João Miranda no DN de sábado passado "Medidinhas").
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Because they could make these changes more rapidly than the rate at which various pressures were increasing, the Greenlad Norse stayed ahead of the need for fundamental restructuring. They had no way of knowing how adverse their conditions would become, what the adaptive limits of their culture and technology were, or when these limits would be reached. Innovating within their system was a perfectly reasonable thing to do. In fact, it worked for a very long time precisely because they were able to outrun nearly imperceptible environmental change.
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Eventually, however, the limits of their ingenuity were reached and the stresses placed on their society by the slowly changing environment overwhelmed them.
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In contrast, if everything had collapsed before their last seaworthy vessel had rotted, the outcome might have been very different... Instead, it was the slow erosion of their society over decades, if not centuries, that did them in. The glacial pace of change made the need for a more radical response nearly impossible to see, and ultimately impossible to implement."