Porque não podemos ser uma Arca de Noé! (II)

A revista “The Mckinsey Quarterly” no seu número 4 de 2005 apresenta o artigo “The vanishing middle market”. O seu conteúdo pode ser lido na íntegra aqui.

Executives recognize that premium and no-frills offerings are squeezing middle-of-the-road products and services in many industries. Our study of 25 industries and product categories in Europe, North America, and on the global level shows the extent of this phenomenon, known as market polarization. We found that, from 1999 to 2004, the growth rate of revenues for midtier products and services trailed the market average by nearly 6 percent a year (Exhibit 1).

For companies competing in industries and product categories as diverse as appliances, banking, mobile phones, and apparel, growth is strong at both ends of the market (Exhibit 2, group 1). Such companies face a difficult choice: either focus on one of the market's extremes and concede ground elsewhere or learn to serve both premium and value customers. Nokia, for example, has opted for the latter approach by attempting to expand beyond its traditional stronghold in the middle market. The company is marketing handsets that boast features such as cameras and MP3 players to customers in the premium segment while offering stripped-down phone models to rapidly growing emerging markets.

A second group of industries and product categories (such as airlines, groceries, and PCs and servers) is seeing growth as customers migrate primarily toward the value-oriented part of the market (Exhibit 2, group 2). For companies in this group, driving down costs is critical because no-frills competitors are constantly on the lookout for new opportunities—as Dell and Wal-Mart Stores demonstrated several years ago with their expansion into servers and groceries, respectively. Incumbents that can't lower their costs enough may find they have no alternative but to exit the market.

A third group of industries and product categories, ranging from digital cameras and MP3 players to coffeemakers, diapers, and razors (Exhibit 2, group 3), is achieving growth at the higher end of the market. (A similar move toward closer partnerships and value-added solutions is also taking place in many business-to-business industries.) Companies that thrive on higher-end offerings tend to justify higher prices by focusing on innovation that adds value and on forging an emotional connection with consumers or solutions-oriented corporate customers. Consider how Apple's iPod changed the MP3 game or how Gillette has continually broken new ground with its Atra, Sensor, and Mach3 razors.

Our research unearthed significant variations in the ways polarization plays out within industries. Consider the refrigerator category in Europe. Although traditional producers and channels have seen their market share for midrange products remain fairly constant, this segment is in relative decline. The explanation is that imports (particularly of new brands at the market's high and low ends), which are often sold through new channels such as hypermarkets and big-box retailers, have grown significantly. The overall market, as measured by the number of units sold, is becoming polarized as much of the revenue growth takes place at the high end (Exhibit 3).

We also found that polarization occurs at significantly different speeds in different parts of the world. The spike in demand for high-end refrigerators happened roughly a decade earlier in North America than in Europe, for example. This phenomenon was perhaps caused by the rapid growth of the top income categories in the United States and by the fact that premium brands such as Sub-Zero and Viking were better established there. Today, however, the growth rates of high-end models in Europe have overtaken those in North America. As companies and consumers on the Continent adjust to an expanded European Union, polarization could play out in many different ways.

We also examined a significant example of polarization in Europe's auto industry. As elsewhere, the compact-car segment traditionally has been associated with midtier brands. Now, however, automakers such as Audi, BMW, and Mercedes are introducing luxury compact models—and changing the segment's dynamics in the process.

Market polarization is a powerful trend that will continue to have a pronounced impact within channels and across industries and regions. The pattern of polarization does not lie in a category's DNA, however. Instead, product and service providers and their channel partners will heavily influence how this phenomenon unfolds. For companies hoping to stretch their offerings to take advantage of these new opportunities, developing a keener understanding of the changing needs of the customer is the place to start.

Outra referência interessante pode ser encontrada aqui. Em especial na página 5 “From Tiering to Targeting”

Outra referência neste artigo “Death in the Middle: Why Consumers Seek Value at the Top and Bottom of Markets “ da Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania

Outra referência neste artigo “Cheap is good” publicado pelo Boston Consulting Group, a partir do livro “Treasure Hunt – Inside the mind of the new consumer” de Michael Silverstein. Segundo o autor: “Not that long ago, cheap meant bad. A cheap product was, by definition, low quality. It was embarrassing, even shameful, to buy low-cost goods because it meant you couldn’t afford any better.” E ainda “To satisfy the trading-down consumer, your product has to be as cheap as – or cheaper than – any comparable product. But that doesn’t imply dull or ordinary; rather, it means the product contains only those technical and functional features that the trading-down consumer wants.” Esta tirada faz-me recordar uma outra que me ficou gravada na mente, retirada do livro "The experience economy" : "Customers don't want choice; they just want exactly what they want"

ADENDA: esta nota do JN de 25 de Maio

The Mid-market (parte I)

"Does all this activity mean the mid-market is finally disappearing, or can operators in this segment of the market evolve to survive? We ask the experts... [Moi ici: Segue-se a resposta de Ray Algar]
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Mid-market clubs were very slow to respond when low-cost gyms entered the market and disrupted the status quo. Now, unless they can offer something more compelling, it will only be a matter of time before more of these generic health clubs start to close.
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In the last couple of years, we've seen a disproportionate number of mid-market independents close as membership stagnated, membership prices remained flat and insufficient funds were generated to reinvest into refreshing the experience.
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The low-cost and premium markets are both well defined, but historically the mid-market brands have deliberately been more generic. Neither one thing or the other.
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The remaining legacy brands need to take stock and now jettison things which no longer serve them, or their members, and rediscover their core excellence. Similar offerings may be good enough when there's significant geographic distance between clubs, but can be disastrous as the distance between health clubs shortens.
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Mid-market clubs need to become experts, and build a reputation, in an area they really care about."

