"customer profitability analysis"

Interessante e talvez sintomático, talvez não seja obra do acaso, mas fruto das circunstâncias que vivemos com a pandemia, com o crescimento acelerado do online (recordar esta epifania), nos últimos tempos tenho encontrado vários artigos que ilustram a importância de pensar nos clientes-alvo, a importância de perceber a curva de Stobachoff e o seu significado:

"No company can afford a flawed understanding of customer profitability, least of all in a recession when the margin for error (as well as profit) is whisper-thin. The flip side is that improvements in this area can be a very effective way of bolstering the bottom line — and companies can often make those improvements with only a modest initial investment. 

...

A customer profitability analysis, done right, tells you not just which customers are profitable, but why certain customers are more or less profitable than others. At a strategic level, this information can help guide decisions on everything from growth initiatives to marketplace segmentation. And, tactically, the information can suggest a variety of ways to improve profitability, such as lowering the cost to serve, improving the sales force’s bargaining position, and developing more effective prices and promotions.

...

However, many companies that believe they understand customer profitability are actually working with the wrong information. Most use aggregate measures of profitability, typically gross margin, that fail to account for costs that are difficult to measure or that can’t be attributed to individual transactions (such as marketing expenses or distribution costs).

Even when these costs are considered, they’re often computed at an aggregate level using metrics that ignore the nuances of serving particular customers, segments or other populations of interest.

...

Pocket margin refers to the amount left in a company’s “pocket” after all of the costs related to a transaction, as well as the cost of goods sold, are subtracted from the list price. These costs can range from the obvious, such as off-invoice discounts and promotions, to the easily overlooked, such as costs associated with freight, warehousing and other activities that may be generally classified as “overhead.” The costs incurred at each point in a transaction are often graphically represented in a “price waterfall,” a bar chart that depicts the impact of each successive cost-to-serve element on the list price."

Trechos retirados de "How profitable are your customers … really?"

Lidar com os Golias!

"Battling Goliath’s on their terms, in their arena, against their strengths, is a mistake many businesses make. Replicating a business model is perfectly fine (many of the most successful companies in history have done it) but that doesn’t mean battling existing companies where they are strongest. 

Create new arenas, formulate new rules and make your strengths the ones that matter. 

If you are to compete in this ever-changing digital world, don’t be afraid to be bold. Believe, change the status quo, focus, be agile and finally, be precise. 

No matter how much money they have behind them, no business is invincible. 

Take heart David’s of the world, the sling is yours."

O trecho foi retirado de "David vs. Goliath: How Small Businesses Can Compete with Giants" e parece, todo ele, baseado num postal de 2009, "Golias estava invicto até ter encontrado o pequeno David (parte II)" ou noutro de 2012, "Adeptos e promotores da concorrência imperfeita!!!"

Uma visão para a Fase IV - calçado

Trabalhar no mundo do calçado é trabalhar num mundo de margens apertadas, quase sempre. Podemos não competir com os chineses, mas competimos com turcos e albaneses. (Recordar as 144h).

Neste postal, "Quantas empresas? (parte VII)", escrevo sobre aquilo a que chamo a Fase IV do calçado português:

Continuarão a existir empresas grandes, mas num país com esta dimensão, e com este nível de vida nunca serão muitas. No entanto, a grande massa que sobreviver ou nascer vai ficar mais pequena e terá de trabalhar para ter muito melhores margens.

Escrevo isto e estou, na minha mente, a ouvir o amigo Pedro a retorquir:

- O Carlos quer que a gente se reduza a um ateliê!!!???

Ontem, numa caminhada matinal em Lousada encontrei via Twitter esta peça de publicidade da Microsoft que serve para ilustrar o que aspiro como visão para a Fase IV. E sublinho COMO VISÃO!

"Successful companies do not wait for opportunity — they create it. Case in point: the French glove and protection manufacturer Racer.

Racer has carved a niche creating high-performance gloves for a discerning worldwide clientele of skiers, cyclists, motorbike riders and equestrians. Its team of 25, based in the southern French town of Salon de Provence, produces premium products that are second to none. 

...

