Clientes em vez dos concorrentes

 "Ten major changes characterize the transition from industrial-era strategy practices to today.

1. The Shift In Focus From Competitors To Customers

The practice of business strategy is often said to have begun with Michael Porter’s 1979 HBR article, “How Competitive Forces Shape Strategy.” The article opened with the fateful sentence, “The essence of strategy formulation is coping with competition.” [Moi ici: Recordar Dick Dastardly - Live and let live]

...

Porter’s main mistake was his concept of “the essence of strategy.” The essence of strategy is not coping with competition—a contest in which a winner is selected from among existing rivals. The essence of business strategy is to add value for customers. [Moi ici: Desde o princípio deste blogue temos focado a nossa atenção na  determinação dos clientes-alvo, em deixar de ver os clientes como "miudagem no recreio" - Sem uma estratégia clara, come on... BSC? (parte I) ] Porter’s five-force model of strategy misses the basic point that ultimately customers are the determinant of business success."

Trechos retirados de "What's New About Strategy In The Digital Age"

Being Dick Dastardly is a dangerous move

Há muito que uso aqui a metáfora do Dick Dastardly para retratar as empresas que se focam mais nos concorrentes do que nos clientes. Por exemplo:

• Qual era o grande defeito de Dick Dastardly?
• Acerca do fenómeno das empresas tipo-Dick Dastardly

Neste artigo, "You can’t beat TikTok by becoming its clone", pode ler-se:

"Competitor orientation

What is so wrong with all of this, you might wonder? Why not focus on competitors and what they do, and augment it by evolving your own offering? I’m often asked this question by marketers I train and who are shocked at the lack of competitor assessments that I recommend as part of brand diagnosis.

I like looking at competitors through customer’s eyes, but I’m less interested in the insights that can be derived from directly studying competitors. In fact, it turns out there are very good reasons not to focus too heavily on competitors, what they do and how they do it.

There is a long and rewarding literature on the power of market orientation and keeping the customer in your cross hairs at all times. And there is an equally persuasive literature on the perils of competitor orientation – of switching our gaze from our customers to our competitors and how they do things. And that danger multiplies significantly if these insights turn to action and we start to replicate our competitors’ moves in our own approach.

...

As strategy guru Roger Martin observes, we are set for “a financial bloodbath”. That’s the scenario he predicts when multiple companies go to the same market, with the same strategy, at the same time. And he is right.

We’ve beaten up differentiation for too long in marketing. Sure, there is no unique offering out there. And no one will ever own any attribute or association. But playing the game your way, to your strengths, on your terms remains one of the hallmarks of successful business strategy."

Clientes versus concorrentes

Há dias citei aqui e comentei:

It is axiomatic that a first step in a firm's formulation of competitive strategy is the identification of its major competitors (e.g., Porter, 1980). [Moi ici: Não penso assim, não sigo este axioma. Tenho receio dos Dick Dastardly desta vida, e dos motards. Prefiro imaginar uma paisagem competitiva cheia de picos. Prefiro começar por determinar quem são os clientes-alvo e qual o ecossistema que deve ser mobilizado para os seduzir, satisfazer e desenvolver]

Entretanto, ontem li "Research in Cognition and Strategy: Reflections on Two Decades of Progress and a Look to the Future" de Sarah Kaplan e publicado no Journal of Management Studies 48:3 May 2011, e voltei a pensar no mesmo tema. A autora faz um trabalho muito interessante a descrever a evolução da investigação sobre as categorias de conhecimento. Outra vez um foco na categorização dos concorrentes. Por exemplo:

"Firms from other parts of the UK and other countries, even if they produced fully-fashioned knitwear at similar price points, were seen as being in different businesses or only ‘somewhat’ competitors

...

‘Cognitive oligopolies’ exist because competitors define each other as such.

...

They showed that managers based their categorization of competitors on a hierarchical understanding of the product offerings

...

Managers of larger hotels categorized competitors over a wider range of prices than did those of small hotels

...

The Scottish knitwear study showed how the categorization of different competitors as direct rivals affected the strategic choices and actions of firms."

Enquanto lia isto pensava em como seria se os autores citados tivesse optado por trabalhar com base na categorização dos clientes. À noite fui à minha biblioteca e saquei o meu velho "Managing for Results" de Peter Drucker, publicado em 1986 e fui ao capítulo 6, "The Customer Is the Business" ... continua tão actual e tão fresco:

"Business is a process which converts a resource, distinct knowledge, into a contribution of economic value in the marketplace. The purpose of a business is to create a customer. [Moi ici: O propósito não é o de ganhar aos concorrentes] The purpose is to provide something for which an independent outsider, who can choose not to buy, is willing to exchange his purchasing power. And knowledge alone  (excepting only the case of the complete monopoly) gives the products of any business that leadership position on which success and survival ultimately depend.

...

1. What the people in the business think they know about customer and market is more likely to be wrong than right. There is only one person who really knows: the customer. Only by asking the customer, by watching him, by trying to understand his behavior can one find out who he is, what he does, how he buys, how he uses what he buys, what he expects, what he values, and so on.

2. The customer rarely buys what the business thinks it sells him. One reason for this is, of course, that nobody pays for a “product.” What is paid for is satisfactions. But nobody can make or supply satisfactions as such—at best, only the means to attaining them can be sold and delivered.

...

3. A corollary is that the goods or services which the manufacturer sees as direct competitors rarely adequately define what and whom he is really competing with. They cover both too much and too little.

...