Como não recuar a 2005 e ao primeiro artigo que li sobre o fim do middle-market com a polarização do mercado: The vanishing middle market,” The McKinsey Quarterly, 2005 Number 4.
 
Trechos retirados do número de Outubro da revista "Health Club Management"

Estratégia para as lojas do futuro

Ko Floor em Branding a Store faz um excelente exercício de 'reframing' sobre o futuro das lojas, dando pistas interessantes para as hipóteses de actuação e posicionamento futuro.

“The retail market will become increasingly between functional and emotional shopping. On one side of the market, retail brands will focus on functional and solution-driven shopping of (replenishement) commodities like food, household products, drugs and basic textiles.

On the other side retail brands will operate that sell expressive merchandise with strong emotional appeal, like fashion, domestic accessories and perfumes. Functional stores will mainly choose price, range and or convenience as their positioning attributes. In contrast, emotional stores will mainly position themselves on range and store experience. Retail brands in between, that do not make a clear choice between functional and emotional shopping, will disappear.”

…

“There will not only be a clear dichotomy between functional and emotional retail brands: a strong polarization over price will also occur.

Price will continue to be an important driver in retail in the coming years. Consumers want to save money in some stores in order to be able to afford premium prices in other stores. This will cause a clear dichotomy in retail: low-price and high-value mass retail brands on one side of the market, and premium-priced niche retail brands on the other side.

Low-price and especially high-value mass brands will grow rapidly. After all, for most consumers it is not about the lowest price; it is about the highest value.”

…

“In contrast to these low-price and high-value brands, premium niche brands will position themselves as deriving their appeal from their exclusivity and very high prices. The difference between these luxury premium retailers and the low-price/high-value retailers will become bigger than it is now. While low-price/high-value stores will emphasize their range and price, premium stores will pay attention to range, service and often to store experience as well.”

…

“For years, the middle segment was the largest part of the market, but that is going to change. Just like with the functional and emotional retail brands, the middle segment will also disappear. Retail brands that are stuck in the middle will loose territory at a quick rate. These medium-priced retail brands will get squeezed between the low-price and high-value brands on one side of the market, and the premium brands on the other. To the consumer they do not have a clear offer.”

Isto das marcas não serem claras, não terem uma mensagem coerente e consistente não é treta, por exemplo, o artigo “Building Brands Without Mass Media” de Erich Joachimsthaler e David Aaker, publicado pela Harvard Business Review em Janeiro de 1997 ilustra um exemplo de como uma marca que quer ser tudo não é nada e anda à deriva:

“Consider Farggi. In 1993, a Spanish company called Lacrem launched Farggi as a premium ice cream in Spain--one year after the arrival of Haagen-Dazs. The Farggi name was chosen because it sounded Italian and hence would evoke images of quality ice cream among Europeans. It also drew on the reputation of the successful Farggi line of pastry outlets.

The problem was that the name had too many associations and messages. It had already been used for a standard-quality ice cream sold to food service establishments.

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The Farggi strategy, confusing at best, had too many elements: competing directly with Haagen-Dazs, exploiting ties to Spain, having an Italian-sounding brand, and cashing in on the popularity of American-style ice cream.

(The brand was positioned as being based on an authentic American recipe featuring the best-quality ingredients from Spain.)

Confusing messages were sent by Farggi’s method of distribution as well. It said "premium" by offering the ice cream in 500-milliliter cups for two people (originally pioneered by Haagen-Dazs in Europe) through Farggi-owned or franchised ice-cream parlors reminiscent of nearby Haagen-Dazs stores. At the same time, it said "cut-price" by distributing Farggi through hypermarket stores in low-rent neighborhoods and through concessions at regional soccer stadiums.

In short, the brand was everything and nothing. And we believe that, ultimately, its muddled identity confused consumers and put them off. Not surprisingly, today Farggi is trailing Haagen-Dazs in Spain by a significant margin in both sales and market share."

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Voltando a Ko Floor:

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“The differences between stores will become larger. Mid-priced stores and stores that do not make a clear choice between functional and emotional shopping will disappear. The disappearance of these mid-market stores will lead to a split of the retail market into four extremes: efficient routine, small pleasures, affordable dreams and luxurious experiences.”

Este esquema ajuda a enquadrar os desafios que as lojas têm pela frente, as escolhas que terão de fazer.
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E voltamos a temas já aqui abordados na óptica das empresas, temas como polarização dos mercados, stuck in the middle e fim do middle market.

