Levittown

Quando quero usar uma metáfora sobre o modelo económico do século XX uso os termos Metrópolis, por causa do filme de Fritz Lang, e Magnitogorsk ou Magnitograd por causa do bairro operário dessa cidade do tempo de Estaline. Centenas ou milhares de casas todas iguais, todas com o mesmo mobiliário. A única diferença é que algumas casas tinham candeeiros brancos e outras tinham candeeiros laranja.

Não se pense que as Magnitogorsk eram um apanágio do mundo comunista. Não, eram uma consequência de um modelo industrialista baseado na produção em massa e com pouco ou nenhum cuidado com o que os utilizadores pretendiam ou valorizavam.

Ontem, ao folhear uma publicação do Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas reencontrei uma imagem que procurava à muito:

"In July 1947, on potato fields 20 miles from Manhattan, William Levitt pioneered the mass production of affordable homes. Variations in the 17,477 houses were minor; each had two bedrooms, a bath, living room and kitchen on a 750-square-foot concrete slab. By standardizing the units, Levitt eventually was able to put up more than two dozen a day, helping fill the enormous postwar demand. Over the years, innumerable changes to the homes have transformed the community. But even now, Levittown remains a kind of shorthand for the sameness of mass production that’s starting to give way to mass customization."

"The traditional playbook for strategy is no longer sufficient"

"Many of today's business leaders came of age studying and experiencing a classical model of competition. [Moi ici: Como não recordar as palavras de Napoleão] Most large companies participated in well-defined industries selling similar sets of products; they gained advantage by pursuing economies of scale and static capabilities such as efficiency and quality; [Moi ici: Como não recordar o Normalistão e o plancton] and they achieved those advantages through deliberate analysis, planning, and focused execution.
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The traditional playbook for strategy is no longer sufficient, however. Across all businesses, competition is becoming more complex and dynamic. [Moi ici: Como não recordar a explosão de picos na paisagem enrugada] Industry boundaries are blurring. Product and company lifespans are shrinking. Technological progress and disruption are rapidly transforming business. High economic, political, and competitive uncertainty is conspicuous and likely to persist for the foreseeable future.
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Accordingly, in addition to the classical advantages of scale, companies are now contending with new dimensions of competition  —   shaping malleable situations, adapting to uncertain ones, and surviving harsh ones  —   which in turn require new approaches. And the stakes are higher than ever: the gap between the performance of top- and bottom-quartile companies has increased in each of the last six decades.[Moi ici: Como não recordar o bispo Berkeley]
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Today's business leaders are having to deal with multiple and complex short-term concerns, like declining growth, political uncertainty, resistance to globalization, social division, and so on. But as the 2020s approach, leaders must also look beyond today's situation and understand at a more fundamental level what will separate the winners from the losers in the next decade."

Trecho retirado de "Today's CEO playbook is outdated. Here are 5 things rising stars should focus on to win in the next decade"

"shifts toward particular logics can be reversed" (parte IV)

Parte I, parte II e parte III.

"The beer item collectors association BAV also published a bimonthly magazine that frequently reported on historic Dutch breweries. A number of writers also began addressing the history of Dutch beer brewing. As a result, there was growing awareness of the history of Dutch brewing, and a growing amount was recollected and curated, increasing the availability and accessibility of the remnants of the craft logic.
Thus during the first stage of logic reemergence, institutional change took off once ties between the previously dormant and dispersed custodians of the decomposed logic were regenerated. This involved restorative activities as dormant actors were reawakened, ties between them were reestablished, and the remnants of the decomposed logic were again made available and accessible. It also involved transformative activities as the dormant custodians of craft became organized in new ways, new recruits became absorbed in these networks, and foreign entities also came to be regarded as representations of a craft-brewing logic that had decomposed in the Netherlands.
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PINT’s membership grew from 30 in 1981 to over 1,000 by 1994, and its bimonthly magazine attracted an increasingly wide readership in the Dutch beer-brewing field. But since PINT became organized around multiple local chapters that kept close ties with local pubs, hobby brewing associations, and eventually nascent craft breweries, which were not necessarily members of the association, the texts it produced were indicative of a developing national discourse and captured the regenerated vocabulary of practice surrounding craft brewing that began to emerge from reestablished networks. PINT not only provided a platform for alternative voices in the beer industry but also deliberately disseminated texts about what was ‘‘wrong’’ with the beer industry and what remedies were needed according to emerging ideas that were constitutive of this discourse.
A recurring component of these texts was the use of frames in which prototypical examples of modern brewing, industrial brewing corporations such as Heineken, were depicted as a foil to provide a favorable contrast for craft brewers."

Impressionante como uma revolução pode ser gerada por um movimento de base, que vai agrupando de forma ad-hoc indivíduos e grupos gerando um todo coerente.

Continua.

Trechos retirados de "What Is Dead May Never Die: Institutional Regeneration through Logic Reemergence in Dutch Beer Brewing", Administrative Science Quarterly 1–44 (2018) de Jochem J. Kroezen e Pursey P. M. A. R. Heugens.

"shifts toward particular logics can be reversed" (parte III)

Parte I e parte II.

O interessante é como este renascimento

começou a partir de um movimento de base, sem grandes recursos, sem patrocínios, sem intervenções governamentais.