Today, Racer’s challenge is to maintain its focus on high-end handmade products while also innovating to anticipate the needs of its customers. It has to diversify in a way that stays true to its brand values. In recent years, it has harnessed tech to do so.

...

Racer extended its product line with heating jackets and a sportswear range for urban mobility, with a new generation of very discreet, light and stylish helmets. [Moi ici: Isto é o que acontece quando deixamos de pensar em tubagens e passamos a concentrar-nos no desafio de mover fluidos, e mergulhamos no contexto de quem o faz, para lá daquilo que produzimos]

...

Recent developments include heated rehabilitation gloves and protective clothing for the elderly to prevent injuries caused by falls.

Racer has used an ecosystem of local partners on its latest innovations, from the regional workshops that provide the leather and material for their products to the University of Marseille, with which it works on rehabilitation and healthcare products. There is also a move towards reintroducing production in France and offering a repair option, where possible, instead of expecting customers to buy replacement gloves due to the effects of wear and tear."

Focar no que não fazer

"If the hallmark of a great strategy is its telling you what not to do, what not to worry about, which developments to disregard, many of today’s efforts fall short."

Trecho retirado de "Better, Simpler Strategy: A Value-Based Guide to Exceptional Performance" 

"We’re in a cultural war between the forces of dynamism and stasis"

"our tribal ancestors viewed entrepreneurs with suspicion. In their view, entrepreneurs were too willing to violate well-accepted social norms. They were too greedy, careless, and foolhardy, and too ready to reject their duty to their fellow men.

...

Over the last decade, McCloskey has explored the roots of the Industrial Revolution and the 16-fold increase in per capita wealth it produced—a magnificent result she calls the “Great Fact.” The magnitude of these gains, she notes, cannot be explained solely by the causes generally advanced—trade, capital accumulation, natural resources.

Rather, the Great Fact, she believes, was made possible by the greater social acceptance of the rising bourgeois commercial class, and how that acceptance was expressed in the changed language, rhetoric, and dialogue of the industrial era. Society shifted from a blanket condemnation of the entrepreneurial Scrooges of the world, as dramatic economic gains caused many to recognize the virtues of the entrepreneurs who produced those gains.

...

the slowly growing esteem accorded to entrepreneurs liberated mankind’s creative spirit, by raising the social esteem of the dynamic entrepreneurial virtues of hope, courage, love, and faith, to stand alongside the traditional, less dynamic virtues of prudence, temperance, and justice.

...

Entrepreneurs go beyond emulating competitors. They seek totally new ways of meeting some existing human need, and even visualizing “new” needs for which they then provide. 

...

Our challenge is to increase public recognition of the morality and virtuous nature of a dynamic economy and entrepreneurial culture. The entrepreneur flourishes when her culture comes to accept the mundane morality of the market as superior to the magnanimous morality of the tribe.

This acceptance need not be total. We need only to create the cultural legitimacy needed to liberate the entrepreneurial forces that drive innovation and growth. Over the last century, more and more people around the world have come to realize this, but the acceptance of entrepreneurial change remains slow and halting.

Entrenched vested interests are always reluctant to accept the pains of dislocation. They are skillful at emphasizing the destructive over the creative aspects of change, and are more powerful politically than tomorrow’s innovators.

These economic conservative forces are buttressed by intellectuals who favor change in principle but believe it is best achieved via centralized political planning, that magnanimous morality can be readily accommodated in a dynamic economy, and that society’s goal should be capitalism “with a human face.”

Intellectuals focus on the failures of markets to achieve utopian goals (prudence), the risks they introduce (temperance), and the pain caused to third parties (justice to the displaced workers). They emphasize fear rather than courage, resentment rather than love, timidity rather than faith, despair rather than hope. In other words, they are obsessed with clinging to a traditional world based on the older tribal values of justice, prudence, and temperance. These are values to be honored, for sure, but not to the exclusion of the values critical to the dynamism essential to create a better world tomorrow.

We’re in a cultural war between the forces of dynamism and stasis. Can it be won? Do today’s potential entrepreneurs have the courage to resist the forces of stagnation? Perhaps."