Because the customer buys satisfaction, all goods and services compete intensively with goods and services that look quite different, seem to serve entirely different functions, are made, distributed, sold differently—but are alternative means for the customer to obtain the same satisfaction.

...

5. The customers have to be assumed to be rational. But their rationality is not necessarily that of the manufacturer; it is that of their own situation."

Vivemos neste fluido de percepções

Atrai-me esta percepção que vivemos num mundo assente neste fluido de percepções resultantes de interpretações subjectivas que se objectificam através de acções e comportamentos. Abre muito mais alternativas, aliás, há sempre alternativas. Nós é que podemos não querer tentar algumas delas, mesmo quando as outras falham. No caso das empresas, o dinheiro pode acabar antes de termos tentado a que ia transitoriamente resultar. Já não sei se foi com Kahneman ou Gigerenzer que li sobre como dois adeptos de clubes diferentes, de boa-fé, conseguem olhar para a mesma realidade e ver coisas diferentes. Por isso, um deles escreveu: a realidade é o que vemos, nada mais! 

E o que vemos é o que o nosso trajecto de vida nos permite ver. Se estivermos abertos e atentos, podemos intuir novas possibilidades de interpretar a realidade e reformular a actuação.

"In this article we argue that one important link between group-level and firm-level competitive phenomena are the mental models used by key decision makers to interpret the task environment of their organization.

...

material decisions ultimately reflect the intuition and cognitive constructions of decision-makers. At a cognitive level, business competition must be analysed in terms of the mental models of decision-makers and how such mental models lead to a particular interpretation of the competitive milieu.

...

The interpretive approach rests upon four long-standing assumptions. First, activities and structures of organizations are assumed to be determined in part by the micro-momentary actions of their members. Second, such actions are assumed to be based upon an information-processing sequence in which individuals attend to cues in the environment, interpret the meaning of such cues, and then externalize these interpretations via concrete activities. Third, it is assumed that 'meaning' is problematic, and that individuals must construct actively an interpretation by linking received cues with well-learned and/or developing cognitive structures. Finally, individuals are assumed to possess a reflective capability such that they are able to verbalize at least the contents of their interpretations if not the processes through which such interpretations were generated. Taken together, these four assumptions portray human activity as an ongoing input-output cycle in which subjective interpretations of externally situated information become themselves objectified via behaviour.

...

Through processes of induction, problem-solving, and reasoning, decision-makers construct a mental model of the competitive environment which consists minimally of two types of beliefs; beliefs about the identity of the firm, its competitors, suppliers and customers, and causal beliefs about what it takes to compete successfully within the environment which has been identified. 

...

Just as mental models are determined by cues from transactions within the value chain, such transactions are themselves partially determined by the cognitive constructions of organizational decision-makers. Beliefs about the identity of competitors, suppliers, and customers focus the limited attentional resources of decision-makers on some transactional partners to the exclusion of others.

...

the strategic choices of individual firms take place within the context of many shared beliefs about how and with whom to engage in transactions in the marketplace.

...

It is axiomatic that a first step in a firm's formulation of competitive strategy is the identification of its major competitors (e.g., Porter, 1980). [Moi ici: Não penso assim, não sigo este axioma. Tenho receio dos Dick Dastardly desta vida, e dos motards. Prefiro imaginar uma paisagem competitiva cheia de picos. Prefiro começar por determinar quem são os clientes-alvo e qual o ecossistema que deve ser mobilizado para os seduzir, satisfazer e desenvolver]

Trechos retirados de "Competitive Groups as Cognitive Communities: The Case of Scottish Knitwear Manufacturers" publicado no Journal of Management Studies em Julho de 1989.

"we do not live in a world of perfect competition" (parte II)

Parte I.

Mais uns trechos de "Windows of Opportunity: How Nations Make Wealth". 

"Very few countries have ever developed by means other than innovation, learning [Moi ici: The race to the top] and the growth exceptions to this rule have been of industrial production.

...

it is the production-capability school of thought that has proved most to policy-makers trying to increase the growth rates of their countries; while a harsh assessment would conclude that the market-efficiency school of thought, including neoclassical economics, proved most useful to policy-makers trying to stop other countries from catching them up and competing against them.

...

Starting at the beginning of the twentieth century, neoclassic economists came to view the economic problem as being the optimal allocation of scarce resources rather than one of generating productivity to overcome conditions of scarcity. [Moi ici: Era outro tempo. Recordar isto] 

...

The premise of neoclassical theory is that, if the investments are made, the acquisition and mastery of new ways of doing things is relatively easy, even automatic. [Moi ici: Recordar isto acerca do plano de recuperação e resiliência. Macacos trepam, não voam] 

...

[neo-classical economic theory] It does not see production as it in the observable world; that is, as a complex process which involves innovation and the creation of competitive advantage, and which needs an entrepreneeur to make it happen.

Secondly, it underestimates heterogeneity of production activities within and across production sectors. It ignores the issue of both what is being produced (i.e. the product) and how it is being produced i.e. the technologies and organisation used). [Moi ici: Este foi um dos temas que sempre me fez espécie, ninguém fala da variabilidade intersectorial]

...

The third element is the capability of a firm, which enables it to apply the activity-specific technology to producing the product or service in order to meet market demand, thus creating a capability/market-opportunity dynamic.  [Moi ici: É sempre mais fácil culpar o contexto externo]

The fourth element is the institutions of the country where the firm is located, which enable the capability/market-opportunity dynamic to operate effectively.  [Moi ici: Recordar "Why Nations fail". Recordar que o futuro tem um custo, se as empresas não se podem capitalizar, não podem enfrentar o futuro de forma séria e proactiva... viram zombies]

...