"A key development was the emergence of five independent beer pubs that were not contractually tied to any industrial brewer and that began to import modest amounts of traditional foreign craft beer, predominantly Belgian ale, as an alternative to Dutch industrial lager. These locales, where individuals with ‘‘strange tastes’’ could meet (to quote a representative of one of these pubs), were Cafe ́ De Beyerd in Breda, Gollem in Amsterdam, Jan Primus in Utrecht, ‘t Pumpke in Nijmegen, and Locus Publicus in Rotterdam and Delft. The idea to import foreign beers emerged when the founders of these pubs came in contact with traditional beer styles that were still being brewed in Belgium, Germany, and the United Kingdom.
...The owners of pioneering beer pubs started with very modest means and ambitions and were surprised by the impact of their actions. Their initial success was followed by an emerging network of importers that began to specialize in foreign traditional craft beer.
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The attention given to traditional alternatives reawakened actors with marginalized or dissolved roles, who were dissatisfied with the state of the Dutch beer-brewing industry. The exposure to foreign traditional craft beer led to these actors’ growing perception that something had been lost in the Netherlands with the shift toward industrial brewing. The pioneering beer pubs gave these actors a chance to meet and (re)connect. One of these, Gollem in Amsterdam, began to organize an annual beer festival in 1978 for alternative Dutch beer. Initially, this was a very small-scale affair, but the festival grew from 65 to over 300 visitors within two years and would eventually attract more than 10,000 visitors...The pubs and their festivals thus provided an important space for marginalized actors, like enthusiast consumers, brewmasters, and pub owners, to connect and discuss the state of Dutch beer brewing. Importantly, these groups contained both individuals with access to institutional remnants and individuals who were entirely new to beer brewing.
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A group of Dutch beer enthusiasts who frequented the pioneering pubs also regularly traveled to London to visit pubs there. They noticed that the diversity of beers and brewing practices was higher in the UK and that there was a consumer association—the Campaign for Real Ale or CAMRA—promoting the revitalization of traditional craft brewing. This group would go on to establish the Dutch beer consumer association PINT.
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The establishment of PINT initiated the emergence of an ecosystem of new collective organizations that all contributed to a nostalgia-infused movement for change in the industry.
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In 1983, Nico van Dijk co-established a foundation for beer item collectors (BAV), which fueled greater awareness of traditional Dutch craft brewing. In 1984, the first modern brewers’ guilds—De Roerstok and Twents Bierbrouwersgilde—were established to encourage hobby brewing, inspiring a new generation of brewery entrepreneurs. The Bier Keurmeesters Gilde (BKG) that trains judges for the independent examination of the quality of amateur beers during competitions and tastings was established in 1986. And in 1987, an association for specialty beer pubs (ABT) was established, which acted as a catalyst for the distribution of craft beer. Collectively, these initiatives amplified the initial effect of the pioneering pubs. They revitalized marginalized actor groups by reawakening traditional members, providing them with spaces to reconnect and reflect, and attracting new recruits."

Continua.

Trechos retirados de "What Is Dead May Never Die: Institutional Regeneration through Logic Reemergence in Dutch Beer Brewing", Administrative Science Quarterly 1–44 (2018) de Jochem J. Kroezen e Pursey P. M. A. R. Heugens.

"shifts toward particular logics can be reversed" (parte II)

Parte I.

Voltemos à tabela 1:

O que vemos ali dentro da área sublinhada é um retrato fiel do paradigma económico do século XX.

Não admira a evolução do número de sobreviventes:

No modelo económico do século XX, o modelo gerado pela Revolução Industrial e que atingiu o seu apogeu no século XX, só existe um pico na paisagem competitiva. No final só pode existir um vencedor.

Mas em Mongo, o modelo económico deixa de ser único e abrem-se muitos outros picos:

Cada pico representa uma hipótese de procurar o sucesso. E ter sucesso num pico pouco tem a ver com ter sucesso num outro pico. Daí a minha exortação, concentrem-se nos clientes-alvo e não na concorrência.

Recomendo uma comparação das duas colunas, na figura acima, entre "Traditional Craft Brewing" e "Modern Industrial Brewing" - dois modelos tão diferentes!!!

O que é que aconteceu para que o renascimento típico de Mongo ocorresse a partir dos anos 70 do século passado?

"The dominance of the large industrial brewers led to substantial diminishment and, ultimately, dissolution of the roles of field actors who used to carry traditional craft brewing. But this decomposed logic left behind institutional remnants that continued to be at least partially conserved [Moi ici: Isto faz-me lembrar uma empresa de calçado que conheço que tem uma fatia muito grande de trabalhadores reformados. Gente com mais de 65 anos e que continua a trabalhar. A quantidade de gente que domina a arte de cortar pele à mão é impressionante. Sobretudo nestes tempos de balancés e máquinas de corte.]
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While these remnants appear to be important resources for institutional change, regenerating them was rife with challenges due to their significant degree of decomposition. First, although there were individuals who could act as custodians of these institutional remnants, they were dispersed and had either become disembedded from the field or had completely switched to modern industrial brewing. Until 1980, there had been no collective efforts in the field to maintain or conserve elements of the craft-brewing logic. Craft-brewing remnants were therefore scattered around the field. Second, the remaining remnants provided only an incomplete set of representations of the traditional logic, which was insufficiently actionable.
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Traditional craft brewing had come to be associated with inferior quality as compared with modern industrial brewing, in part because of the political efforts of the modern industrial brewers. Compliance with increased ‘‘quality’’ regulations imposed in 1926, which had resulted in part from industrial brewers’ lobbying efforts, required substantial investments in ingredients and equipment, which many traditional breweries were unable to make [Moi ici: Tão típico! ASAEs et al são criações dos gigantes para afastar concorrência. Recuo a 2010 onde escrevi "Quanto mais maduro estiver um sector para consolidação, maior a torrente de legislação e regulamentação sobre ele. Antes de começar a comprar concorrentes, há que expulsar os mais fracos do mercado, ou criar-lhes dificuldades extra para que sintam uma oferta de aquisição como um alívio bem-vindo."]. These policies, which had institutionalized crisp industrial lager as the dominant and qualitatively superior product, combined with the natural stigma associated with failure initially disqualified remnants left behind by the traditional carriers of craft brewing as legitimate building blocks for later change efforts.
In spite of these challenges, however, the craft-brewing logic reemerged in the Netherlands through the establishment of 489 new breweries between 1980 and 2016. These new organizations collectively regenerated the institutional remnants of craft. This led to fundamental institutional change, as these organizations contributed to the restoration of the institutional orders of the community, family, professions, and religion in the field.
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The process of regenerative institutional change in Dutch beer brewing began during the early 1970s, when networks of actors with marginalized roles—such as brewmasters and members of traditional brewing families, who were the dormant custodians of craft brewing—were restored and transformed. These groups were reawakened when they were exposed to the surviving elements of traditional craft brewing in surrounding countries and began to mix with other marginal actors who were attracted to a budding hobby-brewing scene. Out of these interactions developed a growing sense that something of value had been left behind with the shift to modern industrial brewing. This fueled an interest in Dutch beer-brewing history and the mobilization of resources to promote nostalgia-infused change, ultimately leading to the rediscovery of what was left of the decomposed craft-brewing logic."