Trechos retirados de "We're In A Cultural War Between The Forces Of Economic Dynamism And Stasis"

Sem resultados pelos quais responder não há skin-in-the-game (parte II)

Na parte I, quando me referia a Schumpeter, era acerca disto: 

"Although these models [Moi ici: Teoria neoclássica] have yielded some illuminating insights, they ignore essential aspects of Schumpeterian competition-the fact that there are winners and losers and that the process is one of continuing disequilibrium. An evolutionary analysis seems required if the model is to recognize those facts.

In an evolutionary theory of the sort that we develop, the nature of the “economic problem" is fundamentally different from that depicted in contemporary orthodox theory. The latter views choice sets as known and given. The economic problem is to pick the best possible production and distribution, given that set of alternatives. The function of competition is to get- or help to get- the signals and incentives right. In evolutionary theory, choice sets are not given and the consequences of any choice are unknown. Although some choices may be clearly worse than others, there is no choice that is clearly best ex-ante. Given this assumption, one would expect to see a diversity of firm behavior in real situations. Firms facing the same market signals respond differently, and more so if the signals are relatively novel. Indeed, one would hope for such a diversity of responses in order that a range of possible behaviors might be explored. One function of competition, in the structural sense of many firms, then would be to make possible that diversity. Another function of competition, in this more active sense, is to reward and enhance the choices that prove good in practice and to suppress the bad ones. Over the long run, one hopes, the competitive system would promote firms that choose well on the average and would eliminate, or force reform upon, firms that consistently make mistakes.

In this view, the market system is (in part) a device for conducting and evaluating experiments in economic behavior and organization. The meaning and merit of competition must be appraised accordingly. … We should understand as "development," he wrote," only such changes in economic life as are not forced upon it from without but arise by its own initiative, from within" (p . 63). The key development process he identified as the "carrying out of new combinations," and in the competitive economy "new combinations mean the competitive elimination of the old" (pp. 66-67). It is the entrepreneur who carries out new combinations, who " 'leads' the means of production into new channels". and may thereby reap an entrepreneurial profit. "He also leads in the sense that he draws other producers in his branch after him. But as they are his competitors, who first reduce and then annihilate his profit, this is, as it were, leadership against one's own will""

Quando a AT ou a classe política olha para as empresas esquece esta volatilidade, esquece esta volubilidade.

Trechos retirados de "An evolutionary theory of economic change" de Richard R. Nelson.

Sem resultados pelos quais responder não há skin-in-the-game

Em 2016, "Mambo jambo de consultor ou faz algum sentido?".

Há dias, "Então, o negócio deixava de ser tubagens...".

Agora:

Como não recordar tantos postais de há mais de 10 anos. Por exemplo, uma série de clássicos deste blogue são os planos de combate à SIDA, ou de combate à violência doméstica, carregados de actividades mas sem um único compromisso quanto a um resultado.

Recordar os monumentos à treta:

• "
  Balanced Scorecard: Mais um monumento à treta - parte II
  " (Apreciar no comentário a citação de Irene Ng no seu blogue sobre o mesmo tópico) (2007)
• "
  Como nascem os monumentos à treta
  " (2011)
• "
  mais uma vez: a propósito de monumentos à treta
  " (2008)
• "
  Metas, boas metas vs más metas
  " (2006)

A Autoridade Nacional de Emergência e Protecção Civil nunca tem o pescoço no cepo. Não existe para produzir resultados, existe para agir (planear, coordenar e executar). Quando questiono os organismos públicos sobre isto, invariavelmente respondem:

- Mas nós não controlamos os resultados, os resultados dependem de tanta coisa que está para lá de nós!

Quanto tenho mais confiança respondo:

- E as empresas, controlam os clientes? Por que têm objectivos de vendas?

Sem resultados pelos quais responder não há skin-in-the-game. 

Isto põe-me a pensar em Schumpeter e em Deirdre McCloskey ...

Divagações

Ontem dei uma vista de olhos a "“Futureproof: 9 rules for humans in the age of automation" de Kevin Roose. Às tantas dou comigo a germinar mais uma teoria da conspiração. O autor reporta que em 2018 foi encarregado pela sua entidade patronal para relatar o encontro de Davos de 2018 sobre o tema "Globalization 4.0".

