"a erosão da autoridade do estado"

"Hans Monderman, the Dutch traffic engineer who is credited with revolutionizing our thinking on road design and safety. Imagine having a road or intersection in your town where too many accidents take place. What would you do to improve driving behaviors and reduce the number of accidents? Most people facing such a task will immediately think of putting in place more traffic lights or traffic signs, or more police to monitor the area. But not Hans Monderman. He came up with the concept of the “naked street” based on the principle that the removal of all the things that are supposed to make a road safe—such as traffic lights, road markings, and road signs—would actually make it safer. 

...

And he proposed the removal of all street signs, encouraging people to negotiate right of way by human interaction and eye contact.

He argued tirelessly for more than 20 years in favor of such “naked” roads as safer alternatives to roads full of signs and markings. He often complained that road design in the western world was based on the (mistaken) belief that driving and walking were utterly incompatible modes of transport and that the two should be segregated as much as possible. 

...

To prove his idea, he undertook a series of experiments where he reconstructed roads by making them narrower and by removing traffic lights and signs. In a famous experiment, he totally redesigned a roundabout (traffic circle) in the town of Drachten, Netherlands by removing all traffic signs, eliminating curbs, and installing art. The result was that traffic accidents all but disappeared. In another experiment in West Palm Beach, Florida, the roads were made smaller and narrower. As a result, traffic slowed so much that people felt safe to walk there. This led to an increase in pedestrian traffic that attracted new shops and apartment buildings. Property values doubled. Successes such as these turned the tide of public opinion on Monderman. Initially vilified as a dangerous maverick, he soon became a traffic engineer “pioneer.”"

Coloco aqui estes trechos a propósito da preocupação de algumas pessoas com a erosão da autoridade do estado. Eu preocupo-me é com a erosão da liberdade de pensamento e de acção dos anónimos. 

Trechos retirados de “Organizing for the New Normal” de Constantinos Markides. 

O poder das estórias

"Make the Need for Change Personal

First, give them all the negative facts about disruption and warn them that if we don’t change, bad things will happen to us. This is the threat framing that is necessary to demonstrate that we are not hiding from reality. But as already pointed out, you should not stop there. Complement this threat framing with a positive reason why we need to change. The key is to make sure this positive reason is personal to every single employee.

...

A statement, however nice or inspiring, will not by itself elicit emotion from people. We therefore need to go beyond simply communicating to people to doing certain other things to support what we say. Here are a few tactics illustrating what we could be doing:

Walk the talk: It should be obvious that we need to support what we are saying with actions. Nothing could be more persuasive to people than seeing their senior leaders behave in ways that support what they are proclaiming, especially when the actions are not cost-free. 

...

Visualization: Things that people see are more likely to evoke emotions than things they hear or read. You should therefore help them visualize what you are trying to sell to them. This suggests that instead of simply telling them, “We need to become customer-centric because that will make our customers happy,” it is better to show them a video of happy customers complimenting the company on its customer responsiveness. Similarly, instead of telling them, “We need to become more innovative because that would save people’s lives,” it is better to bring patients into the organization to tell the employees how your company’s products have saved their lives.

...

Story-telling: Stories and how you tell them are more likely to evoke emotions than a presentation. You should therefore support what you are selling to people with stories."

Uma ilustração do poder das estórias nesta figura:

Quando se apresentam os factos associados a uma medicação e uma estória positiva ou negativa associada, vemos a taxa de aceitação dessa medicação. O caso B é particularmente impressivo!

Outra ilustração:

Trechos retirados de “Organizing for the New Normal” de Constantinos Markides. 

"pensar no que poderia ser"

Algumas pepitas interessantes:

"strategy is a problem-solving tool. Its job is to overcome a gap between the outcomes we experience and the aspirations we hold. [Moi ici: Quando se está preso da rotina, não se levanta a cabeça para pensar no que poderia ser] That gap is a product of the current set of choices that has guided our actions up to this point in time, [Moi ici: Não há acasos, a situação actual é o resultado perfeitamente normal do sistema existente] regardless of whether that set of choices evolved implicitly over time or was the product of an explicit strategy effort.

A new strategy seeks to close the gap by means of a new set of choices. By definition, this needs to be a different set of choices, or it would fail entirely to close the gap that has been produced by the current set of choices. Because strategy is what you do not what you say, that different set of choices need to be manifested in different actions. Otherwise, there is no reason to believe that there will be any progress toward eliminating the gap. To summarize, strategy needs to produce a new set of choices that translates into action and, by doing so, eliminates the problematic gap produced by the existing set of choices.

The heart of strategy is the matched pair of Where-to-Play and How-to-Win (WTP/HTW) choices. There will be no elimination of the problematic gap between outcomes and aspirations without a change in the WTP/HTW pair. You can change one, the other, or both. But if you don’t change them, you haven’t changed your strategy choice.

...

What then is the planning activity that follows your strategy choice? You should create a plan comprised of three elements. First, it should specify and communicate the choices that you personally will be making and the timing of those choices (...). Second, it should specify the choices you will be chartering (...). Third, it should specify your own Enabling Management Systems  for following up on the chartered choices to make sure they are being effected and made consistently with your choices. This is why I argue that the wise and thorough chartering of strategy choices is one of the highest-leverage activities for any executive."

Trechos retirados de "From Strategy to Planning - What’s Next After Strategy?"

Prioridades e ISO 9001

Implementar um sistema de gestão é como lançar e manter uma série de pratos no ar a circular, como um jongleur.

Um prato é, por exemplo, acerca da encomenda, recepção e fornecimento de matérias-primas à produção. Outro prato é sobre as vendas, outro é sobre a produção, controlo e embalamento, outro é sobre ...

O que acontece muitas vezes é que uma vez lançados os pratos... eles caem ao chão...

O sistema de gestão não consegue ganhar vida própria. Alguém tem de estar sempre a dar conta de que os pratos caíram e de que é preciso lançá-los ao ar novamente.

Um dos mecanismos mais importantes para manter o sistema de gestão a funcionar, para manter os pratos no ar, passa por medir e tomar decisões para melhorar.

Um dos webinars que faço para a Advisera é este, "Free webinar – Measurement, analysis, and improvement according to ISO 9001:2015". Os temas são escolhidos com base na procura do tema na internet. Julgo que não faço este webinar desde Outubro passado. Sinal de que o tema não faz parte das prioridades de quem trabalha com sistemas de gestão...