Because neoclassical economists have not been able to quantify these four elements and so include them in their mathematical models, they have not been able to explain why different sectors in an economy have different levels of value-added growing at different rates. 

...

the growth rate of country depends on what is happening to the value-added per capita in each of its different sectors as a result of the capability/market-opportunity dynamic, and on any shift in the distribution of economic activity across sectors. [Moi ici: Racional perfeito para fugir aos mitos]

...

[the dynamic capability school] does not assume the market economy is one of perfect competition, in which every firm is selling the same product at the same price as its competitors. This is a completely unrealistic view of the world, as can be seen by a quick trip to any shopping centre or car showroom. Instead, the dynamic capability theory assumes that, in a competitive market economy, firms compete by trying to gain a competitive advantage over their rivals, [Moi ici: Aqui torço o nariz a este trecho. Sim, mas! É outra vez o fenómeno da obliquidade, mas mais ainda. A economia não é necessariamente um jogo de soma nula. A economia não é uma guerra para eliminar o advsersário, o sucesso das empresas passa por satisfazer os clientes. Cuidado com o Dick Dastardly] as this is what enables them to grow and their profitability. It also assumes that this same type of competition exists between firms in different countries and is what determines in the long term what goods and services a country exports and imports.

The essential question that economic growth theory raises, therefore, is how do firms gain a competitive advantage over their rivals? There are two ways they can do this. Firms can either reduce the cost of their product or service through innovations in their production methods, or use innovation to make their product more attractive to their customers by better meeting their needs through enhanced performance, more functionality or improved design." [Moi ici: Recordar as três regras]

Live and let live

Se fossem crianças, no Portugal do início dos anos 70 do século passado, depois do almoço estariam em frente à televisão para ver as Corridas Loucas ou o Stop the Pigeon.

Nas Corridas Loucas, Dick Dastardly dava cabo da minha paciência por estar mais preocupado em dar cabo da concorrência do que em ganhar a corrida. Basta pesquisar Dastardly neste blogue para ver como uso a personagem na minha relação com as empresas.

Gosto de usar a metáfora de David e Golias na minha relação com as empresas, mas procuro sublinhar que a metáfora não é sobre o combate em si, o mundo dos negócios não é uma guerra para aniquilar os concorrentes, é um esforço para seduzir e servir clientes. Já agora, gosto de usar a metáfora de David e Golias por causa do "twist" na estória, tal como nesta outra estória, para transmitir a mensagem de que há uma alternativa ao pensamento dominante à espera de ser encontrada ou melhor, construída.

Por isso, recomendo muitas vezes o "Live and let live", uma deturpação do título de um antigo filme de cowboys. Outra metáfora que gosto de usar é a da relação entre economia e biologia:

A continuação da leitura de "When More Is Not Better" de Roger Martin prossegue:

"Executives dream of becoming the next John D. Rockefeller, who built a monopoly in the oil-refining business in the late nineteenth century. Eliminating the competition feels like a natural goal; it means you’ve won. ... Managers feel more secure when their customers have no alternative to the product or service they produce. Given that American monopolists from Rockefeller to Bill Gates to Mark Zuckerberg have become among the richest men in history, the appeal of establishing a monopoly is understandable. But it has a downside. Monopolies don’t last in the natural world, and they don’t last in business either.
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Monopolies don’t last in nature because they don’t adapt, [Moi ici: Claro que monopólios protegidos, pelo estado, têm a possibilidade de serem eternos] and the fundamental rule of nature, as posited by Charles Darwin, is survival of the fittest—by which he meant those most able to adapt to the environment and its changes. And what drives adaptation in business? It is learning from one’s customers how to provide better value for them. Customers, not those who serve them, define value. Providers can only hypothesize about what constitutes customer value. Providers learn based on customer feedback, and therefore customer feedback is the linchpin of positive adaptation. It is very difficult to become a better provider of a given product or service in the absence of real customer feedback.
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It is not the mere existence of customer feedback that produces positive adaptation. Listening to customer feedback and taking action on it are both necessary preconditions for positive adaptation. But change is never easy. It is tiring and expensive. As a consequence, most companies, most of the “time, will listen to customers only when they must, and they have to only when the customer can credibly threaten to become an ex-customer if the provider doesn’t listen and change.
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Therein lies the fundamental sustainability problem for monopolists. They don’t have to listen to their customers. ... In the end, monopolists exist to serve themselves, not to serve their customers. They don’t get the training that customers normally provide, because the monopolist doesn’t have to train.
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As a consequence, monopolies stultify over time. They may have virtually unlimited resources, but they don’t have the motivation to deploy them productively. When the environment in which they operate necessitates major adaptation, they are unable to adjust, because they are out of practice."

"a laser-like focus on a particular customer segment"

O capítulo 5 - "The Amazon Effect" do livro “Remarkable Retail” de Steve Dennis procura desmistificar o que se diz sobre a Amazon e as mudanças no retalho físico.