"My bosses at the Times had invited me to cover that year’s forum, which was focused on “Globalization 4.0”—the essentially meaningless term Davos types had concocted for the emerging economic era defined by this new, transformative wave of AI and automation technology. Every day, I went to panels with titles like “Shaping a New Market Architecture” and “The Factory of the Future,” where powerful executives vowed to build “human-centered AI” that would be great for companies and workers alike.

But at night, after their public events were over, the Davos attendees took off their humanitarian masks and got down to business. At lavish, off-the-record dinners and cocktail parties, I watched them grill tech experts about how AI could help transform their companies into sleek, automated profit machines. They gossiped about which automation products their competitors were using. They struck deals with consultants for “digital transformation” projects, which they hoped would save them millions of dollars by shrinking their reliance on human workers."

...

"The pandemic gave companies the cover they needed to make huge, unprecedented strides in automation without risking a backlash. So they automated, and automated, and automated some more."

...

"In all, Covid-19 seemed to speed up the automation timeline by years, if not decades. McKinsey, the giant consulting firm, dubbed it “the great acceleration.” Microsoft CEO Satya Nadella claimed that the company had experienced “two years’ worth of digital transformation in two months.” In March 2020, a survey by the accounting firm EY found that 41 percent of corporate executives were investing more in automation to prepare for a post-coronavirus world. David Autor, an MIT economist and leading automation expert, called the pandemic an “automation-forcing event,” and predicted that it would usher in technological trends that would persist long after the virus was gone.

The pandemic has shown us some of the benefits of automation more clearly than any Davos panel could have. Robots and AI allowed companies to keep providing essential goods and services, even as more workers called in sick."

Até que ponto é possível?

"Innovators rarely have a competition problem. The challenge isn’t that your market is buying from an alternative provider–the challenge is that they’re buying from no one.

The work we do and the stories we tell when we seek to create activation are dramatically different from the mindset of competition, and yet the lessons from our culture (sports, mass merchants, politics) are all about competition.

“We’re better than them,” is a competition slogan.

That’s very different from, “things could be better,” or “you’re missing this new thing,” or, “people you admire are already using this.”

If you want to grow, you’ll need to get someone to not only decide that you’re worth their time and money, you’ll need to motivate them to act now instead of later." 

Agora é juntar este postal acerca do futuro do calçado, "Calçado - Fazer a transição", ou este outro, "Quantas empresas (parte XI)", e recordar as palavras de Wickham Skinner em Maio de 1974 acerca da "empresa focada". Até que ponto é possível aspirar a ter sucesso e comportar-se como um dinossauro vermelho?

Trecho retirado de "Competition vs. activation" 

"trying to beat them at their own game is almost foolish"

"[um David] has only three partners. “We personally spend 98% of our time working with clients,” explains one of them, Yvonne Rumler. Florian Hechl chips in: “The projects we worked on were never shorter than nine months” This means that they work alongside senior executives, who become their sounding board.

The Big Three work quite differently. They deliver a solution rather than working it out together with the client. Mind you, these solutions are often excellent and delivered in record speed, but not all executives want this. Seeking out clients who want to be in charge of the whole process can be a winning strategy for small but highly experienced consulting teams. Partners at large firms are preoccupied with acquiring new projects and client engagement. They simply don’t have the time to be always on-site. “We spend as much time with our clients as more junior consultants in large consultancies” Hechl points out. This way transferring skills becomes part of the deal.

And remember, you are small

McKinsey, BCG, and Bain are great at what they do so trying to beat them at their own game is almost foolish. Success will come through positions that are deliberately distinct. Having said that, using them as a motivator in a David versus Goliath game does work! The adrenaline rush that comes with beating them at a pitch is pretty motivating I am told."

Trecho retirado de "How Boutique Consulting Firms Can Outflank McKinsey, BCG, And Bain" 

Então, o negócio deixava de ser tubagens...

Esta semana, ao passar junto ao estádio da bola em Cesar, vi um atrelado de camião com a seguinte mensagem "[Marca] - SOLUÇÕES INOVADORAS EM TUBAGENS".

Fiquei logo a pensar na frase e em algo que não bate certo...