"you need to tell people the bad stuff... However, we cannot stop there. We need to also tell them the positive stuff"

This is my avatar on social media. A tribute to the importance of the sense of urgency, the "burning platform".

"change is hard. It is so hard that even fear of death is not enough to convince people to change for good. Second, scare tactics can be used to create urgency for change, but such tactics will only create change that is short-lived. [Moi ici: There is something of value in these words, something new for me] Unless we continuously engage in “scaring” people, they will slowly overcome their initial fear and revert to old habits. These insights have immediate applicability in business: Yes, we need a sense of urgency to encourage change in our organization, but how we create urgency matters. There is a right way to create urgency for change and a wrong way. Choosing the “right” way is essential if we are to succeed with our transformation program.

What is the “right” way? ... Specifically, scaring people into change is not the right way. ... scare tactics produced a short-term reaction from people, but that was not sustainable. At least in this case, the change generated—albeit short-term—was in the right direction, in that people stopped smoking and started exercising. But this cannot be taken for granted. Consider, for example, the popular analogy of the burning platform. There is no question that the burning platform creates urgency that leads to action, but what is the nature of that action? It is people jumping into the sea in a panicky and uncoordinated way—surely this is not the kind of urgency that we want in our organization? 

...

To create a sense of urgency, you have to make your people appreciate the imminent threat of disruption and the mortal danger the company is facing.” This suggests that many of us believe that using scare tactics can be an effective way to create urgency—hence the popularity of the “burning platform” analogy. Yet, as we argue above, nothing can be further from the truth. 

...

To create the “right” kind of urgency and get people to change for good, you need to make the need for change positive, personal, and emotional. There are three requirements here and it is important to appreciate what each implies.

The first requirement is to make the need for change positive. This does not mean that we can ignore the bad stuff and focus only on the positive.

...

you need to tell people the bad stuff—that is, the dire consequences of not responding to the disruption. However, we cannot stop there. We need to also tell them the positive stuff—that is, the wonderful things that will happen if we do respond to the disruption. [Moi ici: I must confess I never though much about the importance of presenting the positive side] This is not an either/or choice. Just like it is not enough to use only scare tactics, it is also not enough to just make the need for change positive—we need to do both.

...

The third and most difficult requirement is to make the need for change emotional. This is not the same thing as making the need for change personal. Yes, employees are more likely to connect at an emotional level with a personal rather than an impersonal reason for change, but this is not guaranteed. Work still needs to be done to make even a personal reason for change emotional."

Trechos retirados de “Organizing for the New Normal” de Constantinos Markides. 

Curiosidade do dia

Há muito que penso que os políticos gostam é de temas pelos quais nunca serão julgados como o aquecimento global, pensões e reformas. Por mais asneiras que digam ou façam, as consequências dos seus actos e decisões só serão evidentes passado muito tempo. E a memória dos povos é fácil de manipular. Afinal, por exemplo, foi o Passos que chamou a troika e se comprometeu a privatizar a TAP.

Eu pelo contrário, gosto das situações que põem os políticos num campo de batalha como os generais. Nessas situações, rapidamente se percebe o impacte das decisões tomadas, com poucas hipóteses de as esconderem.

Recordo daqui:

"Esta gente não está habituada a trabalhar com base em dados, trabalha no reino da retórica, no reino da conversa, no reino da ilusão. Quando a realidade lhes vem bater à forta desmascara-os facilmente. BTW, é por isso que os políticos gostam de acções sobre o ambiente. Dificilmente, a realidade virá pedir-lhes contas enquanto estão no poder."

Entretanto, o choque da realidade:

"As pessoas que vierem à final da Liga dos Campeões virão e regressarão no mesmo dia, com teste feito e em situação de bolha, ou seja, em voo charter, deslocação para duas zonas de espera de adeptos, daí para o estádio e depois do jogo de volta para o aeroporto, estando em território nacional menos de 24 horas", disse a ministra quando anunciou o plano para a final. Este era o plano do Governo no papel, mas a realidade está a fintar o que estava delineado."

Algures durante a semana passada ouvi um técnico dizer que seria impossível o Aeroporto Sá Carneiro receber de, e despachar para Inglaterra, 17000 pessoas em menos de 24 horas. Eu sou um vulgar anónimo da província. Pena que os so-called jornalistas presentes durante a comunicação da ministra não tivessem o trabalho de casa feito e pusessem em causa, ao vivo e a cores, a possibilidade de executar o que a ministra prometia.

Performative aspects

 

"Routines are the bedrock of any organisation.[Moi ici: I call them processes like in ISO 9001] By ‘routine’ we mean a repeated performance either by an individual or a collection of people interacting together. Some of these routine behaviours have been deliberately designed and trained into people. Others have emerged without any deliberate intervention by managers. All routines evolve and are a source of incremental change and improvement inside the organisation.

...

Routines have an ostensive aspect and a performative aspect. The ostensive aspect is the basic structure of the routine. For example, consider the routine of dealing with a customer in a car-servicing facility. There is a general structure for this routine which includes greeting the customer, offering a seat and some refreshment, locating the paperwork, checking the work to be done and any other issues, handling the car keys, informing the customer when the car will be ready, etc. This ostensive structure is understood implicitly by experienced customer-service personnel, and it rarely alters significantly. The performative aspect is a particular enactment of the routine, that is, what I did with this customer this morning. Each time someone performs the routine, it will be slightly different, due to a whole raft of reasons, for example, time of day, the mood of the customer, the complexity of the service and repairs, etc. Thus, the performative aspect of the routine is the source of variation.

...

In fairly stable environments, it is likely that the ostensive routines of most competing firms will look very similar. What this means is that the sources of advantage that a particular firm might have will come from the particular performances of these routines achieved by its members. Subtle differences in the way that they enact these routines may well be sources of advantage and if these subtle differences incorporate significant amounts of tacit knowledge, then it is very difficult for competitor firms to replicate these valuable routines. Tacit knowledge is often referred to as know-how, and it is built through experience. ”

Trechos retirados de: Paul Raspin. “What's Your Competitive Advantage?”