The end of the middle-market (parte II)

"Value migration", "the end of the middle-market", "stuck-in-the-middle", "polarização dos mercados", "trading-up", "trading-down", ...
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Estes são os marcadores que recordei assim que li este artigo "As America’s Middle Class Shrinks, P&G Adopts “Hourglass” Strategy":
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"In a marked shift from P&G's historic focus on middle-class households, "the world's largest maker of consumer products is now betting that the squeeze on middle America will be long lasting," The WSJ reports.
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The company is engaging in what The WSJ calls a "fundamental change" in how it markets products in the U.S. "We're going to do this both by tiering up in terms of value as well as tiering down our portfolio down," CEO Robert McDonald says. As noted above, P&G isn't the only company coming to the same conclusion: Heinz is following a similar strategy to P&G while Saks is focusing its attention more on high-end consumer vs. 'aspirational' shoppers."
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Nada de novo, talvez um acelerar da tendência mundial descrita neste postal baseado no fabuloso artigo de 2005 "The vanishing middle market" (chamo a atenção em particular para a figura 2)
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Michael Silverstein também escreveu sobre o fenómeno.
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Se olharmos para o nosso futuro próximo, tendo em conta este texto "O último fôlego da desvalorização fiscal" vai acontecer o mesmo, um reforço da polarização. Consumir vai, cada vez mais, ser considerado pecado, ser considerado um luxo.
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Não perder este artigo "As Middle Class Shrinks, P&G Aims High and Low"

E, no fim, ganha a Alemanha

Ontem, no JdN, no artigo "Desvalorização do euro pode substituir queda dos salários?", podia ler-se:

"Alemanha é quem mais ganha?
O BCE estima que uma depreciação de 10% do euro, faz aumentar 0,4% o PIB da Zona Euro e 0,6% a inflação. Embora se antecipem ganhos para Portugal a partir deste movimento, há quem aponte que os principais beneficiários serão os grandes países, com a Alemanha à cabeça."

A Alemanha será a mais beneficiada mas não por ser grande.
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Dolan e Simon em "Power Pricing" justificam de forma clara porque é que a Alemanha ganha mais com a desvalorização do euro, por causa da assimetria das gamas de preço:

"Many markets have a structure in which brands or products are aligned on a "value-map" of perceived product value vs. price as shown in Figure 4.4. This particular map shows three market tiers: economy, middle market, and premium.[Moi ici: Consideremos, por exemplo, o sector da maquinaria onde marcas alemãs e portuguesas concorrem. Normalmente, a marca alemã é mais cara, e compete no tier-premium. A marca portuguesa, mais barata, compete no tier-middle market]"

Normalmente, as marcas do tier-economy não competem directamente com as do tier-middle ou com as do tier premium. Normalmente, a competição ocorre dentro de cada tier.

"The appropriate number of tiers to utilize is situation specific. A two-tier (branded vs. nonbranded) separation is sometimes useful. ... Regardless of the number of tiers, the essential point is the same: one's chosen position on the "value-map" effectively implies a strategy and defines a relevant competitive set. ...

• competition within a price-tier is typically more vigorous than across tiers. 

• there is an asymmetry in competition across tiers. Price cuts by higher quality tiers are more powerful in pulling customers up from lower tiers, than lower tier price cuts are in pulling customers down from upper tiers; i.e., customers "trade up" more readily than they "trade down." 

Pictorially, we show this in Figure 4-5 for a two-tier market, which for simplicity we show as having two premium brands P1 and P2 and two economy brands E1 and E2. 

...

Figure 4-5 shows a "fence" separating the premium and economy tiers. The "fence" denotes the fact that a price cut by any brand typically impacts its same-tier competitors more strongly. ... A price cut by premium tier brand P1 draws to it economy tier buyers - who are able to slip through the spacing in the "picket fence" portion at the upper left end of the fence. That is, P1, has some clout in being able to induce customers from the economy tier to "trade up" to it. However, if E2 cuts price, the premium brand buyers conceptually crash into the solid portion of the fence on the lower right, without trading down to the economy segment. E2's price cut can increase its sales volume - by drawing El customers or increasing the category consumption rate - but it will not draw many customers away from the premium brands."

Assim, facilmente se percebe porque é que a Alemanha ganha mais, porque tem mais marcas premium.

Mongo decorre desta evolução natural

 Imagem retirada de "The Countries With The Most Craft Breweries"

"there are two separate types of firms operating: generalists and specialists.
...
Generalists are able to attract resources or consumers from the wide range of competitive dimension whereas specialists attract only a limited range. Although competing firms operate in the same market, there can be significant differences between consumers within this market. Consider the example of the market for beer: beer drinkers are distributed amongst age and social status, with a majority of consumers being of a middle social status and are middle aged. Generalists can (and do) target this mass market. Specialists may however target a particular part of the market, for example providing products that are attractive to older or younger consumers or provide specific products that appeal to lower or higher status consumers. These differences matter, in that ‘niches’ emerge where there exists an opportunity for a specialist to enter the market and gain market share from the incumbent firms.
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In early competition, generalists enter the market and tend to compete at the center of the market, without necessarily competing head-to-head.
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In further competition, the market may not be able to support two generalists, and one may be selected, forming a niche where the customers of the second firm are no longer served. This periphery of the market becomes unserved and exposed meaning that specialists are able to enter the market in these locations. These niches are often ‘legitimated’ by the entry of more specialists, and movement barriers may persist based on the difficulty for consumers to return to a generalist product.
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Finally, these niches take away customers from the incumbents, meaning that the generalist firm has fewer customers. Since the distribution of customers moves towards the niche supplier, these niche locations become ‘legitimated’.
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Therefore, as concentration of the industry increases it may mean superficially that it is an unattractive industry, and that the generalist firm is not satisfying the needs of peripheral customers. Rather than considering this as an unattractive industry, this can be an ideal breeding ground for specialist firms willing to offer a product closer to the needs of these peripheral customers."