"As stores close by the thousands, once-prosperous chains go bankrupt, and scores of malls are bulldozed or massively repurposed, it’s become common to lay the blame on the rise of e-commerce generally and on Amazon in particular.
...
First, as we have seen, some of the most disrupted sectors were in decline well before Amazon was a blip on the radar screen.
...
Second, absolutely nothing prevented any of these retailers that have lost share to online retailers from developing their own similar e-commerce capabilities. In fact, a brand with really great digital capabilities combined with kick-ass brick-and-mortar assets that are well integrated should have important advantages in competing with online-only players. That is one of the main arguments of this book.
...
Many major national brands have yielded little or no share to Amazon and other pure-play competition. That’s not to mention the many local, regional, and specialty stores that have a laser-like focus on a particular customer segment, [Moi ici: Uma condição crítica para o sucesso, a definição dos clientes-alvo] deliver superior customer service, and provide a unique product and/or service mix.

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The real question for retailers is, do you let the shifts destroy you or do you turn them to your advantage?...[Moi ici: Tudo uma questão de mindset]
This is best shown by examining the difference between “buying” and “shopping. In this way of dissecting the retail world, “buying” is more task-driven or mission-focused. It’s mostly functional. The consumer already has a clear idea of what he or she wants and generally wants it quickly and at a decent price. Buying is more commodity-oriented and search typically plays a key role. Amazon—and e-commerce more broadly—does especially well here.
“Shopping,” on the other hand, is more nuanced and complex, typically involving more exploration and browsing. Generally speaking, browsing on Amazon can be a frustrating experience. When shopping, rather than looking for a specific item, the consumer may be seeking a more complete solution or inspiration and often requires some form of advice. Shopping also tends to be more emotional, with a greater emphasis on the full experience rather than merely checking an item off a to-do list. [Moi ici: Mais uma vez o paralelismo para os media. Com que é que a imprensa se safa, com os buyers ou com os shoppers?] The role of physical stores is dramatically more important in shopping than buying, and as a consequence Amazon and other sites that are dominantly or entirely e-commerce have a disproportionately lower share.

...
“Amazon is powerful, but it is not invincible. Yet it is not very likely that anyone reading this book will contribute to the company’s downfall. Nor are there many parts of Amazon’s core business where its vulnerabilities can be profitably exploited. But there are many aspects of retail where Amazon is not—and will not be—especially successful.
Amazon has incredible momentum, but it is not going to take over the vast majority of retail—at least not in anyone’s sensible planning horizon. In plenty of areas Amazon has a long way to go before it will ever gain meaningful market share.
Our job, therefore, is threefold. The first is to stop chasing Amazon like Ahab obsessively pursuing Moby Dick. [Moi ici: Uma forma interessante de chamar a atenção para a actuação ao estilo do Dick Dastardly] You won’t catch it and even if you do, before long you will likely get crushed or eaten alive. The second is to separate the myths from the reality. The third is to focus your strategy on the areas where Amazon is not, and will not be, an unbeatable competitor anytime soon.
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“This is not to say that Amazon should not be a potential distribution partner. This doesn’t mean that many things that Amazon does well should not be studied and potentially made part of your organization’s capabilities. But it does mean accepting the fact that we are not going to beat Amazon at its own game."

Ver para lá do que se conhece (parte IV)

Parte I, parte II e parte III.

Por que me interesso por este tema aqui no blogue pelo menos desde 2011?

Em torno de 2011 trabalhei com uma empresa que operava no sector da mobilidade, e não só, para pessoas com deficiência.

Por que nutro a paixão pelos exoesqueletos há tanto tempo? Porque recordo as cenas finais do Alien I ou II em que Ripley combate o xenomorfo vestindo um exoesqueleto usado para operar num armazém. Vi aquela cena e nunca mais a esqueci:

Ontem, durante uma caminhada matinal de 7 km continuei a leitura de “Seeing Around Corners” de Rita McGrath e sublinhei este ponto:

"What Must Be True? Creating a Plan to Learn Fast
...
The techniques described here are not about making predictions and being right. They are about generating possibilities and opening your mind to what might happen, so that as evidence gets stronger, you are ready to take action. For any future state, there are many variables that can lead to one outcome or another. What is valuable in complex systems is to be able to keep multiple possible futures in mind so that if and when they unfold, the landscape is more recognizable.
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Intel, for instance, has employed science fiction writers, futurists, and students to produce creative works about aspects of the future, with the purpose not of making predictions, but of opening people’s  minds to emerging possibilities. Seeing around corners is about broadening the range of possibilities you consider paying attention to. Your ability to look into the future is only as well developed as the set of possibilities you are prepared to entertain."

Por causa do tal trabalho desenvolvido em 2011 acompanhei de longe ao longo dos anos as movimentações entre as empresas grandes do sector das cadeiras de rodas... a imagem que me vem à mente agora mesmo é esta:


Empresas tão preocupadas em ganharem quota de mercado umas às outras, empresas tão absolutamente concentradas no que fazem que não vêem o contexto a mudar nem vêm o mundo pelos olhos de quem devem servir. A atenção da gestão de topo é gasta em aquisições, é pulverizada a seguir e a marcar a concorrência, qual Dastardly,

em vez de tornar o seu negócio actual obsoleto.

Como não esquecer os 8 anos de inércia...