Minerar mercados

Em 2015 chamei aos disruptores de mineradores:

"o seu negócio não é low-cost? Então, agradeça aos membros low-cost o trabalho de "mineração" que fazem, eles criam os seus potenciais futuros clientes. Eles "ensinam-lhes" o bê-à-bá da actividade. Depois, alguns ficarão sempre por aí, mas outros ganharão uma paixão e sentirão uma necessidade genuína de subir para outros desafios. É aí que entra a sua empresa, dedicada a servir um grupo que quer mais do que o básico. Para isso, precisa de ter uma estratégia clara e estar alinhado com ela."

Recordo este postal de 2020, "O low-cost como um aliado". 

Agora, em “Organizing for the New Normal” de Constantinos Markides encontro:

"when we look at one specific disruption that is affecting numerous companies: the arrival of a new and disruptive business model in an established market. If there is one thing we know about disruptive business models it is that they grow by attracting two different types of customers: the customers that are currently served by the established companies, and entirely new customers that enter the market for the first time.

...

When it arrives, the new business model attracts customers that are different from the customers of the core business. 

...

These “different” customers are what sustain the new business model in the short term, but the innovators who introduced the business model keep improving it year after year until it reaches a point that it becomes “good enough” for the customers of the core business. That’s when these core customers begin to switch to the new model and that is when the cannibalization of the core business begins."

 

Curiosidade do dia

Um país dois sistemas.

Para os estrangeiros:

Sen palabras eh pic.twitter.com/EpwuhW5lQw

— Alberto Mancebo (@AlbertoMancebo) May 28, 2021

"A dois dias da Final da Champions, há zonas da cidade do Porto que estão ainda transformadas em estaleiro. É o caso do parque de estacionamento junto à Alfândega, na zona de Miragaia, onde está a ser montado uma fan zone para adeptos do Manchester City. O espaço albergará barraquinhas de comes e bebes, sanitários e também um ecrã gigante." (aqui)

Para os mansos do costume:

Polícia vai reforçar a fiscalização nas praias durante o fim de semana para evitar enchentes

Tudo para acabar em violência um destes dias.

Portugal é, cada vez mais um país que me envergonha...

 

Mudar? Come on

Todos sabemos que Passos Coelho chamou a troika.*

Todos sabemos que aplicou a austeridade porque quis.*

Todos sabemos que havia outra alternativa.**

Quando um país chega à situação de pré-bancarrota e precisa de mais dinheiro tem de acordar as condições em que quem empresta aceita conceder mais um empréstimo.

O governo de Sócrates negociou as condições e chegou-se a um acordo.

Houve eleições, outro governo foi constituído e teve de aplicar o acordado.

Com o país à beira do abismo seria de esperar que o país mudasse de vida. E enquanto a troika andou por cá assim foi, ou antes assim parecia. À primeira oportunidade, assim que surgiu um alívio, voltámos às velhas práticas indiferentes ao destino onde nos voltarão a levar. Não é uma questão de se, mas de quando.

Interessante como no caso grego o acordo e a mudança foi feita pela extrema-esquerda e uma vez finda a legislatura o novo governo continuou o mesmo projecto. E agora, pasme-se, parte importante do dinheiro da bazuca para a Grécia será para ... compensar a baixa de impostos. Já estão no bom caminho e vão voltar a ultrapassar Portugal.

Nós por cá já estamos, no que depende de nós, pior do que em 2011. Confesso que não sei como será quando aquilo que não depende de nós, política do BCE e taxas de juro, tiverem de mudar forçados pelas circunstâncias.

Tudo isto a propósito da conversa com João César das Neves ontem. Alguém que ao fim de 30 anos percebeu que não mudamos ponto. Por isso, não perde tempo à espera que mudemos. Talvez por aquilo a que Nuno Garoupa chama de “displicência de Bruxelas”.

Entretanto, esta manhã na minha caminhada matinal leio este texto e percebo que tudo se encaixa em mais uma mensagem do Cosmos para me educar acerca da natureza humana.

"In his book Change or Die, Alan Deutschman reports a truly amazing statistic: After undergoing coronary artery bypass grafting, most people—not surprisingly—attempt to improve their health by undertaking radical changes to their lifestyle, for example eating a healthier diet or quitting smoking or exercising more. However, people slowly start to drift back to old habits and—here is the amazing thing—90 percent end up with the same lifestyle as before within two years of their operation. Take a moment to absorb this information. There are two insights that immediately pop out. First, change is hard. It is so hard that even fear of death is not enough to convince people to change for good.”

Trecho retirado de “Organizing for the New Normal” de Constantinos Markides

* Para os mais distraídos, estou a ser irónico.

** O "amigo" bicicletas já virou adepto da TINA (there is no alternative), o tal que durante a troika dizia que a solução era o crescimento.

"increase WTP or decrease WTS"

"The difference between WTP and price is value for the customer.

...

In value-based thinking, price is not a determining factor of WTP. We often use WTP and price interchangeably. But it is useful to keep them separate.

...

If we want to understand why some companies are much more profitable than others, a useful starting point is to identify the reasons why the middle section of the value stick—the firm’s margins—is slim for some companies and fat for others.

...

Value sticks illustrate that there are only two avenues for companies to create value: increase WTP or decrease WTS. Every strategic initiative needs to be evaluated against these two metrics. Unless an activity increases WTP or decreases WTS, it will not contribute to the firm’s competitive standing.

...

Unless an initiative promises to increase WTP or decrease WTS, it is not worth pursuing.

...

Companies compete for customers by creating superior customer delight. Many companies strive to be best in class. But having better quality and higher WTP is no guarantee for success. What matters is the difference between WTP and price—in other words, customer delight.

...

In competition, more generous margins (and greater profitability) reflect an ability to create superior customer delight, greater employee satisfaction, and more generous supplier surplus.

...

Strategists think in differences. Exceptional product quality and outstanding working conditions do not confer a lasting advantage if they can be matched easily by rival firms."

Trechos retirados de "Better, Simpler Strategy: A Value-Based Guide to Exceptional Performance" 

A Venezuela somos nós

 A Venezuela somos nós, ao nosso ritmo próprio:

A economia das carpetes e dos biombos no Observador a vivo e a cores

A propósito deste tweet:

Lembrei-me da relação estranha que o nome Espírito Santo tem com a concorrência. Por isso, a minha mente recuou a 2007 e a este postal "Big Man economy em todo o seus esplendor".