Mongo decorre desta evolução natural.
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Trechos retirados de "The Dynamics of Strategy - Mastering Strategic Landscapes of the Firm" de Duncan Robertson e Adrián Caldart.

Ter uma estratégia clara = escolhas claras = ideias claras = desejar sucesso à concorrência (parte VI)

Parte I, parte II, parte III, parte IV e parte V.

E volto às entrevistas incluídas no relatório "European Health & Fitness Market - Report 2015" da Deloitte, desta feita com John Treharne, CEO do Gymn Group.

"Could you briefly describe the concept of The Gym Group? What sets your company apart from the competitors?
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We were the first low-cost operator open 24/7 in the UK. Furthermore, there are three other key parts of our business. First of all, we do offer competitive prices in relation to our 24/7-concept. Then, we implemented a very high technology-driven business, which differentiates us very much from the rest of the UK health club market. Another key part is that we have a no contract environment, so that members can join for any period. [Moi ici: Outra proposta diferente, outra combinação de oferta - low-price; aberto 24/7; muita tecnologia; e sem a amarra de um contrato. Como se houvesse uma lista de atributos e cada um destes entrevistados escolheu um modelo de negócio baseado em diferentes atributos e diferentes combinações, para servir diferentes segmentos da procura]
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From your point of view, what are the major trends and developments in the fitness industry that influence your company now and also in the future? ...
Work-life balance now receives higher significance. Additionally, I think the UK market is becoming more competitive in the local sector similar to the top market, which is also growing very quickly.
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I think the market will concentrate on special facilities, which might be special PT facilities, special cycling facilities or others. They will satisfy customers' wants and needs as well as their particular wishes and interests. So my guess is that the market requires more micro clubs, which offer only one special product so that customers can access exactly what they want without distraction from other things. [Moi ici: A caminho de Mongo, o acelerar do bailado entre o aumento da heterogeneidade da procura, a alimentar e a ser alimentado por um aumento da heterogeneidade da oferta]
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Is there further growth potential in the fitness industry in general; if so, in what regions or segments?
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What is happening already is the premium end of the market continues to grow and we will see the local sector grow very rapidly as it has done elsewhere in Europe. These concentrations lead to the mid-market being squeezed so that they have to move further up to the premium end of the market or have to become lower segment rather than to stay in the mid-market or stuck in the middle. [Moi ici: O velho fenómeno da polarização dos mercados e do "stuck-in-the-middle"]
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In recent years, low-cost operators have significantly impacted the European health and fitness industry. How would you characterise their role in the UK market today and will this trend continue in the near future?
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My personal belief is that the UK health market will continue to grow, but I do think it will be sector specific. We observe that over 35% of our members who join each month have never visited a health dub, sports centre or gym before, which is driven by a number of things. Prices reflect one important factor, but also the concept of 24/7 operation. This enables us to attract people like doctors, nurses, bus drivers etc. We are available to them, whenever they want. This is the key behind 24/7 operation."

Continua.

The vanishing middle market

Esta crise talvez não tenha criado nada de realmente novo no mundo dos negócios!
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Custa-me a engolir esta afirmação ... talvez a ideia ainda não esteja bem trabalhada.
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Talvez esta crise em que estamos mergulhados a nível mundial não tenha feito mais do que acelerar algo que já estava em curso.
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Ao ler este artigo "In New York, No Crisis for Niche Manufacturers" lembrei-me logo de Suzanne Berger e sobretudo de " “The vanishing middle market” (Porque não podemos ser uma Arca de Noé! (II) ).
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"But in recent years, small manufacturers like Bien Hecho (Spanish for “well made”) have been on the rise, making products for niche markets and wealthy customers. And now, even as the broader economy is suffering, many of those manufacturers are proving surprisingly resilient, city officials and economic analysts say."
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"“For a lot of the niche manufacturers, including those that are broadly appealing to the high-end market, they may be doing O.K.”"
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"In Brooklyn, the number of jobs for niche manufacturers, which are not only small but also tend to have local clients, rose by 17 percent between 2001 and 2007, said James Parrott, the chief economist of the Fiscal Policy Institute. In the same period, the number for manufacturers making products for mass markets declined by 48 percent. "
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Em simultâneo no mesmo jornal "At McDonald’s, the Happiest Meal Is Hot Profits"
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"As of November, the latest data available, the company had delivered 55 consecutive months of increases in global same-store sales. During a year when the stock market lost a third of its value — its worst performance since The Great Depression — shares of McDonald’s gained nearly 6 percent, making the company one of only two in the Dow Jones industrial average whose share price rose in 2008. (The other was Wal-Mart.)"
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A crise só veio acelerar algo que estava em curso, o fim do mercado do meio-termo.

Quando se acorda atolado num pântano de indefinição...

Há meses, chamamos a atenção para um fabuloso artigo da revista “The McKinsey Quarterly” sobre o desaparecimento do mercado do meio termo.

O numero 4 de 2006, da revista “The McKinsey Quarterly” surge agora, com uma interessante entrevista com Hans Straberg, o CEO da Electrolux: “Escaping the middle-market trap: An interview with the CEO of Electrolux”

Strabeg chama a atenção para o facto de “In major appliances, over the past 15 or 20 years, people have doubled the amount they spend on their homes.” … “This general trend coincided with globalization, which opened up the possibility of new, lower-cost manufacturers in emerging economies coming onstream. These parallel developments drove apart two segments of the market – call them the premium end and the value end.”