"Customers expect your attention to be on them"

Um excelente texto que recomendo para reflexão, sobretudo para os adeptos de Dick Dastardly, "The New Retail: Sell to Me in a Me2B World":

"Jeff Bezos said, “If we can keep our competitors focused on us while we stay focused on the customer, ultimately we´ll turn out all right.”
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Many retailers today seem to do exactly this and try to compete with Amazon.com. It's not rare that I have conversations with retailers about implementing strategies to compete with, or even leapfrog, Amazon. I usually provocatively ask the question, “which part of Amazon would you aim to overtake?”
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Focusing on competing with Amazon isn't a winning strategy. Retailers, instead, need to laser-focus on their customers and not primarily on the competition.
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Consumers say, “Treat me like a person, not as a sales opportunity. Don´t just sell products. Sell to me!” [Moi ici: Pensar nos inputs do cliente e não nos outputs]
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Consumers are willing to pay more for positive experiences. Making individual consumers happy will be the ultimate driver for loyalty and differentiation. However, companies must first be able to see their own business through the eyes of the customer,
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How you sell what you sell is important! Customers expect your attention to be on them, not your competitors. It's all about more empathy, more fun and less friction, which results in happy customers for life."

É nestes momentos de mudança ... (parte IV)

Parte I, parte II e parte III.

Agora vou correr o risco de ser mal interpretado. Costumo escrever aqui que muitas empresas se preocupam mais com a concorrência do que com os clientes-alvo. É a velha metáfora de "ver passar motards" ou aquilo a que chamo as empresas Dick Dastardly nas Wacky Races.

As empresas não devem focar-se demasiado na concorrência, mas ao iniciar um processo de transformação convém perceber onde estamos, quem pode competir connosco no novo espaço para onde poderemos pensar ir, e se poderemos ter alguma hipótese nele.

Por exemplo, em "Acerca do papel da estratégia (parte IV)", dou o exemplo de uma empresa que sente que precisa de mudar:

"empresa a querer mudar de concorrentes, sinónimo de querer subir na escala de valor - ainda precisa de perceber que existem diferentes tipos de clientes e que recusar encomendas não é pecado." 

Desenhamos em conjunto o panorama competitivo e reconhecem-se aqui:

Depois, chega a provocação:
- Será que podem competir neste campeonato? Por que há-de alguém escolher-vos em vez de escolher um concorrente chinês? (No postal listo uma série de justificações, como por exemplo: Os macacos não voam! Ou a primeira lição da Teoria dos Jogos, "Do not play a strictly dominated strategy". BTW, quando na parte II da presente série escrevo "mesmo quando se faz tudo bem, a paisagem competitiva pode alterar-se e "estragar" tudo", estou a falar da segunda lição "Rational choice, choosing a dominant strategy, can lead to outcomes that suck")
- Não fará mais sentido abordar o mercado com outro referencial competitivo?
Por isso escrevi: "Talvez a aposta em vectores alternativos: Flexibilidade? Rapidez?"

Devemos ser capazes de olhar para a empresa e para o seu contexto competitivo sob diferentes perspectivas, para tentar percepcionar como poderá ser o mundo da empresa em cada uma dessas situações.

No mundo da melhoria da qualidade, perante um desafio, abrimos opções (com o diagrama de causa-efeito, por exemplo), para depois as fecharmos (com testes, com verificações). O grande Richard Normann propunha 3 questões:

• What business are we in? What are we?
• What business (or businesses) could we be in? What could we be?
• What business should we be in/do we want to be in? What should we be?

Conseguem competir com a fama alemã em desempenho?

Conseguem competir com a fama alemã ou italiana em flexibilidade, rapidez?

Ou seja, antes de avançar uma empresa deve avaliar se o espaço onde vai competir é um espaço onde realmente tem uma vantagem competitiva. Vantagem não é senão uma avaliação comparativa: podemos fazer a diferença?

A análise de onde e quando a empresa foi bem sucedida, pode ser uma pista para inferir quais as fontes do sucesso, qual a vantagem competitiva. Por isso, recomendo pesquisar sempre: Para quem continuamos a vender bem nestes tempos de crise? Porquê?

A resposta a estas perguntas permite-nos manter os pés na terra e evitar erros mirabolantes, recordar Anteu segundo Nassim Taleb.

Depois de confirmada a hipótese de existência de uma vantagem competitiva, vem a definição de quem são os clientes-alvo e quem pode fazer parte do ecossistema da procura.

Por exemplo,

Uma empresa pode identificar os seus clientes-alvo e, perceber que pode em simultâneo trabalhar a relação com aqueles que podem "mandar" nos clientes, ou pelo menos influenciá-los.

Para cada uma destas entidades faz sentido pensar no problema que as faz sofrer, ou no objectivo que as motiva para melhorarem o seu estado. Esta é a base para a entrada no mapa da estratégia do balanced scorecard, a perspectiva dos clientes e outras partes interessadas:

Queremos atingir três resultados:

• Seduzir novos clientes;
• Satisfazer os clientes; e
• Manter os clientes

Estes resultados não hão-de ser resultado de magia ou sorte, mas consequências perfeitamente normais de experiências que os clientes sentem emergir da interacção com a empresa.

Continua.