A certa atura nesse postal escrevi:

"Esta argumentação é tão ridícula, tão ridícula... escolhem os negócios protegidos da concorrência internacional, apostam nas indústrias de bens não transaccionáveis, e depois quando a maré muda, não sabem o que é competir num mundo de excesso de oferta, virando-se logo para o papá estado!!! 

Bem vindos ao mundo quotidiano do senhor Manel merceeiro, da dona Elvira operária, do senhor Andrade pescador, dos agricultores, dos industriais que não jantam com o poder, dos empresários sem contactos telefónicos nos governos."

Este último sublinhado tem presença assídua no blogue quando refiro a economia das carpetes e dos biombos (2021), ou em 2009. 

Esta manhã no programa "Explicador" da rádio Observador oiço Correia de Campos ao minuto 13:27 descrever como é fácil a um grande empresário (quem segue este blogue que para mim grande empresário, ou grande empresa, não é a mesma coisa que empresário grande, ou empresa grande. Por exemplo, para mim um verdadeiro grande empresário - adjectivo não substantivo - não telefona a ministros ponto) telefonar a um ministro da Economia, ou da Segurança Social para resolver os seus assuntos. E Correia de Campos disse isto com a maior naturalidade...

"The difference between leading and lagging companies in the same industry"

Sei que é um tema que já abordo aqui no blogue há mais de 10 anos: há mais variabilidade no retorno do investimento dentro de um sector económico do que entre sectores económicos. Não esquecer os catequistas. No entanto, estes trechos vão servir de trampolim para o que aí virá em próximos postais:

"I know it is probably poor storytelling, but I am tempted to share the good news right up front. I am incredibly optimistic about the potential of most companies to create more value and substantially improve their financial performance. And no, this is not just wishful thinking. My optimism is grounded in careful analysis of the data. Select any segment of the economy, and you will see that the very best companies in that segment dramatically outperform other firms. If the average company made even modest advances, value created and profits would soar.

...

When I meet with executives whose companies achieve less-than-stellar performance, the typical conversation quickly turns to industry dynamics. They explain that their industry is disrupted by digital technology, how they face tough import competition, and why talent is difficult to hire and retain. The executives are right. Profitability can indeed change substantially from one industry to the next. Some industries are blessed with high average returns, others decidedly less so.

...

The difference between leading and lagging companies in the same industry is typically far greater than the variation across industries.

...

there is more than twice as much room to grow profitability inside an industry as opposed to across industries. From the standpoint of profitability, industries are fairly similar. Companies inside an industry, however, tend to be very different."

Trechos retirados de "Better, Simpler Strategy: A Value-Based Guide to Exceptional Performance" 

Iniciativas, a operacionalização da transformação

"Value creation takes place in an uncertain world. We cannot predict the future, and in order to survive, firms need to be able to respond to unfolding circumstances. As we have stressed, we need to work with the complexities of the real world, and not assume these away, or pretend to ignore them.

An initiative may have a positive impact in one part of the system, but result in negative impacts elsewhere. 

...

significant change in an organisation typically occurs in two circumstances: a crisis, or a change of leadership, which is often preceded by a crisis. This is not surprising as to change an organisation that is ticking along in an acceptable way is a daunting prospect. “If it ain’t broke don’t fix it’ would be the way most people would think. The idea that managers will enact ‘transformational change’ outside of a crisis is frankly unlikely.

...

Firstly, we need to have a clear description of the initiative: what is involved in the change being proposed. The expected or hoped for outcomes of the initiative should also be set out which can help us figure out what feedback is required to monitor the impact of the changes on the wider value system. Some thoughts as to the time frame of the change process will help, that is, is it weeks, or months before we would expect to see some effects?

It will be necessary to identify, at least initially, the resources required to kick-start the change process, and who owns the initiative. If there are expected synergies with other initiatives, these could be set out and monitored and it would be essential to highlight potential risks associated with the changes.

The first initiative will require a significant amount of change energy. The idea is new, it will need management support, and those involved will need to move out of some familiar routine ways of behaving. But once the initiative gets established, it requires a lot less energy to sustain it as the new practices become embedded into routine ways of working.

...

Value is created by combining inputs with existing assets to create products and services. Operations activities are those where the firm has most influence. Relationships with suppliers and customers can be influenced by what happens in the value creation process, but the firm has no direct control over what suppliers or customers choose to do. [Moi ici: Este sublinhado é incompreensível para quem vive fora do sector privado. "Como é possível estabelecer objectivos para as vendas quando não é possível obrigar os clientes a comprar]

The value activities ‘inside’ the firm generate outcomes with respect to customers, costs and prices."

Trechos retirados de: Paul Raspin. “What's Your Competitive Advantage?”

"Value created"

"Willingness-to-pay (WTP) sits at the top end of the value stick. It represents the customer’s point of view. More specifically, it is the most a customer would ever pay for a product or service. If companies find ways to improve their product, WTP will increase.

Willingness-to-sell (WTS), at the bottom end of the value stick, refers to employees and suppliers. For employees, WTS is the minimum compensation they require to accept a job offer.

...

The difference between WTP and WTS, the length of the stick, is the value that a firm creates.

...

Companies that excel at creating value focus squarely on WTP and WTS. Every significant initiative is designed to either enhance the customer experience—that is, increase consumers’ WTP—or make it more attractive for vendors and employees to work with the company, in other words, decrease their WTS.

...

Companies that outperform their peers increase WTP or decrease WTS in ways that are difficult to imitate.

...

It is surprising, perhaps, but true nevertheless: the companies that perform best do not think about themselves first and foremost. They dream up ever better ways to create value for others. Think value, not profit, and profit will follow."

Trechos retirados de "Better, Simpler Strategy: A Value-Based Guide to Exceptional Performance" 

Média versus discrepantes

Um excelente conselho de Roger Martin, mais um, acerca de pensar estratégia.

"I am utterly tired of the modern strategy focus on averages, whether means, medians, or modes.

...

In world of strategy, all analytical guns have long been trained on means, medians, and modes.

...

The flip side of obsession with averages is aversion to the outliers. They are largely ignored if not entirely suppressed.

...

There is a cost to this aversion. While the mean tells you about what is operating today, outliers give you hints about the future.

...

The problem is that our analytical mindset and toolbox has migrated away from paying attention to the outliers. 

...