Os produtos da Electrolux não pertenciam a nenhum destes extremos, estavam no meio, no mercado do meio (produtos nem muito baratos, nem muito caros), o mercado que precisamente… estava a desaparecer, ver gráficos eloquentes no artigo acima referido. Segundo Straberg: “In my mind, the middle market – the stomping grounds of Electrolux – was on the verge of disappearing.”

Para fazer face à nova realidade, a empresa teve de repensar quem são os clientes-alvo e quais as suas necessidades, teve de fazer o seu perfil. Seguir à risca a frase que aqui registamos ontem: “Strategy based upon the customer as the unit of value. Not factories, not databases or products, but customers.”

Segundo Straberg: “Now our segmentation has as many as 20 product positions that relate directly to the lifestyle and purchasing patterns of different consumers.” Por exemplo “Catherine, Anna, Maria, or Monica”

Ou seja, primeiro: concentração no cliente. Depois, ajustar, optimizar o modelo do negócio, de forma a produzir normalmente clientes satisfeitos. A Electrolux decidiu jogar nos dois extremos do tabuleiro (clientes do preço-baixo e clientes do preço-prémio). Como? A figura 8 deste artigo, mostra o perigo de querer trabalhar em mais do que uma proposta de valor em simultâneo.
Straberg responde: “At first, I thought we needed to decide whether to compete with commodity-like offerings or to deliver higher-value products. But after some deep soul-searching, we decide we could still make money in both ends if we separated our business models for the two ends of the market. Dividing the sales force is one example of what I mean when I talk about different business models.” … “The same sales force usually can’t handle both of those roles.” Assim, como diferentes fábricas (na Alemanha, na Polónia,…) , cada uma dedicada a um tipo diferente de mercado.
A revista por fim, pergunta a Straberg que conselho daria a uma empresa enterrada no pântano do mercado do meio, a sua resposta é: “Start with consumers and understand what their latent needs are and what problems they experience.”

A Grande Recessão não o gerou, apenas o acentuou

Via Twitter, fui encaminhado para este texto "The Disappearing Middle Is a Real Market Threat — Here’s What Firms Can Do" onde leio logo à cabeça:

"The Great Recession forced consumers to drastically rethink their purchase behaviors and, even though many have regained their financial footing in the five years since the downturn officially ended, those buying patterns have remained. As a result, more and more products are moving toward the “value” or “premium” ends of the spectrum, leaving a middle market that is struggling to remain relevant."

 Não creio que esta tendência tenha sido criada pela Grande Recessão. Terá, quando muito, acelerado uma tendência que vinha de trás.
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Nunca me esqueço de um brilhante artigo na The McKinsey Quarterly de Novembro de 2005, “The vanishing middle market”. Muito antes do choque da Grande Recessão.
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Recordar também "Polarização do mercado ou como David e Golias podem co-existir"

A ISO 9001:2008 e a satisfação dos clientes, a oportunidade perdida? (parte III)

"As markets mature, (este é o ponto. Os mercados não são estáticos, o que funcionava ontem deixa de funcionar hoje) the shift from production-driven to customer-driven to
market-driven is critical to the company’s long-term success. Becoming market driven does not mean you stop caring about customers or that you stop fully utilizing your production capability. Rather, a market-driven firm establishes that some customer segments are more strategic than others and that the organization will align its offering to meet the needs of strategic groups rather than align its operation to meet the needs of others."
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Nos mercados, quando a oferta é menor do que a procura, como em Portugal nos anos sessenta, ou em Angola nos tempos que correm, o essencial é produzir a um preço competitivo, a palavra de ordem é production-driven.
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Quando a oferta ultrapassa a procura, o factor crítico de sucesso deixa de ser o preço e passa a ser a qualidade, a satisfação dos clientes. A palavra de ordem é: clientes, clientes, clientes. O cliente é rei, o cliente é que manda. É o mundo customer-driven.
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Querer ser tudo para todos não é fácil, a polarização dos mercados, o stuck-in-the-middle leva as empresas a descobrirem que nem todos os clientes são importantes, há clientes que são mais importantes do que outros, os clientes-alvo. É o mundo market-driven.
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"A company cannot be market-driven if it wants to sell to everyone in the market and be all things to all people. There is no way you can understand all customers intimately and design the highest value offering for all of them. For this reason, market-driven companies must give up business to gain business, a tradeoff that appears frightening to the production-driven company, but is, in fact, extremely profitable once executed. Defining the competitive strategy and developing a marketing plan to implement it are the tools we use to focus a company more narrowly so that it can become market-driven. They help a company lead changes rather than be constantly battered by changes outside its control. Market-driven companies create the future they desire."
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Estas realidades não permeiam a filosofia ISO 9001, no entanto, uma abordagem market-driven não é incompatível com a ISO 9001, basta olhar para a cláusula 5.2 e pensar em focalização nos clientes-alvo.
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Não nos podemos esquecer da génese das normas da série ISO 9000, eram normas para os clientes auditarem os fornecedores. Se era esse o propósito, não fazia sentido que os fornecedores avaliassem os clientes.
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Assim, quando no ano 2000 se passou de garantia da qualidade para gestão da qualidade... nem tudo o que resultava, decorria, da perspectiva inicial foi alterado. Quer sobre os clientes-alvo, quer sobre a necessidade de desenvolver actividade comercial. A ISO 9001 não diz uma palavra sobre a actividade de ganhar clientes... continua encalhada na perspectiva da garantia da qualidade, considerando apenas o tratamento dos pedidos dos clientes já existentes.
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Trecho retirado de "Winning Without Competition: How to Break Out of a Commodity Market."