Continua.

Trechos retirados de "What Is Dead May Never Die: Institutional Regeneration through Logic Reemergence in Dutch Beer Brewing", Administrative Science Quarterly 1–44 (2018) de Jochem J. Kroezen e Pursey P. M. A. R. Heugens.

"shifts toward particular logics can be reversed" (parte I)

"Many organizational fields in which modernity has seemingly taken hold may experience a revival of traditional arrangements. Revival dynamics are visible in organizational fields as diverse as cattle farming, retail banking, radio broadcasting, and whisky distilling. Such cases pose a puzzle for institutional change theoreticians, who, ... have long depicted change as a process of modern institutional arrangements destroying and replacing traditional ones. Institutional change can thus paradoxically also occur through the reemergence of traditional arrangements that challenge modern ones.
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Regenerative institutional change thus refers to shifts that occur due to the reemergence of logics that had previously experienced decline and decomposition due to modernization. The development of the grass-fed livestock market in the U.S. as a result of the revival of traditional farming practices suggests a reemergence of particular logics that had previously dwindled in importance due to a shift toward industrial agriculture. The microradio movement in the U.S. spurred the reemergence of communal, religious, and educational radio stations by way of restoring low-power radio technology that had previously been abandoned as a result of increasing corporate concentration and federal regulation. And the reemergence of community banks in areas in the U.S. that were previously subject to acquisition activity by large national banks also suggests that shifts toward particular logics can be reversed.
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craft revival followed an extensive period of total domination by industrial brewing. 

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Modern industrial brewing. The Industrial Revolution, the invention of the corporation, and substantial improvements in the transportability of perishable goods ultimately enabled both the proliferation of modern industrial breweries and the emergence of a very different institutional logic around the turn of the twentieth century. [Moi ici: O Normalistão] Although there were many other examples, Heineken is the epitome of industrial brewing. It was established in 1864, when the son of a trader in cheese and butter acquired a struggling traditional brewery that had recently become a limited liability company. Heineken quickly developed into one of the largest breweries globally by focusing on mass production of industrial lager. The economic rationalization of beer brewing by Heineken and others led to a dramatic homogenization of products, such that by 1980 all of the beer produced in the Netherlands could be classified as industrial lager and traditional breweries had failed en masse. As an ideal type, modern industrial brewing involved a concern with profit, market power, and economies of scale; an automated and standardized brewing process; and a highly rational approach to the organization of production and sales, in which brewmasters became operations managers who were hierarchically subjected to financial and sales managers. Table 1 contrasts the ideal-typical logics of traditional craft and modern industrial brewing."

Trechos retirados de "What Is Dead May Never Die: Institutional Regeneration through Logic Reemergence in Dutch Beer Brewing", Administrative Science Quarterly 1–44 (2018) de Jochem J. Kroezen e Pursey P. M. A. R. Heugens.

"O que passa-se?" (parte II)

Parte I.

O artigo continua com um exemplo já conhecido aqui do blogue, a Local Motors (postal de 2012, outro de 2016 e outro de 2017).

"A small U.S. startup called Local Motors offers an intriguing glimpse into the future of manufacturing. The company manages five so-called microfactories around the world, which primarily use 3D-printing equipment to produce such modern-day curios as Olli, a self-driving shuttle bus with IBM Watson artificial intelligence that can be hailed via a smartphone app and follows voice instructions; a cargo-carrying drone for Airbus dubbed the Zelator; and the world’s first 3D-printed car, the Strati — road-worthy if not a speedster — built live in 44 hours at the International Manufacturing Technology Show.
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But the 3D-printing aspect of Local Motors’ business model is just a small part of what makes this company worth examining. The company is also crowdsourcing production designs from a network of global participants,
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As the microfactory concept evolves, Local Motors will build new plants wherever its customers are located, and each manufactured item will effectively be one of a kind, built to suit the tastes and requirements of individual consumers. Scale is replaced by potential savings from engineering, design, parts, labor, and efficiency in a 3D microfactory. Local Motors describes this approach as making money from scope. In other words, it offers useful, attractive, bespoke products to customers who are within shouting distance of its factories, at a price that matches the distinctive value of the item.
Local Motors is still a nascent business — and may or may not ultimately succeed — but at its core it reflects a vital shift in production dogma that manufacturers of all sizes will have to reckon with in the coming years. After decades of chasing lower production costs and scale by extending factory footprints and supply chains deeper into emerging nations and distributing products around the world in huge quantities over complex logistics networks, manufacturers are finding that their globalized approach is losing its viability. In particular, their centralized management structure, lengthy supply chains, lack of product variety, and long shipping times are impeding regional agility — and, in some cases, placing them at a disadvantage to local competition.
Instead, the new strategic archetype for successful manufacturers will be based on a relatively simple idea: The most efficient manufacturing setup is the one that makes goods in appropriate volumes to meet demand at the point of demand, with plenty of room for local and individual customization. Much of this concept will be driven by advances in technology — 3D printing, factory innovations, e-commerce, data analytics, and the Internet of Things, to name a few
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Moreover, the impact of the point-of-demand model will not be limited to the business-to- consumer environment. Suppliers in the business-to-business realm will also be under pressure to improve responsiveness as part of the campaign by their customers — that is, manufacturers — to shorten the value chain and more proactively serve the end consumer.
The implications are problematic for some companies: Manufacturers that are today highly invested in a global factory network of multiple large centralized plants, managed by traditional operating systems, organizations, and processes, may find their business models becoming obsolete faster than they ever expected. [Moi ici: Recordar esta reflexão de 2014] However, the nimblest manufacturers stand to reap significant gains from this new model. As their supply systems become more responsive and as customer demand becomes less of a guessing game, inventory inefficiencies and the carrying costs of warehousing products in bulk — only to ultimately jettison some of them as dead stock — will decline. In addition, savings will be generated by the reduction in expensive long-range production planning and supply chain management. And for companies able to outpace rivals in producing products that are best suited to customer needs — making these items available when customers want them — sales margins should rise markedly."