Foi então que me lembrei da G - "Privilegiar os inputs sobre os outputs (parte IX)". Aquele slogan concentrado em tubagens tem tudo para focar e fixar as pessoas da empresa ao output, ao século XX.

Soluções inovadoras em tubagens deve dar origem a uma gama medonha de tubagens, num negócio que compete pelo preço ... stuck-in-the-middle, com margens de meter medo de tão apertadas ... talvez um dinossauro vermelho...

Especulo. E se em vez de tubagens, (output), pensassem em input. Os clientes usam as tubagens para quê?

Movimentar fluidos! O que é preciso para movimentar fluidos? O que pode correr mal na movimentação de fluidos? Que oportunidades de criar valor para os clientes existem, podem ser desenvolvidas, em torno da movimentação de fluidos?

Então, o negócio deixava de ser tubagens, ou deixava de afunilar em tubagens e começava a abrir em complementos com muito mais potencial para a criação de valor. 

Tudo é serviço, até os produtos são um avatar de serviço.

Todos os dias, anonimamente, a culpa morre solteira

"O Tribunal de Y absolveu a [empresa X], e cinco funcionários com cargos de chefia que respondiam por um crime de violação de regras de segurança, agravado pelo resultado, a morte de um trabalhador.

[Um de nós] morreu a 6 de abril de 2016, ao cair de uma altura de quatro metros, juntamente com um varandim móvel concebido para serem feitos trabalhos de soldadura e inspeção em vigas metálicas para a obra do TGV de Marrocos.

A vítima, que usava o varandim pela primeira vez, não recebeu formação e executou os trabalhos sem estar preso por um cinto de segurança ou um arnês. O varandim desprendeu-se e caiu, com o trabalhador, no pavimento da fábrica. O Ministério Público entendia que o varandim estava “indevidamente instalado e insuficientemente estabilizado“, através do uso de meros grampos que “não foram suficientes para manter o varandim fixado à viga metálica”.

O tribunal não deu como provada a razão pela qual o varandim caiu. O juiz presidente, João Pedro  Cardoso, apontou mesmo fragilidades no relatório da Autoridade para as Condições de Trabalho. Também não ficou provado que os arguidos soubessem em que condições o trabalhador executava a tarefa."

E a vida continua...

É das coisas que mais me arrepia nas notícias, ouvir que alguém saiu de casa para trabalhar e morreu a trabalhar por causa de um acidente de segurança. Ainda esta semana comentava em duas empresas diferentes que muita gente não gosta de usar os equipamentos de protecção individual, desde os pescadores que acham o colete salva-vidas como algo para maricas, até aos trabalhadores das obras que dizem que está muito calor para usar um colete reflector ou um capacete de segurança. Ainda esta semana comentei a reunião que tive numa empresa há cerca de 15 anos. Dono da empresa, economista, sem parte dos dedos de uma mão, por acidente de trabalho. Funcionário da empresa da parte da contabilidade sem metade de um braço, por acidente de trabalho. Fornecedor de máquinas, dono da empresa, também sem alguns dedos de uma mão. O único com os dedos todos era eu... isto é cultural.

No entanto, ainda mais grave são as situações sublinhadas a amarelo lá em cima... e o tribunal acha que não se passou nada.

Isto não faz parangonas de jornais, mas mostra tanto do que somos como comunidade falhada. A prioridade é sermos os primeiros a apresentar planos de pedinchice em Bruxelas.

Trecho retirado do JN de hoje. 

ADENDA (08h45) - A empresa em causa tinha um sistema de gestão na área da segurança certificado ... como é que a entidade certificadora terá tratado o assunto?

 

Acerca da coragem

Lembrei-me deste esquema...

Onde é que cada PME aposta os seus escassos recursos?

Quantas têm a coragem de dizer não! Quantas têm a coragem da disciplina?

Quantas alinham gastos com estratégia? Estratégia? Existe? É conhecida? Há consciência dela?

"The pandemic sharply accelerated market fragmentation"

Um texto que parece retirado deste blogue:

"Markets change, and business models have to change in parallel. Success depends on constant business model innovation. In order to succeed, you need to get two things right: You have to target a defensible market segment, and you have to create a business model that enables you to win against competitors who are going after your target segment. In developing a high-profit business model to engage your target customers, you have two basic choices: (1) increase your customer value, or (2) lower your cost to serve (or do both).