A concorrência não interessa!

Apreciem as lições desta pequena história "How I Reinvented My Business".
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Ressalta a preocupação em manter algum controlo sobre o futuro, em perceber quais são as tendências e aproveitá-las antes que outros o façam.
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"Like many fabled company founders, Curt Richardson launched his first business in his garage. He channeled his love of tinkering into a series of businesses that custom-manufactured plastics for automotive, medical, and industrial companies. But by the mid-1990s, Richardson had grown weary of having his fortunes tightly hitched to the financial returns of his clients. ( Moi ici: Viu o que seria o impacte da China e a optimização do modelo de negócio que propõe o preço-mais baixo ao cliente... escala, escala, escala e pedofilia empresarial) So, as he had done several times before, he went back to his garage to develop his own product line. "We wanted to take our destiny into our own hands," he says. ( Moi ici: Locus de controlo no interior)
Since water sports such as surfing and scuba diving were gaining in popularity, Richardson decided to create a product to target that market. In 1995, he developed the first prototype of a waterproof electronics case. His wife, Nancy, dubbed it the OtterBox, in reference to the animal's waterproof fur. Over the next couple of years, Richardson built up a modest revenue stream with the new product, and in 1998, he launched a separate company around the line.

That move turned out to be prescient. Although Richardson had anticipated a steady decline in his industry's fortune, the one-two punch of the dot-com crash and the 9/11 terrorist attacks severely hastened the fall. In 2002, he decided to outsource OtterBox's manufacturing in order to devote the company's resources to design and marketing. ( Moi ici: Onde podemos ser bons? Onde podemos fazer a diferença? Onde temos de nos concentrar? Onde está a alma do nosso negócio? Que experiências vamos alimentar?) "We were not in the hub of manufacturing, and it affected us finding talent," he says. "That definitely limited our scalability." The demise of many of his former competitors has since confirmed his decision; whereas once there had been hundreds of molding shops in Colorado, Richardson says, now there are only a few dozen.
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OtterBox, conversely, has blossomed into a nearly $170 million business. Much of the company's success stems from its ability to pinpoint technology trends. In the beginning, though, OtterBox's business was far from the cutting edge. For the first few years of its existence, the company sold travel cases for cigar humidors in addition to its namesake waterproof cases. It wasn't until a retail customer asked if the company could make a case for PDAs that OtterBox got into mobile technology. When the iPod made its debut in the fall of 2001, the company quickly moved to develop a new line for the device, and its sales soon shot up.
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Although OtterBox's fortunes are no longer tied to the health of domestic manufacturing, its success is dependent on another, notoriously fickle industry. But Richardson isn't worried. "If one device drops off, one will pick up," he says. "We don't really care who it is." Richardson's confidence in his company's success is particularly evident in his willingness to make bets on changing tides in the market. He decided, for instance, to produce accessories for tablets even when market observers were skeptical about whether the iPad would sell. And, last year, he made the move to stop selling OtterBox's line of iPod cases, which were still one of the company's top sellers, in favor of focusing on mobile accessories. ( Moi ici: Aplicação prática daquela máxima "Volume is vanity, Profit is sanity") "We looked at the market, and there was a lot of noise, a red ocean there," he says. "We knew fairly quickly we had made a good strategic move."
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That said, plenty of market intelligence factors into OtterBox's decisions to develop or discontinue product lines. The company maintains strong relationships with mobile manufacturers, and it often receives information about new devices well in advance. ( Moi ici: São clientes-alvo? Não! No canvas de Osterwalder ocupam a caixa dos Parceiros-chave. Gente que não nos compra, gente que não prescreve mas gente que ganha em os seus potenciais clientes terem a vida facilitada e a experiência de uso mais enriquecida) Often, manufacturers' own investments offer valuable clues as to which products will be most successful. In addition to keeping close contact with those companies, OtterBox has made substantive investments in research and development over the past few years. This year, the company hired a director of R&D, and it has since expanded the department to 16 employees. ( Moi ici: Isto troca as voltas aos INEs de todo o mundo ... como acompanhar a explosão de divergência cladística? )
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In addition to its continuous investments in market prediction, the company is eyeing global expansion. OtterBox has regional offices in Cork, Ireland, for the European market and Hong Kong for the Asia-Pacific Rim market, as well as a small sales office in Dubai. The latter region has had particularly explosive growth, Richardson says. The company now has three sales representatives in Australia and plans to hire additional reps based in Singapore, Korea, and Taiwan. OtterBox's sales have also picked up significantly in the Middle East and Africa, particularly South Africa. "Globally, if we could see 3 percent of the market," Richardson says, "I would be ecstatic."
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Ultimately, Richardson credits as much of the company's success to its internal processes as the products it ships out to the public. He places particular emphasis on consistently being prepared for change—a necessity given the rapidly changing consumer market. Richardson requires each department and account manager to submit a new plan every six to eight weeks in order to take stock of current trends and resources. ( Moi ici: A gente da moda talvez pudesse tirar daqui ideias para o target das 52 épocas por ano) ( Moi ici: And now... The Grand Finale!!!!!) One area he doesn't focus on, however, is the competition. "I don't know what competitors are doing with their systems, prices, or infrastructure," he says. "To me, it doesn't really matter. We're our own worst enemy here."
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Como não recordar John Holland:

• There is no universal competitor or optimum
• There is great diversity, as in a tropical forest, with many niches occupied by different kinds of agents
• Innovation is a regular feature – equilibrium is rare and temporary
• Anticipations change the course of the system.