Conseguem imaginar como isto vai mudar o paradigma económico? Conseguem visualizar o fim do mundo criado pelo século XX?

"O que passa-se?"

Normalmente aqui no blogue, chamo a atenção para a cegueira das empresas de consultoria grandes, parece que escondem dos seus clientes grandes o impacte de Mongo na sua actividade.

Julgo que é a primeira vez que encontro um texto de uma consultora grande sobre Mongo e as suas implicações na economia, nos ecossistemas e na dimensão das empresas.

"In the next manufacturing revolution, spurred on by technologies that reinvent the way a factory can create products, such as 3D printing and robotics, companies will also need to rethink what they make and where they make it. Products will come off the assembly line in small, highly customized batches, like a high-tech version of old-fashioned craftsmanship. [Moi ici: Digam lá se isto não é uma entrada à matador com Mongo em toda a linha!!! Desde os pequenos lotes até aos artesãos tecnológicos longe das máquinas-monumento tão queridas dos que pensam que o Normalistão do século XX automatizado será o paradigma produtivo do século XXI]
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The revolution is on its way, and within the next five to 10 years, manufacturers in all industries will find themselves in a race to efficiently produce products at the point of demand — that is, where their customers are — and to deliver these items when their customers want them, personalized to their customers’ individual tastes. They will have to make strategic choices to stay competitive, investing in technology that allows them to continually analyze data about their customers’ preferences and buying habits so they can adapt quickly to changes in market conditions. Factories will be smaller, [Moi ici: Imaginem os cromos da Junqueira ao ler estas blasfémias!] operating with minimal lead times and shorter value chains. Management will be decentralized, the supply chain will be simplified and shortened, and the distance separating the manufacturer from its customers will be sharply reduced.
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Although technology will enable this new manufacturing model, customers will compel its adoption. In emerging markets as well as developed regions, customers increasingly expect products that match local cultural preference rather than homogeneous global brands and business-to-business services. The auto industry pioneered this localized model as long ago as the 1980s, when Japanese automakers entered the U.S. market with cars tailored to American tastes. But only recently have other industries taken up this approach — with refrigerators, toothpaste, furniture, clothing, and software that are designed for each region. The popularity of e-commerce has changed the customer experience, giving people more information about products and competitors’ products, pricing, and, through peer reviews, quality. For the first time, customers can reasonably demand from mass producers products that look and feel like they were made next door.
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Nimble manufacturers will reap significant gains from the point-ofdemand model. As their supply systems become more responsive and as local customer demand becomes less of a guessing game, inventory inefficiencies and the carrying costs of having to warehouse products in bulk will decline. The expense of supply chain management and production planning will drop as well. And companies able to produce personalized products that are best suited to customer needs when customers want them will enjoy higher sales margins. By contrast, as point-of-demand manufacturing takes hold, companies that operate global factory networks with large centralized plants, managed by traditional operating systems, organizations, and processes, may find that their business models are outmoded."

Ao chegar aqui recordei, "Pedro Nuno Santos quer Estado como motor do desenvolvimento", porque estava a nascer em mim um outro pensamento, o oposto... o que esperar de um contrarian-militante! O que seria a orientação geral de um governo para facilitar a transição para este tipo de sociedade?

Empresas pequenas, DIY, empreendedorismo verdadeiro não treta para sacar Portugal 2020, fiscalidade normanda, legislação laboral, democratização da produção.

Esta transição vai acontecer, inevitavelmente, pedida, ordenada pelos clientes, pelas tribos de Mongo. E teremos governos cada vez mais incapazes de perceber o que se passa, questionando-se, "O que passa-se?", cada vez mais crentes nas virtudes do Normalistão, num mundo que se afasta cada vez mais desse paradigma.

Trechos retirados de "Manufacturing’s new world order: The rise of the point-of-demand model"

A suckiness dos gigantes nada pode contra isto

"Along with the ceaseless churn of collections — averaging at least four a year — designers leading major brands must invent It bags, launch mass-market fragrances and cosmetic lines, and produce ever more extravagant shows and events to feed social media. Despite this, what consumers long for are experiences, authenticity and community — concepts that, when touted for marketing purposes, quickly lose meaning.
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While running a small independent fashion label is more difficult in some ways than being part of a big conglomerate, it does allow the freedom to be true to one’s instincts and beliefs, which in turn leads to real brand community.
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who are transforming how business is done in their industry with practices that are ethical and equitable to their manufacturers, employees and the environment. They do this not because it is good business (it usually isn’t), but because it seems the obvious moral choice. And because they do this while creating fashion that articulates and, most importantly, anticipates what women want to express and how they want to feel, they have earned the devotion and loyalty of their customers, who tend to be talented, self-realized women: architects and actors, writers and gallery owners.
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Indeed, the quest to be true to one’s self is something all these designers share. Several years ago, Rachel Comey, 45, realized the usual fashion show setup — people crammed on hard benches to watch a few minutes of clothes on parade — didn’t do justice to the kinds of clothes she was making. Instead, Comey began hosting intimate dinner parties, where guests could converse while seeing pieces worn by models of various ages and races. Comey’s designs, which early on suited the creative Brooklyn woman who wanted to look equal parts sexy, comfortable and dorky, are sometimes deeply personal, riffing on her own girlhood memories." (1)