...

In order for your company to succeed in the post-pandemic era, you must do two things well: Select your strategy carefully to target a defensible market segment and tailor your business model to capture and dominate your target market.

The problem is, most companies aren’t ready to compete on these new terms. The pandemic sharply accelerated market fragmentation. This allowed the digital giants, fueled by their market micro-segmentation, to grow quickly, but most companies have not changed their business model to meet these new conditions. Many managers who rose through the ranks in the previous era simply assumed that their age-old, tried-and-true, broad-market business models were still effective. Financial analysts continued to evaluate companies based on sales growth and expense minimization, reinforcing the problem.

In developing a high-profit business model to engage your target customers, you have two basic choices: (1) increase your customer value, or (2) lower your cost to serve (or do both). This is complicated by the need to transition from the previous broad market targeting to the new segment-specific targeting."

Trechos retirados de "How to Create a Winning Post-Pandemic Business Model" 

"raising their willingness to pay (WTP)"

"Creates value for customers by raising their willingness to pay (WTP)."

Isto é voltar a uma imagem de 2011 sobre o vocabulário do valor, desenhada junto ao Rio Rabaçal. O modelo de Kano diz-nos que a novidade de ontem é o aborrecido de amanhã.

Aumentar a WTP é aumentar o valor bruto originado.

Aumentar a WTP deve gerar um aumento do preço, mas não é um aumento do preço. O aumento do preço é uma consequência. Só assim os números de Marn e Rosiello fazem sentido, senão a concorrência agradece.

"If companies find ways to innovate or to improve existing products, people will be willing to pay more. ... In casual conversations, we often use WTP and price interchangeably. But it is helpful to distinguish between the two. WTP is the most a customer would ever be willing to pay. Think of it as the customer’s walk-away point: Charge one cent more than someone’s WTP, and that person is better off not buying.

Too often, managers focus on top-line growth rather than on increasing willingness to pay. A growth-focused manager asks, “What will help me sell more?” A person concerned with WTP wants to make her customers clap and cheer. A sales-centric manager analyzes purchase decisions and hopes to sway customers, whereas a value-focused manager searches for ways to increase WTP at every stage of the customer’s journey, earning the customer’s trust and loyalty. A value-focused company convinces its customers in every interaction that it has their best interests at heart."

Trechos retirados de "Eliminate Strategic Overload".

"Lost in translation"

"A strategic initiative is worthwhile only if it does one or more of the following: creates value for customers by raising their willingness to pay, creates value for employees by making work more attractive, or creates value for suppliers by reducing their operating cost.

...

I believe that strategic management faces an attractive, back-to-basics opportunity. By simplifying strategy—by selecting fewer initiatives with greater impact—we can make it more powerful. In this article, I describe an easy-to-use framework called value-based strategy, which gives executives a common language for evaluating strategic initiatives and developing a holistic view of the many activities taking place within their organizations."

Estratégia ...

Valor (clientes-alvo)

Iniciativas (projectos de transformação) ...

Tudo coisas que escasseiam nas PMEs... e são tão preciosas e necessárias. 

Sexta-feira passada dei uma formação via internet (um estónio, uma alemã, um irlandês, e um senegalês). Por duas ou três vezes ... usávamos as mesmas palavras, mas queríamos dizer coisas diferentes. 

Como falar em estratégia, valor e iniciativas com PMEs e elas perceberem: cancro, preço e concorrentes, e lista de tarefas.

Trechos retirados de "Eliminate Strategic Overload". Um artigo com muito que se lhe diga, mas para já apenas esta preocupação.

Going deep?

Uma sugestão para quem tem de apostar no digital 

"Sellers can employ several strategies to take advantage of platforms while minimizing the risk of commoditization. They can develop and invest in direct channels while using platforms as showrooms to bring in new customers. They can either go deep on a platform, with highly specialized offerings, or go broad, with many different offerings that leverage expertise in specific platform features. And they can wage public relations and lobbying campaigns to take advantage of increased regulatory scrutiny of platforms.