Não vejo diferenças!

Leio o artigo "Let Emerging Market Customers Be Your Teachers" de Guillermo D’Andrea, David Marcotte, e Gwen Dixon Morrison, na revista Harvard Business Review deste mês de Dezembro e pergunto:

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Qual a novidade? Qual a diferença para os mercados dos países desenvolvidos? Não vejo diferença nenhuma!

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"In developing economies, the retail aisle is where the marketing action is—it’s where customers make purchasing decisions. McKinsey studies show that in China, for example, as many as 45% of consumers make those decisions inside stores, compared with 24% in the United States." (Moi ici: Nirmalya Kumar, Thomassen & Lincoln pelo menos, apontam para a mesma tendência nos mercados dos países desenvolvidos)

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Segue-se trecho retirado de "Retailization : brand survival in the age of retailer power" de Keith Lincoln, Lars Thomassen & Anthony Aconis.":

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"Shoppers have grown increasingly sceptical of brands and retailers alike and their endless marketing claims. They have become increasingly informed, thanks to the internet, as they are able to compare prices, service levels and features at the click of a button. This is knowledge they actively use as a weapon in their increasingly aggressive and independent shopping behaviour. Shoppers are squeezing the brand to perform and be priced according to their wants.

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When these super-charged and scarily informed shoppers are out there they do not waste time. Their loyalty stretches only a couple of seconds: as Rolf Eriksen, CEO of H&M, told us in the Preface, ‘Our success depends on what customers think when they meet us, and we believe that our customers spend four seconds to decide whether they like the meeting or not.’

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The Economist (2005a) reports that shoppers waste no more than six seconds on average looking for a specific brand before they settle for an alternative. This is fascinating stuff.

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In a 2004 report, retail experts POPAI described how more and more brand decisions are made in-store. In Europe, 75 per cent of the purchase decisions are made after the shoppers enter the store. In the United States, the number is 70 per cent (Liljenwall, 2004)."

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Voltando ao artigo da HBR:

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“Customers buy the cheapest or the best. Whether the economy is strong or weak, developed market consumers tend to buy across the price spectrum. They might show up at the register with a high-end digital camera, medium-quality linens, and cheap sunglasses. Emerging market consumers focus on essentials, favoring the lowest-priced items that offer acceptable quality, even when it comes to luxuries. They tend to know the exact price of everything they want and refuse to pay more.

They also refuse to buy in greater quantities than they need, even if that means they must purchase an individual piece or two from an opened package in a traditional outdoor market.” (Moi ici: E o que é isto senão a aplicação deste artigo de 2005 “The vanishing middle market” que tantas vezes cito neste blogue)

O mesmo primeiro trecho retirado de Retailization serve para suportar este outro trecho da HBR:

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“Consumers care about quality, not status. In developed economies, many companies successfully position their brands as status symbols. But in areas with low incomes, that strategy often falls flat.

The allure of status isn’t enough to induce consumers to buy. Instead, shoppers care most about quality. Multinationals may feel they’ve got the quality issue covered, but it’s not always that simple” (Moi ici: O mesmo no mercado dos países desenvolvidos. Basta procurer o marcador Centromarca, basta estudar o avanço das private label, basta estudar os autores que referi acima, basta ler “Treasure Hunt: Inside the Mind of the New Consumer“ de Michael J. Silverstein e John Butman”)

Agarrem-me senão eu mato-me (parte IV)

Continuado da parte II e da parte III.

Vou começar a comparar o que pensa a Centromarca com o que se escreve no segundo livro da lista da parte III, um livro muito, muito interessante que se lê de uma penada, de tão bem escrito e suportado em números: (Retailization – Brand Survival in the Age of Retail Power; de Lars Thomassen, Keith Lincoln e Anthony Aconis).

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A capa chama, grita, logo à partida para a situação crítica das marcas.

Eis os recortes que saliento.

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Do prefácio: "Imagine a mountain of brands, a very big mountain of brands: a mountain so heavy and so dense, everything in it has been squeezed. It has been squeezed physically to a point where the individual brands have lost their form and identity. And right in the middle of this heap is your brand.
This is the reality for the majority of brands today. They are part of that squeezed mountain. They are fighting for their very survival. They are fighting for their identity. They are fighting for their sales.
Managing a brand these days is an increasingly difficult job and no longer glamorous. It is a job that is under more and more strain, a job that is about survival – squeezed by everyone:

squeezed by retailers;
squeezed by shoppers;
squeezed by private label;
squeezed by media.