The single most important thing to do is to think consciously and carefully about when you pay attention to averages and when to outliers. When you want to hone and refine what is, focus on the averages and ignore the outliers. Outliers will distract you when creating improvement for the middle of the distribution is your goal.

...

If you want to figure out what could be, you have to pay attention to the outliers."

Trechos retirados de "Strategists: Stop Obsessing about Averages" 

Preservação versus destruição

Via Dinheiro Vivo, numa coluna de opinião assinada pelo presidente da CIP, descubro que a CAP, a CCP, a CIP, a CPCI e a CITP criaram o Conselho Nacional das Confederações Patronais.

Leio que "as duas preocupações são, no imediato, a preservação do tecido produtivo existente e, numa visão de médio e longo prazo, enfrentar os problemas que travam a produtividade, a competitividade e o crescimento das empresas."

A preservação do tecido produtivo existente ... onde isto nos pode levar. Levantar barreiras à entrada, como o apoio do governo de turno? Apoios e subsídios?

Depois, relaciono "que travam a produtividade" e "preservação do tecido produtivo existente" e penso que é, em certa medida um oxímoro, se eu confiar nas ideias de Taleb e de Maliranta. Depois, relaciono "preservação do tecido produtivo existente" com o meu grito "DEIXEM AS EMPRESAS MORRER!" como condição indispensável para aumentar a produtividade. Relaciono também a preservação com o dilema entre resistir ou abraçar a mudança.

Podem pensar: 

"Essa é só a sua opinião. Você é um anónimo da província. Quer saber mais do que quem comanda estas associações?"

Aceito o reparo com humildade, e vejo que ele me leva para outra parte do texto:

"As causas comuns que nos unem são claras:

- O primado da iniciativa privada e da economia de mercado;

- A defesa das empresas e a promoção do empreendedorismo;

- A dignificação dos empresários e a valorização dos seus colaboradores;

- O crescimento da economia e a partilha da riqueza criada.

Os desafios transversais que as empresas têm pela frente estão, também, identificados:

- Recuperar clientes e mercados;

- Aumentar a competitividade à escala internacional;

- Captar e reter recursos humanos com as competências adequadas;

- Alcançar estruturas financeiras mais sólidas;

- Adequar os novos investimentos aos novos desafios, acelerando a introdução de novas tecnologias."

Sei que nestas coisas é mais forte do que eu, sou um cínico. Sem ver objectivos específicos mensuráveis e uma janela tempral para os atingir começo logo a pensar que é tudo treta... que objectivos assumem para avaliar o resultado da nova instituição?

No dia em que assumirem objectivos, metas e janelas temporais podemos avaliar quem tem razão, até lá é retórica e oratória.

Até lá continuo a preferir a destruição criativa.

O ponto âncora

Já em tempos publiquei esta imagem:

Agora acrescentei-lhe o foco nas estruturas, sistemas e cultura.

Ao reler “What's Your Competitive Advantage?” de Paul Raspin a minha mente continua a concordar com a leitura de 2019, uma estratégia que não se traduz em acções é treta. Contudo, agora emergiu-me outra perspectiva, a associada a um postal de 2015, "Do concreto para o abstracto e não o contrário".

Trabalho para PMEs!

A PME típica não pode começar pelo abstracto, pela estratégia.

A PME típica tem de começar pelo que tem à mão.

Tendo em conta as actuais estruturas, sistemas e cultura da PME o que é que resulta? Há alguma parte do negócio que já seja competitiva, ou tenha potencial para o ser?

Esse é o ponto âncora!!!

Já escrevi sobre isto: nascemos e algures tomamos consciência que existimos:

"só depois de existirmos é que tomamos consciência que existimos.

O que quero dizer com isto?

Quero dizer que muitas empresas simplesmente existem. A vida a algumas até lhes corre bem, outras vivem aquilo que Thoreau descreveu como "lives of quiet desperation". Muito trabalho e pouca margem, muito esforço e pouco retorno.

A dor do fracasso faz com que uma minoria, páre, reflicta sobre o que lhe está a acontecer, e procure subir na escala de abstracção para arranjar uma alternativa que melhore os resultados, que aumente o retorno do esforço. Outros, têm empresas que estão a resultar, que até estão a ter bons resultados, mas conseguem que dentro deles emirja a questão: Por estamos a ter sucesso? A estes chamo de 'batoteiros'. Os 'batoteiros' são os que reconhecem que até têm uma receita que está a resultar mas não percebem porquê. E, porque querem sentir o controlo sobre a coisa, porque querem fazer aumentar o rendimento do que fazem, procuram tomar consciência do que é que está a resultar.

Acredito que muitas empresas não tem consciência de qual é, ou qual deve ser a sua 'receita' para o sucesso. Não há que ter vergonha dessa tomada de consciência. Afinal não é o que acontece connosco como seres humanos? Primeiro existimos e só depois tomamos consciência que existimos."

A partir do que está a resultar, vê-se pelos resultados. Ou a partir do que tenho, não tenho mais nada, o que poderá dar-me resultados?

Olhar para o que suporta ou pode suportar:

Subir na escala de abstracção para perceber o que está na base do sucesso actual ou poderá estar na base de um sucesso futuro assente no que tenho. Olhar para o contexto e para o ecossistema de um ponto de vista sistémico para perceber as "leis" que devem ser seguidas: reforçando o que já se faz (o meu clássico fazer batota), ou mudando a agulha para passar a fazer.

Agora, ciente do universo onde se está e das suas "leis" olhar para a frente, para o concreto, para o que precisa de ser feito, para o que precisa de ser transformado:

O ponto de partida é o ponto âncora. O que tenho? O ponto de partida da "effectuation":

"Bird in Hand Principle – Start with your means. Entrepreneurs start with what they have: Who they are, what they know and who they know."

Coerência e ambiente

Ser coerente custa muito. OK, eu sei que viver não é fácil, eu sei que a vida não vem com manual de instruções, mas não estou a falar de coerência pessoal.

Imaginem as capas de jornais e a verborreia dos políticos acerca das preocupações ambientais. 

Agora, vejam a capa do JN de segunda-feira passada:

Tanta preocupação ambiental... então, menos população menos impacte ambiental.

Outra incoerência é a de muitas empresas com grandes tiradas sobre o ambiente, mas que não vêem o quanto essas tiradas minam o modelo de negócio em que assentam. Recordo do Verão de 2019 a conversa da Inditex... Como é que o fast-fashion pode ser amigo do ambiente?