Um filme com um título que diz tudo "Hand-Crafted Is So In Right Now--And This Company Is Capitalizing On It"

Os gigantes vão ser úteis, como a Uber para limpar a legislação, para financiar o investimento em tecnologia que depois, com a sua democratização, poderão ser usados pelos independentes, "If the Shoe Fits: 3D Printing and the Future of Manufacturing Footwear", porque a suckiness vai dar cabo deles.




Trechos 1 retirados de "The Independent Women’s Designers Having a Big Moment"

"Giants invariably descend into suckiness" (parte XII)

Parte I, parte II, parte III, parte IV, parte V, parte VI, parte VII, parte VIII, parte IX, parte X e parte XI.

Revolta contra a suckiness.

Em especial a parte X, acerca dos gigantes terem sido talhados para o Normalistão e falhem cada vez mais com o avanço de Mongo, eis o tema abordado por Seth Godin ontem em "Bigger to feel safer":

"Creative institutions get bigger so that they can avoid doing things that feel risky.
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They may rationalize this as leverage, as creating more impact. But it's a coin with two sides, and the other side is that they do proportionally more things that are reliable and fewer things that feel like they might fail.
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In other words, hiring more people makes their useful creative productivity go down.
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This is not the way it works in a factory. When Henry Ford hired more people for the assembly line, productivity went up. Things got more efficient. More lines, more plants, more hands led to more productivity. The natural scale of the enterprise was large indeed.
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But a creative studio, a marketing team, architects, strategists, programmers, writers, editors, city planners, teachers--the natural scale of the enterprise is smaller than you think. [Moi ici: O que dizemos acerca de Mongo? O triunfo da arte! Organizações que praticam a arte não podem ter sucesso com os pressupostos que resultavam no Normalistão]
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This is a new law of organizations, and it's not well understood."

A maré do século XXI

Há dias Steve Blank usava a história para fazer um paralelismo entre Elon Musk e o fundador da GM, "Why the Future of Tesla May Depend on Knowing What Happened to Billy Durant".

O artigo é muito interessante e deu para aprender factos importantes. No entanto, há uma ressalva que  quero fazer: atenção à grande corrente de fundo que estava em marcha na primeira metade do século XX.

A primeira metade do século XX foi a ascensão de Metrópolis, a ascensão de Magnitograd, a ascensão da produção em massa, a ascensão da padronização, o triunfo do Normalistão.

Agora, a embrenharmos-nos no século XXI, estamos perante uma outra corrente, uma corrente numa direcção oposta: a ascensão de um mundo económico a que metaforicamente chamo de Mongo; o Estranhistão, a ascensão da variedade, a ascensão da diversidade, a ascensão dos artesãos e das tribos.

Ontem descobri um artigo que ilustra bem esta corrente que nos está a levar a Mongo, "How to Start Designing Your Own Products in 4 Easy Steps":

"With print-on-demand, the sky's the limit with what you can create. And the best part is, for aspiring business owners, it's extremely easy to get started.
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Over the last two years, I've gone from zero to over 600 products that I sell online using print-on-demand technology. The technology has not only allowed me to create a passive income, but also explore my creative side. The best part -- there are literally hundreds of products that I can create so I can focus my time and creative efforts on coming up with incredible designs."

Aquilo a que se chama aqui de democratização da produção (desde 2012), o que vai derrotar os gigantes concentrados na massa, as cooperativas de artesãos. Recordar que na cidade americana de Baltimore, só nessa cidade, em 1920 existiam 19 marcas fabricantes de automóveis.

Revolta contra a suckiness

À medida que nos embrenharmos em Mongo, esse universo económico repleto de tribos, assistiremos a um cada vez maior número de organizações e fenómenos como o retratado em "Consumers’ collective action in market system dynamics: A case of beer".

Como Seth Godin explicitou e citei em "We Are All Weird - Um manifesto sobre Mongo":

"The mass market — which made average products for average people — was invented by organizations that needed to keep their factories and systems running efficiently.
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Stop for a second and think about the backwards nature of that sentence.
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The factory came first. It led to the mass market. Not the other way around.
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The typical institution ... just couldn’t afford mass customization, couldn’t afford to make a different product for every user."

Foi o século XX que uniformizou os gostos, e Mongo será o regresso ao estado humano natural, a explosão contínua da variedade de gostos, e a ascensão das tribos ("Giants invariably descend into suckiness" (parte XI e parte X)).