A viagem dos heróis

"That’s because it casts the company as a customer-conquering hero:
...
What would it look like if, instead, your positioning was rooted in a story in which the customer was the protagonist? You would have to invite the customer on some kind of journey to a new, presumably happier place:[Moi ici: Se o cliente é o protagonista, então ele não tem de ser convidado para fazer qualquer viagem. É ele que escolhe as viagens que quer fazer, onde quer chegar, que progresso precisa de fazer. Um potencial fornecedor é uma hipótese/ferramenta que ele pode utilizar para atingir esse destino desejado]
...
Regarding competitors, Cancel simply advises:
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Don’t worry about them at all. [Moi ici: Eheheheh fugir do comportamento à la Dastardly]
What is positioning, if you’re not going to talk about how you’re different from competitors?
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It’s about becoming so customer-centric that customers don’t even think about your competitors. How do you do that? Like Cancel, start by inviting customers on an irresistible journey. [Moi ici: Percebo a ideia, mas tem de ser melhorada neste ponto de vista do convite. Os fornecedores é que querem ser convidados] The journey must be made urgent by a change in the world that makes the status quo untenable, and its destination must be a desirable yet difficult-to-reach Promised Land. Whereas a traditional positioning statement aims to conquer prospects into submission (getting them to say: “Yes, your products are the best”), positioning via the Promised Land seeks validation (getting them to say: “Yes, you’re telling my story”).
...
I see my role as helping these teams switch metaphors: from the competitor-centric combat one (traditional positioning statement) to the customer-centric journey one (Promised Land narrative). How do I know they’ve got it? When their pitch starts sounding less like an infomercial and more like a movie.
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Always a movie, though, in which the customer is cast not as territory to be won, but as the hero of his or her own epic adventure."

Recordar "Afinal quem é o herói?"

Trechos retirados de "How Winners Really Differentiate"

O efeito de rebanho (parte II)

Parte I.

O segundo viés cognitivo é o do efeito de rebanho.

"Proposition 2: The extent of managerial price herding is negatively related to the extent to which firms practice value-based pricing."

O que é isto do efeito de rebanho?

"Herding is defined as individual disregard of private information, instead basing decisions on the observed actions of the majority. In so doing, individuals assume that decisions taken by the majority constitute valuable information for their own decision-making.
...
In the context of pricing, managers who engage in herding deliberately disregard private information (e.g., about customers' purchase history) and instead conform to market prices. The assumption underlying this herding effect is that market prices constitute a viable point of reference. Managers may resort to herding because they believe that competitor prices reveal information about the market, or that pricing like one's competitors seems a justifiable tactic. ... many firms evade responsibility for pricing decisions by following market or competitor prices instead. Managers “do not want to stand alone when they increase the prices if the competition does not move”. In other words, managers fear accountability in the event of an unfavorable outcome. This suggests that herding's foundations may be motivational as well as cognitive. On the other hand, ... firms that “set the rules of the game” —do not hand over pricing responsibility to the market but instead price strategically. In other words, these firms consider pricing to be a matter of meticulous managerial activity.
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companies that simply match competitors' prices irrespective of cost and customer considerations are mimicking those competitors rather than analyzing them; this is not competition-based pricing but rather indicates a herd mentality.
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That said, the weight of the evidence suggests that price herding is habitual rather than strategic. Consequently, a herd mentality is myopic, as it typically neglects distinct product characteristics, and increases the likelihood of price wars. That being so, it becomes important to understand product differences and to withstand competitive price pressure.
The fundamental issue with price herding is its reactive nature and its disregard for potentially useful information about cost and customer value. Moreover, a strong emphasis on market and competitor prices diverts managerial attention from the effort to comprehend customer perceived value. [Moi ici: Recordar Dastardly] It also distracts from efforts to comprehend the strategic actions of competitors (e.g., their pricing strategy) and to observe or anticipate market developments (e.g., changes in market structure or segments)."

Trechos retirados de "Value-based pricing and cognitive biases: An overview for business markets" de Mario Kienzler e publicado online por Industrial Marketing Management.

Gente de outra estirpe

Um texto, "Ineficiência na gestão custa 47 milhões à hotelaria todos os anos", que mereceria reflexão especial no recato de cada organização e a nível de associações do sector.

"Desfasamento entre o 'boom' da procura e a adequação do preço médio da hotelaria custou, em cinco anos, 235 milhões.
...
Quanto custou a ineficiência na gestão do boom da procura turística à hotelaria? Em cinco anos (de 2012 a 2016), nas três regiões onde o desfasamento entre o disparo da procura e a resposta do setor foi maior, as empresas hoteleiras perderam 235 milhões de euros.
...
O estudo da BlueShift comparou o período compreendido entre o ano antes do arranque da procura (2012) e o ano recorde para o turismo nacional (2016). A análise pretendeu averiguar até que ponto as organizações conseguiram ou não tirar partido da nova tendência de crescimento. Deste modo, foram comparadas a Taxa de Ocupação e o Preço Médio, já que a rentabilidade operacional só pode ser maximizada se ambos se expandirem. Um euro de crescimento em preço, por exemplo, traduz-se diretamente em resultados. Se esse mesmo euro for apenas conseguido via ocupação, apenas 40 cêntimos (numa operação otimizada) traduzem-se em resultados — uma vez que é necessário subtrair os custos variáveis do montante acumulado."

Triste é as associações sectoriais serem chefiadas por gente mais interessada em fazer política partidária do que em pensar o sector e trabalhar para fazer sempre a melhor limonada com os limões que a vida nos dá em vez de estar sempre no choradinho porque nos calharam limões e não ananases ou maracujás.

O filme é claro, o estudo começa em 2012 com o ano a que chama "antes do arranque da procura":

•  Janeiro de 2013 - Não há nada a fazer?