• Curiosidade do dia
• Are you prepared to walk the talk?

No entanto, não são só as multinacionais. Também as PMEs procuram rótulos ambientais, mas poucas pensam nas implicações do movimento que ajudam a reforçar. Há dias escrevi sobre a minha visão para a Fase IV. Penso que essa visão é mais consentânea com uma maior preocupação ambiental.

Entretanto, leio "The future of footwear is circular" e pergunto-me: quantas empresas de calçado pensam nisto? Faz-me lembrar as pessoas que se manifestam contra o consumismo e, depois, perdem o seu emprego baseado na produção para satisfazer esse consumismo.

"There are many reasons to focus on circularity, but there are a few astounding stats that urge the need for change. First, the fashion industry is recycling less than 1% of all products into new items, all while using 98 million metric tons of nonrenewable resources (such as oil and plastic) each year, according to a report published by the Ellen MacArthur Foundation. Those numbers are staggering. The second fact illustrates the opportunity with circularity: If you extend the life of a product by just 9 months, you can reduce its waste, carbon, and water footprint by a combined 20 to 30%. [Moi ici: E qual o impacte disto no número de empregos? É como querer a transição energérica, mas não querer despedimentos na refinaria de Leça] But to realize the potential of circularity and reduce the footprint of footwear, we’ll need to take some big steps.

...

shoe production accounts for one-fifth of the fashion industry’s environmental impact and generates 1.4% of global carbon emissions. While a handful of other shoe brands have announced the development of a circular product or their efforts working toward circularity, there really aren’t circular solutions for the footwear industry at large. That’s mainly because circularity in footwear has proven to be elusive and complex.

Unlike apparel, shoes are typically made from a variety of different materials engineered to stick together, making them near impossible to disassemble. To put it into perspective, a cotton T-shirt is made of one type of fiber, which can easily be recycled. On average, a sneaker can be made of 30 individual materials, and a hiking boot may require 100 materials. The more complex the shoe construction is, the more difficult it is to disassemble and recycle its components. Because of this, the unfortunate reality is that the vast majority of footwear ends up in landfills. So the first step in tackling all of this waste is producing shoes with fewer materials and designing for disassembly, making them more viable for end-of-wear recycling."

Que modelos de negócio vão emergir desta combinação com o ambiente sem o fast-fashion? 

A Resistência

Ontem de manhã, a conduzir para Felgueiras, ouvi este trecho no sistema audio do carro:

"Frames not only guide us to our goals, they shape our broader worldview. Seeing the world through a particular cognitive lens may gradually turn into a more general dimension of one’s reasoning. In a 2010 experiment in Ethiopia, researchers changed people’s perspectives so that they could see they had control over their future. The result was that those people saved more and invested in their children’s education, suggesting tangible benefits from altering the way one frames things. It also highlights how mental models can have a powerful impact on economic development."

Mal cheguei a casa à noite fui à procura no livro se havia alguma referência bibliográfica para o estudo... estupidamente não!

Quando ouvi o trecho acima a minha mente começou logo a juntar peças de um puzzle... 

• portugueses não poupam...
• cultura portuguesa é adepta do estúpido "só se pode fazer o que está na lei. Se não está na lei, não se pode fazer
• ter visto num programa no canal História, na noite anterior, como é que a maioria dos judeus reagia nos anos 30 na Alemanha nazi à progressiva publicação de leis contra eles - resignação e apatia

Eu acredito que a maioria das pessoas neste país se vê como impotentes folhas levadas na corrente... os que fogem à regra emigram, ou são estúpidos como eu e preferem viver na Resistência.

Trecho retirado de "Framers: Human Advantage in an Age of Technology and Turmoil" 

Esse é o busílis!

Consideremos uma PME portuguesa exportadora. Tipicamente está envolvida numa relação B2B com os seus clientes. Consideremos estas diferentes possibilidades:

Em que relações é que a sua empresa mais está envolvida?

• O quadrante 1 não se recomenda por motivos óbvios.
• O quadrante 3 é irrealista, uma PME não pode competir no campeonato da comoditização ponto!
• O quadrante 4 decorre da construção de uma relação de cooperação ao longo dos anos. A dependência mútua decorre da confiança depositada nas capacidades e promessas de cada parte. Por exemplo, entregas rápidas, entregas de pequenas séries, capacidade de desenvolvimento rápido
• O quadrante 3 é talvez o mais desejável, mas também o mais difícil para uma PME. a) Quem são os clientes-alvo? b) O que é que eles procuram e valorizam mesmo? c) O que é que a PME lhes pode oferecer com vantagem sobre a concorrência?

Agora, quantas PMEs têm uma resposta clara, na ponta da língua aquelas perguntas a), b) e c)?

Esse é o busílis!

Imagem adaptada a partir de “What's Your Competitive Advantage?” de Paul Raspin

"duas economias, diferentes realidades, diferentes meios de competir ou não competir" (parte II)

Parte I. 

Comecei a parte I com a imagem dos "caretos" da região de Trás-os-Montes como símbolo de um tempo em que cada região tinha a sua roupa, a sua gastronomia, os seus dialectos e sotaques, sem a pressão de uma uniformização centralizadora. 

No final da semana passada, numa caminhada matinal junto à foz do rio Douro 

tive a oportunidade de ler um texto muito, muito interessante, "Competition on Rugged Landscapes: The Dynamics of Product Positioning" de Leon Zucchini.

Antes de mais recordemos esta evolução na economia, do século XX para o século XXI, representada pela alteração da paisagem competitiva de um pico único para múltiplos picos:

"Competition on Smooth Landscapes [Moi ici: O mundo do século XX, o mundo do mercado homogéneo]

First, we consider performance in a smooth consumer landscape. ... in this type of landscape all consumers have similar preferences so there is only one large niche with a single global peak. In Figure 2, Panel (A) shows how average firm performance develops in the smooth landscape over time for different levels of competition. The learning process is clearly visible: firms start from their randomly assigned positions and gradually increase their performance as they explore the landscape and locate the global peak. After approximately 40 periods average performance has stabilized. The influence of competition is also clear: for a rising number of firms (F) the average performance stabilizes at a lower level. Thus, competition is detrimental to performance, which is exactly what we would expect in a real world setting. [Moi ici: A imagem clássica da competição económica. Quanto mais concorrentes, pior o desempenho]

...

firms‟ performance increases over time because they gradually approach the global peak: the distance initially drops sharply and then stabilizes after about 40 periods. This is what we would expect in an NK model with low ruggedness . However, in standard NK models without competition all firms would locate exactly at the global peak, whereas in Panel (B) an increasing number of competitors causes firms to locate at an increasing distance from the global peak. This is due to the difference between competition in horizontal and vertical differentiation ... if a firm has already located at the peak it becomes less attractive for all others. A corollary of this result is that with increasing competition the product designs offered in the market display greater heterogeneity: on average firms produce product designs that are similar but not identical to the modal consumer preference.