...

Go Deep or Go Broad

Doing business on MSPs forces sellers to choose one of two means of building competitive advantage and withstanding the threat of commoditization: They can go deep, by offering a highly specific product or service and leveraging MSPs’ economies of scale, or they can go broad, by offering many different products or services and leveraging economies of scope.

Going deep.

Specializing in a product or service is generally a good strategy for achieving competitive advantage—and it’s even more important for sellers operating on MSPs. Digital platforms usually make it easy for consumers to compare many offerings and find their ideal product. And by breaking down geographic barriers and accumulating very large user bases, they greatly increase a seller’s reach. Taken together, those qualities mean that becoming the highest-quality or lowest-cost provider in a narrowly defined product or service category is significantly more valuable for sellers who conduct business on MSPs.

Deep specialization on an MSP can create a self-reinforcing cycle. The more a product aligns with what consumers are searching for, the higher its ratings will be, increasing the chances that the platform’s algorithms will drive target customers to it. That means more people will buy and rate the product, further heightening its advantage. Thus, highly specialized sellers can build a sustainable competitive advantage over time.

...

Deep specialization is the best strategy for small “native” sellers—ones that started out on an MSP. In fact, one of the most important ways in which the platforms create value is by generating unprecedented opportunities for niche products or services to succeed.

Going deep is also likely to be the best option for sellers (small or large) with established businesses outside the MSP in question. Because they already have a successful offering, they can more easily adapt it to the MSP than build expertise around specific MSP features that they could leverage horizontally—an area where “non-native” sellers have no comparative advantage. Still, they should recognize that succeeding on an MSP may require much more specialization than they needed on their own."

Trechos retirados de "Don’t Let Platforms Commoditize Your Business"

"Always Day 1"

"Amazon’s Jeff Bezos, who has upped the frequency and speed of change for so many other companies, understands that success is never permanent. His famous “Day 1” mantra (also the name of the building that houses his office) reflects a daily fight against complacency. As he wrote in his first annual report in 1997, “Day 2 is stasis. Followed by irrelevance. Followed by excruciating, painful decline. Followed by death. And that is why it is always Day 1."

Tantas empresas a precisarem desta mentalidade, deste desassossego, desta sede... de rever o que se faz, de mudar o que se faz, de não cristalizar.

Trecho retirado de “Rethinking Competitive Advantage” de Ram Charan. 

Outra epifania!

Ontem a meio da minha habitual caminhada de 6 km antes das 8h da manhã a certa altura tive uma epifania. 

Nos primeiros anos deste século dei comigo a trabalhar com PMEs e a aprendermos como fazer face à concorrência chinesa. Agora, voltamos ao mesmo desafio, só que já não tem nada a ver com chineses... tem a ver com a internet e os seus gigantes digitais.

Se dantes era: como fazer o by-pass à China?

Agora será: como fazer o by-pass aos gigantes digitais?

Há 20 anos o desafio passou por encolher, subir na escala de valor e trabalhar para certo tipo de clientes-alvo. O novo desafio passará por voltar a apostar nesses três vectores.

Esta manhã li no JN a notícia da falência da Coelima. Fez-me recuar a isto em 2011 "A política misturada com os negócios". Em dez anos, aquela que chegou a ser a maior empresa têxtil do mundo (quando nós eramos a china, antes de haver China), encolheu para 250 trabalhadores.

"think carefully when choosing measures and link them to the strategy"

"In summary, our main conclusions are threefold. First, when external environments become more uncertain, managers have a tendency to add non-financial performance measures. However, as more variety does not add value per se, managers should think carefully when choosing measures and link them to the strategy that the firm wants to pursue. Second, more uncertain environments make managers add customer-related measures, customers being a critical stakeholder group. This can only be expected to increase given the rising economic turbulence in the wake of the current COVID-19 crisis. In doing so, it is important that managers draw on current research and practice within customer relationship management and customer profitability management and link these measures to strategy and tactics. Third, there seems to be a lesser focus on risk and CSR measures in service-sector firms than in non-service-sector firms in Iceland."

Trecho retirado de "Is more really better? Performance measure variety and environmental uncertainty"