O horror a ser tratado como plancton descrito no artigo:

"So it was lager beer, right? The provincial breweries copied Carlsberg and Bryggerigruppen, and more and more types of beer disappeared from the market, and there was no innovation at all. (Anders)
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The predominant institutional logic was organized around a belief in standardization and mass produced products. The belief affected forms of production, product variety, and institutionalized taste structures. From this institutionalized condition, DØE was formed to challenge this hegemonic institutional logic. One way the challenge manifested itself was by giving the current institutional condition a face, making a scapegoat of the incumbents’ effect on taste structure:
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I wrote a manifest, where I wrote many good things about beer and why one should drink interesting beers instead of just boring Tuborg ... really disparaging the old breweries there, at that time. (Anders)
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The interviews and archival material demonstrate that the association directed its energy and thrust toward this one common reference point. It was argued that the large breweries relied on the mentality that ‘‘big is beautiful and efficient’’. This critique of incumbents is illustrative of the onset of processes of deinstitutionalization and delegitimization. Several informants allude to the monotonous and standardized condition of the products that prevailed in the market and hence provoked a rally based on the position that the supply restricted the development of a more advanced consumption and taste culture: DØE was, as expressed through the AleMail communication list, a community for ‘‘everybody that is devoted to beer beyond the ordinary ‘down-the-throat’ culture’’"

Mongo já vem desde, pelo menos 2007: "A cauda longa e o planeta Mongo"

E, no fim, ganha a Alemanha (parte II) - o reverso da medalha

Ao olhar para uma série de gráficos desta publicação da APICCAPS:

Preços de importação de calçado no Japão

Preços de importação de calçado na China

Preços de importação de calçado na Rússia

Preços de importação de calçado nos EUA

Vivemos tempos de euro forte, ou talvez, tempos em que outros desvalorizam as suas moedas. Em tempos de euro forte alerta-se para o impacte nas exportações. Na mesma publicação referida acima, nas páginas 4 e 8, por exemplo, pode ler-se:

"2017 fecha com novo crescimento de 2,2% da exportação, mas apreciação do Euro frustra objetivo dos 2 mil milhões, sem ajuda dos EUA.
...
Como se temia, a excelente performance da exportação de calçado exibida durante o primeiro semestre de 2017, evidenciava já uma forte travagem, para metade, do ritmo de crescimento no ano terminado no 3o trimestre, saldando-se, ainda assim, por um crescimento anual de 2,2% (G9).
Sendo um crescimento ainda razoável, ficou um ponto percentual abaixo do ritmo de 2016, o que não permitiu quebrar a barreira dos dois mil milhões de exportações de calçado que parecia ao alcance no fim do 1o semestre. A impedir uma maior contribuição dos mercados extra-Euro, pesou a apreciação do Euro frente ao Dólar (+7%) e em geral (+2%, EEF Winter, Fevereiro 2018)."

Em "E, no fim, ganha a Alemanha" procuro demonstrar porque é que quando o euro baixa o país que mais ganha é a Alemanha. Olhando para as figuras acima a Alemanha do calçado é a Itália. Usando o mesmo racional de Dolan e Simon no postal referido sobre a Alemanha, quando o euro sobe o país mais prejudicado pode ser a Itália, e os países abaixo, Espanha e Portugal, com boas marcas ou com boa imagem do sector podem aproveitar o movimento dos clientes-premium que se vêm forçados/tentados a saltar a vedação e vir experimentar marcas intermédias.

Por favor, não embalem em explicações académicas com 50 anos, desenvolvidas para o Normalistão por pessoas que nunca viram paixão na economia, só matemática. Em vez de medo e receio por causa da apreciação do euro, trabalho redobrado para subir na escala de valor e estar atento às oportunidades.

Uma aceleração tremenda

Outro sintoma de Mongo e da força da:

• personalização;
• rapidez,;
• proximidade; e do
• online

Atenção a este exemplo "Local manufacturer bets on fast fashion for furniture":

"Third-generation furniture maker Meganne Wecker is betting that customization will be the next big trend in home decor, and she's anted up to capitalize on it.
...
a digital textile printer capable of producing fabric in any one of 500 colors or patterns.
...
The question is how fast the market for midrange custom pieces will arrive, and how big it will be when it does.
...
Skyline's customers do not yet have websites designed to offer the "Nike experience"—so dubbed because consumers can craft and order customized sneakers online from the shoemaker. The Thornton company spent more than $1 million last year to buy the printer; it plans to offer its first customizable furniture through an online retailer sometime this year. The company expects others to follow.
...
High-end manufacturers like Lexington Furniture have offered customization for decades, if customers were willing to pay top dollar and wait four to 12 weeks. But Wecker doesn't need to order textiles from a supplier, and she doesn't need to buy in bulk. She just prints the fabric.
...
t's not just about the sales, either. It's about margin. Customization is one more way for retailers to differentiate themselves in a crowded market so they're not competing on price,"

Em todo o lado a força de Mongo e a implosão do Normalistão herdado do século XX.

Ideias acerca da perda de poder da estatística

Algumas ideias a propósito de "How statistics lost their power – and why we should fear what comes next".

Cada vez mais os resultados estatísticos não são resultados naturais mas resultados "engenheirados". Por exemplo, quando os governos inflacionam os gastos no so-called "investimento público" para conseguirem melhores resultados a nível de PIB e emprego. Que melhor exemplo do que alterar a geografia da Região de Lisboa e Vale do Tejo para manipular estatísticas perante Bruxelas?

Cada vez mais afastamos-nos do Normalistão a caminho do Estranhistão, ou seja, a média é cada vez mais menos representativa de populações cada vez mais heterogéneas (recordar a explosão de tribos em curso). E as pessoas não se revêem nessas médias e desconfiam.

A sociedade é cada vez mais fluida e dinâmica enquanto que a estatística é muito mais conservadora e lenta na sua actualização da interpretação da realidade. Por exemplo, cada vez mais pessoas trabalham por conta própria em regime de auto-emprego e as definições estatísticas continuam a não classificar essas pessoas como estando empregadas.

Uma novela sobre Mongo (parte IX)

 Parte I, parte II, parte III, parte IV, parte V, parte VI, parte VII e parte VIII.

Uns trechos sobre a explosão de diversidade, sobre a explosão de tribos, sobre o fim da massa uniformizadora.