...

This means that in competitive markets with homogeneous consumer preferences firms never settle down but instead continue to adjust their product designs. Because firms only move when they can increase their (expected) performance and we know from Panel (A) that average performance has stabilized, that must mean that they are engaged in a constant process of stealing each other‟s customers.

This raises yet another question: which firms are moving? Does one dominant firm settle down on the peak while the others move around collecting the scraps, or does competition continue to threaten all firms? Panel (D) in Figure 2 shows that the latter is the case. It shows the proportion of market leaders, i.e. the firms with the highest market share, which are overtaken („dethroned‟) in each period. With an increasing number of competitors it becomes increasingly likely that the most successful firm will be dethroned: defending a leading market share becomes increasingly difficult the more competitors there are in the market.

Taken together these results suggest that on smooth landscapes, increasing competition causes markets to become increasingly and persistently volatile. Firms do not settle down with stable product designs but rather dance around the peak, continuously jostling for the best positions and being thwarted by their competitors. In terms of products the result is a continuous stream of new but similar product designs which become more and more diverse as competition increases. The cutthroat competition of stealing market shares in these markets is detrimental to firm performance, not only on average, but even for the most successful firms who are in constant danger of losing their leading position."

Agora o outro modelo económico, aquele a que chamo de Mongo, ou o Estranhistão, o modelo em que o século XXI se está a transformar:

"Competition on Rugged Landscapes

We have established that in „smooth‟ markets, competition leads to persistently volatile processes of adaptation. We now investigate how these dynamics are influenced by different distributions of consumer preferences. Figure 3 shows average results for different levels of ruggedness along the horizontal axis (from a single niche to many niches) and competition for the different lines (one, two, four and eight firms). The results are taken from the final period in the simulation ( ). Note that as illustrated by Figure 2 this is more than enough time for the results to settle into a pattern, whether static or volatile.

Panel (A) in Figure 3 shows how average performance changes with changing ruggedness and competition. For landscapes with few peaks (low ) increasing competition is detrimental to performance. This is the same result we saw in Figure 2. Here however, we see that as the landscape becomes increasingly rugged, the detrimental effect of competition on performance decreases: [Moi ici: Aquilo a que há anos designo aqui por "Live and let live"] evidently, if there are several niches it matters less if there are lots of rivals.

...

We already know that on smooth landscapes more competition causes firms to locate further away from the nearest peak. In Panel (B) we see that as the landscape becomes more rugged, firms locate closer to the nearest peak, regardless of the number of competitors in the market. This result suggests that firms may be dispersing to serve different niches. However, this result must be interpreted with caution because in more rugged landscapes there are also simply more peaks around. Note that firms that are alone in the landscape locate slightly further away from the nearest peak as K increases from zero.

...

what is the dynamic driving competition? One possibility is that there is constant movement both on smooth and rugged landscapes alike, with firms jostling each other off the peaks. In that case the differences in results for high levels of ruggedness may be due to the fact that the alternatives are more attractive: displaced firms can find other attractive niches to serve. Another possibility is that there is simply less movement on rugged landscapes because firms disperse and „settle down‟ to stable situations where each serves a local niche.

Panel (C) suggests that the latter explanation is more likely. For markets with few consumer niches competition has a large influence on volatility: the more firms in the market, the more movement we observe. As ruggedness increases, the average number of moves per firm and period decreases, regardless of the number of competitors. In very rugged landscapes (K=9) it makes hardly any difference whether there are two or eight firms in the market: firms have reached an essentially stable distribution.

Panel (D) corroborates this finding. On smooth landscapes the probability that the market leader will be dethroned depends heavily on the number of competitors. Thus, if there is a single large consumer niche then it will be difficult for any one firm to defend a lead in the market. As the number of niches increases, the number of competitors matters less and less: in the extreme case (K=9) the market leader has more than a 95% chance of defending its position even if there are eight competitors in the market. In these cases firms have dispersed to serve individual niches (local peaks in the consumer landscape) and are unlikely to move. That means firms which have located favorable niches with high performance (relative to their competitors) are unlikely to be overtaken.

To summarize, the distribution of consumer preferences matters for the dynamics of competitive positioning: On smooth landscapes we observe firms constantly jostling for competitive advantage around a few peaks. Competition is detrimental to performance and even successful firms are constantly in danger having their customers stolen by rivals. As the landscape becomes increasingly rugged, firms disperse more and more. Instead of clustering at some distance around a single peak they spread out to serve individual consumer niches. This has the additional effect that in very rugged markets movement drops to a minimum, and it is very unlikely that successful firms will be overtaken. Note that this result does not happen suddenly when the number of peaks becomes greater than the number of firms (at approximately ), but occurs gradually as ruggedness increases."

"duas economias, diferentes realidades, diferentes meios de competir ou não competir" (parte I)

Sim, eu sei que houve muitas mistificações acerca dos trajes tradicionais portugueses. No entanto, podemos aceitar que num passado mais distante, cada região tinha os seus trajes, tinha a sua gastronomia, até os seus sotaques (quando conheci a minha mulher ainda cheguei a pensar em escrever um dicionário acerca das muitas palavras que eu nunca tinha ouvido, ou que tinham um significado diferente do habitual, e que eram corriqueiras na aldeia onde ela nasceu a apenas 30 km do Porto, perto de Penafiel).

Nassim Taleb explica a variedade religiosa libanesa à custa do seu relevo montanhoso, assim como o desaparecimento da maioria cristã copta no Egipto à conta da ausência de barreiras geográficas. Quando falamos nos Balcãs, falamos de uma panóplia de etnias que não se chegaram a misturar, apesar de tantas séculos de domínio otomano, por causa das barreiras geográficas.