O presidente de uma associação não pode e não deve falar impunemente. Deve ser consequente, deve ser responsável. Não deve mentir mas deve dar esperança. Não esperança cor de rosa, não esperança mágica mas esperança com base nas oportunidades que possam existir. O que dizia o presidente da Associação da Hotelaria de Portugal:

"Para 2013 espera-se menos emprego, menos investimento, pior prestação em termos de resultados. Não há milagres"

• Outubro de 2013 - O exemplo da hotelaria

"A hotelaria portuguesa poderá ter um ano de recordes em 2013. Até ao final do ano, o sector prevê receber 14,5 milhões de hóspedes, contra 13,9 milhões em 2012, e 42 milhões de dormidas, face aos 39,8 milhões do ano passado. “Nunca se atingiram estes números em Portugal e vamos ter resultados significativos este ano”, sublinha o presidente da Associação da Hotelaria de Portugal (AHP), Luís Veiga, em entrevista ao SOL." [Moi ici: Em algum lado ouviram uma retratação deste senhor? Não, qual Cravinho continuou como se nada se tivesse passado]

• Abril de 2015 - Decididamente há aqui alguma coisa que não bate certo... 

O senhor até me faz recordar Pessoa:

"«Aqui ao leme sou mais do que eu:
Sou um Povo que quer o mar que é teu;"

Ao leme de uma associação não deviam estar os mais retrógrados, deviam estar os visionários, deviam estar os que dão esperança, os que mostram sugerem caminhos, gente com locus de controlo interno. Gente que sabe que ao leme têm de ser mais do que são.

Quando ao leme está alguém que vê e proclama que o copo está meio vazio o que é que faz a maioria? Acredita na mensagem de que o copo está meio vazio.

Aquele trecho lá em cima:

"Um euro de crescimento em preço, por exemplo, traduz-se diretamente em resultados. Se esse mesmo euro for apenas conseguido via ocupação, apenas 40 cêntimos (numa operação otimizada) traduzem-se em resultados"

devia ser objecto de reflexão profunda. Sabem qual é a elasticidade da procura? Sabem quantos clientes perdem quando aumentam o preço 1% Sabem quanto ganham a mais quando o preço aumenta 1%? Espero que saibam que o objectivo não é ter os quartos todos ocupados mas sim ganhar dinheiro.

Em vez de olhar para estas coisas, qual Dastardly, sempre a olhar para a concorrência, sempre preocupado com o queijo a que tem como direito adquirido:

• Março de 2015 - Sim, é muito mais complexo do que o "paradigma"

E olhar para dentre e ser frontal só deve trazer problemas. Imaginem o que seria com alguém da estirpe do senhor Proença à frente da AHP.

Pois, gente de outra estirpe, recordar Novembro de 2011

Está tudo relacionado

Está tudo relacionado.

Este texto, "Starbucks Closes Online Store to Focus on In-Person Experience", tem tudo a ver com "How Not to Fail at Retail" e com perceber o papel das interacções e da co-criação de valor.

Tudo o que, por exemplo, o jornalismo mainstream nunca percebeu.

Se os "chineses" do retalho, as lojas online, têm preços e diversidade de oferta imbatível, não adianta tentar competir com eles nesse campeonato (good old Kasparov), não adianta entrar numa guerra entre cães, mais vale mudar para gato.

"O truque está no jogador reconhecer aquilo que faz melhor. Se é melhor na espera e numa estratégia de paciência, então é esse o caminho que deve seguir; se é melhor num ataque poderoso, deve criar condições para o fazer. O elemento chave para uma estratégia de sucesso é assegurar que, no ambiente que está criado, somos muito melhores do que o nosso concorrente. Trata-se de forçá-lo a cometer erros.
...
é preciso conhecer a nossa natureza e a do nosso adversário. Reconhecer as forças e as fraquezas de cada um. E assegurar que a luta se processa num território no qual as nossas fraquezas são menos importantes, enquanto que as do adversário são flagrantes.
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Se o meu exército tem cavalaria, convém que a batalha seja num vale; mas se a cavalaria for do adversário é melhor que o confronto seja nos montes. Trata-se de encontrar o campo de batalha que potencia a nossa vantagem competitiva e no qual as potenciais vantagens do adversário encontrem contrariedades. Acredito que a maioria das batalhas - na história militar, nos negócios ou no xadrez - são decididas por manobras prévias e que as grandes vantagens competitivas são acumuladas antes da batalha propriamente dita." [Moi ici: Claro que há que dar um desconto à visão dos negócios como uma guerra ou um jogo. Não devemos ser como o Dick Dastardly e darmos demasiada importância à concorrência. Nos negócios o objectivo não é eliminar o concorrente, o objectivo é  seduzir de forma sustentada um cliente]

Por um lado:

"“Every retailer that is going to win in this new environment must become an experiential destination,” Mr. Schultz told investors in April." [Moi ici: O mais provável é que o máximo que o comércio online possa fazer seja "permutar". O comércio online é muito bom para artigos padrão, é muito bom para artigos permutados, não é bom para quem procura algo à sua medida, para quem procura algo que ainda não existe, para quem não sabe o que procura]

O contexto tem muita força (parte VIII)

Parte I, parte II, parte III, parte IV, parte V, parte VI e parte VII.

Outro artigo citado em "Strategic Planning in Turbulent Environments: A Social Ecology Approach to Scenarios" de Rafael Ramírez e John W. Selsky, publicado por Long Range Planning em 2014, é "Contrasting Perspectives of Strategy Making: Applications in ‘Hyper’ Environments" de John W. Selsky, Jim Goes e Oguz N. Babüroglu, publicado por Organization Studies em Janeiro de 2007 de onde retirei:

"Revolutionary change, increasing volatility and blurring of boundaries in many industries have stimulated two lines of extension of the core neoclassical perspective."