The first of these squeezes is the retailer. We face a new era that will not go away – a new era called ‘the era of retail power’. When the largest retailer in the world is now several hundred times larger than an individual brand it is clear where the power of the business world is residing. When only a few retailers control 75 per cent of an individual market and the biggest brands control less than 1 per cent, it is clear where the real power lies. When a few buyers at a few major retailers determine total effective consumer choice, it is clear where the real power lies. We used to live in a world where brand power was all, but slowly and inexorably brand power is being replaced by retail power." (Moi ici: a Centromarca acha que a concentração no mercado português é grande? E quando a comparamos com a que se verifica noutros países?)
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"The mountain here is the shelf: a shelf in a supermarket, a shelf in a concept store or a shelf on the internet. Once the shelf was the place we proudly displayed our brands. Now it’s the place we fight to stay on. Now it’s the place we can be evicted from on the smallest whim."

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Do primeiro capítulo, chamo a atenção para a dimensão da concentração:

"According to Fortune magazine (Boyle, 2003), the largest discount retailers are responsible for 80 per cent of the daily groceries sales in the United States – 10 years ago it was only 30 per cent.
In the United States, retail is the second largest industry in terms of both establishments and number of employees, generating approximately $3.8 trillion in sales (About, 2005).
In the United Kingdom, four chains have 75 per cent of the grocery market (Economist, 2005a) and nearly one pound in every eight is spent on shopping at Tesco (Couch, 2005).
In Scandinavia the major retailers have more than 80 per cent of the market – a staggering 91 per cent of the Finnish market is dominated by three retailers (www.kesko.fi; www.s-kanava; www.tradeka.fi; www.elanto.fi).
Aldi, Germany’s big discount retailer and one of the strongest retail brands in Europe, has a market share of the German discount market of approximately 50 per cent (Ramos, 2004).
Even in China the retail market is already dominated by four major retailers (Ørskov, 2004).

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With these sorts of shares it is pretty clear who is in charge As one grocery retailer CEO told us, ‘Whoever owns the shelf, owns the market.’ The consequences of the above numbers are self-evident. Not only are retailers increasingly taking charge of the brands’ customers, they are also starting to own the key points of contact with them. They often know their customers much better than any individual brand. They increasingly own and shape customers’ consumption patterns, influencing not only how they buy brands but also which brands to buy. Retailers increasingly dictate the prices charged and are themselves setting the terms for their relationships with each individual brand. This is much to the frustration of many brand owners, which to a large extent find themselves with no other option than to do exactly what the retailers tell them to do. No questions asked. The only thing on their mind is simply trying to maintain distribution.
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There was a clear message to us from the retailers – don’t expect to live on high fat margins anymore! You need to provide constant price value to our customer." (Moi ici: Ter uma "grande" marca, reconhecida, com tradição, não é um título nobiliárquico. Tem de se prestar contas todos os dias perante os juízes, os compradores.)

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Na introdução do capítulo 7:

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"There is no point in fighting the retailer. Instead you should focus on creating proprietary distribution, reinventing your arena or coopetition." (Moi ici: dá para perceber a posição da Centromarca?)
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Um dos subtítulos do capítulo 10 é precioso "Everybody has a brand, few have a product."
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"When it comes down to the retail arena, shoppers reach out for products. Make sure that you can offer one for them to reach out for; make sure they reach out for yours. You see, everybody these days has a brand, but very few have a product. The truth is that behind every great brand there is an even greater product. Without that great product there is no great brand. Always, always remember that there is no such thing as a power brand, only products that sell a lot." (Moi ici: Como os sublinhadores que às vezes os Lidl tem á venda, literalmente não têm marca, mas são os melhores que encontro como produto)
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"This does not mean that brands are void and irrelevant, but it does mean that the future is not brand-driven in the way we thought it would be. It is shopping-driven and therefore product-driven, and that has huge implications for the way we create new products and new brands. No longer can we rely on image alone to guarantee preference and loyalty. No longer can we rely on image alone to deliver the selection of the brand at the purchase point. No longer can we rely on image alone to drive shoppers towards our products. Only the product can deliver these things. Our product must deliver on every front. It is far too easy for shoppers these days to know the reality about our products and the truth of their claims. Sometimes they are better informed than the companies who deliver the brands! You have to remember that the brand is merely a vehicle for communication; it is not the product or an excuse for a bad product. Great retail presence works when you have great products, it is as simple as that. All the advertising, listing fees, marketing and relationships in the world mean nothing, if your product sucks. The product is the ultimate closer."
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"If you are not able to create continued differentiation and constant newness you risk being replaced by private label brands. You risk death by commoditization. It is one thing to get back into a category where you were previously outperformed in the competitive context, but it is a completely different thing to get back into a category where the retailers are perfectly able to take care of the shelf space themselves."
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Do capítulo 14 retiro, para finalizar:
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"Once prestigious key partners to retailers, brands have often been relegated to simple suppliers. Brands have lost respect, fallen in status and no longer have the power they once had, the power they took for granted for so long. Much of this they have brought upon themselves. Inertia, apathy, formulaic thinking and an inability to move forward with consumer change have left most brands standing in an obsolete yesteryear. It is time to regain that lost power."
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Qual o propósito da intervenção da Centromarca?
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São palavras duras mas que apontam para a única forma de dar a volta por cima, e não é através das queixas e do choradinho. É arregaçando as mangas e lutando pela conquista da preferência do comprador final.
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Continua.