Antes do século XX as barreiras geográficas proporcionavam a existência de muitos mercados regionais, mais ou menos independentes. Depois, com o comboio, com as estradas, com as linhas de montagem, os mercados nacionais começaram a tomar forma. (BTW, gosto sempre de recordar o curto-prazismo e cegueira dos autarcas do interior. De cada vez que reclamavam melhores estradas, matavam mais umas empresas que se tornavam presas fáceis das empresas do litoral que tinham crescido mais depressa - sim, Karma is a bitch!)

O século XX representa a Grande Normalização, a Grande Uniformização! (Recordar Potato Fields nos Estados Unidos e Magnitogorsk na União Soviética). A economia do século XX pode ser representada por uma paisagem com um único pico e em que todas as empresas procuram escalar esse mesmo e único pico.

A economia do século XX pressupõe um mercado homogéneo e uma competição violenta por um lugar na escalada ao pico único.

O que é que ando a pregar aqui no blogue e na vida profissional ao longo dos anos? O fim do modelo do século XX! 

O crescimento da oferta para lá da capacidade da procura a absorver desencadeou um bailado entre a oferta e a procura que criou e intensificou a Grande Diversificação, aquilo a que chamo de Mongo! Um universo económico com cada vez mais picos. Uma paisagem cada vez mais enrugada.

Duas paisagens competitivas, duas economias, diferentes realidades, diferentes meios de competir ou não competir.

Ainda ontem escrevia sobre os modelos mentais ultrapassados. Depois, durante o final da tarde ouvi:

"Humans think using mental models. These are representations of reality that make the world comprehensible. They allow us to see patterns, predict how things will unfold, and make sense of the circumstances we encounter. Reality would otherwise be a flood of information, a jumble of inchoate experiences and sensations. Mental models bring order. They let us focus on essential things and ignore others—just as, at a cocktail party, we can hear the conversation that we’re in while tuning out the chatter around us. We craft a simulation of reality in our minds to anticipate how situations will play out.

We use mental models all the time, even if we are not aware of them.

...

our decisions are not simply based on the reasoning we apply, but on something more foundational: the particular lens through which we look at the situation—our sense of how the world works. That underlying level of cognition consists of mental models.

The fact that we need to interpret the world in order to exist in it, that how we perceive reality colors how we act within it, is something that people have long known but take for granted.

...

The mental models that we choose and apply are frames: they determine how we understand and act in the world. Frames enable us to generalize and make abstractions that apply to other situations. With them, we can handle new situations, rather than having to relearn everything from scratch. Our frames are always operating in the background. ”

...

We now know that the right frame applied in the right way opens up a wider range of possibilities, which in turn leads to better choices. The frames we employ affect the options we see, the decisions we make, and the results we attain. By being better at framing, we get better outcomes.

...

Sometimes our frames don’t fit the reality to which we apply them. There is no such thing as a “bad” frame per se (save for one exception that we’ll raise later), but there are certainly cases of misframing, where a given frame doesn’t fit very well. In fact, the path of human progress is littered with the carcasses of misused frames."

Trechos retirados de "Framers: Human Advantage in an Age of Technology and Turmoil" 

Continua.

Modelos mentais ultrapassados

Do século XX, do Normalistão, até Mongo, o Estranhistão, em meia-dúzia de linhas:

"When distribution is scarce, the hits are powerful indeed.

AM Top 40 radio meant that if you made that list of 40 hits, you were going to sell a huge number, and if you didn’t, you were gone.

Giant movie screens meant a few movies could play for months and own the market.

Limited independent bookstores kept a hit on the bestseller list for up to a year.

And then, when the long tail arrives, there’s a riot of variety, with most of the available offerings selling few indeed (most videos on YouTube have fewer than 25 views) but the ones on the shoulders do far better than they ever would before. This happened to movies in the 1990s when the number of screens multiplied, and to cable TV when the premium networks were okay with 3 million viewers for Mad Men.

Excited creators start to imagine infinity. There will be room for an unlimited number of Kindle books or YouTube videos or Netflix shows…

And that’s when the pendulum starts to oscillate a bit.

Because the media business remains a business, and it’s largely built on attention, and attention is scarce and it’s hard to scale.

So instead of an infinite number of successful titles, the market begins to segment. Instead of one blockbuster movie like Jaws that owns the summer for an entire nation, there are multiple markets, multiple audiences. But within those segments, there are still hits. Short heads built on multiple long tails.

Yes, having the most popular podcast in the world is quite valuable. But having the most popular podcast for a particular audience is valuable as well.

And we continue to segment for as long as the attention can be lumped together in valuable ways.

But, at the same time, we live in community, and we have a thirst for the big hit, the one that ‘everyone’ is talking about.

The disconnect occurs when producers and creators try to average things out and dumb things down, hoping for the big hit that won’t come. Or overspend to get there. The opportunity lies in finding a viable audience and matching the project’s focus and budget to the people who truly want it.[Moi ici: É aqui que se impõe o conluio entre os governos e os incumbentes para os proteger, para tentar eliminar do mercado os mais pequenos, para facilitar a possibilidade de os comprar. A tal economia das carpetes e dos biombos. Por exemplo, no século XXI faz algum sentido que uma empresa precise de aguentar um calvário de 4 anos para ter licença para operar? Por isso, escrevo teets como o que se segue abaixo]

And the dance continues."

Sinto que muita gente, a maioria, continua fiel ao ditado de Napoleão, queres saber como é que pensa uma pessoa? Estuda como era o mundo quando ela tinha 20 anos. BTW, uso este ditado há vários anos, este ano, ao ler um livro percebi a sua origem. Em 1793 Napoleão chegou, com 24 anos, como capitão de artilharia à cidade de Toulon, tomada por uma força anglo-espanhola, e saiu de lá como brigadeiro-general. Como? Porque percebeu o quanto a artilharia tinha mudado e podia ajudá-lo a fazer algo que parecia muito difícil e moroso. Os outros, moldados num outro tempo, estavam noutra. Julgo que Napoleão fez o que fez para expulsar os anglo-espanhóis à revelia das chefias.

Sim, muitos professores, aqueles que moldam os futuros agentes, muitos analistas, muitos políticos, continuam com a mente no século XX e nos seus estímulos e modelos mentais.

Trechos retirados de "The dance between the long tail and the short head"