Como não pensar logo neste exemplo: "Mayweather e McGregor causam pior fim de semana nas bilheteiras em 16 anos"

"Conflating turbulence with intense competitive challenges reveals two problematic assumptions. One assumption is that strategy is competition, that is, a firm’s key relations with other firms are competitive (or hypercompetitive) and competitive behaviour is directed at other industry players. However, competitive actions may not always be appropriate, and direct effects of competitive actions — as well as unintended higher-order consequences — may not be con- fined to other industry actors. The other assumption is that the competitive ground is considered stable enough for familiar kinds of competitive behaviour, albeit speeded up or more focused.
...
The logical conclusion of conflating turbulence with competitive challenges is that ‘the more turbulent the environment the more aggressive must be the firm’s response’. As we discuss below, such ‘proactive’ responses may produce problematic unintended consequences in extended social fields."

Para alguém como eu que tem pavor dos Dick Dastardly que passam a vida a ver motards e que não seguem o meu querido "Live and let live" isto é importante.

Continua.

Para enquadrar a coisa (parte II)

Parte I.

Quem não ouviu no último ano conversas sobre o perigo do alojamento local?

Quem não ouviu queixas dos incumbentes do sector da hotelaria acerca da deslealdade do alojamento local?

Conhecem esta personagem?

Dastardly nunca ganhava uma corrida porque estava mais preocupado com o sucesso dos outros do que com a sua própria corrida.

Qual o impacte do Alojamento Local nos preços da hotelaria tradicional no último ano?

Uma ilustração prática do que são diferentes segmentos de clientes, diferentes posicionamentos.

Uma espécie de rouxinóis de McArthur:

Viver e deixar viver.

Asneira

Mal vi o título, "H&M lança nova marca para dar luta à Inditex", pensei:

-Asneira!

Como não recordar Dastardly:

Recomendaria à H&M que não se preocupasse tanto com a Inditex mas se preocupasse mais com os seus clientes-alvo e as suas aspirações.

"think about selling a transformation"

"The starting point of most competitive analysis is a question: Who is your competition? That’s because most companies view their competition as another brand, product, or service. But smart leaders and organizations go broader.
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The question is not who your competition is but what it is. And the answer is this: Your competition is any and every obstacle your customers encounter along their journeys to solving the human, high-level problems your company exists to solve.
...
Sure, someone in your company needs to understand the marketplace: who your competition is, what other products are on the market, and how they are doing, at a basic level. But there’s a point at which paying attention to other companies and what they’re doing interferes with your team’s ability to immerse itself in the world of your consumer. Focusing on competitive products and companies often leads to “me-too” products, which purport to compete with or iterate on something that customers might not have liked much in the first place.
...
First, rethink what you sell. Most companies think they sell a product. To transcend strictly one-time, transactional relationships with your customers, your company must think about selling a transformation: a journey from a problematic status quo to the new levels and possibilities that will unfurl after the behavior change you help make happen.
...
Next, rethink your customers. They are not just the people who have purchased your product or the people who follow you on Facebook. Your customers are all the people who grapple with the problem your business exists to solve.
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Now, focus on their problems. Engage in customer research, online and in the real world, to understand and document their journeys. I don’t mean their customer life cycle with your brand. Map out your (redefined) customer’s journey from having the problem you exist to solve to no longer having that problem. That may be the journey from unhealthy to healthy living, or from being broke to being a good steward of their finances."

Recordar o Dick Dastardly e os observadores de motards.

Trechos retirados de "Obsess Over Your Customers, Not Your Rivals"

Estratégia não é sobre ver os motards

"when leaders think of business as a war with their competitors—and many continue to do just that—they inevitably seek to beat their rivals in ways that don’t meaningfully enhance customer-perceived benefits—such as with product-feature frenzy or predatory pricing. Such moves rarely grow the total market and almost always produce lower margins and losing products.
...
When strategy is about competitors, leaders lose focus on the unlimited opportunities to grow customer value.
...
Whereas making strategy about competitors can be highly destructive, making it about the customer encourages leaders to find ways to win without having to pay the price for their victories. Does this mean that competitors can be safely ignored when it comes to strategy? No. Understanding competitors’ value propositions is one effective way to generate new thinking on how to improve your own value propositions.
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Business is not war or sport. Strategy in business is different than strategy in war and sport. It’s not about competitors. It’s about the customer, your value proposition, and the capabilities you need to deliver it better than anyone else. It’s that simple—and that difficult."

Recordar:

• A ver passar motards (Janeiro de 2017)
• Qual era o grande defeito de Dick Dastardly? (Agosto de 2015)
• Acerca do fenómeno das empresas tipo-Dick Dastardly (Agosto de 2014)

Trechos retirados de "Strategy Is Not About The Competition"

A ver passar motards

"Bad Habit #7: Obsession of competitor rather than customers
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Unfortunately, many companies are more obsessed by their competition than their customers. Your customers are far more important than your competitors. Your (potential new) customers contain the evidence your organization needs to validate or invalidate new business ideas and potential growth engines. That doesn’t mean you should completely ignore the competition. After all, business models and value propositions aren’t designed in a vacuum. However,  competitors should not be your primary focus.
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Remedy: Obsess over your customers first when developing and testing new value propositions, business models, and growth engines. As a secondary: evaluate how these new ideas perform in the competitive landscape."

Recordar os que passam a vida a ver passar motards em vez de se concentrarem e ganharem estão sempre a perder, qual Dick dastardly.


Trecho retirado de "11 Corporate Habits That Kill Your Company’s Innovation Engine"