"The curious thing about demographics is that they were actually shaped by the media, rather than the media reacting to what the demographics liked and believed in. The media loved the idea of demographics so much that they invented pet names for different groups to define them in neat, saleable clusters: the baby boomers, Generation X, Generation Y, the sea changers. They were all designed to simplify the selling process. The media shaped the demographics itself according to what it chose to expose the demographic to.
...
The probability of aggregating an audience was higher at that time because the media was part of the shaping process itself. The choice of what any demographic group would see was determined by a very thin line-up of media. They all aired the same types of program at roughly the same time. They all ran the same advertisements for the products they thought a demographic may buy, and the retailers would choose to only put those products with national advertising support on their shelves. The limited choice created the profile more than the attitude and desires of the people inside the profiles. It was also hard to escape the ‘norm’. [Moi ici: Recordar que foi a produção em massa que criou o mercado de massas e não o contrário] We all worked and went to school at normal and predictable hours. It was hard work just escaping the message. For want of a better term, people got brainwashed into fitting into their pre-defined demographic behavioural pattern. But this system is breaking down, and beyond age and a few limited geographic constraints, demographics is totally finished as a useful marketing tool."

O trecho que se segue é bem exemplificativo da realidade actual:

"How similar are teenagers who live in the same suburb, go to the same school, with the same ethnic origin profile, with the same average income who are also these different things: goths,[Moi ici: Nuno, era este grupo que nos falhou na conversa durante a viagem, os góticos]  punks, surfers, skaters, geeks, ravers, jocks, musicians, hipsters, preps, emos, gamers [insert your preferred teenager genre here]?
.
Would any of these groups listen to the same music, wear the same clothes, hang out in the same places, eat the same food, read the same books or watch the same movies … let alone like the same brands?" 

Confundir o Estanhistão com Comoditização... suspeito

Escrevo aqui há muitos anos que o século XX foi o século do Normalistão. O século das linhas de montagem, o século do eficientismo, o século das mega-empresas, o século da massa - da produção e do consumo.
.
Escrevo também que o século XXI será o século do Estranhistão, o oposto do século XX.
.
Enquanto o Normalistão tudo comoditizou, elevando a interacção zero ao altar supremo (Grab & Go; automatização; compra online; ...), no Estranhistão quanto mais interacção melhor. Sem interacção como criar uma experiência e um negócio excepcional?
.

Mentes formatadas durante o Normalistão terão sempre tendência a vê-lo como a referência. Por isso, não estranho um texto como este "Commodification". 

.

É claro que muitos olham para hoje e vêem as Uber e as AirBnB e adivinham um futuro dominado por essas mega-plataformas. Prefiro considerá-las como entidades transitórias, úteis para dinamitar as grilhetas criadas pelos governos para proteger os incumbentes do Normalistão. Depois? Depois, virão as plataformas de 2ª geração ou cooperativas, porque existe estratégia em todo o lado, às vezes é só uma questão de tempo.

.

Voltando ao texto de Branko Milanovic é impressionante como a economia do século XXI pode ser confundida como um caminho para a comoditização... como se não existissem tribos, como se não se aposte cada vez mais na interacção, na co-criação, nas experiências. Só esta semana escrevi aqui:

• Um exemplo do mobiliário (ontem)
• Mais um sintoma do Estranhistão (quinta-feira passada)
• "There is no such thing as an average or old-fashioned business" (quarta-feira passada)

Ontem ao final da tarde encontrei "Scale and the Dilution of Quality". Um texto que parece retirado daqui do blogue só que mais bem escrito. E confundir o Estranhistão com comoditização?!!! Eu sei que Milanovic é muito político mas há limites.

.

Adiante, apreciar estes trechos:

"The act of scaling beyond a certain point is a dilution of quality.
.
Scale is the decision to serve more people. This means swapping “by hand” for more efficient means. Efficiency is the choice of speed over quality. It’s trading exceptional, exquisite, and excellent for “good enough. Scale doesn’t mean that something isn’t good, useful, or even that it isn’t worth buying. But it does mean that trade-offs were made.
...
To retain exceptional, exquisite, and excellence, you have to make greater investments, investments that kill efficiency. You have to hire more people to create high touch, high value, and high caring. You have to keep slack in the system when your competitors are working on becoming leaner. The decisions you make because of your choice of strategy must look like madness to your competitors.
.
Exceptional takes more investments in time, money, and caring. Good enough is about being efficient."

BTW, parece que o Milanovic não conhece os sistemas de avaliação mútua que as plataformas usam, melhor que qualquer sistema usado nos táxis. Como se não fosse no Normalistão que os clientes eram tratados como plancton

Balanced Scorecard (parte II)

Parte I.
.
Numa situação tipo 3, quando se começa, a única certeza é que o que existe hoje não serve para o futuro. Por isso, vai ser preciso construir uma nova alternativa para o futuro.
.
No último projecto Balanced Scorecard que facilitei, no relatório da primeira sessão de trabalho escrevi antes de mais nada:

"Ponto prévio

.

Estratégia é escolher.

Estratégia é renunciar.

.

Um consultor não faz escolhas nem renúncias em nome de uma empresa.

.

Um consultor é um outsider que facilita as reflexões que levam as empresas a fazer escolhas e renúncias. E quando decisões são tomadas, o consultor deve ainda fazer o papel de advogado do diabo, para que a empresa tome consciência das consequências dessas decisões. 

Todas as decisões, todas as escolhas e renúncias acarretam riscos que devem ser avaliados."

Nem de propósito, ontem durante a caminhada matinal li este working paper "Strategy and the Strategist: How It Matters Who Develops the Strategy", de um autor que muito aprecio, Eric Van den Steen:

"when or why should a company’s strategy be developed by its CEO – the paper shows that strategy formulation by the CEO (or by a strategist with control over the right decisions) leads to both a better strategy and better execution when the strategic decision is controversial. [Moi ici: E para uma empresa na situação 3 o mais provável é que a decisão seja controversa porque vai passar por uma mudança de vida] With regard to the second question, the paper shows that a strategist’s vision (as a strong belief) may improve implementation, but only if two conditions are met: the strong belief must be about a strategic decision and that decision must be controlled by the strategist. Vision about non-strategic decisions may in fact hurt the strategy’s implementation."

