Do paradoxo da estratégia à psicologia, passando pelo preço do dinheiro e o horror a perder

Ainda na passada sexta-feira de manhã, a conversa, na viagem de carro da Figueira da Foz para Coimbra, veio parar a isto, ao paradoxo da estratégia.

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A conversa começara por causa de um sinal que vimos na autoestrada, aquele que se coloca a 1300 metros a avisar que vai haver um corte de faixa. Um sinal daqueles custa cerca de 700 euros. 

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Fará sentido, para uma empresa que faz uma obra por ano numa auto-estrada, adquirir um sinal? Não fará sentido haver no mercado empresas que aluguem sinais como quem aluga gruas?

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Perguntava-me a jovem:

- Então, se o futuro for no sentido que diz, empresas mais pequenas e especializadas. Elas podem ganhar mais dinheiro enquanto tudo correr bem mas, se o mercado mudar, têm menos hipóteses de escapar?

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Claro que concordei com o seu raciocínio. E tentei descrever esta figura e o seu significado:

Mais foco, mais pureza estratégica, maior rentabilidade e mais risco, logo mais mortalidade.

Menos foco, menos pureza estratégia, menor rentabilidade e menos risco, logo menos mortalidade.

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Este trecho veio-me recordar a conversa da passada sexta-feira:

"As I was reading this book I kept wondering why organizations were so reluctant to employ a strategy. All of this thinking reminded me of another book I had read a few years back on strategy called The Strategy Paradox. What is the paradox?

The most profitable strategies are “extreme” strategies that commit companies to positions of either product differentiation or cost leadership. These extreme positions expose firms to a greater likelihood of bankruptcy by increasing the strategic risk they face. Consequently, the strategies likeliest to succeed are also likeliest to fail. That is the strategy paradox.
At first I thought organizations avoided good strategy simply because it was complicated and involved hard choices. The more I thought about it, however, the more I settled on the fact that people avoid good strategies because they don’t want to be wrong."

E isto leva-me a fazer a ligação com o capítulo 28 do livro de Daniel Kahneman "Thinking, Fas and Slow", um capítulo chamado "Bad Events":

"The concept of loss aversion is certainly the most significant contribution of psychology to behavioral economics. This is odd, because the idea that people evaluate many outcomes as gains and losses, and that losses loom larger than gains, surprises no one. ... The brains of humans and other animals contain a mechanism that is designed to give priority to bad news. ... The brain responds quickly even to purely symbolic threats. Emotionally loaded words quickly attract attention, and bad words (war, crime) attract attention faster than do happy words (peace, love). ... The self is more motivated to avoid bad self-definitions than to pursue good ones. Bad impressions and bad stereotypes are quicker to form and more resistant to disconfirmation than good ones."

E agora estas estatísticas retiradas do golfe:

"Pope and Schweitzer reasoned from loss aversion that players would try a little harder when putting for par (to avoid a bogey) than when putting for a birdie. They analyzed more than 2.5 million putts in exquisite detail to test that prediction. They were right. Whether the putt was easy or hard, at every distance from the hole, the players were more successful when putting for par than for a birdie. The difference in their rate of success when going for par (to avoid a bogey) or for a birdie was 3.6%. This difference is not trivial. ... These fierce competitors certainly do not make a conscious decision to slack off on birdie putts, but their intense aversion to a bogey apparently contributes to extra concentration on the task at hand."

 Como o preço do dinheiro está cada vez mais elevado, são precisas rentabilidades cada vez mais elevadas para remunerar o capital, logo, um desafio interessante em cima da mesa... o paradoxo da estratégia, o preço do dinheiro e o horror às perdas que permeiam a nossa psicologia.