Numa situação tipo 3 as coisas não poderão continuar como estão e não basta uma melhoria de eficiência, é preciso mudar de "jogo", é preciso mudar de modelo de negócio.
.
O Normalistão, o modelo económico do século XX, deixou-nos a herança mental de que os clientes são todos iguais e que o preço é a variável mais importante para eles. Assim, a maioria das PME, imersa nesta visão económica, compete pelo preço e tenta ser tudo para todos, tenta ter o melhor preço e, em simultâneo, tanto oferecer pequenas como grandes séries.
.
Quando os negócios correm mal a tentação é fazer uns descontos e tentar seduzir clientes por essa via. Normalmente essa é uma via que acelera o caminho para a desgraça.
.
Continua.

Flagrante da vida real

Interrompo aqui a pausa de férias só para relatar um flagrante da vida real que incorpora três temas muito caros a este blogue: Valor, pricing e autenticidade.
.
Antes, dois tweets desta semana que relaciono com o flagrante. O primeiro, num tom irónico mas sério:

@ccz1 https://t.co/pRpD9HCuL6 a minha consultoria só peca por ñ ter marca de multinacional e muitos digitos nos honorários

— Carlos P da Cruz (@ccz1) August 3, 2016

O segundo, sobre a tolice que muitos académicos divulgam, que o preço é a única coisa que conta:

A ler livro escrito por alemães sobre monetização de produtos. Regra #1 nunca entrar em guerra de preços. Tótós acham q basta mexer na moeda

— Carlos P da Cruz (@ccz1) August 2, 2016

Esta manhã tive de ir a Estarreja e aproveitei para comprar fruta no supermercado Couto. Resolvi comprar pêssegos. Então, tive de escolher de entre três variedades:

• uma caixa de madeira com pêssegos espanhóis;
• duas caixas de madeira com pêssegos portugueses.

Houve uma caixa que me seduziu porque os pêssegos tinham todo o aspecto de serem caseiros. Não sei explicar ... talvez uma maior diversidade de tamanhos e não o "autoritarismo" do calibre, talvez um tom mais amarelado a sugerir apanha mais tardia, talvez a estirpe menos "comercial", tudo a sugerir-me, subjectivamente, um je ne sais quoi de autenticidade. Só sei que escolhi os pêssegos dessa caixa. Depois, reparei que eram os mais baratos a 1,20 €/kg.

.

Ao chegar à balança, em tom cúmplice disse a um dos gerentes:

- Estes é que deviam ser os mais caros. Parecem caseiros!!!

A resposta foi imediata:

- E são! Vieram directamente do agricultor na serra da Estrela.

.

Bingo!

.

.

.

.

.

É a isto que chamo deixar dinheiro em cima da mesa. A gerência até é capaz de ficar toda contente por os pêssegos se venderem bem. É aquilo a que os alemães da Simon-Kucher & Partners me ensinaram a chamar de minivation. Imaginem que o supermercado queria vender os preços do agricultor e ganhar dinheiro a sério. Seguindo regras do pricing, colocaria uma das caixas de pêssegos portugueses a um preço de entrada. Colocaria a caixa de pêssegos do agricultor a um preço bem superior mas intermédio e a caixa de pêssegos espanhóis a um preço mais alto. Imaginem, seguindo os ensinamentos e percentagens do Evangelho do Valor, o quanto mais dinheiro seria libertado!!!

.

A informação que o gerente me deu não devia estar escondida. A caixa de pêssegos devia ter uma foto do agricultor, um mapa da região onde foram produzidos e uma mensagem pessoal dele para os consumidores. 

.

Voltando ao segundo tweet, citado lá em cima, o século XX enterrou-nos no Normalistão, encarcerou-nos num modelo mental em que só o preço conta, e só nos ensinou uma forma de fazer preços: custo mais uma margem.

.

No Estranhistão, os actores económicos vão aprender que o preço não tem nada a ver com o custo e tudo a ver com o valor percepcionado pelos clientes-alvo.

.

Tenho de arranjar marca de multinacional e inflaccionar os honorários.

.

De volta às férias.

Para calar os geradores de cortisol

Conhecem a metáfora de Mongo aqui no blogue, acerca do advento do Estranhistão, acerca do advento da democratização da produção, acerca do bailado entre tribos cada vez mais numerosas, diferenciadas e a não quererem ser tratadas como plankton e, empresas ou particulares cada vez mais concentrados em as servir.
.
Interessante perceber que apesar do século XX ter sido o século do Normalistão e do eficientismo, ainda assim:

"Shares in smaller companies came out on top. Investing £1 in 1955 in the Numis 1000 index, which represents the smallest UK-listed companies, would have produced £12,144 by the end of last year. The same £1 invested in the FTSE All Share would have grown to just £829.
.
Most investors will not have a 60-year time horizon. But even over more realistic holding periods, smaller shares still shine. Over 10-year periods, smaller firms outperformed larger ones five times out of six."

E, recordando esta figura:

Este trecho:

"Small firms generally carry higher risks for investors than the big blue-chip firms in the FTSE 100 index."

E para um blogue que aposta nas idiossincrasias como este, o que se segue é poesia:

"“At times when economic growth is weak, which I think will remain the case in the coming years, smaller companies considerably outperform larger companies,” Mr Williams said. “This is because the growth potential of a smaller company tends to be more closely linked with factors specific to the individual company rather than economic trends.”"

Por isso, o conselho de fazer como Ulisses mandou os seus marinheiros fazerem, pôr cera nos ouvidos e não ouvir os geradores de cortisol que encharcam os media.

Trechos retirados de "In numbers: how tiny companies have outperformed the giants over six decades"